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安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会在第 2207(2015)号决议第 2 段中请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。

主席特此分发从专家小组收到的报告(见附件)。

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请回收

附件

2016 年 2 月 22 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨依照第 2207(2015)号决议第 2 段随函转递其最后工作报告。

该报告在 2016 年 1 月 19 日向第 1718(2006)号决议所设安全理事会委员会提交，该委员会在 2016 年 2 月 16 日审议了这份报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意此信及其附文并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组协调员

Hugh **Griffiths**(签名)

专家

Beno î **Camguilhem**(签名)

专家

Katsuhisa **Furukawa**(签名)

专家

Dmitry **Kiku**(签名)

专家

Youngwan **Kim**(签名)

专家

Stephanie Kleine-**Ahlbrandt**(签名)

专家

Neil **Watts**(签名)

专家

Jiahu **Zong**(签名)

附文

2016 年 1 月 18 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给第 1718(2006)号决议所设安全理事会委员会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨依照第 2207(2015)号决议第 2 段的规定，随函转递小组的最后工作报告。

请提请第 1718(2006)号决议所设安全理事会委员会的成员注意此信及报告为荷。

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第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组的报告

摘要

自从十年前朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行了首次核试验及联合国由此而通过制裁制度以来，专家小组没有发现任何迹象显示该国打算放弃其核计划和弹道导弹计划。恰恰相反，最近该国进行了第四次核试验，同时还在继续进行被禁止的弹道导弹发展计划，包括进行潜射弹道导弹试验，并继续发射弹道导弹。鉴于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国意图明确，并继续努力扩充其核计划和导弹计划规模，寻求国际社会认可这些被禁止计划并力求使之获得合法性，由此而使人对现行联合国制裁制度的效力产生严重怀疑。

小组的调查表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一直在有效地规避制裁，并继续利用国际金融系统、航空公司和集装箱航运路线进行违禁物品交易。被指认的实体将代理安插在外国公司，以此掩盖其非法活动。他们利用外交人员、长期贸易伙伴和与少数值得信赖的外国国民的关系。尽管远洋海运管理有限公司在 2014 年 7 月已被指认，但该公司仍在运营，方法是利用悬挂外国旗的船只、船名、对公司重新登记和将船员租借给外国船只，使公司得以进入该地区内外的外国港口以及获得海事保险，而这是运营的一个先决条件。

该国继续向中东出口弹道导弹相关物品，与非洲进行军火及相关材料的交易。它继续利用在非洲和亚洲的长期军事关系，为警察和准军事部队提供培训。新趋势包括购置外来高端商业产品以及基本系统，以加强其在本国发展被禁方案的能力。该国还在利用对国际组织的参与，设法使其空间发射计划合法化，并获得利用科学网络和知识的机会。

会员国对安全理事会决议的执行率低，助长了所有这些活动。专家小组不断强调不执行决议导致违禁活动继续存在的问题。造成这种情况的原因很多，但其中包括缺乏政治意愿，授权立法不足，对决议缺乏理解和不够重视。

专家小组已建议指认一些参与违禁活动或规避制裁的个人和实体。它还建议更新制裁名单。专家小组的报告及其结论提出了关于联合国制裁制度的整体效力的重要问题，尽管 10 年来该制裁制度在逐步加强控制，但仍未能确保朝鲜民主主义人民共和国放弃其核计划和弹道导弹计划。

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* 附件仅以原文分发，未经正式编辑。

词汇

本报告中使用的下列词语具体含义如下：

“该国”	朝鲜民主主义人民共和国
“委员会”	安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会
“决议”	安全理事会第 1718(2006)号、第 1874(2009)号、第 2087(2013)号和第 2094(2013)号决议
“专家小组”	安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组
“制裁”	决议中规定的措施
“制裁名单”	委员会根据第 1718(2006)号决议建立并维持的有关个人、实体、团体或企业的名单
“阻截”	第 1874(2009)号决议第 11 至第 14 段、第 2087(2013)号决议第 8 段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 16 段所定义的对货物的检查、扣押和处置
“指认”	安全理事会或委员会根据第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)和(e)段(经包括第 2094(2013)号决议第 27 段在内的后来几项决议修订)对个人或实体采取的行动(资产冻结和(或)旅行禁令)

一. 导言

1. 安全理事会第2207(2015)号决议将专家小组的任务期限延长至2016年4月5日。本报告所述期间为2015年2月6日至2016年2月5日。

2. 专家小组在本报告中审查了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续试图发展核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹的证据；审查了会员国执行决议和违反制裁措施的情况。持续进行的调查工作见附件一。专家小组还跟踪各会员国执行委员会决定，包括指定对某些个人和实体实施资产冻结和旅行禁令的情况。最后，专家小组就改进决议执行情况提出建议。

二. 背景和政治环境

3. 没有迹象显示过去一年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国内的局势有什么根本性变化。金正恩执政已有四年，联合国实施制裁也有十年，金正恩通过加强该国的核能力和弹道导弹能力，继续进行军火和相关物质的交易，不断巩固政权，藐视相关决议。该国已采取明确步骤，加紧致力于发展其核计划并寻求机会强调其获得核国家地位的主张。2015年9月，该国宣布其所有核设施都“运作正常”，当前的任务是提高国家核武器库存的“数量和质量”。[1] 2016年1月6日，该国在丰溪里进行了第四次核试验，并重申它将“不断提升其核威慑”，在任何情况下都决不放弃核威慑。

4. 金正恩继续在内部巩固其权力，包括消除和更换主要官员，同时强调必须平行发展经济和核能力。[2] 虽然该政权把改善民用经济作为新重点，但仍在继续努力加强国防部门，包括提升武器系统和建立大规模毁灭性武器的能力。2015年8月非军事区紧张局势升级，金正恩将朝鲜人民军投入“战争状态”。[3] 朝韩会谈成功地化解了这一危机，但朝鲜与大韩民国之间的关系仍然岌岌可危。

5. 2015年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与国际社会交往的特点是，一边谴责制裁，呼吁签订和平条约和进行双边会谈，同时却故意回避对无核化的任何承诺或恢复

[1] 见“朝鲜原子能研究所所长关于国家核活动的讲话”，朝鲜中央通讯社(朝中社)，2015年9月15日，可查阅：www.kcna.kp (访问日期为2015年9月15日)。

[2] 见“朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻联合国代表团提交联合国的新闻稿”，2015年10月31日，以及“金正恩在大阅兵和平壤市民大游行时的讲话”，朝中社，2015年10月11日，可查阅：www.kcna.kp (访问日期为2015年11月11日)。

[3] 见“朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交部长谈到局势已处于战争边缘”，朝中社，2015年8月28日，可查阅：www.kcna.kp (访问日期为2015年8月21日)。

它于 2009 年退出的六方会谈。该国还坚决反对两个联合国机构有关人权状况的决议，表示这些指控全都是不实之词。[4]

6. 制裁未能阻止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国逐步提升和扩充其核能力和弹道导弹能力。除了发展核计划，它还高度重视导弹计划，通过试验发展短程导弹，提升西海的发射设施，并表示致力于发展潜射弹道导弹的能力，为此它在 5 月和 12 月(据报也在 11 月)进行了试验。它还继续对新浦潜艇造船厂的设备进行更新换代。该国还保证未来“朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将不间断地发射各种卫星和远程火箭”。[5]

7. 这些事态发展表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国按照相关决议解决国际社会对安全和人道主义问题关切的前景越来越渺茫。所有会员国必须致力于更坚定地实施联合国的制裁，这一点一如既往地重要。

三. 专家小组及其方法

8. 专家小组的任务仍然是收集、检查和分析由各国、联合国相关机构和其他利益方提供的关于决议所定措施执行情况，特别是不执行的情况的信息，并就安理会、委员会或会员国为更好执行决议规定措施而可能考虑采取的行动提出建议。

9. 专家小组依照安全理事会关于制裁一般性问题非正式工作组的方法标准(S/2006/997)开展工作。专家小组尽管没有司法机构的传票、取证能力和调查权力，但仍努力维持高证据标准。专家小组依赖于三类信息：专家的第一手和现场观察；会员国、国际组织、官员、经认证的媒体来源/记者和个人提供的信息；公共信息。专家小组注重信息来源的身份和角色，始终寻求辅证，并确保以与专家小组职责相符的方式处理所提供的机密或有限制的信息。专家小组在调查期间向个人和实体提供答复机会。除非另有说明，所有图片均由专家小组提供。

10. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组向委员会提交了 4 份事件报告，并在本报告中考虑到这些事件，同时提供关于仍在调查的案件的资料。专家小组与 33 个会员国、14 个联合国机构和其他有关各方举行了磋商。专家小组还继续与联合国其他制裁问题小组合作。专家小组就其开展的调查共向会员国、国际组织和私营实体及个人发出了 748 份信息请求和 88 份后续信函(见附件 2)，共收到 215 份答复。

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[4] 见“外务省发言人断然拒绝针对朝鲜的人权决议”，朝中社，2015 年 11 月 21 日，可查阅：www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 11 月 21 日)。

[5] 见“金正恩观看战略潜艇水下试射弹道导弹”，朝中社，2015 年 5 月 9 日，可查阅：www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2015-05-09-0014。

四. 会员国报告

A. 国家执行情况报告

11. 第 1718(2006)号决议通过已有 10 年，专家小组继续观察到，特别是在非洲，会员国未提交报告或晚提交报告的比例居高不下(见附件 3)。本报告所述期间，只有 6 个会员国依照第 2094(2013)号决议提交了国家执行情况报告。目前为止，只有 42 个会员国(总数 193 个)依照第 2094(2013)号决议向委员会提交了报告，有 90 个会员国从未按照其中任何决议提交报告(见图 1)。专家小组向 93 个未提交报告的会员国发出了提醒函，其中 7 国在 2015 年时是安全理事会非常任理事会。

12. 除了报告率低，专家小组还注意到收到的报告质量差，缺乏细节。缺乏良好信息抑制了小组的能力，使其无法充分报告制裁执行情况和适当分析国家执行方面存在的困难。会员国缺乏能力和政治意愿更加重了它们在了解决议基本范围和实质内容方面的困难。总体而言，这种情况为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行被禁活动创造了机会。

13. 专家小组在 2015 年积极鼓励 7 个安全理事会非常任理事国开始遵守其报告义务。作为委员会成员应以身作则提交执行情况报告，为此，专家小组建议委员会考虑采取双边办法(见建议 1)。

图 1

按区域开列的报告情况概览



B. 违规行为报告和其他事项

14. 除了国家执行情况报告，会员国有义务迅速向委员会提交报告，说明对所有货物的检查情况——包括没有发生违规事件或在发生违规事件之前的检查情况。只有一个会员国报告了对与指认实体有关的军火相关货物进行检查和扣押的情况。

15. 安全理事会呼吁所有国家提供它们所掌握的不遵守决议的信息。(见建议 11)委员会收到 14 份相关报告。多个会员国报告了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2015 年 3 月短程弹道导弹发射和 2015 年 5 月潜射弹道导弹弹射试验的情况。

五. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国持续违反其放弃核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹计划的义务

16. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续公然违反决议，无视安全理事会一再提出的以明确、不可逆转和可核查方式履行该领域的国际义务的要求。它继续发展核计划和弹道导弹计划，包括为此改进试验基础设施，加强有关机构的作用。它继续加深这些领域的研究工作和知识，包括参加各种国际组织，使它能够获得科学培训和网络。第四次核试验和成功的潜射弹道导弹弹射试验表明，该国决心更坚定地获取先进系统，同时试图证明其拥有核国家地位的主张。

A. 最近与核有关的活动

1. 2016 年 1 月 6 日的核试验

17. 2016 年 1 月 6 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国宣布它进行了“氢弹”试验。[6] 全面禁止核试验条约组织(禁核试组织)筹备委员会确认，核试验场附近发生“异常地震”。[7] 这次“人为爆炸”(震级 4.85 级)的波形特征类似于 2013 年该国核试验之后测出的波形特征。所用装置类型尚待确定(见图 2)。

[6] 见“DPRK proves successful in H-bomb test”，《劳动新闻》，2016 年 1 月 7 日，可查阅：www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-01-07-0004。

[7] 见禁核试组织 ，“CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo on the unusual seismic event detected in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”，press release，2016 年 1 月 6 日，可查阅：www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/ 2016/ctbto-executive- secretary- lassina- zerbo-on-the-unusual-seismic-event-detected-in-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea/。

图 2

2006 年(黄色)、2009 年(橘色)、2013 年(紫色)和 2016 年(红色)核试验的估计地点对比



资料：禁核试组织。

2. 扩大核基础设施和持续开展活动

18. 核试验场的卫星图像显示，整个 2015 年该地区特别是西门附近一直在不间断地进行活动，例如运输繁忙、建造新建筑、进行挖掘和伐木活动(见附件 4)。

19. 2015 年 9 月 15 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“原子能研究所”所长[8] 说，宁边的所有核设施，包括铀浓缩厂和 5 兆瓦石墨慢化反应堆都已经过重新安排、改变或调整，并开始“正常运行”。[9] 该发言似乎与国际原子能机构(原子能机构)总干事 2015 年 8 月 26 日关于各种与核相关活动的报告大致相符。

20. 据原子能机构报告，宁边场址内到处都在不断翻修和开展新工程，这表明 5 兆瓦反应堆已进入战备状态，轻水反应堆场址的工程仍在进行，[10] 据报安置浓缩设施的大楼得到扩建和使用(2014 年该大楼的面积被有效地增加一倍)。[11] 通过卫星图像，原子能机构还观察到似乎与平山铀矿和铀浓缩厂的开采和碾磨有关的活动。

[8] 朝鲜：조선민주주의인민공화국 원자력연구원。

[9] 见“Director of Atomic Energy Institute of DPRK on its nuclear activities”，朝中社，2015 年 9 月 15 日，可查阅：www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 9 月 15 日)。

[10] 原子能机构报告说，没有迹象显示将反应堆主要部件送入或引入轻水反应堆安全壳建筑物。

[11] 见原子能机构文件 GOV/2015/49-GC(59)/22。

21. 商业卫星图像显示，似乎在整个报告所述期间这些活动都在持续进行，印证了该国宣布的所有核设施都在“正常运行”。这些图像确认在紧靠轻水反应堆处有一个看似电气开关站的工程，5 兆瓦反应堆安全壳建筑物附近有卡车来往，反应堆有冷却水排放(2015 年 7 月和 11 月可能中断过)，以及相似燃料组件楼的附近和铀浓缩设施在进行翻修和出现新建筑物(见附件 5)。

22. 虽然仅仅根据卫星图像无法断然确定这些动态的战备状态及性质或目的，但一旦这些设施和反应堆的现役状态得到证实，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可以从中为核计划生产更多裂变材料储存。这将印证该国关于扩充和改进其核武库的所述意图。

3. 与核计划相关的实体和个人

军火工业局

23. 专家小组曾报告称，军火工业局[12] 在该国的核计划和导弹计划方面发挥了关键作用(见 S/2010/571，第 55 段和 S/2013/337，第 37 段)。专家小组证实了该局在 2016 年 1 月核试验中的关键作用，其名称出现在 2015 年 12 月 15 日和 2016 年 1 月 3 日金正恩签署的进行核试验的命令中。这些文件清楚显示该局计划和准备了这次试验(见图 3)。

图 3
军火工业部关于“氢弹”试爆准备工作的报告



来源：《劳动新闻》，2016 年 1 月 7 日。

[12] 又称劳动党中央委员会军火生产局、军需工业局、机械工业局或机械制造工业局。朝鲜文名称：군수공업부 或 기계공업부。

24. 三名高级官员 Ri Man Gon、Ri Pyong Chol 和朴道春参加了与金正恩在一起的庆祝试爆成功合影，显示他们在核试验中的关键作用。[13] Ri Man Gon 先生似乎在 2015 年 12 月至 2016 年 1 月 7 日某个时候成为军火工业局的新任局长。专家小组先前报告称，朴道春先生在该国的核计划和导弹计划中发挥关键作用 (见建议 7，机密附件 109 和 S/2013/337，第 37 段)。

政府间国际研究组织

25. 专家小组先前报告称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参加了联合核研究所的活动，这是一个政府间国际核科学研究组织，总部设在俄罗斯联邦(见 S/2015/131，第 29-33 段)。联合核研究所首席科学书记在答复专家小组的询问时证实，自 2015 年 3 月 31 日起，没有任何朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的国民与该研究所有关联，已暂停该国成员资格，直到其能够充分履行对研究所的义务。专家小组注意到，研究所的决定符合决议规定。

26. 该研究所确认，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在全权委员会的代表是 Ri Je-Son (被列名为“李济善”)(见 S/2015/131，第 29 段)。2009 年 7 月，他被委员会指认为是当时的原子能总局局长，自 2014 年 4 月起担任原子能工业相。据该研究所说，自 2010 年以来，有两人代表他参加委员会会议。根据决议，作为代表李先生行事的个人，有关会员国应将他们置于资产冻结和旅行禁令的限制之下。他们是：

(a) Jon Myong Chol 先生，时任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆一等秘书。他于 2010 年 3 月 25 日、26 日和 11 月 26 日、27 日、2011 年 3 月 25 日、26 日和 11 月 25 日、26 日以及 2012 年 3 月 26 日和 27 日参加了委员会会议；

(b) Kim Se Gon 先生，时任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆一等秘书。他于 2012 年 11 月 23 日和 24 日、2013 年 3 月 25 日和 26 日、11 月 22 日和 23 日、2014 年 3 月 25 日和 26 日以及 2015 年 3 月 25 日和 26 日参加了委员会会议。

27. 专家小组建议委员会在制裁名单内提供的关于李先生(KPi.002)的资料中增列“李济善”这一别名(见建议 4 (a))。

B. 最近开展的与弹道导弹计划有关的活动

1. 弹道导弹发射

28. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续发射弹道导弹。专家小组确认了该国 2015 年弹道导弹计划的两大趋势：

[13] 见“Kim Jong Un has photo session with contributors to H-bomb test”，Rodong Sinmun，11 January 2016，可查阅：www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-01-11-0024。

(a) 通过测试增程型固体推进剂 KN-02 短程弹道导弹，开发具有高度准确性和快速攻击能力的经改进的短程弹道导弹；

(b) 通过进行潜射弹道导弹的水下抛射试验，发展潜射弹道导弹的基本攻击能力。

短程弹道导弹

29. 2015 年 3 月 2 日该国发射了两枚短程弹道导弹。[14] 这些导弹的射程约达 500 公里。一些会员国确定它们是飞毛腿弹道导弹。这一射程与该国以最大射程发射的 C 型飞毛腿弹道导弹的能力相符。如以往一样，这些导弹未经警告发射，对周边的船只和飞机构成安全威胁。

30. 关于 2014 年 8 月 14 日在该国元山地区发射的导弹(见 S/2015/131，第 38 段)，专家小组评估称，该射弹是 KN-02 弹道导弹的加强版，[15] 原因是两者形状相似，并达到了 220 公里的射程。[16] 小组注意到，KN-02 导弹与 9M79 弹道导弹有明显的相似之处(见图 4)，[17] 并印证了该国有关发射了一枚“高性能超精确战术火箭”的声明。[18] 专家小组还通过一个会员国的信息证实了这一分析，即该国为研发 KN-02 对 9M79 弹道导弹实施了逆向工程(见附件 6)。[19] 自那时以来，该国为减少导弹的有效载荷以增加射程，一直在积极研发一种新型导弹。[20]

[14] 七个会员国向委员会报告了发射事件。

[15] KN-02 被一些会员国认为是使用固体推进剂燃料的短程弹道导弹，估计射程为 120 公里。

[16] 见 Jeffrey Lewis, “Don’t know where Waldo went, but Kim Jong-Un was in Wonsan: geolocating North Korea’s June 26 and August 14 missile launches”, 38 North, 3 November 2014, available from http://38north.org/2014/11/jlewis110314/。

[17] The 9M79 ballistic missile is also known as Tochka or SS-21 and reportedly has a circular error probable of 160 m。

[18] 见“Kim Jong-Un guides tactical rocket test-fire”, KCNA, 15 August 2014, available from www.kcnawatch.co/newstream/1451896687-307647019/kim-jong-un-guides-tactical-rocket-test-fire/。

[19] 据一个会员国称，该国 1996 年从阿拉伯叙利亚共和国获得了 9M79 弹道导弹。

[20] 通过将弹头重量从 480 公斤减至 150 公斤实现增程。

图 4

9M79 导弹(上)和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2014 年 8 月 14 日发射的导弹(下)的相似之处



资料来源：http://www.militaryphotos.net (上)和朝中社(下)。

31. 据一个会员国称，该国三次发射被认为是 KN-02 或其改进版的射弹(见表 1)。

表 1

2015 年发射的 KN-02 和 KN-02 改进版

日期和时间	射弹数目	类型	射程(公里)
2 月 8 日，下午 4 时 10 分-5 时 10 分	5 枚	推定为一枚 KN-02 改进版和 4 枚 300 毫米制导火炮	200
4 月 2 日，上午 10 时 30 分	1 枚	推定为 KN-02	140
4 月 3 日，下午 4 时 10 分-5 时	4 枚	推定为 KN-02	> 100

潜射弹道导弹

32. 七个会员国向委员会报告说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2015 年 5 月 8 日从东海岸新浦港的水下平台进行了弹道导弹试验。这些报告与 2015 年 5 月 9 日关于“朝鲜式强有力战略潜艇弹道导弹水下试射”的官方公告一致(见附件 7)。[21] 潜射弹道导弹的发展和今后可能的部署将为该国的弹道导弹能力增加一个海上组成部分。

[21] 见见金正恩观看战略潜艇的水下弹道导弹试射，朝中社，2015 年 5 月 9 日，可查阅 www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2015-05-09-0014

33. 官方公布的潜射弹道导弹照片(见附件 8)显示为“북극성 1”(Pukgeukseong 1)，[22] 通称 KN-11。从外形上看，导弹与前苏联时代 SS-N-6/R-27 潜射弹道导弹十分相似，因其形状明显相似，尤其是弹头(见图 5)。导弹从海水中射出时尾部没有白烟，显示使用了 R-27 导弹所用的液体推进剂。根据一个会员国提供的资料，该导弹与 R-27 导弹相同，后者是 1990 年代从前苏联采购的，然后由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实施了逆向工程。

图 5

KN-11 和 R-27 导弹的长宽比



资料来源：R-27(上)：Thomas Cochran and others，Soviet Nuclear Weapons，Nuclear Weapons Databook，vol. 4(New York，Harper and Row，1989)；潜射弹道导弹(下)：《劳动新闻》，2015 年 5 月 9 日。

图 6

与 2015 年 5 月 8 日发射有关的图像

资料来源：《劳动新闻》，2015 年 5 月 9 日。

[22] 即“北极星-1 号”。

34. 专家小组认为，多张试验照片被处理过，并且可能插入了与试验无关的图像(见附件 9)。在没有水下录像的情况下，专家小组不能确切核实发射平台。

35. 导弹似乎在水上点燃(见图 6 和 7-3 至 7-5)，显示是从发射管进行的水下冷喷射，[23] 可能是由压缩气体点燃的(见图 7-1)。该导弹达到 150 米的高度，在空中飞行了约 500 米(根据一个会员国提供的信息)。飞行时间相对较短，其原因可能是通过配重减少可燃物负荷，以显示发射能力，或者更可能的是，在点燃后不久切断燃油供应。无论哪一种情况，发射都是全重起飞，以证实弹射点火顺序。

图 7

2015 年 5 月 8 日弹道导弹试验时的序列图像

资料来源：朝中社。

[23] 弹道导弹发射系统可以是“热发射”(即导弹在管中点燃)或“冷发射”(即导弹从管中排出，然后点燃)。

36. 专家小组认为，这次试验是一项重大技术发展，并且明确显示这是发展潜射弹道导弹并将其投入使用的一项持续方案。要完成发射系统和导弹的运作，还需要进行更多试验，特别是一个全面飞行试验，这可能是该国当前受到限制的一个因素。

2. 发射设施活动

37. 2015 年，该国继续快速进行西海卫星发射站方面的工作，对发射区作出了进一步改进。由于在发射准备基础设施的每个步骤都开展了大量隐蔽工作，将更难发现任何发射前活动。专家小组还监测了新浦造船厂，该设施与该国的潜射弹道导弹计划有关。

西海卫星发射站

38. 图像分析显示，该国在故意进行各种掩饰工作，以掩盖空间运载火箭发射的准备情况(见附件 10)。在 2015 年 3 月进行挖掘工作后，一个新的地下铁路终端站于 4 月完成(附件 12)。在新终端站的水泥中有一个约 20 米长的槽可用于在铁路隧道和发射台之间安装一部电梯。[24] 一个新建筑也在发射台的东端建成。2015 年 1 月，可以明显看到该建筑的地基，并一直取得稳步进展，直到 9 月前完成(见图 8)。该建筑的位置表明，它可能是发射准备阶段空间运载火箭装配或检查的发射支助设施。此外，一个沿铁轨移动的新平台可用于掩饰空间运载火箭从辅助建筑物到火箭塔架的移动。[25] 最初在 2015 年 4 月观察到该平台的建造工作，9 月完工(见同上)。最后，在火箭塔架上有一个遮盖物(更多图像见附件 12)。[26]

[24] “North Korea: new construction at the Sohae satellite launching station”, *38 North*, 2015 年 5 月 28 日，可查阅 http://38north.org/2015/05/sohae052815/。

[25] 移动平台为 21 米宽，29 米长和 28 米高。

[26] 2014 年 10 月观察到火箭塔架上有遮盖物。

图 8

截至 2015 年 9 月 1 日的西海发射台



资料来源：Geo-Eye-。

39. 观察到装配大楼的翻修活动，在那里建造了新的工棚。在铁路支线建立了一个遮盖物，可能是为掩盖与空间运载火箭平台的运输相关的铁路活动(见附件 11)。

40. 观察到的其他活动显示，今后可能试验体积较大的火箭发动机。在发射台以西和发动机试验区域内建造了新的具有储存更多推进剂空间的更大型建筑(见附件 12 和 13)。[27] 这种假设与火箭塔架能够发射比“银河 3 号”更大的空间运载火箭的能力相一致，小组前一份报告中对此有所叙述(见图 9)。

[27] 见“North Korea: update on activity at Sohae satellite launching station”, 38 North,”2015 年 10 月 9 日，可查阅 http://38north.org/2015/10/sohae100915/。

图 9

“银河 3 号”和“银河 9 号”潜射弹道导弹模型

资料来源：共同社，2015 年 10 月 13 日。

新浦造船厂

41. 2015 年 5 月 8 日试验之前东海岸新浦造船厂厂区的卫星图像显示，早在 2012 年就开始了与本土开发潜射弹道导弹及相关发射平台有关的基础设施工作。

42. 2013 年 10 月，卫星图像显示在潜艇水滩西南有一个试验综合设施。这个综合设施大楼设有一个试验台，可能的冲击区域为大约 9 米，可能在这一设施进行陆上潜射弹道导弹的弹射试验。据一个会员国称，在 2014 年 10 月进行了一次这样的试验(见附件 14)。2014 年 7 月至 2015 年 10 月的图像显示，正在靠近 195 米 X33 米的主制造车间施工盖建筑厂房，以及车间和延伸出来的新发射平台(见附件 15)。

43. 同样，2014 年 7 月的卫星图像显示新浦造船厂有一艘身份不明的潜艇。随后的图像显示了潜艇指挥台尾壳不同的内部施工阶段、一艘潜水试验驳船和一艘小拖船。[28] 据一个会员国称，该国获得了退役的 G 级潜艇，并通过拆卸潜艇获得了弹射相关技术。上述潜艇似乎是本国设计的，与 G 级或其他类型的潜艇没有直接可比性。[29] 2015 年 5 月 10 日的图像显示，可能是一个 10 米长的导弹运输集

[28] 业务卫星应用项目证实了 5 月 8 日试验官方图片中的潜艇很可能是出现在卫星图像中的潜艇(图 10)，并确认了 2015 年 5 月 10 日卫星图像中停泊在潜艇旁边的小船。

[29] 由于该国具有建造潜艇方面的经验，该国有能力建造该潜艇。

装箱停靠在长度为 65 米的潜艇旁边，还有一个指挥台围壳中的单发射口，[30] 这是为潜射弹道导弹发射能力设计的(见图 10)。[31]

图 10
潜射弹道导弹单发射管的发射口[32]



资料来源：DigitalGlobe，2015 年 5 月 10 日(左)；朝中社，2015 年 6 月 5 日(右)；H. I. Sutton，2015 年 5 月 9 日(下)。

44. 该国正积极升级和掩盖其在新浦的潜艇生产设施，这使其可能在不被发现的情况下建造更多的潜艇，包括具有发射弹道导弹能力的潜艇。根据第 2094(2013 年)号决议第 22 段，会员国应对出口可能有助于该国潜射弹道导弹计划的商业物品提高警惕，这些商品包括子系统和部件，特别是电动马达、铅酸电池和相关的充电系统和声纳技术(见建议 10)。

3. 与弹道导弹计划有关的实体和个人

45. 专家小组确定了两个与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国航天发射计划有关的发展趋势。首先，该国一直在通过参与国际组织促进其空间发射能力的合法性，进入

[30] 孔径直径约为 1.5 米。容器的长度和直径与 2015 年 5 月 8 日试验的导弹直径相符。据一个会员国称，潜艇内只有一个发射管。

[31] 据金正恩说，：“当潜射弹道导弹进入建造阶段，并在不久后投入待命后，就像为政权的敌人安装了定时炸弹”，见 Choi You-sun, “North Korea test-fires 3 ship-to-ship missiles into East Sea”，《阿里郎新闻》,2015 年 5 月 9 日，可查阅 www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=179369。

[32] 业务卫星应用项目证实了与潜艇和潜射弹道导弹有关的活动（见图 10 中的卫星图像）。

国际科学界和培养研究人员进一步发展其被禁方案。其次，国家宇宙开发局继续在该国的空间计划中发挥重要作用，包括负责一个新的卫星控制中心。

亚洲和太平洋空间科学和技术教育中心

46. 亚洲和太平洋空间科学和技术教育中心(见附件 16)在五个空间科学和技术学科提供九个月的研究生文凭课程，包括遥感和地理信息系统、卫星通信、卫星气象和全球气候、空间和大气科学以及全球导航卫星系统。该中心告知专家小组，在遴选和录取工作中认真考虑了联合国安全理事会制裁综合名单。

47. 该国在 1996 年加入中心后，派出 30 多名国民在该中心接受培训，其中包括 Paek Chang Ho，他被指认在 2012 年 12 月 12 日发射“银河 3 号”火箭时发挥作用。据报告，他目前是国家宇宙开发局科学研究和发展司副司长。他在 1999-2000 年参加了中心的卫星通信课程(见附件 17)。目前该国有 2 位国民正在参加该中心的课程，其中一人隶属于国家宇宙开发局(见附件 18)。小组注意到该中心取消了 4 名选定国民参加 2015 年 8 月开始的课程的资格，其中 1 人隶属于国家宇宙开发局，本应参加全球导航卫星系统课程(见附件 19)。[33] 不断有国家宇宙开发局成员申请和参与中心课程显示了这些课程对其工作的重要性。

48. 专家小组分析了由中心提供的课程教学大纲。空间和大气科学课程包含 一个太空仪器 模块与子模块，这些子模块与该国使用 运载火箭、姿态控制、遥测、跟踪、指挥和数据处理系统等弹道导弹技术设计和测试运载火箭有直接关联(见附件 21)。[34] 全球导航卫星系统课程包含接收器和整合式导航两个模块(见附件 22)，两者都与该国的弹道导弹计划直接有关，特别是考虑到它正在致力于通过使用全球导航卫星系统(全球定位系统和全球导航卫星系统)改善弹道导弹的制导精度。[35] 卫星通信课程包含“调制、多路复用和多址接入”模块(见附件 23)，这有助于提高弹道导弹计划的遥测能力。

49. 印度在给主持中心咨询委员会[36] 工作的外层空间事务厅的一个备忘录中指出，印度关于两个课程内容的立场是：“这些课程涵盖的专题非常宽泛，包含了有关领域的基本原则，提供给学员的教材可以从公开来源获取。”[37] 它进一步指出，“在短时间涵盖的专题的深度[原文如此]，不会有助于参加者获得这些具体领

[33] 专家小组注意到，在编写本报告时参加课程的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的职称为研究员或高级研究员(见机密附件 20)。

[34] S/2014/253 号文件提供了与这些专题有关的某些违禁物品清单。例如，天文陀螺指南针(又称恒星传感器)(物品 9.A.2)。

[35] 美国 2015 年 6 月 15 日发送小组的来函。

[36] 咨询委员会指导技术方面，包括课程表。

[37] 该陈述指的是空间和大气科学和全球导航卫星系统的课程。专家小组注意到，专业教学可包括一般和基本原则以及从公开来源获得的材料。

域的专业知识”。外层空间事务厅告知专家小组，它愿意将此事报告给联合国和平利用外层空间委员会，该委员会将于 2016 年 6 月 17 日举行第五十九届会议。

50. 虽然该中心提供的课程不是刻意旨在促进弹道导弹的发展，专家小组在现有资料基础上作出评估认为，某些模块或子模块构成的专业培训，可被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用于从事被禁止的活动，而参加空间和大气科学和全球导航卫星系统课程是决议禁止的弹道导弹有关活动。

51. 专家小组回顾，根据决议，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国必须停止所有与弹道导弹有关的活动(见向委员会提出的建议 2)。

国家宇宙开发局

52. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2015 年已多次表示，它打算在国家宇宙开发局的指导下继续进行更多卫星发射。[38] 国家宇宙开发局局长说，这个世界会清楚地看到先军朝鲜的卫星在朝鲜劳动党中央委员会确定的时间和地点一个接一个地飞上高空。[39] 这些发射是第 2087(2013 年)号决议禁止的。

