



Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation”, the Security Council adopted resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 2 February 2021 (see annex).



Annex

Letter dated 2 February 2021 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith a document submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the document to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rafael Mariano **Grossi**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution **2231 (2015)***

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in relation to its enrichment-related activities. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports.¹

Activities Related to Enrichment

2. As previously reported, on 4 January 2021, Iran started the production of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in Unit 2 using six cascades configured as three sets of two interconnected cascades containing a total of 1044 of IR-1 centrifuges.²

3. On 28 January 2021, the Agency received from Iran an updated design information questionnaire (DIQ) for FFEP. According to the updated DIQ, Iran plans to use eight cascades of IR-1 and/or IR-6 centrifuges to enrich uranium in Unit 2 at FFEP.³ The DIQ indicates that these cascades may be operated in any one of the following three modes:

- a. Eight cascades of IR-1 and/or IR-6 centrifuges enriching UF₆ up to 5% U-235.
 - b. Four sets of two interconnected cascades of IR-1 centrifuges enriching UF₆ up to 20% U-235.
 - c. Two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges enriching UF₆ up to 5% U-235 and feeding one or more of the interconnected cascades to enrich UF₆ up to 20% U-235.
4. In a letter dated 1 February 2021, Iran informed the Agency that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges would be installed in Unit 2 at FFEP. These two IR-6 cascades will be fed with natural UF₆ to produce UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 to directly feed the cascades enriching up to 20% U-235, i.e. to be operated in mode (c) above.

5. The updated DIQ also indicated that a second feed station will be installed at FFEP for operational mode (c).

* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/INF/2021/9.

¹ GOV/2020/51, GOV/INF/2020/16, GOV/INF/2020/17, GOV/INF/2021/1, GOV/INF/2021/2, GOV/INF/2021/3 and GOV/INF/2021/8.

² GOV/INF/2021/2, para. 5.

³ JCPOA, 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', Section H.