Security Council

Letter dated 30 December 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations established pursuant to a decision of the Security Council contained in a statement by its President (S/PRST/2001/3) at its 4270th meeting. The report contains an account of the activities of the Working Group from 29 June to 31 December 2011.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Chair
Security Council Working Group
on Peacekeeping Operations

Report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations was established pursuant to a decision of the Security Council contained in a statement by its President (S/PRST/2001/3) at its 4270th meeting. In the statement, the Council reiterated its agreement to hold consultations with troop-contributing countries in a timely manner at different stages of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

2. In fulfilment of its mandate, the Working Group held five meetings between the months of June and December 2011. The present report highlights the structure and substance of the meetings, including the exchange of views and recommendations of the Chair of the Working Group.

II. Meetings

A. Meeting held in June with delegations from troop-contributing countries

3. On 29 June, the Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations met with a cross section of troop-contributing countries.

4. At the meeting, the following thematic issues proposed by troop-contributing countries for inclusion in the July to December 2011 calendar of the Working Group were considered and agreed upon:

- Challenges faced by the United Nations in the procurement of helicopters for peacekeeping missions
- Enhancement of triangular cooperation between troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat and the Security Council
- Welfare and safety of troops
- Capacity gaps in the context of clear and achievable mandates

B. First substantive meeting

5. The Working Group held its first substantive meeting on 24 August 2011 with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat was represented by United Nations Military Adviser General Babacar Gaye, and the Director of Africa II Division in the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Raisedon Zenenga, who briefed delegates on the concept of inter-mission cooperation with lessons learned from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

6. The briefings focused on the historical rationale of inter-mission cooperation in West Africa, and its implementation in the United Nations Mission in Sierra

Leone in 1999, UNMIL in 2003 and UNOCI in 2004, 2006 and 2010. The successes achieved and the challenges faced by those missions during the implementation were also examined.

7.   Specifically, the following issues were covered:

(a)   How securing the consent of concerned troop-contributing countries, among other challenges, contributed to the delay in the redeployment of troops and assets from UNMIL for the implementation of inter-mission cooperation in Abidjan, and that the utility of the inter-mission cooperation mechanism was diminished by the fact that the security situation in Abidjan had stabilized somewhat at the time that the UNMIL unit had arrived;

(b)   How the temporary transfer of troops and aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI in 2010 was carried out as part of the contingency planning for the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire;

(c)   How armed helicopters were used to enhance inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL;

(d)   Assessment of the success in the temporary redeployment of three Pakistani infantry companies to the western part of Côte d'Ivoire following the redeployment of UNOCI troops to Abidjan to protect the Golf Hotel;

(e)   Utility of temporarily redeploying existing United Nations forces in situations of sudden crisis vis-à-vis standard force generation;

(f)   Need to make provisions for inter-mission cooperation in the mandates of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

(g)   Need for redeployments as part of inter-mission cooperation to include enabling forces such as engineers and logistics and transport units, and not to be limited to infantry, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft;

(h)   Proposed revision of the standard operating procedure by the Office of Military Affairs, drawing on experiences from UNOCI and input from troop-contributing countries;

(i)   How the potential areas for future inter-mission cooperation arrangements should include contingency planning ahead of the national elections in Liberia and the development of subregional strategies to address the threat of the cross-border movements of armed groups and illicit trafficking in drugs and persons.

8.   The following were identified as some of the lessons learned from the UNMIL/UNOCI redeployment:

(a)   The 2006 post-election crises in Côte d'Ivoire proved inter-mission cooperation to be of value but should be used only as a quick crisis-management tool and not as a substitute for the deployment of additional troops when required;

(b)   Inter-mission cooperation should not be used to strengthen one mission at the expense of another at critical stages of mandate-implementation;

(c)   Advance planning, coordination and communication with concerned stakeholders is critical to the success of inter-mission cooperation since it usually

takes time to obtain consent from concerned troop-contributing countries before effecting a redeployment;

(d) New approaches are required to tackle logistical issues. For example, the above-mentioned three Pakistani infantry companies were deployed from UNMIL to UNOCI under full sustainment arrangements, while UNOCI had no arrangements for the transferred companies; the United Nations will, therefore need to take steps to ensure that surge equipment, supplies and services such as tents, ablutions, catering services and medical access are readily accessible in order to provide the necessary support to uniformed personnel deploying under those conditions.