53. 与其所声称的计划相一致的是，2015 年，该国为坐落在一个高级官员住宅区旁的平壤中心内的新卫星控制中心揭幕(见附件 24)。金正恩在 5 月访问该中心期间，“强调要提供更先进的设施”。[40]

[38] 见“国家宇宙开发局局长有关成功开展外层空间发展的发言”，朝中社，2015 年 9 月 14 日，可查阅 www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 5 月 8 日)。

[39] 见“NADA Director on successes in outer space development”, 朝中社，2015 年 9 月 14 日， 可查阅 www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 9 月 14 日)。

[40] 见“金正恩访问新建成的通用卫星控制中心”，朝中社，2015 年 5 月 3 日，可查阅 www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 5 月 14 日)。

图 11
金正恩访问新的卫星控制中心

资料来源：《劳动新闻》。

54. 官方公告明确表示，新中心由国家宇宙开发局管辖，见官方媒体发布的照片(见图 12)。这一证据显示，国家宇宙开发局已经接管了先前由朝鲜空间技术委员会运作的一个关键设施，并支持专家小组在其 2015 年最后报告中的结论(见 S/2015/131，第 44-48 段)。

图 12
卫星控制中心和国家宇宙开发局标识

来源：朝鲜中央电视台。

55. 国家宇宙开发局同时在寻求国际合法性，为此与其他空间领域有关国际机构，即外层空间事务厅和国际宇宙航行联合会建立关系。这与该国不断声称其太空计划符合《关于各国探索和利用包括月球和其他天体在内外层空间活动的原则条约》的说法相符。

56. 国家宇宙开发局也充当空间物体登记的国家联络点(见图 13 和附件 25)。2015 年 2 月 26 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国传达了这一信息，它在该日依照《关于登记射入外层空间物体的公约》第二条，通过外层空间事务厅向秘书长通告建立了一个射入地球轨道或外层空间物体的国家登记册(见附件 26)。

图 13

2015 年 2 月 26 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻联合国代表团(维也纳)普通照会摘录

朝鲜国家宇宙开发局

电子邮件：nada.dprk@star-co.net.kp

传真：00850 23814585

地址：朝鲜平壤中心区 Central District，Pyongyang，DPR Korea

57. 2015 年 10 月 15 日，国家宇宙开发局据报被接纳为国际宇宙航行联合会成员。[41] 联合会告知专家小组，10 月 16 日，联合会大会根据专家小组提供的信息，撤销了其先前 10 月 12 日的核准入会决议。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻巴黎联合国教育、科学及文化组织代表团代表国家宇宙开发局申请了这一会员资格。

58. 国家宇宙开发局的章程规定，国家宇宙开发局“指导所有航天设备及其运载火箭的生产、组装和发射”。该章程还详细介绍了国家宇宙开发局的内部组织及其下属机构(见附件 27)。此外，专家小组还获得了有关开发局主要官员(见表 2)和预算(1.025 亿欧元)的信息。专家小组的结论见机密附件 109。

[41] 见“朝鲜国家宇宙开发局加入国际宇宙航行联合会”，朝中社，2015 年 10 月 15 日，可查阅 www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2015 年 10 月 15 日)。该国还参与了联合国/国际宇宙航行联合会 2013 年 9 月 20 日至 22 日在北京举办的有关空间技术促进经济发展的讲习班 (A/AC.105/1048)。

表 2
专家小组确认的国家宇宙开发局内的关键人员

姓名	朝鲜名字	职称
Yu Ch'o'l-u 先生	유철우	局长
Kim In Cheol 先生	김인철	副局长
HyonGwang Il 先生	현광일	科学研究和发展司司长
Paek Chang ho 先生	백창호	科学研究和发展司副司长
Kim Cho'n-ho 先生	김천호	科学工作司司长
Jong Tong Gil 先生	정동길	副司长
Kim Gun Song 先生	김군송	通用卫星控制和指挥中心主任
Yun Chang Hyok 先生	윤창혁	通用卫星控制和指挥中心副主任
PaeCho'n-haek 先生	[배천핵(혁)	国际事务代表
Pak Gyong Su 先生	박(백)경수	国际事务副主任

六. 与进出口有关的措施

59. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国仍在积极从事武器和相关物资的交易，包括采购、转让或代理买卖商业产品用于军事目的，以及向东南亚、非洲和中东国家提供技术援助。该国优先采购精良设备，如无人机组件和雷达系统。该国在这方面利用了不同的出口管制系统。专家小组持续进行的调查情况摘要见附件 1

A. 对核武器、其他大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹相关物品实施禁运

日本扣押的铝合金棒

60. 专家小组继续调查 2012 年 8 月被日本作为与核有关物品扣押的 5 个铝合金棒的货物(见 S/2015/131，第 54-57 段)。此前，专家小组注意到，一个使用“KUMSOK”标记的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体有可能制造了这些物品。“KUMSOK”被朝鲜铁金属进出口公司(前称朝鲜金属贸易公司，又名朝鲜黑色金属综合贸易公司)作为其电码使用(见图 14)。KFMEIC 在广告中声称自己从事各类黑色金属的贸易。它的标识与扣押货物的标识非常相似(见附件 28)。

图 14

KFMEIC 的广告

资料来源：朝鲜对外贸易，1996 年 1 月。

61. 这批货物的收货人是一个在缅甸的实体，Soe Min Htike 有限公司(见 S/2015/131，第 56 段)。专家小组要求缅甸协助取得有关先前被美国财政部指认为参与与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军火贸易的缅甸实体和个人信息，包括 Soe Min Htike 公司。缅甸在回复中否认这种参与，没有对专家小组关于 Soe Min Htike 参与情况(包括将该公司列为收货人的一份运输文件)的询问作出答复。专家小组的结论是 Soe Min Htike 公司作为被禁止核相关物项的收货人参与了这一企图转运行为。

B. 武器禁运的实施情况

1. 目的地为阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的武器相关货物运输

62. 2015 年 12 月，一个会员国向委员会报告，继其 2014 年 5 月根据决议规定进行的检查和扣押后，该国决定处理 2010 年 9 月以来的这批货物。当时该船在中国大连前往阿拉伯叙利亚共和国拉塔基亚(Ladhiqiyah/Latakia)的途中。

63. 专家小组的调查和现场检查证实，该货物由为亿达(香港)国际和朝鲜金龙贸易公司工作的实体和个人拥有，这两个公司在 2013 年 1 月被指认为与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司(KOMID)有关联，2009 年 4 月被指认为与弹道导弹和常规武器有关的货物和设备主要出口商。KOMID 使用“金龙”这一化名进行采购活动，而“亿达”则代表 KOMID 为货运提供便利。装运单据显示货物由亿达代表金龙作出安排(见附件 29)。该批货物含有各种商业物品，包括一些可被用于军事目的的商业物品。

64. 装运单据上的收货人为阿拉伯叙利亚共和国机械系统公司，它与 Handasieh 工程行业总组织[42] 有相同的电话/传真号码，该组织是 2007 年 10 月负责弹道导弹相关物品运输的一个与军事相关的实体(见附件 29)。[43] Handasieh 被欧洲联盟作为叙利亚科学调查和研究中心的幌子公司受到制裁。美利坚合众国此前报告称 Handasieh 在 2010 年试图获取两用物品用于该中心的弹道导弹项目。[44]

65. 这批货物有 5 个集装箱的商业物项，包括机械、零部件和测量设备(见图 15 和附件 30)。已有类似产品被公布为用于军事目的(见附件 31)。某些物品可用于生产武器或是飞毛腿导弹液体推进剂的主要部件。[45] 专家小组继续调查这些物品的性质。

图 15

一个会员国扣押的物品

66. 亿达/金龙使用两个公司，即大连益联国际贸易有限公司和丹东永兴和贸易有限公司(见附件 32)来采购这些物品。丹东永兴和是托运人(见附件 29)。物品大部分购自中国台湾省、中国香港和中国其他城市，一些物品购自丹麦、日本和美国(见附件 33)。采购主要由大连益联所有者蔡光(音译)先生负责进行，该人还担任亿达的董事(见 S/2015/131，第 185 段)。大连益联通过一个香港注册公司荣光(香港)国际发展有限公司的一个银行账户进行支付(见附件 34)。[46]

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[42] Handasieh 被欧洲联盟指认为叙利亚科学调查和研究中心的幌子公司，该公司一直代表军方行事(见欧盟理事会第 1244/2011 号条例)。

[43] 见 S/20122/422，第 57 段和小组 2012 年 11 月 30 日向委员会提交的报告。

[44] 美国财政部，“情况介绍：加大对叙利亚制裁的力度”，2012 年 7 月 18 日，可查阅 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Fact%20Sheet.pdf。据一个会员国称，科学调查和研究中心与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国第二经济委员会联系关于提供各种物项的问题，包括原产于一个东欧国家的滚柱轴承 。此种物品可用在导弹涡轮泵中。

[45] 抑型红色发烟硝酸在 S/2014/253 号文件中的项目编号为 4.C.4。氢提炼器可用于硝酸前体生产之前的工序，这是用于飞毛腿导弹的液体推进剂抑型红色发烟硝酸这一禁止物品的主要成分。

[46] 荣光公司于 2013 年 7 月解散。

67. 亿达、大连益联、丹东永兴和和荣光都通过相同的人联系起来，这些人同时拥有和/或控制其它公司，包括一些被指认的公司(见图 34 和附件 35)。

68. 这些外国供应商都不知悉这些物品将被再出口到阿拉伯叙利亚共和国。日本供应商曾询问这些物品的最终用户，但丹东永兴和拒绝提供答复。与亿达/金龙有关的个人和公司尚未向小组提供答复。

69. 这些公司与转运武器和有关物资或弹道导弹有关物品的个人和实体有直接关联。它们采取隐藏技术，例如利用外国中介机构、幌子公司网络和不完整的文件。

70. 小组确认，扣押货物的会员国的行动符合禁止转运朝鲜民主主义人民共和国代理买卖的所有武器和有关物资的决议以及第 1874 (2009)号决议第 18 段规定的义务，安全理事会在该段中呼吁会员国防止可能有助于该国弹道导弹有关活动的任何资产的转移。

2. 向埃及运输飞毛腿备件

71. 2013 年，一个会员国向委员会报告，该国截获了一批从北京运往开罗的托运货物。在文件中，发货人为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一家公司 Ryongsong 贸易有限公司，收货人是埃及公司 MODA Authority International Optronic。该批货物是发货人和另一个公司(Rungrado 贸易公司)之间于 2013 年 2 月 15 日签署的合同的一部分(见机密附件 36)。这家公司以往曾涉及违反日本实施的奢侈品物品禁令(见 S/2012/422，第 78-79 段)。

72. 专家小组对货物进行了现场检查，作出了研究并咨询了几位专家，以调查物品的潜在用途。小组审查了飞毛腿 B 型导弹系统，以对托运货物中物品的技术规格进行实物比较(见图 16)。

73. 这些货物被标为“机器备件”，包括继电器、“线圈”、连接器和断路器(见机密附件 37 和 38)，被列为用于“冷冻运输工具”、“鱼厂母船”、“鱼类加工机”和“旧船”(见机密附件 39)。[47]

[47] 这些物品似乎与收货人的业务不符(据报告收货人从事用于军事和商业用途的高级电光学和电子系统的开发、生产和销售)。埃及表示，在埃及公司数据库中没有 “发现一家名称是 MODA Authority International Optronic Company 的公司 ”（见附件 110）。

图 16
货物中物品实例



1-3：连接器； 4-6：继电器；7-8：断路器；9：气压开关

74. 虽然这些物品都没有达到违禁物品清单中的具体标准(见 S/2014/253)，但专家小组发现，它们是用于飞毛腿 B 型导弹系统的备件或物品(见机密附件 40)。这些物品作为武器和相关物资，被决议禁止出口。

75. 专家小组从货物中两个物品有朝鲜文标记(见图 17)和检验证明印章(机密附件 41)得出结论认为，这些物品是在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国内生产的。此外，列出的包装单负责人的名字也是朝鲜文(见机密附件 42)。

图 17

小组发现的朝鲜文标记和印章

76. 货物由高丽航空从平壤运出(见机密附件 43)。航班标签上的机场安检印章也说明检查是在平壤进行的。

77. 包装清单上物品制造商显示为“Machine Electric Factory”(见机密附件 42)。专家小组发现 Ryongsong 公司的地址与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻北京大使馆的地址相同(见机密附件 44)。Rungrado 声称是“出口海产品和海鲜”，“使用自己的船只和包船进行货物运输贸易”(见附件 45)。

3. 从韩国找回的无人机残骸

78. 关于无人驾驶飞行器残骸，专家小组进行了现场检查和调查(见图 18 和表 3)，发现有两个中国公司为几乎相同的无人机作广告(见 S/2015/131，第 61-68 段)。[48] 对内部组件供应链的初步分析显示，至少其中一架无人驾驶飞机是从国外购置的。据一个会员国称，无人机可能是从中国的幌子公司采购的。

[48] In the light of their ranges below 300 km, the transfer of these drones to the country is not prohibited under the weapons of mass destruction embargo imposed under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) 。

图 18
专家小组在检查期间拍摄的无人机图像



白翎岛无人机及波州和三陟无人机

表 3
两种类型无人驾驶飞机的主要特点

特点	波州/三陟无人机	白翎岛无人机
宽度(米)×长度(米)	1.93×1.22	2.46×1.83
发现时的重量(公斤)	13	12.7
发动机	2 冲程发动机	4 冲程发动机
燃料和燃油容量(l)	辉光燃料-4.97	复合油燃-3.4
起飞和降落	发射装置/降落伞	发射装置/降落伞
降落伞	十字形	八角形
飞行指挥	是	是
近距离遥控	否	是
飞行路线自动飞行	是	是
估计航程(公里)	180-220	250-300

79. 据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国拥有约300架不同类型的无人机，包括侦察、目标定位和战斗无人机。该国负责情报收集的主要实体侦察总局参与了侦察无人机的采购、生产和运作，并努力发展战斗无人机方面的能力。因此，这些拍摄了重要军事设施和青瓦台图像的无人机，有可能是侦察总局采购和运作的(见附件 46 及建议 5 和 8)。

白翎岛无人机

制造商

80. 总部设在中国上海的晨风航拍影像技术公司在其网站上为无人机-UV10 作广告(见附件 47 和图 19)，联合国训练研究所业务卫星应用项目确定该无人机与 2014 年 3 月 31 日在白翎岛坠毁的无人机技术明显相似(见机密附件 48)。晨风没有答复小组的询问。

图 19
晨风在广告中宣传的 UV10 无人机



资料来源: www.5ihangpai.com。

组件的供应链

81. 尽管专家小组的一些询问尚未得到答复，但小组确定了发动机和自动驾驶仪的购买者(见表 4)。

表 4
在白翎岛无人机内部发现的主要来自外国的物项

编号	物项		制造国	供应链
1	发动机		捷克共和国	2013 年 9 月 5 日销售给 Maikaifei Engineering & Technology
2-1	飞行控制计算机	自动控制板	加拿大	2011 年 7 月销售给中测瑞格测量技术有限公司
2-2		输入/输出板	瑞士	2013 年 6 月 4 日销售给台北的中间商
2-3		遥控接收器	日本	没有序列号
3	伺服电机和驱动器		大韩民国或中国	可能是 2013 年 8 月 28 日和 2013 年 9 月 11 日制造
4	全球定位系统天线		美国	2007 年 6 月 8 日制造
5-1	任务计算机	中央处理器板	中国	制造商尚未答复
5-2		输入/输出板	瑞士	2013 年 6 月 4 日销售给台北的中间商
6	照相机		日本	2013 年 10 月 18 日销售给中国的分销商
7	电池		中国	制造商尚未答复

82. 发动机最终通过几个违规交易过程由北京一家名为 Microfly 工程技术的公司购置。[49] 该发动机最初是由另一个公司 Maikaifei 工程技术(香港)有限公司购买，该公司没有在香港合法登记(见附件 50 和 51)。Microfly 和 Maikaifei 是通过 E.Chengwen 先生取得联系的，他作为 Maikaifei 的“首席工程师”促成了这次采购(见附件 52)，同时也被列为 Microfly 的董事会成员(见附件 53)。Microfly 和 Maikaifei 的中文名字都是:迈凯飞。在 E. Chengwen 先生帮助处理定购单后，发动机被运送给了设在北京的一个第三方收货人，Microfly 与该收货人有进口代理授权协议(见附件 54)。[50] 尽管协议规定由该收货人支付货款，实际货款却从 Microfly 公司法人代表 Xue Qiang 先生的个人银行账户汇出(见附件 55)。

83. 自动驾驶仪是中测瑞格测量技术 2011 年 7 月购买的 10 个自动驾驶仪的一部分(见附件 56)，也是由 E.Chengwen 先生使用别名 E.Chengwen Able 先生以代理身份安排的(见附件 52)。[51] 中测瑞格测量技术提供的最终用途说明是伪造的，称自动驾驶仪“只能由最终用户使用”,“不会被转移到另一个目的地、转运或再出口”(见附件 57)。[52] 说明中还规定，物品将在为测绘活动设计的电动徒手启动的无人机中使用，然而，列出的特性与 UV10 的完全不同(见图 20)。

[49] Microfly 的网站为无人机作广告，并称该公司致力于航空相关产品的设计、开发、测试和制造(见附件 49)。

[50] 协议是指收货人和发动机制造商之间的合同(2013HXI/110SP/C)，后者称合同不存在。发动机制造商告知专家小组，它从未收到收货人的付款，意味着收货人被用来进行单次货运。这一假定解释了为何协议是在为发动机付款几天后和出货前签署的。

[51] 自动驾驶仪首先被发送给香港的一个收货人，然后发送天津另一个收货人，后又发送给中测瑞格测量技术。

[52] 自动驾驶仪受加拿大出口管制(见 S/2015/131，第 66 段)。

图 20

发动机的供应链和白翎岛无人机的自动驾驶仪



84. Microfly 称，它是 UV10 的最初设计者和制造商，在出现了关于中国境外存在非常类似于 UV10 的无人机的负面报道后停止了这一型号的生产。它还称该型号只出售给中国国内的客户，从未出售给具有军事背景的客户。Microfly 否认与晨风有任何关联，并怀疑后者仿制了该公司的无人机。Microfly 称，UV10 出售给了中测瑞格测量技术，但拒绝提供其他买家的名称(见附件 58)。Microfly 还称，中测瑞格测量技术特别要求 UV10 装上其在 2011 年 7 月购买的自动驾驶仪，表明中测瑞格测量技术可能是在知情的情况下作出此种举动。

波州和三陟无人驾驶飞行器

制造商

85. 北京中交通信科技有限公司的网站刊登了 SKY-09P 和 SKY-09H 无人驾驶飞行器的广告(见图 21 和附件 59)，业务卫星应用项目确定其与在波州和三陟坠毁的无人机在技术上明显相似(见机密附件 60)。中交通信没有答复专家小组的询问。

图 21
中交通信刊登的 SKY-09P 和 SKY-09H 无人驾驶飞行器广告

资料来源：www.trancomm.com.cn。

零部件供应链

86. 波州和三陟无人驾驶飞行器上所有物项，包括陀螺仪，都可广泛获取且未被列入被禁物项清单。专家小组关于某些物项的询问未获答复(见表 5)。

表 5
波州和三陟无人驾驶飞行器的主要外购零部件

编号	物项	制造国	供应链
1	发动机和消音器	日本	无序列号
2	燃油泵	美国	无序列号
3	飞行控制计算机/中央处理器板	中国	厂商尚未答复
4	陀螺仪板	日本	序列号不当
5	全球定位系统接收器	瑞士	发货日期可能是 2011 年 9 月 1 日
6	伺服电动机	日本	制造时间可能是 2008 年 4 月至 2013 年 3 月
7	收发报机	美国	2011 年 8 月 31 日售给中国中间商
8	照相机	日本	2011 年 9 月 19 日售给分销商
9	降落伞	中国	制造时间可能是 2011 年 10 月，厂商尚未答复

4. 试图从大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国购买军用等级光学感应器

87. 2015 年 2 月，联合王国通知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国试图向一家英国制造商购买“受制裁物资”，并表示这些物资包括可用于无人驾驶飞行器的小型化光学设备(见附件 61)。

88. 据联合王国海关当局称，试图购买设备的公司通过位于中国大陆并在香港注册的中间商采购，然后转运至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。这家公司被称为“专门采购无人驾驶飞行器和潜水器零备件的军事物流公司”。

89. 通信记录和出口许可证申请显示，寻求购买物资之人是 Richard Wang(中文是王德文)。王德文被列为香港科尼科技有限公司董事，该公司最初在英属维尔京群岛注册，后于 2014 年在香港注册。

90. 王先生用一家中国大型公司的名称伪造了出口许可证申请和最终用户说明。专家小组确定香港科尼与据报化名朝鲜 21 贸易公司(Korea 21 Trading Company)的朝鲜先锋科技有限公司(Korean Pioneer Technology Company Ltd)存在贸易关系(见附件 62-63)。

91. 专家小组得出结论，这是某些人代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行事，试图采购用于无人机的军用等级物资，专家小组正在继续调查。

5. 试图从美国转运军用等级夜视镜

92. 专家小组调查了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Song Il 先生(出生于 1973 年 9 月 23 日)涉嫌购买并试图运军火和有关物资的案件。2015 年 7 月，他购买了 6 部军用等级夜视镜并试图违反美国法律出口至中国，他随后在美国被捕。[53] 此人已经对所提出的指控表示认罪。姓名和居住国与其相同的一名柬埔寨国籍人员在香港公司注册处被标注为青松国际有限公司和领大贸易有限公司董事。

93. 鉴于此前有一宗朝鲜国民滥用外国护照的案件(见 S/2013/337，第 132 段)，专家小组强调会员国应在处理类似护照申请时保持警惕。

6. 与厄立特里亚可能存在的军火合作[54]

94. 在索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组报告述及青松联合会社(2012 年 5 月 2 日被指认)向厄立特里亚政府车辆修理部提供“军事和技术支助”后(见 S/2013/440，第 92 段)，专家小组报告了重新调查与厄立特里亚开展军火合作指控的结果。专家小组证实青松与该部存在军事关联。专家小组得到了 2010 年 3 月 19 日青松总

[53] 美国犹他地区法院，美利坚合众国诉 Kim Song Il 案。

[54] 见 S/2014/147，第 94-97 段以及 S/2015/131，第 89 段。

裁 Ri Hak Chol 先生给该部领导人的正式邀请信，信中表示希望为期一周的访问“将对开启双方实质性合作产生重大意义”。

95. 专家小组还确定了青松的新化名为青松协会(见附件 66)。据一个会员国提供的资料，2011 年 4 月，Kim Kwang Rim 先生被派任青松驻厄立特里亚代表。在对专家小组提供资料请求的答复中(见附件 67)，厄立特里亚表示该国没有违反第 1718(2006)和第 1874(2009)号决议及其所做指认接触相关人员和(或)实体(见附件 68 以及提交委员会的建议 4(b))。

7. 2015 年 10 月 10 日阅兵时看到的军用车辆

96. 专家小组调查了 2015 年 10 月 10 日阅兵时运送人员、军火和弹道导弹的一些车辆。

图 22
火箭运输车

资料来源：Oleg Kiriyanov。

97. 2015 年 10 月首次公开展示了运输 2014 和 2015 年测试的 300 毫米制导火箭炮(这些火箭最终达到了 200 公里射程，见表 1)的车辆(见图 22)。[55]

98. 三轴车辆与一家中国公司制造的卡车系列几乎完全一样。此外，据联合国训练研究所业务卫星应用项目评估，两种卡车具有许多相同特征。卫星项目还确认可看见这家中国公司的部分标识(见附件 69)。

[55] 见“金正恩指导试射新开发的超精度战术导弹”，朝中社，2014 年 6 月 27 日，可查阅 www.kcna.kp (访问日期为 2014 年 6 月 27 日)，以及“北朝鲜的保守展示与历届朝鲜劳动党庆典形成鲜明对比”，朝鲜新闻网，2015 年 10 月 10 日，可查阅 www.nknews.org/2015/10/analysis-of-new-updated-equipment-in-october-10-parade/。

99. 中国在答复专家小组时表示该公司“确定了一项明确条款，即买方同意并确保这批出口至朝鲜的卡车应仅用于民事活动，并遵守中国法律规定和联合国决议”，而且“在中国经销商与朝方的销售合同中，还商定了出口卡车的用途，即买方应只将卡车用于林区作业和木材运输”。•

100. 与该案类似，朝鲜林业部控制的一个实体曾在国外采购车辆，然后改装为用于弹道导弹的运输竖起发射装置(见 S/2013/337，第 52-58 段)。专家小组重申 2013 年所提建议并再次呼吁会员国应在向朝鲜出口可改装为军车或军火和有关物资的商业卡车时提高警惕(见建议 10 和 S/2013/337，第 58 段)。

8. 在纳米比亚境内修建弹药厂

101. 朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司据报在纳米比亚境内开展商业活动直至 2015 年初，包括与万寿台海外开发会社合作，或使用该化名在温得和克地区的豹谷修建弹药厂。[56]

102. 纳米比亚告知专家小组，2005 年前与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国签订了关于军火和有关物资的合同。其中一份合同涉及请一家万寿台附属企业在 2002 至 2005 年参与修建温得和克弹药厂。纳米比亚还证实接受了与军火有关的培训和技术援助，但表示专家由于联合国制裁已返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。

103. 纳米比亚证实，万寿台曾参与数个军事建造项目，包括军事学院和修建中的国防部总部。它否认了解万寿台与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司之间存在关联(见附件 70)。

104. 然而，卫星图像显示，豹谷军事基地在 2014 年 9 月仍在施工(见附件 71)。万寿台公司宣传册还刊登了 2010 年与该国国防部签订的修建豹谷设施的合同(见附件 70)。

105. 专家小组证实，截至 2015 年 8 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人在位于 Suider Hof 的另一个军事基地从事施工活动(见图 23)。到撰稿时为止，纳米比亚尚未就在建设施的用途作出答复。

106. 修建任何弹药厂或相关军用设施均被视为与提供、制造或维护军火和有关物资相关的服务或援助，因而被各项决议严令禁止。

[56] 见美国财政部，“发布关于北朝鲜的新行政命令；北朝鲜的指认情况”，2015 年 1 月 2 日新闻稿；可查阅 www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150102.aspx，“Namibia，expatriate sanctioned Democratic People’s Republic of Korea individuals (translation)”，Radio Free Asia，8January 2015 and“Namibie skend VN-resolusies”，Republikein，8 January 2015，可查阅 www.republikein.com.na/internasionaal/namibi-skend-vn-resolusies.236209。

图 23

在 Suider Hof 军事基地的施工

资料来源：Satoru Miyamoto。

9. 将日本制造的商业雷达系统改用于军舰

107. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购和改装商业雷达天线用于其军舰，2015 年 2 月 7 日播出的反舰艇导弹试射中看到了其中三个(见表 24)。[57] 日本制造商表示 2009 年 6 月 12 日后没有售往朝鲜的记录。专家小组注意到，显示器、指南针和弹道输入感应器等子系统可轻易通过插入界面集成。导弹艇上展示的系统均为全球渔业和休闲船只市场广泛使用的现成产品，如无序列号记录无法追查。鉴于这一做法违反武器禁运，专家小组建议会员国应在出口海事电子产品(雷达、声纳、指南针等)时保持警惕(见建议 10(c))。

图 24

将商业雷达天线改用于军舰



资料来源：《劳动新闻》。

资料来源：制造商。

[57] 见“金正恩视察新开发的反舰艇火箭弹试射”，《劳动新闻》，2015 年 2 月 7 日。可查阅 http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2015-02-07-0015。

10. 青松公司作为中介将用于潜艇和军舰的备件和设备从奥地利运至安哥拉和越南

108. 专家小组调查了两起涉及青松公司的事件(见 S/2012/287)：2011 年 7 月将两批用于军事巡逻艇的物项运至安哥拉以及 2011 年 2 月空运一批在台北检验的潜水艇零部件(见附件 1 和 S/2015/131，第 81-83 段)。这些货物由奥地利国民 Josef Schwarz 通过其公司 Schwarz Motorbootservce & Handel 从维也纳发货。此人过去多次与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交易，包括违反和试图违反奢侈品禁令。[58] 专家小组确认他协助青松公司逃避武器禁运。

11. 联合国商品贸易统计数据库中记录的武器或弹药贸易

109. 专家小组利用联合国商品贸易统计数据库数据证实，存在不遵守商品统一分类名称和编码系统第 93 章所述小武器和轻武器出口的事先通知义务的事件。不论这些物项有何用途，只要符合 2015 年 6 月联合国小武器问题协调行动机制国际小武器管制标准提出的“小武器和轻武器”定义，就构成小武器和轻武器(附件 72)。[59]

110. 呼吁会员国在向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口小武器和轻武器时保持警惕，并必须根据第 1874(2009)号决议第 10 段，在销售、供应或转让此类物资前至少 5 天通知委员会。

C. 技术培训、咨询、服务或援助

111. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用长期军事关系以及有关国家对决议的片面理解，继续违反各项决议提供技术培训和援助(见 S/2015/131，90-91 段)。除财务动机外，这些被禁活动是基于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的总体外交和国际外联目标。

1. 与乌干达的警察和军事合作

112. 专家小组调查了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国培训乌干达警官的报告。乌干达证实有 45 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，包括 19 名准军事警察的安全教官，提供了此类培训，而且至 2015 年 12 月仍在继续。乌干达表示，据其对决议的理解以及联合培训的性质，这并未违反决议(见附件 73)。

113. 2015 年，专家小组请求乌干达就关于 2015 年 4 月 18 日以来另有 400 名警官在奥利维坦博领导才能研究所和乌干达初级指挥员和工作人员学院接受了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国教员培训的媒体报告提供资料。专家小组还注意到，乌干达警察部队脸书网页称乌干达总统“赞扬了培训期间与警察部队教官携手合作的朝鲜团队”。

114. 上述培训违反了第 1874(2009)号决议第 9 段。专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军事顾问和教官身着乌干达空军制服并佩戴领袖像章(见图 25)。

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[58] 这些行为包括 2007-2008 年从奥地利出口豪华车辆，2009 年试图从意大利出口豪华游艇。见 S/2012/422，第 84-85 段以及欧洲委员会执行条例第 1355/2011 号。

[59] 可查阅 http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0120-en.pdf。

图 25

2014 年 4 月在纳卡松戈拉空军基地的军事顾问和教官

2. 与越南的警察培训合作

115. 越南人民警察学院 2013 年 3 月报告，作为越朝两国公共安全部双边合作项目的一部分，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专家 2012 年以来向越南警察提供了军事培训课程(见图 26)。[60] 据称，朝鲜专家通过使用 K50 左轮手枪和 AK-47 衍生突击步枪开展实弹演习的方式提供了军事培训。

图 26

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专家培训越南警察的照片

资料来源：《越南新闻报》。

[60] 见人民警察学院，“北朝鲜专家培训越南警察”，2013 年 3 月 23 日，可查阅 http://ppa.edu.vn/en/Training/International-Cooperation/167/3241/North-Korean-experts-train-Vietnamese-police.aspx。

116. 专家小组注意到，相关决议无条件禁止与提供、维护或使用任何军火和相关物资相关的技术培训或援助。然而，据一些会员国的解释，制裁措施仅适用于从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购买军火和有关物资。在这方面，专家小组注意到，安全理事会已经重申制裁措施适用于所有军火和有关物资(见附件 75)。此外，此类有条件的解释将使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国能提供和接受与维护或使用购自其他会员国的核或弹道导弹物项有关的技术培训或援助，从而违反制裁措施的目标(见向委员会提出的建议 3 和 9)。

117. 专家小组得出结论，此类培训违反了第 2094(2013)号决议第 7 段重申的第 1874(2009)号决议第 9 段。

D. 执行奢侈品禁令

1. 2012 至 2015 年平壤阅兵时看到的装甲豪华轿车

118. 专家小组此前报告了在 2012 年 4 月 15 日、2013 年 4 月 15 日、2014 年 4 月 15 日和 2015 年 10 月平壤阅兵时看到的四辆梅赛德斯-奔驰 S-600 改装豪华轿车。此类车辆可能违反了第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)㈢段。

图 27
2012 年 4 月 15 日(右)和 2015 年 10 月 10 日(左)平壤阅兵式期间出现的梅赛德斯-奔驰 S-600 改装豪华轿车

资料来源：Oleg Kiriyanov(左)和朝鲜中央通讯社(右)。

119. 专家小组追查了 2015 年 10 月阅兵时再次看到的奢侈车辆采购情况，从其欧洲来源到在美国的装甲定制直至中国中间商。(见附件 76 和 S/2015/131，第 97-98 段以及 S/2012/422，第 86 段)。

120. 组织者和资助者是中国商人马玉农先生(音译)(亦称 George Ma)，其公司海翔国际也是高丽航空的海外代理(见 S/2013/337，第 97 段)。海翔此前曾参与从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法空运军火和有关物资(见附件 77-80)。

121. 海翔指示一家美国公司将收货人名称注为辽宁丹兴国际货运有限公司，该公司是一家中国大型物流企业，其网站自称是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的航运代理，[61] 并开设了大连与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦之间的第一条集装箱航线。辽宁丹兴没有答复专家小组的提供资料请求(见附件 77-85)。专家小组仍在进行调查。

2. 奢侈品禁令方面的其他案件

122. 专家小组根据会员国涉及第 2094(2013)号决议的贸易统计报告，调查了可能违反奢侈品禁令的事件。查明至少从 8 个国家向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口了奢侈品。[62] 专家小组发出了询问并收到证实资料。

贵金属(黄金)

123. 专家小组调查了关于以色列 2013 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发送两批黄金的报告。以色列告知专家小组，两次出口量为 7 公斤，价值 346 726 美元。以色列还报告，2015 年 12 月 9 日，该国议会批准了一项关于控制向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法出口的命令，从而执行了关于奢侈品出口的决议并将黄金列为违禁物项。

