



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 3 April 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to Security Council resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#), by which the Council requested me to provide options and recommendations by 4 April 2014 on United Nations (including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and other technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia in complying with the Council's requirements in paragraphs 3 to 7 and its requests in paragraph 9 of that resolution, and to assist the Government in improving its capacities to manage weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and verification.

In line with this request, an assessment team was deployed to Mogadishu and Nairobi from 12 to 18 March 2014. The team was led by the Department of Political Affairs and comprised experts from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

The assessment team began with meetings in New York with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the National Security Adviser to the President, in his capacity as coordinator for arms and ammunition management. In Mogadishu, the assessment team conducted a one-day consultation with the National Security Adviser, the Chief of the Defence Force, representatives of the police and the Custodial Corps, and the Ministries of Defence and National Intelligence and Security to identify capacity constraints and remedial options. During this consultation, the Secretariat also facilitated a meeting between the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group and a representative of the Office of the National Security Adviser to discuss the last assessment of the Monitoring Group regarding the partial lifting of the arms embargo, submitted pursuant to paragraph 41 of resolution [2093 \(2013\)](#). The assessment team also met with the Force Commander of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, as well as representatives of the Governments of France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the European Union, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia and a strategic review team for that Mission from Brussels.

#### Key findings

Throughout its encounters with the Federal Government of Somalia, the assessment team heard expressions of strong commitment to comply with the sanctions regime and the reporting requirements articulated in resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#)



and in previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2111 (2013) and 2093 (2013). The Government understands that it has to demonstrate not only the will to comply with the relevant resolutions, but also to show real tangible progress in the coming weeks and months in complying with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo. However, it was clear that the Government faces serious capacity challenges and multiple competing priorities. The Office of the National Security Adviser, which coordinates the Government's reporting obligations to the Security Council and oversees the national architecture for weapons and ammunition management, is already stretched beyond its limits. During its one-day consultation with the Government, the assessment team provided an initial briefing on the Government's obligations arising from resolution 2142 (2014). A more sustained approach to capacity-building will however be required to ensure that the Government, as well as the Member States that are supplying weapons or military equipment or providing assistance and training to the Government, comply with Security Council requirements.

The political and security environment presents a considerable challenge to the Government's effort to meet its reporting obligations and effectively manage weapons and ammunition stockpiles. The renewed offensive by Somali security forces and AMISOM will further complicate efforts to accelerate security sector reforms, including efforts to develop the structure and professionalism of the security forces and integrate allied militias. As an expanded AMISOM and the Somali National Army pursue a renewed offensive against Al-Shabaab in line with Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), monitoring and verifying the flow of weapons is likely to become more challenging for the Government, but not impossible.

In recent months, the Government and its international partners have made some initial progress in establishing an institutional framework for overseeing weapons and ammunition management that is in line with national development priorities under the Somali Compact. Institutions have been established that should drive oversight of weapons and ammunition management issues and coordinate support to the security sector from international partners. These institutions and the National Security Adviser, who chairs them, have the confidence and support of the United Nations and bilateral and multilateral actors.

The Somali Explosives Management Authority, established by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in August 2013, is the national body for ammunition, explosives and weapons management. On 22 January 2014, the Government established an Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee as a high-level body to coordinate and monitor the implementation by the Federal Government of activities related to arms control and stockpile management, import, export and transit of weapons, tracking of weapons, public awareness-raising and legislative development. The Steering Committee membership reflects the Government's national security institutions and is supported by some Member States and regional organizations that provide support to the security sector. The Steering Committee is chaired by the National Security Adviser and is composed of representatives of the Federal Government security sector,<sup>1</sup> UNSOM, the Mine Action

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<sup>1</sup> Ministries of National Security and Defence, Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, National Intelligence and Security Agency and Custodial Corps.

Service, AMISOM, the European Union, bilateral partners<sup>2</sup> and non-governmental implementing partners.<sup>3</sup>

A multi-stakeholder Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group<sup>4</sup> supports the Steering Committee in the implementation of its mandate. The Working Group's work plan for 2014 includes supporting compliance with resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014), establishing an arms registration system, constructing armouries and ammunition storage facilities and holding a government-wide workshop on arms and ammunition management responsibilities. On 21 January 2014, the workshop was hosted in partnership with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), UNSOM, the Mine Action Service and UNDP. Its findings and recommendations will be published by UNIDIR in April 2014.

Some new infrastructure has also been built and old infrastructure revived to manage and store weapons, but existing donor programmes will need to be accelerated and enhanced. Immediate interim measures to address gaps can and should be achieved by October 2014.

### **Notifications and reporting**

Since the partial lifting of the arms embargo, four notifications have been submitted by the Government for the Committee's attention, but all have lacked sufficient details. The assessment team noted that the Government has received little direct assistance in drafting and submitting these notifications, and recognized its limited capacity to adequately respond to the requirements. The assessment team also noted that quality of information provided by Member States that supply weapons and military equipment has a bearing on the Government's ability to appropriately notify the Committee.