9.   Finally, the Secretariat advised that inter-mission cooperation should not be limited only to the sharing of military police, personnel and assets. More formal and structured practices of information-sharing needed to be developed with a view to enabling the better understanding of regional dynamics and to fostering a more active approach to sharing experiences and lessons learned.

Exchange of views between the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

10.   Delegations raised concerns about logistical challenges, which hampered the timely deployment of additional capacities.

11.   Delegations also underscored the need to engage inter-mission cooperation arrangements in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Great Lakes region. The Secretariat, however, reasoned that in the light of mechanisms already in place, using inter-mission cooperation in the fight against LRA at the present stage would be counterproductive.

12.   The need to involve troop-contributing countries/police-contributing countries in the planning and mandate-adjustment stages of missions was also stressed. Delegations recommended that periodic rehearsals be carried out to allow troops to familiarize themselves with the workings of inter-mission cooperation. To that end, the Secretariat reminded delegations of the Office of the Military Adviser's project entitled "Infantry Battalion 1", which would provide all battalions with standard skills sets and as such would facilitate the timely transfer of capacities between missions.

13.   Concerns were also raised about a possible negative repercussion of inter-mission cooperation resulting from the gap occasioned in the redeploying location. The Secretariat was, therefore, encouraged to revise the 2007 standard operating procedure on inter-mission cooperation accordingly, bearing in mind the possibility of a void being capitalized upon by spoilers. It was suggested that a "sustained and informed" reserve force be provided to anticipate any trouble in the country of origin of troop deployment.

14.   Delegations from troop-contributing countries also cautioned against the blanket use of inter-mission cooperation across missions, and requested a progressive approach recommending that troop-contributing countries and the host country be consulted and that sufficient logistical preparations be made ahead of a transfer of assets and personnel. While acknowledging the need for a progressive approach, the Secretariat stressed that lessons could only be drawn from experiences

and that the more inter-mission cooperation arrangements were implemented, the better the room for adjustments.

15.   Delegations also highlighted a number of bottlenecks and legal constraints related to inter-mission cooperations, including the need to seek congressional authorization from countries contributing troops before such transfers took place. Accordingly, it was stated that inter-mission cooperations were not a panacea and should be used as a stop-gap measure as opposed to a substitute for filling capability gaps. Responding, the Secretariat acknowledged that the implementation of a number of inter-mission cooperation activities was constrained by several legal, managerial, budgetary, political and operational considerations. The Secretariat drew the attention of the Working Group to paragraph 77 of the 2005 report, which provided a number of useful recommendations in that regard.

16.   The view of the Secretariat regarding inter-mission cooperations was also sought in the context of traditional operations, including hybrid missions. The Secretariat stated that it had considered the transfer of helicopters from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), but decided against the use of inter-mission cooperation at the time, given the risky situation in Darfur. It noted that discussions were being held regarding the possibility of employing inter-mission cooperation arrangements as part of the contingency planning for the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, it was noted that before opting for inter-mission cooperation, an analysis to evaluate the risks and opportunities was needed.

C.   Second substantive meeting

17.   The Working Group held its second substantive meeting on 2 November with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat, represented by Deputy Police Adviser, Shoaib Dastgir, briefed delegates on capacity gaps and capacity development of the host country's police force, with lessons learned from the support of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to the Haitian National Police.

18.   At the briefing, a chronology was presented of events associated with the National police since 2004 and the thrust of MINUSTAH's support, including the reform process of the national police and the development of its four-year strategic plan.