124. 专家小组还在调查加纳 2013 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发送两批金块的行为。

珠宝、宝石、贵宝石及次等宝石

125. 关于 2013 和 2014 年在巴西向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非常住国民出售珠宝一事，巴西表示，珠宝很有可能是在机场免税店出售的。

126. 2014 年，印度向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口了价值 1 913 677 美元的贵金属和宝石，高于 2013 年报告的 103 107 美元出口额。[63] 据印度称，2014 年出口中的 98.6%是不被视为奢侈品的铜阳极泥。

127. 泰国向专家小组报告说，2013 年 9 月至 2014 年 2 月出口了总价值分别为 10 984 美元和 262 908 美元的银珠宝和五部车辆。泰国在其进出口立法下颁布了一项通知，直接提及履行第 1718(2006)和第 2094(2013)号决议规定的义务。[64]

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[61] 见“朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船运代理的一个工作日”，可查阅 http://www.danxing.cn/En/ChaoXianChuanDaiGonGZuoZheDeYiGeGonGZuoRi-8.html。

[62] 为确定可能的奢侈品出口，专家小组使用了商品统一分类名称和编码系统第 71 条，“天然或养殖珍珠、宝石或次等宝石、贵金属、包有贵金属的金属及其制品；仿制珠宝；铸币”，和第 87 条，“铁路及电车道车辆以外之车辆及其零件与附件”。

[63] 2013 年最大宗商品出口是价值约 80 000 美元的宝石和次等宝石(非钻石)。2014 年，此类物项出口额为 20 000 美元。2013 年 4 月，钻石出口额为 7 276 美元。

128. 专家小组无法证实关于据报丹麦、埃塞俄比亚和菲律宾 2013 年和 2014 年出口了奢侈品的信息。

129. 调查突出表明，会员国所报出口在一些情况下违反了奢侈品禁令。专家小组注意到，第 2094(2013)号决议附件四第 1 段所列物项与从第 71 条开始的统一编码系统内容形成对应。在这方面，会员国应在出口该编码下货物时保持警惕。

七. 阻截：海运船队

130. 随着船只报废，远洋海运管理有限公司(远洋海运)悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国旗的船队日益萎缩(见表 6)。该国将至少两艘船只作为废品出售。专家小组认为，与报废船只相关的交易也会构成逃避金融制裁。

131. 除 2015 年报告的 14 艘与远洋海运有关的在役船只外，专家小组确定，在远洋海运被指认之前和其后，Hoe Ryong 号也作为与远洋海运有关的船只运营。总体而言，15 艘船只中有 9 艘似乎仍在服役，14 艘已重新登记。[65]

表 6
远洋海运船只现况

现用名	国际海事组织(海事组织)编号	曾用名	现况
Chol Ryong	8606173	Ryong Gun Bong	在役
Hu Chang	8330815	O Un Chong Nyon Ho	在役
Hui Chon	8405270	Hwang Gum San 2	在役
Kan Gye	8829593	Pi Ryu Gang	在役
O Rang	8829555	Po Thong Gang	在役
Song Jin	8133530	Jang Ja San Chong Nyon Ho	在役
Tan Chon	7640378	Ryong Gang 2	在役
Tong Hung San	7937317	Chong Chon Gang	在役
Hoe Ryong	9041552	Wang Jae San 2	在役(加入远洋海运船队)
Mu Du Bong	8328197		2014 年 7 月被墨西哥扣押
Myong San 1	7632955	Pho Thae	2014 年 8 月 22 日解体
Tae Ryong Gang	8132835	Ap Rok Gang	2015 年 3 月 24 日解体
Ji Hye San	8018900	Hyok Sin 2	闲置，可能准备报废
Se Pho	8819017	Rak Won 2	闲置，可能准备报废
Ryong Rim	8018912	Jon Jin 2	不确定，但被列为在役 [a]

[a] 来自该船的自动识别系统信号含有来自无关船只的数据。

[64] 泰国的奢侈品禁令被列入 2014 年发布的商务部通知。

[65] 在过去十年里，远洋海运拥有和(或)经营了至少 35 艘船只(见 S/2015/131，第 131 段)。

132. 截至 2014 年 10 月，Hoe Ryong 号名为 Wang Jae San 2 号。港口国管制当局 2014 年 8 月将该船登记为远洋海运经营的船只(见附件 86)。该船已改名并从朝鲜王在山船运公司重新登记至会宁船运有限公司。在编写本报告时，官方记录仍将远洋海运列为该船船东(见同上)。因此该船至 2014 年 7 月 28 日由远洋海运控制。

133. 远洋海运在被指认之前和其后经营着一支悬挂外国旗的船队并为其提供船员，其中包括与米瑞海运(香港)有限公司共同管理的船只(见第 151-152 段和表 7)。远洋海运通过向外资企业、海外分公司及建立了长期关系的其他外国企业派驻海外代表对这些船只行使控制。悬挂外国旗船只的船员结构效仿悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国旗的远洋海运船只，乃至每艘船设有一名政治秘书(见图 28 中“政治秘书”级别或评级)，并挂有朝鲜领导人肖像(见图 29)。

表 7

与远洋海运有关的悬挂外国旗的船只

名称	海事组织编号	现况
Benevolence 2[a]	8405402	售出，重新命名为 Gold Star 3 并改挂柬埔寨旗
Ever Bright 88	8914934	据会员国报告说受远洋海运控制；专家小组正在调查与远海海运的关联
Fertility 5	9147332	不明
Fertility 9	8417962	不明，可能准备报废
Glory Morning	8416164	2015 年 8 月售出并报废
Glory Ocean	8306929	不明，相信准备报废
Grand Karo	8511823	会员国报告说至 2015 年 6 月受远洋海运控制；船员中 2 人来自远洋海运船只；专家小组正在调查与远海海运的关联
Ma Sik Ryong	8608030	2015 年 8 月售出，准备报废
Ocean Dawning	8505329	据报 2015 年 2 月售出，后报废
Ocean Galaxy	8418227	据报 2015 年 2 月售出，后报废
Orion Star	9333589	据一个会员国报告说受远洋海运控制
South Hill 2	8412467	自 2012 年 7 月 1 日以来登记为塞拉利昂在役船只
South Hill 5	9138680	自 2014 年 9 月 1 日以来登记为帕劳在役船只

[a] 海燕船务有限公司的其他船只包括 Petrel 1 号和新兰号。

图 28

船只的船员名单中显示了安插在船员中的政治秘书

海事组织船员名单				抵港 X 离港	页号:1/1
1.1：船只名称和类型：**GLORY MORNING/散货船** 1.2：海事组织编号：**8416164** 1.3：呼号：**T3JU2**				2. 抵离港口； 納霍德卡/霍尔迪亚	3. 抵离日期： 2014 年 5 月 20 日
4.船只船旗国：**基里巴斯**				5. 停靠的上个港口： 上海(中国)	12. 护照号和有效期
7. 编号	8. 姓名	9. 等级或评级	10. 国籍	11. 出生日期	
1	[redacted]	MASTER	朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	[redacted]	[redacted]
2	[redacted]	P/SECRETARY	朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	[redacted]	[redacted]
3	[redacted]	APP/MASTER	朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	[redacted]	[redacted]
4	[redacted]	CHIEF MATE	朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	[redacted]	[redacted]

图 29

船长舱和船员生活区显示有领袖照片和朝鲜标语

134. 鉴于确定了悬挂外国旗的船只和船员与远洋海运存在关联模式，专家小组回顾安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 19 段要求所有国家向委员会提供关于从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向其他公司转让船只的任何可用资料，包括船只的重新命名或重新登记，专家小组请委员会广为公布上述资料(见建议 6(c))。

八. 被指认实体和个人的活动

135. 自通过第一项决议以来的十年期间，被指认实体和相关个人继续采取日益复杂和多样手段逃避制裁，包括通过藏匿在外国合作伙伴跨国网络之中以掩盖被禁活动。这些实体从多个地点进入全球贸易和金融体系，并利用相关会员国之间缺少合作来逃避对其活动的审查。外交和使馆工作人员的协助是仍在延续的模式。重要的是，这些网络通常依赖为数不多的受信任关键节点开展工作。

A. 远洋海运管理有限公司

136. 自 2014 年 7 月 28 日被指认以来，远洋海运继续运营和调整。专家小组证实，远洋海运在被指认之前和其后，一直在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国陆海运省的领导下工作并受其控制。该省在帮助远洋海运逃避制裁措施方面发挥了不可或缺的作用。

1. 远洋海运在清川江号事件中的关键作用

137. Chinpo 船运有限公司(私营)在 2013 年 7 月清川江号事件中代表远洋海运进行交易，因而在新加坡遭到起诉(见 S/2015/131，第 149 段)。2015 年 12 月 14 日，Chinpo 因在 2013 年 7 月 8 日转账 72 016.76 美元被新加坡地区法院定罪。该案揭露了 Chinpo 与远洋海运存在广泛关联，而且远洋海运新加坡分公司在指示 Chinpo 支付非法货运方面发挥了关键作用。

138. 法院文件明确指出，Chinpo 将远洋海运视为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府的组成部分。[66] 同样，巴拿马诉讼程序表明，被远洋海运控制的清川江号所有船员(事件后被关押在巴拿马)均由朝鲜政府付薪。[67]

139. 根据长期业务关系，Chinpo 在“所有事务”上担任远洋海运的代理，甚至将远洋海运视为“业主”。[68] Chinpo 代表远洋海运开展重大金融交易，并在管理远洋海运资金时按照后者的业务领域归为“运营”、“船舶购置”和“船员工资”。

140. Chinpo 总裁 Tan Cheng Hoe 承认，2013 年 7 月 8 日，Chinpo 根据远洋海运新加坡分公司指示办理了汇款。[68] 在汇款前，远洋海运新加坡分公司还指示 Chinpo 谎称收取的清川江号货运款是用于另一艘船只 South Hill 2(见附件 89，表 5，专家小组对这艘船只的调查结果)。检察官得出结论，“远洋海运时任驻新加坡代表 Kim Yuil 和(或)Choe Chol Ho 在发送这封电子邮件时显然知道这次正待发送的非法货运”。

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[66] 检方在审判结束时的呈件，2015 年 10 月 30 日。

[67] 巴拿马提供的司法程序文件。

[68] 检方在审判结束时的呈件，2015 年 10 月 30 日。

141. 远洋海运驻新加坡代表 Kim Yu Il 告诉检察官，任命他为远洋海运海外代表的陆海运省是其总部机构，他直接向该省报告，仅在必要时抄送远洋海运。[69] 他的陈述符合三个会员国提供的资料，即远洋海运被陆海运省控制，或“是该省结构的一部分”(见 S/2014/147，附件三十五)。专家小组得出结论，陆海运省控制了包括远洋海运新加坡分公司在内的远洋海运，而后者在 2013 年 7 月违反第 1718(2006)和第 1874(2009)号决议的货运中发挥了关键作用。

2. 远洋海运 2014 年 12 月转让和购置船只

142. 专家小组证实，在远洋海运 2014 年 7 月被指认之前和其后，米瑞海运(香港)有限公司[70] 以及朝鲜米瑞海运有限公司(“米瑞”)深圳办事处代表远洋海运行事。米瑞香港实际上是远洋海运的附属公司(见图 30)。该网络主要活动的执行人是米瑞驻深圳代表“李先生”以及米瑞香港的董事 Hiroshi Kasatsugu 先生(日本国民，亦称 Kim Bak)。控制米瑞深圳办事处的是与远洋海运“关系密切”的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(见附件 87)。

图 30
远洋海运网络图



[69] 检方在审判结束时的呈件，2015 年 10 月 30 日。Kim Il Yu 并非驻新加坡外交官。

[70] 中文：米瑞海运(香港)有限公司。

143. 在 2014 年 7 月被指认之时，米瑞作为租船方经营着若干艘悬挂外国旗的船只。然而，它由于经历财务困难未能付款。这些船只的业主公司和抵押权人(“求偿人”)分别于 2014 年 8 月和 9 月要求中国武汉和青岛的海事法院拘留和扣押若干船只，其中包括 Great Hope 号和 Benevolence 2 号。[71]

144. 作为应对，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口监管局以“逃税”为由在该国港口拘留和扣押了求偿人船只(见附件 87)。由于租船人与朝鲜海运管理机构此前发生的争议，求偿人拥有的另一艘已被该国扣押。

145. 随后，陆海运省代表远洋海运进行干预。该省/远洋海运牵头举行谈判，以一揽子协议方式处理争议。谈判产生了一套复杂安排，旨在促使各方同时释放多艘船只。专家小组注意到该省/远洋海运对港口监管局和该国其他船运公司有明显影响力。

146. 2014 年 12 月，谈判达成了解决方案，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国释放了求偿人的船只，换取求偿人从中国释放米瑞公司经营的船只(见附件 87)。[72] 解决方案对远洋海运极为有利。米瑞公司摆脱了未偿债务。求偿人被陆海运省/远洋海运强迫放弃了另一艘船，此船随后被无偿转让给朝鲜 Tong Hung 航运和贸易公司(该船经营方)。

147. 在谈判中，陆海运省/远洋海运的代表是在远洋海运新加坡分公司工作至 2014 年 1 月的陆海运省高级官员 Kim Il Yu(见第 139-140 段、图 31 和附件 87)。

图 31

代表远洋海运的 Kim Yu Il 的签名和详细情况及其护照

Kim Yu-Il 先生
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国陆海运省高级官员
代表朝鲜远洋海运管理有限公司

[71] 武汉海事法院 2014 年 8 月 1 日和 8 日民事裁决以及青岛海事法院 2014 年 9 月 17 日和 25 日民事裁决。

[72] 武汉海事法院 2014 年 12 月 23 日的民事裁决。

조선민주주의인민공화국 Democratic People's Republic of Korea
PS PRK 381220516
김유일 M
Surname KIM Given Name YU IL
Date of Birth 15 DEC 1967
Place of Birth PYONGYANG
Date of Issue 23 MAY 2011
Date of Expiry 23 MAY 2016
Issuing Authority MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Holder's Signature
PSPRKKIM<<YUIL<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
3812205160PRK6712156M1605239<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<2

148. 根据解决方案，以下公司被提名接手米瑞公司运营船只的所有权(见附件 87)：[73]

(a) 华恒船务有限公司接手 Great Hope 号的所有权；

(b) 海燕船务有限公司接手 Benevolence 2 号的所有权。

149. 华恒公司和海燕公司的董事和股东是李安山(音译)，此人与 Kasatsugu 先生有密切的业务关系(见附件 88)。李先生否认与远洋海运有任何关系或关联(见附件 87)。

150. 专家小组因此得出结论(见建议 87 和保密附件 109)：

(a) 远洋海运和陆海运省、特别是该省高级官员 Kim Yu Il 先生胁迫求偿人将米瑞(代表远洋海运行事)经营的至少两艘船只(Benevolence 2 号和 Great Hope 号)转让给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，这是逃避第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 8 段和第 11 段规定的制裁。陆海运省代表远洋海运行事并协助其逃避制裁；[74]

(b) 米瑞公司代表远洋海运行事至 2014 年 12 月，并通过 2014 年 12 月跨界转让船只以及担任远洋海运实际控制的 Great Hope 号业主，协助其逃避制裁；

[73] 海事组织数据库也反映了这些所有权转让。

[74] 专家小组没有理由相信索偿人自愿参加了远洋海运逃避制裁行为。

(c) 华恒公司和海燕公司被米瑞公司或远洋海运提名为 Benevolence 2 号和 Great Hope 号新业主，以协助远洋海运/米瑞公司逃避制裁；[75]

(d) 远洋海运代表 Tong Hung 采取胁迫手段向求偿人购置了另一艘船只，以逃避制裁。

3. 米瑞公司

151. 2015 年 1 月，米瑞公司深圳办事处因未提交 2012-2013 年度报告受到地方当局的惩罚，不得再从事任何商业活动(见附件 88)。专家小组仍在调查该公司和相关个人的活动。[76]

152. 米瑞香港公司总裁 Hiroshi Kasatsugu 是 9 家公司的所有人和实际控制人，包括雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船员运营 7 艘船只的几家公司(见图 32 和附件 88)。与这些船只和公司有关的任何商业交易，都可能构成米瑞公司/远洋海运对禁运的规避。

图 32
Kasatsugu 先生的网络图



4. 华恒船运有限公司、海燕船运有限公司和 CM 租船有限公司

153. 华恒公司和海燕公司总裁兼股东李安山向专家小组确认了 2011 年 6 月至 2015 年 6 月期间与 Kasatsugu 先生进行商业交易的事实，但否认他知道 Kasatsugu

[75] 专家小组尚未确定华恒/海燕公司知悉远洋海运的参与行为。

[76] 米瑞深圳公司的代表为 Ri Sung Il 先生、Kong Pong O 先生和 Jong Kyong Chon 先生。

先生与远洋海运的关联，也不知道他与远洋海运存在任何商业关系。但是，专家小组无法确证李先生的说辞，且注意到李先生的解释中有多处前后不一之处(见附件 89)。

5. 远洋海运船只

154. 2014 年 7 月远洋海运被指认之后，与该公司有关联的船只先后在其他所有人、船舶管理人和运营商重新命名登记。远洋海运在海事组织的数据库中消失，该实体和这些船只成功地规避了制裁。例如，这些船只中的 *Hui Chon* 号、*Kang Gye* 号、*Ryong Rim* 号和 *Tae Ryong Gang* 号均于 2014 年 10 月后接受了港口国管制当局的检验(见附件 90)，但从未对这些船只采取资产冻结措施。

155. 如 2015 年最后报告所述，专家小组认为远洋海运控制的船只在 2014 年 7 月 28 日之后重新命名和登记是该公司企图规避制裁，而对这些船只新注册的朝鲜公司则是以其名义行事或按其指示行事，协助远洋海运规避制裁。安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 19 段已经将重新命名或登记船只正式列入“把朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只转让给其他公司以规避制裁的范畴。因此，重新命名和登记船只的行为已被正式确定为是规避制裁的众多手段之一。

156. 专家小组再次强调其 2015 年最后报告中的建议，即被专家小组列入清单(见 S/2015/131，表 8 和图 24)的、由远洋海运本身所拥有或控制，或以其名义行事或按其指示行事协助规避制裁的实体所拥有或控制的全部船舶均应受制于第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 8 段和 11 段施加的措施，特别是资产冻结措施(见附件 90 中专家小组的评估意见)。

157. 在这方面，俄罗斯联邦要求专家小组提供更多资料证实这些船只与远洋海运有关联，并在 2016 年 1 月 13 日的信中表示，专家小组并没有证据表明有这种关联。俄罗斯联邦进一步表示：“如果确有实质性的证据，我们将随时准备就可能的调查展开讨论，以将这些法律实体指认列入联合国安理会 1718 委员会的制裁名单。”“一旦委员会指认这些实体，安理会各项决议规定的必要限制措施均将适用于这些实体”(见附件 107)。

158. 专家小组强调，会员国的资产冻结义务不仅限于远洋海运本身所拥有或控制的船舶，而且也适用于以其名义行事或按其指示行事以及协助其规避制裁的实体所拥有或控制的全部船舶。

159. 如前所述，上述船舶是由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国上述实体(新注册的船只所有人、运营商和经理人)当前拥有或正式控制的资产，这些实体以远洋海运的名义行事，并协助它规避制裁。因此，专家小组认为这些船舶应受制于制裁措施(见建议 6，另见 S/2015/131，建议 6)。

160. 与远洋海运有关联的船舶 *Hui Chon* 号在 2015 年 3 月 9 日至 13 日期间停靠在日本境港市的港口。日本告知专家小组，由于遭遇恶劣天气，该船只获准在日本领海躲避风暴，但它一直没有进入港口。日本的立场是，根据习惯法和《联合国海洋法公约》，扣留这艘船是没有法律依据的，因为它正在行使无害通过领海的权利，从未进入日本港口，而日本只有在它入港后才能行使管辖权。该船只于 2015 年 3 月 13 日离开日本领海。

6. 关于与远洋海运有关联的公司和个人的最新情况

161. 专家小组更新了 2015 年最后报告中提交的关于与远洋海运有关联的实体、个人和船只的情况(S/2015/131，表 8 和附件 18、24 和 33.2)，归纳如下：

(a) 曾经为远洋海运工作过的个人：[77]

㈠ Kim Phyom Bom 先生(截至 2014 年 12 月担任总裁)；

㈡ Nam Un Gyong 先生(财务管理员)；

㈢ Ri Ki Jung 先生(财务管理员)；

㈣ Kim Sang Gun 先生(财务管理员)；

(b) 曾经为远洋海运大连分公司工作过的个人：

㈠ 前总代表金永元先生(可能使用 Kim Yong Won 的别名)；

㈡ 吴雄虎先生；

㈢ 张良宇先生；

(c) 与远洋海运有关联的船舶：*Hoe Ryong* 号(海事组织第 9041552 号)(原名 *Wang Jae San 2* 号)；

(d) 与远洋海运有关联的实体：

㈠ 会宁船运有限公司(海事组织第 5817786 号)

- 地址：108，Pongnam-dong，Pyongchon-guyok，Pyongyang；
- 2014 年 10 月以来 *Hoe Ryong* 号(海事组织第 9041552 号)的注册所有人；

㈡ 朝鲜王在山船运有限公司(海事组织第 5787671 号)

- 地址：Tonghung-dong，Chung-guyok，Pyongyang；

[77] 专家小组获得的情报。

- 2013 年 1 月至 2014 年 9 月期间 *Wang Jae San* 号的原注册船舶经理人和运营商(海事组织第 9041552 号)；

㈢ 大同江船运公司(海事组织第 5435974 号)：

- 大同江号的原注册所有人(海事组织第 7738656 号)，该船只于 2014 年 5 月 16 日在海事组织数据库登记为“已损毁”。亚太地区港口国管制东京谅解备忘录数据库将远洋海运列为该船舶的国际安全管理法规管理人；
- 地址：Tonghung-dong，Chung-gu，Pyongyang；Tonghung Dong，Central District，Pyongyang；
- 电话：850-2-18111 转 381-8818-04；传真：850-2-381-4567；
- 电邮：taedonggang@silibank.com。

B. 朝鲜永邦总公司

162. 朝鲜永邦总公司(原名龙岳山贸易总公司)被指认参与了军事采购和销售。专家小组确认，朝鲜龙岳山贸易总公司和朝鲜龙月山公司均为永邦公司的别名。[78] 截至撰稿时，龙岳山贸易总公司中国珠海分公司仍列为运营状态，所列的法人代表为 Kim PyongChan 先生(见附件 92)。[79] 龙岳山贸易总公司还在中国丹东、集安、临江和图们设有分公司(见附件 93)。有一位分公司代表也被列为朝鲜成钢贸易公司的经理，其地址完全相同(见同上)。据会员国汇报，永邦公司的下属公司包括朝鲜国际化工合资公司、朝鲜革新贸易公司、朝鲜浦钢贸易公司、朝鲜复合设备进口公司、朝鲜光星贸易公司和朝鲜 Ryongwang 贸易公司(见附件 94-96)。[80]

朝鲜复合设备进口公司

163. 2013 年 3 月，安理会指认朝鲜复合设备进口公司为永邦公司的下属公司。专家小组确认了一个会员国提供的资料，即朝鲜复合设备进口公司早在 2001 年就开始使用 Korea Equipment & Plant Corporation (KEP)的别名(见附件 95)。

164. 专家小组建议委员会对制裁名单进行更新，增加以下资料(见建议 4(c)至(e))：

[78] 龙岳山贸易总公司原名为朝鲜龙月山贸易总公司(见附件 91)。

[79] 中文为：朝鲜龙岳山贸易总会社。

[80] 美国财政部，“Treasury targets North Korean entities for supporting WMD proliferation”，新闻稿，2005 年 10 月 21 日，可查阅 www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2984.aspx。

永邦公司

别名： 朝鲜龙岳山贸易总公司

朝鲜龙月山贸易总公司

其他资料： 永邦公司拥有的实体包括朝鲜国际化工合资公司。

朝鲜复合设备进口公司

别名： 朝鲜设备与厂房公司(KEP)

地址： Central District，Pyongyang

电邮： kepc@co.chesin.com

C. 朝鲜莲河机械合营公司

165. 朝鲜莲河机械合营公司违反联合国制裁继续开展活动。最近的官方出版物刊载照片显示，金正恩正在视察品牌名为“莲河机械”的机床运转。专家小组以往没有见过这个品牌(见图 33)。

图 33：
品牌名为“莲河机械”的机床

资料来源：《劳动新闻》，2015 年 12 月 21 日。

166. 专家小组早先报告指出莲河公司与总部设在莫斯科的 KORTEC 公司有业务联系。据 KORTEC 公司前执行总裁表示，KORTEC 公司于 2012 年停止了与莲河公司的业务联系。[81] 他表示，KORTEC 公司和莲河公司之间的行政职能(如合约和发票等)是由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆的秘书 Park Sen Gun

[81] 据俄罗斯提供的资料，2013 年 1 月 22 日委员会指认莲河公司之后，KORTEC 公司与莲河公司的关系中止。

先生处理的。[82] 专家小组重申对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官和使馆工作人员从事私营部门和商业行为的明确模式表示关切。

167. 专家小组原先报告指出莲河公司驻丹东的一名代表使用“KORTEC”的别名以促销 KORTEC 公司生产的机床，这些机器和莲河公司的产品完全雷同(见 S/2015/131，第 177 段)。因此，专家小组建议委员会将“KORTEC”列为莲河公司的别名。专家小组重申建议在制裁名单上增列“KORTEC”为莲河公司的别名(KPE.016) 。

168. 专家小组重申这一建议的原因是，它与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国使用同一名称的实体相关，而不是使用同一名称的外国公司。特别是，如果朝鲜的实体使用 KORTEC 公司的名义推销机床，应引起会员国的注意。

D. 亿达(香港)国际

169. 尽管委员会于 2013 年 3 月指认亿达公司，该公司的总裁蔡光(音译)先生继续通过大连益联贸易有限公司开展贸易活动，构成了对制裁的规避(见第 62-70 段)。大连益联贸易有限公司及其总裁 Piao Chengyuan[83] 一直在协助蔡先生和亿达公司规避制裁。

170. Piao 先生担任其他 3 家公司的总裁和/或股东：丹东永兴和贸易有限公司、丹东益联贸易有限公司和 Longjin (香港) 国际贸易有限公司(见附件 97-99)。 丹东永兴和贸易有限公司、丹东益联贸易有限公司和朝鲜大成贸易会社驻当地的分公司地址相同(见附件 98)。[84] 欧洲联盟和美国都对朝鲜 Taesong 实施了制裁，因为该公司与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司有贸易联系，包括与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国有贸易往来。[85] 李红日(音译)先生和马格文(音译)先生[86] 也与亿达公司和朝鲜金龙贸易公司有关联，他们与 Piao 先生及其大连益联贸易有限公司和丹东永兴和贸易有限公司保持了商业往来关系(见图 34、第 62-70 段和附件 97-99)。因此，与这些个人及其公司的商业往来可能有助于规避制裁。[87]

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[82] 手机：+7 (985) 962-59-81 /电邮：corustrade@gmail.com。

[83] 又名 Park (Pak) Seung (Sung) Won。

[84] 中文：朝鲜大成贸易会社丹东代表处，朝鲜大星贸易会社丹东代表处。

[85] 欧洲联盟理事会第 2013/183/CFSP 号决定和美国财政部，“United States designates North Korean entities and individuals for activities related to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program”，2010 年 8 月 30 日新闻稿，可查阅 available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg840.aspx。

[86] 李先生和马先生分别担任 Xiuhua 国际贸易有限公司和香港 Max Moon 贸易有限公司的总裁(见附件 99)。

[87] 安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 11 段禁止提供有助于规避制裁措施的金融服务和转移相关资产。

图 34
与亿达公司有关联的实体



E. 朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和朝鲜檀君贸易公司

171. 美国财政部 2015 年 1 月和 11 月指认的 15 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民中，有 11 人隶属朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司或代表该公司行事[88]。2015 年 11 月指认的个人中有 3 人与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司在缅甸开展的活动有关；1 人和 1 个实体与该公司在埃及的活动有关。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻缅甸大使 Kim Sok Chol 先生被指认为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的协调人。专家小组没有证据显示，他此后已经不再担任这一职务。

172. 在这 11 人中，Kim Kwang Yon 和 Kil Jong Hun 被列为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司驻纳米比亚代表(见 S/2015/131，第 187 段)。纳米比亚确认他们的外交身份认证至 2015 年初有效，但于 7 月份表示已中止其外交身份，要求朝鲜召回国内(见附件 100)。纳米比亚否认知晓他们与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的联系，但在指认后将他们列入了“移民禁令清单”。

173. Kim 先生和 Kil 先生原来分别被派任朝鲜驻南非普利陀利亚的二等和三等秘书。但 2012 年后的旅行记录显示他们大多数时间是在纳米比亚温得和克渡过的，且每隔两个月离开该国一次，每次离境时间从 1 周到 1 个月不等。纳米比亚

[88] 美国财政部, “Issuance of new North-Korea-related executive order; North Korea designation”, press release, 2 January 2015, 可查阅 www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- Enforcement/Pages/20150102.aspx; “North Korea designations”, Resource Center, 13 November 2015,可查阅 www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20151113.aspx。

旅行记录显示，自 2014 年 12 月以来再也没有他们的出入境记录。朝鲜大使馆为 Kil 先生开设了私人账户，Kim 先生也可以使用该账户。

174. 专家小组还确认，另一位被指认人员 Kim Kwang Chun 先生在担任朝鲜檀君贸易公司驻阿拉伯叙利亚共和国分公司代表时，在 2012 年运输弹道导弹相关物资事件中发挥了关键作用(见附件 101 和 S/2013/337，第 44-46 段和 S/2014/147，第 51-54 段，这批弹道导弹物资后被大韩民国扣押。有 2 个会员国表示，Kim 先生还担任 Ryungseng 贸易公司(檀君公司的别名)驻中国沈阳分公司的代表(见 S/2015/313，第 187 段)。

F. 据报告与被指认实体有关联的个人的差旅活动

175. 2015 年期间，专家小组调查了会员国指认的个人或经专家小组调查可能为被指认实体效力的个人的差旅活动。[89]

176. 专家小组获得了被美国指认为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表或官员的 7 位个人的护照和航空旅行资料[90] (见表 8)。

表 8
据报为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表的差旅活动

姓名	出生日期	护照号	据报开展活动的国家
Jang Yong Son 先生	1957 年 2 月 20 日	563110024	伊朗伊斯兰共和国
Kim Yong Chol 先生	1962 年 2 月 18 日	472310168	伊朗伊斯兰共和国
Kang Ryong 先生	1962 年 2 月 18 日	472310168	阿拉伯叙利亚共和国
Ryu Jin 先生	1968 年 8 月 21 日	472410192	阿拉伯叙利亚共和国
Kil Jong Hun 先生	1965 年 8 月 7 日	563410081	纳米比亚
Kim Kwang Yon 先生	1972 年 2 月 20 日	472410022	纳米比亚
Jang Song Chol 先生	1966 年 7 月 30 日	563210059	俄罗斯联邦[a]

[a] 俄罗斯向专家小组表示反对回复任何基于单方面制裁的质询(见附件 106)。

177. 专家小组迄今无法确认这些个人为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的代表或官员。2012 年至 2015 年 9 月期间，这些个人曾经在以下国家过境或出入境：中国、埃及、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、马来西亚、新加坡、苏丹、乌干达、阿拉伯联合酋长国和津巴布韦(见附件 102)。驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国和纳米比亚的代表被阿联酋、巴

[89] 见附件 102，内有关于全球航空信息项目的补充资料。

[90] 美国财政部，“Treasury imposes sanctions against the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”新闻稿，2015 年 1 月 2 日，可查阅 www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9733.aspx。

基斯坦和纳米比亚证实为正式委任的外交官。这些个人获得了旅游或过境签证，前往阿拉伯联合酋长国。巴基斯坦指出，他们的签证申请反映出访问朝鲜驻巴基斯坦使馆和领事馆的意向。有几位乘坐同一航班，其机票由同一机构出具，且机票编号相连。

九. 金融措施

178. 专家小组在本报告所述期间获得的金融资料为我们分析朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的商业运作和银行做法提供了便利。有一个会员国向委员会报告了根据第1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段关于资产冻结的规定而采取的行动。

179. 尽管面临金融制裁，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续通过别名、代理商、身处多个司法管辖区的外国个人、长期的幌子公司网络和使馆工作人员，进入和利用全球的国际金融体系(包括银行和保险)，通过银行交易、大宗现金和贸易行为为非法活动提供支持。

180. 专家小组忧虑地注意到，一些银行缺乏充分的金融监管措施和执行这些措施的意图，尤其是在缺乏有效的法律及合规机构的国家。[91] 源自境外银行的交易通过设在美国和欧洲的银行账号处理。涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的各项决议要求加强尽职调查，但是由于与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的公司往往由非朝鲜国民注册，并使用间接付款方式和迂回交易剥离公司与商品或服务流动之间的联系，以掩盖他们的活动，决议的实施大打折扣。

181. 随着金融制裁从基于指认清单的定向金融制裁向基于活动的制裁过渡，[92] 金融制裁的实施愈来愈趋于复杂，必须首先确定一个实体是否由被指认实体控制或利用。造成情况复杂的原因在于，别名清单永远不可能面面俱到，尤其是鉴于音译朝鲜名称的替代方式多种多样。此外，由于当事方对专家小组的质询作出回复需要时间，从而让这些实体有更多的空间继续开展活动，专家小组在更新被指认实体的资料时面临困难。

A. 银河 3 号火箭外购零部件的相关交易

182. 2012 年 12 月发射的银河 3 号火箭残骸中发现的压力变送器是由总部设在台北的华悦国际企业股份有限公司(华悦公司)通过 2006 年 12 月和 2010 年 5 月两笔交易采购的。华悦公司从一家设在联合王国的公司购置了这些物品，但没有告

