



安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 2094(2013) 号决议第 29 段请第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。

主席特此分发从专家小组收到的报告(见附件)。



附件

2014 年 3 月 3 日第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组协调员给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组，依照第 2094(2013) 号决议第 29 段，转递专家小组工作的最后报告。

报告已于 2014 年 2 月 7 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006) 号决议所设委员会，并于 2014 年 2 月 24 日经过委员会审议。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信及其附文为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组
协调员

马丁·乌登(签名)

附文

2014 年 2 月 7 日第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组给第 1718(2006) 号决议所设委员会主席的信

[原件：法文]

安全理事会第 1874(2009) 号决议所设专家小组谨依照第 2094(2013) 号决议第 29 段以及 S/2013/186 号文件，转递专家小组工作的最后报告。

请提请安全理事会第 1718(2006) 号决议所设委员会成员注意本信及其附件为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009) 号决议
所设专家小组

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第 1874 (2009) 号决议所设专家小组的报告

摘要

尚无迹象表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国打算对安全理事会呼吁放弃其核武器、弹道导弹和大规模毁灭性武器作出回应。相反，该国无视安理会有关决议，坚持进行其军火贸易和其他被禁活动，而与其核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的活动也在继续进行。

目前，专家小组认为，没有必要采取任何新措施，以进一步减缓朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的被禁计划速度，劝阻其进行扩散活动，或阻止其军火和相关物资贸易。相反，专家小组认为，会员国已有足够的工具可用。

从巴拿马对“清川江”号的处理这一事例可见，在现有措施基础上采取果断行动，可挫败被禁活动。然而，专家小组强烈认为，应大大改进现有制裁措施的总体执行情况。在本次及先前给安全理事会的报告中，专家小组已提出建议，以帮助弥补所指出的不足之处。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国给会员国带来了严峻的挑战。该国在采取行动逃避制裁方面，已较有经验。通过对本报告所述期间若干事件的分析，专家小组发现，该国越来越多地使用多个和分级的规避技巧。登上“清川江”号检查，使专家小组获得了一个绝佳的机会，借以深入了解一些用于规避制裁的手段。这起事件还提醒会员国，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国除不得进行军火和相关物资贸易外，也不得为武器的制造、维修或使用提供服务或协助。

其他事件显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国仍依赖于从外国采购某些物品，特别是一些涉及核计划和弹道导弹计划的物品。具体而言，该国国内精密机床制造能力不足，因而为与弹道导弹有关的计划购买现成的物品。专家小组还评估认为，该国可能会寻求外国供应商，以获得其制造反应堆燃料棒所需的部件。

专家小组委托进行的一项研究提供了宝贵的信息，可借以深入了解该国的海外商业存在，其中一部分是为了寻找替代和有意愿的供应商，从而获得其被禁计划所需的技术和产品。这项研究还表明，在国外经营的个人和实体，特别是专家小组确定从事于航运业的个人和实体，可被视为属于一个相互连通的网络，对开展合法和非法贸易均有用。

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* 各附件未经正式编辑，仅以来件所用语文分发。

** 因属机密，在本文件中未提供该附件。

缩写和词汇

金融行动任务组	反洗钱金融行动任务组
原子能机构	国际原子能机构
IAN	执行援助通知(由安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会向会员国发出)
海事组织	国际海事组织
INFCIRC	《情况通报》(原子能机构出版物)
朝中社(KCNA)	朝鲜中央通讯社
兆瓦	兆瓦电
TEU	二十英尺等量单位(指集装箱)
毒品和犯罪问题办公室	联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室
WCO	世界海关组织

本报告中使用的下列词语具体含义如下：

“委员会”	安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会
“决议”	安全理事会第 1718(2006)号、第 1874(2009)号、第 2087(2013)号和第 2094(2013)号决议
“专家小组”	安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组
“制裁”	决议中规定的措施
“阻截”	第 1874(2009)号决议第 11 至第 14 段、第 2087(2013)号决议第 8 段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 16 段所定义的对货物的检查、扣押和处置
“指认”	安全理事会或委员会根据第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)和第 8(e)段(经包括第 2094(2013)号决议第 27 段在内的后来几项决议修订)对个人或实体采取的行动(资产冻结和(或)旅行禁令)

一. 导言

1. 在其第 2094(2013)号决议中，安全理事会将专家小组的任务期限延至 2014 年 4 月 7 日。本报告所述期间为 2013 年 5 月 12 日至 2014 年 2 月 7 日的 9 个月。
2. 本报告审查现有关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续试图发展核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹计划的证据。本报告参阅了会员国的报告、公开材料及卫星图像，并研究了在本报告所述期间向委员会报告的违反制裁情况，并就专家小组关于其他案件的询问和结论提供信息。
3. 报告还调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送货物，特别是利用其机群和船队以及集装箱货运手段运货的能力变化，并审查了用来规避制裁措施的技巧和策略。专家小组审议了安理会对指认实体和个人的旅行禁令和资产冻结措施以及为提高制裁效力而通过的各项金融措施的成效。还报告了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外商业存在的研究结果。本报告还审查了制裁对平民和外国外交使团造成的意外影响。
4. 最后，专家小组就改善决议执行情况提出建议。本报告附件载有报告主体部分的适当支持证据及进一步背景资料。

二. 背景和政治环境

5. 现在要弄清 2013 年 12 月清除国防委员会副主席张成泽事件对金正恩的整体政治领导和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国战略和外交政策有何影响，还为时尚早。特别是，军队是否进一步增强了其影响力和控制力，仍是一个疑问。与 2013 年初相比，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已降低了其挑衅性言辞的强度，更加重视经济发展。其与世隔离的状态、贸易赤字、缺乏信誉以及迫切的经济需求均表明，朝鲜要么需通过增加被禁物品销量来提高收入，要么须改善与国际社会的经济关系。
6. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国无视安理会有关决议，继续声称其“无论他国承认与否，均拥有作为核武器国家的合法地位……”，并多次宣布将加强其“核威慑能力”。¹ 朝鲜劳动党中央委员会 2013 年 3 月全体会议通过的“新战略路线”，即强调经济和核武器能力平行增长的路线² 被不断提及和重申。
7. 六方会谈各方与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国接触，并彼此接触，努力重启会谈，但尚未取得显著进展。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国虽努力改善与其他各方的政治和经济关系，但若其国内和区域环境不发生显著变化，包括其接受有关决议所要求的步骤，则不大可能取得成效。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和大韩民国之间的关系实现了很有限的和解，最主要的是允许重开开城工业园区，而在该园区，已有关于扩大国际商业参与的初步讨论。

¹ “NDC Spokesman of DPRK Issues Crucial Statement”, RodongSinmun, 18 June 2013.

² “Report on the plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee”, KCNA, 31 March 2013.

三. 专家小组及其方法

8. 按照第 2094(2013) 号决议，专家小组的任期延至 2014 年 4 月 7 日，专家人数从 7 名增至 8 名。

9. 专家小组的任务仍是收集、检查和分析由各国、联合国相关机构和其他利益方提供的有关决议所定措施执行情况的信息，特别是不执行的情况，并就安理会、委员会或会员国为更好执行决议规定措施而可能考虑采取的行动提出建议。

10. 专家小组依照安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组的报告(S/2006/997)所载的方法标准开展其工作。专家小组尽管没有司法机构的传票、取证能力和调查权力，但努力维持很高的证据标准。专家小组依赖于三类信息：(a) 专家的第一手和现场观察；(b) 会员国和(或)国际组织的官员、记者和个人提供的信息；及(c) 公共信息。专家小组始终不忘信息来源的身份和角色，尽可能寻求辅证，并确保以与专家小组职责相符的方式，经手所提供的机密或有限制的信息。

11. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组向委员会提交了 9 份事件报告，并在本报告中考虑到这些事件，同时提供关于仍在调查的案件的资料。专家小组与 13 个会员国、3 个联合国机构和其他有关各方举行了磋商。磋商活动包括 7 次为收集关于各种违规事件的信息而进行访问(其中包括 2 次为检查货物而进行的访问)、7 次为讨论制裁措施执行情况而进行访问、以及 11 次为出席会议和研讨会以宣传各项决议而进行访问。

12. 专家小组共就其开展的调查向会员国、私营实体和个人发出了 64 份信息请求。共收到 32 份答复。与会员国之间的来往公文列于附件一。虽然就其调查向会员国发出的有些信息请求很长时间仍未完全得到答复，但在本报告所述期间，对专家小组的请求的答复已经加快。

13. 按照第 2087(2013) 号决议第 11 段，一些国际组织就其涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的活动咨询委员会的意见。专家小组协助委员会确保这些活动不会有助于被禁计划或活动。专家小组还继续就共同关心的问题，与其他联合国制裁(专家)小组合作，包括与反恐怖主义委员会执行局合作。

四. 会员国报告

A. 各国执行情况报告

14. 在其第 2094(2013) 号决议第 25 段中，安全理事会呼吁各国向其报告“它们为有效执行本决议的规定采取的具体措施”。截至 2014 年 2 月 1 日，31 个会员国提


交了国家执行情况报告。³ 而安理会要求提交国家执行情况报告的其他决议，包括第 1718(2006) 号和第 1874(2009) 号决议，也出现过这种提交报告速度缓慢的情况。

15. 在这 31 个会员国中，有几个会员国为履行以往有关决议规定的报告义务，提交了合并报告。因此，提交报告的会员国总数稍有增加，达 97 个。这一总数亦与安理会其他决议的报告提交情况相符。⁴

16. 一如既往，提交的国家执行情况报告在内容上差异较大。有些报告叙述了所采取的具体措施，而其他报告则提供很少的细节，甚至未提供细节。专家小组鼓励未提交报告/晚提交报告的会员国参照委员会 2013 年 10 月 22 日更新的《编写和提交国家执行情况报告的导则》。⁵

图一

按区域开列的报告情况概览



17. 通过分析迄今提交的国家执行情况报告可见，第 2094(2013) 号决议规定的各项措施没有得到一视同仁的重视。专家小组注意到，对货物检查、拒绝进入港口或飞越、起飞和着陆、以及对外交人员的警惕等措施，往往没有提及。

18. 未提交报告或晚提交报告的原因包括，但不限于对决议缺乏认识和理解不足。⁶ 正如本报告第 67 段所指出的那样，这种情况往往有利于朝鲜民主主义人

³ 所有国家执行情况报告均可在以下网页查看：www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml。

⁴ 截至 2013 年 6 月，超过一半的会员国尚未提交第 1874(2009) 号决议执行情况报告。见 S/2013/331，第 14 段。

⁵ 见 www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/implementation_assistance_notice_2.pdf。

⁶ 见 S/2010/571，附件，第 36 段。

民共和国。专家小组进一步指出，未提交报告/晚提交报告的会员国多属于与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有较长合作历史的区域。

B. 违规行为报告

19. 专家小组了解到，会员国未向委员会报告某些检查和扣押货物的活动，尽管第 1874(2009) 号决议第 15 段“要求任何会员国……提交及时报告，包含有关细节。”不报告检查和扣押活动，有碍于委员会的任务，即有效应对违反决议的行为和指认其他个人和实体。此外，这也限制了专家小组收集、研究和分析关于有关决议执行情况，尤其是违规事件的信息的能力，以及其根据详细证据向安理会、委员会或会员国提出建议的能力。

20. 若会员国对提交检查和扣押报告的外交或其他影响有所顾虑，则也可以保密的方式与委员会通信。虽然国内法律方面的考虑可能会妨碍会员国提供细节，但这并不影响其按规定汇报进行了一项检查的事实。即使检查结果显示所运货物没有违反制裁规定，此项义务也适用。

21. 专家小组建议，会员国按照第 1874(2009) 号决议第 15 段的规定，及时向委员会报告对运往和运自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或由该国充当中介的货物进行的所有检查，即使检查未发现被禁物品。

22. 在其第 2094(2013) 号决议第 26 段中，安全理事会呼吁所有国家提供它们掌握的不遵守有关决议的情事的信息。专家小组指出，近期会员国对实体和个人的单方面指认似乎显示，存在关于违反制裁行为的的信息。但是，这样的信息却没有向委员会和专家小组提供。

23. 专家小组建议，会员国按照第 2094(2013) 号决议第 26 段的规定，向委员会提供它们掌握的不遵守有关决议的情事的信息。

五. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国持续违反其放弃核计划、其他大规模毁灭性武器和导弹计划的义务

24. 在第 2094(2013) 号决议中，安全理事会重申了其一项决定，即朝鲜民主主义人民共和国应以完全、可核查和不可逆的方式放弃所有核武器和现有核计划、其他所有大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹计划。至目前为止，仍然没有迹象表明该国已准备好以符合有关决议规定的方式放弃这些计划。相反，最近的声明、技术发展和观察表明，该国仍在积极进行此类计划。

A. 最近与核有关的活动

25. 在本报告所述期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续自称“核武器国家”，并多次显示出加强其“核威慑能力”的决心。⁷ 据报道，在 2013 年 4 月 21 日举行的一次会议上，朝内阁讨论了若干与核有关的问题，包括增加铀矿开采活动以及核燃料和材料生产的目的。还讨论了增加核科学家和技术人员教育和培训水平的必要性。⁸

26. 2013 年 4 月 2 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国宣布将重启宁边的所有核设施，包括铀浓缩车间及 5 兆瓦反应堆。⁹ 2013 年 8 月 28 日，原子能机构报告称，该机构继续观察到在宁边核设施内不同地点发生的翻修和新建活动，与朝鲜进一步发展其核能力的声明大体相符。¹⁰ 通过使用商业卫星图像，专家小组证实，在本报告所述期间，这些活动持续进行。

27. 日期为 2013 年 8 月 31 日的商业卫星图像显示，有蒸汽从与 5 兆瓦反应堆相邻的建筑，即被认为装有一台发电机的建筑中冒出。这表明，该反应堆系统当时可能在部分运行(见附件三)。若属实，则确认了国际原子能机构的分析，即最近在附近挖掘的沟渠可能是为了重新配置其冷却系统，以便在不重建毁于 2008 年 6 月的冷却塔的情况下，让反应堆能够运行。这一卫星图片还显示，与反应堆相邻的另一建筑在 2013 年下半年进行了翻新。

28. 据称，有一建筑内设有铀浓缩车间。而原子能机构确定，自 2013 年 3 月，该建筑开始扩建。该扩建全年均在推进。扩建将使原建筑的大小几乎翻一番(见附件四)。还能观察出，2013 年下半年对附近的一些建筑物进行了增建或翻新，对一相邻区域进行了绿化改造。

29. 还观察到在宁边核设施发生的其他活动。特别是，试点燃料制造厂北边的旧建筑被改建成一个更大的新建筑，而在据称是浓缩铀车间的建筑北侧一区域内，修建活动继续进行(见附件二)。

30. 自原子能机构的报告后，没有观察到轻水反应堆外部出现大的新情况。据该机构指出，该建筑外部的工程似乎已于 2013 年 6 月完成，在该建筑上及周围的

⁷ “NDC Spokesman of DPRK issues crucial statement”, RodongSinmun, 18 June 2013.

⁸ “Let us thoroughly implement party’s line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed force-an expanded meeting of the cabinet plenum was held”, MinjuJosen, 21 April 2013.

⁹ “DPRK to adjust uses of existing nuclear facilities”, KCNA, 2 April 2013.

¹⁰ IAEA, Report by the Director General on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, IAEA Board of Governors General Conference, 28 August 2013. 可在以下网页查看: www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-22_en.pdf.

施工活动包括安装一个通风栈、修建电气开关站、以及挖掘看来是用于铺设反应堆冷却水管的沟渠。

31. 专家小组利用卫星图像，还观察到在丰溪里核试验场发生的各种活动(见附件五)，如挖掘、建筑拆除和改造、以及新建工程。虽然这些活动的目的不能仅通过卫星图像来确定，但一些分析家认为，这些活动可能涉及上一次核试验所用隧道的密封、对其他现有隧道的维修和(或)新隧道的挖掘。¹¹

32. 轻水反应堆的运行需要大量的燃料棒，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国因此可能需要扩大其核燃料制造能力。¹² 核专家们向专家小组表示，他们怀疑该国国内可能还不具备这一产能，因而可能须从国外购买必要的设备和技术。一般而言，此类设备包括周期性轧管机和心轴、用于生产锆合金管的压模和润滑油、以及用于进行检查的超声波测试设备。专家小组建议，会员国对出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的上述物项，适当加以警惕。

B. 最近与弹道导弹和相关计划有关的活动

33. 自 2012 年 3 月从其西海岸设施发射“银河 3 号”火箭后，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国未再使用弹道导弹技术进行任何发射。¹³ 然而，该国未停止所有与弹道导弹有关的活动，也未重新确认以前做出的暂停导弹发射的承诺。

34. 2013 年 7 月 27 日庆祝朝鲜战争结束 60 周年阅兵式的报道介绍了一批弹道导弹(见图二)。阅兵式展示的导弹包括通常称为“火星”、“劳动”、“舞水端”和 KN-08 的若干型液体燃料弹道导弹，每一型导弹均展示了 6 枚。

¹¹ “North North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site: no indication of nuclear test preparations”, 38 North, December 2013. 可在以下网页查看: <http://38north.org/2013/12/punggye122013/>。

¹² 见“Let us thoroughly implement party’s line on simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear armed force-an expanded meeting of the cabinet plenum was held, ”MinjuJoson, 21 April 2013。

¹³ 2013 年 5 月中旬，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从其东海岸发射了数枚短程导弹。目前还不清楚这些导弹是短程弹道导弹(称为 KN-02)，还是反舰和地对空导弹。

图二
2013 年 7 月 27 日阅兵



资料来源：美联社图片转自共同社

35. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在西海岸设施的试验台进行了大型液体火箭发动机的进一步试验。商业卫星图像显示，去年进行了若干次试验。¹⁴ 与以往的试验一样，这些可能是“银河 3 号”火箭第一级或KN-08 道路机动导弹(仍未进行飞行试验)的试验，或与开发更强大的新型火箭有关。

36. 朝鲜继续努力改进其与导弹有关的设施。商业卫星图像显示，自 2013 年年中，西海岸设施的修建活动一直在持续。分析家认为其中一些项目是为了扩大龙门塔和机动发射台、修建一个新的发射架和一个新的雷达跟踪站。¹⁵ 卫星图片还显示，2011 年夏开始的东海岸设施的新修建活动在 2013 年停止了很长时间，但年底又恢复进行。据观察，在新的组装和发射控制楼方面有所进展，而在新发射台方面没有进展。¹⁶

¹⁴ 至少进行了三次实验。见 38 North“New long-range rocket engine tests at North Korean launch facility: development continues”, 10 July 2013, “Probable rocket engine test conducted at Sohae”, 23 September 2013 和“significant development at North Korea’s Sohae test facility”, 29 January 2014。可在以下网页查看：<http://38north.org/2013/07/sohae071013/>，<http://38north.org/2013/09/sohae092313/>，<http://38north.org/2014/01/sohae012914/>。

¹⁵ “Major construction at the Sohae rocket test site”, 38 North, 30 August 2013 和“Significant development at North Korea’s Sohae test facility”, 29 January 2014。可在以下网页查看：<http://38north.org/2013/08/sohae083013/>，<http://38north.org/2014/01/sohae012914/>。

¹⁶ “Construction at Tonghae resumes: no tests likely in 2013”, 38 North, 29 November 2013。可在以下网页查看：<http://38north.org/2013/11/tonghae112913/>。

37. 2013 年 1 月，针对安理会通过第 2087(2013) 号决议谴责朝鲜 12 月份的发射活动，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向安理会作出了挑衅性的回应，宣布它“继续为和平目的发射卫星，以征服空间并成为世界……大国”。¹⁷ 但是，自该日以来，朝鲜既没有进行新的发射，也没有就其所谓的卫星和运载火箭计划进一步发布消息。¹⁸

图三

签署战略火箭部队计划



资料来源：法新社图片/KCNS 图片转自朝中社

38. 两个月后，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在给安全理事会的另一封信中宣布，它“有自己强大、精确的核打击手段和核战争方法”。¹⁹ 与此相关，朝中社 2013 年 3 月 29 日报道，金正恩已“审阅并批准了战略火箭部队火力打击计划”（见图三）。朝鲜宣布该计划包括对位于美国大陆及夏威夷和关岛的军事基地的打击。²⁰ 但是，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从未成功进行过一次远程弹道导弹的试验。上一次，即 2006 年宣布进行的导弹发射失败，导弹在发射后 40 秒爆炸。因此，这些官方声明的可信度只能来自于成功发射“银河 3 号”，而且专家小组认为，这些声明显示，该国的弹道导弹和空间发射计划之间存在实质性重叠。

C. 其他大规模毁灭性武器计划

39. 尽管公共可用的有关资料不多，但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国其他现有的大规模毁灭性武器计划依然令人关注。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从未表示有意按照第

¹⁷ 2013 年 1 月 24 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信(S/2013/50)。

¹⁸ 唯一的新情况是其于 2013 年 10 月加入了《国际移动卫星组织公约》。见 IMSO, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accedes to the IMSO Convention”, IMSO News, No.092, 16 October 2013. 可在以下网页查看: <http://www.imso.org/ReadNews.asp?FileID=956>。

¹⁹ 2013 年 3 月 27 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信(S/2013/194)。

²⁰ “Kim Jong-Un convenes operation meeting, finally examines and ratifies plan for firepower strike”, KCNA, 29 March 2013。

2094(2013)号决议重申的规定，以完全、可核查、不可逆的方式放弃这些计划，而且该国是既没有签署、也没有加入《关于禁止发展、生产、储存和使用化学武器及销毁此种武器的公约》的四个国家之一。²¹ 北朝鲜是《关于禁止发展、生产和储存细菌(生物)及毒素武器和销毁此种武器的公约》的缔约国，但仅在 1990 年提交了一份自愿建立信任措施表。²²

40. 过去一年里，一些媒体的文章谈及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向阿拉伯叙利亚共和国提供军事行动援助，包括化学武器领域的援助。²³ 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交部于 2013 年 11 月发表声明否认在军事上涉足叙利亚冲突。²⁴ 专家小组既无法证实和也无法否定这些报道。

六. 与出口和进口有关的措施

41. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组调查了两起新近报告的扣押和检查被禁物项的事件，以及提请专家小组注意的先前其他违规事件的报告。所有这些案例都充分证实了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在继续进行被禁物项的贸易。

42. 但是，专家小组无法确定在本报告所述期间被禁活动有所增加还是减少：

- 经验表明，尽管有关决议作出了规定，但对被禁物项的检查和扣押行动并非全都立即向委员会报告(不报告所产生的影响在第四节中阐述)。
- 专家小组继续收集关于过去的、目前持续的和新发生的与武器方面有关的合作信息。收集的信息表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国积极地参与了涉及武器生产、维修和(或)使用方面的服务或援助。专家小组不相信所有当前的非法合作行为都已被查明，也不相信不会再发现新的客户。
- 最近的扣押和检查事例表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正日益采用多种和分级的规避技法。或许因为这一原因，阻截有所减少。
- 要使第 2094(2013)号决议规定的新的和强化的措施对被禁活动产生重大影响，目前还为时过早。例如，专家小组未闻悉(该决议第 22 段中的)

²¹ 其他未签署的国家是安哥拉、埃及和南苏丹。索马里和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国于 2013 年加入了《公约》。

²² 见 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/>。

²³ 见 NKNews, “North Korea and Syrian chemical and missile programs,” 19 June 2013. 可在以下网页查看: <http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/north-korea-and-syrian-chemical-and-missile-programs/>, 和 Robin Hughes, “SSRC: spectre at the table,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 January 2014.

²⁴ “DPRK refutes false rumour about its involvement in military operations in Syria”, KCNA, 14 November 2013.