The Government faces considerable challenges in accurately reporting on the structure, strength and composition of its forces, not least because of the coordination challenges inherent in a nascent and fragmented security sector supported by multiple bilateral partners. The core Somali National Army and police contingents are often supplemented by localized allied militias. To develop an accurate picture of the security sector, the Government needs to amalgamate a number of separate data systems, including from different registration processes in different sectors, payroll databases and human resources lists, to develop a coherent centralized system that reflects the extent of the security forces.

The assessment team emphasized to the Government the importance of accurately reflecting the current status of the security forces in future reporting rather than its aspirational goals, and the urgent requirement for the Government to clarify the number of armouries and ammunition storage facilities in use. In this regard, ongoing assistance will be required to develop a reliable reporting baseline

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<sup>2</sup> United Kingdom, United States, Turkey.

<sup>3</sup> Mines Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group and Bancroft Global Development.

<sup>4</sup> The Technical Working Group is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security and the United Nations Mine Action Service. The composition mirrors that of the Steering Committee, and also includes the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Norwegian People's Aid and the Fondation suisse de déminage.

of the security structure, including allied militias, as well as the status and number of Government facilities and procedures and codes of conduct.

### **Weapons and ammunition management**

The Government has a plan to implement a much-needed national weapons registration system, to further develop its network of armouries and ammunition storage facilities and start revising the legislative framework of Somalia despite its significant challenges in managing weapons and ammunition stocks. With technical support from the Mine Action Service, the Somali National Army, the police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency have received training in armoury record-keeping. Training in weapons marking as well as arms and ammunition disposal and quality assurance is planned to commence in May 2014.

Some progress has been made towards developing infrastructure required to safely store weapons and ammunition. As of March 2014, the Mine Action Service and its implementing partners have rehabilitated or constructed a total of 10 armouries,<sup>5</sup> ranging from relatively small police storage facilities to larger purpose-built constructions for the Somali National Army and the Somali police forces. These armouries are designed to store small arms and light weapons as well as small-calibre ammunition only. They are not built to accommodate explosive light weapons ammunition. Some of the armouries have not yet been commissioned, but are scheduled to become operational in the near future and do not contain any weapons.

A purpose-built storage facility at Halane now serves as the main processing point for marking, recording and distributing imported weapons and ammunition, with weapons marking starting in April 2014. The Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group has identified 18 armouries (capable of holding 27,700 weapons) and 12 ammunition depots (capable of holding up to 12.1 million rounds of ammunition), in Mogadishu and the regions, that need to be constructed for the national army, police and corrections forces. Construction work has commenced, with the support of the Mine Action Service, but the anticipated timeframe for completing these construction projects is beyond 2014. The assessment team noted that procedures for receiving, verifying, recording and reporting weapons at the point of entry require urgent and sustained capacity-building assistance. Immediate assistance is also required to implement procedures for the safe transportation and delivery of weapons and ammunition, including interim options to secure weapons where operations are happening. As a matter of priority, the Government should quickly identify the government entity responsible for importing weapons and ammunition.

The Government's plans for enhancing weapons and ammunition management have considerable support from the international community, including the United Nations, but implementation timeframes need to be accelerated to strengthen the Government's control over weapons and ammunition. The Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and its working group would benefit from a surge

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<sup>5</sup> Comprising Somali National Army armouries in Mogadishu at Halane, Villa Gashandiga, Villa Baidoa and Jazeera Camp; National Intelligence and Security Agency headquarters armoury in Mogadishu; and Somali police force headquarters armoury in Mogadishu and armouries at Baidoa and Beledweyne police stations (two at each location).

in international and national capacity as well as a long-term capacity-building programme.

Urgent funding and equipment is required to speed up the implementation of storage facility construction projects as well as the marking and registration capacity in Mogadishu and the regions.

Immediate technical capacity is also required to enable the Government to centrally authorize, notify, receive, verify, report and record imports of arms, ammunition and military equipment for use by its security services. In the long term a multi-partner support programme will be required to raise standards and procedures at seaports, counter arms trafficking and develop a robust legislative framework for governing the possession and use of firearms by State security services.

### **Monitoring and verification**

An international monitoring mechanism on compliance with the sanctions regime, including the partial lifting of the arms embargo, already exists. The Monitoring Group, which is based in Nairobi, currently analyses notifications and deliveries of weapons into Somalia and gathers further information on their management. The Monitoring Group has limited capacity to fully implement this aspect of its mandate, however, especially to physically verify all deliveries and movements of weapons. In addition, the security situation in Somalia currently prevents the Monitoring Group, which operates under the same security restrictions as the rest of the United Nations system, from moving freely throughout the country. There is currently no other mechanism to independently verify weapons and ammunition stocks, and the Government's capacity to monitor and verify its own weapons management systems needs to be reinforced.