[91] 另一个问题是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法活动所涉及的各国银行并没有为其金融部门提供充足的激励措施，鼓励它们投入资源打击非法金融，特别是反扩散金融。

[92] 基于活动的制裁防止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供与供应、出售、转让或使用各项决议违禁物品有关的金融服务、资源或协助。

知对方其最终运输目的地，然后将其转运至平壤的朝鲜 Chonbok 贸易公司。最晚从2004年3月开始，华悦公司一直从同一供应商采购了大量的变送器(见表9)。

表 9

2006 年 10 月后由华悦公司购置的压力变送器的数量和类型

	[redacted]2610						[redacted]630			[redacted]1400			
采购日期	16 bar	40 bar	60 bar	100 bar	250 bar	400 bar	6 bar	250 bar	400 bar	16 bar	60 bar	160 bar	250 bar
2006 年 9 月										3	2	3	1
2006 年 12 月	12		28	31		4							
2007 年 7 月	3					3							
2008 年 4 月								8	15				
2008 年 6 月	9												
2009 年 8 月	12	3					5	14	10				
2009 年 9 月				3	3	9		14	10				
2010 年 4 月	23		2	14		6							

注：专家小组确认向 Chonbok 公司出口的物资均划了红圈。

1. 2010 年 5 月向 Chonbok 转运压力变送器

转运非法物资

183. 尽管华悦公司与专家小组进行过多次交流，但该公司无法提供任何出口记录。华悦公司确曾告知专家小组说，该公司将相关物资随身携带上飞机从台北经由北京运送至平壤，没有向海关申报。此前，台北地方法院 2008 年曾判决华悦公司 2 名员工通过中国北京和澳门向朝鲜出口战略高技术物资，包括采用类似的隐蔽方式多次通过空运转送。专家小组确定，转运这些物资违反了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国关于停止所有弹道导弹相关活动并放弃其弹道导弹计划的义务。

金融交易

184. 华悦公司先是向专家小组介绍了一个复杂的循环支付方案，该方案涉及另一家总部设在台北的公司(A 公司)和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一家公司(朝鲜国际展览公司)。根据安排，这 3 家公司均付款给对方的债权人，这样就不需要进行任何涉外交易了。A 公司欠朝鲜国际展览公司的费用(台北的公司参与交易会的费用)与 Chonbok 公司欠华悦公司的费用大致相等。A 公司向华悦公司转移资金，而 Chonbok 公司则向朝鲜国际展览公司支付其应付华悦公司的金额，这实际上抵消了各方的债务(见图 35 和附件 108)。后来，华悦公司又改变了对交易的解释，不再提及 A 公司，而是说 Chonbok 公司直接在平壤支付现金，然后华悦公司立即把这笔钱支付给朝鲜国际展览公司，作为总部设在台北的公司参与交易会的组织费用。

图 35

与 2010 年交易有关的资金流向图



185. 华悦公司无法向专家小组提供这两种支付方式的任何记录。根据法律，华悦公司有义务向当局申报从 Chonbok 公司获得的 28 350 欧元外汇收入。但是，监管当局不可能发现任何交易。专家小组得出结论认为，华悦公司有意无意规避了地方当局的监管，从而协助朝鲜民主主义人民共和国规避制裁。[93]

2. 2006 年 12 月华悦公司向 Chonbok 公司转运压力变送器

186. 2006 年，Chonbok 公司通过一位名为“Ryom Jong Chol”的个人从一家马来西亚银行向华悦公司转移了 71 700 欧元。根据专家小组获得的资料，Ryom 先生当时担任马来西亚东方银行的代表。东方银行于 2013 年被安理会指认为协助另一个被指认的实体绿松联营公司开展与武器相关的交易。专家小组就这一交易与马来西亚方面进行了接触，但至今为止仍未收到回复。

B. 侦察总局

187. 专家小组获得的文件表明，有一个名叫 Kim Su Gwang 的侦察总局特工自 2013 年以来被一个欧洲会员国冻结资产，他利用欧洲某国际组织工作人员的身份将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国其他国民(包括 2 名侦察总局特工)带入欧洲，其中包

[93] 替代第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)段的第 1874(2009)号决议第 10 段；禁止转移任何可能有助于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发展弹道导弹相关活动的金融资产(第 1874 (2009)号决议第 18 段)。

括平壤朝鲜联合开发银行国际关系部主任 Kim Su Gyong[94] 和她的父亲 Kim Yong Nam。据一个会员国报告，Kim Yong Nam 先生负责管理侦察总局驻欧洲和世界各地的工作人员的支助网络，为他们提供财政资源和其他资源，执行侦察总局总部委派的任务。Kim 女士与她的兄弟和父亲共谋，从事非法活动，并为该组织的活动提供掩护。

C. 执行定向金融措施的立法

188. 专家小组发现，在许多情况下，由于缺乏充足的国家执行立法和/或缺乏机构间共享信息以协助会员国评估被禁活动的进程，定向金融制裁的执行情况参差不齐。在其外联活动的背景下，专家小组已受命在审查扩散资助的立法草案方面提供援助。在这方面，专家小组强调指出，为履行会员国根据决议承担的义务，会员国必须在此类立法措施中列入禁止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交易所有武器和相关物资(还有扩散大规模毁灭性武器)的条款。如果没有列入这样的条款，会员国在采取行动打击被指认实体和代表这些实体行事的个人违反常规武器禁运的行为时，将会面临重大障碍。

D. 远洋海运管理公司资产冻结

189. 墨西哥向委员会了解 2014 年 7 月以来被其扣留的 *Mu Du Bong* 号的情况，并获得了明确指示。委员会在 2015 年 5 月 6 日给墨西哥的信中指出，第 1718(2006)号决议规定的资产冻结义务适用于远洋海运及其所有的金融资产和经济资源，包括 *Mu Du Bong* 号。根据这一结论，墨西哥冻结了 *Mu Du Bong* 号。

E. Chinpo 船运公司和资助扩散

190. 新加坡地区法院在一起罕见的资助扩散起诉案中，控告 Chinpo 船运公司(私营)及其总裁 Tan Cheng Hoe 向远洋海运提供金融服务或转移金融资产或资源。(第 137 至 141 段)法院 2015 年 12 月 14 日认定 Tan 先生为 2013 年 7 月 *Chong Chon Gang* 号上所运货物向一家外国船运代理支付了 72 016.76 美元，但该船只被巴拿马拦截。

191. 法官 Jasvender Kaur 称，Chinpo 船运公司在 2013 年 7 月 8 日转移资金时“完全没有任何尽责措施”。她发现该公司在 2009 年至 2013 年期间代朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民一共汇出了 605 笔汇款，总值达 4 000 万美元。被告声称自己是远洋海运的“付款中介”。

192. 法庭文件提供了充分的证据证明，定向金融措施确实得到了执行，但被告规避了这些措施。法庭文件表明，Chinpo 公司曾在对外汇款表格上填写过船舶名称，但从 2010 年下半年开始就不再这么做。根据 Tan 先生的供述：“如果填写船

[94] 俄罗斯联邦告知专家小组，单边制裁“不是怀疑在俄罗斯领土上存在非法活动的理由”(见附件 106)。

舶名称，美国的银行就会问更多的问题，一些处理银行在索要更多资料后还会拒绝交易”。他还表示，Chinpo 公司是在中国银行新加坡分行进行的这笔 72 016.76 美元交易，该行“建议[我们]在交易中不要填写船舶名称，因为银行知道我们的汇款是代朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的实体汇出的”。[95] Tan 先生显然听从了这一建议，开始在付款细节中遗漏船舶名称。Chinpo 公司同样多次建议朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体不要在汇入汇款时写入船舶名称，从而进一步协助规避制裁行为。一名雇员表示，她受命在发出的电邮中加入这一提示。还有一名雇员则详细解释说，加入这一指示的原因“部分是因为 Chinpo 公司想要拿到钱，但是倘若美国方面知道转账与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船舶有关，就会阻止汇款交易”。[96] 专家小组指出，这种刻意遗漏信息与远洋海运新加坡分公司其他实体和个人所采取的规避做法是一致的。

F. 金融行动任务组

193. 专家小组与金融行动任务组紧密合作，并与类似金融行动任务组的区域机构开展外联，以促进和支持实施联合国的定向金融制裁。金融行动任务组的相互评价进程负责评估第 1718(2006)号决议及其后续决议规定的定向金融措施的遵守情况，专家小组出席了评估讨论会，回答会员国提出的问题。2015 年 2 月 27 日和 10 月 23 日，金融行动任务组重新将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国列入“公共清单”，并强调其做法对国际金融体系的健全构成了威胁。在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的交易中，金融行动任务组敦促会员国的金融机构采取反制措施，包括加强尽责。

十. 制裁的意外影响

194. 专家小组没有发现任何实例表明联合国决议实施的禁令直接导致朝鲜粮食短缺或其他人道主义援助短缺。有报告指会员国通过的国内立法或私营部门采取的程序措施导致出口至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的商品受阻或延迟。人们往往很难将这些措施和联合国制裁区分开来。

195. 2015 年遭遇的相关问题之一涉及到联合国驻朝鲜机构所面临的金融交易困难。专家小组虽然无法确定这一问题与联合国制裁有直接联系，但注意到委员会第 6 号执行援助通知建议 4 鼓励朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采取合理措施为驻该国的外交使团的业务运作提供便利，包括必要时提供替代金融渠道。

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[95] 中国告知专家小组：“根据 Chinpo 船运有限公司提交的汇款申请，中国银行根据有关规定处理了汇款流程，其收款人为 C.B. Fenton 公司。”

[96] 检方在庭审结束时提交的呈堂文件，2015 年 10 月 30 日(新加坡)。

196. 专家小组还注意到秘书长关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人权状况的报告，秘书长在报告中表示，“对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国施加的联合国制裁及单方面制裁显然不适用于人道主义援助，但这些制裁仍对弱势民众产生了意外、间接的负面影响”(A/70/393，第 41 段)。专家小组仍在继续开展调查。

十一. 建议

197. 自专家小组于 2010 年向委员会和安全理事会提交第一次报告以来，专家小组注意到其建议逐渐从一般性建议演变为更有针对性、更加实际和可执行的建议。专家小组重申，其上一次报告(S/2015/131)中的建议仍然有效，应结合专家小组作出的进一步研究和收集的补充证据重新审查这些建议。

A. 给委员会的建议

建议 1
国家执行报告和会员国的义务

专家小组建议委员会主席和副主席与未提交报告的会员国接触，敦促它们履行其根据相关决议承担的报告义务。他们应该：

(a) 定期为会员国举行公开通报会；

(b) 为各区域集团的主席举办通报会；

(c) 定期举行双边会议；

(d) 鼓励安全理事会非常任理事国提交报告，作为良好做法的典范。

建议 2
专业教学与培训

专家小组建议委员会向安全理事会建议加强根据第 1874(2009)号决议第 28 段实施的措施：

(a) 要求会员国防止本国国民在本国领土上为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民提供可能有助于朝鲜发展禁止项目的学科的专业教学或培训，并明确规定此类教学或培训同样包括传授通用或基本知识；

(b) 鼓励各国际组织请求委员会提出指导意见，以确保其培训方案和课程不和第 2087(2013)号决议第 11 段实施的禁运相冲突。

建议 3

第 5 号执行援助通知第 10 段

专家小组建议委员会对第 5 号执行援助通知第 10 段倒数第二句作出如下更新：

(a) “这些决议禁止本国国民从朝鲜或本国领土转移与维护或使用禁用武器或相关物资有关的咨询、服务或援助，无论这些物资由朝鲜供应还是从朝鲜转移而来”(着重部分由作者标明)。

建议 4

更新制裁名单

专家小组建议委员会更新制裁名单如下：

(a) 在 KPi.002 中添加“李济善”的确切别名；

(b) 在 KPe.010 中添加新资料如下：

KPe.010 绿松联营公司

别名：

绿松联营

绿松公司

(c) 在 KPe.002 中添加新资料如下：

KPe.002 朝鲜永邦总公司

别名：

朝鲜龙岳山贸易总公司

朝鲜龙月山贸易总公司

其他资料：由永邦公司拥有产权的实体包括朝鲜国际化工合资公司。

(d) 在 KPe.019 中添加新资料如下：

KPe.019 朝鲜复合设备进口公司

别名：朝鲜设备与厂房公司

地址：Central District， Pyongyang

其他资料：电邮：kepc@co.chesin.com

(e) 在 KPe.006 中添加新资料如下：

KPe.006 朝鲜 Hyoksin 贸易公司

其他资料：电邮：rbc635@co.chesin.com

建议 5
更新违禁项目清单

专家小组还建议委员会将以下项目列入弹道导弹相关项目清单(S/2014/253)：

(a) 具备侦查能力、自主飞行控制和导航能力的无人驾驶飞行器(如配备惯性导航系统的自动驾驶飞机)；

(b) (a)项列出的特别设计用于纳入“无人驾驶飞行器”的任何相关系统、设备和组件，包括用于导航、高度指示、引导或控制的系统。

建议 6
资产冻结

(a) 专家小组建议委员会主席向所有会员国分发 2015 年 5 月 6 日给墨西哥的信，信中指出 *Mu Du Bong* 号是远洋海运的资产，将予以冻结；

(b) 为确保会员国有效履行有关资产冻结和金融措施的义务，专家小组建议委员会通过一份执行援助通知广泛传播以下讯息：

㈠ 委员会明确表示，第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段以及第 2094(2013)号决议第 8 段和第 11 段采取的措施也适用于会员国确认有助于开展决议禁止的活动或有助于规避决议要求采取的措施的任何金融或其他资产或资源；

㈡ 委员会明确表示，将“资产”和“资源”视为包括任何种类的资产(包括船只)，因此，有关会员国应冻结由被指认实体拥有和/或控制的船只；

㈢ 委员会重申朝鲜民主主义人民共和国同样受制于第 2094(2013)号决议第 11 段要求采取的措施，该决议禁止从一个被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体/个人向另一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体/个人转移任何资产或资源；

㈣ 作为资产冻结措施实施努力的一部分，委员会明确表示，会员国可以根据本国的法律进程(依照第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段以及第 2094(2013)号决议第 8 段和第 11 段)决定对被冻结资产或资源实施控制，作为防止出逃的一种方式。

(c) 专家小组建议委员会向安理会提出以下提议：

㈠ 要求会员国在采取第 1718 号决议第 8(d)段或第 2094 (2013)号决议第 8 段和第 11 段要求采取的措施时立即向委员会提交报告，报告中应包含冻结金融或其他资产或资源或者防止转移此类资产或资源的有关详情；

㈡ 决定各国应向委员会通告有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国飞机或船只转移给其他公司、可能意在规避制裁或违反安理会决议规定的任何情报，包括重新命名和登记飞机、船只或船舶；并请委员会广泛传播这些情报。

建议 7

指认

根据第 2087(2013)号决议第 12 段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 27 段，专家小组建议委员会指认违反相关决议和/或协助规避制裁的个人和实体(见机密附件 109)。

B. 专家小组给会员国的建议

建议 8

第 2094(2013)号决议第 22 段

会员国应根据第 4 号执行援助通知对向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口具备侦查能力的航程 300 公里以下商用无人驾驶飞行器给予应有的注意，因为它们可能被用于军事目的。

建议 9

第 1874(2009)号决议第 9 段

会员国应特别注意勿向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口与提供、生产、维护或使用所有军火或相关物资有关的技术培训、咨询、服务或援助。

建议 10

第 2094(2013)号决议第 22 段

会员国应对向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口以下物项提高警惕：

(a) 可被改装为军用车辆或武器和相关物资的商用卡车；

(b) 可能有助于潜射弹道导弹计划的商用物项，包括子系统和部件，尤其是电动机、铅酸电池和相关的充电系统和声纳技术；

(c) 可用于海军舰艇的海事电子产品(雷达、声纳、指南针等)。

建议 11

报告义务

会员国应向委员会汇报本国掌握的关于违反禁令的企图的情报以及为执行各项决议所采取的措施。

Annex 1 : Ongoing Investigations

Case 1. Shipments of spare parts and equipment for submarines and military boats brokered by Green Pine from Austria to Angola and Vietnam

1. The Panel continued its investigation of two incidents involving Green Pine Associated Corporation (designated on 2 May 2012 as a primary arms dealer)[1]: two July 2011 deliveries of equipment and spare parts for military patrol boats to Angola and a February 2011 air shipment of submarine parts inspected in Taipei.[2] These consignments were shipped from Vienna by an Austrian national, Mr. Josef Schwarz through his company, Schwarz Motorbootservice & Handel GmbH. Mr. Schwartz had engaged in many previous trades with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea including violations and attempted violations of the luxury goods bans.[3]

2. The Panel confirmed that Mr. Schwarz acted on behalf of and assisted Green Pine in the evasion of the sanctions by acquiring and transferring arms and related materiel in violation of paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009).

3. As the items in the shipment were parts for submarines and military patrol boats, the Panel considers them arms and related materiel. Member States are prohibited from procuring from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea all arms and related materiel, whether or not originating in the territory of the country.[4]

4. The Panel notes that some Member States interpret the resolutions as only prohibiting the transfer of arms procured from North Korea, and not those brokered by North Korean entities but originating in other countries. The Panel recalls that paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 reaffirmed the prohibition of brokering or other intermediary services.

5. The Panel recommends that Member States ensure that all military-to-military cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea complies fully with the resolutions, in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Committee's IAN No. 5. The Panel further recalls paragraph 24 of resolution 2094 (2013), which calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance over the country's diplomatic personnel, given the key role played by the diplomats in promoting Green Pine's business activities abroad.

6. Green Pine had customers in Africa and Asia, procured arms and related materiel from the United States and Europe, and routed all shipments though Asia. Many of the countries with which it did business had long-term military-to-military cooperation with some States to evade sanctions. Green Pine also embedded its representatives within Democratic People's Republic of Korea's embassies under aliases in a neighbouring country. Green Pine further evaded States' export regulations by operating under the cover of Mr. Schwartz's company.

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[1] S/2012/287.
[2] S/2015/131, paras. 81-83.
[3] The export of eight Mercedes Benz vehicles from Austria 2007 - 2008, attempted export of two luxury yachts from Italy in 2009. See, S/2012/422, paras. 84-85; and EU Regulation, No 1355/2011.
[4] Pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009).

7. The July 2011 shipments were shipped from Vienna to a Luanda-based military company, Simportex E.P., as part of a 2 September 2009 contract with Green Pine relating to its provision of technical assistance for Mandume-class patrol boats (e.g. maintenance, repairs and replacement of parts). The contract expired in January 2012. In cooperation with the Angolan authorities, the Panel found that Green Pine's representative, Mr. Kim Hyok Chan, served as a diplomat in the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Luanda, and used Schwarz Motorbootservice to procure the items from a European company. Green Pine also operated from this embassy.[5]

8. The February 2011 consignment also originated in Austria. The consignee was a Vietnamese military company, General Army of Economic and Technology (GAET). Green Pine's office in a neighboring country ("Saeng Pil Trading Corporation") was involved in the shipment. The shipment was part of an agreement with GAET on technical training and services for the repair of Yugo class submarines. Mr. Schwartz had also procured items for this cargo from a United States company. The United States had already designated Green Pine at that time.[6]

9. The rerouting of shipments from Vienna through a neighbouring country to other destinations, despite less expensive alternate transportation routes, erased Mr. Schwartz's name from the documents on the final leg of the shipments. Angola provided information to the Panel indicating that Simportex's payments to Green Pine were to be made to a Beijing-based bank account held by an individual named "Kim Kwang Ho," routing through two corresponding banks in New York (figure 1).

Figure 1. Bank account used by Green Pine's representative



Source: The Panel.

[5] Email: gpa_angola@yahoo.com.
[6] US Treasury, Fact Sheet, 30 August 2010.

Case 2. Attempted arms transfer to United Arab Emirates

10. The Panel is investigating a United Arab Emirates entity named Al Mutlaq Technology and its representatives, including Mr. Abdulrahman Abdualla Abdulrahman Baqer and associated individuals, over a reported attempt to acquire 100 million USD of arms and related materials from KOMID, as well as this entity's potential past dealings with other Democratic People's Republic of Korea entities. The UAE stated that Al Mutlaq had been investigated and that "Al Mutlaq had requested a 100 million dollar quotation "from an individual named Mr. Yoon Song Kim from North Korea based in China" but that "no relationship between KOMID and Al Mutlaq Technology or Mr. Baqer was detected." The UAE stated that as a precautionary measure Al Mutlaq Technology had been shut down (see annex 104-105).[7]

Case 3. Possible brokering of military communication equipment in Malaysia

11. According to a Member State, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea national, Mr. Pyon Won Gun, was likely working for a Malaysia-based company, Global Communication Co. ("Glocom"), which manufactures and supplies equipment for communication, navigation, command and control for military and para-military organizations. Glocom has reportedly been connected to the Reconnaisance General Bureau (RGB). Furthemore, Mr. Pyon's name is featured in email address on Glocom's online advertisements (figure 2).

12. The Panel has confirmed that no company under the name of Glocom exists at its listed physical address and that another company's information, "International Golden Services Sdn Bhd" (IGS) is listed as Glocom's contacts (figure 3). Mr. Fareeq Qael was listed as ICG's director since January 2013. Mr. Qael removed ICGS from his personal professional profile shortly after he was contacted by the Panel (but has never replied to the Panel). The Panel has also been waiting for a reply from Malaysia since November 2014.

13. The resolutions prohibit brokering by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the transfers of all arms and related materiel, as reaffirmed by paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 (2013). The Panel continues to investigate the activities of Glocom and its reported connections to the RGB.

[7] The Panel's meeting with UAE delegation, New York, December 2015.

Figure 2. An example of GLOCOM's product advertisements referring to the contact information of wg.pyon@glocom.com.my

Source: GLOCOM's homepage available at http://glocom.com.my/public/pdf/GS-2400%20Catalogue%20v11e.pdf.

Figure 3. GLOCOM's contact information provided on its website referring to International Golden Services Sdn Bhd



Source: http://glocom.com.my/en/contacts-en.html.

Case 4. Korea National Insurance Corporation links to designated entities

14. The Panel identified business relationships between OMM and Korean National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) whose German subsidiary was designated by the EU on 2 July 2015. KNIC purchased vessels and commodities including sugar via Chinpo Shipping, an OMM agent. The Panel has evidence demonstrating that KNIC insures Air Koryo aircraft for international flights (figure 4). Air Koryo has not responded to the Panel's request for insurance certificates. Further, the Panel notes that KNIC has insured both cargo and vessels operated by Ocean Maritime Management Co. Ltd (figure 5) and is thus continuing its investigation into KNIC and its role in facilitating the movement of assets of designated entities.

Figure 4. Korea National Insurance Corporation



조선민족보험총회사
Korea National Insurance Corporation
비행기보험증권
AIRCRAFT POLICY

번호 No. 10/4-1016-4

피보험자이름
Name of the Insured: AIR KORYO, D P R KOREA

피보험지주소
Address of the Insured: SUNAN DISTRICT, PYONGYANG, D P R KOREA

보험기간
Period of Insurance: From 18th Jan., 2012 To 31st Oct., 2012 both days inclusive

비행기리용목적
Purpose of Use: PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION

비행사자료
Details of Pilots: MR. KIM CHOL

지역범위
Geographical Limits: From Pyongyang to Asia,America,Africa and Europe

비행기 자료 Particulars of Aircraft

제작형태 Make & Type	등록번호 Registration Marks	제작년도 Year of Manufacture	탑승수 Declared Max. No. of Passenger at any one time	보험금액 Amount Insured	위험담보 Risks covered (Flight, Taxing, Moored, Ground)
IL-62	AIR KORYO P-886P	1988	160	K.WON: 1,314,710,000.00	"FLIGHT, TAXING, MOORED, GROUND" AS APPLICABLE

Source: The Panel.

Figure 5. Korea National Insurance Corporation insuring Ocean Maritime Management Ltd., vessels



Source: The Panel.

Case 5. September 2009 export of machine tool

15. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of Hsien Tai Tsai (also known as Alex Tsai) who has reportedly had business dealings with KOMID. Alex Tsai and his son, Yueh-Hsun Tsai (also known as Gary Tsai), were prosecuted by the United States in connection with their activities which violated United States laws against weapons of mass destruction proliferation, including through the September 2009 export of a machine tool from the United States to Taiwan Province of China. Both individuals pleaded guilty, and were sentenced by the court. The Panel could not confirm Alex Tsai's intention to re-route the machine tool to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Taiwan Province of China. The Panel continues to investigate Alex Tsai's reported dealings with KOMID.

Case 6. Suspected arms-related cooperation with Ethiopia[8]

16. The Panel continued to investigate past military cooperation between an Ethiopia-based company (Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry) and a Democratic People's Republic of Korea entity (Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation).[9] According to media reports, assistance to the Homicho Ammunitions Engineering Industry continued until at least late 2007.[10] Ethiopia confirmed to the Panel that Homicho was established in the 1980s with support from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but stated, "that kind of military cooperation does not exist anymore." The Panel notes that Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation is still listed as one of Homicho Ammunitions Engineering Industry's primary suppliers on the company's website (figure 6).

Figure 6. *Extract of Homicho Ammunitions Engineering Industry profile*

Homicho Ammunition Engineering Industry (HAEI) – Fact Sheet		
	For spare parts : • Governmental and nongovernmental organizations	
Major Suppliers	• Anton Spare Parts Trading GMBH Hamburg (Germany) • Communication and Accessories Int. (Italy) • Effective Laboratory (India) • HMT International Limited (India) • Korea Mineral Trading General Corporation	• North Industries Corporation (China) • Profilex (Czech Republic) • Serind S.P.A. (Italy) • Shiv Dial Sud and Sons (India) • West Kemper Engineering (Germany) • Poly, ALIT (China)

Source: http://www.metec.gov.et/index.php/en/metec-industries/homicho-ammunition-industry, accessed 8 December 2015.

[8] S/2014/147, paras. 100-101 and S/2015, para. 88.
[9] See S/2015/131, para. 88 and S/2014/147, paras. 100-101.
[10] Andrea Berger, "Is Ethiopia Violating United Nations Sanctions against North Korea: New Evidence Uncovered", 38 North, 23 December 2014, available from http://38north.org/2014/12/aberger122314/

Annex 2 : Correspondence with Member States

Country	Number of letters sent	Responses received	No responses
Albania	1	1	0
Angola	4	3	1
Austria	1	(one letter for previous inquiries)	1
Bangladesh	6	6	0
Belgium	1	1	0
Brazil	3	3	0
Cambodia	7	0	7
Cameroon	1	0	1
Canada	1	1	0
China	8	5	3
Cuba	3	0	3
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0	1
Czech Republic	1	1	0
Denmark	3	0	3
Egypt	4	3	1
Eritrea	1	1	0
Ethiopia	5	1	4
Estonia	2	0	2
Fiji	1	1	0
France	6	1	5
Germany	8	4	4
Ghana	5	1	4
Greece	2	2	0
Guinea	1	0	1
India	6	4	2
Indonesia	4	0	4
Iran	1	0	1
Israel	6	4	2
Italy	5	4	1
Japan	4	4	0
Kazakhstan	2	2	0
Kiribati	5	5	0
Latvia	1	1 (plus one letter for previous inquiry)	0
Lebanon	1	1	0
Malaysia	6	0	6
Mexico	4	4	0
Mongolia	2	2	0
Morocco	1	1	0

Mozambique	2	0	2
Myanmar	4	3	1
Nigeria	1	0	1
Pakistan	1	1	0
Panama	3	1	2
Paraguay	1	1	0
Peru	1	1	0
Philippines	7	4	3
Poland	1	1	0
Qatar	3	3	0
Republic of Korea	4	4	0
Russia	5	5	0
Saudi Arabia	3	0	3
Senegal	1	1	0
Sierra Leone	4	0	4
Singapore	5	5	0
Solomon Islands	1	0	1
South Africa	3	1	2
Spain	6	5	1
Sudan	2	0	2
Switzerland	3	3	0
Tanzania	1	0	1
Thailand	8	4	4
Togo	1	0	1
Turkey	1	1	0
Tuvalu	4	4	0
Uganda	6	4	2
Ukraine	4	4	0
United Arab Emirates	2	1 (plus one letter for previous inquiries)	1
United Kingdom	6	6	0
United States	3	1 (plus 2 letters for previous inquiries)	2
Viet Nam	7	5	2
Yemen	1	0	1
TOTAL	**229**	**136 (plus 5 letters for previous inquiries)**	**93**

Source: The Panel

Annex 3 : Member States to submit NIR

Africa

1. Angola
2. Benin
3. Botswana
4. Burundi
5. Cameroon
6. Cape Verde
7. Central African Republic
8. Chad
9. Comoros
10. Congo
11. Côte D'Ivoire
12. Democratic Republic c Congo
13. Equatorial Guinea
14. Eritrea
15. Ethiopia
16. Gabon
17. Gambia
18. Ghana
19. Guinea
20. Guinea Bissau
21. Kenya
22. Lesotho
23. Liberia
24. Libya
25. Madagascar
26. Malawi
27. Mali
28. Mauritania
29. Mauritius
30. Mozambique
31. Niger
32. Rwanda
33. Sao Tome and Principe
34. Senegal
35. Seychelles
36. Sierra Leone
37. Somalia
38. South Sudan
39. Sudan
40. Swaziland
41. Tanzania
42. Togo
43. Tunisia
44. Zambia
45. Zimbabwe

Americas

46. Antigua and Barbuda
47. Bahamas
48. Barbados
49. Belize
50. Bolivia
51. Costa Rica
52. Dominica
53. El Salvador
54. Grenada
55. Haiti
56. Honduras
57. Jamaica
58. Nicaragua
59. Saint Kitts and Nevis
60. Saint Lucia
61. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
62. Suriname
63. Trinidad and Tobago
64. Venezuela

Asia

65. Afghanistan
66. Bangladesh
67. Bhutan
68. Cambodia
69. Iran
70. Iraq
71. Malaysia
72. Myanmar
73. Nepal
74. Oman
75. Syria
76. Tajikistan
77. Timor-Leste
78. Yemen

Europe

79. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Oceania

80. Fiji
81. Kiribati
82. Micronesia
83. Nauru
84. Palau
85. Papua New Guinea
86. Samoa
87. Solomon Islands
88. Tonga
89. Tuvalu
90. Vanuatu

Annex 4 : Pyunggye-ri Nuclear test site

West portal (15 October 2015)

Signs of heavy traffic and grounding activities are visible.

Main support area (15 October 2015)

Source: The Panel

Annex 5 : Yongbyon nuclear complex

Light water reactor and 5 MWe reactor (15 October 2015)

5MWe reactor (15 July 2015)

Source: The Panel

Areas near the possible fuel assembly building (15 October 2015)

North side of the possible fuel assembly building

15 October 2015

15 July 2015

Source: The Panel

Fuel fabrication plant (uranium enrichment facility)



Annex 6 : 9M79 missile main characteristics



Bild 1 Rakete 9M79F (9M79K, 9M79D)

1 = Gefechtskopf 9N123F (9N123K, SGK); 2 = Träger 9M79.00.00.000-03; 3 = Flügel 9M79.04.00.070; 4 = Flügel 9M79.04.00.120; 5 = Gitterruder 9M79.03.52.000; 6 = Gasstrahlruder 9M79.03.50.006

Unofficial translation by the Panel

1: Warhead (9N123F or 9N123K)
2: Body
3: Fins
4: Fins
5: Aerodynamic rudders
6: Gas-dynamic rudders



Panel Translation:

Diameter:	650 mm
Length of the missile:	6400 mm
Wingspan:	1440 mm
Mass at take-off:	2000 kg
Length of the body:	4075 mm
Mass of missile body (without Warhead):	1518 kg
Missile engine fuel:	solid fuel mixture
Mass of the fuel incl. armor:	926 kg
Mass of armor:	17 kg
Thrust:	96020 N
Missile engine operation time:	18.4 ... 28 s (depending on the fuel temperature.)
Medium pressure in the combustion chamber:	6.77 MPa

Durchmesser	650 mm
Länge der Rakete	6 400 mm
Spannweite der Luftruder	1 440 mm
Startmasse der Rakete	2 000 kg
Länge des Trägers	4 075 mm
Masse des laborierten Trägers	1 518 kg
Treibstoff der Triebwerkseinrichtung	Feststoffgemisch
Masse des Treibstoffs der Triebwerkseinrichtung mit Panzerung	926 kg
Masse der Panzerung	17 kg
Nennschub der Triebwerkseinrichtung	96 020 N (9 788 kp)
Betriebszeit der Triebwerkseinrichtung	18,4 ... 28 s (in Abhängigkeit von der Treibstoffanfangstemperatur)
Mittlerer Druck in der Kammer der Triebwerkseinrichtung	6,77 MPa (69 kp/cm^2)

Masse des Gefechtskopfes 9N123F	482 kg
Sprengstoffmasse der Sprengladung	162,5 kg
Zu bekämpfende Fläche durch den Gefechtskopf 9N123F bei einer spezifischen Splitterenergie von	
a) 1,32 kJ/cm^2 (135 kp/cm^2) auf eine Zielfläche von 1,8 m^2	3 ha
b) 2,35 kJ/cm^2 (240 kp/cm^2) auf eine Zielfläche von 1,8 m^2	2 ha
Masse des Gefechtskopfes 9N123K	482 kg
Anzahl der Splitterladungen	50
Sprengstoffmasse in der Splitterladung	1,45 kg
Zu bekämpfende Fläche durch den Gefechtskopf 9N123K bei einer spezifischen Splitterenergie von	
a) 1,32 kJ/cm^2 (135 kp/cm^2) auf eine Zielfläche von 1,8 m^2	7 ha
b) 2,35 kJ/cm^2 (240 kp/cm^2) auf eine Zielfläche von 1,8 m^2	3,5 ha

Mass of the 9N123F warhead:	482kg
Mass of the explosive:	162.5 kg
Effective combat area of the 9N123F warhead with specific burst energy of:	
a) 1,32 kJ/cm2 (135 kp/cm2) on a target area of 1,8 m2	3 ha
b) 2,35 kJ/cm2 (240 kp/cm2) on a target area of 1,8 m2	2 ha
Mass of the 9N123K warhead:	482kg
Number of sub-munitions:	50
Mass of the sub-munition explosive:	1.45 kg
Effective combat area of the 9N123K warhead with specific burst energy of:	
a) 1,32 kJ/cm2 (135 kp/cm2) on a target area of 1,8 m2	7 ha
b) 2,35 kJ/cm2 (240 kp/cm2) on a target area of 1.8 m2	3.5 ha

Source: The Panel.