“全面管制”规定被用来防止转让任何可能有助于被禁计划或活动的物项。

A. 执行核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹有关物项的禁运

43. 在本报告所述期间，有一个会员国向委员会报告，该国对一批空运货物进行了一次检查。被专家小组发现该货物中含有与弹道导弹有关的物项。专家小组继续调查日本和大韩民国以前扣押和报告的涉及核及弹道导弹的货运。这些案例表明，会员国在确定受查物项是否属于被禁物项(尤其是零部件形式，而非完整组装的物项)时面临种种困难。确定受查物项的性质和特征需要的专门技术知识超越了一些会员国掌握的资源。

44. 专家小组还调查了在银河 3 号火箭残片中发现的源自于外国的物项，发现有使用市场现购物项或稍稍低于禁止标准的物项的情况，这些物项随后经过组装，或纳入整体系统或次级系统。有关新近购置的计算机数字控制(数控)机床及零部件的信息也表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的精确制造能力依然有赖于向外界的采购。

会员国检查的与弹道导弹有关的货物

45. 2013 年 9 月，一个会员国向委员会报告说，该国于 2013 年 5 月检查了一批空运货物，据称该批货物包含旨在用于“冷冻货物运输船”、“鱼品加工母船”、“鱼体处理机”和“旧船”的“机械零件”和“继电器”。这艘船据怀疑由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出发或由该国充任中介经纪营运。会员国请求专家小组帮助确定该货物中发现的物项是否受到决议的禁止。

46. 专家小组发现该批货物中的任何物项都不符合有关被禁的核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹计划的物项、材料、设备、货物和技术清单上界定的标准。但是，所有物项都是与飞毛腿弹道导弹系统有关的零件或其他物项。专家小组认为，这些物项是得到第 1874(2009)号决议第 9 段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 7 段修改的第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(b)段规定禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口和充当中介的武器和相关材料。

47. 专家小组还得出结论：这批货物源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。专家小组还认为，委托收货人是一个涉及开发、生产和销售具有军事和商业用途的先进产品的实体，其官方业务范围似乎与宣称的物项性质不符。专家小组正在继续调查。

日本扣押的核物项

48. 2013 年 3 月，日本向委员会报告说，日本于 2012 年 8 月扣押了在万海 313 号集装箱船(国际海事组织编号 9248708)上发现的五支铝合金棒。²⁵ 日本当局确定，源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的这些铝合金棒(见图四)符合原子能机构文件

²⁵ 见 S/2013/337，第 66 段。

INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 2 的标准。根据日本公布的信息，这些铝合金棒通过大连(中国)运往第三国。

图四

在万海 313 号上发现的铝棒



资料来源：专家小组

49. 专家小组在日本检查了这些物项，获得了关于可能的生产商和相关实体的信息。货运商万海航运有限公司和日本政府以机密的方式提供了信息。


50. 2014 年 1 月，中国主管部门根据专家小组的询问证实这批运货源自于南浦，并说申明的目的地在缅甸境内。中国主管部门并报告说，委托发货人是一个称为朝鲜 Kumpyo 贸易公司的实体。专家小组继续调查，并向缅甸索取进一步信息。

大韩民国扣押的与弹道导弹有关的货物

51. 专家小组得出结论，专家小组完成了对大韩民国 2012 年 5 月扣押的与弹道导弹有关的货物(见图五)的调查，并向委员会提交了事件报告。²⁶ 专家小组得出结论认为，这批货物构成了违反禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口属于与弹道导弹有关的清单(S/2012/235)所列物项的第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(b)段的行为。

²⁶ 这一事件的概要载于专家小组先前的最后报告(S/2013/337，第 44-46 段)。

图五
大韩民国扣押的石墨筒



资料来源：专家小组

52. 专家小组确定，实际发货人是大连辽新商贸有限公司(见表 1)，委托收货人是Electric Parts Com。根据大韩民国提供的信息，这两家公司都代表朝鲜檀君贸易公司行事，而后者是委员会于 2009 年 7 月指认的实体，²⁷ 且涉足先前 2007 年 10 月扣押的运往阿拉伯叙利亚共和国与导弹有关的货物。²⁸ 大连辽新商贸有限公司的对外介绍说，该公司与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国内的许多实体保持了密切、长期的商业关系。²⁹ 这家公司也是辽新集团的四个子公司之一。

表 1
有关大连辽新商贸有限公司的资料

地址：	中国辽宁省大连市中山区港景园 22 号 14-1
电话：	86-411-8278-9796/8946，传真：86-411-8278-8901
电子邮件：	fuzh1991@yahoo.com，fuzh@liaosin.com
代表：	富振海 ³⁰

资料来源：专家小组根据公开档案提供

53. 专家小组的调查进一步显示，Electric Parts Com的地址、电话和(或)传真号码与专家小组调查的违规事件所涉其他实体和(或)被怀疑为叙利亚科学研究

²⁷ 见 S/2009/364。

²⁸ 见 S/2012/422，第 57 段。


²⁹ 大连辽新商贸有限公司从事许多物品的贸易(包括矿物、化学品、电器、机床和纺织品)，在平壤有一个代表处，并在咸兴有一个钼矿石加工厂。这一情况载列于可从 Wayback Machine 网站进入的辽新集团公司的网站上(www.liaosin.com)。

³⁰ 一个具有类似名称的实体即辽新商贸公司也以富振海先生名义在中国香港注册。

中心的幌子公司的地址、号码相同(见图六)。某些会员国指出,该中心参与采购与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹计划有关的敏感物项。³¹

图六

与相关事件有牵连的叙利亚公司网络



资料来源: 专家小组, 各种来源

54. 专家小组审查了来自有关会员国关于此案的新资料之后将向委员会报告, 并提出适当建议。³²

源自外国的“银河 3 号”部件

55. 专家小组先前的最后报告指出, 大韩民国 2012 年 12 月保存的银河 3 号火箭残片包含一些源自外国的部件(见图七)。³³ 专家小组研究了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国获得这些部件的方式。14 件不同种类的物项为辨认其生产者提供了足够的信息, 但仅有少数带有可辨认的系列编号。其他物项则不带系列编号或破损过于严重, 难以辨认。

³¹ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Three entities targeted by treasury for supporting Syria’s WMD proliferation”, press release, 4 January 2007。可在以下网页查看: www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx。日本也指出叙利亚科学研究中心是存在扩散问题的实体。

³² 中国主管部门最近表示, 它们目前没有进一步信息, 但将根据专家小组提供的新资料进一步调查这一事件。

³³ 见 S/2013/337, 第 33 段。

图七
收集的银河 3 号残片



资料来源：专家小组

56. 专家小组的分析表明，这些物项是由一些不同的国家生产的(见表 2)。为了核实和收集证据，专家小组请所有六个相关的会员国提供信息。其中四个会员国提供了详尽资料，而瑞士说该国将在完成自己的调查后分享进一步的资料。美国尚未答复。

表 2
在银河 3 号残片中发现的源自外国的部件

物项	数量	生产国	备注
1. 星形滚珠轴承	4	前苏联	可能于 1980 年代生产
2. 温度变送器	2	联合王国	生产商于 2011 年售出
3. 压力变送器	5	联合王国	生产商于 2006 年 11 月和 2010 年 4 月售出
4. 压力开关	4	前苏联	从飞毛腿导弹上拆卸下来的部件
5. 电缆线		中国	
6. 电阻器	1	联合王国	由于标识不足无法追踪辨认
7. 直流对直流转换器	4	瑞士	
8. 电磁干扰滤波器	4	中国	
9. 运算放大器	约 30	美国	
10. 现场可编程门阵列	1	美国	
11. 同步动态随机存取存储器	2	美国和大韩民国	由大韩民国公司制作的物项是于 2003 年至 2010 年间生产的。由于标识不足无法追踪辨认
12. CCD ³⁴ 摄像机	1	中国	2008 年生产
13. 视频解码器	1	美国	
14. 级间连接器	1	前苏联	飞毛腿导弹上拆卸下来的部件

资料来源：专家小组

³⁴ CCD 系指电荷耦合器件。

57. 所有部件都是现成物项，不符合被禁物项清单，尤其是与弹道导弹有关的清单上的规格，³⁵ 或其他军事规格。仅有一个物项，即在四台火箭发动机的涡轮泵中发现的星形滚珠轴承(见图八)符合上述清单中界定的某些、但非全部标准。³⁶ 尽管朝鲜遵行自力更生的主体思想，但为实施被禁计划而到国外采购部件的情况显示了朝鲜本身工业生产能力的局限性。这也表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有能力用来自全球各地的部件组装复杂的系统。

图八

涡轮泵和星形滚珠轴承



资料来源：专家小组

58. 有两个物项是从飞毛腿导弹上拆卸的部件(见图九)。多数其他物项的供应链难以辨认，因为这些物项随处可得，缺乏独特的标识，运用范围也很广。仅有五个压力变送器的供应链能追踪辨认。根据其生产商提供的资料，这些压力变送器是于 2006 年和 2010 年由在中国台湾省注册的一个实体购置的，该实体据悉曾向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行非法出口。

59. 但是，联系上的所有生产商都向专家小组证实没有向设在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的实体出售这类物项。这表明这些实体避免直接采购，而偏向于直接从货架上购置成品或通过设在第三国的中介采购。

³⁵ 与弹道导弹方案有关的物项、材料、设备、货物和技术最新清单见 S/2012/947。

³⁶ S/2012/947 项目 3.A.7 对被禁星形滚珠轴承在容限、内外环直径和宽度方面规定了具体标准。残片中发现的另一物项可归属最新清单的一个种类，而脐带式 and 级间连接器目前被禁止进出口(见 S/2012/947 项目 11.A.5)。

图九

从飞毛腿导弹上拆卸的部件(压力开关和分离连接器)



资料来源：专家小组

采购计算机数控机床和技术

60. 2013年5月10日，美国根据第13382号行政命令指认了在中国台湾省的一个实体和个人。³⁷ 根据公布的资料，Trans Multi Mechanics有限公司首席执行官Chang Wen-Fu一直积极涉足为朝鲜民族主义人民共和国购置军民两用机械。此外，Hsien Tai Tsai(又名Alex Tsai)通过Trans Multi Mechanics公司为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购并运送价值几十万美元的设备，并代表朝鲜的实体或个人谈判相关合同。

61. 专家小组先前曾经报告，Alex Tsai及其儿子Yueh-Hsun Tsai(又名Gary Tsai)于2013年5月受到美国起诉，罪名包括于2009年至2010年间出口或企图出口一台可用来生产大规模毁灭性武器的机械。³⁸ 刑事诉状称，该机械被从美国运往中国台湾省。³⁹ 专家小组有鉴于Alex Tsai过去的非法采购活动，认为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国很有可能是该机械的最终目的地。

62. Alex Tsai和他的一家公司Trans Merits于2008年在中国台湾省因伪造收据和向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送受限制的物项而被定罪。2009年，Alex Tsai、其妻、Trans Merits和他的另一家公司Global Interface公司因向朝鲜矿业发展

³⁷ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions Taiwan proliferators linked to North Korea”, 10 May 2013。可在以下网页查看：www.treasury.gov/press-center/press0releases/Pages/j11935.aspx。第13382号行政命令旨在冻结大规模毁灭性武器扩散者及其支持者的资产。

³⁸ S/2013/337，第61段。

³⁹ United States, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, “United States of America v. Hsien Tai Tsai, also known as ‘Alex Tsai’”, Criminal Complaint, 23 October 2012。可在以下网页查看：www.ice.gov/doclib/news/release/2013/130506chicago1.pdf；和“United States of America v. Yueh-Hsuan Tsai, also known as ‘Gary Tsai’”, Criminal Complaint, 19 April 2013。可在以下网页查看：www.ice.gov/doclib/news/release/2013/130506chicago2.pdf。

贸易公司⁴⁰和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国其他实体提供支持，而被美国根据第13382号行政法命令指认。⁴¹

63. 专家小组将审查从这一审判中获得的关于不遵守有关决议行为的进一步资料，并对上述个人和实体的活动进行查阅研究。

B. 军火禁运的执行情况

64. 委员会收到的多份事件报告及专家小组收集的信息表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一直而且依然在违反多项决议的情况下积极进行军火和有关物资贸易。尽管对朝鲜从中获得的确切收入众说不一，但毫无疑问，此类贸易是该国利润最丰厚的收入来源之一。

65. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不仅出口武器和弹药，还出口与军火和有关物资制造和维护相关的服务或援助。2009年以来，专家小组收集的证据表明，朝鲜积极从事前苏联在60年代和70年代生产的武器，如喷气式战斗机、地对空导弹系统或防空炮、潜水艇、主战坦克、装甲运兵车、榴弹炮、多管火箭炮和迫击炮的整修。若所需设备和技术水平不太高，朝鲜便在国外整修这些军火和有关物资。⁴²在这种情况下，则从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运来必要备件和其他物项，或在国外采购并直接运送给客户。若所需设备和技术水平过高，则在朝鲜国内整修这些军火和有关物资。

66. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国似乎在该市场中处于有利地位，原因如下：

- 竞争对手逐渐减少。由于技术分流或缺乏经济理由(认为保留整修能力不赚钱)等原因，如今很少有公司提供此类老旧设备整修服务的选项。两个与朝鲜签订了合同的国家向专家小组表示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国是它们极少的几个选择之一，甚至是唯一选择。
- 价格比仅存的几个竞争对手低得多。前苏联国家价格不断上涨，使朝鲜具有竞争优势。

67. 专家小组还发现，虽然朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已被制裁8年，但很多国家，特别是朝鲜的长期伙伴方仍对军火禁运的范围缺乏了解，因而使朝鲜可以从中受益。并非所有的会员国都认识到，军火禁运也适用于与提供、制造、维护或使用此类军火或物资有关的服务或援助。

⁴⁰ 该公司几个月后被委员会指定为北朝鲜与弹道导弹及常规武器有关的货物和设备的主要武器贸易商和主要出口商(S/2009/222)。

⁴¹ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Treasury designation of Taiwan entities and individuals”, 16 January 2009。可在以下网页查看：<http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/01/115019.htm>。

⁴² 见 S/2012/422，第71段。

68. 专家小组建议委员会在专家小组的协助下发布一个执行援助通知，提醒会员国，对所有军火和有关物资的禁运包括与提供、制造、维护或使用军火或物资有关的服务或援助。

巴拿马扣押的一批军火

69. 2013 年 7 月，巴拿马当局在巴拿马运河大西洋一侧拦住并检查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所有并悬挂该国国旗的“清川江”号杂货船(见图十)。巴拿马在 200 000 多袋糖的下面发现了藏匿的物项，据信这些物项是军火和有关物资。

图十

“清川江”号



资料来源：专家小组。

70. 专家小组在提交给委员会的事件报告中得出结论认为，货物本身以及古巴和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间的交易违反了制裁。下文将对该案件作一简述。而本报告第 124 段则介绍了该案中所用的藏匿技术细节，第 179 段介绍了与金融交易有关的方面。此外，附件七和附件八列出了在船上发现的货物详细情况，附件九至附件二十七及附件三十五列出了与该事件有关的文件。专家小组还提交了一份与该事件有关的保密附件，提请安全理事会和委员会注意(附件六)。

71. 专家小组在巴拿马进行的调查力求通过货物的物证、在船上发现的文件、通过采访船组人员以及与巴拿马当局磋商，来确定这批货物的背景。

72. 专家小组发现，藏匿的货物(见图十一，完整清单见附件七，详细分析见附件八)有 6 辆用于装载地对空导弹系统的拖车、以及 25 个集装箱，里面装有 2 架未组装的米格-21 飞机、15 台米格-21 飞机引擎、地对空导弹系统组件、弹药以及与军火有关的杂项物资。这是自第 1718(2006)号决议通过后阻截的运往或运自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军火和有关物资中数量最大的一批。

图十一

在“清川江”号上发现的军火全景。插入图片显示的分别是MiG引擎及其包装箱、导弹组件、雷达组件以及指挥车




资料来源：专家小组。

73. “清川江”号(海事组织编号 7937317)是一艘杂货船, 1977 年建成, 其配置不适合运载标准的海上集装箱, 只能在甲板下的 5 个大货舱运载杂货。该船一直是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所有并悬挂朝鲜国旗。

74. 专家小组证实, “清川江”号的航行路线是从古巴至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。航行计划和船上的其他文件显示, 该船于 4 月 11 日从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出发, 4 月 11 日至 17 日间在俄罗斯 Vostochny 港加油, 之后经过巴拿马运河开往哈瓦那。记录显示, 自 6 月 1 日通过巴拿马运河至 7 月 11 日再次经过巴拿马运河, 该船除古巴外, 未经停任何其他国家。

图十二

“清川江”号 6 月 1 日至 7 月 11 日期间停靠古巴



资料来源：专家小组。

75. 在船上发现了该船的入港记录和证书，专家小组可据此重现出该船离开巴拿马运河后的航行路线，并确定其在前往南浦之前停靠的所有港口(见图十二)。“清川江”号沿古巴西侧航行，6月4日至9日停靠在哈瓦那，并在此卸下了入境货物(轧钢板和机车车轮)。离开哈瓦那后，该船在古巴北部漂流了一段时间。6月20日，该船停靠在 Mariel 港，并在此将军火和有关物资装船。6月22日，“清川江”号航行至 Puerto Padre，于6月24日停船装载糖。7月5日，该船开始向南浦返航。

76. 古巴外交部于7月16日发表声明，承认这批军火和有关物资属于该国，并指出是把它们运去修理再运回。之后，古巴向专家小组辩解，并在向提交给委员会的报告中辩解称，不存在(按照第 1718(2006) 号决议第 8(a) 段的规定)“提供、销售或转让”，因为古巴仍是这批货物的“所有人”。此外，古巴声称，第 1718 号决议第 8(c) 段所述是“维修(maintenance)”，而古巴与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国签订的合同内容是“修理(repair)”，二者不同。古巴还请专家小组到哈瓦那进行磋商，并在磋商时指出，运出去的所有军火和有关物资都是为了进行“评价、诊断和修理”。

77. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交部7月17日指出，这批军火源自古巴，运送过来是为了根据两国间的合同进行大修。

78. 经过调查，专家小组证实，在“清川江”号船上发现的藏匿货物是从古巴运送到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军火和有关物资，并认为：

- 这批货物违反了经第 1874(2009) 号决议第 10 段修订的第 1718(2006) 号决议第 8(a)(-) 段关于禁止直接或间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供、销售或转让军火和有关物资的规定。
- 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和古巴之间的交易违反了经第 2094(2013) 号决议第 7 段阐明的第 1718(2006) 号决议第 8(c) 段和第 1874(2009) 号决议第 9 段的规定。通过这些决议是为了防止在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、该国公民或自该国领土提供、制造、维护或使用此类军火或物资方面提供技术培训、咨询、服务或援助。
- 古巴提出的“维修”和“修理”是两码事的理由不能让专家小组信服。二者都是第 1718(2006) 号决议第 8(c) 段和第 1874(2009) 号决议第 9 段规定的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不应提供的与提供、生产、维护和使用军火和有关物资有关的服务或援助。同样，如果对涉及“转让”的所有权进行另一种解释，那么就将允许贷借或租赁军火和有关物资，从而严重削弱有关决议规定的与军火和大规划毁灭性武器有关的禁运。

79. 巴拿马政府采取的行动完全符合相关决议，为今后的阻截行动确立了一个完美先例。关于这批货物的去向，巴拿马政府有义务处置被禁物品，不能将军火和

有关物资转让给来源国或目的地国(第 1874(2009) 号决议第 14 段和第 2087(2013) 号决议第 8 段)。在编写本报告时, 专家小组了解到, 该船、船组人员和货物仍在巴拿马, 但巴拿马已经宣布释放 32 名船组人员, 而且可能会在交付罚款后放船。

80. 从为隐藏这批军火和有关物资所做的大量特别工作(见图十三和第 124 段)以及在船上发现的过境可能需要的为进入巴拿马运河虚假申报(附件十四至十八)准备的应急指示(附件九至十二)说明这显然是为了有意规避各项决议。

图十三

隐藏在糖袋下的集装箱



资料来源: 美联社照片/Amulfo Franco。


81. 使用的隐藏方法也是对国际条例和安全惯例以及运河规章的蔑视。以这种方式运输未申报的武器和爆炸物, 给该船附近的所有人员和设施造成了重大危险, 应引起船务公司、港务局、国际海事界以及保险公司关注。

82. 虽然清川江船运公司被列为⁴³ 该船的船主/运营公司, 但专家小组发现实际的运营/管理公司是朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司(Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd)。该公司在安排运输这批隐匿的军火和有关物资方面发挥了重要作用(见图十四)。尽管该船未列入该公司所属船只,⁴⁴ 但朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司通过其平壤总部和其在海参威的区域分公司操控“清川江”号的此次航程, 而其大连代表处则安排备件。朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司还通过设于新加坡的Chinpo船运有限公司支付此次航行有关费用(见附件十三)。动用这么多方面为该船提供支持, 表明有一个由多个集中管理共同合作的实体构成的网络, 千方百计让朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的交易少招人耳目, 以避免检查, 从而逃过制裁。

⁴³ 见 Lloyds List Intelligence(www.lloydslistintelligence.com/)和 Equasis(www.equasis.org/)。

⁴⁴ Lloyds List Intelligence 和 Equasis。

图十四
揭示与清川江的关联的组织图



资料来源：专家小组。

83. 专家小组发现，船长收到了关于未申报货物装船和隐藏的“秘密”指示，并照办（见附件九和十）。他还有一个集装箱和拖车清单，显示其中部分是军火和有关物资（见附件二十七）。船长和朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司之间的沟通（见附件十一和十二）使用代码，表明朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司知道这些指示。此外，朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司知道该船在 10 000 吨糖的下面装载了并正在运输 25 个集装箱和 6 个拖车，但却反复向巴拿马当局和该船的当地代理说，该船运载的只是糖，这与事实不符（见附件十四至十八）。

84. 应专家小组的询问，朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司海参崴分支答复证实（见附件十九），他们公司负责该船的运营与管理，但否认对这批军火和有关物资负有任何责任（“与古巴的军事硬件无关”），也不清楚“秘密”指示；并指出，他们只是就将要装船的糖发出了指示。

85. 在船上发现的证据（见附件二十和二十一）表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻古巴的使馆人员也有参与。从船长笔记中发现的联系电话号码和记录使专家小组得出结论认为，驻哈瓦那的使馆工作人员参与安排了这批军火和有关物资的运送，包括支付办法。

86. 专家小组还得知, Chinpo 船运公司以及另外两家公司与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻新加坡大使馆同地办公(见附件二十二至二十四)。⁴⁵ Chinpo 告诉专家小组, 该公司是“朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司及其代表机构 Ocean Russia D 在新加坡的船运代理。”⁴⁶

87. 专家小组力求找出这批军火的发货人和收货人。在船上发现的文件表明, 这批糖的发货人是古巴糖业出口公司(Cubazucar), 收货人是 Korea Central Marketing and Trading Corporation(见附件十六和十七)。未发现与隐藏货物有关的类似文件。古巴在与专家小组磋商时证实了参与糖业交易的各方, 并指出运输军火是一份政府协定的内容之一。但古巴说, 因有关合同中有保密条款, 因此不能向专家小组提供这些文件的影印本。因此, 专家小组无法确定参与这些协定的实体或个人。

88. 专家小组企图联络各参与实体, 并收到了朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司海参威分公司和 Chinpo 船运公司的答复。朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司在答复(见附件十九)中自称“朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司海参威公司”。朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司海参威分公司和 Chinpo 船运公司在答复中均未对专家小组要求提供有关清川江船运公司的进一步资料做出答复。新加坡告知专家小组, 其正在调查 Chinpo 船运公司, 而且专家小组还让中国和俄罗斯联邦提供有关朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司大连代表处和海参威分公司的资料。俄罗斯联邦在 2014 年 2 月 18 日的普通照会中提供了信息(见附件 35)。

89. 专家小组在事件报告中提出了以下两条建议:

- 委员会提请会员国当局和航运界注意该案件中使用的隐藏技巧, 其程度显示出必须严格克尽职守, 核查源自或运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的货物内容, 提交文件的合法性以及所涉所有实体和个人的身份。
- 委员会鼓励会员国审查它们与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国签署的协定, 特别是那些涉及军方间合作的协定及 2006 年前签署的协定, 因为这些协定中可能含与安全理事会相关决议规定的军火和有关物资措施不符的条款或内容。

据报与缅甸开展的军火合作

90. 尽管缅甸当局 2012 年一再许诺, 该国将遵守各项决议, 包括关于军火和有关物资禁运的决议, 但新情报表明, 缅甸可能正在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行军火方面的合作。

⁴⁵ 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻新加坡大使馆的地址是 7500 Beach Road, Room #09-320(www.mfa.gov.sg 和 <http://app1.mfa.gov.sg/pdf/dipconopen.pdf>)。

⁴⁶ 船上发现的文件用此名称呼朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司海参威分公司。

91. 2013 年 7 月和 12 月，美国根据 13619 号行政命令，针对参与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和缅甸间军火交易者，指认了 2 个人和 3 个实体。⁴⁷ 根据发布的信息，这 2 个人是Thein Htay中将和Kyaw Nyunt Oo中校，他们个人参与了非法军火交易。这 2 个人都是缅甸国防工业局的关键成员，他们因继续从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行采购于 2012 年 7 月依照 13619 号行政令被指认。⁴⁸ 被指认的 3 个实体中的两个是Soe Min Htike有限公司和卓越矿产公司 (Excellence Minerals)，这两家公司最近一次是在 2013 年 6 月与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的官员合作，为军事武器方案进口物资。截至 2012 年 12 月，第三个实体，亚洲金属公司 (Asia Metal) 在缅甸国防工业局的一个厂址上盖楼，并为其提供建筑材料，约 30 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的工人仍在该工地作业。

92. 正如专家小组之前所报告的，缅甸国防工业局是从日本非法运出机械工具的收货人。这些机械工具可用于生产导弹陀螺仪。其运输是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的幌子公司安排的。⁴⁹

93. 专家小组最近致信美国，要求提供更多资料，以便评估这些活动是否违反了各项决议。

与厄立特里亚在军火方面的合作

94. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组最近获得并公布的新证据指出，2011 年 5 月的一批机械工具(见图十五)可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和厄立特里亚之间持续开展的与军火有关的合作一部分。

95. 正如专家小组之前所报告的，东部非洲一国当局 2012 年告诉专家小组，他们检查了运往厄立特里亚的一批货，他们怀疑这批货来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国而且其中含有被禁物品。⁵⁰ 最初的分析断定，这批机器未达到被禁物项、材料、设备、货物和技术清单所列标准。此外，当时，这批货物没有特别之处表明其运输涉及与厄立特里亚的军火合作。

⁴⁷ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Treasury designates Burmese Lt. General Thein Htay, Chief of Directorate of Defense”, Press Release, 2 July 2013; 和 “Treasury designates Burmese companies and an individual with ties to the Directorate of Defense Industries” Press Release, 17 December 2013. 可在以下网页查看: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1998.aspx> 和 <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2247.aspx>。

⁴⁸ United States, Department of the Treasury, “Joint fact sheet from U.S. Treasury and State Departments: Administration eases financial and investment sanctions on Burma”, Press Release, 11 July 2013. 可在以下网页查看: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1633.aspx>。

⁴⁹ 见 S/2012/422, 第 91 段。

⁵⁰ 见 S/2013/337, 第 80 至 81 段。

图十五
所运机械工具



资料来源：专家小组。

96. 然而，监测组断定，这批货物申报的收货人，即公共技术服务中心是政府汽车修理部(厄立特里亚负责武器系统维护和修理的一个机构)的别称。⁵¹ 此外，厄立特里亚 1 名叛变军人认出，这些机械工具与政府汽车修理部武器设施内的其他工具完全一样，其用途是整修武器系统。⁵² 最后，监测组指出，多个相互一致的消息来源证实，委员会 2012 年 5 月 2 日指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个主要军火出口商，即绿松联营公司至少在 2010 年前便向政府汽车修理部提供了“军事和技术支持”。⁵³

97. 鉴于这一新情况，专家小组重启调查，并请船运公司和海上承运商提供资料，同时也请厄立特里亚提供有关这批货及其与绿松联营公司的合作的资料，目前还未收到答复。

与坦桑尼亚联合共和国可能的军火合作

98. 据称，2013 年 8 月，某媒体报道，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国约 18 名军事技术人员参与整修坦桑尼亚姆万扎空军基地的 F-7 战斗机和其军用飞机。⁵⁴

⁵¹ 见 S/2013/440，第 89 至 91 段。

⁵² 同上，第 89 至 91 段。

⁵³ 同上，第 92 至 95 段。

⁵⁴ “The Dar Leader”, *Africa Confidential*, 2 August 2013。

图十六

姆万扎空军基地的歼-7 战斗机(2010 年)和新修建的库房(2013 年)



资料来源：HansueliKrapf(通过“维基共享资源”)和“谷歌地球”。

99. 专家小组证实,坦桑尼亚人民防卫部队空军在姆万扎空军基地⁵⁵ 约有 10 架歼-7 战斗机,⁵⁶ 而且最近修建了停放这些飞机的新设施(见图十六),这有力地显示这些飞机都得到了维护,可投入使用。2013 年 11 月,专家小组要求坦桑尼亚当局提供资料请求,并正在等待答复。

可能向埃塞俄比亚提供与军火有关的物资

100. 专家小组查明,一个埃塞俄比亚弹药生产商与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个实体之间可能存在联系,若属实,则可能违反军火禁运。在Homicho弹药工程实业公司(Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry)官方简介上,主要供应商一栏里列有一个名为“朝鲜矿产贸易总公司”(“Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation”(KMTGC))的实体(见图十七)。⁵⁷ Homicho弹药工程实业公

⁵⁵ 不清楚姆万扎空军基地的歼-7 飞机是旧的还是新购的。据报,坦桑尼亚人民国防军空军在 2011 年共收到 14 架新歼-7 飞机。“Tanzania-Air Force”, Jane’s World Air Forces, 16 December 2013。

⁵⁶ 米格-21 的中国升级版。

⁵⁷ 公司简介可在以下网页查看: www.metec.gov.et/index.php/en/metec-industries/homicho-ammunition-industry(2013 年 1 月 15 日查阅)。

司是金属和工程公司 (Metals and Engineering Corporation) 下属实体之一，后者是埃塞俄比亚为加快埃塞俄比亚的工业化，于 2002 年成立的一个机构。Homicho 弹药工程实业公司简介称，其生产各种弹药 (包括子弹、坦克炮弹和迫击炮弹)。

