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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 16 August 2021 (see annex).





Annex

Letter dated 16 August 2021 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith a document submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the document to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rafael Mariano Grossi

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on activities related to fuel manufacturing for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using indigenously-produced uranium enriched up to 20% U-235. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports.¹

Activities related to production of uranium metal for TRR fuel

2. As previously reported,² on 23 June 2021, Iran informed the Agency that it intended to transfer UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 from Natanz to the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan for the purpose of producing fuel assemblies³ for the TRR. On 28 June 2021, Iran informed the Agency about a four-step process by which it intended to produce new TRR fuel, which included the use of uranium metal enriched up to 20% U-235.⁴ On 6 July 2021, Iran informed the Agency that the UO₂ enriched up to 20% U-235 that had been produced in step two of the four-step process would be transferred to the research and development (R&D) laboratory of FPFP, where it would be converted to UF₄ and then to uranium metal (in step three of the four-step process).^{5,6}

3. On 14 August 2021, the Agency verified at the R&D laboratory at FPFP that Iran had used 257 g of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 in the form of UF₄ to produce 200 g of uranium metal enriched up to 20% U-235.

^{*} Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/INF/2021/39.

¹ GOV/2021/28, GOV/INF/2021/32 and GOV/INF/2021/36.

² GOV/INF/2021/36, para. 4.

³ A standard fuel assembly comprises 19 fuel plates and a control fuel assembly comprises 14 fuel plates.

⁴ GOV/INF/2021/36, para. 5.

⁵ GOV/INF/2021/36, para. 9.

⁶ JCPOA, 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', paras 24 and 26.