Annex 7 : SLBM test media release 9 May 2015

Headline: *"Kim Jong Un Watches Strategic Submarine Underwater Ballistic Missile Test-fire"*

선군조선의 무진막강한 위력의 힘있는 과시,
전략잠수함 탄도탄수중시험발사에서 완전성공

경 애 하 는 김 정 은 동 지 께 서
시 험 발 사 를 보 시 였 다

Source: Rodong Sinmun, available from NK News archive at http://kcnawatch.nknews.org/pub/assets/pdf/rodong-sinmun/2015/05/09/rodong-sinmun-2015-05-09.pdf.

Annex 8 : Enlargement of the SLBM



Source: Kim Jong Un Watches Strategic Submarine Underwater Ballistic Missile Test-fire, Rodong Sinmun, 9 May 2015.

Official test images

The Panel is of the view that several of the 8 May 2015 test official photographs were manipulated and that images unrelated to the test may have been inserted (see annex 9). While the additional release of test video footage showed the missile emerged from the sea, it is unclear whether the ejection was from a submarine or a submerged platform. Without underwater footage, the launch platform could not be verified with certainty by the Panel. However, two Member States reported that the SLBM was launched from a submarine.

Annex 9 : Error-level analysis

Image 1: Note the box-like straight-edges showing image adjustment or superimposed cut-outs of other images of the missile exhaust smoke area

Image 2: Note the squares and rectangles showing possible image manipulation, erasure and superimposed image cut-outs



KCNA images released by the DPRK of the SLBM test on 8 May 2015

Annex 10 : Sohae Overview

Annex 11 : Sohae Assembly Building Area



Annex 12 : Sohae Launch Pad

Tongchang-ri Launch Pad

Map No. 4551.3
December 2015

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Tongchang-ri Launch Pad

Map No. 4551.4
December 2015

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Tongchang-ri Launch Pad



Map No. 4551.5
January 2016

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 13 : Sohae Engine Test Pad

Tongchang-ri Engine Test Pad



Map No. 4551.6
January 2016

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 14 : SLBM related facilities at Sinpo

Map No. 4551.7
January 2016

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 15 : Sinpo South Shipyard

Sinpo submarine shipyard progress since 24 July 2014



Map No. 4551.8
January 2016

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 16 : CSSTEAP introduction

The CSSTEAP was the first regional centre established in November 1995 in Dehradun, India pursuant to UNGA resolutions 45/72 of 11 December 1990 and 50/27 of 6 December 1995 referring to the need for space science and technology education to become accessible to developing countries. Its activities are administered by an international governing board consisting of 15 signatory members from countries in the Asia- Pacific, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Governing Board of the CSSTEAP



Source: http://www.cssteap.org/ accessed 30 December 2015.

Annex 17 : Mr. Paek Chang Ho at CSSTEAP

7/30/2016 Second PG Course in Satellite Communications 1999 - 2000 | CSSTEAP

Second PG Course in Satellite Communications 1999 - 2000

S.No.	Participant Name	Country	Project Title (Click on Title for Details)
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.	Mr. Paek Chang Ho	DPR Korea	Study and System Design of HEO based Communication system
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			
16.			
17.			
18.			

Source: http://www.cssteap.org/ accessed 30 December 2015.

Annex 18 : DPRK's participation into the CSSTEAP courses since 2006

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ENROLLED AFTER OCTOBER 2006 FROM DPR KOREA				
S.N.	Name	Organization Address	Course Year	Passport No.
Course: Remote Sensing & Geographic Information System (PG)				
1.		Academy of Science, RS & GIS Institute, Sat image processing division, Kwahak1-dong, Unjong District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2008-2009	
2.		State Academy of Sciences, Institute of Geography, Water Resources Division, Kwahak -1 dong, Unjong District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2008-2009	
3.		Senior Researcher Institute of Earth Environmental Information (IEEI), State Academy of Sciences, Kwahak-1 Dong, Unjong District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2014-2015	
4.		Senior Researcher Scientific Research Institute for Municipal Administration (SRIMA), State Academy of Sciences, Gyangbok 1-Dong, Gyangbok Street, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2014-2015	
5.		Senior Researcher Institute of Earth Environmental Information (IEEI), State Academy of Sciences, DPR Korea, Kwahak-1 Dong, Unjong District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2015-2016 *(ongoing)*	
6.		Researcher Research Institute, National Aerospace Development Administration, Central District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2015-2016 *(ongoing)*	
Course: Satellite Meteorology & Global Climate (PG)				
7.		Central Meteorological Institute State Hydrometeorological Administration (SHMA), Oesong-dong, Central District Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2010-2011	

8.		Institute of RS & Geoinformatics State Academy of Sciences Kwahak 1-dong, Unjong District Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2010-2011
Course: Satellite Communications (PG)			
9.		Senior Researcher The State Academy of Science, DPR Korea Kinmaul1-dang, Moranbong District Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2009-2010
10.		Head of Laboratory of Space Communication The State Academy of Science, DPR Korea Kinmaul1-dang, Moranbong District Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2009-2010
Course: Space & Atmospheric Sciences (PG)			
11.		The State Academy of Sciences, DPR Korea Institute of Remote Sensing & Geo-Geoinformatics (IRGS) Gwang Myong Dong, Unjong District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2010-2011
12.		Institute of Physics (IOP) The State Academy of Sciences, DPR Korea, Kwahak – 1 Dong, Unjong District Pyongyang, DPR Korea	2010-2011

Source: The Panel.

Annex 19 : CSSTEAP cancellation regarding four DPRK nationals



Annexure -E

Contact details of 4 participants from DPR Korea (two each from SATCOM and GNSS courses of year 2015), whose admission has been cancelled.

1. (SATCOM course)
Senior Researcher
Institute of Earth Environmental Informatics (IEEI)
State Academy of Sciences,
Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Phone: +850-02-18111 Ext: 381 8544
Fax: +85023182100/4410
Email: arirangip@star-co.net.kp

2. (SATCOM course)
Institute of Earth Environmental Informatics (IEEI)
State Academy of Sciences,
Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Phone: (O) +85-02-18111 Ext : 8050
Fax: 00850-02-3814585
Email: Nada.Dprk@Star-Co.Net.Kp

3. (GNSS course)
Researcher
National Aerospace Development Administration
Central District, Pyongyang
Phone: +00850-2-18111 Ext : 381 8544
Email: Nada.Dprk@Star-Co.Net.Kp
Fax: +00850-2-3814585

4. (GNSS course)
State Academy of Science, Unjong District,
Pyongyang DPR of Korea
(O): +85-02-18111
Ext: 381- 8544
Email: Arirangip@Star-Co.Net.Kp
Fax: +00850-2-381-2100/4410

Source: The Panel.

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Annex 20

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 21 : Extract of the SAS syllabus

	• Ionosonde • HF and VHF Radars • Coherent and Incoherent Scatter Radars (HF, VHF and MST) • Radio Beacon Techniques • Global Positioning System (GPS)
1.3.3 Optical Techniques	• Photomultipliers Tubes • Image Intensifiers • Lasers • Semiconductor Photonic Devices • Photo diodes • Avalanche diodes • Laser diodes • CCD & CMOS imaging detectors • Imagers Interference Filters and Etalons • Fabry Perot Interferometer • Filter Photometers • Lidar,Aerosols, Trace Gases and Ozone measuring devices
1.3.4 Airglow	• Airglow • Oxygen green and red line emission • Nightglow • Dayglow • Twilight Glow • Applications of Airglow Measurements for Ionospheric Dynamics
SAS.104 Space Instrumentation	
1.4.1 Launch Vehicles, Satellites and their Orbits	• Principles of Rocketry • Rocket Motors • Solid and Liquid Fuel Rockets • Sounding Rockets • Cryogenic engines • Multistage Rockets • Satellite Launch Vehicles • Basics of Satellite orbits • Kepler's Laws • Sub-satellite Point • Orbital Parameters • Sun-synchronous and geosynchronous Orbits • Low-Earth Orbits
1.4.2 Attitude Control, Power and Thermal systems of Spacecrafts	• Attitude Sensors • Sun Sensors • Star Sensors • Earth Sensors • Magnetic Aspect Sensors • Accuracy • Spin Stabilization and Gyros • Control of Flight-path • Close-loop Guidance, Spacecraft Power System • Solar Cells and Panels

	• Primary and Secondary Batteries • Special Power Sources • Radioactive Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) , Spacecraft thermal control techniques
1.4.3 Selection of Materials for Space – borne payloads	• Behavior of Materials in Space (Temperature, Pressure and Radiation) • Outgassing • Corona Discharge • Coating and Coating-compounds • Radiation Damage • Mounting of Subsystems • Structural and Mass Limitations • Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) • Honeycomb Structures • Effects of Vibrations and Shocks on Spacecraft Structures • Spacecraft Thermal Environments • Thermal Paints and Surface Finish
1.4.4 Reliability, Tests and Qualification of Payloads for Space Experiments	• Fabrication of Electronics • Subassemblies • Electromagnetic Compatibility • Checkout, Reliability Considerations and derating • Test and Evaluation • Thermovac tests • Vibration and shock tests
1.4.5 Telemetry, Tracking, Command (TTC) and Data Handling System	• Telemetry System • Signal Conditioner, Onboard Data Recorder, Telecommand • Encoder • Decoder • Pulse and Data Commands • RF Systems • Receivers, Transmitters and Antenna • Ground Segments • Real-time and Off-line • Tracking
1.4.6 in Situ Techniques on Space Platforms	• Langmuir Probe • Electric Field Probe • Ion Drift Meter • Retarding Potential Analyzers • Mass Spectrometers and Magnetometers • Satellite based temperature measurement • Satellite Drag for Neutral Densities
SAS.105 Space Exploration	
1.5.1 Atmospheres of other Planets and Satellites	• Inner and outer planets • Structure and Composition of atmospheres planets (e.g. Jupiter, Mars, Venus and Saturn) • their important Satellites
1.5.2 Ionospheres of	• Ionospheres and magnetospheres of solar planets

Source: The Panel.

Annex 22 : Extract of the GNSS syllabus

6.8 Receiver Output	• 1pps signal • NMEA • RINEX
7.0 GNSS/INS Integrated Navigation	

7.1 Inertial Navigation Systems	• Inertial Sensors
	  - Accelerometer
	  - Gyroscopes
	• Inertial Measurement Units
	• Inertial Navigation
	  - Inertial-Frame Navigation Equations
	  - Earth-Frame Navigation Equations
	  - Local-Navigation-Frame Equations
	  - Navigation equation Precession
	  - Initialization and Alignment
	  - INS Error Propagation
	• Platform INS
	• Horizontal-Plane Inertial Navigation
	• Integration GNSS and INS data using Kalman Filter

8.0 GNSS Applications	
8.1 GNSS Navigation	• Professional and personal • GIS/mapping • Surveying • Natural Hazards management • Earth science • Natural resources • Infrastructure • Heavy Equipment navigation • Navigation for Bicyclers • Hikers, Climbers, Pedestrians • Space Flight navigation
8.2 Navigation and Communication	• Automobile Navigation • Aircraft Navigation • Maritime Navigation • Tracking • Time Related Applications
8.3 Communication, Navigation and Surveillance	• Geodesy • Location-Based Services • Precision Agriculture • Natural resources management • Disaster warning and emergency response • Aviation • Maritime • Land transportation

Source: The Panel.

Annex 23 : Extract of the SATCOM syllabus

1.4 Digital Signal Processing	• Discrete Time Signals and Systems • Sampling of Continuous Time Signals • Z-Transform • Discrete Fourier Transform • Computation of Discrete Fourier Transform • Structure for Discrete Time Systems • Filter Design Techniques • Wavelet Transforms • Signal Compression • Examples of DSP based subsystems for Satellite Communications
1.5 Modulation, Multiplexing and Multiple Access	• Analog and Digital Modulation and Demodulation Techniques (AM/ FM/ PM/ M-PSK/ MSK/ Hybrid) • Transmission Impairments • Source Coding of Video & Audio signals • Channel coding • Multiplexing /De-multiplexing • Spread Spectrum Techniques • Multiple Access Techniques
1.6 Seminar	**Topics on societal applications based on Satellite Communications**
Module-II	
2.1 Earth Station Technology	• Satellite Communications Earth Station – An Overview • Technology of Earth Station Sub-Systems • Earth Station Design Considerations • Earth Station Standards • Checkout of Earth Station • Operations & Maintenance of Fixed and Transportable Earth Station • Fabriostion Techniques
2.2 Broadcasting using Satellite Communication	• Analog & Digital Broadcasting Systems & Standards • Satellite TV and Access Systems • Internet Protocol (IP) over Satellite • Selected Applications • Satellite News Gathering (SNG) for Radio and TV • Radio Networking • Digital Audio Broadcasting • TV Studio and its Operations/ Outdoor Broadcasting Van • Video Conferencing via Satellite • Multimedia & IP TV • Video On-Demand

Source: The Panel.

Annex 24 : Satellite Control Center location in Pyongyang



Source: Google Earth.

Annex 25 : NADA as the focal point on the registration of space objects

조 선 민 주 주 의 인 민 공 화 국
상 설 대 표 부
Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

No: Date: 26 February 2015

The Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the United Nations (Vienna) presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in accordance with article II of the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 3235, annex), has the honour to inform him that the DPRK has established a national registry of objects launched into outer space.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 62/101, entitled "Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects", the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also wishes to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of a national focal point on the registration of space objects. The national focal point on the registration of space objects is the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK. The contact details are:

National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK

E-mail: nada.dprk@star-co.net.kp

Fax: 00850 23814585

Address: Central district, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

The Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.

Secretary-General of the United Nations
c/o United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

Beckmanngasse 10-12 , A-1140 Vienna, Austria
Tel: (+431) 894 2313 Fax: 894 3174 Email : vi.dprk@chello.at

Source: The Panel.

Annex 26 : The DPRK and the Registration Convention

In 2009, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ratified the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ("Outer Space Treaty") and acceded to the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space ("Registration Convention") (see figure below). This notification follows the registration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's space object "Kwangmyongsong 3-2" launched into Earth orbit on 12 December 2012 and registered under the Convention on 24 January 2013 (see ST/SG/SER/E/662), and considered as a purely "technical procedure" in a letter of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council (see S/2013/108).

Figure: Document showing the Registration Convention entered into force for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 10 March 2009



(XXIV.1)

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE: UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE: UNATIONS NEWYORK

Reference: C.N.154.2009.TREATIES-1 (Depositary Notification)

CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE
NEW YORK, 12 NOVEMBER 1974

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ACCESSION

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary, communicates the following:

The above action was effected on 10 March 2009.

The Convention entered into force for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 10 March 2009 in accordance with its article VIII(4) which reads as follows:

"For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession."

10 March 2009

Source: The Panel.

Annex 27 : NADA bylaw

국가우주개발국
National Aerospace Development Administration
Email: nada.dprk@star-co.net.kp Fax: 0085023814585 Tel: 00850218111(8050) Address: Central District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

Bylaw of the
National Aerospace Development Administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

1. Name and establishment
   1) Official name of the space development leading organ of the DPRK is the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK.

   2) NADA of the DPRK was established pursuant to the 7th session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly in April 2013.

2. General Provisions
   1) NADA of the DPRK is the governmental central leading organization that administers all the space exploration and activities of the DPRK for peaceful purposes of accelerating economic construction and bettering people's living by making a great advancement in the space science and technology.

   2) NADA of the DPRK carries out its tasks for realization of the national space development policy of the national space development policy in conformity to the "Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Space Exploration", observing the constitution of the DPRK.

   3) NADA of the DPRK has its own official seal and emblem.

3. Structure
   1) NADA of the DPRK belongs to the cabinet of the DPRK.

   2) NADA of the DPRK has its sub-departments including Planning Dep, Scientific Research & Development directive Dep, Manufacturing & Coordination directive Dep, International Affairs Dep, Financial Dep, etc…

   3) NADA of the DPRK has the following affiliated organs

      - Space Science Academy
      - Space Production Complex
      - Satellite Control Center

   4) The head of NADA of the DPRK is the Administrator (Minister Level)

4. Primary task

1) NADA of the DPRK draws the comprehensive plans for space exploration and space activities, gets them approved by the Supreme People's Assembly through the Cabinet of the DPRK, and provides unified guidance to their implementation.

2) NADA of the DPRK monitors and controls everything concerned with space exploration and space activities within the national boundary and establishes the necessary order.

3) NADA of the DPRK guides the production, assembly and launch of all space equipment and their launch vehicles.

4) NADA of the DPRK processes and disseminates the data received from space equipment.

5) NADA of the DPRK ensures the safety of space activities.

6) NADA of the DPRK authenticates the space exploration technology.

7) NADA of the DPRK activates the cooperation and exchange with international space organizations and other foreign space organizations.

5. Obligations and Rights

1) Obligations

- NADA of the DPRK is obliged to bear the responsibilities for execution of the national space development policy to the state.
- NADA of the DPRK is obliged to supervise and control all the space activities for successes achieved from them to be put into peaceful purposes including the state interest, economic development and the improvement of people's living as specified in the "Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Space Exploration".
- NADA of the DPRK is obliged to confine the scope of its work within the boundary of the space plans approved by the Supreme People's Assembly and to write a detailed report about the implementation of those plans to the Cabinet every 6 months and to the Supreme People's Assembly every year.

2) Rights

- NADA of the DPRK is authorized to grasp, control, and guide all the space research institutes and production enterprises in the country for their activities to be carried out in keeping with the "Law of the DPRK on the Space Exploration".
- For the successful implementation of the space plans approved by the Supreme People's Assembly, NADA of the DPRK is authorized to organize the necessary organs.
- NADA of the DPRK is authorized to make an agreement with foreign GOs and NGOs as well as IOs, to review and approve the space-related agreements

and contracts between government organizations or groups and other foreign organizations, and to monitor their successful implementation.

6. International cooperation

1) NADA of the DPRK seeks for the active cooperation with space-related IOs and other foreign organizations for peaceful space exploration and space activities upon principles of equality, mutual benefits and complements.

2) NADA of the DPRK respects the international laws and orders in respect to space exploration and space use.

3) NADA of the DPRK encourages the cooperation and exchange between domestic space organizations or groups and foreign space organizations or groups as well as IOs.

4) NADA of the DPRK is willing to be an active member of space related IOs and to render further contributions to international cooperation.

Source: The Panel.

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Annex 28

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 29 : Shipping Documents of cargo

LEADER (H.K) INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITED

ADD : ROOM 1610 NAN FUNG TOWER, 173 DES VOEUX ROAD C., HONG KONG
TEL: 852-21527388
FAX: 852-35719160

PACKING LIST

No. : [redacted]
Date: AUG. 16, 2010

Notify Party KOREA KUMRYONG TRADING CORP.
Consignee MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
ALEPPO STREET-BUILDING NO.14/B, DAMASCUS, SYRIA

Shipped per [redacted] From DALIAN, CHINA to LATTAKIA, SYRIA
Sailing on or about AUG.25,2010 B/L No. [redacted]
Payment T/T Contract No. [redacted]

MARK & NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	Q'TY	N/W	G/W	MEASUREMENT
[redacted]			KGS	KGS	CBM
TOTAL:	88 CASES		40,093KGS	41,799KGS	155.4721CBM

SAY TOTAL EIGHTY EIGHT CASES ONLY.

- END -

For and on behalf of
LEADER (HONG KONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADING LIMITED
領達(香港)國際貿易有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

Source: The Panel.

B. Bill of lading



Source: The Panel

C. Information on Handasieh and Syronics from EU Council Regulation No 36/2012

25.	Syronics – Syrian Arab Co. for Electronic Industries	Kaboon Street, P.O. Box 5966, Damascus Tel.-No.: +963-11-5111352 Fax: +963-11-5110117	Front company for the acquisition of sensitive equipment by the CERS.	1.12.2011
26.	Handasieh – Organization for Engineering Industries	P.O. Box 5966, Abou Bakr Al-Seddeq St., Damascus and P.O. Box 2849 Al-Moutanabi Street, Damascus and P.O. Box 21120 Baramkeh, Damascus Tel.: 963112121816 – 963112121834 – 963112214650 – 963112212743 – 963115110117	Front company for the acquisition of sensitive equipment by the CERS.	1.12.2011

Source: Official Journal of the European Union.

Annex 30 : List of items found on the cargo

Items number as on packing list	Nature of items as declared on packing list
WHKR-14-1-2/6	Blower Fan
WHKR-14-1-5/6	Blower Fan
WHKR-16-22-1/2	Standing Furnace
WHKR-12-13-2/2	Electric control ark
WHKR-12-5-2/2	Electric control ark
WHKR-12-8-2/4	Electric control ark
WHKR-12-8-4/4	Electric control ark
WHKR-13-11-1/4	Vapour drier
WHKR-13-11-2/4	Electric control ark
WHKR-13-11-4/4	Electric control ark
WHKR-14-1-1/6	Hardening machine
WHKR-14-1-3/6	Electric control ark
WHKR-14-1-4/6	Hardening machine
WHKR-14-1-6/6	Electric control ark
WHKR-18-2-2/2	Centrifugal dewatering machine
WHKR-33-43-1/1	Glass cutter
WHKR-34-10-2/5	Hydrogen refiner
WHKR-34-20-1/5	Hydrogen refiner
WHKR-34-27-3/8	Nitrogen gas cylinders
WHKR-34-27-4/8	Nitrogen gas cylinders
WHKR-34-27-7/8	PE pipe
WHKR-34-27-8/8	PE pipe
WHKR-34-31-1/2	Accessories for vibration test stand
WHKR-34-41-1/1	Quartz tube cutter
WHKR-34-70-1/2	Sanblast machine
WHKR-5-16/2-1/1	Rectifier
WHKR-5-26-1/2	Ball crasher
WHKR-5-26-2/2	Ball crasher
WHKR-5-27-1/2	Grade Sifter
WHKR-5-27-2/2	Grade Sifter
WHKR-5-39-1/1	Anode active mat. Screen
WHKR-5-41-1/1	Electrolyte screen
WHKR-17-23-1/2	Crank press
WHKR-17-23-2/2	Crank press
WHKR-17-5/1-1/1	Crank press
WHKR-17-6-1/1	Crank press
WHKR-21-2/30-12-33-30-1/1	Painting film impact tester
WHKR-21-2/30-12-33-30-1/1	Sound pressure gauge
WHKR-21-2/30-12-33-30-1/1	Illiminometer
WHKR-21-5-1/1	Resin bending tester with QC-01
WHKR-21-6-1/1	Elastic tester withg QC-A02
WHKR-21-8-1/1	Rubber sample machine
WHKR-5-28-1/1	Crank press

WHKR-R-5-1/1	Shock/Bump tester
WHKR-12-13-1/2	Drier
WHKR-12-8-1/4	Heating furnace
WHKR-12-8-3/4	Heating furnace
WHKR-13-11-3/4	Vapour drier
WHKR-13-14-1/2	Mixer
WHKR-13-14-2/2	Mixer
WHKR-16-22-2/2	Electric control ark
WHKR-17-16-1/1	Spring tester
WHKR-18-2-1/2	Centrifugal dewatering machine
WHKR-18-29-1/1	Vacuum dewatering machine
WHKR-21-3-1/1	Painting film bending tester
WHKR-25-35-1/1	Winding number counter
WHKR-30-31-1/1	Resin film butting device
WHKR-30-32-1/2	Phaser
WHKR-30-32-2/2	Phaser
WHKR-33-13-1/1	Supersonic washer
WHKR-33-67/34-13-2/2	Accessories for high vacuum meter
WHKR-33-67-1/2	High vacuum meter
WHKR-34-10-4/5	PE pipe
WHKR-34-10-4/5	PE pipe
WHKR-34-13-1/2	High vacuum meter
WHKR-34-20-1/5	Working microscope
WHKR-34-20-2/5	Working microscope
WHKR-34-20-3/5	Working microscope
WHKR-34-20-4/5	Working microscope
WHKR-34-20-5/5	Working microscope
WHKR-34-24-1/1	Semiconductor display
WHKR-34-25-1/1	Auto collimator
WHKR-34-27-1/8	High purity nitrogen refiner
WHKR-34-27-2/8	High purity nitrogen refiner
WHKR-34-27-5/8	Accessories for high purity nitrogen refiner
WHKR-34-31-2/2	Vibration test stand
WHKR-34-54-1/2	Mirror face grinding machine
WHKR-34-54-2/2	Accessories for mirror-face grinding machine
WHKR-34-59-1/1	Digital multimeter
WHKR-34-60-1/1	Liquid nitrogen vessel
WHKR-34-66-1/1	Konimeter (Hand held particle counter)
WHKR-34-67-1/1	High Temp. Tester
WHKR-34-68-1/1	Low temp tester
WHKR-34-69-1/6	Liquid nitrogen dewar flask
WHKR-34-69-2/6	Liquid nitrogen dewar flask
WHKR-34-69-3/6	Liquid nitrogen dewar flask
WHKR-34-69-4/6	Liquid nitrogen dewar flask
WHKR-34-69-5/6	Liquid nitrogen dewar flask
WHKR-34-69-6/6	Liquid nitrigen dewar flask
WHKR-34-70-2/2	Air compressor for sandblast machine
WHKR-34-74-1/1	Conduction judgement
WHKR-34-76-1/2	IC solder
WHKR-34-76-2/2	IC solder and accessories for IC solder
WHKR-1-20-1/2	Surface plate
WHKR-1-20-2/2	Surface plate
WHKR-12-5-1/2	Roller
WHKR-16-23-1/1	Surface plate
WHKR-33-24-1/1	Centrifugal coating machine (vacuum drier)
WHKR-34-10-3/5	Stainless pipe
WHKR-34-27-6/8	Stainless pipe

Source: The Panel.

Annex 31 : Example of advertisement of similar products for military application

A. Inclinable Precision Press

Product Details

Primary Competitive Advantages:
- Brand-name Parts
- Quality Approvals
- Country of Origin
- Reputation
- Distributorships Offered
- Guarantee/Warranty
- Product Features
- Electronic Link
- International Approvals
- Product Performance
- Experienced Staff
- Military Specifications
- Prompt Delivery

Source: http://www.globalsources.com/si/AS/Anhui-Huyin/6008848128990/pdtl/High-Speed-Precision-Power-Presses-25-Ton-High-Performance-Crankshaft-Punch-Press/1071098543.htm.

B. Bump Test Machine



meet the specifications of military, industrial, and individual test requirements.

Source: http://www.spectraldynamics.com/index.php/products/shakers/shock-test-machines

C. Liquid Nitrogen Dewar flask

"Self-pressurized liquid nitrogen tank produces pressure by evaporation of little liquid nitrogen so that liquid nitrogen will exhaust itself and complement other containers. It finds its application in the transportation and storage of liquid medium (liquid nitrogen, liquid oxygen and liquid argon) and cold source of other refrigeration equipments. It is now widely used in tool and die industry, animal husbandry, medicien, semi-conductor, food, cryogenic chemical industry, aerospace, military and other industries and areas. (Dewar flask, dewars, dewar, etc)"

Source: http://www.tradekorea.com/product/detail/P439798/pressure-building-liquid-nitrogen-tank.html.

Annex 32 : Documents on Dalian Union and Dandong Yongxinghe

Invoice referring to Dalian Union as purchaser



[redacted]

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

Bill To:
大連益聯國際貿易有限公司
大連市中山區長江路123號1034室
連絡人：蔡光 先生 TEL：+86-411-82557218

Ship To:
大連天寶國際物流有限公司
DALIAN SUN MOON STAR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS CO., LTD.
大連市中山區魯迅路72號1801室
聯繫人:梁烨
電 話：+86-411-39805230
傳 真：+86-411-82701207

DATE: JUNE 18, 2010
NO.: 06180110
SHIPMENT: BY SEA
[redacted]
TO: DALIAN
[redacted]
ETD: JUNE 20, 2010
ETA: JUNE 25, 2010
S/O: 8495

ITEM & DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QTY	UNIT PRICE (USD) CIF DALIAN	AMOUNT (USD)
[redacted]	1 SET	US$26,000.00	US$26,000.00
TOTAL :			US$26,000.00

SAY TOTAL US DOLLARS TWENTY SIX THOUSAND ONLY.

SHIPPING MARKS:
[redacted]

Informal English translation
Bill To:
Dalian Union International Trading Co., Ltd.
[address abbreviated]
Contact Person: Cai Guang
Tel: +86-411-82557218

Source: The Panel.

Contract dated 26 March 2010 referring to Dandong Yongxinghe as purchaser of the item found in the container

设备订货合同

合同编号：20100326

签约地点：[redacted]

需方单位（买方）：丹东市永兴和贸易有限公司

签约时间： 2010 年 03 月 26 日

供方单位（卖方）：[redacted]

序号	产品名称	型号规格	单位	数量	单价（元）	总价（元）
1	[redacted]	[redacted]	台	2.6	8700	8700
2	[redacted]	[redacted]	台	1.3	5800	5800
合计（大写）：人民币 壹万肆仟伍佰元整（末税）						14500

Source: The Panel.

Purchaser: Dandong Yongxinghe Trade Co., Ltd.

Annex 33 : Sales record of foreign companies

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

Bill To:
大連益聯國際貿易有限公司
大連市中山區長江路123號1034室
連絡人: 蔡光 先生 TEL: +86-411-82557218
Ship To:
大連天寶國際物流有限公司
DALIAN SUN MOON STAR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS CO., LTD.
大連市中山區魯迅路72號1801室
聯繫人:梁烨
電 話:+86-411-39805230
傳 真:+86-411-82701207

DATE: JUNE 18, 2010
NO.: 06180110
SHIPMENT: BY SEA
FROM:KEELUNG,TAIWAN
TO: DALIAN
PER SS: WAN HAI 235 V-N170
ETD: JUNE 20, 2010
ETA: JUNE 25, 2010
S/O: 8495

ITEM & DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QTY	UNIT PRICE (USD) CIF DALIAN	AMOUNT (USD)
彈跳沖擊試驗機 BUMPING TESTER DP-201-60 MADE IN TAIWAN	1 SET	US$26,000.00	US$26,000.00

产品名称：尘埃粒子计数器
货号：[redacted]
产品品牌：[redacted]

日期			
年/月/日	客户	机身编码	出货数量
2006年6月8日	[redacted]	E7200	1
2006年7月3日		E5345	1
2006年7月22日		E6649	1
2006年8月10日		E6650	1
2006年8月10日		E7201	1
2006年10月8日		F5978	1
2006年10月15日		F7284	1
2006年11月22日		F5975	1
2007年1月25日		F7286	1
2007年3月7日		F5976	1
2007年3月27日		F5974	1
2007年4月18日			1
2007年5月15日		F7240	1
2007年7月13日		F8045	1
2007年9月5日		G6199	1
2007年10月17日		G6198	1
2007年12月14日		G6200	1
2008年3月6日			1
2008年5月20日		H2521	1
2008年6月21日		H5459	1
2008年7月17日		H2522	1
2008年10月31日		H5462	1
2009年6月4日		H5458	1
2009年10月16日		H5461	1
2009年12月30日		H5460	1
2010年4月16日		K12153	1
2010年4月1日	大连益联国际	K10056	1

Source: The Panel.

Annex 34 : Financial transaction records referring to Sunny

Source: The Panel.

Annex 35 : Information on the companies and individuals connected to the 2010 Shipment

The Panel has identified multiple companies and individuals connected to the 2010 shipment. These connections are visualized in the chart below.



Further details of each company and individual are summarized below.

1. Dalian Union International Trading Co., Ltd.
Address: Room 1606, No. 96 Changjiang Street, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China.
Individuals involved:

- Mr. Cai Guang (shareholder)
- Mr. Piao Chengyuan (or Park Seung Won) (Chinese: 朴承源) (director and shareholder)

2. Dandong Yongxinghe Trading Co., Ltd.
Address: Room 1101 Jiadi Square, Economic Development Zone, Dandong, China
Individuals involved:

- Mr. Piao Chengyuan (or Park Seung Won) (Chinese: 朴承源) (director and shareholder)
- Mr. Ma Gewen (Chinese: 马革文) (shareholder)
- Mr. Li Hong Ri (Chinese: 李紅日) (shareholder)
- Mr. Chen De Bin (Chinese: 陈德斌) (shareholder)

3. Dandong Union Trading Co., Ltd.
Address: Room 1106, No 64 Binjiangzhong Street, Dandong City, China
Individuals involved:

- Mr. Ma Gewen (Chinese: 马革文) (director and shareholder)
- Mr. Piao Chengyuan (or Park Seung Won) (Chinese: 朴承源) (shareholder)

4. Sunny (HONG KONG) Int'l Development Co. Ltd.
Address: LM 873, Room B, 14/F, WaH Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong
Individual involved:
- Mr. Li Hong Ri (Chinese: 李紅日) (director and shareholder)

Additional information about each individual

1. Mr. Cai Guang (Chinese: 蔡光)
- Chinese identification number: 220104197201271530
- Date of birth: 27 January 1972
- Description:
  - Leader's director and shareholder
  - Dalian Union's shareholder

2. Mr. Piao Chengyuan (Chinese: 朴承源)
- Possible aliases: Mr. Park [or Pak] Seung [or Sung] Won
- Chinese national identification number: 120104196601256358
- Date of birth: 25 January 1966
- Description:
  - Dalian Union's director and shareholder
  - Dandong Yongxinghe's shareholder
  - Longjin (Hong Kong) International Trading Co., Ltd.'s director
  - Dandong Union Trading Co., Ltd. (in Chinese: 丹东市永联贸易有限公司) (hereafter "Dandong Union")'s shareholder

3. Mr. Ma Gewen (Chinese: 马革文)
- Chinese national identification number: 22010219660804333X
- Date of birth: 4 August 1966
- Description:
  - Dandong Yongxinghe's shareholder
  - Dandong Union's shareholder
  - Hong Kong Max Moon Trading Co., Ltd.'s director

4. Mr. Li Hongri (Chinese: 李红日)
- Also known as Li Hong Ri
- Chinese national identification number: 22242619640705113X
- Date of birth: 5 July 1964
- Description:
  - Dandong Yongxinghe's shareholder
  - Sunny's director
  - Dandong Yongtong Trading Co., Ltd.'s director
  - Xiuhua International Company Limited's director and shareholder

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Annex 36

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Annex 44

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Annex 45 : Rungrado General Trading Corporation

Name: Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation
Alternate name(s): Rungrado Trading Corporation, Korea Rungrado Jonsong Trading Company
Address: Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Telephone: 850-2-18111-3818022
Fax: 850-2-3814507
Email address: rrd@co.chesin.com

Extract of Foreign Trade of the DPRK (Issue number 3, 2006):



Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation

The Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation is a state-run corporation with eight subsidiaries and 20-odd export bases.