图十七

Homicho 弹药工程实业公司简介摘录

弹药工程实业公司简介		
公司背景	本公司成立于 1987 年，项目号 130，旨在建立当地生产弹药产品的能力。2010 年，本公司并入 Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) 旗下，实行改组，成为 Homicho 弹药工程实业公司 (HAEI)。	
主要供应商	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Anton Spare Parts Trading GMBH Hamburg(Gemany) – Communication and Accessories Int.(Italy) – Effective Laboratory(India) – HMT International Limited (India) – 朝鲜矿产贸易总公司 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – North Industries Corporation (China) – Profilex(Czech Republic) – Serind S.P.A.(Italy) – Sjoy dial sud and Sons(India) – West Kemper Engineering (Germany) – Poly, ALIT(China)

资料来源：www.metec.gov.et

101. 专家小组证实，“朝鲜矿业贸易总公司”不是大韩民国实体，据推测其可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个实体，因此正着手进行调查。专家小组最近要求埃塞俄比亚当局发出了提供信息。

与乌干达的合作

102. 2013 年 7 月有报告称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正按照一项政府协定，为乌干达警察提供培训。⁵⁸ 根据 2013 年 6 月 17 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人民安全部副部长与即将离任的乌干达共和国内务部长发表的联合通告，⁵⁹ 两国在 2008 年 7 月签署了重点为“警察合作”的相互合作协定。作为该合作的一部分，

⁵⁸ “Exclusive: North Korean minister inspects Ugandan Police Force”, NKNews, 13 June 2013; 和“North Korea trained Ugandan marines graduate”, NKNews, 2 July 2013。可在以下网页查看：www.nknews.org/2013/06/exclusive-north-korean-minister-inspects-ugandan-police-force/ 和 www.nknews.org/2013/07/north-korea-trained-ugandan-marines-graduate/。

⁵⁹ Uganda Police Force, Joint communication by the Vice Minister of People’s Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the outgoing Minister of Internal Affairs, Hon. Hillary Onok, 17 June 2013。可在以下网页查看：www.upf.go.ug。

乌干达警方会得到各种形式的援助，包括武术方面的基础训练、海军部队专门训练以及医疗专业知识。

图十八

2013 年 6 月，李成哲副部长访问乌干达



来源：Stringer/法新社/Getty Images

103. 为了确定这一合作是否有哪些方面可能违反军火禁运，专家小组于 2013 年 11 月要求乌干达发出了提供信息。2013 年 12 月，乌干达当局答复了专家小组，指出乌干达警察部队没有从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购买任何设备，后者也未提供任何设备。此外，他们表示，只获得了以下方面的援助：

(a) 警察武术训练；

(b) 海上救援训练(灾害管理、海事安保与安全)；

(c) 警察建筑部门的能力建设；

(d) 为乌干达警察特种部队、警察建筑部门、刑事和法医调查部门提供安保和技术培训课程。

104. 2014 年 1 月，专家小组要求提供进一步资料，说明所提供训练的确切性质，特别是对乌干达警察特种部队的训练的性质。

在索马里发现的弹药

105. 2013 年 2 月，有媒体报道称，在非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)在摩加迪沙的仓库中发现了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国制造的武器，并提出有可能存在多次违反军火禁运的情况。⁶⁰

106. 2012 年 7 月，监测组证实，在非索特派团的仓库中发现了多箱朝鲜民主主义人民共和国制造的 14.5 毫米重机枪弹药。⁶¹ 监测组报告，经与利比亚问题专家小组确认，这些是最初按照 1977 年订立的合同向利比亚交付的 600 箱弹药中的一部分。监测组还表示，利比亚问题专家小组获准查看了同一份合同项下的弹药箱，发现有 1978 年的生产标识。

107. 但是，由于尚不清楚这些弹药箱进入利比亚的日期，监测组无法断定朝鲜民主主义人民共和国是否违反了军火禁运。监测组和利比亚问题专家小组计划联合进行实地访问，本专家小组将对该访问可能获得到的任何新资料进行审查。

可能未被发现的向伊朗运送武器

108. 专家小组最近获得的信息显示，在 2009 年 11 月伊朗伊斯兰共和国运往阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的一大宗军火货物(500 吨)中，发现一些物项可能来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。这批货物是以色列海军在从埃及达米埃塔驶往阿拉伯叙利亚共和国拉塔基亚的“Francop”号轮船装载的集装箱里发现的。⁶² 这被认为是伊朗伊斯兰共和国违反了第 1747(2007)号决议关于禁止其出口任何武器或有关材料的规定。

109. 根据最近得到的照片证据，专家小组确认：

- 在“Francop”号船上发现的火箭引信的形状和标识与 2009 年 8 月在“ANL Australia”号船上查获的引信相似(见图十九)。⁶³
- 122 毫米火箭的标识与 2009 年 12 月在曼谷扣押的一批军火中发现的 240 毫米火箭的标识相似(见图二十)。⁶⁴
- 装火箭引信和 122 毫米火箭的货箱上贴的是假标签，标示为“推土机零部件”和“建筑设备”，这是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国惯用的欺骗做法(见附件二十八，关于逃避制裁的方式)。

⁶⁰ Louis Charbonneau, “Exclusive: UN monitors see arms reaching Somalia from Yemen, Iran”, Reuters, 10 February 2013.

⁶¹ 见 S/2013/413, 附件 6.1, 第 74-76 段。

⁶² Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israeli naval force intercepts Iranian weapon ships”, 4 November 2009.

⁶³ 有关从“ANL Australia”号上扣押的军火物资的更多资料，见 S/2010/571, 附件，第 61 段。

⁶⁴ 有关在曼谷扣押的军火物资的更多资料，见 S/2013/337, 第 75-79 段。

110. 因此, 专家小组得出结论认为, 这些火箭和引信极有可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国生产的。但是, 由于不知道它们转移到伊朗伊斯兰共和国的具体日期, 不能确定是否违反了军火禁运。

图十九

2009 年 8 月(上)和 2009 年 11 月(下)扣押的引信



图二十

2009 年 11 月(左)和 2009 年 12 月(右)扣押的火箭上的标识



来源: 专家小组和以色列外交部(通过 Flickr)。

111. 专家小组最近还获得了 2012 年 11 月向以色列发射的 333 毫米 FAJAR 火箭残留物的照片。小组注意到, 该火箭引信的残留物与先前扣押的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国生产的引信有一些相似之处。⁶⁵ 但是, 由于不知道其转让日期和监管链的情况, 小组不能确定这是否违反了军火禁运。

⁶⁵ 见 S/2013/337, 第 71-74 段。

据称被土耳其扣押的军火和相关物资

112. 2013 年 8 月, 据称土耳其当局截获了来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一批货物, 包括步枪和手枪(1400 支)、弹药(约 30000 发)和防毒面具。⁶⁶ 据报这些武器是 2013 年 4 月在一艘悬挂利比亚国旗的名为“Al Entisar”的渔船(海事组织编号 8904044)上发现的, 当时它正在伊斯坦布尔靠港。由于这艘船曾被指参与 2012 年 9 月向阿拉伯叙利亚共和国运送利比亚武器,⁶⁷ 本专家小组联系了利比亚问题专家小组。该专家小组的成员表示, 他们正在调查涉及“Al Entisar”的这一新的指称事件, 迄今尚没有资料表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能牵涉其中。本专家小组将进一步研究利比亚问题专家小组获得的信息。

泰国扣押的一批军火

113. 专家小组在 2013 年的最后报告中指出, 在曼谷扣押了从平壤顺安国际机场起飞的一架伊-76 飞机上装载的一批军火, 并就此建议对三个人进行指认(见 S/2013/337, 第 75 至 79 段)。2013 年 6 月 12 日, 其中一名哈萨克国民通过其律师向委员会主席递交一封信, 反驳专家小组的指控。专家小组随后与他的律师交换了信件。专家小组还一直与建议指认的另外两人保持联系, 他们都是乌克兰国民。专家小组认为, 迄今获得的资料并不能改变其结论, 即这三人的行动协助了决议禁止的活动。不过, 专家小组将继续仔细审查现有资料和未来获取的资料, 必要时, 将进一步报告和(或)调整其提交安全理事会和委员会的调查结果和建议。

据报扣押潜艇零部件

114. 专家小组继续对 2011 年检查有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一个实体参与的空运潜艇零部件事件(见 S/2013/337 第 82 段)进行调查。根据获得的资料, 这批货物预定以空运方式从欧洲某国运往东南亚某国, 但 2011 年 2 月在中国台湾省的一个国际机场被查。另外, 专家小组获得的资料表明, 中介人可能是绿松联营公司(Green Pine Associated Corporation)。专家小组最近要求据信是航空承运人的一家公司提供信息。小组将继续询问情况。

企图从蒙古采购喷气式战斗机零部件

115. 2013 年 4 月, 有媒体报道称, 蒙古空军前指挥官于 2011 年签署了一项合同, 内容是向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供大约 20 架废弃不用的米格-21 喷气式

⁶⁶ Barbara Demick, “North Korea tried to ship gas masks to Syria, report says”, Los Angeles Times, 27 August 2013.

⁶⁷ 见 S/2013/99, 第 183-188 段。

战斗机的发动机及其他零部件和废料。⁶⁸ 专家小组一直就此与蒙古当局保持联系。蒙古当局最近邀请专家小组就这一案件进行协商。

C. 执行奢侈品禁令

116. 在本报告所述期间，会员国没有向委员会报告违反奢侈品禁令的事件，但专家小组正在调查媒体报道的可能违反制裁的事件。虽然在某些情况下显然违反了禁令，但专家小组尚不能确定，在报道的所有事件中是否都存在违反奢侈品禁令的情况。

117. 专家小组的调查表明，有效执行奢侈品禁令仍然是一个棘手问题。对“奢侈品”一词有不同的定义，这意味着直接从某国出口算是违反禁令，但如果从另一个国家购买则可能就不算违反。瑞士政府告知专家小组，它修改了关于奢侈品的规定，将“奢侈性体育设施(例如滑雪场和游泳池)所用的基础设施和设备”列入规管范围，从而阻止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国企图从瑞士购买滑雪缆车。在8月14日之前，另一家滑雪缆车供应商，即一家名为恩菲工程技术有限公司的中国公司已经签约；据其网站公布，⁶⁹ 2014年1月12日前已向滑雪场交付了所有缆车。滑雪缆车不属于第2094(2013)号决议中定义的奢侈品类别。

马息岭滑雪场

118. 2014年1月关于马息岭滑雪场开业的报告载有多个外国公司提供的设备的照片，包括Prinoth 和PistenBully压雪设备、Areco吹雪机和BRP雪地摩托车。⁷⁰ 由于加拿大和欧洲联盟对奢侈品的定义可能包括这类设备，⁷¹ 专家小组联系了所有相关生产厂家和政府。

119. 针对专家小组的询问，意大利证实，意大利当局认为，Prinoth 压雪机是奢侈品。他们进一步指出，没有向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口这类设备，朝鲜可能是从位于其他国家的分销商那里购买的。PistenBully 公司承认向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个实体出售过压雪机，但那是在2003年，即奢侈品禁令通过之前的事。专家小组正在等待其他政府和制造商的答复。

⁶⁸ 见 S/2013/337，第 83-85 段。

⁶⁹ “China ENFI's ‘Masik Pass Speed’-Korea Won San(Won Mountain)Masik Ridge/Pass ski cableway project enters into operation”, 21 January 2014. (见 www.enfi.com.cn)。

⁷⁰ “Equipment at N. Korean ski resort may breach UN luxury goods sanctions”, NK News, 2 January 2014.

⁷¹ 加拿大对奢侈品的定义包括“体育用品”和“汽车及其他机动车辆”，欧洲联盟对奢侈品的定义包括“滑雪用品及设备”。

豪华游艇

120. 专家小组调查了 2013 年 6 月媒体报道的购买豪华游艇一事，查明该游艇是位于英国普利茅斯的 Princess Yachts 公司生产的。⁷² 小组咨询了英国，正等待进一步信息。目前尚不清楚游艇的具体型号、制造年份和交货日期。

丹尼斯·罗德曼及其同行人员赠送礼物

121. 专家小组还对指称丹尼斯·罗德曼及其同行人员在 2013 年 9 月和 12 月及 2014 年 1 月访问平壤时携带奢侈品作为礼品一事进行了调查。专家小组查证了媒体报道，⁷³ 其中指出，丹尼斯·罗德曼及其同行人员访问期间携带的物品包括来自不同国家的体育用品、罗德曼带去的五瓶伏特加(美国)、爱尔兰公司的 Paddy Power 带去的一瓶威士忌(爱尔兰)、两个威士忌酒杯、一个威士忌酒器(爱尔兰)和一个 Mulberry 手袋(英国)。美国的奢侈品清单包含酒精饮料，而 2007 年 3 月 27 日欧洲理事会第 329/2007 号条例中的“奢侈品”定义包括高品质葡萄酒(包括起泡酒)、烈酒和酒精饮料、以及高品质铅晶玻璃器皿和高品质手袋。专家小组认为，这一事件表明，有必要向个人和公司说明其根据决议应承担的义务。专家小组正在继续调查此事。

七. 阻截

122. 所报告的阻截行动以海上运输为主(14 次中有 12 次)，这可能未准确体现整体的违禁模式，但却说明了为逃避检查而采用的手段；附件二十八载有根据所有调查案件汇总的逃避侦查手段。“清川江”号上发现的货物使人们对逃避检查的手段有了新的认识：虽然这些非法货物与以前，即在实施制裁前阻截的货物一样，被千方百计隐藏起来，但其运输却并未采用常规的商业航运渠道。

123. 海运业的特点是所有权和运营商安排复杂，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的情况也是如此，但又因为该国试图掩盖国家参与，试图以合法贸易伪装来逃避检查而变得更加复杂。专家小组委托开展的一项研究(见第 165-168 段)有助于说明所有权和挂旗方面的安排，查明一些支持这些安排的网络，而这些网络显示出可能与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的迹象。

A. “清川江”号使用的逃避制裁技巧

124. “清川江”号事件揭示了为掩盖货物的存在及其性质而实施的全面有预谋的战略。这是专家小组第一次能够立即、直接登上会员国阻截的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。该船是要直接过境的，因此，悬挂外国旗、转运或租船并未使其


⁷² “Exclusive: Fit for a princess: Kim Jong Un’s \$7m yacht”, NKNews, 18 June 2013. 可在以下网查看: www.nknews.org/2013/06/exclusive-fit-for-a-princess-kim-jong-uns-7m-yacht/。

⁷³ Chad O’Carroll, “Paddy Power gifts to Kim Jong-un could have broken UN sanctions”, Daily Telegraph, 10 January 2014.

受益，而需要采取不同的隐藏技巧，即若货物被认为是合法商业运输，则不会被发现的活动。所采用的一些技巧包括：

- 船员谨守操作秘密，通信严格保密，核心是：仅向高级人员发送秘密指示，内载与该船运营商通信的详细暗语和货物虚假申报应急指示(见附件九至附件十二)；
- 从离开巴拿马运河直至重新进入运河期间，关闭了提供船舶位置实时信息的自动识别系统，⁷⁴ 以隐瞒和掩饰船只位置，遮掩船只行动，特别是在马里埃尔港停靠和漂流时，并伪造船舶日志。
- 在马里埃尔港⁷⁵ 而不是哈瓦那或帕德雷港装船。该船在没有标准货运单据、装运收据、装运报告和货物检验报告的情况下接收了货物。
- 故意不告知古巴和巴拿马的航运代理有关该船行动和实际装载货物的情况。
- 该船未将集装箱放置在最上层(危险货物建议如此装运)，而是进行了调整，将 40 英尺的集装箱装在货舱深处；这样，集装箱可被糖袋/下层甲板舱盖/糖袋这三层覆盖。

图二十一
显示隐藏货物位置的剖面图



资料来源：专家小组

- 伪造货物预装载计划，给人一种仅装载了糖的印象(见附件二十五)。
- 虚假申报，舱单根本不包括所隐藏货物，没有非法货物提单(见附件十五和十六)。

⁷⁴ 自动识别系统是为了预防海上碰撞，以便在船舶交通管理中确保船舶安全通过，以及进行搜救。《国际海上人命安全公约》，第五章，第十九条第二款，关于携带船载导航系统和设备的要求。

⁷⁵ 一个古巴与巴西的联合体和古巴军方控制的 Almacenes Universal S.A.公司正在将马里埃尔港开发成一个主要深水港和自由贸易区。该港口原是潜艇基地，2014年1月27日起正式启动开发工作。

- 提交了一份曾停靠的 10 个港口的清单(以便通过巴拿马运河)，但未列出马里埃尔港(见附件十五)。

125. 此前的事件中至少使用过上述某些技巧，包括在实施制裁之前。2002 年，一艘从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驶往也门途中的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只——So San号遭拦截，⁷⁶ 舱单所列货物仅为水泥，但检查发现水泥袋下藏有 15 枚飞毛腿 B型导弹、15 枚常规爆炸弹头和 23 个火箭燃料筒(见图二十二)。1999 年，印度海关(根据情报采取行动)，搜查了悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗的船只 Kuwolsan号，该船由Korea Buhung 运输公司所有和运营，运载的货物是糖。虽然船员进行了阻拦，但海关人员检查后发现了几箱贴有“水净化设备”标签的飞毛腿导弹部件，该船正从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驶往巴基斯坦，或可能是利比亚(舱单系伪造)。

图二十二

So San 号所载水泥袋下装有飞毛腿部件的集装箱



资料来源：西班牙国防部

B. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国拥有或控制的运输资产

船队

126. 截至 2014 年 1 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商船队估计共有 240 艘船。⁷⁷ 根据Lloyd's List Intelligence，政府商船队⁷⁸ 的特点如下(术语定义见附件二十九)：

- 实际所有人：152 艘船(见图二十三)

⁷⁶ 海事组织编号 8020252，2004 年 7 月 14 日更名为 Chang Dokon。2002 年 10 月 2 日重挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗。注册所有人为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府，实际所有人和所列运营商为 2002 年 10 月 2 日成立的 Korea Kangsong General Trading Corporation。


⁷⁷ 朝鲜新闻网船只跟踪工具。网址：<http://www.nknews.org/north-korea-ship-tracking/>。

⁷⁸ 除 4 艘船之外，所有船舶都挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗。140 艘船的注册公司是驻该国的公司。关于所有权类型的解释见第 132 至 138 段。

- 注册所有人：12 艘船
- 商业运营者：30 艘船

图二十三

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府为实际所有人的商船队的构成



资料来源：Lloyd's List Intelligence。

127. 在其第 2094(2013) 号决议第 19 段中，安全理事会请所有国家向委员会提交为规避制裁或违反决议规定，而把朝鲜民主主义人民共和国飞机或船只转让给其他公司的信息(包括重新命名或换旗)。虽然各国未提交此类报告，但专家小组发现，该决议通过后，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所有的或悬挂该国船旗的船只被重新登记或换旗(见附件三十)。⁷⁹ 专家小组不了解重新登记/换旗背后的动机。

128. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为以下货船使用方便旗(见表 3)

⁷⁹ Lloyd's List Intelligence 和欧洲优质航运信息系统；不包括油船。

表 3
2013 年方便旗的使用情况

船旗国	船名	海事组织编号	船型	起始日期
伯利兹	East Wind	4906525	补给船	1994 年 11 月 2 日
蒙古	Victory 2	8312227	杂货	2012 年 1 月 9 日
蒙古	Kunjari	9045182	杂货	2003 年 7 月 9 日
蒙古	KwangMyong	8856962	杂货	2003 年 7 月 10 日
巴拿马	Woory Star 2	8717910	杂货	2011 年 5 月 13 日
塞拉利昂	Global Nampo	9000766	集装箱船	2010 年 11 月 4 日
塞拉利昂	New Hunchun	9536272	杂货	2010 年 6 月 3 日
圣基茨和尼维斯	RifatMacit	6703812	杂货	2005 年 10 月 26 日

资料来源：Lloyd's List Intelligence 和欧洲优质航运信息系统

129. “清川江”号上发现的文件为专家小组首次提供了一个实例，说明：朝鲜民主主义人民共和国如何由其自己的船舶来计划、安排和管理该国的国际海运。这些文件还进一步说明了监测船舶所有权的复杂性，而若考虑到该国采用的做法，则更是如此。

130. “清川江”号的注册所有人、实际所有人和运营商是清川江航运有限公司，但该船的实际运营商是海洋海事管理公司。目前，该公司不是任何船舶的注册所有人，尽管它是 14 艘船的申报运营商。

131. 该船上发现的文件说明，“清川江”号隶属于陆地和海洋运输部所属的海洋管理局(해운관리국)见(附件二十)。这一关系表明，如同在其他经济部门一样，政府实体可能在航运中使用其他名称或化名开展海外业务。这一点还让人质疑朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内“私营”公司合法拥有的船只的身份。

132. 除政府之外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的大多数注册所有人是仅有 1 艘或 2 艘船的小公司。与全球所有权集中的趋势相反，该国拥有超过 5 艘船只的公司很少。这一做法可能有许多原因，但它的确带来了限制金融资产扣押/冻结可能产生的不利影响的好处。许多情况下，似乎船只重新命名和换旗与成立航运公司同时进行，这很可能是为了使其历史和关系“清白”。某些公司的成立仅仅是为了购买新船或出售/处置不再运营的船只等特定目的。许多贸易公司有自己的船只。专家小组编制了一份在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国注册的航运公司清单(见附件三十一)。

133. 除了自有和悬挂本国船旗以及自有和悬挂外国船旗的船只外，还有一个类别的船引起了专家小组的重大关切，原因是这类船可更方便地协助朝鲜民主主义人民共和国规避制裁。难以查明那些登记簿上即未显示所有人，也未显示船旗国，

但是却由该国控制的船舶。通常，这些船的注册所有人和运营商是专门的幌子公司或者是作为更大型的航运业务一部分的中介公司。

134. 在涉及前商船Light号的事件中，⁸⁰ 该船被阻截之前，船舶所有权或管理方面的记录未表明它仍然由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制。⁸¹ 专家小组继续研究一些船只的航行历史，追踪其所有权和管理方面的变化。迄今为止，专家小组已确定了 19 艘它认为可疑的货船。除了 2013 年最后报告中指出的 5 艘船可能由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制之外，⁸² 专家小组认为还有 2 艘船满足去年报告第 111 段规定的标准，即可能仍在该国控制之下(见表 4)。

表 4

可能仍由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的船舶

海事组织 编号	现用名	曾用名	船旗	新运营商 国籍	挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 船旗的时期
8225436	Faith	Kuk San	柬埔寨	中国香港	2009-2013 年
8954893	Qian Li Shan 13	Kum Rung 8	柬埔寨	中国香港	1995-2008 年

资料来源：Lloyd's List Intelligence 和欧洲优质航运信息系统

135. 除调查船舶本身之外，专家小组开始调查以掩盖船只与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间联系的方式来“拥有和管理”船舶的公司网络。这些船舶在众目睽睽之下隐匿。Light号被阻截时，该船的注册管理人是Dalian Sea Glory航运公司，⁸³ 注册所有人是Ever Ocean航运代理公司，所列地址是Sea Star航运有限公司转交。⁸⁴ 按照这种结构，该船于 2006 年重挂伯利兹船旗。在该船是由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的情况曝光后：⁸⁵

- Light 号重挂船旗，从伯利兹改为塞拉利昂(2011 年 7 月 28 日)；
- Light 号更名为 Victory 3 号(2011 年 8 月 13 日)；
- 运营商从 Dalian Sea Glory 航运公司改为 Sea Star 航运有限公司(2011 年 8 月 13 日)。

⁸⁰ 见 S/2013/337，第 110 段。

⁸¹ Light 号曾用名 为 Bu Yon 1 号，2004 年 1 月 1 日至 2006 年 5 月 23 日由 Korea Buyon 航运公司拥有，此后所有权移交给 Ever Ocean 航运代理，管理从 Buyon 航运公司移交给 Dalian Sea Glory 航运公司。

⁸² 见 S/2013/337，第 111 段。


⁸³ 中国辽宁省大连市中山区人民路 71 号成大大厦，M09 室；电话/传真：(86)4118 259 7896。未确定电子邮件或网站地址。查明代表人：Guang Feng Miao。

⁸⁴ 中国香港湾仔谢斐路 90 号河南大厦 17 层，1701 室。

⁸⁵ Lloyd's List Intelligence。

136. Sea Star 航运有限公司除了为永洋船務代理有限公司提供地址之外，还为另一家船东和管理人Grandtex 航运有限公司提供了转交地址。⁸⁶ Grandtex使用的另一个地址是Korea Kunhae 有限公司转交。⁸⁷ Grandtex是Sai Nal 3 号这艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗的船只的注册所有人。⁸⁸

图二十四
与 Light 号商船有关的公司



资料来源：专家小组依据公开记录

137. 网络中的实体和个人之间的联系是通过各种属性建立的。本报告第166-169段介绍了专家小组委托开展的研究，其中概述了若干大型、相互关联的航运网络，它们可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的船只的庇护所。上述研究所关注的方面包括：公司有共同所有人/董事/高级职员；相同的地址、电话和传真号码；使用一小群相同的业务协调人；上述研究还审查了船只，特别是那些定

⁸⁶ 根据世界船舶登记簿(<http://www.world-ships.com/>)的记录。

⁸⁷ 根据欧洲优质航运信息系统提供的地址: Tonghung-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, North Korea。

⁸⁸ 欧洲优质航运信息系统。

期停靠朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口的船只，或者是以其他方式引起关注的船只所有权和管理权转移情况。

138. 例如，上述研究发现的一个网络以一家设在香港(中国)的公司为核心。专家小组 2013 年的最后报告指出，挂巴拿马船旗的船只Guang Hai号(海事组织编号 8403258)可能由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制，说明了该国可能利用船舶重新命名的方式来掩盖船舶与本国航运公司之间的联系(专家小组注意到，据报告，无论是该船还是该网络中的公司均不涉及违禁事件)。⁸⁹

- 2011 年 5 月 16 日，Kwang hae 号从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗改挂巴拿马船旗。
- 2011 年 8 月 29 日，该船更名为 Guang Hai；注册所有人和实际所有人也发生变化。
- 此前的注册所有人由该船以前的实际所有人拥有。两家公司在平壤共用同一办公地址。同样，该船新的注册所有人和新的实际所有人也共用一个地址。

机队

139. 运营在平壤顺安国际机场起飞和降落的定期航班和航线的航空公司的数目依然非常有限。但是，2013 年 5 月以来，每条航线的航班数目发生了变化。每周往返北京的航班从 6 次增至 8 次，其中 5 次由高丽航空公司运营，3 次由中国国际航空公司运营，中国国际航空公司是唯一一家定期为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国服务的外国航空公司。⁹⁰ 目前，高丽航空公司航班还每周 2 次往返海参威。往返沈阳的航班次数未变(每周 2 次)，而往返吉隆坡的航班次数减少(从每周 2 次减至每周 1 次)。每周往返曼谷的航班情况不明。该航班和前往科威特城、莫斯科、南京、上海和延吉的其他航班很有可能是根据特定需要或按季节运营。