19.   The Secretariat stated that, before the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, MINUSTAH had implemented a "train-the-trainers" concept, establishing a police academy and developing a training curriculum that helped it to increase the strength of the national police from 2,500 to 9,000 officers, out of which 6,500 were vetted, recruited and certified. Visibility of the national police was also increased, which led to the restoration of public trust and confidence.

20.   Despite the earthquake, which damaged 45 per cent of the police facilities, MINUSTAH relief operations ensured that 80 per cent of the national police resumed its tasks within two weeks. The police academy was re-established and provided special training for public order and forensics. Training was thereafter handed over to the national police, whose operations supported the safety of

internally displaced persons, as well as security, mentoring, anti-kidnapping and anti-sexual and gender-based violence units.

21. The gaps identified included oversight mechanisms, public trust and confidence, infrastructure, recruitment, training and the administration of the national police (finance, procurement, logistics and human resources procedures). The challenges to bridging the gaps were also identified, such as political buy-in, equipment deficits, budget constraints, gender imbalance and insufficient adherence to the principles of democratic policing, such as political neutrality and accountability to an independent oversight entity.

22. With regard to lessons learned, the Secretariat advocated the need to secure a consensus before developing a road map. In that regard, it stressed that the involvement of the local population, civil society and other stakeholders was crucial to the success of a road map.

23. The lessons associated with developing a strategic plan included an emphasis on gender during recruitment, a focus on the development of middle and senior management and the development of cross-cutting support mechanisms. The lessons learned also included placing priorities on building institutions by strengthening oversight mechanisms, planning and policy development. The Secretariat called for the host Government's coordinated approach in that regard and the establishment and maintenance of partnerships with stakeholders, including donors.

24. Finally, the Secretariat proposed a way forward that would require a concerted focus in the following areas:

- Political support for the five-year national police development plan (2012-2016)

- Developing indicators for the sustainability of the national police

- Incremental capacity development

- Institution-building

- Community orientation

- Transition of the national police to greater self-reliance and institutional sustainability, including in terms of learning and organization

Exchange of views between the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

25. Delegations acknowledged that United Nations policing continued to evolve. However, an inquiry was made as to how the lessons learned from Haiti could be applied across other United Nations missions. In that regard, it was suggested that a process be institutionalized for collating the experiences of experts from past missions when planning future missions.

26. The Secretariat stated that peacekeeping missions are context-specific and, as such, that lessons learned could not be applied generally, adding that one of the lessons learned was to refrain from prescriptions. The Secretariat observed, however, that trainings had been historically carried out to fill voids in capacities without any training dedicated to leadership development. The Secretariat equally noted that the capability of the United Nations police is directly linked to the level of expertise that Member States were willing to provide.

27.   Bearing in mind that the Security Council noted the importance of the national police meeting specific benchmarks for reform, a progress report on how MINUSTAH has assisted the national police in attaining the benchmark was requested.

28.   Delegations noted that the integrated nature of a peacekeeping operation may be affected by issues relating to political ownership, and they sought the Secretariat's opinion on how a mission's leadership could handle such issues.

29.   Delegations also expressed concerns over transnational and organized crime in view of the drawdown of the MINUSTAH formed police unit capacity following its mandate renewal. They recommended that the United Nations police should also focus on training coastguards, a process for which some Member States were willing to provide the resources.

30.   Troop-contributing countries underlined their concerns on gaps occasioned by a decline in public trust and confidence. Acknowledging that such gaps were largely determined by political factors, they recommended that more be done to engage the Haitian authorities in that regard.

31.   With regard to providing police personnel with the requisite skills and specializations across missions, troop-contributing countries requested that the Secretariat provide its assessment on whether a force description would be required. The Secretariat stated that the first step was to have sufficient United Nations police specialists, adding that such a measure would require bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

32.   Commenting on the reform benchmarks, the Secretariat stated that the United Nations police would, in the period of its second implementation plan, build substantially on the progress made during the first implementation plan. It was further stated that the effect of the drawdown on policing activities was negligible since the initial surge had been necessitated by the earthquake. While underscoring Haiti's large coastline, which makes it susceptible to transnational organized crime such as drug trafficking, the Secretariat noted that some boats had been donated by Member States but that not enough assistance was on ground to combat the menace.