Since its establishment in the early 1970s, the corporation has carried on trade dealings with its partners in over 50 countries.

It has branches and agencies in China, Russia, Singapore and other countries.

The corporation handles the export of marine products and sea foods.

It engages in such businesses as cargo transportation and chartering with its own cargo vessels.

Its major exports comprise clothes, knitwear, plaited articles, processed foodstuffs, agricultural produce, jewelry and nonferrous metals, and its imports include animal fodder, tropical fruits, plastics and raw materials for chemical products.

Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Tel: 850-2-18111-3818022
Fax: 850-2-3814507

Annex 46 : Paju and Baengneyong-do Island UAVs flight path



Source: The Panel.

Annex 47 : Morrowind website advertising the UV10

12/29/2015 UV10无人机资源_曼风影像科技

·航拍微电影无人定制服务...
·登山航拍图片案例...
·平面航拍地产宣传图片...
·航拍婚庆小视频及多剪辑片...
·个人写真航拍MV服务...
·上海企业宣传片业务及费用、报价...

其他要提问 点击咨询

摄像稳定平台:

该无人机可安装两轴稳定摄像平台，提供可见光和红外稳定控制能力。

应急指挥车:

该无人机可配合用户的应急指挥车工作，相关无人机操控设备可集成在用户的应急指挥车内，便于应急指挥首长与无人机操作人员沟通，无人机发现相关情况后也可以在第一时间通报首长。

视频实时传输:

该无人机使用COFDM模式视频实时传输系统，该系统实时性好，传输距离远，保密性高，抗干扰能力强，在目前国际同类型民用无人机中，该技术处于领先水平。

总部视频传输:

无人机通过COFDM视频传输系统将视频传回无人机地面控制站以后，无人机地面站可将视频通过目前国内政务部门普遍采用的“动中通”等系统将视频转发回后方指挥人员处。

摄像机和照相机平台复用性和模块化设计:

同一架无人机既可搭载摄像机进行视频监控作业，又可搭载照相机进行航摄作业，两种任务载荷在接口上完全兼容，用户可很方便的互换。

UV10巡视无人机航拍中

UV10无人机降落降落

http://www.5ihangpai.com/news/ga/201.html 2/4

Source: www.5ihangpai.com.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 48

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 49 : Microfly website

Homepage of Microfly's website

Page of Microfly's website featuring the UV10

Source: http://www.microfly.com.cn.

Annex 50 : Engine manufacturer invoice to Maikaifei



Invoice / Faktura 201300054

Issue date / Datum vystavení: 25.9.2013
Due for payment / Datum splatnosti: 25.9.2013
VAT date / Datum uskutečnění zdanitelného plnění: 25.9.2013

Customer / Odběratel:

MAIKAIFEI Engineering & Technology (HongKong) Co,. Ltd
Room 517, Qing Run Building,
Ching Ho Estate, Sheung Shui
999077 New Territories,Hongkong
China

Description / Obchodní údaje:

The exporter of the products covered by this document declares that where otherwise cleary indicated these products are of Czech Republic preferential origin. CIP

Description / Popis	PLU / Číslo	Quantity / Množství	Unit Price / Cena za jedn.	Price Excl. VAT / Cena bez DPH		VAT / DPH	Price Total / Cena celkem
ROTO 35FS		6 Pc.	530,00	3 180,00	0%	0,00	3 180,00
ROTO 50V2		2 Pc.	545,00	1 090,00	0%	0,00	1 090,00
ROTO 70V2		1 Pc.	555,00	555,00	0%	0,00	555,00
Propeller drill jig		1 Pc.	12,00	12,00	0%	0,00	12,00
SSA for ROTO 50		2 Pc.	58,00	116,00	0%	0,00	116,00
SSA for ROTO 70		1 Pc.	58,00	58,00	0%	0,00	58,00
Air intake		5 Pc.	9,00	45,00	0%	0,00	45,00
Svíčka NGK M10x1 - spark plug		6 Pc.	5,00	30,00	0%	0,00	30,00
Gasket		10 Pc.	0,20	2,00	0%	0,00	2,00
Transport		1	416,00	416,00	0%	0,00	416,00
Zapalování 35FS - ignition		4 Pc.	64,00	256,00	0%	0,00	256,00
Total / Celkem:		**39 mu/mj**		***5 760,00***		***0,00***	***5 760,00***

Rate/Sazba	Basis (CZK) / Základ (Kč)	VAT (CZK) / DPH (Kč)
0%	0,00	0,00

Rounded / Zaokrouhlení:	0,00	USD
Total / Celkem:	**5 760,00**	**USD**
Paid advancement / Uhrazená záloha:	5 338,00	USD
To be paid / Zbývá uhradit:	422,00	USD

Issued by / Vystavil:
software Altus VARIO - www.vario.cz

Page / Strana 1 of / z 1

Source: The Panel.

Annex 51 : Hong Kong company registration result for Maikaifei and correspondence from the Hong Kong Housing Authority

網上查冊中心 CR
ICRIS
Cyber Search Centre

Search ▾ | Product ▾ | Shopping ▾ | About e-Search ▾ | Logout

Welcome! System Clock: 11-SEP-2015 01:56:23 GMT +0800

Company Name Search

Attention:
Pursuant to section 100(2)(c) of the Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622, Laws of Hong Kong), registration of a company name which is identical to a name on the list of old company names at name_list_section 100(2)(c).pdf will NOT be approved except with the consent of the Registrar of Companies. To complete the search on company names, please also check the intended name against the list.

Your Search: LEFT PARTIAL match with 'MAIKAIFEI ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY (HONGKONG) CO., LTD.'

Search Language: English

NO MATCHING RECORD FOUND FOR THE SEARCH INFORMATION INPUT!

Source: The Hong Kong company registration records database available from http://icris.cr.gov.hk/csci.

香港房屋委員會
Hong Kong Housing Authority

本函檔號：HD3-4/DTMO(NTH1)/1-65/3
Our Ref

來函檔號：S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.116
Your Ref

圖文傳真： 2677 9009
Fax

電話：2677 2002
Tel

日期：
Date : 5 June 2015

Mr. Hugh Griffiths,
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established,
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874(2009),
United Nations Security Council,
Headquarter-Siege, New York NY 10017
(email: furukawa@un.org)

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Provision of Information
on MAIKAIFEI Engineering & Technology (HongKong) Co., Ltd.

I refer to your facsimile dated 22nd May, 2015 requesting provision of information regarding the address of 'Room 517, Qing Run Building, Ching Ho Estate, Sheung Shui, New Territories, Hong Kong, China'. Since there is no such 'Qing Run Building', I regret to inform you that the aforesaid address is not a valid address in Ching Ho Estate.

(YEUNG Chi-keung)
Acting Housing Manager
District Tenancy Management Office (North1)
Housing Department

HD6(I) 房屋署北區租約事務管理處(一) 新界上水天平邨天治樓地下107號
Housing Department North District Tenancy Management Office (1) No. 107, G/F., Tin Yee House, Tin Ping Estate, Sheung Shui, N.T.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 52 : Aliases used by Mr. E Chengwen

Information obtained by the Panel shows that Mr. E Chengwen has used aliases when dealing with foreign companies.

The document in figure 1 proves that an individual named "Mr. Chengwen Able" brokered the deal of 10 autopilots MP2028 for RedChina Geosystems. The email address used by this individual for this communication is albert_aircam@yahoo.com.cn. The document in figure 2 shows that the same email address was used by Mr. E Chengwen from Maikaifei. According to information obtained by the Panel, Mr. E Chengwen also used the following aliases: "Chengwen", "Cheng Wen", "E Cheng Wen", "Able E", "Able Chengwen" and "Able Cheng Wen".

Figure 1: "Chengwen Able" using the email address albert_aircam@yahoo.com.cn

Source: The Panel.

Figure 2: E Chengwen using the email address albert_aircam@yahoo.com.cn

Chengwen Able (albert_aircam@yahoo.com.cn)
ROTO 35FS
[redacted]

[redacted]

Here is my company information:
Company Name:
MAIKAIFEI Engineering & Technology (HongKong) Co,. Ltd
Address:
Room 517, Qing Run Building, Ching Ho Estate, Sheung Shui,
New Territories,Hongkong, China
Phone: +86 0150-1008-2330
ZipCode 999077

When shipping me the engines please use the follow recipients who is a secretary see after receive products.
Recipients:Fu Hong.
Recipients Phone Number: 00852 67022125

Best Regards'
E Chengwen
Chief Engineer
Phone: +86 0138-1068-1469

Source: The Panel.

Annex 53 : Microfly registration

Source: available from http://qyxy.baic.gov.cn/beijing.

Annex 54 : Import agency authorization agreement between the consignee and Microfly

Import agency authorization agreement

Agreement number: 2013HXI/070US/C

Client (Party A): Beijing Maikaifei Engineering & Technology Co., Ltd.	Agent (Party B):
Address: First level, No. 12, Shuangyang St., Yizhuang, Beijing Post code: 100176	
Telephone: 13910182382 Fax:	
Bank information: Account-holding bank: Account name: Account number:	

[Partial impression of Beijing Maikaifei Engineering & Technology Co., Ltd. company seal]

For details of product names and valuations, see the Foreign-Trade Contract signed between Party B and [redacted] (Contract number: 2013HXI/110SP/C, hereafter abbreviated as "the Contract")

Engine manufacturer

I. Duties and responsibilities:

A. Party A:

1. Obligations to Party B voluntarily assumed by Party A under the Contract include but are not limited to the following. Party A assumes responsibility for providing Party B with signed and verified inventories (in bilingual Chinese and English text) of goods contracted for import; guarantees compliance with the Customs Law of the People's Republic of China and relevant national laws; and also guarantees that the product names, quantities and prices of the goods actually imported match those [appearing in] the Contract as well as in the declared invoices and packing lists, and assumes full responsibility in case of failure to do so.
2. If needed, [Party A shall] provide Party B and relevant Government organs (including the relevant Customs and State organs etc.) with the necessary product descriptions and technical explanations of goods imported, and accept final Customs identification [of same].
3. Party A assumes responsibility for paying contract payments and taxes (first calculated according to that day's exchange rate, with refund for overpayment or supplemental payment for deficiency in the actual payment) into Party B's account, within two days prior to outgoing payment by Party B, and also exclusively for handling bank fees. Consignee service charges (1.5 per cent of the contract payment, with RMB ¥1000 to be assessed for amounts below RMB ¥1000) to be paid [by Party B] before Party B settles the account with Party A. If payment is not made on time, [Party A] assumes all responsibility for all liabilities and losses sustained by Party B as a result; Party B retains ownership rights to the goods [involved] and may also take control of them.
4. If trans-shipment is required after Party A takes delivery of the goods, it may make its own arrangements [in that regard], and may also authorize Party B to do so; Party A assumes responsibility for associated shipping-insurance costs and service fees. Party A is [also] responsible for international shipping insurance.

5. In the event of a foreign claim, Party A must provide Party B with the claim-compensation demand in writing and the commodity inspection certificate within the claim or warranty period specified by the Contract; furthermore it must come to an agreement with Party B on a claim-payment programme and assume responsibility for the associated costs, or be deemed to have abandoned its right to the claim.
6. After Party B has concluded and signed the Contract, Party A assumes responsibility for pecuniary losses resulting from amendment to or cancellation of the Contract by Party A.
7. Party A assumes responsibility for all costs incurred by reason of delayed declaration, delayed tax payment, or warehousing on its part.
8. Party A concludes and signs after-sales services agreements on its own. Party B assumes no responsibility for after-sales service.
9. Party A is responsible for confirming product specifications, examination of goods and domestic shipping. If a third party raises any objection to a product, Party A is solely responsible.
10. Party B is authorized by Party A to act as import agent on its behalf. Party A is solely responsible for dealing with all conflicts with third parties arising as a result of actions by Party A, or by reason of the goods themselves; Party B is entirely exempt from any liability.

[*Partial impression of Beijing Maikaifei Engineering & Technology Co., Ltd. company seal*]

B. Party B:

1. Following conclusion and signing of the Agreement, Party B assumes responsibility for concluding and signing import foreign-trade contracts with foreign parties, as well as foreign payments, within the scope authorized by Party A.
2. If Party A requests changes in the content of the Contract during the period of validity of the Contract, Party B shall make written representations to foreign parties based on the written changes in the Contract provided by Party A; responsibility for any fees arising from such negotiations must be assumed by Party A. If Party A requests termination of the Contract, Party A must assume responsibility for all consequent pecuniary losses, including pecuniary claims made by foreign merchants arising from non-performance of the Contract.
3. Party B shall assist Party A in handling Customs clearance for goods imported.
4. Following the completion of foreign-payment and customs-declaration procedures, Party B shall submit the clearing list to Party A, and shall draw up the value-added tax invoice.
   The clearing list should include agency fees and other costs necessitated by the import process: for example, import-permit application fees, Customs clearance fees, commodity inspection fees, shipping costs (including international and domestic shipping costs), along with all taxes arising in connection with performance of the Contract.
5. When foreign claims are presented (within the claim-compensation or warranty periods), they shall be handled in accordance with the claim-compensation demand in writing and the commodity inspection certificate provided by Party A

along with the foreign-claims procedure mutually agreed by the two parties; [associated] fees are the responsibility of Party A.

6. If repairs are required after the goods have been imported, Party B shall undertake the necessary repairs in cooperation with Party A; [associated] fees are the responsibility of Party A.

II. Other agreed matters:

1. After each imported-goods manifest submitted by Party A has been signed by both Parties, each Party shall retain a copy, which shall be considered an integral part of this Agreement. Each transaction automatically takes effect upon the signing of the imported-goods manifest by Parties A and B and the receipt by Party B of pre-payment for goods by Party A, and automatically concludes upon receipt by Party A of goods and the value-added tax invoice.
2. Following the signing of this Agreement, both Parties shall complete and execute all operations [stipulated in] the Agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Any conflict arising in the course of execution of this Agreement shall be settled by the two Parties through negotiation; if agreement cannot be reached through negotiation, either party may apply to the Economic Contract Arbitration Board of the Beijing Municipal Administration Bureau for Industry and Commerce for arbitration, or bring suit in Beijing court.
3. Force majeure: In the event of such force majeure events recognized by Parties A and B as war, fire, flood, cyclone or earthquake, the Party encountering force majeure shall promptly notify the other Party, and provide the corresponding evidence. Upon receipt of [such] notification, the Parties shall actively discuss ways to deal with the situation. If the Party encountering force majeure is unable to fulfil [its obligations under] the Contract, it shall not be held liable for breach of contract.
4. If either party wishes to terminate this Agreement, it must obtain the prior agreement of the other Party; if agreement has not been reached through mutual consultation, the Party terminating this Agreement shall assume responsibility for all pecuniary losses entailed for the other Party.
5. Matters not covered under this Agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the Provisional Regulations on the Foreign Trade Agency System, promulgated on 29 August 1991 by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.
6. The present Agreement is made in duplicate, with a copy to be retained by each party, and each copy having equivalent legal validity.

Party A: Beijing Maikaifei Engineering & Technology Co., Ltd.
[Beijing Maikaifei Engineering & Technology Co., Ltd. company seal]
Representative: Xue Qiang
Date: 4 September 2013
Place: Beijing

Party B:
Place: Beijing

[Officially Translated from Chinese by the United Nations]

Source: The Panel.

Annex 55 : Payment confirmation associated to the sale of the engine


境 外 汇 款 申 请 书
APPLICATION FOR FUNDS TRANSFERS (OVERSEAS)

致 中国银行
TO: BANK OF CHINA

汇款申请书编号:10V0229913000104

日期 Date 2013/06/25

电汇 T/T □ 票汇 D/D □ 信汇 M/T

发电等级 Priority □ 普通 Normal □ 加急 Urgent

申报号码 BOP Reporting No.

20 银行业务编号 Bank Transac Ref No.

32A 汇款币种及金额 Currency & Interbank Settlement Amount USD5,358.00

金额大写 Amount in Words 美元伍仟叁佰伍拾捌元整

其中 Amount in FX 0.00

购汇金额 Amount of Purchase USD5,358.00

其他金额 Amount of Others 0.00

50a 汇款人名称及地址 Remitter's Name & Address
XUE QIANG
DONG CHENG HE PING LI ZHONG JIE JIA 12 HAO BJ CHINA

□ 对公 组织机构代码 User Code □ 结私 个人身份证件号码 Individual ID NO. 51250119820130001O

□ 中国境内个人 Resident Individual □ 中国境内非个人 Non-Resident Individual

59/59a 收款银行之代理行名称及地址 Correspondent of Beneficiary's Bank Name & Address

57a 收款人开户银行名称及地址 Beneficiary's Bank Name & Address 收款人开户银行名称及代理行账号 Bene's Bank A/C No. XOMBCZPPXXX

59a 收款人名称及地址 Beneficiary's Name & Address

70 汇款附言 Remittance Information 只限140个字位 Not Exceeding 140 Characters

71A □ 汇款 OUR □ 收款 BEN □ 共同 SHA

收款人所在国家(地区)名称及代码 Resident Country/Region Name & Code 其他

请选择: □ 预付货款 Advance Payment □ 货到付款 Payment Against Delivery □ 退款 Refund □ 其他 Others

交易编码 BOP Transac Code

相应币种及金额 Currency & Amount USD5,358.

交易附言 Transac. Remark 货款

本笔款项是否为预先货物项下付款 □ 是 □ 否 合同号 发票号

外汇局批件号/备案表号/业务编号

银行专用栏 For Bank Use Only

申请人签章 Applicant's Signature 客户提示:你不给陌生人汇款 转账,理财荐股,造成损失

银行签章 Bank's Signature

结汇汇率 Rate 6[illegible].342

等值人民币 RMB Equivalent [illegible]44

手续费 Commission [illegible]

电报费 Cable Charges 2[illegible].

合计 Total Charges [illegible]44

支付费用方式 In Payment of the Remittance □ 现钞 by Cash □ 支票 by Check □ 账户 from Account

本人已核实该笔汇款全部信息,确认无误。

Name of Applicant

电话 Phone No. 13910162382

经办人签字 Authorized Person

日期 Date

核印 Sig. Vfy.

复核 Checker

录入 Maker

请阅读银行背面所载各项条款及填报说明 Please read the conditions and instructions overleaf before filling in this application

Source: The Panel.

Annex 56 : Autopilot manufacturer invoice to RedChina Geosystems



Invoice

Date	Page
Jul 11, 2011	1

Invoice Number
IN006001

Sold To:
Red China Geosystems (Beijing) Co., Ltd.
RM1013 Richen Intl Center
No. 13 NongZhanGuan NanLu
Beijing 100125
China
Attn: Able Weng
Tel: +86 01 65858516

Ship To:

Auth #
VC1377
813A Form ID
20110700003
Export Permit #
1105061026

Order No.	Order Date	Customer No.	Salesperson	PO Number	Ship Via	Terms
ORD004275	Mar 10, 2011	RED-CHINA	RB		UPS	PREPAY

Item Number/Description	Qty. Ord.	Qty. Shp.	Qty. B/O	UOM	Unit Price	Discount	Extended Price
A-2028 - MP2028g flight control computer **Serial Numbers** 04-02136 04-02139 04-02140 04-02141 04-02142 04-02155 04-02170 04-02171 04-02175 04-02176 This item includes autopilot circuit board 1Hz GPS reciever only.	10	10	0	ea	4,000.00	0.00	40,000.00
SHIP Shipping & Handling Does not include any duty brokerage fees or taxes, associated with the importation of these goods. These expenses are the customers responsibility.					0.00	0.00	855.40

04-02176 is the serial number of the autopilot retrieved in the Baengneyong-do Island UAV

Tax summary: GSTU	0.00	
Subtotal		40,855.40
Total sales tax		0.00
Total amount		40,855.40
Less payment		40,855.40
Less pmt. disc		0.00
Amount due:USD		0.00

Source: The Panel.

Annex 57 : End-use statement provided by RedChina Geosystems

RCG
RedChina Geosystems Group

END USE STATEMENT

Name and address of exporter:

[redacted]

Name and address of intermediate consignees:

[redacted]

Name and address of end-user:

RedChina Geosystems (Beijing) Co.,Ltd
Address: RM1013 Richen Int'l Center, No.13 NongZhanGuan NanLu,
City: Beijing
Province / State: Beijing
Postal code / Zip code: 100125
Country: China
Website: www.ilidar.com
Ph: +86 10 65858516
Fax: +86-01-65858516-801
E-mail: info@ilidar.com
Contact Name: Chen SiCong
Title:Manager

中测瑞格测量技术（北京）有限公司
RedChina Geosystems(Beijing) Co., Ltd.
北京市朝阳区农展馆南路 13 号瑞辰国际中心 1013 室 邮编 100125
电话：+86 10 65858516 传真：+86 10 65858526
网址：www.iLiDAR.com

RCG
RedChina Geosystems Group

Description of goods:

Part No.	Description	Quantity	Unit Value	Total Value
MP1028g	Flight control computer (autopilot)	10	$2,250 CAD	$ 22,500 CAD
MP2028g	Flight control computer (autopilot)	20	$8,250 CAD	$165,000 CAD
MP2128g	Flight control computer (autopilot)	10	$9,000 CAD	$ 90,000 CAD
MP2128heli	Flight control computer (autopilot) – enabled for helicopter control	10	$12,000 CAD	$ 120,000 CAD
MP2128-LRC	Integrated Flight control computer (autopilot)	6	$12,600 CAD	$ 75,600 CAD
MP2128heli-LRC	Integrated Flight control computer (autopilot) – enabled for helicopter control	6	$15,600 CAD	$ 93,600 CAD
Updates	Software updates downloaded from the MicroPilot customer support website for MicroPilot autopilots, Horizon ground control software, Xtender system developer kit and trueHWIL simulator..	60	$75 CAD	$ 4,500 CAD
Repair/Replacement	MP 1028, MP 2028, MP 2128, MP 2128 Heli to cover warranty or non-warranty repair work or replacement	15	$3,750 CAD	$ 56,250 CAD
Repair/Replacement Integrated autopilots	MP 2128 LRC, MP 2128 Heli LRC to cover warranty or non-warranty repair work or replacement	15	$5,400 CAD	$ 81,000 CAD
MP2128 3x	Triple Redundancy Flight control computer (autopilot) – enabled for helicopter control	2	$37,500 CAD	$ 75,000 CAD

Specific end-use of goods:

RedChina Geosystems (Beijing) Co.,Ltd is a private holding company, which is not affiliated with any other companies.

This project, in which autopilots are used, is for the civil mapping.

As an in-development country, China has huge requirement of updating its map for city construction. RedChina Geosystems (Beijing) Co.,Ltd will develop a mapping UAV, on which autopilots are used, to rapidly get remote sensing pictures for the mapping department. autopilot has reliable performance of control UAV. RedChina Geosystems (Beijing) Co.,Ltd will choose it to control its mapping UAV. The UAV is a electrical powered hand launch UAV. The UAV will equip a card camera as its payload to capture remote sensing pictures. The UAV can be operated by mapping professional operators. The UAV can fly upto 45 minutes to capture about 10 square

中测瑞格测量技术（北京）有限公司
RedChina Geosystems(Beijing) Co., Ltd.
北京市朝阳区农展馆南路 13 号瑞辰国际中心 1013 室 邮编 100125
电话：+86 10 65858516 传真：+86 10 65858526
网址：www.iLiDAR.com



RCG
RedChina Geosystems Group

kilometer pictures.

The specification of the UAV is as follow:

Weight: 2.5Kg

Dimension: Length:950mm, Wing span:1600mm, Height:445mm

Endurance: 45 minutes

Range: 10km

Flight Altitude: 300 to 1000 meter AGL

Cruise Speed: 35 to 60 km/h

Payload: RICOH Caplio GX100 digital card camera

Propulsion: Electrical

Certifications and assurances:

- The above goods will be used only by the end-user.
- The above goods will not be diverted to another destination, trans-shipped or re-exported.
- The above goods will only be re-exported by the end user in accordance with the export control laws of the country of final destination.
- The products will not be used to develop or produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or their delivery systems.

Authorized Signature:

Signature

Chen Sicong
Print Name

Manager
Title / Position

January 25, 2011
Date

中测瑞格测量技术（北京）有限公司
RedChina Geosystems(Beijing) Co., Ltd.
北京市朝阳区农展馆南路 13 号瑞辰国际中心 1013 室 邮编 100125
电话：+86 10 65858516 传真：+86 10 65858526
网址：www.iLiDAR.com

Source: The Panel.

Annex 58 : Extract of Microfly correspondence to the Panel

Microfly email to the Panel of 20 November 2015

Sir,
[…]
Mr. E Chengwen is a staff member of our company, who uses Able as his English name when corresponding electronically with foreign enterprises (including Micropilot Co.).
Owing to the differences between Chinese and Western given names, foreign enterprises may have addressed him as Able E, Able Chengwen or Able Cheng Wen when contacting him; out of courtesy, Mr. E Chengwen did not try to correct this.
[…]
When RedChina Geosystems was planning to purchase flight controllers, our company recommended Micropilot Co. to them, and helped them to contact Micropilot Co. Thereafter, our company and Mr. E Chengwen had no further dealings [with RedChina Geosystems], including but not limited to signing end-user statements, making payments for goods, or taking delivery of consignments.
[…]
In our previous letter to you, we noted our suspicion that someone was manufacturing knockoff UV10 drones; we have subsequently seen, via the news media, negative stories of [the existence of] drones closely resembling the UV10 in appearance outside of China. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we have decided to halt the production and sale of UV10 drones, and have accordingly removed all related material from our website.
[…]
UV10 drones have not been sold to customers with military backgrounds.

To protect our customers' privacy, please pardon our inability directly to provide you with the names and contact information of customers to whom we have sold UV10 drones since June 2009. We are, nonetheless, willing to cooperate actively with you in your work. We therefore advise you to contact the relevant departmental authorities in our country's Government; our company will be very happy to provide those authorities with the information you seek, based on the relevant Chinese laws and in accordance with the requirements of the relevant departmental authorities of the Chinese Government.
At present, we can [only] provide you with the information that RedChina Geosystems was [indeed] one of the purchasers of UV10 drones.

Naturally, the reason we mention RedChina Geosystems here is only because it was already mentioned in your letter to us; this represents no determination or conjecture on our part.

Beijing Maikaifei Engineering and Technology Co., Ltd.

Microfly email to the Panel of 08 January 2016

Hello,
We believe the following information may be helpful to you.

When RedChina Geosystems purchased UV10 umanned aerial vehicles [drones] from us, they made a special request that the drone flight controllers should be supplied by them.
In the light of that request, when we produced UV10 drones paid for by RedChina Geosystems, we installed the MP2028g flight-controller circuit boards supplied to us by RedChina Geosystems in all those drones.
We did not record the serial numbers of those controllers.
Beijing Microfly Engineering Technology Co., Ltd.

Official translation from the United Nations

Source: The Panel.

Annex 59 : Trancomm website advertising the SKY-09P

Source: www.trancomm.com.cn.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 60

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 61 : Case summary, documentation on HK Conie and Mr. Wang

In February 2015, the United Kingdom informed the Panel about an attempt by emocratic People's Republic of Korea to procure "sanctioned goods" from its manufacturer. The UK stated that the goods included miniaturized optical equipment which could be used in UAVs.

The Panel undertook a visit to the United Kingdom. The manufacturer noted that its main clients for these particular items were major world militaries and defence manufacturers. According to the company's information and through its investigation into the characteristics of the items, the Panel assessed that they are mainly used in military applications.

According to the United Kingdom customs, the company which attempted to procure the equipment did so through intermediaries based on the mainland and registered in Hong Kong before onward shipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.[11] The report described the company as "a military logistics company specialising in the procurement of parts for unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles."

Dewen Wang was listed as the Director of HK Conie Technology, originally registered in the British Virgin Islands before registering in Hong Kong in 2014. In correspondence relating to the procurement attempt, Mr. Wang stated that his company had an "R&D office" in China. (see figures 1,2,3,4)

Correspondence records and the export licence application showed that the person who attempted to procure the goods was Richard Wang (Dewen Wang in Chinese). The Panel identified HK Conie's trade relationship with a company called Korean Pioneer Technology Company Ltd, which reportedly used the alias Korea 21 Trading Company (annex 50, 51).

Documentation shows that HK Conie invited representatives of Korean Pioneer to China shortly after submission of the export licence. This further demonstrates the linkage between HK Conie and Pioneer. HK Conie also maintained an account in a Pyongyang bank which a made a large transfer order in United States dollars to a Democratic People's Republic of Korea national (annex 51).

In response to the Panel's inquiry, an unsigned letter was sent from the HK Conie email address on 2 January 2016. The author denied involvement in any attempt to procure military grade sensors, but acknowledged that he had a business relationship with (Korea) 21 company (annex 51). The Panel concludes this was an attempted procurement of military grade goods for use in a UAV program by individuals acting on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for their UAV program and is continuing its investigation.

[11] The optical equipment procured by Member States for use in technologically advanced UAVs for military purposes.

Figure1: National Identity Card of Dewen Wang / Richard Wang

Source: The Panel.

Figure 2: Email from Richard Wang on behalf of HK Conie to UK Manufacturer



From: RICHARD WANG [mailto:conie888@126.com]
Sent: 10 February 2014 09:59
To: [redacted]
Subject: INQUIRY [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]
Nice to have a new contact with u.
Here send u my inquiry for [redacted] module.
1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]

Would u pls send me quotation and detail datasheet?
Thanks and best regards.
Wang, HK CONIE technology Co.,Ltd.

Source: The Panel.

Figure 3: Email from Richard Wang to UK manufacturer regarding HK Conie

Dear Mr. [redacted]
Nice to get news from u.
My company name is HK CONIE TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD ,currently have no website and R&D office located in shenyang,Liaonig China.
My company is IT development and marketing company many years involved in developing industry automation products including day and night plant field surveillance and accident preventing.
We have many customers and once we complete new [redacted] system the further market is rather good
Recently we have come to know that [redacted] is a big revolution for day/night surveillance with lower cost than IR theraml imaging and also u are professional maker of [redacted]
I hope u can surpport in good touch further for em ccd products and closely co operate each other.

And can u let me know [redacted] is for surveillance or sientific?
What information do u need for future promotion?

Lookoing forward yr early reply.
Thanks.

At 2014-02-14 01:53:34, [redacted] wrote:

Hello Richard,

I hear you have been calling the office for me.
I have been traveling and have inconsistent access to the internet, so I apologies for the delay.

Can you give me some feedback on your company, Web address etc.
Also who and where is this end user, and what are their application.

These items are export controlled and we will need to make an export licence application, its best to know if it's worth the effort before we get to involved.

Export licence takes Approx. 6 weeks to get once we file all the details.

Source: The Panel.

Figure 4: Hong Kong Company registry records of Mr. Dewen Wang's companies

網上查冊中心 CR
ICRIS
Cyber Search Centre

Search▾ | Product▾ | Shopping▾ | About e-Search▾ | Logout

Welcome! System Clock: 26-JUN-2015 23:03:53 GMT +0800

Directors Index Search (Director-based)

Name in English: WANG,DEWEN
Name in Chinese: 王德文
HKID No.: -
Overseas Passport No.: ID210106196007260930
Passport Issuing Country: 中國 CHINA

No.	CR No.	Company Name	Company Type	Remarks	Director Particulars
1	2204548	HK CONIE TECHNOLOGY CO., LIMITED 香港科尼科技有限公司	Private company limited by shares	-	
2	1941470	HONGKONG YONGLI TECHNOLOGY LIMITED 香港永利科技有限公司	Private company limited by shares	-	

Displaying: Record 1 to 2 of 2 records.
Jump to page 1 of1

Please select the Order Type:

Order certified report HK$152.00 plus additional handling charges for different delivery mode(*)

(*) Additional handling charges for different delivery mode will be shown when check out shopping cart.

Back

Back to top
ICRIS_Ver_1_0_5_Build_08_01

ICRIS CSC Companies Registry, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Source: The Hong Kong companies registry database.