140. 高丽航空公司的机队无重大变化。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国注册的所有客运和货运飞机继续由国有航空公司——高丽航空公司运营。2013 年 2 月，客机机队增加了一架安东诺夫(安)148 型喷气式支线客机，⁹¹ 这是订购的 2 架飞机中的第一架。⁹² 第二架飞机的预计交货时间是 2013 年第三季度，但尚未交货。专家

⁸⁹ 关于所有权、管理、命名和挂旗的信息来自 Lloyd's List Intelligence。

⁹⁰ 2013 年 10 月，蒙古总统访问朝鲜之际，蒙古航空公司运营了从乌兰巴托至平壤的 3 架包机。这些飞机是在包租的基础上运行的。Routes Online, "MIAT Mongolian Airlines Launches North Korean Service in October 2013", 20 October 2013. 可在以下网查看: <http://www.routesonline.com/news/29/breaking-news/222819/miat-mongolian-airlines-launches-north-korea-service-in-october-2013/>。

⁹¹ 注册号: P-671。安-148-100 B 型可容纳 68 至 85 名乘客(取决于配置)，航程 3 500 公里。<http://www.antonov.com/>。

⁹² 空运数据库(<http://www.aerotransport.org/>)。

小组认为，还订购了 1 架比安-148 型稍大的安-158 型(99 座)飞机。⁹³ 这三架安东诺夫飞机是为了取代图波列夫(图)-134 和图-154 飞机，这两种型号的飞机因安全原因已在几个国家的领空禁飞，正在被逐渐淘汰。

141. 正如专家小组以前指出，高丽航空公司和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的所有机场或简易机场均由朝鲜人民空军通过民航局控制。据报，所有工作人员都是空军人员，所有国内的维护工作都由空军工程人员负责。⁹⁴ 高丽航空公司与空军彼此不分，以下情况进一步说明了这一点：2013 年 7 月 27 日阅兵式期间，3 架伊留申(伊)-76 飞机飞越金日成广场(见图二十五)。

图二十五

2013 年 7 月 27 日阅兵式期间飞过的伊-76 飞机



资料来源：Ed Jones / 法新社 / 盖蒂图片社(左)和俄新社(右)

⁹³ 空运数据库。

⁹⁴ 见专家组 2011 年最后报告(未发表)第 114 段。

142. 分析结果表明，这些飞机不是空军违反关于所有武器和相关物资禁运规定新购置的飞机，而是高丽航空公司正式运营的飞机。专家小组获得的一幅图片显示，其中一架伊-76 飞机在阅兵式前被重新喷漆(见图二十六)，另一架阅兵式后降落在莫斯科谢列梅捷沃国际机场的伊-76 飞机机身上仍显现出军用飞机的油漆图标(见图二十七)。这表明，高丽航空公司正式购买和运营的飞机，空军不仅可以使使用，而且实际上已经使用。

图二十六

伊-76 飞机在阅兵式前被重新喷漆



资料来源：Stefan Krasowski

图二十七

阅兵式后，伊-76 飞机机身上可看到的军用飞机油漆痕迹



资料来源：朝鲜新闻网 (Dmitry Batov / Znamyatruda)

143. 考虑到空军对高丽航空公司飞机的控制和使用，专家小组认为，会员国应该意识到，与提供、维护或使用高丽航空公司飞机有关的金融交易、技术培训、咨询、服务或协助可能违反第 1874(2009) 号决议第 9 段规定的所有武器及相关材料的禁运。⁹⁵

144. 2009 年 12 月在曼谷扣押的武器是在一架包租的军用货机上发现的。⁹⁶ 最近，专家小组在一批空运货物中发现的弹道导弹相关物项(见本报告第 45 至 47 段)证实，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还利用常规货运方式运输违禁物项。虽然还不清楚从平壤(专家小组发现该批货物的出发地是平壤)至北京使用的是哪一类服务，但此事证实一点，即按计划，是要利用常规货运方式将该批货物运往最终目的地。常规货运收取的费用低于包机，使用的是在主要枢纽运营的定时客运和货运航班。由于这些枢纽须遵守高级别安保规章，常规货运服务仅被用于不易被严密检查发现的违禁物品。正如专家小组以前指出，与平壤有定期联系的 5 个机场的货物搬运工和在这些机场提供定期货运服务的航空公司应密切监测所有源自或运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的所有货物。

陆运

145. 迄今为止，委员会未收到经铁路或公路跨越朝鲜民主主义人民共和国边境运输有关货物的报告。

146. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最近对公路和铁路进行的基础设施投资体现了与邻国开展贸易的重要性。这也可能为非法货物运输提供了备选路线，相对减少对区域港口的依赖。2015 年，将新开通沈阳至丹东的高速铁路。⁹⁷ 最近的发展以罗先经济区为核心，其中包括 2013 年 9 月罗津和喀山之间的双轨铁路重新开通，⁹⁸ 将其与跨西伯利亚铁路联通；至欧洲的运输时间将因为综合铁路网的使用而从 45 天缩短至 14 天。⁹⁹

八. 旅行禁令和资产冻结

147. 获得关于安全理事会 2013 年 1 月指认的国防工业集团——朝鲜永邦总公司(Korea Ryonbong General Corporation)所属Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint

⁹⁵ 一名专家小组成员认为，飞机重新喷漆不足以证明这些飞机由空军控制。

⁹⁶ 见 S/2013/337，第 75-79 段。

⁹⁷ Adam Rose, “China to open high speed rail link to North Korean border in 2015”, Reuters, 2 January 2014.

⁹⁸ “Rajin-Khasan Railway Section Opens for Service”, KCNA, 23 September 2013.

⁹⁹ “Down the ‘Iron Silk Road’: Russia, North Korea open railway link”, RT, 23 September 2013.

Venture Corporation¹⁰⁰（下称“Ryonha”）的新资料后，专家小组更加关切被指认实体利用未被认出的新名称¹⁰¹等手段继续在国外开展业务的能力。

148. Ryonha企图参加2013年10月在中国丹东举办的一次贸易展览会。¹⁰² 根据专家小组获得的资料，该公司以“朝鲜联合机械贸易会社”的名称登记参加展览会（见附件三十二）。按照发音译成英文，这相当于使用“Korea Ryonhap[或Lian’he]Machinery Trading Company”这一名称。然而，一进入展览会，该公司的横幅却采用了其已知别名之一——Korea Ryonha Machinery Corporation(中文：“朝鲜莲河机械公司”、朝鲜文：“조선련하기계회사”)(见图二十八)。据报，该公司的横幅和展品在展览会的第二天消失。

图二十八

Korea Ryonha Machinery 公司展位



资料来源：专家小组获得的图片

149. 中国当局在对专家小组询问的答复中报告说，Ryonha 的名称不在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供的参展者名单中，展览会开幕前也没在任何展位出现。在发现其存在后，中国要求 Ryonha 退出展览会，并确保有关人员离境(根据专家小组的情报，在展览会期间，至少有七名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民为 Ryonha 工作或接受其指令)。

150. 专家小组还发现，尽管是被指认实体，但Ryonha在中朝贸易网的网站上仍被列为“推荐企业及会员”。¹⁰³ 中国在对专家小组询问的答复中回应说，Ryonha 已被从列表中删除。

¹⁰⁰ 安全理事会于2013年1月指认 Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation。

¹⁰¹ 见 S/2013/337，第135和136段。

¹⁰² 2013年10月11日至14日举办的第二届中朝经贸文化旅游博览会。

¹⁰³ 中朝贸易网网站(<http://zcmw.com/cn/>)。

图二十九

Ryonha 的代表



资源来源：专家小组获得的图片

151. 此外，专家小组注意到，Ryonha 在展览会上展出的机床中至少一台装有源自他国的控制平台。由于有关决议规定的措施禁止向被指认实体转让任何物项，因此专家小组联系了该控制平台的制造商，该制造商回答说，这些产品由于出口管制的限制并未出售给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，但朝鲜有可能是通过中间商获得的。专家小组打算进一步研究这一问题，以便确定 Ryonha 是何时、以何种方式获得这些控制面板的。

152. 专家小组建议委员会在被指认实体和个人综合名单中将“朝鲜联合机械贸易会社”列入 Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation 使用的别名清单。

153. 委员会就专家小组在其 2013 年最后报告中提出的两项建议采取了行动。委员会在其网站上提供了一个链接，连接至一份关于被指认实体和个人惯常使用的朝鲜文名称的非正式综合名单，其中包括专家小组在被指认实体和个人综合名单中认定的 Ryonha 的若干新别名和识别资料。¹⁰⁴

154. 捷克共和国在 2013 年 12 月通知委员会，这些新的识别资料帮助该国查出了 Ryonha 的另一个别名。该国建议委员会在综合名单中增加“Millim Technology Company”，最近一次更新已列入这一名称。

155. 专家小组指出，一些会员国公布了安全理事会或委员会所指认实体的别名，这些别名可以列入综合名单。例如，综合名单上没有 Korean Tangun Trading Corporation (朝鲜檀君贸易公司) 使用的公认别名，如 Korea Dangun Trading Corporation、Korea Tangun Trading Corporation、Tangun Trading 等。正如

¹⁰⁴ 综合名单的最新版本见 www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List_Entities_and_Individuals_English.pdf。提供被指认实体和个人朝鲜文实际名称的清单见 www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List_Entities_and_Individuals_Korean.pdf。

捷克共和国的例子所示，会员国依赖综合名单了解被指认实体所使用的别名和识别资料。

156. 根据安全理事会在 2012 年 4 月 16 日主席声明(S/PRST/2012/13)所表达的指导意见，委员会定期寻求综合名单所列个人及实体的最新识别资料。特别是出生日期和地点、护照号码、已知别名、名称的其他拼法以及任何已知地址方面的资料。

157. 专家小组再次提出其 2013 年最后报告的一项呼吁，即呼吁会员国向委员会及专家小组提供担任被指认实体和个人代表或根据其指示行事者的资料。

158. 专家小组尚未获悉有任何会员国根据第 1718(2006)号决议第 10 段拒绝被指认个人或其家庭成员入境或过境，或向委员会寻求豁免旅行禁令。专家小组回顾其 2013 年最后报告，其中曾建议会员国自愿提供关于根据旅行禁令规定采取的行动的資料。因没有收到这样的资料报告，专家小组无法评价这一措施的效果。

159. 有关会员国遵循资产冻结措施的资料仍然很少。会员国没有义务报告资产冻结。专家小组尚无法证实Ryonha的资产，包括其展出的计算机数控机器这样的经济资源，在其参加博览会时被冻结。专家小组也无法证实已对第 2087(2013)号决议所列名的Leader(Hong Kong) International公司采取行动，但指出该公司在中国香港的企业注册处仍列为正在运作的公司。¹⁰⁵

160. 专家小组在其 2013 年最后报告中鼓励会员国自愿报告资产冻结情况，以便使专家小组更好地评估这一措施的效果。在这方面，专家小组欢迎捷克共和国的报告，该报告通知委员会，该国冻结了与Millim Technology Company的交易有关的资金。这是一个宝贵的范例，展示了如何按照第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段的要求以适当的警惕和紧迫感实施资产冻结措施，以便对可能被用来支持被禁计划和活动的资金、金融资产或经济资源产生预期的冻结效果。

161. 专家小组发现，所提供的关于第 2087(2013)号决议所列Leader(Hong Kong) International的资料方面的问题可能产生了不良后果。专家小组将所发现的情况向委员会作了通报，并建议对综合名单作出适当修改。；

(a) 识别资料包括一个缩短了别名，一个已过时的地址，但没有该公司独一无二的企业登记号；

(b) Leader 公司名称的中文音译与其在正式成立文件上使用的中文名称不同；

(c) 按照发音翻译的中文名称与其他并无关联的香港注册公司使用的名称几乎相同。

¹⁰⁵ Leader(Hong Kong) International 公司董事 Cai Guang(蔡光)的中国身份证号码为：2201041972 01271530，地址：中国大连市中山区世纪街 18 号 1716 室。

162. 没有企业登记号来区别 Leader(Hong Kong)International 和其他名称相近的企业，这些企业就成了“假阳性”，而 Leader(Hong Kong)International 却逃避了识别。这有可能导致 Leader(Hong Kong)International 不受制裁，而其他“假阳性”的企业则面临声誉和财务损害。

163. 专家小组将进一步审视被指认实体和个人的名称是如何以联合国六种正式语文传达给各会员国的，并酌情向委员会提出进一步的建议。

九. 金融措施

164. 有关决议中的金融措施与加强国际金融标准结合在一起，从根本上改变了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国活动所处的金融环境。特别是，朝鲜直接利用其银行为被禁货物、培训和技术交易进行收款和付款变得困难得多。反洗钱金融行动任务组(金融行动任务组)¹⁰⁶ 倡导旨在改进标准的长期变革，因此，今后该国还将面临更大的困难。金融行动任务组在技术方面的努力，特别是最近为帮助打击资助扩散行为而采取的步骤，是对安全理事会各项行动的补充。

165. 因此，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不得不调整、探索和完善其逃避侦查和规避被禁方案及活动资金所受限制的方式。所有规避技巧均涉及更高的风险、额外的费用，并会丧失及时性。专家小组已开始更深入地审查朝鲜使用的体制框架和运作技巧：朝鲜在利用外国个人、幌子公司和空壳公司以及从事合法业务的合营企业来掩盖与采购核、弹道导弹和其他大规模毁灭性武器计划有关的非法活动方面经验丰富。所有权结构往往复杂、不透明，并利用了某些会员国在实际所有人身份认证方面不严格的规定。

A. 对设在外国的企业组织的研究：结构、业务和资金

166. 在此次任务期间，专家小组委托进行了一项深入研究，以更好地了解朝鲜民主主义人民共和国如何利用设在外国的企业和个人逃避对其资产、金融和贸易活动的审查。该研究寻求全面审视朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在国外的商业足迹，以了解在其调查中显现的实体和个人彼此之间以及与这一广泛网络之间有何联系。专家小组认为，审查这些关联将有助于其侦查工作，有助于就可能在逃避各项决议所通过的贸易和金融措施方面起到控制和辅助作用的其他实体和个人向委员会和会员国提供咨询意见。

167. 此外，专家小组还希望从这类调查的最佳实践中汲取经验。私营部门普遍采用的尽职调查和金融查证技巧可以帮助确定公司成员和组织中重要的关键个人，并发现实体与其他组织的联系。这一研究为专家小组提供了一个含有进一步调查线索的丰富数据库。该研究从在调查期间引起专家小组注意的不到 500 个具

¹⁰⁶ 金融行动任务组是一个专门制定标准和技术措施以健全国际金融制度的决策组织。

有松散联系甚或没有联系的个人和实体切入，发现了与另外 700 名个人、1600 多家公司和近 2 500 个企业识别资料项的联系。

168. 研究结果表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在国外的运作不再是以前所描述的“两个人、一台传真机”那样。相反，研究发现了一个相对成熟、复杂和国际化的公司生态系统。通过对已被识别出的个人和实体之间的联系进行审查，发现了其模式，显示有六个庞大、独立的网络，而且全部有共同的关联。

169. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国似乎偏好具有良好运输条件和银行业务连通性以及(或)传统商业和政治联系的国外地点。专家小组注意到了国外活动据点如何针对当局加强监督或非法活动的暴露而变换。在日本实施全面贸易和航运限制之后，与日本境内担任被禁物品和计划采购代理的公司之间密切关系便急剧减弱。正在调查的一些事件表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国更加注重从中国台湾省采购精密机床和相关物项。专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在过去几年里致力于扩大和改善与正在发展类似制造能力的会员国之间的经济关系，并敦促这类国家提高警惕。

B. 金融行动任务组

170. 2013 年 11 月 18 日，金融行动任务组主席 Vladimir Nechaev 在制裁委员会于纽约举行的公开通报会上说明了金融行动任务组的各项标准如何可以通过涵盖技术问题对定向金融制裁起到补充作用，特别是在打击资助恐怖主义和扩散行为方面(见图三十)。

图三十

关于安全理事会和金融行动任务组作用的联合公开通报会



资料来源：金融行动任务组

171. 金融行动任务组和类似该任务组的区域机构与实施联合国制裁措施的各国当局协作，向其成员强调有效执行安全理事会根据《宪章》第七章的授权通过

的定向金融制裁的重要性。专家小组继续与金融行动任务组和类似该任务组的区域机构密切合作，向其成员解释制裁措施。

172. 金融行动任务组仍然特别关切朝鲜民主主义人民共和国构成的洗钱风险，该国尚未通过和执行适当的银行条例。2013 年 10 月，金融行动任务组再次将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国列入“公开名单”，并呼吁成员在金融交易方面实施有效的对策(见附件三十三)。因而，要求各银行在处理朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和企业的交易时加强尽职调查，并敦促它们考虑声誉风险。许多银行在权衡预期成本和收益后已决定回避这种业务。

173. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国显然希望被从公开名单上删除，该国和金融行动任务组及亚太反洗钱工作组讨论了满足反洗钱要求所必要的监管改革。该国出席了亚太反洗钱工作组七月在上海召开的全会，并申请作为观察员加入工作组。工作组成员认真审议了这一请求，决定当时不接受。讨论很可能将继续进行。

C. 针对金融制裁可能采取的反措施

174. 根据安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 11 至 13 段，专家小组开始审查资金如何在外国隐藏，或以掩盖与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的账户或交易所所有权的方式转汇，并辨别出了一些提供这种机会的商业活动和银行做法。

175. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国寻找机会，承包或分包重大建筑项目和(或)提供工人，他们的收入绝大部分最终落入国库。通过专有和(或)机密商业交易，可在一些账户中集蓄资金，而这些账户反过来又可以帮助推动被禁计划或者掩盖与军火或扩散有关的转让的收入。正如在基于贸易的洗钱案例中那样，非法收入可以伪装成合法工作所得。现有的媒体报道，特别是关于几个非洲国家项目的报道指出，项目的价值似乎被夸大了。该国还通过合营企业参与海外建筑工程，而在这些企业中，外国合作伙伴可以代管或被指认实体和被禁计划的利益持有资金。

176. 尽管可能受到强化尽职调查，但使用既有国际金融渠道的优点是及时、安全。据观察，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采用了迂回方式进行完全合法的交易。这效率不高，也不太安全，但可能是故意的，目的是在将特定金融幌子公司和空壳公司以及特定转账路径用于非法交易之前测试其使用的“安全性”。实际上，如不采取审慎预防措施测试疏漏，则显得草率。

177. 专家小组知道，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在企图购买被禁物品时采用了间接付款。小组在其 2012 年最后报告中提及该国 2009 年企图在意大利购买两艘豪华游艇一事。¹⁰⁷ 用来规避第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(三)段的财务技巧包括在 Schwartz Motorbootservice 公司拥有人 Josef Schwartz 的奥地利银行账户中汇集资金，由他来签订采购合同。资金从若干位于不同地点的公司以及朝鲜民主主

¹⁰⁷ 见 S/2012/422，第 84 至 85 段。

义人民共和国本身的银行以不同数额汇入。¹⁰⁸ 在受到调查之际, Schwartz将合同转给另一家公司, 即中成国际运输(大连)有限公司(Complant International Transportation(Dalian)Co., Ltd), 后者则接着使用障眼手法, 隐藏实际目的地。据意大利当局报告, 该公司又利用另一家公司至少电汇了支付给造船厂的 500 多万欧元中的一部分。

178. 一个以非同寻常的复杂方式为交易供资的例子是 2012 年高丽航空公司的新飞机采购合同。¹⁰⁹ 付款是通过八家在中国香港注册的公司组织的, 这些公司声称它们是高丽航空公司的贸易伙伴, 是在汇它们欠高丽航空公司的款项。各项决议并不禁止购买民用客运和货运飞机。然而, 专家小组怀疑为偿债而汇款的解释不实: 一些公司似乎是最近成立的空壳公司; 专家小组认为, 八家企业在按照合同应向飞机销售商付款时全部欠高丽航空公司大量款项, 这种巧合令人诧异。空壳公司的名称以及其他公司的活动似乎都与黄金贸易有联系。专家小组怀疑, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有可能正在利用或考虑利用先前赊销的金属制造出“应付账款”。而这些资金来源不一定显示出受该国控制, 甚至可以与其他企业交换, 以进一步疏远与该国的联系, 从而更好地逃避制裁和银行的强化尽职调查。

179. 在“清川江”号事件(见第 69 至 89 段)中, 朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司安排新加坡的一家企业Chinpo航运公司为该船通过巴拿马运河付费, Chinpo航运公司告诉专家小组, 朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司给该公司提供了资金并要求该公司向巴拿马一家企业支付费用。¹¹⁰ 根据专家小组收到的银行记录, 此前朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司所属另两艘船只Bo Tong Gong号和O Un Chong NyonHo号在 2011 年和 2012 年通过运河时, 该公司以同样方式让Mirae Shipping(H. K.) Company支付了过境费和相关费用。¹¹¹

D. 银行“保密”

180. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续采取步骤限制外国对其国内银行业和其他金融机构的了解。没有关于其银行和金融企业的基本信息, 第 2094(2013) 号决议第 12 和第 13 段通过的关于银行业的措施就难以实施。为提供参考, 专家小组根

¹⁰⁸ 这家奥地利银行不相信 Schwartz 关于这些不寻常的交易是合法交易的解释, 并提交了可疑活动报告。该报告引发了奥地利当局的正式调查, 随后导致 Schwartz 受到审判并被定罪。

¹⁰⁹ 某会员国向专家小组秘密提供的情报。

¹¹⁰ 专业小组尚需确认朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司是否向 Chinpo 航空公司转入了资金, 又是何时以何种方式转入的。Chinpo 航运公司声称该公司是朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司在新加坡的航运代理。

¹¹¹ 根据欧洲优质航运信息系统资料, Mirae Shipping (H.K.) Company 拥有挂巴拿马旗帜的散装货船 Great Hope。专家小组认为, 这家设于中国香港的公司与设于朝鲜平壤的 Mirae Shipping Company Ltd., Pyongyang 有关联。根据《平壤时报》(2000 年 3 月 17 日), 朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司确认 Mirae Shipping Company 是其拥有全部管理和运营权限的几个公司之一。

据现有最佳资料编制了一份银行清单(见附件三十四)。尽管没有公布可提供业绩基准的银行财务状况,但一些银行给人的印象是接受了资金注入且(或)有扩大业务的预期。例如,中央银行和东北亚银行正在平壤建造新总部大楼(见图三十一)。

图三十一

中央银行大楼(左)和东北亚银行大楼(右)



资料来源: 专家小组获得的图片

十. 制裁的意外影响

A. 平民

181. 有关各项决议强调,制裁不是要对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的平民产生不利的人道主义后果。如前几次报告所述,由于专家小组无法进入该国,其调查决议这一方面情况的能力受到限制。尽管如此,专家小组还是随时了解有关文献,并利用一切机会获取关于这一问题的资料,包括与派驻平壤的有关专家、外交人员和联合国工作人员交谈,并将继续寻求关于这一问题的资料。特别是,专家小组与联合国在平壤的驻地协调员保持联络。此外,应联合国人权理事会设立的调查委员会的要求,专家小组与该委员会举行了会晤,讨论联合国制裁对人权状况的影响以及两机构任务授权之间其他可能共同关心的领域。

182. 总体而言,大多数评估均认为,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的营养状况虽依然糟糕,但正在改善,¹¹² 其中特别令人关切的是社会脆弱阶层。世界粮食计划署估计,该国平均饮食所含卡路里和国际上建议的每天 2 100 千卡之间相差 30%。

¹¹² 见 World Food Programme, “Harvests in DPR Korea up 5 percent for third year but chronic malnutrition persists” 2013 年 11 月 28 日。可在以下网页查看: <http://www.wfp.org/news/ews-release/harvests-dpr-korea-5-percent-third-year-chronic-malnutrition-persists>。

虽然专家小组知道关于制裁正造成粮食短缺的笼统指控，但专家小组对这种状况的审查未能发现可以直接将之归咎于有关决议所行措施的实例。国别制裁的作用与会员国及商业组织关于是否愿意协助朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或与其打交道的决定二者，常常被混为一谈。

B. 外交使团

183. 在其第 1874(2009) 号、第 2087(2013) 号和第 2094(2013) 号决议中，安全理事会反复强调，根据《维也纳外交关系公约》，所有会员国在执行第 1718(2006) 号决议第 8(a)(三)段和第 8(d) 段时，不应影响驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国各外交使团的活动。若干会员国向委员会和专家小组报告，其使团在业务中遇到安全理事会关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的决议造成的困难。其中部分原因是，外国私营部门的金融和其他实体不愿向驻该国的外交使团提供货物和服务。

184. 专家小组审查了一些驻平壤外交使团就制裁对其活动的影响向委员会提供的资料，并于 2013 年 5 月 29 日向委员会提交了非正式评估文件，正由委员会审议。

185. 2013 年 10 月 28 日，俄罗斯代表团向委员会通报了驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一些使馆和非政府组织在本报告所述期间由于制裁造成的意外影响而面临的若干问题。

十一. 建议

186. 专家小组向委员会和会员国提出以下建议。

专家小组向委员会和会员国提出的建议

建议 1

专家小组建议委员会在被指认实体和个人综合名单中将“朝鲜联合机械贸易会社”列入 Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation 使用的别名清单。(见第 152 段)

建议 2

专家小组建议，会员国对出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的皮尔格铣床和心轴、用于生产铝合金管的压模和润滑油、以及用于进行检查的超声波测试设备，适当加以警惕。(见第 32 段)

建议 3

专家小组建议委员会在专家小组的协助下发布一个执行援助通知，提醒会员国，对所有军火和有关物资的禁运包括与提供、制造、维护或使用军火或物资有关的服务或援助。(见第 68 段)

建议 4

专家小组建议，会员国按照第 2094(2013) 号决议第 26 段的规定，向委员会提供它们掌握的不遵守有关决议的情事的信息。（见第 23 段）

建议 5

专家小组建议，会员国按照第 1874(2009) 号决议第 15 段的规定，及时向委员会报告对运往和运自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或由该国充当中介的货物进行的所有检查，即使检查未发现被禁物品。（见第 21 段）

建议 6

专家小组在其关于“清川江”号的事件报告中建议：


Annex I

Correspondence with Member States

Country	Number of letters sent	Responses received	No responses	Not past date for reply
Austria	1		1	
Azerbaijan	1			1
Belarus	1	1		
Canada	1			1
China	5	4		1
Czech Republic	1			1
Eritrea	1			1
Ethiopia	1			1
Germany	1			1
Greece	1	1		
Italy	1	1		
Japan	2	2		
Mongolia	1	1		
Myanmar	1			1
Panama	2	2		
Russian Federation	4	3		1
Singapore	1			1
South Africa	1	1		
Sweden	1			1
Switzerland	1	1		
Syria	2		2	
Tanzania	1		1	
Uganda	2	1		1
Ukraine	1	1		
United Kingdom	4	4		
United States	2		1	1
Zimbabwe	1	1		
TOTAL	42	24	5	13

Annex II

Imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear complex




Map No. 4517.1
January 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex III

Imagery of the light water reactor and the 5 MWe reactor



Annex IV

Imagery of the fuel fabrication plant




Map No. 4517.3
January 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex V

Imagery of suspected nuclear test site in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Punggye-ri)



Map No. 4517.4
January 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Annex VI

Chong Chon Gang confidential annex*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is confidential.