### **Options for enhancing reporting and weapons management**

Given the imperative to meet the urgent needs of the Government and the reporting requirements of the Security Council, and in the light of the restrictive security environment, there are a limited number of options for and actors capable of providing technical assistance to the Government. However, with some creative thinking and the commitment of the Government and the international community, a number of gaps can be addressed that would enhance the Government's accountability for arms and ammunition, and increase transparency on the structure, composition and status of the security sector.

Training and technical support can quickly strengthen the Government's capacity to fulfil its responsibility to notify the Committee as required by paragraph 3 of resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#). The United Nations can provide additional training programmes on notification and reporting, and develop a suite of reporting templates for notifying the Committee. Outreach to the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations and other Member States that supply weapons and military equipment to the Federal Government of Somalia would help to enhance the quality of information provided to the Government. All of these options are considered feasible and can be immediately implemented by the United Nations Secretariat and UNSOM. To support the Government in managing the flow of weapons and ammunition, Member States should ensure that all notifications and deliveries are coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser.

Reporting on the structure and composition of the security forces, infrastructure and weapons management codes of conduct and procedures needs to be enhanced with the support of the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group. The United Nations can continue to support the Technical Working Group to ensure that international support is coordinated and sequenced appropriately in line with resolutions [2093 \(2013\)](#), [2111 \(2013\)](#) and [2124 \(2013\)](#). A more rigorous process of consultation, and feedback to the Government from the Monitoring Group,<sup>6</sup> could further enable the Government to address information gaps in its reporting and define requirements for future reports in line with resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#).

Monitoring and verification of weapons and ammunition flows presents a significant challenge in Somalia. Other arms embargo monitoring and inspection mechanisms, such as the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the work that the United Nations Mission in Liberia does in inspecting weapons that have been notified to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1521 \(2003\)](#) concerning Liberia, would be very difficult to apply in Somalia. While these may be appropriate for Chapter VII peacekeeping operations, they do not work in the context of a small special political mission. Enhancing the capacity of the Monitoring Group to physically verify all deliveries and movement of weapons would still be subject to the same security constraints that other United Nations entities face, which currently limit its access to the protected zone inside Mogadishu International Airport and some regional areas.

In view of the above, a joint verification team composed of Somali and international verification experts was considered a viable option. Such a verification mechanism would meet three important conditions:

- (a) The international verification experts on the team, who should be able to travel throughout Somalia, would provide the independence and objectivity to promote confidence in the Security Council that weapons are not being resold or transferred to individuals or entities that are not in the service of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
- (b) The Somali counterparts on such a team would ensure access to the inspection sites, and the required commitment from the Government for the verification visits to work and for deficiencies to be remedied;
- (c) The team would also contribute to building national capacity to undertake this important task, which will be required in the long run.

The joint verification team would be established under the authority of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and would be tasked by its Technical Working Group to undertake verification assessments, and report its findings and recommendations. The Technical Working Group would also be the appropriate forum to endorse and support corrective actions required to address any non-compliance in the management of arms and ammunition. Since the Monitoring Group is also represented in the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group, it would receive first-hand inspection reports and could provide feedback to the joint verification team. The Monitoring Group could also raise any

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<sup>6</sup> As requested by the Council in paragraph 12 of resolution [2142 \(2014\)](#).

issues that it has identified regarding the management of arms and ammunition, in line with paragraph 13 (k) of resolution 2060 (2012) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2142 (2014).

### **Recommendations for United Nations and other international assistance**

Immediate international assistance is required to enhance the technical, human and administrative capacity of the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President to enable it to better coordinate inter-agency inputs to the notification and reporting obligations of the Federal Government of Somalia. Owing to the technical nature of these reporting requirements and the immediacy with which assistance must be provided, it would be most effective coming from Member States. In line with their existing mandates, UNSOM and the Mine Action Service can support the Government in gathering necessary data, including by coordinating with major training partners of Somalia, including AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission and other bilateral partners, and providing coordination support and training.

With this enhanced capacity, the Office of the National Security Adviser should:

(a) Update its recent reporting to the Security Council on the structure of the Somalia security forces and address the gaps identified by the Monitoring Group and the new requirements of resolution 2142 (2014);

(b) Commence a baseline registration survey of the security sector, building on the work of the Somali forces registration and payment project being implemented by the Mine Action Service and starting with the Somali National Army. UNSOM should provide technical assistance to the Office of the National Security Adviser to coordinate this project with relevant actors;

(c) Start a phased weapons and ammunition baseline survey, through a weapons marking and registration process, against which future verification activities should be conducted.

