



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 March 2021

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation”, the Security Council adopted resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the reports of the Director General dated 1 and 4 January 2021 (see annex).



Annex

Letter dated 8 January 2021 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith two documents submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosures).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the documents to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rafael Mariano **Grossi**

Enclosure I

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in relation to its enrichment related activities. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports.¹

Activities Related to Enrichment

2. In a letter dated 31 December 2020, Iran informed the Agency that "according to the act passed by the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in order to comply with this act, the AEOI [Atomic Energy Organization of Iran] intends to produce LEU [low-enriched uranium] up to 20%" at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), and that the "relevant part" of the design information questionnaire for FFEP "will be updated accordingly".²

* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/INF/2021/1.

¹ GOV/2020/51, GOV/INF/2020/16 and GOV/INF/2020/17.

² JCPOA, 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', paras. 28 and 45.

Enclosure II

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in relation to its enrichment related activities. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports.¹

Activities Related to Enrichment

2. As previously reported,² in a letter dated 31 December 2020, Iran informed the Agency that "according to the act passed by the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in order to comply with this act, the AEOI [Atomic Energy Organization of Iran] intends to produce LEU [low-enriched uranium] up to 20%" at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).

3. On 2 January 2021, Agency inspectors verified the presence at FFEP of a cylinder containing 137.2 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 4.1% U-235, which had been transferred to FFEP from the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. The cylinder was under Agency seal.

4. On 3 January 2021, the operator of FFEP informed Agency inspectors of Iran's plan to start the production of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 and requested the inspectors to detach the Agency's seal from the aforementioned cylinder containing UF₆ enriched up to 4.1% U-235 to be used as feed material at FFEP. The Agency reminded Iran, in a letter dated 3 January 2021, that before the Agency could detach the seal, Iran was required, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangements (General Part), to provide the Agency with an updated design information questionnaire (DIQ) for FFEP and that this needed to be provided prior to implementing the planned changes related to the operation of the facility.

5. On 4 January 2021, Iran provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for FFEP. On the basis of this DIQ, Agency inspectors carried out a design information verification (DIV) at FFEP. Agency inspectors confirmed that the six cascades installed at FFEP, comprising a total of 1044 IR-1 centrifuges, had been reconfigured as three sets of two interconnected cascades. The inspectors then detached the seal from the aforementioned cylinder and immobilised it in the feeding station. Iran connected the cylinder to the feeding line to start the production of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235.³

* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/INF/2021/2.

¹ GOV/2020/51, GOV/INF/2020/16, GOV/INF/2020/17 and GOV/INF/2021/1.

² GOV/INF/2021/1, para. 2.

³ JCPOA, 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', paras. 28 and 45.