Annex VII**List of arms and related materiel reported by Panama found onboard the *Chong Chon Gang***

No.	Container No.	Size	Hold No.	Contents	Date discovered	Date of inspection
1	TGHU421080-4	40	4	Rear support structure for SA-3 antenna, 2 Volvo diesel engines with Russian electricity generators and 1 modified P-19 target acquisition radar	18/07/2013	20/07/2013
2	MARU4001997	40	4	2 SA-2 Fan Song multi-band antennas	15/07/2013	15/07/2013
3	CLHU8263263	40	4	MiG-21 aircraft fuselage	17/07/2013	21/07/2013
4	XINU8118515	40	4	MiG-21 aircraft fuselage	17/07/2013	21/07/2013
5	CBHU1699039	40	4	2 transport trucks for Fan Song fire-control radar, calibration equipment and missile uplink antenna	18/07/2013	20/07/2013
6	JOLU4066461	40	4	SA-2 missile launcher guide rails and Fan Song radar dishes (target-tracking radar dishes) and a third trailer for the SA-2	19/07/2013	20/07/2013
7	CARU4691721	40	4	SA-3 Low Blow antenna post vans and lower parabolic antenna, communication cable reels and electrical cables	19/07/2013	20/07/2013
8	CBHU1626048	40	4	2 MiG engines and metal afterburner assembly	18/07/2013	20/07/2013
9	TRLU4571812	40	4	2 MiG engines and metal afterburner assembly	22/07/2013	12/08/2013
10	TM049 (illegible)	20	2	2 MiG engines and metal afterburner assembly	28/07/2013	05/08/2013
11	CAXU2224636	20	2	2 MiG engines metal afterburner assembly	28/07/2013	05/08/2013
12	PCIU 2242770	20	2	2 MiG engines and metal afterburner assembly	28/07/2013	05/08/2013
13	SCZU151805 blue	20	2	1 R-25 MiG-21 engine and metal afterburner assembly	28/07/2013	05/08/2013
14	SEBU2959253	20	2	light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), recoilless rifles, night vision binoculars, equipment, munitions	28/07/2013	05/08/2013
n/a	3 blue trucks		2	3 SA-2 computers and vans	27/07/2013	30/07/2013
n/a	1 blue truck		2	1 SA-3 van	27/07/2013	30/07/2013
n/a	2 blue trucks		2	2 electricity generators for surface-to-air missiles and 1 radar base	27/07/2013	30/07/2013
15	ECTU2847620	40	3	SA-3 missile launcher base, rails, trailer wheels	05/08/2013	05/08/2013
16	SCZU5721085	40	3	radar transporter, cylinder antennas	05/08/2013	05/08/2013
17	XINU8111064	40	3	1 MiG tail section, 2 wings	08/08/2013	09/08/2013
18	CLHU8094097	40	3	1 MiG tail section, 2 wings	08/08/2013	09/08/2013
19	CATU4441925	40	3	2 SA-3 missile launchers	08/08/2013	12/08/2013
20	CARU4721702	40	3	2 SA-2 missile launchers	09/08/2013	12/08/2013
21	CARU4722400	40	3	2 SA-2 missile launchers	08/08/2013	12/08/2013
22	TOLU2437239	20	3	2 MiG 21 engines, 2 afterburners	08/08/2013	12/08/2013
23	SCZU1517031 blue	20	3	2 sets of SA-2 bogie wheels 3 sets of SA-3 bogie wheels	08/08/2013	
24	SCZU1514243	20	3	3 SA-2 missile foresections and electronics 6 SA-3 missile foresections and electronics 1 RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade launcher) with tandem-charge; rocket motor Assorted commercial munition loading machines	08/08/2013	11/08/2013
25	CBHU086693	20	3	2 MiG 21 engines, 2 afterburners	08/08/2013	12/08/2013

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex VIII

Cargo found onboard the *Chong Chon Gang*

1. Arms and related materiel

(a) Type and quantities

1. A total of 25 standard shipping containers (16 forty-foot and 9 twenty-foot) and 6 trailers were found, for a total of about 240 tons of arms and related materiel.¹¹³ The Panel confirmed the presence of all the items declared by Cuba. The Panel did not find any items not mentioned in this list. Most of the consignment was of former Soviet military origin.

i. Surface-to-air missile systems

2. The largest part of this shipment consisted of various components of SA-2 (C-75 Volga) and SA-3 (C-125 Pechora)¹¹⁴ surface-to-air missile systems.

3. It included various components for the associated SA-2 and SA-3 radar systems (Fan Song and Low Blow radars – figure 1) such as the 6 trailers (i.e. the vans housing the system electronics, the operator stations or the power generators); antennas, bases, transmitters and tracking systems, as well as their supporting structures; electric generators; and other miscellaneous equipment (reels of cables, transport trailers, control and measurements instruments, etc.). The trailers were clearly labelled as belonging to Volga and Pechora systems on a loading check sheet in the captain's possession.

Figure 1: Complete SA-2 Fan Song¹¹⁵ and complete SA-3 Pechora system with Low Blow radar



Source: Miroslav Gyürösi

Source: Wikipedia

¹¹³ Tonnage as reported by Cuba in its 16 July statement. However, the Panel found that the weight of the containers and trailers on the prestowage plan amounted to 574 tons. The captain's check sheet shows a weight of 474 tons, excluding trailers. The Panel cannot verify which if any of the figures provided or found is correct.

¹¹⁴ Former Soviet manufacture.

¹¹⁵ Fan Song and Low Blow are designations used by North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. The original paint scheme of the 6 trailers was matt green and this scheme was painted over in blue gloss paint. The original paint scheme can be seen on the inside of doors and doorframes (figure 2). The damage caused by bags of sugar also reveals the original paint scheme on the roof of some of the trailers (figure 2). All other parts of the surface-to-air missiles systems found in the containers had not been repainted, but kept their original green or camouflage scheme. This suggests repainting was employed for concealment of military origin and nature, rather than protection against corrosion.

Figure 2: Original paint scheme inside (left) and revealed by damage (right)



Source: Panel of Experts

5. The shipment also contained a total of four SA-2 and two SA-3 launchers, which had been disassembled to fit into standard shipping containers (figure 3).

Figure 3: Disassembled SA-2 (left) and SA-3 launchers (right)



Source: Panel of Experts

6. In addition, various parts for three SA-2 and six SA-3 missiles were in the cargo, such as the nose cones housing proximity fuses, auto-pilots and transponders, transmitter antennas and some actuators (figure 4).¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ The Panel notes that some of the SA-2 and SA-3 parts could also meet the criteria defined in the list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes (S/2012/947), whose export and import by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are prohibited. See in particular the Category II, Item 9 of S/2012/947 covering "instrumentation, navigation and direction finding".

Figure 4: SA-2 and SA-3 missile components



Source: Panel of Experts

7. The shipment also contained a radar antenna, labelled “P-19”, and its associated supporting components. The instruction manual and certification report indicate that it is of Cuban manufacture (figure 5).

Figure 5: P-19 radar and instruction manual



Source: Panel of Experts

ii. MiG-21 jet fighters and engines

8. Two MiG-21 jet fighters were also found in the containers. Both had been disassembled and the various parts had been packed into several containers (figure 6). The tandem seating configuration and other features indicate that these are MiG-21UM advanced jet trainers. These two jet fighters were shipped along with 15 MiG-21 engines and afterburners (figure 6).


Figure 6: MiG-21 fuselage, tails, wings and engines



Source: Panel of Experts

9. All identification markings and insignia of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force had been removed from both MiG-21 aircraft; the Panel observed signs of overspray and scratch marks in places dedicated to original insignia (figure 7).

Figure 7: Comparison of Cuban Air Force insignia with that of the MiG-21 found onboard



Source: Panel of Experts

iii. Ammunition and ammunition manufacturing related items

10. The shipment included 10 lots of shells casings (packed with samples of propelling charge but without primers) of various diameters (57 to 152 mm) for various purposes (fragmentation, high explosive, armour piercing and or tracer). Each lot contained between five and eight shell casings (figure 8).

Figure 8: Ammunition boxes (left) and 57 mm fragmentation cartridges (right)



Source: Panel of Experts

11. Eight 73 mm rocket propelled projectiles (PG-9/PG-15 anti-tank and OG-9/OG-15 fragmentation projectiles) to be fired with recoilless rifles, as well as a single PG-7VR round, a high explosive antitank tandem charge to penetrate explosive reactive armour, were also in the shipment (figure 9). The Panel observed that the 73 mm rounds were packed and shipped with at least the nose portion of the fuse in place.¹¹⁷

Figure 9: 73 mm projectiles (left) and PG-7VR round (right)



Source: Panel of Experts

12. Further, the shipment contained (figure 10):

- A single box of 7.62 mm cartridges (440 rounds);
- A machine tool for loading shotgun cartridges (12 gauge calibre ammunition);
- Another machine tool for manufacturing 5.56 mm cartridges.

¹¹⁷ These projectiles use a Point Initiating, Base Detonating fuse which is composed of two elements. The presence of the explosive portion of the fuse cannot be confirmed without disassembling the projectiles.

Figure 10: Ammunition manufacturing equipment and cartridges

Source: Panel of Experts

iv. Miscellaneous items

13. The shipment also contained various other arms-related items (figure 11):

- A tank track section;
- Various parts for Soviet AO-18 30 mm rotary cannons (firing pin, ejection window, bolt, rings, piston);
- One pair of night vision binoculars;
- A search light that can be fitted on helicopters, fixed wing aircraft or maritime vessels;
- Various gauges (ampere and power meters, tachometer, comptometer).

Figure 11: Tank track section, night vision binoculars and gauges


Source: Panel of Experts

(b) Overall condition of the arms and related materiel

14. While the age of the items found in the shipment varied greatly, most appeared to have been well maintained. Records accompanying a great deal of the equipment indicated or certified the equipment functioned in accordance with specification or had been calibrated just prior to packing.

15. A large number of control and measurement instruments in the radar control stations carried stickers indicating that they were calibrated as recently as 2012 (figure 12). The night vision binoculars' documents indicated that their conformity was certified less than one month before the shipment (figure 12). The P-19 radar antenna came with an instruction manual and a complete certification report dated February 2012 (figure 12).


Figure 12: Calibration stickers (dated 2012) and binoculars' certificate (dated June 2013)



Source: Panel of Experts

16. Further, some of the equipment was unused or still in its original packaging. For example, some missile components were in their original delivery packaging and crates from the former Soviet Union (figure 4). The cable reels were also new, still covered with the original wax paper. The generator sets associated to the radar were constituted of new commercial Volvo Penta engines, coupled with Soviet-era electrical generators, acquired in 2010¹¹⁸ and had yet to be properly run-in (figure 13).

Figure 13: One of the two Volvo engines, tested but not yet run in



Source: Panel of Experts

¹¹⁸ Panel confirmed date of purchase with Volvo.

(c) Packing of the items

17. The care shown in handling of some items was inconsistent with the careless packaging and haphazard stowage of others. Some of the items were carefully sealed, labelled and packed methodically with sufficient protective measures. The MiG-21 engines, the missile components or the P-19 radar were protected with grease, sealed and/or encased in special packing material (figures 5 and 14).

Figure 14: MiG-21 engine (left) and cables (right) well packaged



Source: Panel of Experts.

18. Other items were placed loosely in a container. The MiG fuselages and other parts, as well as the SA-2 and SA-3 launchers were poorly secured in the containers using wire and tires (figure 15), presenting a risk of breaking free and being extensively damaged in rough seas.

Figure 15: Loose packaging observed in containers — MiG-21, Low Blow radar and SA-3 launcher



Source: UNODC.

19. The packaging of the various logbooks was also inconsistent. The logbooks of the missiles and related components were packaged in plastic and placed in crates, just like the record books for the calibration instruments, but those for the aircraft were placed in an old recycled cardboard box of “vegetable oil” (figure 16).

Figure 16: Poor packaging of MiG-21 logbooks



Source: Panel of Experts.

20. Further, some of the items had to be substantially altered to fit into the shipping containers. All hand and foot holds of the SA-2 launchers and a significant portion of the SA-3 launchers' base had been roughly cut-off using oxy-acetylene torches (figure 17).

Figure 17: SA-2 and SA-3 parts chopped off in order for launchers to fit into the containers



Source: Panel of Experts.

21. Korean markings and inscriptions found on packaging, logbooks and equipment (including those painted on the aircraft) point to prior involvement of personnel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with this equipment (figure 18). The Cuban authorities confirmed that specialists from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been in Cuba in 2012 to assess the equipment and marked them for reference purposes. If these activities in Cuba were conducted to provide services or assistance related to the provision, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, they would also have been a violation of paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009), as clarified by paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 (2013).

Figure 18: Examples of Korean writing on crates and equipment



Source: Panel of Experts

22. Cuba explained to the Panel that original packing materials were no longer available given the age of much of the equipment. Thus packing it for shipment posed significant challenges and Cuba had to resort to methods which other countries might not. In this regard, they said this shipment was unlike any other they carried out in the past twenty years.

(d) Dangerous stowage practice

23. The loading of the arms and related materiel on-board the *Chong Chon Gang* was poorly conceived and executed and did not comply with standards or best practices. The sugar bags placed on top caused considerable damage to the shipping containers and trailers (figure 19). In addition, should the bags of sugar break, leakage of sugar into the equipment would have caused damage. Sugar takes and retains moisture and creates treacle-like stickiness, which causes corrosion and adhesion of impurities. It is also a serious risk to electronics in terms of moisture damage.

Figure 19: Damage caused to the containers and trailers



Source: Panel of Experts

24. More importantly, loading the sugar on top of the arms shipment placed at risk the ship, its crew and any other ships or infrastructure in close proximity. An explosion of ammunition tamped down with sugar could have caused considerable damage. The *Chong Chon Gang* has a history of fire-related deficiencies¹¹⁹ and no measures had been taken to allow constant monitoring of the ammunition's container or to flood the compartments in the event of a fire or heat build-up. This is a clear indication that concealment took priority over appropriate safety precautions and potential risks to life, shipping, and related infrastructure.

25. In addition to not submitting the requisite hazardous cargo declaration seven days prior to entering the Panama Canal, the ammunition stowed on-board did not conform to regulations relating to dangerous goods. The International Maritime

¹¹⁹ A Port State Control inspection in Saudi Arabia in June 2010 noted several deficiencies regarding fire detection and readiness of fire-fighting gear. Lloyds List Intelligence and Mediterranean MoU on Port State Control.

Organization (IMO) promulgated the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code¹²⁰ as a uniform international code for the transport of dangerous goods by sea to supplement the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). It includes provisions for the classification, packing, marking, labelling, documentation and stowage of dangerous goods. Similarly, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines developed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, recommends that when ammunitions are transported by sea:¹²¹

- a) Prior to the voyage the consignor of the ammunition should liaise with the master of the vessel to agree the most appropriate location(s) for ammunition containers on the vessel stow plan.
- b) Each transport movement of ammunition should be accompanied by cargo documentation/freight papers. Hand-over/take-over protocols requiring signatures upon receipt should also be in place.

26. The Panel found no indications that such documents or protocols were established for the ammunition shipped on-board the *Chong Chon Gang*. Further, Cuba indicated to the Panel that the decision on the location of the cargo was the sole responsibility of the captain.

27. Cuba explained that the explosive elements of the ammunition had mostly been removed. All ammunition had been placed in a separate container, and the rocket-propelled projectiles and 7.62 cartridges were in their original water-proof packing.

(e) Inconsistencies and other considerations

28. In its 16 July statement and follow-up communications with the Committee and the Panel, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the arms and related materiel were being sent for evaluation, diagnosis, repair and/or verification. Cuba said certain items in the consignment might not appear to require repair, but instead required assessment to ensure continued effectiveness, or were past their proper period for repair.

29. The Panel was told this consignment was part of an agreement between Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Cuban authorities did not provide a copy of this agreement but indicated that it included a requirement "*to perform the diagnosis, repair, monitoring, physical and laboratory tests*" of the equipment in the consignment prior to the costing for the work being agreed upon (the amount, conditions and form of compensation were to be agreed within a period of up to six months after initial evaluation by Democratic People's Republic of Korea technicians).

30. However, it is the Panel's view that examining individually the items and their handling suggest that some, if not all, of the consignment was not expected to be returned to Cuba:

- Some of these items are irreparable (the tank tracks, the AO-18 cannon parts, the shells casings, the rocket propelled projectiles, 7.62 mm cartridges) or were not in immediate need of repair because their proper functioning had been certified recently (the night vision binoculars, the control and measurement instruments) or were unused and still in their original packaging. Their small quantity and variety, however, suggest these were possibly a precursor to a larger order.
- The packing of some of these items was clearly inconsistent with standards of care expected when items of value are to be shipped for later return in respect of conservation of their condition.
- The alterations made to some of the items (SA-2 and SA-3 launchers) to fit them into standard shipping containers are also not appropriate for items to be repaired and returned. Moreover, these items would have to have the same alterations made for return via shipping containers.

¹²⁰ The IMDG Code supplements the regulations contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Amendments to SOLAS chapter VII (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) adopted in May 2002 make the IMDG Code mandatory from 1 January 2004.

¹²¹ International Ammunition Technical Guidelines on the transport of ammunition, IATG 08.10, dated 1 October 2011.

- The removal of all identification markings and insignia of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force on the MiG-21 jet fighters erased visible signs of Cuban ownership. This, in addition to the use of permanent ink on documents and logs, and paint on equipment (as opposed to erasable materials or removable tags/ labels) suggest a change of ownership.
- The Panel also considers it very unusual that a Statement of Work was not prepared prior to the consignment's departure because the consignor is left unable to make an estimate of costs versus affordability and benefits.

31. Some of the systems found in the containers could be cannibalised to provide spare parts to maintain its own aging systems. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is known to be actively seeking MiG-21 aircraft and engines.¹²² The presence of unused equipment and equipment still in its original packaging suggests the disposal of war reserve stock being phased out of service or surplus to current needs.

32. Cuba explained to the Panel that it has close military ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both have historically relied on Soviet-era weaponry to equip their armed forces, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has maintained maintenance and repair facilities and factories for many of these older-generation weapons systems, leading Cuba to seek the assistance of a traditional ally with a capability to repair such equipment.

33. Cuban authorities indicated to the Panel that, despite close cooperative ties, there was no previous shipment of arms and related materiel under this agreement or any other agreement from Cuba to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While the Panel cannot corroborate or refute this, it notes that the voyage of another Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged and -owned vessel to Cuba presents a very similar pattern to the recent voyage of the *Chong Chon Gang*.

34. On April 2012, the general cargo vessel *O Un Chong Nyon Ho* (IMO 8330815) operated by OMM,¹²³ sailed directly from Nampo to Cuba and back without any further calls in the region. After having stopped in Havana and Puerto Padre, the *O Un Chong Nyon Ho* drifted for several weeks off northern Cuba before returning for three weeks to Havana. Its Automatic Identification System was switched off (in violation of IMO requirements) during these three weeks, however, effectively preventing determination of further ports' calls, as in the case of the *Chong Chon Gang*.

2. Sugar

35. According to the cargo manifest dated 4 July, bagged raw sugar and spare polyethylene bags destined for Nampo were the only cargos declared by the *Chong Chon Gang*. The raw sugar was divided into two consignments: the first bill of lading was for 200,018 50-kg bags and the second for 10,001 50-kg bags. Both were dated 4 July, and the total gross weight amounted to more than 10,500 tons.¹²⁴

¹²² See the Panel's unpublished 2011 Final Report and 2012 Final Report (S/2012/422).

¹²³ Equasis.

¹²⁴ Its total estimated value is US\$ 3,925 992 at \$ 0.1696 per lb (www.indexmundi.com). The calculation is based upon a quantity of 10,500 tons; the Panel notes that a different total weight of 10,229.064 tons was found in the loading report.

36. Both consignments listed the same shipper, Cubazucar, and consignee, Korea Central Marketing & Trading Corporation. Freight charges were payable as per the charter party.¹²⁵ The ship's agent, Consignataria Mambisa, had been dealing with the OMM Vladivostok branch and on its invoices named the client as "Ocean Maritime Management – Brasil".¹²⁶ This points to involvement of a Brazil branch of OMM in this shipment.

37. Cuban authorities told the Panel that the sugar consignments were unrelated to the military consignment, and that the sugar was only for domestic consumption. Authorities declined the Panel's request for copies of the contract(s) on the basis of a commercial confidentiality clause in the contract. According to Cuba, the consignment of sugar was bartered in exchange for a shipment of hot rolled steel plates and locomotive wheels. The nominal 'buyer' of the sugar was Korean Central Marketing and Trading Corporation. Cuban authorities did not supply key information for this company (such as names of contacts, addresses, telephone or fax numbers) suggesting instead that the Panel should contact the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce for the details. The Panel could not locate any recent information on the company, but its research findings indicate that it may possibly be now known as Korea General Marketing and Trading Company,¹²⁷ or that the name might be being used as an alias.

38. The Panel cannot conclusively confirm the sugar consignment was unrelated to shipment of arms and related materiel. It finds it plausible that, though physically linked, the two cargos are not contractually linked. The Panel calculates that the estimated value of the sugar, US \$3.8 million, is comparable to the combined value of the hot rolled steel and locomotive wheels delivered by the *Chong Chon Gang*, US \$3.7 million.¹²⁸ This comparison excludes the springs and other unknown items for which the Panel has no basis to construct a complete estimated value.

¹²⁵ Confirmed by the representative for Cubazucar during consultations in Havana.

¹²⁶ The Panel had access to invoices issued by the Puerto Padre agency of Consignataria Mambisa dated 30 June and 5 July.

¹²⁷ The most recent record found by the Panel about Korean Central Marketing and Trading Corporation is dated 2005. According to this information, this entity was a state institution under the Ministry of Foreign Trade which controlled a market in Unha-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang and promoted joint ventures (see "Korean Central Marketing and Trading Corporation", *KCNA*, 13 December 2005). A more recent publication, *Foreign Trade of the DPRK* (issue No. 3, 2008) contained reference to a company named Korea General Marketing and Trading Corporation (Unha-dong, Pothonggang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Tel +850-2-3815926 and Fax +850-2-3815827; email: kftc@co.chesin.com). Considering the similar names and lines of business, the Panel believes it likely that General Marketing is an alias for Central Marketing.

¹²⁸ The value of the hot rolled steel, if new, could be around US\$ 3.66 million (5,341 tons with a July 2013 price at US\$ 673 per ton) and the value of the locomotive wheels at US \$36,000 (12 units valued at US \$ 3,000 each). The calculation is based on figures from www.steelonthenet.com and alibaba.com.

Annex IX

“Secret” instructions given to the captain concerning the arms and related material consignment

청천강 선장앞 (비밀)

안녕하십니까

민길에 수고 많았습니다.

쿠바까지 민길에 배사에 안전하게 조직하여 줄것을 부탁드립니다.

이미 항차지시를 받았으리라고 보면서 쿠바-조국 추가점때문에 추가적인 항차지시를 줍니다.

이하 지시내용을 선장,정치부장,보위원까지만 알고 부선장에게는 아바나 입항 5 일전에 알려주어 PLAN 을 짜도록 하여 주기 바랍니다.

아바나에서 하선후 아바나에서 20 미터 콘테나 26 개를 상선합니다.
콘테나를 먼저 신고 사항(다음항구)을 콘테나 우에 상선하여 콘테나를 사탕 10,000 톤으로 덮어 콘테나가 나타나지 않도록 하셔야 합니다.

이와 관련하여 전문을 보낼때 :

콘테나 - 기계부속

계수 - 지함수로 표기하여야 하며

즉 <기계부속 26 지함 상선함> 이라는 식으로,

콘테나 적선과 관련하여 일보로 보고하지 않아도 되지만 보고하여야 할 필요성이 있는 경우 우와 같이 보고하기 바랍니다.

파나마에서 콘테나를 세관신고하지 않는것을 전제로 하지만 신고하여야 할 경우 <파나마에서 체용금 26K 조직하겠음 >고 하면 콘테나를 파나마에서 신고하라는 뜻으로 리해하여 주기 바랍니다.

신고해야 하는 경우 :

SHIPPER - METAL CO,HAVANA
NOTIFY - FERROUS EXPORT AND IMPORT CO
CONSIGNEE - TO ORDER

CARGO - GENERATORS
QUANTITY - 26 PACKAGE / 127 TONS

기타는 선장의 결실으로 B/L,MANIFEST 를 만들어 신고하기 바랍니다.

파나마에서 콘테나를 세관신고하지 말아야 할 경우 <파나마에서 체용금 26K 조직하지 않았음 > 이라고 하면 세관신고하지 않는것으로 리해하여 주기 바랍니다.

안전항차를 바랍니다.

정의

선장동지

이 전문을 받고 리해한 정형을 <파나마 체용금 지시 > 를 접수 및 리해하였다는 확인을 본사에 주기 바랍니다.

Source: Panamanian authorities

False
Declaration

Annex X

Unofficial translation of the “secret” instructions

Dear Captain of Chong Chon Gang (Secret),

Greetings!

Believing that it must be hard to make such a long voyage, I wish you organize everything well until arriving at Cuba safely.

While you must have already received sailing instruction, I am giving you **additional instructions** regarding the **additional cargo from Cuba** to homeland as follow. The instructions should be known only to the Captain, Political Secretary and Security Officer. **Five days before arriving at Havana, please inform the Deputy Captain** so that he could make a [loading] PLAN.

After unloading in Havana, **load the 26 20-foot containers**. Load the containers first and **load the 10,000 tons of sugar (at the next Port) over them so that the containers cannot be seen**.

When you send communication in this regard, **use the following description**:

Container → **Mechanical parts**

Number → number of boxes

For example <loaded **26 boxes** of mechanical parts>

While you do not need to send a daily report on this shipment of containers, if necessary, report as described above.

In principle, the containers will not be declared to Customs in Panama. However, if it is required for you to do so, you will receive a message < Payment arranged for **26K** in Panama > which you shall understand as having to declare the containers in Panama.

If you need to make a declaration, do as follows:

Shipper - Metal Co, Havana

Notify - Ferrous Export and Import Co

Consignee - To Order

Cargo – Generators

Quantity – 26 package / 127 tons

False
Declaration

I will leave it up to you regarding the other matters on the declaration such as B/L and Manifest.

If the containers should not be declared to customs in Panama, you will receive a message < Payment was not arranged for 26K in Panama > which you shall understand as not declaring the containers.

I wish you a safe voyage.