33.   The Secretariat noted that political ownership and coordination were required to usher in a sustained criminal justice system. While the national police needed to be professional, the host Government should be politically neutral, since a democratic police force can only be a product of a democratic government.

34.   In view of the facts presented by the Secretariat regarding a foreseeable change in the role of the United Nations police in Haiti, Council members also asked if different capabilities were anticipated. Views were expressed on the need to build a consensus on the kind of structure required to develop the national police as well as the need to seek capabilities from countries with similar cultures to that of Haiti.

35.   Troop-contributing countries observed that there was little or no cooperation between the national police and the United Nations police in the northern part of Haiti. They expressed concerns on how such a challenge could affect the sustainability of the national police post-MINUSTAH. Responding, the Secretariat stated that the concentration of the United Nations police in other areas, especially Port-au-Prince, was requested by the host Government and was a result of the higher rate of criminal activities and the higher population of people living in the area. It

was stated, however, that most of the police to be recruited would be deployed in the peripheral areas.

36. Speaking on behalf of Haiti, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations commended the United Nations for all the support it had given the country. He stressed the importance of deploying personnel who could communicate in the local language.

D. Meeting held in November with delegations from troop-contributing countries

37. On 30 November, the Chair of the Working Group held a second meeting with a cross section of troop-contributing countries. The purpose of the meeting was to elicit comments from troop-contributing countries on the agenda of the next substantive meeting of the Working Group. The perspectives of the troop-contributing countries would thus inform the briefing at the next Working Group meeting.

38. Troop-contributing countries raised the following points:

- That the Secretariat continues to give five to six days' advance notice of meetings with troop-contributing countries, despite the recommendations contained in document S/PRST/2001/3

- That technical assessment missions conducted in respect of UNMIL and MINUSTAH by the Secretariat were carried out without the troop-contributing countries being informed of the rationale for the assessment but merely notified on the findings

- That troop-contributing countries are not adequately involved during the planning stages of a mission, especially when a drawdown is anticipated; similarly, that the criteria used by the Secretariat to determine the retention of formed police units following a drawdown are not clear to troop-contributing countries

E. Third substantive meeting

39. On 12 December, the Working Group held its third and final substantive meeting for 2011 with the participation of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The Secretariat was represented by the following members of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: the Team Leader of the West Africa Integrated Operational Team at the Office of Operations, Nannette Ahmed; the Chief of Police Selection and Recruitment Section, Police Division, Ata Yenigun; and the Chief of Staff with the Office of Military Affairs, General Jean Baillaud.

40. At the briefing, the triangular relationship was appraised between the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, as were the consultations with the troop-contributing countries in 2011. Using case studies from MONUSCO, UNOCI, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNMIL, MINUSTAH and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the relationship was also examined at the crucial stages in a mission's life cycle and during other developments in the field.

41. The Secretariat highlighted initiatives taken to strengthen the triangular relationship, including with regard to the timely issuance of reports and systematic consultations linked to assessment missions and mandate renewals.

42. While stating that the triangular partnership aims at improving oversight and enhancing awareness among key stakeholders, the Secretariat emphasized that the partnership encompassed a wider scope as it also involved the General Assembly and other stakeholders, including the Peacebuilding Commission. The partnership also extended to Member States in order to ensure that peacekeeping missions receive the necessary political, operational and material support needed to implement their mandates.

43. The Secretariat also elaborated on its renewed efforts, in line with the recommendations of the "new horizon" process, aimed at strengthening dialogue with troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. The efforts include an increase in the briefings and information flow between the Office of Military Affairs, the Police Division and the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries when there are significant events or developments related to the missions, especially when there is a direct impact on the personnel deployed.