It is important that the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners build on the early work of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and its Technical Working Group, and accelerate priority activities in the 2014 work plan, especially outside of Mogadishu. The United Nations will continue to provide coordination and training support within the framework of the Steering Committee and the Technical Working Group. I urge contributing Member States to provide the necessary financing and in-kind resources as soon as possible to accelerate key deliverables. The explosive remnants of war from ammunition and explosive storage sites in Dayniile, Afgooye, Baidoa and Beledweyne need to be urgently cleared, for example. These sites are currently a source of material for improvised explosive devices and pose a strategic threat to the Government and international partners in Somalia. Once clear, the Dayniile site, which is 30 km outside of Mogadishu, will be transformed into the Government's main weapons and ammunition storage facility. The current Mine Action Service plan to clear these sites will take from three to five years to implement, subject to the availability of funding.

Critical gaps identified by the assessment team for the management of arms and ammunition should be addressed on a priority basis. There is an urgent requirement for five additional marking machines to ensure that weapons imported in the future are marked and registered in line with international standards. To mark weapons in the sectors/regions, vehicles, generators and weapons cutting machines

are required for mobile marking units that would deploy to Government armouries outside of Mogadishu. Interim measures are also required to store weapons in the regions, including containers, rifle racks and basic security measures. The United Nations will continue to support the coordination and training of this assistance through UNSOM and the Mine Action Service, respectively. I call on Member States to contribute outstanding equipment and resources as outlined above.

The Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee of the Federal Government of Somalia should consider establishing a small joint verification team, composed of Somali and international verification experts, to physically verify arms and ammunition provided to the Government and the systems of control for their management. The verification would require technical on-site inspection and the verification team would seek to make recommendations to immediately rectify any problems that may exist. This process should be methodical and should be based on the principles of an audit process. Member States working in Somalia with in-depth experience in joint verification mechanisms, and the monitoring of arms and ammunition, should help the Steering Committee to develop the concept for such a verification mechanism, and assist in training the joint verification team. Donors, including those currently represented on the Steering Committee and the Technical Working Group, could support the verification team.

The Monitoring Group should increase its presence in Mogadishu and step up its interaction with the Government, specifically the Office of the National Security Adviser. The Monitoring Group should participate regularly in the meetings of the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group in line with its mandate, including future verification activities where security conditions permit. It should also continue to provide its independent assessment on whether the Government and other actors are meeting the overall objectives of the arms embargo, identify trends and cause of violations where they exist, and report to the Security Council providing recommendations for the sanctioning of individuals, States or entities that violate the arms embargo. In order to enhance its presence in Mogadishu, consideration should be given to augmenting the capacity of the Monitoring Group within its current configuration.

### **Observations**

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Federal Government of Somalia for the strong collaboration and partnership that has characterized this assessment and to the Member States and international organizations for their support to my assessment team.

Somalia needs to show tangible progress between now and October 2014, when the Council will review the partial lifting of the arms embargo against the Federal Government of Somalia. It is also important, however, that we set realistic expectations for what can be achieved by the Government in this timeframe. State-building in conflict situations is particularly challenging. Many of the recommendations set out above are components of the broader effort required to meet the major, long-term restructuring needs for the Somali security sector, which would be hard to implement under the best of circumstances. It will be difficult, for example, to expect a fully professional system of control for arms and ammunition to be established without the barracks to institutionalize a professional Somali national army. At the very least, baselines for the Somali security forces and

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weapons and ammunition should be established and verified, and future progress should be measured against them. A number of political challenges must also be overcome to enable the Government to fully account for its security forces, including in the context of negotiations on a federal state structure.

I call on the Government to ensure that the urgent gaps identified by this assessment are filled. I am encouraged by its commitment to deliver on the requirements that I have presented above, including its receptivity to the joint verification of arms and ammunition. The sustained support of the international community will be required to meet these priorities and to transform the security services of Somalia after decades of division and mismanagement. The focus of the Government and the international community must now shift rapidly from identifying priority objectives to delivering on priority tasks.

I am grateful for the early strong indications of support from the international community for these recommendations. The additional human resources and technical assistance from the United Nations and other international partners requested above will provide much-needed capacity and could boost confidence in the short term. Where possible, I encourage partners to take a long-term view of their support and ensure that their assistance builds the capacity of Somali counterparts. No less critical will be a coherent international approach to help the Government to meet its reporting obligations and ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently. In this context, UNSOM will support coordination efforts by the Government in line with paragraph 22 of resolution [2093 \(2013\)](#).

I have previously assured the Council and the Federal Government of Somalia of my personal commitment to peace and stability in Somalia. We must do all that we can to create an enabling environment for the Government to succeed. It is imperative that the Government demonstrates its commitment to transparent and responsible management of its security forces. Time is of the essence. I encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to take forward my recommendations.

*(Signed)* **BAN Ki-moon**

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