Salute,

(PS) Please confirm to Headquarters that you have received and understood these instructions by submitting the following message < **Instruction on the payment in Panama** >

Source: Panel of Experts

Communications from *Chong Chon Gang* to OMM referencing “26 boxes” (top left) and loading of containers and trailers (top right) and their unofficial translation (bottom left and right)

<p>To: OCU CC: OCKP</p> <p>From: CHONG CHON GANG 1800 LT (2200 UTC) 11 JUN.</p> <p>Số AGENT ở VHF không CONTACT được vì người điều khiển không nghe. Vì vậy tôi đã liên lạc với người điều khiển VSL để yêu cầu họ chuyển hướng cho tôi liên lạc được. 0800 LT tôi ALTA gửi MSG nhưng không được đáp lại.</p> <p>26 boxes của người điều khiển chưa được thông báo / không rõ số lượng / VHF không thể liên lạc được. Cần phải chờ đợi tiếp tục.</p> <p>RGRS.</p>	<p>To: OCU CC: OCKP</p> <p>From: CHONG CHON GANG</p> <p>0800 LT (1200 UTC) 21 JUN.</p> <p>- 24HRS: TTL 31 PCS trong đó 20 PCS đã được - CONS: G0 B.S (M524, A61.) + M50 40 + A60 30 - ROB! Fo 249.2 + G0 84.76 + M50 10390 + A60 4920 - ETCL: PM TODAY. ETD AM 22 JUN.</p> <p>RGRS.</p>
<p>To: OCU CC: OCKP</p> <p>From: Chong Chon Gang 1800 LT (2200 UTC) 11 June</p> <p>Today failed to establish contact with agent via VHF various times. Request to contact the Counsellor Office as soon as possible and find out how the person in charge of 26 boxes would organize the plan of the vessel's port-entry. No response from the agent to our message at 08:00 LT [local time]. The person in charge of the 26 boxes told us that he would locate the vessel while drifting via VHF once the loading/port-entry is arranged. But there has been no contact yet.</p>	<p>To: OCKP CC: OCU From: Chong Chon Gang 0800 LT (1200 UTC) 21 June</p> <p>- 24hrs: 20 pcs out of TTL of 31 pcs were loaded. - CONS [fuel consumption report, etc.] - ROB [remaining onboard report fuel, etc] - ETCL: PM today [estimated time of completion]: - ETD: AM 22 June [estimated time of departure]</p> <p>RGRS</p>

OCKP – Ocean Maritime Management Company Korea Pyongyang
OCRU - Ocean Maritime Management Company Russia

Source: Panamanian authorities (unofficial translation by Panel of Experts)

Annex XII

Message from OMM regarding transportation fee for an “additional cargo of 200 tons”

STRATOS CSAT 204999123456002 24-JUN-2013 06:32:19 280850

From: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp
 Date: 06/24/2013 06:30:14 AM
 Subject: DISIGEN
 TO MV CCG
 FM OCEAN

From: Ocean
 (OMM head office, Pyonyang)

—SENUEU MAZ GEMSU CHAIGIMZEG EURO HAMYE MUNGEN GOANGYEI ZENGHOAGHI GEMTO S
 UPYO HAGI BARAM.
 AGENT DA NOR ZEICHUL/ZEBSU HOASIN BADSO MAILL SOF, TALLY REPORT DAIZO/MAZ
 SUPYO HAMYE CHULHANG ZEN FINAL TALLY REPORT, M/R;B/L BALGEUB ZENGHOAGHI HA
 GI BARAM.
 —SANGSEN EUN YONGSENZU BUDAM EURO SHORE CRANE RO HAMYE YODU DOIMYEN BAI GI
 ZUNGGI ROZANG HANEUNSES EURO GYEIYAG HAYESS EUM EUL CHAMGO BARAM.
 —CHUGA HDAMUL ZOOTOON UNIM EUL K2 RO ZEGRIB HAGEISS EUM.
 GUIHANG HU CASH RO IBGEUM SIKIGI BARAM.
 —HANGCHA SIZAB HAYE HYENZAI GBABI DIESEL OIL SOBI DAIRYAG SOMT, ILDANG 2MT
 SOBI HANGES EURO DOIM.
 BIREUM ZELYAG EUL CHOIDAIRI NO HAIZUGI BARAM.

RGDS

“Transportation fee for the additional cargo of 200 tons will be transferred to K2. Deposit in cash after setting off for sailing.”

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XIII

Application for payment submitted by Chinpo Shipping Company on behalf of OMM Russia

汇款申请书 Remittance Application Form		Date: 08-07-2013
电汇 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telegraphic Transfer		08 JUL 2013
汇票 <input type="checkbox"/> Demand Draft		Ref: NBRMOT13004163
<p>1. 贵行办理此项交易，一切风险概由本人/本公司自负，贵行无须承担任何责任。或/我们证实已阅读及了解贵行的汇款章程并受其制约。办理个人汇款时，我/我们证实已阅读及了解《个人外汇汇款章程》。</p> <p>2. I/We effect this transaction entirely at my/our own risk without responsibility on your part and subject to the Terms and Conditions on Remittance which I/We have read and understood. Where relevant, I/we confirm having read and understood the listed condition pertaining to Personal Exchange Pre-Settlement Remittance Service.</p>		
货币与金额 Currency and Amount	US\$72,016.76	银行专用 FOR BANK USE
汇率及成交编号 Ex. Rate and Deal No.		CCY and Amount USD72,016.76
收款人姓名与详细地址 Name & Full Address of Payee		PAY CCY USD72,016.76
收款人证件号码 (附船证) Payee's ID No. (for CNY)		Comm. In-lien
收款人电话 Payee's Tel (if any)		Rem. Fee USD96.02
代理行、收款人开户行名称及地址 Intermediary Bank, Payee's Bank & Address (总行仅适用于电汇 For TT only)	CTA DE C.B. FERTON EN N.Y.	Telex USD23.38
收款人账号 Payee's A/c No.		Selling Rate 1.000000
申请人 Applicant	Chinpo Shipping Co Pte Ltd	Buying Rate 1.000000
地址 Address	7500A, Beach Road #09-321 The Plaza Singapore 199591 Tel: 6297 2311/3 Fax: 6296 2952	Total USD72,130.16
对收款人留言 (不超过15个字) Message to Payee (Not more than 15 words)		CHINPO SHIPPING COMPANY PTE LTD
此部分仅适用于电汇，如果没有指示，代理行收费将由收款人支付。 This portion is applicable to telegraphic transfer only. If not indicated, payee will bear charges of agent bank.		BNF: [REDACTED]
代理行收费 Agent Bank's Charges	<input type="checkbox"/> 由本人/本公司支付 charge to my/our account	08072013 11:37:59
上列申请支付方式 Settlement Instruction for Application	PLS FAX BANK SLIP TO: 62962952	
<input type="checkbox"/> 现金 Cash		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 借记账号 Debit A/c No. [REDACTED]		
<input type="checkbox"/> 其他 Others		
申请人姓名及公司印章 (如适用) Applicant's Signature and Company's Stamp (If applicable)		

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XIV

Communication between Ocean Maritime Management Company Russia (OCRU) and the shipping agent in Panama falsely stating that the ship was only carrying sugar (top) and showing that OCRU knew of the need to declare all containers (bottom)

From: Ocean Russia D <oceanvld@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 12:05 AM
To: Operations
Subject: RE: Materials for MV Chong Chon Gang

To: Shipping Agent
 Fm: Ocen Ru

Re: MV CCG – transit Pan canal
 ==

Good day, dear Shipping Agent

Kindly be informed that MV Chong Chon Gang wud arrive at Pan canal by 10th Jul.
 Pls revert us best proforma d/a and any needed documents for this vsl on transit purpose.
 Vsl will arrive there with bgd sugar ldd at Cuba.

Meantime, Owners had arrange bunkering of this vsl thru their channel at Pan canal.
 Local supplier will contact with you directly.

Brqds
 Han

From: Operations [mailto:]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 8:51 AM
To: Ocean Russia D; Operations
Subject: RE: MV CHONG CHON GANG - ETA AND DOX

Good day Captain,

Kindly notice that derrating certificate is expired and please confirm if you will renewal same before arrive Panama or here.

Regarding containers declare on the cargo declaration form, the following information is require: Container number, stowed, size (20, 40), type (general or specialized), weight (cannot exceed 35 MT), size type (HC or STD).

Please confirm your ETA Panama Canal.

Best regards,

OCRU - Ocean Maritime Management Company Russia

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XV

False declaration submitted to the Panama Canal authority
via the local shipping agent

FREQUENCY IN PANAMA CANAL
TOTAL VISITS: 2

DETAIL FREQUENCY

ARRIVAL LOCATION	ETA	ARRIVAL DATE/TIME
BALBOA	30-MAY-2013 10:00	30-MAY-2013 08:13
CRISTOBAL	05-AGO-2008 11:00	05-AGO-2008 12:05

PORTS DECLARATION

PREVIOUS PORTS SECURITY INFORMATION

PORT NAME	COUNTRY	DEPART DATE	MARSEC LEVEL
DALIAN	CHINA	22-NOV-2012	LEVEL 1
KOJONG	KOREA ([SOUTH].)	16-DEC-2012	LEVEL 1
CHONGJIN	KOREA (DEMOCRA.)	17-JAN-2013	LEVEL 1
ZHENJIANG	CHINA	24-JAN-2013	LEVEL 1
CHONGJIN	KOREA (DEMOCRA.)	25-MAR-2013	LEVEL 1
HUNGNAM	KOREA (DEMOCRA.)	08-APR-2013	LEVEL 1
CHONGJIN	KOREA (DEMOCRA.)	11-APR-2013	LEVEL 1
VOSTOCHNIY, PORT	RUSSIA	17-APR-2013	LEVEL 1
HABANA	CUBA	22-JUN-2013	LEVEL 1
PUERTO PADRE	CUBA	06-JUL-2013	LEVEL 1

NEXT PORT OF DESTINATION
PORT: NAMPO COUNTRY: KOREA (DEMOCRA.)

CARGO DECLARATION
PRECAUTIONARY DESIGNATOR (PD): N

DRAFT:	TFW	TSW
FORWARD	28/07	28/07
AFT	29/09	29/09

DETAIL CARGO DECLARATION
LOCATION: _____
METRIC TONS: _____
UN No.: _____
IMO: _____
PROPER SHIPPING NAME/ BC NAME: _____
CONTAINED AS: _____
REMARK: _____

CANE SUGAR (RAW SUGAR)

Reference
to Port
Mariel was
omitted.

Only sugar was
declared

Annex XVI

Cargo manifest submitted to Panamanian authorities falsely stating that *Chong Chon Gang's* only cargo was sugar

IMO-CARGO DECLARATION					Page No
1- Name and description of ship		M/V "CHONG CHON GANG"		2- Port where report is made	X
1- IMO Number		7937317		PUERTO PADRE, CUBA	
4- Flag state of ship		HMZF		3- Port of loading / port of discharging	
DPR KOREA		RI YONG IL		NAMPHO PORT	
5- Marks and numbers		7- Number and kind of packages, description of goods		8- Gross weight	9- Measurement
B/L No. 1		TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND EIGHTEEN BAGS OF CUBAN RAW SUGAR OF THE 2012/2013 CROP PACKED IN POLYTHENE LINED POLYPROPYLENE BAGS OF ABOUT 50 KG NET EACH OF ABOUT 50 KG NET EACH 200 018 BAGS TWO THOUSAND EMPTY POLYETHYLENE SPARE BAGS FREE OF CHARGE 2000 EMPTY BAGS WEIGHING METRIC TONS GROSS: 10,028.462 TARE: 28.440 NET: 10,000.022			
B/L No. 2		TEN THOUSAND ONE BAGS OF CUBAN RAW SUGAR OF THE 2012/2013 CROP PACKED IN POLYTHENE LINED POLYPROPYLENE BAGS OF ABOUT 50 KG NET EACH 10001 BAGS ONE HUNDRED EMPTY POLYETHYLENE SPARE BAGS FREE OF CHARGE 100 EMPTY BAGS WEIGHING METRIC TONS GROSS: 500.602 TARE: 1.420 NET: 500.033			
S/ CUBAZUCAR		WEIGHING METRIC TONS GROSS: 500.602 TARE: 1.420 NET: 500.033			
G/ KOREA CENTRAL MARKETING & TRADING CORPORATION		"CLEAN ON BOARD"			
		"FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY"			
		Destination: D.P.R. OF KOREA			
		BY CUSTOM:		FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHIP'S MASTER SHIP'S AGENT:	
		"WE CERTIFY THAT THIS CARGO MANIFEST CONTAIN ONLY (1) ONE PAGE"			
10- Date and signature by master, authorized agent or officer CUBA, JULY 4th, 2013.					
IMO Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic					

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XVII

Bills of lading for the sugar consignments

CODE NAME "CONGENBILL" EDITION 1994
CUBAZUCAR

Page 2
 BL No. 1

BILL OF LADING
 TO BE USED WITH CHARTER-PARTIES

Consignee
KOREA CENTRAL MARKETING & TRADING CORPORATION

Copy NON NEGOTIABLE

Vessel
M/V "CHONG CHON GANG"

Port of loading
PUERTO PADRE, CUBA

Port of discharge
NAMPO PORT

DESTINATION: D.P.R. OF KOREA

Gross weight

TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND EIGHTEEN BAGS OF CUBAN RAW SUGAR OF THE 2012/2013 CROP PACKED IN POLYTHENE LINED POLYPROPYLENE BAGS OF ABOUT 50 KG NET EACH
 200 018 BAGS
 TWO THOUSAND EMPTY POLYETHYLENE SPARE BAGS FREE OF CHARGE
 2000 EMPTY BAGS

WEIGHING METRIC TONS
 GROSS: 10,028.462
 TARE: 28.440
 NET: 10,000.022

"CLEAN ON BOARD"

"FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY"

(of which being responsible for loss damage howsoever arising)

Freight payable as per CHARTER-PARTY dated: _____

FREIGHT ADVANCE
 Received on account of freight: _____

Time used for loading _____ days _____ hours.

SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above.

Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and if any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

"RECEIVED ON BOARD"
 Place and date of issue
PUERTO PADRE CUBA, JULY 4TH, 2013.

Signature
CAPT. RI YONG IL "MASTER"

Number of original Bills
THREE (3)

15 Printed and sold by Witherby & Company Limited, 2206 Agnesbury Street, London EC1R 0EL Tel. No. 0171 754 5341 Fax No. 0171 754 1295 by authority of The Baltic and International Maritime Council, (BIMCO) Copenhagen

Chongchongang Shipping Co., Ltd.

CODE NAME "CONGENBILL" EDITION 1994
CUBAZUCAR

Page 2
 BL No. 2

BILL OF LADING
 TO BE USED WITH CHARTER-PARTIES

Consignee
KOREA CENTRAL MARKETING & TRADING CORPORATION

Copy NON NEGOTIABLE

Vessel
M/V "CHONG CHON GANG"

Port of loading
PUERTO PADRE, CUBA

Port of discharge
NAMPO PORT

DESTINATION: D.P.R. OF KOREA

Gross weight

TEN THOUSAND ONE BAGS OF CUBAN RAW SUGAR OF THE 2012/2013 CROP PACKED IN POLYTHENE LINED POLYPROPYLENE BAGS OF ABOUT 50 KG NET EACH
 10001 BAGS
 HUNDRED EMPTY POLYETHYLENE SPARE BAGS FREE OF CHARGE
 100 EMPTY BAGS

WEIGHING METRIC TONS
 GROSS: 500.602
 TARE: 1.420
 NET: 500.033

"CLEAN ON BOARD"

"FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY"

(of which being responsible for loss damage howsoever arising)

Freight payable as per CHARTER-PARTY dated: _____

FREIGHT ADVANCE
 Received on account of freight: _____

Time used for loading _____ days _____ hours

SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above.

Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and if any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

"RECEIVED ON BOARD"
 Place and date of issue
PUERTO PADRE CUBA, JULY 4TH, 2013.

Signature
CAPT. RI YONG IL "MASTER"

Number of original Bills
THREE (3)

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Annex XVIII

Communication conveying letter of protest from OMM for Panamanian authorities stating that *Chong Chon Gang* was only carrying sugar

STRATOS CSAT 204999123456002 11-JUL-2013 19:15:53 384982

From: oceanmm@silibank.net.kp
 Date: 07/11/2013 07:15:22 PM
 Subject: MV CHONG CHON GANG
 TO MV CHONG CHON GANG
 CC OCEAN RUSSIA
 FM OCEAN

From: Ocean (OMM head office, Pyongyang)

GINGEUB
 AGENT ROBUTE SUSAN DANGGUB I ZACHEIRO BAI REUL CRYSTOBAL PIER RO IBAG SIKI
 EISSDAGO HANDAGO HAM.
 GANGZEI RO GGEULGO GAZI MOS HADOROG ANCHOR TUMYO REUL DEUNDEUNHI HALGES.
 -BAI NEUN BAI EI SILRIN SATANG GARU 10200TON EUN ENEU GAIBYELZEG HOISA EU
 SANGEB ZEG HOAMUL I ANIRA KOREA-CUBA EUIZENGO HOAMUL IGI DDAIMUNEI ZOSE
 ZENGBU DA CUBA ZENGBU EUI HABBEZEG SEUNGIN EBSINEUN BEU EDDEN GYENGU EI
 O BAI ZACHEIRO HASEN HALSU EBSDANEUNGES EUL OANGANG HAGEI ZUZANG HAMYE HA
 EN EUL BANDAI HALGES.
 HANPYEN BAI REUL CHULHANG SIKIGI UIHAI HAIDANG GIGDAN DEUL EISE GAGBANG E
 RO NORYEG HAGO ISSEUM EUL CHAMGO BARAM.
 -OCEAN RUSSIA NEUN DAEUM EUI DAMBOSE REUL HAIDANG GIGDAN DEUL EI ZENDAL H
 MYE BAI NEUN PANAMA DANGGUB I DAMBOSE EI SEMYENG HAYE BONSA EI BONAI DASE
 ANEUN HOAGIN I ISSEUL DDAI GGAZI BAI EUI BUDU GANGZEI CHAGBU REUL HEYONG
 AZI MALGES.
 DAMBOSE NATYONG SUN GOR UZEN HAGEIS EUM

++++
 WENGMUN CHAMGO BARAM.

Letter of Protest

To Panama Authorities (Drug Prosecution)
 To Panama Canal Authorities
 To C B Fenton S.A
 To all concerned parties

M/V Chong Chon Gang, under ownership of Chongchongang Shipping Co.,Ltd and
 D.P.R.Korea flag, arrived at Cristobal on 9th July for transit of Panama
 Canal with cargo of 10200 net metric tons which were shipped on board at P
 uerto Padre, Cuba.

After transit inspection at 2230hours local time, her scheduled canal tran
 sit was cancelled by the Panama Canal Authority alleging that the vessel
 is now under suspicion of drugs present on board and we regard it regretfu
 l and protest about your action.

In the slim assumption of presence of the drugs on board and without the p
 resentation of justifiable reasons, some 35 army men got on board, confined
 all the crew in deck cabin and searched the vessel from deck to the cargo
 holds.

During their forced search, they stabbed with the stick and shifted the c
 argo bags causing damage and loss to the cargo for which we are now claime
 d by the charterer and the delay of the transit brings about on the huge c
 laims due to late deliveries.

Falsely declares that ship is only carrying 10,200 tons [of sugar] loaded in Padre

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XIX

Correspondence from OMM to the Panel dated 12 December 2013

From:	Ocean Russia <oceanrld@gmail.com>	<div>First response to the Panel's initial letter dated 12 December 2013</div>
To:	morales5@un.org,	
Cc:	uden@un.org	
Date:	06/01/2014 23:04	
Subject:	Reply to the Letter of Enquiry	

Dear Sirs, Good day!

Please kindly deliver our below reply to the concerned party who gave us a letter of enquiry on December 12, 2013.

= = =

Your question 1:

- The relationship between yourselves and the *Chong Chon Gang* . For instance, are you the owner, operator or charterer of the vessel?
- The relationship between yourselves and *Chongchongang Shipping Co., Ltd.*
- The nature of your company. For instance, who owns your company; where are its headquarters; what is its main business; who are its chief officers; what are its contact details

Our answer 1:

We are only assisting external negotiations of Ocean Maritime Management Co.,ltd which is in charge of operation and management of M/V Chong Chon Gang under the ship management contract with its owners "Chongchongang Shipping Co.,Ltd".

The head office is in Pyongyang, and its main scope of business includes ship operation and management, ship repair in Ryongnam Ship Repair Yard, and crew training in the seafarers training centre.

Your question 2:

- The relationship between yourselves and *Chinpo Shipping Co Pte Ltd*.

Our answer 2:

Chinpo Shipping Co Pte Ltd (our ship agent in Singapore) is only one of the ship agents who is appointed to attend our vessels whenever any of them calls in Singapore.

Your question 3:

- Your understanding regarding the cargo on the *Chong Chon Gang* . For instance, who bears responsibility for this undeclared shipment of arms and related materiel; who were the consignors and consignees of these arms and related materiel?

Our answer 3:

We have to make it very clear that the head office did not give any instruction to load other cargo than sugar, nor was aware there ever existed such instruction. The head office only instructed the vessel to carry rolled steel plates, rolling stocks and other accessories for railway sector to Cuba from Korea and sugar vice versa and consequently is not in a position to give any reply to the Cuban cargo which was said to have been shipped for repair.

Your question 4:

- Can you advise the Panel on the following aspects which were revealed during the course of the investigation:
 - The containers, their contents and the six trailers stowed under the sugar were not declared.
 - No documents for this consignment were provided.
 - The ammunition was not declared as hazardous cargo.

· Communications between yourself and the ship contained the following instructions:

- o Conceal the containers beneath the sugar cargo
- o Make reports using the description “ *mechanical parts* ”
- o Do not declare the cargo unless instructed to
- o Prepare a false declaration using the cargo description “ *generators* ”
- o Indicate the shipper as Metalcuba

Our answer 4

It is beyond our comprehension that our communication with the M/V Chong Chon Gang contained instructions allegedly listed in your letter.

We never gave such instruction, and it is a common knowledge that our company could not give any instruction of such nature.

Panamanian authorities are openly revealing their intention of confiscating the sugar alleging it was “used to hide” something. We have to point out it is rather improper behavior lacking the common sense, as sugar was not loaded with a intention of hiding something. The sugar was loaded as goods of annual import from Cuba under the normal trade protocol, and not as a material to “hide” Cuban military hardware.

The sugar is one of the materials essential for our people’s living and is a cargo of humanitarian nature that we are entitled to retrieve by all means.

You may derive correct concept of the sugar from the cargo declarations submitted by our vessels transiting the Panama Canal every year.

= = =

We would highly appreciate if the provided information could assist you to understand the fact that we have no relation to the Cuban military hardware found onboard M/V Chong Chon Gang.

Best regards/ OMM Vladivostok

Annex XX

Documents showing financial transactions conducted by Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy personnel in Cuba (top left and right), and their unofficial translation (bottom left and right)

현금 영수증

쿠바 경제무역참사부로부터 사탕가루 200t 수송운임
으로 12,000.00(금일이공공공원정)USD\$ 를 접수하였음을
확인합니다.

해운관리국 << 청천강 >>호 선장: 리영일

주체 102(2013)년 6월 10일

Cash Receipt

I confirm the receipt of 12,000 [figure in Korean] US\$ in cash from commercial counsellor of the Embassy in Cuba for the transportation fee of 200 tons of sugar.

Maritime Management Bureau << Chong Chon Gang >>,
Captain. Ri Yong Il
Juche 102 (2013), June 10
[Chongchongang Shipping Co. Ltd. seal]

7/5 01:48

To: OCRU
Cc: OCKP
From: CHONG CHON GANG

RE: D/A

공보참사는 1WEEK 내로 D/A를 지급해 주시기 바랍니다.
또한 선박의 운항에 필요한 서류를 제출해 주시기 바랍니다.

본사 OWNER가 1WEEK 내로 D/A를 지급해 주시기 바랍니다.

To: OCKP
We received one pouch from the Embassy to the Homeland.

To: OCRU [Date] July/5 [2013] [Time:] 01:45
Cc: OCKP
From: Chong Chon Gang

RE: D/A [disbursement account]

Commercial counsellor said that he signed a guarantee that D/A* will be paid in one week and confirmed the vessel would start sailing upon finishing the loading. The Counsellor requested the owner to reimburse the D/A in one week.

To: OCKP
We received one pouch from the Embassy to the Homeland.


RGDS

Source: Panamanian authorities (unofficial translation by Panel of Experts)

*D/A: Disbursement Account (to the ship's agent)

Annex XXI

Captain's list of contacts referencing "26 boxes", embassy and Cuban military personnel



Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XXII

Link between Tonghae Shipping Agency Pte. Ltd, Chinpo Shipping Co. Ltd, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy in Singapore



Address of the DPRK Embassy in Singapore

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 → Foreign Missions Accredited to Singapore

Home > Missions > Foreign Missions Accredited to Singapore > Mission Locator

Mission Locator

There are 69 resident foreign High Commissions and Embassies, 41 foreign Consular posts and 11 International Organisations in Singapore. In addition, more than 40 non-resident foreign High Commissioners and Ambassadors are accredited to Singapore.