Annex 62 : UK Export Licence End User Undertaking (EUU) and Annex



EUU FORM

SECTION 1 – PARTIES

(a) Name of UK Licensee [1]	(b) Licensee's Reference [2]
???	???
(c) Name of Consignee [3]	**(d) Consignee's Address**
HK CONIE TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD	ROOM NO.309,CHUANGFU CENTER , 6TH STREET OF XINGSHUN AVENUE ,SHENYANG CITY,LIAONING,CHINA
(e) Name of End-User [4] [redacted]	**(f) End-User's Address** [redacted] ZHEJIANG,CHINA
(g) Is the End user the armed forces or internal security forces of the country ? [5] Please DELETE an option: Yes / No	**(h) Specific location where goods will be used or based (if known) and if different from (f) [6]** [redacted] FACTORY BUILDINGS AREA (SAME WITH THE ABOVE CLARIFIED ADD)

SECTION 2 – GOODS

(a) Quantity of Goods	(b) Description of the Goods [7] (for consumable goods, include length of time supplies are expected to last)
1 SET	CURRENTLY NEED ANALOG OUTPUT [redacted] FOR SAMPLE STAGE. IF THE TEST USE IS OK CONIE WILL LAST PURCHASING MORE QTY FOR FURTHER MANY YEARS ACCORDING TO THE CUSTOMER'S DEMAND

(If you need to use continuation sheets, each must carry the licensee's reference, and must be signed and dated by the same person who signs this form.)

EUU (Revised July 2012) Page 4 of 6 Designed by Export Control Organisation, BIS

SECTION 3 – END-USE OF THE GOODS

Please set out the specific purposes for which the goods are to be used by the end-user (including, if applicable, where the goods are being incorporated) [8]

INSTALLED ON PTZ
AND USED FOR [redacted] FACTORY AREA DAY/NIGHT SECURITY DETECTION

SECTION 4 – END-USER UNDERTAKING [9] (to be completed by the person or body named in 1(e) and 1(f))

We – the person or body named at 1(e) and 1(f) – certify that we are the end-user of the goods described in Section 2, which are to be supplied by the licensee named in 1(a). We further certify that we shall use the goods for the purposes described in Section 3; that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons; that they will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo where that act would be in breach of the terms of that embargo [10]; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity [i] or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle [ii].

Sign Here [redacted] **Date** 2014.3.9
(Signature of official of End User)

Print Name [redacted]
(Add Name of Signatory in Capitals)

Role VICE PRESIDENT OF [redacted]
(Add Job Title of Signatory in Capitals)

Note

i Includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, testing or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or components of subsystems of such a device.

ii Includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material, or separate storage installation, where there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the relevant facility or installation, existing or future, when it contains any source or special fissionable material; or of any heavy water production plant where there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom; or where any such obligation is not met.

EUU (Revised July 2012) Page 5 of 6 Designed by Export Control Organisation, BIS

Source: The Panel.

Annex 63 : Extracts of Panel correspondence with Mr. Wang/HK Conie

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.699

YOUR REFERENCE

22 October 2015

Dear Mr. Wang,

I am writing to you with regard to efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in relation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel wishes to follow up on its correspondence of 1 October 2015 (reference number S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.488; see annex 1). The Panel noted your comments relating to a falsified end user statement submitted by your company as part of an export licence application pertaining to a [redacted] used in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (see annex 2) and sought clarification concerning your business relationships with DPRK nationals and individuals. The Panel requested a reply within two weeks of the date of this letter, but has yet to receive a response. The Panel kindly reiterates its request for this information as it intends to utilize this information for its upcoming Final Report and for its records.

In addition to our previous inquiries, the Panel has gathered additional information and requests your assistance in obtaining the following information:

- The names, dates of birth and passport numbers of **all** DPRK nationals working for the **Korean Pioneer Technology Company** that HK Conie Technology has engaged with.

- The names, dates of birth, passport numbers and contact details of all individuals working for or on behalf of the **Korea 21 Trading Company** for whom HK Conie Technology has procured and supplied goods to.

Mr. Dewen Wang
HK Conie Technology Co. Ltd.
Email: Conie888@126.com
Fax: ++86 2425483266

To: **Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)**

Attn: **Mr. Hugh Griffiths, Coordinator**

Date: **2015-9-8**

Dear Mr.Hugh Griffths.

How are you?

It is really a great honor to have an opportunity of mailing with you, the important coordinator of UN security council, and think it thankful that you have sent me a letter of kindly requesting some explanations and co operation.

Just today, I have got the chance to see your letter and reply.

Sorry for my late reply and for the fact that I disturbed and made u doubtful thought it is unintentional or not.

I have received and read a letter from the Panel and were much knocked on reading that I tried to submit the UK license for purchasing the product with military application.

And also feel pity that because of my unsatisfactory documentation brought some confusions and doubts.

Frankly speaking it was the first time for me to fill in that kind of EUU document and still I have no clear idea of such documentation.

I only followed the seller's requirement for further promotion of the business.

At that time, maybe beginning of last year ,as a lucrative business project ,I was planning to develop a new model of [redacted] which can be widely used for day and night time security surveillance because I found that the market of security [redacted] was still very big and the demand of the customers is growing by the time goes by.

The most important point was to develop high specs of the product with the lowest budget.

While consulting which kind of [redacted] suitable and how can we develop the product at the lowest cost, one of my partner engineers who mainly deals automation products recommended me to use individual camera module, lens and rotating stand and compose the product ,not whole set of [redacted] a in order to save budget. His advice was reasonable.

For many days I searched several kinds of [redacted] from several makers for outdoor surveillance and among them there was also UK's [redacted] series which looked rather reliable for outdoor use and support many kinds of signal output.

But there was no mentioning of military use and said only it is for scientific and surveillance.

And since then I began to contact with the several makers, sent and received the lists of prices and questions.

But to my failure the price from UK company was very expensive than what we expected and the method of use was also complicated.

Other specifications such as resolutions was also lower when comparing with the recently introduced [redacted] which are available on normal

Chinese electronic market.

The budget of using this module together with separately purchasing [redacted] pan/tilt was much higher than normal [redacted]

After receiving the final quotations from different makers of [redacted], I made a decision not to use that expensive one.

I really forgot all of this thing since so long time has past.

When I received the form of EUU from the maker I really and only tried to fill in actual contents, but it was really first time for me to make such kind of document and that is why ,I think, it could not satisfy the requirement of relative organ.

Of course when I prepare the document I used a big company's name and details which was on their website thinking that small company can not be the end user, and it was really incorrect .It was really my fault and I deeply apologies to [redacted] and you. I was only seeking my favor and commercial interest.

But after I compared the price with other normal cheaper [redacted] and received the mail from the seller that my documentation did not passed, I just gave up and did not contact the seller anymore.

I felt the price was expensive and the purchasing course was rather complicated.

When considering it is only 1Megapixel resolution of [redacted]ra sensor module, I could not understand why this product is so expensive and why should the customer pass such documentation.

And how could I think this smal[redacted] can be used for military purpose by the countries under UN sanctions?

At the time of the first contact ,if the seller taught me such conception I surely

would not have tried to receive the price and prepare document.

I only thought using big company's name can easily prevail the seller and easily can receive price and promote the business course.

All were only my faults and there was no other bad attempt or purpose and u know actual selling and buying were not executed.

I would be grateful if u read this letter with deep understanding and hope you have clear and full image of all the circumstances at that time.

I really do not wish harm the others and disturb you any more because of my mistake and what I now can guarantee is that really there was not such serious and bad attempt as you supposed.

And at the same time I assure you and the panel that from now on I will be careful not to make you doubtful, confused and violate the resolution of the security council while doing my business. This time is really a good experience to me.

Hope your good health and the success of your responsible business.

Again beg your deep understanding to this small businessman. Thanks.

Yours sincerely. Wang.

Annex 64 : Reply

Dear sir.

I send u this letter in response to yr letter which requested me to mention the following points on which your doubt is focused.

. You knowingly falsified documentation relating to the purchase of UK manufactured strategic goods, namely [redacted] used in sophisticated military UAVs.

In the first letter of the beginning of Sept, I have already explained in detail about the purpose and the course of my falsification of end user statement and expressed my apologizing mind.

It was only for searching cheap [redacted] which can be conveniently used for second development of [redacted] not for procurement of military use product as u doubt.

. You attempted to procure the UAV [redacted] on behalf of a DPRK military logistics technology company that specialises in the acquisition of components for UAV and unmanned undersea vehicles.

No,I didn't attempt to buy [redacted]r military use on be half of any 3rd party.

I really don't know what kind of [redacted] military use. Your comment is literally an exaggeration.

No one asked me to supply such product and, as u insist ,when considering that 1[redacted] military one what about the other 2[redacted] which is widely available in normal Chinese electronic markets? Are they all for military use?

I again assure u that my inquiry has no relation with military conception and no one pushed me to do it. Why do not u believe my words and where is the evidence that D.P.R.K company or individual asked me to supply [redacted] accordingly attempted to get it? How can u define that the fact is so.

And u can see that [redacted]odule was not actually procured by me or others related and for nearly two years since then I completely forgot about it.

Of course I respect your sensitive opinion ,but really it has no relation with what u are worrying about.

Would u pls kindly tell me which is military one or not, so that I can note in my future businesses?

.Your company HK Conie employs or is represented by DPRK nationals or individuals who act on behalf of your company.

I have never employed individuals from D.P.R.K and only had some normal businesses with them for about two years and there were not so many contracts and transactions of big volume of amount.

And clearly speaking, I know entities from D.P.R.K sometimes used the name of CONIE when they ask the price and terms of the products in contact with our Chinese suppliers.

I think it is natural psychology for foreign traders in China to get direct prices for their maximum interest because normally the foreigners are quoted higher than native.

And only using my company name when mailing or calling under my allowance can not be regarded commercial rudeness.

. Your company HK Conie has a bank account in the DPRK.

U know many Chinese companies have their bank accounts in D.P.R.K because direct remittance is impossible.

For convenient reception of the payment from D.P.R.K companies I had ever opened account in D.P.R.K ,but two or three years ago that bank was closed and also my account was automatically deleted .And since the time I had no big business with them ,at the moment I have no account in D.P.R.K.

. Your company HK Conie has established trade and business relationships with DPRK entities named Korean Pioneer Technology Company and Korea 21 Trading Company.

As I mentioned in the last mail I don't deny that in the past I had some business relationship with 21 company and not sure whether the name was changed to Pioneer or Pioneer is an other company's name. And I also gave u the names of two entities from that company and the items of the products I did with them.

U know many Chinese companies are making business with many D.P.R.K companies for commercial purpose through normal opened route under the inspection of the customs office.

My relationship with them was only normal trading for normal products such as construction materials, computer accessories ,electronic products and other civil commodities and there was no violation against my country's law or UN resolutions. Invoice, packing lists and payment records, as I told u before because since then over five years has past, are not kept in my hand at the moment.

For many years I have no business contact with them and will not in future.

I am sure that company is normal money making one which is selling popular commodities in their homeland market, not specialized one for obtaining military components. Though somebody asked me to provide such products how can I do it and survive till now with the history of crimes? And how can such dangerous goods pass the inspection of our customs office?

And concerning with your words going that you will publish my relationship with D.P.R.K company I would like to ask u if I had built an illegal trade relationship or smuggled with them before or violated our law and UN resolutions? Upon violation against our law, if there was, I will take full responsibility as one of the citizens of PRC. Could u please tell me what is wrong with me while doing business with them?

Dear sir.

Unless there is a clear evidence of attempt or actual delivery for military purpose by D.P.R.K company or related Chinese company I kindly recommend u to give deep consideration to this case .

I think if u conclude my company and those two D.P.R.K companies and individuals attempted to procure the product for military purpose it is really unreasonable and their normal reputation will polluted by the "truth" of no clear evidence.

What is clear is that everyone has a rights to be fairly commented as much as what he actually did.

I really wish you to give fair and scientific solution to this case with high responsibility on be half of divine UN which represents the interests and the rights of all the states and individuals of the world. Your correct and fair conclusion will highly be appreciated.

If any other questions please contact me, and any of your requests will cooperatively be replied.

Best regards.

Annex 65 : Green Pine invitation letter

GREEN PINE ASSOCIATION

LETTER OF INVITATION

Date: 19th March 2010

To: Government Garage Center

Att: Col. Woldu G/Yesus

[redacted]

Dear Sir:

We are delighted to issue an official invitation to your delegation headed by Mr. Tzahaye Mokonen Zerom.

We are planning to receive your delegation for 1-week period during April 2010. We hope that your visit would be of great importance in starting substantial co-operation between two sides.

All of your visa will be prepared at Pyongyang Airport.

We will send necessary information for arranging your flight schedule.

Sincerely Yours.

Ri Hak Chol

President/GPA

ADD: RAKRANG NO. 1 RAKRANG DISTRICT PYONGYANG KOREA
TEL: 008502-18111-8327 E-MAIL: PAC@SILIBANK.COM
FAX: 008502-3814685 P.B. NO: 2465

Source: The Panel.

Annex 66 : "Green Pine Association" as an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation

Green Pine Association's name in Korean script provided in the letter (figure 1), "청송련합회사", is the same as and identical to that of the Korean script used for Green Pine Associated Corporation. In addition, Green Pine Association's logo "GPA" is used by Green Pine Associated Corporation. Close up of the company's stamp provided in the letter:



Source: The Panel

Korean script of Green Pine Associated Corporation provided in the 1718 Sanctions List (in Korean)

KPe.010 GREEN PINE ASSOCIATED CORPORATION
A.K.A.: CHO'NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY; CHONGSONG YONHAP; CH'O'NGSONG YO'NHAP; CHOSUN CHAWO'N KAEBAL T'UJA HOESA; JINDALLAE; KU'MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD; NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION; SAEINGP'IL COMPANY

KOREAN: 청송련합회사
(a.k.a. 청송련합무역회사, 정송련합, 조선자원개발투자회사, 진달래, 금해룡회사, 자원개발투자회사, 생필련합)

Annex 67 : Panel Letter to Eritrea (extracts)

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.819

YOUR REFERENCE

7 December 2015

Excellency,

I am writing to you with regard to efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in relation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel wishes to follow up on its previous consultation with the Eritrean Mission to the United Nations in New York concerning its investigation of the reported provision by the DPRK of military support to Eritrea (for ease of reference, see annexes 1-3 which include the previous correspondence). The Panel is grateful for the cooperation received from your Government. In light of the additional information obtained by the Panel, we wish to ask for further assistance from your Government in obtaining information as summarized below.

In its previous correspondence, the Panel noted the following reports related to the DPRK's possible violations of the resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009):

- A May 2011 inspection by an East African Member State of cargo containing machine tools which may have originated from the DPRK reportedly destined for an Eritrean Military-related entity, the **Eritrean Department of Governmental Garages** ("**EDGG**"); and

- The 2010 provision of "military and technical support" to Eritrea by a DPRK entity, **the Green Pine Associated Corporation** ("**Green Pine**"), which was designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee on 2 May 2012 as the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of arms and related materiel, including military boats (see annex 4).

His Excellency
Mr. Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Permanent Representative of Eritrea
to the United Nations

Fax: (212) 687-3138
Email: general@eritrea-unmission.org

In this regard, the Panel obtained additional information concerning these allegations and confirmed that it is consistent with the aforementioned information.

According to the information, **Mr. Hak Chol Ri (Korean: 리 학철)**, the Green Pine's President, sent an official invitation letter dated 19 March 2010 to **Colonel Woldu G/Yesus**, EDGG's chief (see annex 5 for a copy of this letter obtained by the Panel). In this letter, Mr. Ri officially invited an EDGG's delegation to Pyongyang, stating: "*We are planning to receive your delegation for 1-week period during April 2010. We hope that your visit would be of great importance in starting substantial co-operation between two sides.*"

The Panel obtained further information to corroborate the aforementioned letter, which is summarized below:

- The EDGG's delegation visited Pyongyang, DPRK, from 10 to 17 April 2010 (the delegation included the Eritrean nationals Mr. Abraha Ghebresilassie, Mr. Aman Mohammednur, Mr. Russom Mahare, and Mr. Russom Ghebru); and

- A DPRK national named **Mr. Kwang Rim Kim** (Korean: 김 광림) (date of birth 11 July 1978) has been posted in Eritrea since April 2010 as a representative of Green Pine (also known as **Saeing Pi'l Company**).

The Panel notes that in June 2009, the Security Council prohibited any transfer from the DPRK of all arms and related materiel, as well as technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel.[1] The Security Council resolutions require Member States to ensure that all military cooperation with the DPRK complies fully with the measures imposed by the resolutions.[2] Therefore, the Panel wishes to confirm the facts surrounding EDGG's business dealings with Green Pine.

In its efforts to obtain credible and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for the following:

- Information on the cooperation between Green Pine and EDGG, including:
    - Time period as to when the two entities started cooperation, and confirmation as to whether the cooperation was terminated since May 2012 when Green Pine was designated by the 1718 Committee;
    - Explanation as to what activities have been undertaken between the two entities since they started business cooperation (e.g. whether Green Pine supplied spare parts for military boats or related technical services or training);

[1] Paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009)
[2] Implementation Assistance Notice No. 5, paragraph 11

Annex 68 : Eritrea Letter to Panel

12-28-15;04:05PM; ;212 123 4567 # 1/ 1

ቀዋሚ ሚሽን ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ኣብ ውድብ ሕቡራት ሃገራት: ኒዩ ዮርክ

البعثة الدائمة لدولة إريتريا
لدى الامم المتحدة - نيويورك

Permanent Mission of The State of Eritrea
To the United Nations, New York

The Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honor to refer to the letter of the later with reference S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.819 dated 7 December 2015.

In this connection, the Permanent Mission would like to inform the Panel the Expert that Eritrea is not engaging with persons and/or entities in violation to the UN Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and designations of thereof.

The Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations seizes this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 28 December 2015

Panel of Experts established
pursuant to United Nations
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
New York, NY 10017

800 Second Avenue 18th Floor New York, NY 10017 • Tel : (212) 687-3390 • Fax : (212) 687-3138
e-mail : general@eritrea-unmission.org

Source: The Panel

STRICLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 69

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 70 : Munitions Factory of Namibia and Mansudae's construcition projects

A. Excerpts from Namibia's reply to the Panel

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND OFFER TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION OR AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) AND 2094 (2013), RELATING TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

2. **Major Public Construction Projects undertaken by MOP in Namibia**

MOP was involved in the construction of the following State projects:

a) State House;
b) Heroes Acre;
c) Independence Museum; and
d) Military Academy.

MOP is further sub-contracted by August 26 Holding, a 100% government owned company to construct the new Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. The estimation for the construction of the Headquarters was about N$600 million and the project was expected to be completed in 2017/18 Financial Year.

3. **Copies of Official Contracts Submitted by MOP to Government Authorities/Ministries including Tenders**

The detailed information is being sourced from stakeholders.

4. **Response to the reported Munitions Factory under construction in Leopard Valley**

The project started in 2002 and was completed in 2005. August 26 Holdings was the main contract and sub-contracted the MOP Company to construct the factory. The Ammunition Factory in terms of corporate governance is a subsidiary of August 26 Holdings which is a 100% government owned. The main purpose of the Ammunition Factory is to produce Small Arms Ammunitions of 7.62 mm caliber for own Defence Force use and the general markets. The Factory is located in Khomas Region, Windhoek. The Ministry of Defence has no knowledge of the linkage between MOP Company which was sub contracted to construct the Ammunition Factory to KOMID.

The official addresses and contact details of **Ammunition Factory**:

Ndilimani Pytrotechnics Industries (PTY) LTD
P.O. Box 30400
Windhoek

Source : The Panel.

B. Excerpts of Mansudae's company broucher advertising its construction capability of military related facilities and activities at the Leopard Valley



M . O . P

Architectural & Technical Services (NAMIBIA)

Ref
Date

Tel : (061) 271932 E.mail : NMOP@iway.na
Fax : (061) 271873 P.O.B : 81229 OLYMPIA,WHK

Fax Number: 061 271873

E-mail: nmop@iway.na

MANAGING DIRECTOR: Mr. Kim Tong-Chol

AUDITORS: Grand Namibia

BANKERS: First National Bank

INSURERS: Old Mutual

SPECTRUM OF WORK

Architectural and Engineering Designs

Construction

Demolition

Earthmoving

Special Structure (Underground Facilities and bunkers)



M . O . P

Architectural & Technical Services (NAMIBIA)

Ref
Date

Tel : (061) 271932 E.mail : NMOP@iway.na
Fax : (061) 271873 P.O.B : 81229 OLYMPIA,WHK

MAJOR HIGH PROFILE PROJECTS

New State House (Office of President) 2006

Luiperds Valley Research Centre (Ministry of Defense) 2010

Extension of Leopards Valley Phase II (Ministry of Defense) 2010

New Independence Memorial Museum (Ministry of Works and Transport) 2011

Source: The Panel.

Annex 71 : Satellite Imagery showing construction activities at Leopard Valley Base

Satellite imagery of November 2009

Satellite Imagery of June 2013

Satellite Imagery of April 2014

Source: Google Earth.

Annex 72 : Ammunition trade recorded in UN Comtrade database

The Panel has examined accredited international organizations' databases to identify all possible reported "arms and related materiel" transactions to and from the DPRK. These databases maintain transaction records based on reporting by Member States, through the Harmonized System (HS) code. Although the prohibited items do not have the exact corresponding identifiers in the HS code, the Panel utilized chapter 93 of the HS, "Arms and ammunition, parts and accessories thereof", and 8710 "tanks and other armored fighting vehicles", to identify possible arms and related materiel transfer (see the below table). To ensure the accuracy of transaction records, the Panel cross-checked the databases.

The Panel also noted the definition of "small arms and light weapons" adopted by International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) provided by the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) in June 2015. Based on this definition, the Panel examined the transactions of HS code 9301, 9302, 9303 and 9306, which are consistent with the definition.[12] The Panel also confirmed with the WCO that all parts of chapter 93, from 9301 to 9307 cover small arms and light weapons.

HS Code	Description
9301	Military weapons, other than revolvers, pistols and the arms of heading 93.07.
9301.10	Artillery weapons (for example, guns, howitzers and mortars)
9301.20	Rocket launchers; flame-throwers; grenade launchers; torpedo tubes and similar projectors
9302	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.
9303	Other firearms and similar devices which operate by the firing of an explosive charge (for example, sporting shotguns and rifles, muzzle-loading firearms, Very pistols and other devices designed to project only signal flares, pistols and revolvers for firing blank ammunition, captive-bolt humane killers, line-throwing guns).
930310	Muzzle-loading firearms
930320	Other sporting, hunting or target-shooting shotguns, including combination shotgun-rifles
930330	Other sporting, hunting or target-shooting rifles

[12] According to definition adopted by International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) provided by UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) in June 2015, small arm is any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. It includes, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition, but excludes antique small arms and their replicas. And, light weapon is any man-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, which includes, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti- tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 milli-metres, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

9304	Other arms (for example, spring, air or gas guns and pistols, truncheons), excluding those of heading 93.07.
9305	Parts and accessories of articles of headings 93.01 to 93.04.
9306	Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war and parts thereof; cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including shot and cartridge wads.
9307	Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances and similar arms and parts thereof and scabbards and sheaths therefor.
8710	Tanks and other armored fighting vehicle, motorised, and parts of such vehicles.

Through its investigative work, the Panel identified transaction records of items that may be considered to fall within the category of "arms and related materiel" between Member States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The summary of its findings are as follows:

Country	Year	HS Code	Export/Import	Amount (US $)
Antigua and Barbuda	2009	9305	Import	619
Bahrain	2011	8710	Import	517
Chile	2011	9304	Import	156
	2009	9306	Export	54,754
	2010	9306	Export	38,675
China	2012	9304	Export	13,429
		9306	Export	29,717
	2014	9306	Export	50,000
	2009	9306	Import	3,381,264
Colombia	2010			14,040
	2011			22,400
Egypt	2009	9303	Import	917
Fiji	2011	9301	Import	37,570
India	2012	9305	Export	303,706
New Caledonia	2010	9304	Import	4,624
		9305		106
Paraguay	2013	9306	Import	273,781
Qatar	2011	9303	Import	47,000
Saudi Arabia	2007	8710	Import	323,155
	2008	9306	Export	407,997
	2012	9302		21,787
Switzerland		9303		44,632
		9304		40,950
		9305		76,642
Thailand	2008	9306	Import	13,630
	2009			117,207
Zimbabwe	2011	9303	Export	600

The Panel decided to conduct its investigation into the repetitive transactions valued at USD $1000 or more.[13] The Panel's investigation mainly focused on substantial "arms and related materiel" transactions with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 2006, when resolution 1718 (2006) was adopted by Security Council.

The Panel noted that it had previously conducted investigations into two of these cases. Tt sent out eight additional letters to Member States. Three Member States including Fiji, Paraguay, Qatar replied that clerical or printing errors were made by their respective reporting agencies, and provided supporting documents including contracts or customs declarations. They claimed that part of the arms transactions with the Republic of Korea had erroneously been attributed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel confirmed that items listed in the supporting documents were in line with the items mistakenly reported to have been acquired from the country, although all the particulars of the reported items could not be verified independently.

Two Member States, including China, confirmed that they exported the items of the HS code 93 category to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but stated that those items were only for civilian purposes, such as competitions and hunting. One Member State also viewed that sporting and air guns and pistols did not fall into the category of small arms and light weapons. Thailand, Saudi Arabia and New Caledonia have not replied to the Panel's inquiries as yet. Thailand explained in its reply to the Panel that the relevant government agencies were requested to supply further detailed information, but these processes may require long amounts of time and involve personnel who may have since been reassigned. The Panel is waiting for replies from States concerned including Thailand.

[13] Single transactions valued at less than $1000 were consistently found to be antique small arms or their replicas for souvenir, which are excluded from the definition of small arms and light weapons.

Annex 73 : Uganda Letter to Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE
336 EAST 45th STREET
NEWYORK. N.Y 10017
Tel: (212) 949-0110
Fax: (212) 687-4515
E-mail: ugandaunny@us.int

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

OUR REFERENCE **UN/LG/14**
YOUR REFERENCE

December 4, 2015

The Coordinator
Panel of Experts pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
NEWYORK

UGANDA – DPRK COOPERATION IN POLICE AND MILITARY TRAINNING

Reference is made to your letter ref. **S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.769** dated 10 November, 2015 requesting for information regarding cooperation between the DPRK and Uganda in Police and Military training. You also refer to previous communication on the same subject and request for a response within one month, that's to say, before December 10, 2015.

In your letters dated 31st March 2015, 29th May 2015, 24th July 2015, 30th September 2015 and 10th November 2015, it is stated that the training in Kabalye, Butiaba and Wantebo constituted a potential violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1874(2009) which prohibits the DPRK from exporting technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of all arms or related material.

In addition, you also raise the following issues:

i) Whether the training at Kabalye, Butiaba and Wantebo was still ongoing?
ii) What is the type of training and advisory services that have been given or are being given by these individuals?
iii) What are the names, ranks and affiliations of all DPRK nationals responsible for this training?

Uganda's response to the issues raised is as follows:-

1) Uganda's understanding of the overarching objective of the sanctions imposed upon the DPRK is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as outlined in paragraph 8 in particular sections (a), (b), (c) and (e) of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).

2) Following the imposition of further sanctions on the DPRK in its resolution 1874 (2009) the Security Council escalated sanctions in resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph (8) mentioned

above to include "…..all arms and related material as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advise, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture or use of such **arms or material"**, as outlined in paragraph (9) of resolution 1874 (2009).

3) Uganda's understanding of the resolution when read together with paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006), is that the prohibited training and provision of technical advice is only limited to arms and equipment procured from the DPRK. Therefore, Uganda reiterates the earlier position that in promoting mutual cooperation with DPRK, no arms or equipment have been purchased by or supplied to the Uganda Police Force by DPRK.

4) Whether the trainings were still going on at the said training centers. Indeed, the training is ongoing at Wantebo, as in Butiaba. The following trainings have been or are being conducted:

   i) Martial arts training;
   ii) Marine rescue training;
   iii) Paramedical training;
   iv) Construction engineering; and
   v) Security and technical trainings for Uganda Police Special Force, Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Department (CIID), and Forensics.

5) It is also emphasized that the training weapons and materials are property of the training centers not supplied by DPRK.

6) The training courses were designed in accordance with a jointly prepared training plan and syllabus.

7) The information requested for bullet (ii) of the Panel's letter of September 30, 2015 that is to say, "the names of those DPRK individuals" is attached in Annex I.

8) Investigations regarding a DPRK national, one Ryong Kang, reportedly linked to a designated entity, and who is alleged to have travelled to and from Uganda, are still being carried out. When the investigations are concluded, the requested information will be availed.

9) Uganda's understanding is therefore that the cooperation agreement for training of the police, and occasionally extended to the military, does not violate Security Council resolutions on DPRK.

Uganda remains open to engaging with the Panel of Experts and the Security Council Committee on DPRK in case of any areas requiring further clarification.

Richard Nduhuura (Dr.)
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

Annex I

Security Instructors for Field Force Unit (19)

№	Name	Position
1	Pang Yong Bin	Head of Security Team
2	Jon Yong Chan	Shooting Instructor
3	Han Yong Ho	Martial Art Instructor
4	Jang Kyong Il	Operation Tactics
5	Kang Yong Min	Anti-Terror Expert
6	Pak Chon Bok	Shooting Instructor
7	Choe Yong Chol	Operation Tactics
8	Kim Sang Phil	Shooting Instructor
9	Kim Kwang Song	Martial Art
10	Kim Jin Hyok	Community Policing
11	Kang Yong Chol	Martial Art
12	Kim Sok Chol	Anti-Terror Expert
13	Choe Won Hyok	Martial Art
14	Kim Kwang Il	Anti-Terror Expert
15	Jong Tong Il	Anti-Terror Expert
16	Kang Chol Song	Martial Art
17	Kim Kwang Chol	Shooting
18	Kang Ho	Shooting
19	Choe Myong Chol	Shooting

1

- **Instructors for Police Marine(4)**

№	Name	Unit
1	RI KWANG SU	Navigation
2	JANG CHOL	Martial Art/Shooting
3	Jong Un Guk	Diving
4	Ri Jong Hyok	Swimming/Interpreter

- **Instructors for Police Training School(5)**

№	Name	Unit
1	RO KWANG CHOL	Martial Art
2	Kim Myong Nam	Martial Art
3	Jo Kwang Song	Martial Art
4	Pak Chung IL	Shooting
5	KIM HAK CHOL	Shooting

- **Instructors for Forensic and Investigation(5)**

№	Name	Position
1	Pak Sung IL	Forensic
2	PIN MYONG CHOL	Forensic
3	Choe Kwang Jin	Investigation Tactics
4	Choe Jong Sik	Investigation Tactics
5	Jong Yong Rim	Investigation Tactics

- **Construction Team(8)**

№	Name	Position
1	Pak Kwan IL	Architect
2	Ri Ki Won	Carpenter
3	Ryu Yong IL	Plaster
4	Pak Kil Nam	Steel Fixer
5	Ri Sang Gi	Welder
6	Pak Jin Hyok	Carpenter
7	Jang In Chol	Plaster
8	Kim Tae San	Plaster

- **Taekwondo Instructors(2)**

№	Name	Position
1	Kim Se In	Taekwondo Instructor
2	Pak Song Su	Taekwondo Instructor

- **Paramedics Team(2)**

№	Name	Position
1	Ri Ki Sung	Paramedical Doctor
2	Han Song Gyu	Paramedical Doctor

Source: Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations.

Annex 74 : Viet Nam's People's Police Academy website reporting the training

Source: http://www.hvcsnd.edu.vn/en/Acedemy/International-Cooperation/167/3241/North-Korean-experts-train-Vietnamese-police.aspx.

Annex 75 : Explanation note on the sanction measures concerning the provision of technical assistance or services related to all arms and related materiel

Pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009) superseding paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006), all Member States are prohibited from procuring "**all arms and related materiel**" and transferring from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of "technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use (hereafter "assistance")" of "**such** arms or materiel".

Some Member States interpret that the phrase "**such** arms or materiel" refers only to **"all arms and related materiel" that were "procured from the DPRK"**. Thus, in their interpretations, the resolutions do not prohibit the provision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of assistance related to arms and related material as long as they were not procured from this country.

Paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) also refers to similar measures: all Member States are prohibited from transferring from the DPRK of assistance related to certain arms and related materiel in subparagraphs 8 (a) (i) of the same resolution. In their interpretation, the items referred to in this paragraph were not superseded by "all arms and related materiel" in resolution 1874 (2009).[14] Therefore, to them, these measures do not prohibit the provision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of assistance related to arms and related material as long as they were not procured from this country.

In this regard, the Panel notes that the Security Council has already **reaffirmed** in paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 (2013) that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) applies to "items prohibited by the resolutions", which include all arms and related materiel.[15] The Panel further notes that the Security Council has used the terms "reaffirms", as opposed to "decides", "requests", or "calls upon", which indicates that this provision is intended to provide reaffirmation of its intent regarding the measures already imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

In addition, the aforementioned conditional interpretation by some Member States contains a contradiction when applied to the sanction measures prohibiting the provision to or from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of assistance related to nuclear- or ballistic missile-related items.[16] According to such interpretation, **these sanction measures would not prohibit the provision to or from Democratic People's Republic of Korea of assistance related to foreign-sourced items**. Such interpretation contradicts the objectives of the UN sanction measures which demands the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its ballistic missile- and nuclear programmes (paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 1874 (2006)).

Therefore, the Panel considers that the measures of paragraph 8(c) of resolution 1718(2006) should apply to all arms and related materiel **without any condition**, as reaffirmed by paragraph 7 of resolution 2094 (2013).

[14] Resolution 1874 (2009) has no paragraph that explicitly supersedes paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).
[15] All items prohibited by paragraphs 8 (a) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009).
[16] Paragraphs 8 (a) (ii) and (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009).

Annex 76 : Report of investigation into limousine conversions exported from the United States to the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea

The Panel previously reported on four Mercedes Benz S-600 limousine conversions observed during several military parades in Pyongyang on 15 April 2012, 2013 and 2014, that could constitute a violation of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006).