44. The Secretariat outlined the steps taken to enhance information-sharing and consultation, such as briefings on key developments provided to interested troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries every week by the Situation Centre, a factual weekly briefing note to the Security Council prepared by the Office of Operations, the Integrated Operational Team's informal consultations with Security Council members at the working level aimed at maintaining contact outside the usual briefing schedule and the briefings held before and after technical assessment missions.

45. The Secretariat noted, however, the need to enhance consultations ahead of assessment missions and to improve the analytical focus of reports of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

46. The Secretariat also pointed to the positive experiences with regard to inter-mission cooperation arrangements. Giving the example of UNMIL and UNOCI in 2011, the Secretariat recommended that inter-mission cooperation arrangements be explored further in the future.

47. Finally, the Secretariat underscored the increased need to take account of financial considerations during mandate discussions in order to avoid situations where peacekeeping mandates are received without the required financial resources to implement them.

Exchange of views between Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and Council members

48. Troop-contributing countries acknowledged that there had been an improvement in the triangular relationship, and in that regard welcomed the integrated nature of the briefings as presenting the opportunity to view, in a holistic manner, the challenges faced in mandate implementation.

49. While recognizing the relevance of information-sharing, the troop-contributing countries noted that resolution 1353 (2001) provided for more than information-sharing. It was underscored that triangular relationship could be given an additional

impetus by including systematic consultations with the troop-contributing countries before certain strategic decisions were taken. In that regard, the troop-contributing countries urged that their views be sought before an assessment mission is carried out, during strategic redeployments and at the start-up, transition and drawdown of a mission.

50. In line with the above, the troop-contributing countries requested that the timelines for the consultations at the various phases be enlarged to enable them to provide input at such meetings. They also stressed the need for such consultations to encompass the rationale for a proposed action, its potential impact in the field and the envisaged recommendations to the Council by the Secretariat.

51. Delegations also acknowledged that in order to effectively implement the spirit of resolution 1353 (2001), the line between form and substance must be blurred. In that connection, they called for improved mechanisms for addressing their highlighted concerns. It was also recommended that meetings with troop-contributing countries be structured in a less formal atmosphere than at present.

52. While inter-mission cooperation is regarded as useful, delegations drew attention to its potential for tactical complications in a complex, multi-mandated geographic situation such as the Sudan. In response, the Secretariat stated that decisions on whether or not to effect a drawdown of a military contingent were informed by a military capability study. The Secretariat also cautioned that it was often considered that sending signals of an envisaged drawdown could have adverse effects on the host country's political and security landscape.

III. Conclusion and recommendations

53. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, now in its tenth year, continues to derive its added value from the platform it provides for enhanced informal interactive dialogue among various stakeholders on generic and specific peacekeeping issues.

54. By maintaining a flexible programme of work throughout 2011, the agenda of the Working Group was enriched by the perspectives of Council members, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries as they arose. The Working Group also benefited immensely by considering the issues that attracted extensive discussion at the previous regular session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

55. The discussions of the Working Group can substantially enrich the debates of the Council during crucial phases of a mission's life cycle, including at the stages of mandate renewal, mission planning and technical assessment. In that regard, the Working Group should focus on case studies from peacekeeping missions whose authorizations will lapse in the months ahead and missions in which contemplated strategic actions would have considerable impact on a mandate.

56. The Working Group witnessed an improvement in the substantive participation at its meetings of the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries, which also appreciably brought their experiences to bear on technical and operational issues. The Security Council could reciprocate such support by ensuring that the outcomes of the meetings are translated into timely actions. Regular

reporting on the activities of the Working Group to the Council will be a first step in the right direction in achieving this.

57. Given that the concerns of the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries are sometimes as diverse as their solutions to existing challenges, the Working Group should also become a consensus-building platform. It is therefore imperative to keep the format of the Working Group meetings informal and to further adapt it to a solutions-oriented platform.

58. The Working Group has continued to grow in strength and relevance. In order to sustain its unique role in United Nations peacekeeping, it is important to ensure that no gain is lost by consolidating the progress achieved so far. In that connection, the views and recommendations derived from the Working Group should be scrupulously explored and, where possible, implemented.

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