	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Diplomatic Relations established on: 08-11-1975
Chancery	7500 Beach Road #09-320 The Plaza Singapore 199591
Telephone	6440 3498
Fax	6348 2026
E-mail	embdprk@singnet.com.sg
Office Hours	Mon - Fri 9.00 am - 12 noon 2.00 pm - 6.00 pm
National Day	The Day of Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 09 September
Trade Section	
Address	7500 Beach Road, #09-320 The Plaza Singapore 199591
E-mail	skmicom@singnet.com.sg

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (www.mfa.gov.sg)

Annex XXIII

Official registrations of businesses co-located with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy in Singapore

Chinpo Shipping Company (Private)	Great Best Trading (Private)	Tonghae Shipping Agency																																																																		
<p>WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED & CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.</p> <p>Corporate Compliance and Financial Profile of CHINPO SHIPPING COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED (197000692R) Date: 11/12/2013</p> <p>The Following Are The Brief Particulars of :</p> <p>Registration No. : 197000692R Company Name : CHINPO SHIPPING COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED Former Name if any : Incorporation Date : 11/08/1970 Company Type : LIMITED EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY Status : Live Company Status Date : 11/08/1970</p> <p>Principal Activities</p> <p>Activities (I) : 52222 Description : SHIP AGENCIES & SHIP CHANDLERS Activities (II) : 46900 Description : GENERAL WHOLESALE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS)</p> <p>Capital</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Issued Share Capital *</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>240200.00</td> <td>2402</td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Paid-Up Capital</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>240200.00</td> <td></td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number Of Shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Registered Office Address : 7500A BEACH ROAD #09-320 THE PLAZA SINGAPORE (199591) Date of Address : 01/05/1989</p>	Issued Share Capital *	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			240200.00	2402	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Paid-Up Capital	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			240200.00		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Number Of Shares	Currency			<p>MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED & CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.</p> <p>of GREAT BEST TRADING PTE LTD Date: 16/12/2013</p> <p>The Following Are The Brief Particulars of :</p> <p>Registration No. : 1987000684R Company Name : GREAT BEST TRADING PTE LTD Former Name if any : Incorporation Date : 17/03/1987 Company Type : LIMITED EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY Status : Live Company Status Date : 17/03/1987</p> <p>Principal Activities</p> <p>Activities (I) : 46900 Description : GENERAL WHOLESALE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS) Activities (II) : 52222 Description : SHIPPING AGENCIES (FREIGHT)</p> <p>Capital</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Issued Share Capital *</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>150000.00</td> <td>150000</td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Paid-Up Capital</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>150000.00</td> <td></td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number Of Shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Registered Office Address : 7500A BEACH ROAD #09-320 THE PLAZA SINGAPORE (199591) Date of Address : 12/12/1991</p>	Issued Share Capital *	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			150000.00	150000	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Paid-Up Capital	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			150000.00		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Number Of Shares	Currency			<p>WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED & CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.</p> <p>Variance and Financial Profile of TONGHAE SHIPPING AGENCY (PRIVATE) LIMITED (198403963C) Date: 11/12/2013</p> <p>The Brief Particulars of :</p> <p>Registration No. : 198403963C Company Name : TONGHAE SHIPPING AGENCY (PRIVATE) LIMITED Former Name if any : Incorporation Date : 06/11/1984 Company Type : LIMITED EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY Status : Live Company Status Date : 06/11/1984</p> <p>Principal Activities</p> <p>Activities (I) : 46900 Description : GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS & COMMISSION AGENTS Activities (II) : 52222 Description : SHIPPING AGENCIES</p> <p>Capital</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Issued Share Capital *</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>150000.00</td> <td>150000</td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Paid-Up Capital</th> <th>Number of shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(AMOUNT)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>150000.00</td> <td></td> <td>SINGAPORE, DOLLARS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number Of Shares</th> <th>Currency</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Registered Office Address : 7500A BEACH ROAD #09-321 THE PLAZA SINGAPORE (199591) Date of Address : 01/05/1989</p>	Issued Share Capital *	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			150000.00	150000	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Paid-Up Capital	Number of shares	Currency	(AMOUNT)			150000.00		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Number Of Shares	Currency		
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Source: Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority of Singapore (www.acra.gov.sg)

Annex XXIV**Key management personnel and shareholders shared by Chinpo Shipping, Tonghae Shipping Agency and Great Best Trading**


Name (Singaporean ID number)	Registered address	Chinpo Shipping Company (Private) Limited	Tonghae Shipping Agency (Private) Limited	Great Best Trading (Private) Limited¹⁷
Lim Cheng Wah (S00905251)	55 New Upper Changi Road, #22-1456, Singapore (461055)		Director (since 30 April 1993)	Shareholder
Lim Whay Yuan (S0015766Z)	665A Jurong West Street 64, #12-160, Singapore (641665)	Secretary (since 10 July 2006)	Secretary (since 10 July 2006)	
Ling Ai Kwong (S0568928G)	9A Lorong G Telok Kurau, Singapore (426174)		Shareholder	
Tan Bee Tin (S1548554Z)	434B Fernvale Road, #19-238, Singapore (792434)		Shareholder	Shareholder
Tan Ee Hong (S1637681G)	506 Serangoon North Avenue 4, #06-422, Singapore (550506)	Director (since 25 July 1992) and shareholder	Shareholder	Shareholder
Tan Hui Tin (S1572496Z)	2 Kitchener Link, #28-05, City Square Residences, Singapore (207229)	Shareholder (since 22 August 2012)	Director (since 21 October 1996) and shareholder	Shareholder
Tan Tiak Cheng @ Tan Cheng Hoe (S0300102D)	9A Lorong G Telok Kurau, Singapore (426174)	Director (since 9 December 1999)	Director (since 5 May 2001) and shareholder	Shareholder
Tan Ting Ting (S2182996Z)	9A Lorong G Telok Kurau, Singapore (426174)		Shareholder	Shareholder

Source: Panel of Experts, based on official registrations obtained from the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority of Singapore (www.acra.gov.sg)


¹⁷ Official registration of Great Best Trading Pte., Ltd., does not name the manager(s) of the company.

Annex XXV

Stowage plan, which does not reflect presence of containers and trailers



Stowage plan reflecting actual content of the cargo



Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XXVI

**Letter from captain requesting contact be made with owner
and owner's operating company**

TO: PANAMA AUTHORITY
CC: ALL CONCERNED PARTIES

REQUEST

MASTER AND CREW REQUIRE TO CONTACT
WITH OWNER OF CHONG CHON GANG SHIPPING
COMPANY IN THE PYONGYANG D.P.R. KOREA
AND OWNER'S OPERATING COMPANY IN
VLADIVOSTOK RUSSIA IN DIRECTLY BY
INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE.

MASTER AND CREW WANT TO YOUR KIND
CO-OPERATION.

PHONE NUMBER AS FOLLOWS:
OWNER'S OPERATING CO. IN RUSSIA
MR. HAN.
007 4232 748 369
007 4232 703 208

MASTER MV. CHONG CHON GANG
05. AUG. 2013.

Source: Panamanian authorities

Annex XXVII

Loading check sheet possessed by captain identifying holds where containers and trailers would be placed, size of containers and labelling trailers belonging to surface-to-air missile systems (Volga and Pechora)

Container numbers		Checked	
2	6.3	06933-3	1 창 20"
3	6.3	243723-9	
4	6.5	162604-8	
5	8.7	457181-2	
6	6.5	811106-4	
7	8	826326-3	
8	8	811851-5	
9	10	406646-1	
10	14	169903-9	
11	16	469172-1	
12		《볼가》기구차	1 대
13		《페초라》지휘차	1 대
14		부속품상자(C-1,2,3,4,5,6)	6 짝
15	11	421080-4	
16	8.9	400199-7	
17	21	472170-2	
18	21	472240-0	
19	21	444192-5	
20	6.5	809409-7	
21	6.5	572108-5	
22	14	284762-0	
23		《볼가》배전차	1 대
24		《볼가》송차	1 대
25		《볼가》지휘차	1 대
26		《페초라》배전차	1 대
27	6.2	224277-0	
28	6.3	222463-6	
29	9.7	151805-9	
30	6.3	TM-019	
31			

총합: 20" 집합 8 개, 상자 6 짝
40" 집합 16 개, 각종 기체차 5 대

S & B U 29 58 25-3 20"

No.	Number	Location	Notes
1	151703-1	Hold 1	20 "
2	151424-3		
3	086693-3		
4	243723-9		
5	162604-8	Hold 2	40 "
6	457181-2		
7	811106-4		
8	826326-3		
9	811851-5	Hold 3	
10	406646-1		
11	169903-9		
12	469172-1		
13	<Volga> machine car	Hold 3	1 unit
14	<Pechora> guidance car		1 unit
15	Parts Container (C-1,2,3,4,5,6)		6 crates
16	421080-4		40 "
17	400199-7	Hold 4	
18	472170-2		
19	472240-0		
20	444192-5		
21	809409-7	Hold 4	1 unit
22	572108-5		1 unit
23	284762-0		1 unit
24	<Volga> power supply car		1 unit
25	<Volga> [unidentified] car	Hold 4	1 unit
26	<Volga> guidance car		1 unit
27	<Pechora> power supply car		1 unit
28	224277-0		20 "
29	222463-6		
30	151805-9		
31	TM-019		

Summary: 20" cargo containers (8), crates (6)
40" cargo containers (16), (5) units of cars (various kinds)

Source: Panamanian authorities (unofficial translation by Panel of Experts)

Annex XXVIII

Patterns of sanctions evasion

1. For sanctions measures to be implemented effectively, governments and the private sector (including international air and maritime transportation companies, freight forwarders, banks and trading companies) need to understand the circumvention techniques commonly used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Below is a summary of the most common techniques observed by the Panel in its investigative work.¹⁸ The Panel believes that awareness of these techniques and due diligence based on the principle of "know your customer" by both the governmental and private sectors are essential to curb sanctions evasion.

Use of international shipping container system

2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea relies on the use of sealed shipping containers for its illicit exports utilizing the legitimate international container trade system as cover. It follows techniques pioneered by drug-trafficking organizations that integrate their logistics operations within the global supply chain because those techniques represent the most cost-effective way to circumvent well-resourced and coordinated surveillance.¹⁹ The increasing volume of containers flowing daily through the system allows physical inspection of only a small percentage of them. Equally, the growing number of freight forwarders, carriers and shipping lines provides opportunities to embed illicit trade activities behind different layers of legitimate commercial entities.
3. In almost all cases investigated by the Panel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea transhipped illicit cargo on vessels operated by large international shipping companies, via a neighbouring regional transshipment hub because none of the mainstream shipping companies calls at ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.²⁰ Long distance maritime transportation involves a numbers of ports for transshipment or transit, permitting the use of indirect shipping routes and multiple carriers and an opportunity to obscure a cargo's origin. The Panel has reported such evasion techniques several times (for example, see paragraph 61 of the Panel's Final Report [S/2010/571](#)).
4. In particular, as shipping companies load containers on-board with scant information on the contents, it is easy to hide the real nature of the goods, the real consignor and origin. Reputable shipping companies will carry containers despite knowing almost nothing of what they contain.²¹ In this regard, the practice of handling the cargo under a "Said to Contain" clause, which is widely used in container transportation contracts, poses a challenge for the implementation of sanction measures.
5. In one instance, a European shipping company with an office in Pyongyang was used for arms shipment from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Iran in July 2009. They informed the Panel that they did not have the legal capacity to open the containers and check their contents once the Democratic People's Republic of Korea customer had packed, sealed and cleared them through customs. The Panel found that the shipper, shipping agent, owners, operators and carriers were not provided with correct information on the real nature of the goods.

¹⁸ See also paragraphs 98-102 of the 2012 Final Report (S/2012/422) and paragraphs 119-132 of the 2011 Final Report.

¹⁹ Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks, "Maritime transport and destabilizing commodity flows," *SIPRI Policy Paper* No. 32, January 2012.

²⁰ Paragraph 95 of the 2012 Final Report (S/2012/422).

²¹ Paragraph 95 of the 2012 Final Report (S/2012/422)

6. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also actively using overseas-based front/offshore companies or middlemen to arrange illicit shipments using legitimate trade systems. The Panel has noted that these actors attempt to obscure their activities by using common contact information (for example, maintaining a number of associated entities under the same registered person, address or contact numbers).

False declaration of cargo

7. The most common circumvention technique observed by the Panel is the use of false labels or misleading declarations of cargo in shipping. In the *Chong Chon Gang* case interdicted in Panama July 2013, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea excluded the prohibited military cargo entirely from the manifest and there was no bill of lading for it.

Table 1: False cargo declarations

False declaration of the items	Actual items seized	Date/year of seizure
Construction material	Ballistic missile-related items	October 2007
Generator parts	Rocket fuses	March 2008
Returning oil boring equipment (see figure 20.a.)	Rocket fuses, TBG, etc.	July 2009
Spare parts of bulldozers	Spare parts for tanks	November 2009
Mechanical parts	Conventional arms and munitions	December 2009
Lead pipe (see figure 20.b.)	Graphite cylinders (ballistic missile-related items)	May 2012
Generator	Military cargo (see annex VIII)	July 2013

Figure 20: False descriptions on bills of lading

a. False description of "RETURNING OIL, BORING MACHINE (SPARE PARTS)"

5. COGNOMEN TIAN Voy.No. 0072 W		Port of Load DALIAN, CHINA		ORIGINAL	
6. SHAHID RAJAE SEZ - BANDAR ABBAS		SHAHID RAJAE SEZ - BANDAR ABBAS		Final Destination (of the goods on the ship)	
11. Marks & Nos. container seal No.	12. No. of containers or P.kgs.	13. Kind of Packages : Description of Goods	14. Gross Weight kgs	15. Measurement	
N/M	2276 PKGS	SHIPPER'S LOAD, COUNT & SEAL SAID TO CONTAIN	93550 KGS	285 CBM	
		RETURNING OIL, BORING MACHINE(SPARE PARTS)			
			10X20'GP		


b. False description of "LEAD PIPE"

6. Order Vessel XIN YAN TAI 0154 E		7. Port of Loading TIANJIN		COPY - NON NEGOTIABLE	
8. Port of discharge LATTAKIA		9. Place of Delivery LATTAKIA, SYRIA			
11. Marks & Nos. N/M		12. No. of Containers 10		13. Kind of Packages, Description of Goods WOODEN CASES LEAD PIPE	
10. BSIU2536448 /20GP / C29693 1' X 20GP		14. Gross Weight kgs 12,155.00		15. Measurement CBM 9.864	
FREIGHT PREPAID					

Scant, false or altered information on consignor

8. The Panel has also noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conceals the identity of the entities or individuals involved by providing false, or very limited, information in its shipping documents.²² As shown in figure 21 below, the bill of lading only notes the name of the company without listing an address, contact person, telephone or fax number. This lack of information can make it difficult to identify individuals and /or entities involved in a consignment.

Figure 21: Descriptions of the consignor in the shipping documents

Page Two		VOYAGE NUMBER FL586WDEL	
SHIPPER MACHINERY EXP. & IMP. CORP.		BILL OF LADING NUMBER FUDL000195	
CONSIGNEE D.G.E. CORPORATION TEL:002427529847		EXPORT REFERENCES	
NOTIFY PARTY: Carrier not to be responsible for failure to notify SAME AS CONSIGNEE		 DELMAS SERVICE : ASAF	

²² In many cases, the shipping document provides only very limited information on the consignee as well.

설 송 선 박 회 사 SOLSONG SHIPPING CO., LTD	
“CHUNG SHENG TRADING COMPANY”	B/L No SS2
Shipper <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> CHUNG SHENG TRADING COMPANY </div>	
Consignee SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, MINISTRY OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES CENTRE, ESC. TEL: 00963-11-2316071 (1, 2, 3) FAX: 00963-11-6622309	Shipped on board the vessel named herein in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise indicated) the goods or packages specified herein and to be discharged at the above mentioned port of discharge or as near thereto as the vessel may safely get and be always afloat. The weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value, being particulars furnished by the Shipper are not checked by the Carrier on loading. The Shipper, Consignee and Holder of this Bill of Lading hereby expressly accept and agree to all printed, written or stamped provisions, exceptions and conditions of this bill of lading, including those on the back hereof. One of the Bill of Lading duly endorsed must be surrendered in exchange for the goods or delivery order. In witness whereof, the Carrier or his Agents has signed bills of Lading all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the
Notify Party COMPLANT D/C.	

9. The Panel has also observed a common practice in which a slightly different name of a known or designated entity is used to conceal its identity (see paragraphs 147-150 of this report). Some aliases listed by the Committee show the use of alternative English spellings of names translated from Korean. Slight changes such as this, or omissions or minor spelling changes, have featured in a number of cases investigated by the Panel.

Physical concealment techniques

10. The Panel has also observed physical concealment measures commonly used to avoid the detection of illicit cargo during routine physical inspections. Illicit cargo is often placed in larger crates or hidden behind false walls bearing false labelling or misleading markings.

Figure 22: Physical concealment — multiple layers of packaging



A range of physical concealment methods were employed to intentionally obscure the arms and related materiel underneath 200,000 sugar bags on board *Chong Chon Gang* in Panama 2013 as well as in other shipments from before the imposition of sanctions (see paragraphs 69, 80 and 125 and figures XIII and XXII of this report). The significant costs of such an inspection could easily discourage Member States from applying robust inspection on similar cargos.

Annex XXIX

Definition of terms of beneficial owner, registered owner and commercial owner

According to Lloyd's List Intelligence:

- The **Beneficial Owner** is the ultimate owning entity or representative thereof (either individual, company, group or organization). It may be the vessel's management company or the trading name of a group, both of which are generally perceived to represent the ultimate owners of the vessel.
- The **Registered Owner** is the company or individual to whom the ship's legal title of ownership has been registered. This is where 'open registry', 'paper' or 'name-plate' companies are often involved, with ships being registered in a country whose tax on the profits of trading ships is low/absent or whose requirements concerning manning or maintenance might be more relaxed.
- The **Commercial Operator** is responsible for the commercial direction of a ship, including its employment. It is responsible for ship operations, chartering, bunkering, port services and insurance, and may also oversee technical and crewing management, although these two functions may be outsourced.

Annex XXX

Re-registering or re-flagging Democratic People's Republic of Korea-owned or flagged vessels which took place after the adoption of resolution 2094 (2013)

<i>Originally</i>			<i>Currently</i>		
<i>IMO Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Flag</i>	<i>Renamed</i>	<i>Reflagged</i>	<i>Registered Owner/Operator</i>
8225436 General Cargo & Containers	Kuk San 23 Feb 2009	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 23 Feb 2009	Faith 8 Apr 2013	Cambodia 8 Apr 2013	Owner: Huajin Shipping & Trading Ltd. Operator: Huabao Marine Limited 8 Apr 2013
8323812 General Cargo	Kichei 21 Feb 2007	Cambodia 14 Feb 2007	Kang Nam 6 15 Apr 2013	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 15 Apr 2013	Owner/Operator: Korea Kumrung Trading Co. Ltd. 2 May 2013
8312435 General Cargo	Xin Xin 21 Oct 2008	Cambodia 21 Oct 2008	Su Yang San 2 16 Apr 2013	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 16 Apr 2013	Owner/Operator: Korea Suyangsan Shipping Co. Ltd. 16 Apr 2013
8712362 Tanker	Ju Jak bong 5 1 Mar 2010	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 28 Oct 2002	Eastern Luck 18 May 2013	Togo 17 May 2013	Owner: Eastern Luck Shipping Co. Ltd. Operator: Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. 27 Mar 2013
7408873 Chemical Tanker	Activa 5 Dec 1999	Sierra Leon 5 December 1999	Yu Jong 3 31 May 2013	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 31 May 2013	Owner: Korea Yujong Shipping Company Ltd. Operator: Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 31 May 2013
8661575 General Cargo	Bao Jiang 19 1 Sep 2005	China 1 Sep 2005	Tong Hung 1 1 June 2013	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1 Jun 2013	Owner/Operator: Tonghung Shipping & Trading Co. Ltd. 1 Jun 2013
8217685 General Cargo	Sunshine 16 Jun 2009	Sierra Leone 9 Jun 2009	Hwasong (or Hwa Song) 14 Jun 2013	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 14 Jun 2013	Owner/Operator: Hwasong Shipping Co. Ltd. 14 Jun 2013
8613360 Product tanker	Tae Won 166 13 Apr 2012 Dae Won 166 31 May 2011	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 31 May 2011	DPETRO 166 26 Jul 2013	Cambodia 26 Jul 2013	Owner: DP Shipping & Management Hong Kong Operator: Dalian Jiajia Shipping Technology Co. Ltd. 26 Jul 2013
8610461 Product tanker	Bu Yon (or Pu Yon) 20 Dec 2001	Democratic People's Republic of Korea 20 Dec 2001	Ocean Lucky 23 Dec 2013	Cambodia 23 Dec 2013	Owner: HK Ever Prosper Trading Limited Operator: Huabao Marine Ltd. 23 Dec 2013

Source: Lloyd's List Intelligence and Equasis database

Annex XXXI

Democratic People's Republic of Korea registered shipping companies²³

Company Name	IMO No.	Location	Registered vessels [vessels operated or managed]
Government of DPRK ²⁴		Pyongyang	Baek Sa bong, Bu Gang, Chon Song, Da Song San, Dae Dong Gang, Ka Chi Bong Kang Nam 1, Myong Sin, Ra Nam 2, Ryong Am Po, Sam Ji Yon, Song Hoa 2
Aprokgang Shipping & Trading	5647667	Sinuiju	Jung Gang 1, 6, Kum Pit 28 [also ISM manager ²⁵ of Jung Gang 2, 5]
Amnokgang Shipping Co. Ltd.	5459864	Pyongyang	Ap Rok Gang (OMM is manager)
Daewon Shipping & Management (2008) ²⁶	5489276	Pyongyang	Sobaeksu
Daitonggang(or Taedonggang) Sonbak Company Limited (2004)	1845139	Pyongyang	Tae Dong Gang, Mu Du Bong, Ryong Gun Bong (OMM is commercial operator) Ryong Gang
Dongcheng Shipping Limited	5657218	Pyongyang	Mi Yang 7 (Korea Miyang Shipping is operator)
Eunbong Shipping (2002)	1974121	Pyongyang	Eun Bong (registered as "total loss" since 2002) ²⁷
Falmouth Shipping & Trading S.A. (2005)	5143468	Wonsan	Makkia (since May 2005)
Haesong Shipping Company (1985)	5348658	Pyongyang	Hae Song
Hwa Song Shipping Company Limited (2001)	5434300	Pyongyang	Hwa Song (renamed from Sunshine and reflagged from Sierra Leone in June 2013)
Hyoksin Shipping Co. Ltd	5459966	Pyongyang	Hyok Sin 2 (OMM is ship manager since Dec. 2008)
Jatnamu Shipping Company Limited (2001)	5145084	Pyongyang	(It was the owner of Man Pung until Nov. 2006)
Jipsam Shipping Company (2008)	5465620	Pyongyang	Jip Sam (or Chip Sam) (OMM is ship manager)
Jonjin Shipping Co. Ltd.	5571089	Pyongyang	Jon Jin 2
Kimchaek Fishery Station (1985)	1701171	Kimchaek	Bong Hoa San (or Pong Hwa San), Sa Ja Bong ²⁸ , Zang Dok San
Korea 56 Trading Company (1999)	1839360	Pyongyang	Jin Song 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, Song Gwang Ryon, Woory Star [Also ship operator of Woory Star 2] ²⁹
Korea Amnokgang Trading Company (1999)	1855501	Sinuiju	Sam Bong San, Yaksan

²³ This includes only companies whose addresses are listed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea according to Lloyd's Intelligence and Equasis databases. It is not exhaustive.

²⁴ According to Lloyd's, the DPRK Government is the beneficial owner of 152 vessels, commercial operator of 30 vessels, registered owner of 12 vessels

²⁵ ISM is an abbreviation of International Safety Management.

²⁶ In July 2013, the companies' two ships, Tae Won 166 and Tae Won 168, were renamed as DPETRO 166 and PETRO 168 respectively and reflagged Cambodia

²⁷ Equasis database. Lloyd's database lists the ship under Korea Moran Shipping Company.

²⁸ Korea Susan Shipping Company is third party operator of Sa Ja Bong.

²⁹ It is Panama flagged and Hongkong Haian International Development Limited is registered owner since September 2011. IMS manger of the ship changed to Dalian Jiajia Shipping Tech since June 2013.

Korea Ansan Shipping Company	5676084	Pyongyang	An San 1 (Korea Kumgang Shipping Company is ISM manager)
Korea Buhung Shipping Company ³⁰ (1998)	1792675	Pyongyang	(Sungrisan 8, 9 – registered as “dead” in 2004)
Korean Buyon Shipping Co. Limited (2004)	5057119	Wonsan	Victory 2 ³¹
Korea Chongunsan Trading Company (2004)	5059954	Pyongyang	Chong Un San 2
(Korea) Daebong Shipping Company (2003)	5145243	Pyongyang	Rak Rang
Korea Daehung Shipping Company (1999)	0613729	Pyongyang	Myong Song, Xoh Paek
Korea Daehung Transportation Trading Company (2006)	1845142	Pyongyang	Dae Hung 10 ³² , Dae Hung 2
Korea Daesan Shipping Company (2006)	5291587	Pyongyang	Ocean Dawn (registered as “dead” in 2013) ³³
Korea Daesong Shipping Company	1648029	Pyongyang	Dae Song (or Tae Song) 422, Dae Song 126, Dae Song 201, SeungRi
Korea Green Leaves Shipping (2006)	5229469	Pyongyang	(Owner and manager of Fortune Star 7 until May 2011)
Korea Gumbong Shipping Company			Gumbong
Korea Heungsong (2003)	5019287	Pyongyang	Owner of Sonbong 1 until April 2009
Korea Ikal Shipping (2003) ³⁴	5051021	Pyongyang	I.Kal (registered as “dead” in 2003)
Korea J.S. Shipping Company (2004)			Song Ak San ³⁵
Korea Jamaedo Shipping Company	5517266	Nampo	Kum Sung (ship manager) ³⁶ [Tae Dok San – commercial operator (Dandong Haifeng Shipping is registered owner)]
Korea Jangsaeng Trading Co. Ltd. (2009)	5434344	Pyongyang	Tae Sung (or Dae Song) 923
Korea Jinhung Shipping Co (2002)	5345429	Pyongyang	Jin Hung
Korea Jinhung 8 Shipping Co (2011)	5648339	Pyongyang	Jin Hung 8 (since Nov. 2011)
Korea Jinsong Shipping Co (2009)	4184968	Pyongyang	Jin Song (since Dec. 2009)
Korea Jonsung Trading (2011)	5647640	Pyongyang	Jon Sung 7, 9
Korea Kangsong General (or Shipping and Trading Co.(2000)	1888023	Pyongyang	Il Sim, Kang Song, Ko San Jin, Mai Bong 1, Sam Hai 1, So Hung 1
Korea Kangsong Trading Co (2011)	5522496	Sinuiju	Su Sam (or Cu Sam) 1 (since June. 2011)
Korea Kangsong (2013)	5462713	Pyongyang	Kon Chang (since Jan. 2013)
Korea Kuksan Shipping Company (2009)	5489231	Pyongyang	(Kuk San ³⁷ - owner until April 2013)

³⁰ According to the Equasis database, this company was associated with Chinpo Shipping Co (Pte) Ltd (Singapore).

³¹ Reflagged to Mongolia since Dec. 2012. It renamed from Buyon in Dec. 2012. ISM manager of the ship is Havest Shipping Ltd (Hong Kong).

³² According to the Equasis database, its registered owner is East Fortune Shipping Co. Inc (Panama).

³³ Rename from Dae San in March 2013. Ownership was transferred to Haorun Resources Ltd (Hong Kong, 5731649) on 28 March 2013.

³⁴ Current owner is Jing Yu International Trading Company Limited (Hong Kong). Also Owner of Chong Won 65 which was renamed from Hye Song 2 and reflagged Mongolia in Sept. 2011.

³⁵ Lloyd's List Intelligence database. Equasis database listed the vessel under Tung Hai Navigation and described as total loss since 2005.

³⁶ Registered owner is Hongkong Compliant Intl Trans.

Korea Kumbyol Trading Company	5614028	Pyongyang	Chang Dok, Dan Wyol Bong (or Tan Gyor Bong), Kang An, Ku Bong Ryong, So Baek San, Yong Bong, So Song Chon (or Su Song Chon)
Korea Kumgang Shipping Company (2003)	1757755	Pyongyang	Kum Gang 1, Kum Gang 2
Korea Kumgang Trading Company (2001)	1957290	Pyongyang	Kum Gang 3
Korea Kumhae Shipping Company (2010)	5459983	Pyongyang	Kum Hae (registered as “dead” in 2011)
Korea Kumpit Shipping Company (2011)	5361772	Nampo	Kum Pit, Kum Pit 1, Kum Pit 34, Kum Pit 35
Korea Kumpyo Shipping (1999)	1846786	Pyongyang	
Korea Kumrung Trading Company Limited	5146476	Pyongyang	Kang Nam 1, 3, 5, 7 Kang Nam 6 (Reflagged and re-registered from Kichiei Cambodia-flagged in April 2013)
Korea Kumrung Shipping Company	1888142	Pyongyang	Kum Rung 5 [QIAN LI SHAN 13-Ship manager. Cambodia flag. Owner is ALEX SHIPPING CO LTD)]
Korea Kumunsan Trading Co (2005)	5110478	Pyongyang	Kum Un San
Korea Kunhae Co. Ltd.	5423764	Pyongyang	Sai Nal, Sai Nal 2, Sai Nal 3, Sin Pho, Wang Jong, Mun Su San, Kum Gang San (or Kumgangsant)
Korea Kwanghae Shipping Company (2009)	5490013	Pyongyang	(Kwang Hae - subsequently renamed as Guang Hai, re-flagged in Panama and transferred to Shenghao Marine Hong Kong Ltd since Nov. 2011)
Korea Lyeming Shipping Company	5337141	Pyongyang	
Korea Mandae Trading Company (2010)	5321542	Pyongyang	Hae Gum, Dae Pung, Hung Gyong
Korea Miyang Shipping Company Limited	5434361	Pyongyang	Mi Yang 1, 5, 6. Global Nampo (Sierra Leon flagged) ³⁷ [Miyang 7 and Miyang 8- operator,]
Korea Moran Shipping Company	1068364	Pyongyang	Eun bong (Lloyd’s database described its existence in doubt)
Korea Mubong Trading Company	5093567	Pyongyang	Mu bong 2
Korea Myongsan-Huayang (or Korea Myongsan Shipping Company) (2001)	5225072	Pyongyang	Myong San (Sea Link Shipping LLC (UAE) is a third party operator)
Korea Namsan Shipping Company (1989)	1790444	Nampo	Nampo 9, Namsan (or Nam San) 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, Tae Song 1 [Jung Gang 5- commercial operator. China Dandong Liaodong (2011) is registered owner]
Korea Osong Shipping Company (2011)	5619960	Pyongyang	Glory (Mongolia) –dead (2011-7-2012.7)
Korea Paekho 7 Trading Company (2000)	5010663	Wonsan	Ri Myong Su-8
Korean-Polish Shipping Company Limited	1267131	Pyongyang	Chopol 2 (or Jo Ppol 2), Ryo Myong
Korea Pomsan Shipping Company (2008)	4140580	Pyongyang	Pom San (since 2011)
Korea Pongyue Shipping (2005)	5160832	Pyongyang	Pong Yue
Korea Potonggang (or Botonggang) Shipping Company (1999)	1895246	Pyongyang	Tae Song (or Dae Song) 117, Dae Song (or Daesong) 88
Korea Puksong Shipping Company	5571305	Pyongyang	Puk Song 2 (since Sept. 2010); [Puk Song 3-manager since June 2011

³⁷ The company was the owner and operator of Kuk San which was renamed as Faith and reflagged as Cambodia in April 2013. Its registered owner and operator also changed to Huajin Shipping & Trading Limited (Hong Kong).

³⁸ Operator is Royal Armadas Intl Co Ltd.

			(Owner is Dandong Sanjiang Trading)]
Korea Rungra 888 Trading Company (2006)	2137541	Pyongyang	(Kum Rung 5- until Nov. 2005. Since then Korea Kumrung Shipping Company is owner)
Korea Rungrado Shipping Company	1414592	Pyongyang	Bu Hung, Bu Gang, Rung Ra 1 (since Dec. 2012); Rung Ra Do (the vessel's name was changed from Song Hoa 3 in January 2013)
Korea Ryonhwan Shipping (2010)	5647698	Pyongyang	Chong Gen ³⁹
Korea Samhae Promotion (1998)	1845315	Hamhung	(Un Ha – since April 2009 Korea Phyongwon Trading Co is owner/operator)
Korea Samilpo Shipping Company	1701459	Pyongyang	Ra Nam 2 (since July 2011), Ra Nam 3 (since Sept. 2012), Sin Dok
Korea Samma Joint Venture Company(or Korea Samma Shipping Company)	5145892	Wonsan (Pyongyang)	Sam Ma, Sam Ma 2
Korea Sikryo Trading Company (1998)	1845329	Nampo	(Previous owner of Sam Ma – until 2001)
Korea Sinjin Shipping and Trading Co. or Korea Sinjin Shipping (1951)	5144090	Nampo	Dae Song San, Sin Jin
Korea Sogyong Trading	5146401	Pyongyang	So Gyong (since Aug. 2010), So Gyong 2
Korea Solsong Shipping Company (2005)	5145362	Pyongyang	Song Hoa 2 (Song Hoa 3- renamed to Rung Ra Do and transferred in January 2013)
Korea Sonbak Trading Corporation (1992)	1556069	Pyongyang	Son Bak 10
Korea Sonbong General Trading Co. (2000)	1891570	Pyongyang	Son Bong 1 (or Songbong 1) (its name was Hung Song 8 before Aug. 2010)
Korea Songchongang Trading Co. (1967)	1845346	Hamhung	Baek Un San (or Paek Un San)
Korea Sungjin Shipping Company	5728463	Pyongyang	Sung Jin 6 (Lloyd's described its existence is in doubt)
Korea Suyangsan Shipping Company (1998)	1845332	Haeju	Su Yang San 2 (renamed Xin Xin and reflagged from Cambodia in April 2013)
Korea Taedonggang Shipping Company (1998) (or Korea Taedong Shipping Co)	5146034	Nampo	Dae Yang (or Tae Yang), Puk Dae Bong, Pyong Nam
Korea Taeyang Shipping Co. Ltd.	5522536	Pyongyang	Tae Yang
Korea Tonghae Shipping Company (1967)	0701819	Pyongyang	The company was owner of many DPRK ships until 1996 including Mu Du Bong ⁴⁰
Korea Tumangang Shipping (1999)	1833502	Chongjin	Tu Ru Bong, Tu Ru Bong 1, Tu Ru Bong 3
Korea Uljibong Shipping Company (2006)	5321468	Pyongyang	Ul Ji Bong, Ul Ji Bong 2
Korea Wolbisan Shipping Company (1998)	1845125	Nampo	On chon
Korea Yang Gak Do Shipping Co. (2007)	5341531	Pyongyang	Yang Gak Do 9(reflagged and renamed in Feb. 2013 from Panama), Yang Gak Do 7 (since July 2006) [Yang Gak Do 3(ship manager; owner is China Dandong Lushun Trading)]
Korea Yonsan Shipping Company (2008)	5322007	Pyongyang	Yon San (since April 2008)
Korea Yujong Shipping Company Limited	5434358	Pyongyang	Yu Jong 1, Yu Jong 2, Yu Jong 3 (reflagged and renamed in May 2013 from Aktiva, Siera Leon)

³⁹ Siunbong Ocean Intl Group Co is ISM manager. It was flagged Mongolia until July 2010.

⁴⁰ Registered owner is Mariners Shipping & Trading Company Limited (Thailand).

Korea Zoming Shipping Company (2000)	1909630	Pyongyang	Zo Kwang [Mi Rae 1: Ship manager of the vessel. Daohe Shipping Company Limited (2002) is owner]
Korea Zuzagbong Maritime Limited	1991835	Pyongyang	(Ju Zak Bong 5, re-flagged and reregistered in May 2013 to Eastern Luck, Togo whose manager is Dalian Taiyuan International)
Kumsan Shipping Company (2004)	5145036	Pyongyang	Kum San
Lyeming Shipping Company (2007)	5337141	Pyongyang	[Ryo Myong – manager of the vessel]
Lyukdae Fishery Station (1996)	1680766	Lyukdae	Dae Song San, Nam Po 1, Nam Po 2
Magnolia Mga Shipping Co. Limited (1980)	5103604	Kimchaek	[Mun Su San - Third Party Operator of the vessel]
Manpung Shipping Company(2006)	5343881	Pyongyang	Man Pung
Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited – OMM (1998)	1790183	Pyongyang	No registered vessel under the company, but commercial operator of 14 vessels [Am Nok Gang, Baek Ma Kang, Chip Sam, Dai Hong Dan, Dok Chon, Hwang Gum San 2, Jon Jin 2, Man Pung, Pe Gae Bong, Pho Thae, Ryong Gang, Rong Gang 2, Tae Dong Gang] ⁴¹
Pongsu Shipping Company Limited (1996)	5314364	Pyongyang	Hwang Jin, Song Do Ho
Pothae Shipping Co. Ltd (2011)	5614076	Pyongyang	Pho Thae (OMM is manager)
Rakwon Shipping Company (2008)	5459918	Pyongyang	Rak Won 2 (OMM is manager)
Rason Kangsong Trading Corporation (2009)	5481531	Najin (Rason)	Sa Hyang San (since June 2009)
Ryonggang Shipping Co. Ltd	5522315	Pyongyang	Ryong Gang 2 (OMM is manager)
Shoo Gun Shipping or Korea Shoogun Shipping Co. Ltd. (2003)	5144316	Chungjin	Rimsugoon (or Rim Su Goon)
Sarajevo Maritime LLC (2006)	5144608	Wonsan	Sarajevo
Sinpo Fishery Company (1996)	1701414	Sinpo	Bong Dae San, Kum Kang San, La Pal San, Mo Ran Bong(China flag), Mun Su San, Mun Su San, Sam Chon Ri -1, Tong Chon, Un Pa San
Siunbong Ocean Int'l Group Co(1992)	5725614	Pyongyang	[Kwang Myong, Chong Gen – ISM manager of these vessels]
Si Wan Fung Sea Going Int'l Holding Limited	1502271	Pyongyang	Paek Hak San, [Kunjari (Mongolia), Kwang Myong – ship manager of these vessels]
Sohae Sonbak Company Limited	1697711	Pyongyang	Pe Gae Bong, Baek Ma Kang, Dai Hong Dan, Dok Chon
Sun Shipping Co. Ltd	1894849	Pyongyang	Mi Yang 8 (Korea Miyang Shipping Co. Ltd. is manager of the vessel)
Tadonggang Shipping Co.	5435974	Pyongyang	Tae Dong Gang (Taedonggang Sonbak Co. is ship manager and OMM is ISM manager)
Taedonggang Sonbak Co. Limited (1999)	1845139	Nampo	Chip Sam (or Jip Sam), Pho Thae, Ryong Gang, Ryong Gang 2, Ryong Gun Bong (OMM is commercial operator)
Taedoksan Shipping Company	5673867	Nampo	Tae Dok San (since June 2012)
Takuzan Marine Corporation (2005)	5145739		Takuzan

⁴¹ These ships are owned by Sohae Sonbak Company Limited, Taedonggang Sonbak Company Limited or Jatnamu Shipping Company Limited.

Tonghae Sonbak Company Limited (1998)	1845023	Pyongyang	Bi Ryu Gang (or Pi Ryu Gang), Bo Tong Gang, Hwang Kum San, Kum Gang, Man Gyong Bong, O Un Chong Nyon Ho
Tong Hung Shipping & Trading Co. Ltd. (2011)	5571251	Pyongyang	Fortune Star 7 (Korea Puksong Shipping Co is ISM manager since Jan.2013), Tong Hung 1 ⁴²
Yanghwa Fishery Station	1845099	Yanghwa	Bi Ro Bong (or Pi Ro Bong), Baek Gum San
Yusong Shipping Company (2009)	5146578	Pyongyang	Yu Song 7 (since Feb. 2010), Yu Song 12 (since Aug. 2012)
222 Shipping & Trading (2007)	5321644	Pyongyang	Hwang Chol 1, Chong Un San 1

⁴² Renamed from Bao Jiang 19 and reflagged from China in 1 June 2013. Chinese ship owner is Shanghai Jiayun Investment.

Annex XXXII

Pamphlet of the Second China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Economic, Trade, Culture and Tourism Expo, 11-14 October 2013, showing an alias of Ryonha Machinery Corporation

 第二届中朝经贸文化旅游博览会 <small>2013 中国·丹东 제2차 조중경매무역문화관광박람회</small>		10.10-10.14 <small>CHINA-DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ECONOMIC, TRADE, CULTURE AND TOURISM EXPO</small> 会刊	
<p>邮箱: sobaeksu@star-co.net.kp 各种石墨产品, 化学产品</p> <p>K14 轻工业科学院 电话: 008502-3816147 传真: 008502-3812100 邮箱: kltc@star-co.net.kp 烧酒, 冶炼过滤布</p> <p>K15 朝鲜恩情贸易会社 电话: 008502-18111-1332 传真: 008502-3812100 邮箱: unjong@star-co.net.kp 高硫磺铸钢</p> <p>K16 强兴技术贸易会社 电话: 008502-3816147 传真: 008502-3812100 邮箱: kltc@star-co.net.kp 过滤材料, 焊条, 金属检验器</p> <p>K17 京心食品合营会社 电话: 008502-3816146 传真: 008502-3814410 邮箱: kltc@star-co.net.kp</p>	<p>K18 朝鲜国际展览社 电话: 008502-3814488 传真: 008502-3814654 邮箱: kiec@silbank.net.kp 纪念品</p> <p>K19 朝鲜新日技术贸易会社 电话: 00850218111-8044 传真: 008502-3814410 邮箱: ksttc@star.kp.com 松针油, 万年香油, 血糖值稳定剂</p> <p>K20 朝鲜建材贸易会社 电话: 008502-3814416 邮箱: kpglass@star-co.net.kp 装饰石头, 水泥, 陨石, 玻璃</p> <p>K21、37、46、62、63、127 平壤贸易会社 电话: 008502-18111-8634 传真: 008502-3814410 邮箱: kpytc.tr@star-co-net.kp 保健品</p> <p>K22</p>	<p>平壤酒</p> <p>K23 平壤联兴贸易会社 电话: 008502-3814681 传真: 008502-3818597 邮箱: mfdi@star-co.net.kp 食品</p> <p>K24 朝鲜平行贸易会社 电话: 008502-3814416 传真: 008502-3814410 磨梳石, 海参, 海鲜</p> <p>K25 朝鲜祥原贸易会社 电话: 008502-18111-3816141 传真: 008502-3814416 邮箱: sw2012@star-co.net.kp 牙膏</p> <p>K26-33 朝鲜联合机械贸易会社 数控机床, 各种工具</p> <p>K34 朝鲜万年保健会社 药品技术交流社 电话: 008502-3818905 传真: 008502-3814410(CC-427)</p>	<p>K35 朝鲜林业贸易会社 电话: 008502-18111-3818044 传真: 008502-3814410 保健品, 松叶产品</p> <p>K36 朝鲜国德贸易总会社</p> <p>K39 朝鲜机械贸易总会社 电话: 008502-18111-8102 传真: 008502-3814495 邮箱: kigye@star-co.net.kp</p> <p>朝鲜重着工具开发会社 电话: 008502-18111-8102 传真: 008502-3814495 邮箱: kigye@star-co.net.kp</p>

A Chinese name of “朝鲜联合机械贸易会社” which phonetically translates into English as “Korea Ryonhap [or Lian’he] Machinery

Annex XXXIII

Financial Action Task Force public statement dated 18 October 2013 regarding high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.



Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks emanating from the jurisdictions.

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction.

FATF Public Statement regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Since June 2013, the DPRK has continued to engage directly with the FATF and has engaged further with the APG. The FATF urges the DPRK to enhance its engagement with the FATF to agree on an action plan to address its AML/CFT deficiencies.

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should also protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices, and take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by DPRK financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.

Source: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/statements/18-October-2013.pdf>

Annex XXXIV

List of banks known or believed to be operating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The DPRK does not publish a list of banks licensed to operate in its country and considers business information most other countries normally make available about banks to be a state secret. Various references and guides published with information about DPRK government, party, industry, and trade organizations provide information on some banks. The Panel is unaware of any commercially available comprehensive guide to DPRK banks. The list compiled here, including names in Korean and Chinese when known and appropriate, uses information from a variety of government, press, business and academic sources believed to be reliable and corroborated wherever possible. It reflects information available through 1 February 2014. The Panel welcomes information that would help it further refine and improve the list.

Institution/ Designated by (UN, US, or EU)	Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	AKA (also known as), FKA (formerly known as)	Notes
Amroggang Development Bank 압록강개발은행(UN)	ADBKKPPYXXX (Reported as no longer in use)		Associated with Tanchon Commercial Bank.
Bank of East Land, Pyongyang 동방은행 (UN)	BOELKPPYXXX	AKA: Dongbang Bank AKA: Tongbang Bank	Associated with Dongbang Economic Group; financial arm of Green Pine Associated Corporation (UN designated).
Tanchon Commercial Bank, Pyongyang 단천상업은행 (UN)	[CCBHKPPYXXX] (withdrew from SWIFT)	FKA: Changgwang Credit Bank FKA: Korea Changgwang Credit Banking Corporation	Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID (UN designated).
Central Bank of the D.P.R. of Korea 조선중앙은행			Bank of issue; has stake in Hana Banking Corporation.
Foreign Trade Bank of the D.P.R. of Korea 조선무역은행(US)	FTBDKPPYXXX	AKA: Mooyokbank AKA: Korea Trade Bank	Bank manages State foreign exchange transactions and diplomatic accounts; reportedly established Dandong, China, branch in 2002.
Chinese Commercial Bank, Rason 中华商业银行			Established in January 2013; new competitor of Golden Triangle Bank.
Credit Bank of Korea		AKA: Korea Credit Bank FKA: International Credit Bank	Associated with Heavy Industry Department of KWP; most likely different from First Credit Bank.

Institution/ Designated by (UN, US, or EU)	Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	AKA (also known as), FKA (formerly known as)	Notes
Daedong Credit Bank 대동신용은행 (US)	DCBKKPPYXXX	AKA: DCB Finance Ltd FKA: Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank	Joint venture with Korea Daesong Bank; majority stake recently acquired by a Chinese company, Nice Group. This appears to be General Nice Group Holdings Ltd. Subsidiaries show a focus on coal and iron ore.
First Credit Bank	KYCBKPPYXXX	FKA: Kyongyong Credit Bank, Pyongyang	Possible joint venture.
First Trust Bank Corporation 제일신용은행		AKA: Cheil Credit Bank AKA: Jeil Credit Bank	Joint venture founded by Chosen Soren businessman to handle trade of foreign-invest DPRK firms with Russian Federation.
Golden Triangle Bank, Namsan 황금의삼각주은행	KGTBKPPYXXX	AKA: Golden Delta Bank	Until 2013, only bank servicing Rason Free Trade Zone.
Hana Banking Corporation	BRBKKPP1XXX	AKA: Hwaryo Bank (화려은행) AKA: Huali Bank (朝鲜华丽银行) AKA: Gorgeous Bank of North Korea FKA: Brilliance Banking Corporation, Ltd.	Joint stock company arranged between Central Bank of DPR Korea and Central Bank of China; operates branches in China and deals in RMB; had sought to open branch in Seoul but agreement not reached.
Ilsim International Bank 일심국제은행	a.ILSIKPPYXXX b.FTBDKPPYKBC (b is also reported as BIC for a branch of Foreign Trade Bank)	FKA: Korea Kumsong Bank FKA: Kumsong Bank (possible former FTB window)	Korea Kumsong Bank was reported to be associated with the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.
Hi-Fund Bank International Consortium Bank (ICB)	FHIBKPPYXXX	AKA: Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank; reportedly is capitalized by a number of DPRK and Chinese companies, it is associated with the Sungri Economic Group	Hi-Fund Bank also was formerly listed by Malaysia Korea Partners Group of Companies (MKP) as a banking subsidiary. MKP now lists the name of its banking subsidiary as International Consortium Bank, Sungri Exhibition Hall, Pyongyang.
International Telecom Bank, Pyongyang 국제통신은행	[ITBKPPYXXX] (no longer valid)		Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; this bank appears to have discontinued operations.
Industrial Development Bank			Associated with now defunct Taepung International Investment Group; uncertain if this entity is active.
The International Industrial Development Bank			Functions may now be performed by Korea National Development Bank; uncertain if this entity is active.

Institution/ Designated by (UN, US, or EU)	Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	AKA (also known as), FKA (formerly known as)	Notes
Korea Agricultural Investment Bank	Changed to KAIBKPPYXXX from KAIBKPP1XXX		Established to implement current 10-year plan.
Korea Daesong Bank 대성은행(US)(EU)	KDBKKPPYXXX	AKA: Daesong Bank AKA: Taesong Bank AKA: Chosen Taesong Unhaeng	Part of Korea Daesong Economic Group and financial arm of Office 39 of the KWP; a subsidiary, Golden Star Bank, Vienna, was closed by Austria in 2004.
Korea Joint Bank, Pyongyang 조선합영은행	KJBFKPPYXXX	AKA: Korea Joint Operation Bank AKA: Chosun Joint Operation Bank	Joint venture bank; established by Korea International General Joint Venture Company and Association of Korea Traders and Industrialists in Japan.
Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation 조선광선은행(US) (EU)	KKBCKPPYXXX	AKA: 朝鲜光鲜金融会社 FKA: Korea Kwangson Finance Company	Associated with Foreign Trade Bank; supports Tanchon Commercial Bank; operates branch in Dandong, China, under its former name Korea Kwangson Finance Company.
Korea National Development Bank	Changed to KNDBKPPYXXX From KNDBKPP1XXX		Established to implement current 10-year plan.
Korea United Development Bank, D.P.R. of Korea 통일발전은행	KUDBKPPYXXX	FKA: Myohyangsan Bank FKA: Myonghyangsan Bank	Under direction of Cabinet.
Koryo Commercial Bank 고려상업은행	Changed to KCBKKPP1XXX from KCBKPPYXXX	AKA: Korea Commercial Bank	Joint venture bank; established by DPRK and US residents; related to Kumgangsan International Group.
Korea Commerce Bank			Established by Commercial Banking Law adopted in 2006; reportedly took over some functions formerly handled by Central Bank.
Koryo Credit Development Bank	KGCBKPPYXXX	FKA: Koryo Global Trust Bank FKA: Koryo-Global Credit Bank FKA: 고려글로벌신용은행	Joint venture with Koryo Bank; foreign partner returned license; uncertain if this entity is active.
Koryo Bank, D.P.R. of Korea 고려은행	KORBKPPYXXX		Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank; possibly associated with Office 38 of the KWP.

Institution/ Designated by (UN, US, or EU)	Bank Identifier Code (BIC)	AKA (also known as), FKA (formerly known as)	Notes
Kumgang Bank 금강은행	KMBKKPPYXXX	Possible AKA: Kumgang Export and Import Bank	Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company; described as a window of the Foreign Trade Bank.
North East Asia Bank 동북아시아은행	NEABKPPYXXX		Associated with Korea National Insurance Corporation.
Orabank	ORABKPPYXXX		Established by Egypt's Orascom Group of Companies.

Annex XXXV

Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations dated 18 February 2014

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при Организации
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900
Fax: (212) 628 0252



Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10065

№ 649 /Н

Постоянное представительство Российской Федерации при Организации Объединенных Наций свидетельствует свое уважение Председателю Комитета по санкциям, учрежденного в соответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций 1718 (2006), и в ответ на обращение координатора Группы экспертов Комитета в отношении т.н. «владивостокского отделения» северокорейской компании «Ocean Maritime Management Company» (ОММ), причастной к инциденту с задержанием панамскими властями северокорейского сухогруза «Чхончхонган», имеет честь сообщить следующее.

Е.П.г-же Сильвии Лукас,
Председателю Комитета по санкциям,
учрежденного резолюцией Совета
Безопасности ООН 1718 (2006)

с.с.: г-ну Весселину Костову,
секретарю Комитета по санкциям,
учрежденного резолюцией Совета
Безопасности ООН 1718 (2006)

г-ну Мартину Удену
координатору Группы экспертов,
учрежденной резолюцией Совета
Безопасности ООН 1874 (2009)

Согласно данным российских компетентных органов, ОММ является одной из структур Министерства морского и сухопутного транспорта КНДР, представительство которой до 2010 г. было зарегистрировано во Владивостоке по адресу: ул. Луговая, д. 43, кв. 39. Прав собственности на какое-либо имущество на территории Российской Федерации у представительства не установлено. В качестве заявленной деятельности организации фигурировала перевозка грузов, приобретение товаров народного потребления и списанных судов. С 2010 г. эта структура свою деятельность в Российской Федерации не осуществляет.

По информации Федерального бюджетного учреждения «Государственная регистрационная палата при Министерстве юстиции Российской Федерации», представительства или филиалы ОММ в настоящее время в сводном государственном реестре аккредитованных на территории Российской Федерации представительств иностранных компаний и в государственном реестре филиалов иностранных юридических лиц, аккредитованных на территории Российской Федерации, не значатся.

Хотели бы также обратить внимание на то, что в обращении координатора Группы экспертов г-н Хан Ен Кю упоминается в качестве «представителя» отделения ОММ во Владивостоке. Для Российской Федерации неприемлемо в этом контексте оперирование информацией несуществующей структуры «Russian Online Commercial Business Registry» (в докладе экспертов сделана ссылка на интернет-ресурс Одесского института инженеров морского флота, расположенного на Украине и имеющего украинский домен).

Одновременно сообщаем, что гражданин КНДР Хан Ен Кю впервые въехал на территорию Российской Федерации 15 июня 2012 г. по деловой визе. С июня 2012 г. по настоящее время трижды посещал Россию. Официально к деятельности Министерства морского и сухопутного транспорта КНДР и ОММ г-н Хан отношения не имеет.

Постоянное представительство Российской Федерации пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Председателю Комитета по санкциям, учрежденного соответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций 1718 (2006), уверения в своем весьма высоком уважении.

Нью-Йорк, «7» февраля 2014 года



Translated from Russian

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

No. 649/N

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and has the honour to provide the following information in response to the communication from the Coordinator of the Committee's Panel of Experts regarding what was termed the Vladivostok office of the North Korean company Ocean Maritime Management (OMM), in connection with the incident involving the Panamanian authorities' detention of the North Korean bulk carrier Chong Chon Gang.

According to information in the possession of the appropriate Russian authorities, OMM is part of the structure of the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a representative office in Vladivostok registered until 2010 at 43 Lugovaya Street, apartment 39. It was not established that the representative office had rights over any kind of assets in the Russian Federation. The declared activity of this entity was transport of freight and acquisition of consumer goods and scrapped vessels. Since 2010, this entity has not operated in the Russian Federation.

According to information from the State registration office, a federal budget office attached to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, no OMM representative office or subsidiary appears on the State register of representative offices of foreign companies accredited in the Russian Federation or the State register of subsidiaries of foreign legal persons accredited in the Russian Federation.

We also wish to point out that the communication from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts lists Mr. Han En Koo as the "representative" of the OMM Vladivostok office. The Russian Federation cannot accept in this context the use of information from the non-existent Russian Online Commercial Business Registry (the report of the Panel of Experts referred to the website of the Odessa institute of naval engineers, which is located in Ukraine and has a Ukrainian domain name).

We also wish to inform you that Mr. Han En Koo, a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, first entered the Russian Federation on 15 June 2012 on a business visa. Between June 2012 and now, he has made three visits to the Russian Federation. Officially, Mr. Han has no links to the activities of the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or OMM.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation takes this opportunity to convey to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 18 February 2014

Her Excellency Ms. Silvie Lucas
Chair of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#)

cc: Mr. Vesselin Kostov
Secretary of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#)

Mr. Martin Uden
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council resolution
[1874 \(2009\)](#)