The Panel has investigated the chain of custody of the vehicles from their origin in Europe, to their armored customization in the United States (Ports of New Jersey and Long Beach) to an intermediate delivery point at the Port of Dalian, China. The ultimate consignee in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not yet been identified.

United States authorities stated that no export licence was required for the export of the vehicles to China, but that a licence would have been required for their transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the final destination country. The United States also stated that an export licence would have been required "if any party involved in the transaction" appeared on any lists related to export control and unilateral sanctions measures maintained by the United States (see Annex 66).

As part of its investigation, the Panel identified a number of individuals, entities, transfer inconsistencies, and a false declaration, which indicate that when the vehicles were exported from the United States to China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was already the intended destination.

The Panel has identified the organizer and financier of the various shipments as Yunong Ma, a Chinese businessman whose English name is George Ma. One of Mr. Ma's companies, Seajet International, has been idenitified in previous Panel reports as an overseas agent of the state airline of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Air Koryo. Moreover, Mr. Ma is under a separate Panel investigation because the role of another of his companies in an air shipment of arms and related materiel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Transfer inconsistencies indicate that George Ma was likely aware that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the ultimate end user prior to the vehicle's departure from the United States include the issuance of instructions by Seajet to the United States-based freight-forwarder to list in United States documentation various Chinese buyers as responsible for the shipments. Several of these shipping documents were made available to United States authorities and carried an export liability warning. For example, Mr. Ma issued instructions to a United States company that shipping documents must name the financially responsible party (consignee) as his offshore company, ZM International Ltd, registered in Hong Kong (See Annexes 67,68,69)

The Panel obtained documentation showing that ZM International Ltd indirectly acquired the armored Mercedes vehicles by transferring funds to a United States freight forwarder to purchase the vehicles on its behalf (Annex 71). The transfer of $375,705 to the freight forwarder on 29 December 2010 lists as its originator "ZM International Company Ltd" which shares an address with Seajet. No such company exists in the China business registry. Seajet also instructed the United States freight-forwarder to purchase Shipper's Own Containers to transport the vehicles.

Shipper-owned containers generally ensure a greater degree of anonymity than those owned and monitored by global shipping carriers (See annex 72).[17]

A Seajet email of April 2010 also made reference to an unspecified "customer" when the armoured limousines were held by United States customs, delaying their shipment to China (See annex 73).

In other shipping documents, Seajet instructed a United States company to name the consignee as Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding Co., a major Chinese logistics company that describes itself on its website as a Democratic People's Republic of Korea shipping agency[18] which established the first container shipping line between Dalian and Nampo in March 2000 (Annex 69, 70). Liaoning Danxing has not responded to any of the Panel's requests for information.

George Ma instructed the U.S freight-forwarder to falsely declare to the carrier that the Mercedes batteries had been disconnected, against warnings by the United States company of the liability and penalties associated with such a false declaration given shipping safety regulations requiring that batteries be disconnected for shipping. These instructions were given after George Ma had been informed that any authorized Mercedes dealership could reconnect the batteries. (See annex 74) While there are many authorized Mercedes dealerships in the People's Republic of China, there are none in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[17] S/2014/394, para. 64. Shipper owned containers allow the shipper to avoid the possibility of their containers being tracked across the globe using commercially available databases. See Griffiths, H., Jenks, M., "Maritime Transport and Destablizing Commodity Flows", *SIPRI Policy Paper* No.32, 2012, p.30.

[18] "One day in the life of Democratic People's Republic of Korea shipping agency", http://www.danxing.cn/En/ChaoXianChuanDaiGonGZuoZheDeYiGeGonGZuoRi-8.html.

In October 2014, Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) opened an investigation into the export of certain armored vehicles to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The investigation was predicated upon information from the United Nations, which identified two armored 2010 Mercedes Benz S600 sedans in use by the DPRK military and alleged to be previously owned and armored by U.S. Company 1 (USC1).

OEE identified two additional Mercedes Benz S600 sedans owned and armored by USC1. All four vehicles were purchased from USC1 by a freight forwarder, U.S. Company 2 (USC2). U.S. Person 1 (USP1), an employee of USC2, served as USC1's client. The vehicles were exported in three shipments.

The four armored 2010 Mercedes Benz S600 sedans are identified as follows:

1. Two vehicles from USC1 orders 4795 and 4796 were exported on May 12, 2010. [Exhibit 1-2]

2. Vehicle from USC1 order 4827 was exported on October 27, 2010. [Exhibit 3]

3. Vehicle from USC1 order 4828 was exported on January 14, 2011. [Exhibit 4]

All of the vehicles were listed as destined for China, and ZM International Company Ltd in Hong Kong was listed as the ultimate consignee. ZM is owned by Ma Yunong (aka George MA), who also owns Seajet Company Limited (Seajet) in China. [Exhibit 5]

The shipping documents and correspondence provided by USC2 reveal the coordination between USC2 and Seajet personnel including Ma Yunong. Seajet personnel directed the shipments to Lianoning Danxing International Forwarding Co., Ltd. In Dalian, China. [Exhibits 9-11]

According to BIS License Determinations, the vehicles are classified under EAR99. BIS licenses were not required for the vehicles' export to China, but BIS licenses would have been required for the vehicles' export or reexport to the DPRK. [Exhibit 12]

Investigation is therefore ongoing to identify details of the vehicles' alleged transshipment or reexport from China to the DPRK.

Source: Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations.

Annex 77 : United States Department of Commerce note

License Determination
E1007672
Date of Completion:
March 12, 2015

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

Witness(es): Technical: [redacted]
Foreign Policy: [redacted]

Commodity Description: 2010 Mercedes-Benz S600 armored by [redacted]

Manufacturer: Mercedes-Benz (armoring by [redacted]

Requested Start/End Dates: January 01, 2010 - June 01, 2012

Intermediate Countries: China

Destination Country: Korea Democratic People Republic Of

Determination Details

Start Date: January 01, 2010 End Date: June 01, 2012

BIS License Required: Yes

ECCN: EAR99

Reason(s) for Control: N/A

Policy Text:

Based on the information provided with this request, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has determined that the 2010 Mercedes-Benz S600 sedan with armoring by [redacted] classified as EAR99. From January 1, 2010 to June 1, 2012, a BIS license was required under Section 746.4 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 C.F.R. Part 730 et seq.) for the export or reexport to North Korea of items classified as EAR99. During the specified time period, license applications for the export or reexport to North Korea of an item classified as EAR99 would have been reviewed pursuant to the licensing policy set forth in Section 746.4 of the EAR.

Regardless of the items exported, a BIS license may also be required if any party involved in the transaction appears on the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the EAR), the Denied Persons List, or the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. A consolidated screening list is available at http://www.export.gov/ECR/eg_main_023148.asp. Further, a BIS license is required to export or reexport an item subject to the EAR, even when one would not otherwise be necessary, if an exporter or reexporter knows, has reason to know, or is otherwise individually informed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with respect to a specific transaction, that the item will be used in activities related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile delivery systems as defined in Part 744 of the EAR.

Page 1 of 2

Source: United States Department of Commerce.

Annex 78 : Instructions from Seajet

[redacted]

From: [redacted]@seajet.com.cn]
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 11:27 PM
To: [redacted] George Ma'
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: 答复: 答复: 2 x S600

Dear [redacted]

Pls arrange telex released B/L and consign Dalian as cnee on MBL

Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding Co.,Ltd
Room A1909-A1612 Mingshi International Building
No30 Wuwu Road Zhongshan District,Dalian,China
Postcode:116001
FAX:86-411-39887711

Issue ZM as cnee on HBL:

ZM International Company Limited
4/F Enterprise Bldg.,218-238 Queen's Road Central,Hong Kong

Pre-alert should be send before vessel departed, so as we could arrange insurance timely
Thanks in advance!
Any unclear pls let me know!

B/rgds
[redacted] Supervisor- Logistics
Seajet Company Limited
B-804, SOHO New Town,
88 Jianguo Road, Chaoyang District,
Beijing 100022 P.R.China
Tel:+86-10-85803334 ext 708
Fax:+86-10-85803052 ext 708;+86-10-85803051
E-mail: [redacted]@seajet.com.cn
http://www.seajet.com.cn

[redacted] George Ma'
[redacted] 2 x S600

[redacted] please keep me posted for the name of trucking company, who will send me the original MSO & when?

Morning George please provide mbl & hbl instruction asap

tks.
Best Regards
[redacted]

Source: The Panel.

Annex 79 : Documents created according to Seajet instructions



BILL OF LADING

[redacted]

JM INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED
4/F ENTERPRISE BLDG
228-236 QUEEN'S ROAD CENTRAL
HONG KONG

SAME AS CNEE

DELIVERY AGENT
LIAONING DANING INTERNATIONAL
FORWARDING CO LTD ROOM 81609-81612
MINGSHI INTERNATIONAL BUILDING NO.30
WUWU ROAD ZHONGSHAN DIST DALIAN CHINA

[redacted]

LONG BEACH

DALIAN

CY / CYT

1 X 40'GP
SOC

SAID TO CONTAIN:
2 UNITS OF 2010 MERCEDES-BENZ S600

[redacted]

3,616.0KGS 33.950CBM
12,381.0LBS 1,167.13CFT

** EXPRESS RELEASE **
OCEAN FREIGHT COLLECT

LADEN ON BOARD

[redacted]

CONTAINER NO.
OKOU721583-8

SEAL NO.
1972436

CY/CY

THESE COMMODITIES, TECHNOLOGIES, OR SOFTWARE WERE EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS. DIVERSION CONTRARY TO U.S. LAW IS PROHIBITED.

FREIGHT RATES, CHARGES, WEIGHTS AND/OR MEASUREMENTS		
SUBJECT TO CORRECTION	PREPAID	COLLECT
OCEAN FRT COLLECT AS ARRANGED		
GRAND TOTAL		

[redacted]

MAY,12,2010

Source: The Panel.

Annex 80 : Other documents created according to Seajet instructions

[redacted]

PROFORMA

[redacted]

PORT TO PORT OR COMBINED TRANSPORT BILL OF LADING

Booking No. 8002761990

Bill of Lading No. [redacted]

Export References [redacted]

EXPORT REF: [redacted]

2. Consignee

LIAONING DANXING INTERNATIONAL FORWARDING CO LTD ROOM A1608-A1613 MINGXIN INTERNATIONAL BUILDING NO.36 WUWU ROAD ZHONGSHAN DIST DALIAN CHINA

Forwarding Agent and References

Place and Country of Origin

CA, U.S.A.

3. Notify Party

SAME AS CONSIGNEE

Also Notify Partyrouting & Instructions

4. Combined Transport* Pre-Carriage by

5. Combined Transport* Place of Receipt

LONG BEACH

6. Ocean Vessel Voy. No. [redacted]

7. Port of Loading

LONG BEACH

Service Contract No. [redacted]

Commodity Code

8. Port of Discharge

DALIAN

9. Combined Transport* Place of Delivery

/

Type of Movement

FCL / FCL

CY - CY

Marks & Nos. Container / Seal No.	No. of Containers or Packages	Description of Goods (If Dangerous Goods, See Clause 20)	Gross Weight	Measurement
AEGS X20160423054279	2 UNITS	1X40'"SOC"CONTAINER SLAC.: 2 UNITS 2019 MERCEDES-BENZ S600 VIN# [redacted] FREIGHT PREPAID	5616.000KGS 12381.000LBS	33.0590CBM 1167.130CFT
OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID ON CY-CY TERMS				
SHIPPERS LOAD, STORAGE AND COUNT THESE COMMODITIES, TECHNOLOGIES OR SOFTWARE WERE EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS. DIVERSION CONTRARY TO U.S. LAW IS PROHIBITED.				
OEOU7215838 /1972458	/	2 UNITS /FCL / FCL	/40GP/3,616.90 KG	

Declared Cargo Value (US$)

Description of Contents for Shipper's Use Only (Not part of This B/L Contract)

10. Total Number of Containers and/or Packages (In words) Subject to Clause 7 Limitation

SAY ONE CONTAINER TOTAL

11. Freight & Charges	Revenue Tons	Rate	Per	Amount	Prepaid	Collect	Freight & Charges Payable at / by
LAN10009		1100.00	1/40GP	USD 1,100.00	PPD		
BUNKER CHARGE		525.00	1/40GP	USD 525.00	PPD		
CARRIER SECURI		6.00	1/40GP	USD 6.00	PPD		
ORIGIN DOC FEE		50.00	1.000	USD 50.00	PPD		

Received in external apparent good order and condition except as otherwise noted. The total number of the packages or units stuffed in the container, the description of the goods and the weights shown in this Bill of Lading are furnished by the merchants, and which the carrier has no reasonable means of checking and is not a part of this Bills of Lading contract. The carrier has issued 3 original Bills of Lading, all of this tenor and date, one of the original Bills of Lading must be surrendered and endorsed or signed against the delivery of the shipment and whereupon any other original Bills of Lading shall be void. The merchants agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Bill of Lading as if each had personally signed this Bill of Lading.

*Applicable Only When Document Used as a Combined Transport Bill of Lading.

Date Laden on Board 12 MAY 2016

Signed by: [redacted]

AS AGENT

9805 Date of Issue 12 MAY 2016 Place of Issue LOS ANGELES

Signed for the Carrier, [redacted]

Source: The Panel.

Annex 81 : Liaoning Danxing website page describing itself as first container shipping line between Dalian, China and Nampo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea



Source: The Panel.

Annex 82 : Indirect payments for armoured limousines to U.S-based freight forwarder by ZM International (owned by George Ma, registered in Hong Kong)





[redacted]

Wire Transfer Detail Report
As of 05/04/2010

Treasury Information Reporting

[redacted]

Currency: USD
Bank: [redacted]
Account: [redacted]

Credit Wire Amount	Process Date Time	Wire Service Wire Detail	Status
32,361.92	05/04/2010 05:20 AM CT	From: [redacted] N/A ZM INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED N/A N/A	COMPLETE

Corresponding Bank: [redacted]
Wire Service Reference Number: [redacted]
Wells Message Number:
PC Reference/Confirmation Number:
Value Date: 05/04/2010
Text: [redacted]



Source: The Panel.

Annex 83 : Email requests by George Ma for Shipper Owned Containers (SOC)



From: George Ma [mailto:george.ma@seajet.com.cn]
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 7:00 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: 答复: 2 x S600

Dear Mandy,
Tks for your below infm and pls buy used container accordingly. Meanwhile can you arrange the survey of

4/20/2010

Page 4 of 5

the car by certified vehicle inspector as you did the last time?
B/rgds
George

[redacted]
发送时间: 2010年4月8日 8:21
收件人: 'George Ma' [redacted]
抄送: [redacted]
主题: 2 x S600

Morning George & [redacted]

see below SOC 40' cy/cy rate (net/net cost) from LGB to Dalian for 2 units of S600.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 84 : Seajet employee Henry references unspecified customer when armoured limousines held by United States Customs



[redacted]

From: [redacted]

Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2010

[redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re:RE: LOADING pics booking: 8002761990

Dear [redacted]

Thank you very much for your clarification!

Meanwhile, could you pls advise the reason why customs held this container so as we could explain the delay to customer accordingly.

Thanks and nice weekend! [redacted]

[redacted]

Best Reagards,

Henry

Source: The Panel.

Annex 85 : George Ma instructs U.S freight forwarder to make false declaration in documents for Carrier



From: George Ma [mailto:george.ma@seajet.com.cn]
Sent: Monday, April 12, 2010 9:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: 答复: 2 x S600

Dear [redacted]
Pls don't disconnect the batter and confirm by return. Tks.
B/rgds
George

发件人: [redacted]
发送时间: 2010年4月13日 10:39
收件人: 'George Ma'; [redacted]
抄送: [redacted]
主题: RE: 2 x S600

morning George,

see below in GREEN.

Best Regards

[redacted]

Member of C-TPAT

From: George Ma [mailto:george.ma@seajet.com.cn]
Sent: Saturday, April 10, 2010 10:45 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: 答复: 2 x S600

Dear [redacted]
Pls find my answer as below.
B/rgds
George

发件人: [redacted]
发送时间: [redacted]
收件人: 'George Ma'; [redacted]
抄送: [redacted]
主题: RE: 2 x S600

4/20/2010

Source: The Panel.

morning George.

I already place the order to purchase the used 40'GP.

Regarding the survey of the car, do you mean by inspection of the equipment & features? Every dealership will have PDI (Pre-Delivery Inspection) done prior to release the car to customer.
Transloading warehouse can do the **standard (general)** equipment & features instruction upon receiving the cars but you need to send me a checklist. Inspection fee: usd 150 per auto.
Dear [redacted] can you send all of us a check list of it in order the inspection can be executed?

If you mean to have certified surveyor, they only inspect body of the auto upon arrival at loading location, during loading & lashing and check carrier's regulation (empty fuel tank & The battery must be disconnected).
They never perform equipment & feature inspection.
Then there is no need of it.

Our auto rate with carrier is based on non-haz which means auto must ship with empty fuel tank & the battery must be disconnected. Since these 2 x S600 are very high tech vehicles, cnee may have problem to operate the auto after battery is disconnected.

We can 1) declare with carrier that batteries are disconnected but actually are not and Seajet is liable for all claims and penalties if and when carrier finds out the misdeclaration.
How much will be the penalties and what the carrier may claim?
** **We won't know until [redacted] find out OR there is damage or accident occurs.**

2) declare with carrier that batteries are disconnected and it is disconnected but cnee may have problem to start the vehicles.
What the cnee should do to restart the vehicles? Is there any operation manual to restart the vehicles after battery disconnect due to transport? ** **cnee will need to contact with their local Mercedes Benz dealership for how to restart or reprogram the vehicles.**

these are the two options and it is up to you to decide. Please advise.

[redacted]

Member of C-TPAT

From: George Ma [mailto:george.ma@seajet.com.cn]
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 7:00 PM

[redacted]

Source: The Panel.

Annex 86 : The *Hoe Ryong* and Mirae Shipping HK

Information on Mirae Shipping HK

CR 公司註冊處 Companies Registry

周年申報表
Annual Return

表格 Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number: 1136375

1 公司名稱 Company Name: MIRAE SHIPPING (H.K.) CO. LIMITED

2 商業名稱(如有的話) Business Name (If any): --

3 公司類別 Type of Company
請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box
☑ 私人公司 Private company ☐ 公眾公司 Public company ☐ 擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up: 29 (日 DD) 05 (月 MM) 2014 (年 YYYY)

董事 (自然人) Director (Natural Person)
(如超過一名董事屬自然人，請用續頁 B 填報 Use Continuation Sheet B if more than
適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box(es)

☑ 董事 Director ☐ 候補董事 Alternate Director 代替 Alte

acity

姓名 e in Chinese: --

姓名 e in English
姓氏 Surname: KASATSUGU
名字 Other Names: Hiroshi

護照 Passport
簽發國家 Issuing Country: Japan
號碼 Number: TK0666126

Source: The Hong Kong company registration records database.

Official information for the *Hoe Ryong* (fka *Wang Jae San 2*) referring to OMM

Information from the Tokyo MOU database on the vessel's port state control inspections records

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
ASIA PACIFIC COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM

SHIP DETAILS
(according to last update)

Ship Name: HOE RYONG IMO No: 9041552 Call Sign: HMBF
Ship Type: 360 - General cargo/multipurpose Gross Tonnage: 4157
Flag: KP - Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Deadweight: _
Classification Society: 445 - Korea Classification Society Date Keel Laid: 09.07.1991
Company Name: Hoeryong Shipping Co Ltd Company IMO Number: 6817786
Click to get details ===> High Risk Ship, Window Inspection Range: 16.03.2016 - 15.06.2016

gend: □ - initial inspection ■ - follow-up without new deficiencies recorded ◪ - follow-up with new deficiencies recorded

	Inspection Date	Inspection Place	Ship Name (at the moment of inspection)	Call Sign (at the moment of inspection)	Flag (at the moment of inspection)	No. Deficie (total /
□	15.01.2016	Yancheng, China	HOE RYONG	HMBF	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	11 /
□	12.11.2015	Taizhou, Jiangsu, China	HOE RYONG	HMLM	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	11 /
□	02.04.2015	Rizhao, China	WANG JAE SAN 2	HMLM	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	19 /
□	22.08.2014	Rizhao, China	WANG JAE SAN 2	HMLM	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	11 /

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
ASIA PACIFIC COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM

INSPECTION DETAILS

name of ship: WANG JAE SAN 2 call sign: HMLM
date keel laid: 09.07.1991
gross tonnage: 4157
deadweight: _
type of ship: General cargo/multipurpose
flag of ship: Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
classification society: Korea Classification Society
company IMO No: 1790183
particulars of company: OCEAN MARITIME MANAGEMENT CO LTD
name of reporting authority: China
place of inspection: Rizhao
date of inspection: 22.08.2014
deficiencies: yes
ship detained: no
number of deficiencies: 11 including:

Source: Tokyo MOU database.

Source: http://www.chinaports.com/souchuan/view/445150000.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 87

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 88 : Companied related to Mr. Kasatsugu

Mirae HK's director, Mr. Kasatsugu, has owned and controlled the following companies, including those involved in the operation of vessels using DPRK crews:[19]

- Allied Ocean Shipping Limited (registered owner of the *Fertility 9* (IMO 8417962));
- First Trend Shipping Limited (former registered owner of the *Ma Sik Ryong* (IMO 8608030));
- Glory Shipping (H.K.) Limited (registered owner of the *Glory Ocean* (IMO 8306929)) ;
- Gold Zone Shipping Limited (involved in the loan arrangements for several vessels, including the *Glory Ocean* and the *Glory Morning* (IMO 8416164));
- Grandtex Shipping Company Limited (ship manager, operator and registered owner of the *Fertility 5* (IMO 9147332));
- New Champ Shipping (former registered owner of the *Glory Morning* and the *Ocean Galaxy* (IMO 8418227));
- Rich Step Shipping (former registered owner of the *Ocean Dawning* (IMO 8505329));
- Sunrise International (HK) Trade Company Limited; and
- V.O. Shipping Limited (the director and owner is officially listed as Mr. Kastsugu's son).

Information obtained by the Panel indicates these companies were experiencing financial difficulties. Three of the aforementioned vessels were demolished in 2015 and another one is scheduled to be demolished.[20] Only three remaining vessels (*Fertility 9*, *Fertility 5*, and *Glory Ocean*) were listed officially in the IMO database as inactive, as of 1 January 2016.

The Panel sent a letter to Mr. Kasatsugu to request for information about his current relationship with OMM, but has received no reply. Therefore, business dealings with these companies and vessels could contribute to the evasion of the measures by Mirae/OMM.

Mr. Kasatsugu's passport



[19] The Hong Kong company registry database; the IMO database
[20] *Glory Morning, Ma Sik Ryong, Ocean Dawning, Ocean Galaxy.*

Official company registration record for Mirae Shenzhen

Source:
http://www.szcredit.com.cn/web/GSZJGSPT/QyxyDetail.aspx?rid=8a4ddbfce3e045239dec08128348baed.

Annex 89 : Mirae-linked companies

Hua Heng Shipping Limited, Petrel Shipping Company Limited and CM Chartering Limited

1. Mr. Li Anshan is the director and shareholder of Hua Heng and Petrel. In replying to the Panel, Mr. Li denied having any business relationships with OMM. Mr. Li confirmed his business dealings with Mr. Kasatsugu from June 2011 until June 2015, but emphasized that he had no knowledge of Mr. Kasatsugu's connection to OMM (figure 1). However, the Panel noted inconsistencies between Mr. Li's explanations and information obtained by the Panel. The Panel also found that Mr. Li's companies were utilized by OMM previously and had business dealings with a company previously involved in the 2011 suspected violation of the resolutions.

Mr. Li's relationship with Mr. Kasatsugu

2. With respect to the December 2014 settlement, Mr. Li confirmed that he had purchased the vessels from Mr. Kasatsugu as part of normal commercial activities. To corroborate Mr. Li's statements, the Panel requested records of his correspondence with Mr. Kasatsugu in connection with these transactions, but was informed that Mr. Li no longer kept any relevant records (figure 1).

3. Mr. Li also explained that his business relationships with Mr. Kasatsugu were limited only to the provision of ISM Management services for several vessels [21] and that all issues related to the vessel's operation or crews were handled by Mr. Kasatsugu. However, documents obtained by the Panel listed Hua Heng as the vessel's operator and an "employer" of DPRK crew (figure 2). Also, Mr. Li's explanation does not appear consistent with the responsibility imposed by the relevant IMO resolutions for ISM managers to ensure that the crew is adequately qualified and certified to operate the vessels. The Panel is as yet to confirm the specific activities undertaken by Hua Heng for these vessels.

OMM's utilization of Petrel Shipping and CM Chartering Co Ltd

4. Previously, the Panel found that OMM representative based in Bangkok (OMM Bangkok) had listed his affiliation and title as "the Chartering Manager of the PETREL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED" in an official document submitted to Thailand (legally valid from December 2013 to December 2014, at least) (figure 3).[22]

5. OMM Bangkok controlled the vessel *Mu Du Bong*. Documentation obtained by the Panel from this vessel lists OMM-associated companies which included "MIRAE SHIPPING" and "CM Chartering". CM Chartering Limited (IMO 5687371) had has close business relationship with Hua Heng (figure4).

[21] *Chon Un 68* (IMO 9001021), *Great Hope*, *Glory Morning*, *Glory Ocean* and *Ma Sik Ryong*.
[22] S/2015/131, footnote no. 71.

6. CM Chartering has owned the *South Hill 2* (IMO 8412467) (Hua Heng served as the vessel's ship manager and operator).[23] OMM Singapore used this vessel's name in its instruction to Chinpo to make a false declaration to the remitting bank for the July 2013 shipment (figure5).

Network of Mr. Li's companies



7. CM Chartering's director has also served as the director of Everfaith Trade Limited which owns the *South Hill 5* (IMO 9138680) (figure 6). Everfaith purchased this vessel in August 2014. The Panel learned that at that time there was unknown "ultimate buyer" of the *South Hill 5* who initially nominated Mirae HK to buy this vessel but later switched its nomination to Everfaith (figure 6). A Member State informed the Panel that the two foreign-flagged vessels (*South Hill 2* and *-5*) were controlled by OMM as of June 2015. The Panel continues to investigate OMM's reported connections to these two vessels.

8. In replying to the Panel, Mr. Li confirmed that he was the sole director and owner of Petrel but that he had never let any other person to use this company. According to Mr. Li, CM Chartering's director learned of OMM when purchasing the *South Hill 2* in June 2012 through Mirae Shenzhen, but MC Chartering had no business relationship with OMM. It was also stated that CM Chartering had served as a broker for the *Mu Du Bong* "years ago" (figure 1).

9. Previously, Mr. Li used the email address of CM Chartering when he replied to the Panel in January 2015 on behalf of this company. The same email address was listed on the document from the *Mu Du Bong*. This document also listed Mirae's representative's email address of miraerep@cmchartering.com which used the domain name of CM Chartering (figure 4). In

[23] IMO database.

replying to the Panel, however, Mr. Li simply stated that he was told by CM Chartering that the "e-mail ID" was stopped since late 2012.

10. In light of the multiple connections between Mr. Li and Mirae/OMM, as well as the inconsistencies between Mr. Li's statements and information obtained by the Panel, and in the absence of precise explanations and supporting documentation from Mr. Li, the Panel could not confirm Mr. Li's denial of his relationship with OMM and his knowledge of Mr. Kasatsugu's connection to OMM.

Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd and V-Star Ships Limited

11. The Panel found that Hua Heng/Petrel have had business relationships with three directors of Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5233903) which was previously involved in a May 2011 suspected transfer of proliferation-related items on-board the vessel *Light* (IMO 8415433) (figure 7).[24] Mr. Fan Min Tian (one of the three individuals) stated that they had provided consultancy services for ship registration and inspection for Hua Heng, which was also confirmed by Mr. Li. Mr. Fan also stated that Dalian Sea Glory was dissolved in October 2015 (figure 7).

12. The three individuals also served as the directors of V-Star Ships Limited (figure 7). This company was mentioned during the Singapore court trial related to the CCG incident. According to the prosecutor, Chinpo sent an email to OMM on 11 July 2013 (5 days after the remittance for the CCG incident) in which "Chinpo had requested OMM not to send any instructions for outward and inward remittances to and from *V-Star Ships Limited* and Cuba so as to avoid being blacklisted."[25]

13. In replying to the Panel, Mr. Fan stated that V-Star had no connection to OMM, Chinpo, or the *Chon Chong Gang* (figure 7). It was explained that another company with a very similar name was "on the blacklist" of the United States, and that Mr. Fan had informed the matter to the authorities previously. The Panel could not find such company and was unable to confirm his statements denying his companies' connections to OMM.

[24] From May 2006 to July 2011, Dalian Sea Glory was listed in the IMO database as the ship manager and operator of the vessel ***Light*** (IMO 8415433). In May 2011, the U.S. Navy attempted to inspect this vessel because the vessel was considered to be transferring proliferation-related items. After this incident, this vessel was renamed to Victory 3 and re-registered with a new ship manager and operator of Sea Star Ship Co Ltd.

[25] *Prosecution's submissions at the close of trial*", 30 October 2015.

Network of Dalian Sea Glory-related companies



Other companies related to Mirae

14. Mirae-linked companies, Grandtex Shipping Co Ltd and Allied Ocean Shipping Limited, have had business relationships with Aoyang International Co Ltd and East Grand Shipping Co Ltd. through the operations of the vessels *Fertility 5* and *Fertility 9* (see table 2). Aoyang Marine Company Limited (connected to Aoyang International) has shared the same contact details as Grandtex (figure 8).[26] Aoyang International and East Grand are managed by the same individuals (figure 8).

Table 1. Companies connected to the Fertility 5 and Fertility 9

Company	Vessels	Role	Period
Allied Ocean Shipping Limited	*Fertility 9*	Registered owner	From 23 December 2011 to present
Aoyang International Company Limited	*Fertility 5*	ISM Manager	From 25 August 2011 to present
East Grand Shipping Co Ltd.	*Fertility 9*	ISM Manager, ship manager and operator	From 26 August 2013 to present
Grandtex Shipping Co Ltd	*Fertility 5*	Registered owner, ship manager and operator	From 3 May 2012 to present

Source: IMO and Equasis databases

[26] According to information obtained by the Panel, Aoyang International assisted Grandtex by registering in the IMO database the official company records for Grandtex. Aoyang International is linked to other companies that have business dealings with the DPRK in the fields of shipping business.

Companies linked to the Fertility 5 and 9



15. Aoyang International is listed in the IMO database as a group beneficial owner of the *Grand Karo* (IMO 8511823). The vessel's registered owner has been listed as Yuanyao Shipping Ltd. (IMO 5821925), since September 2014. This company is listed with a "care of" address provided by Aoyang International. According to information from a Member State, the vessel was reportedly controlled by OMM as late as June 2015. The Panel learned that Mr. Kasatsugu was previously involved in financing for this vessel. The Panel found that the vessel's DPRK crew included two individuals who were crew on OMM-controlled vessels (figure 8). The Panel continues to investigate the vessel's reported connection to OMM.

16. Mr. Kasatsugu has had business relationships with Shenghao Marine (Hong Kong) Co Ltd. and Jinjiang Shipping Pte Ltd through the operation of the vessels *Ocean Galaxy* (IMO 8418227) and *Ocean Dawning* (IMO 8505329), until February 2015 (see table 1 below). Shenghao Marine provided a "care of address" for Mirae-linked companies, Rich Step Shipping Limited and New Champ Shipping Limited. In the Korean Register of Shipping database, New Champ and Shenghao Marine were listed with the same contact information (figure 9).

Table 2. Companies connected to the *Ocean Galaxy* and *Ocean Dawning*

Company	Vessels	Role	Period
New Champ Shipping Limited	*Ocean Galaxy*	Registered owner	From 23 December 2011 to February 2015
Rich Step Shipping Limited	*Ocean Dawning*	Registered owner	From 9 January 2012 to 9 January 2015
Shenghao Marine (Hong Kong) Ltd	*Ocean Galaxy*	ISM Manager	From 25 August 2011 to 15 July 2012
		Ship manager and operator	From 25 August 2011 to February 2015
	Ocean Dawning	Ship manager and operator	From 9 January 2012 to 9 January 2015
Jinjiang Shipping	*Ocean Galaxy*	Registered owner	From 25 August 2011 to

Pte Ltd			December 2011
		ISM Manager	From 16 July 2012 to March 2015
	Ocean Dawning	ISM Manager	After 2 July 2012

Source: IOM database

Companies linked to the Ocean Galaxy and Ocean Dawning



17. One of Shenghao Marine's directors, Mr. Zhang Qiao, has been listed as the director and/or shareholder of several other companies including Baili Shipping and Trading Limited (the ship manager of the vessel *Ever Bright 88*) and Bene Star Shipping & Trading Ltd (the ship manager and registered owner of the *Orion Star*) (figure 10). According to information provided by a Member State, these two vessels were controlled by OMM as late as September 2015. The Panel continues to investigate OMM's reported connections to these vessels.

Senat Shipping Limited

18. Bene Star had business relationship with Senat Shipping which was designated by the United States Department of the Treasury on 23 July 2015 for its role in providing extensive material support to OMM. Information provided by Senat's lawyer shows the company's business dealings with Bene Star in chartering vessels operated by DPRK crews, including Senat-owned vessel *Dawnlight* (IMO 9110236).

19. According to Senat, Bene Star operated *Dawnlight* under a bareboat charterer agreement with Senat of April 2014, using Hua Heng as ISM manager for this vessel until July 2015. The vessel was sold from Senat to Bene Star in September 2015. The Panel found that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea crews of the vessel included two individuals who were crew of OMM-controlled vessels (figure 10). Senat's lawyer stated that one of them

was employed by Bene Star. It was also stated that almost all Democratic People's Republic of Korea crew members would have worked for OMM at some point because OMM was the largest shipping company. The Panel continues to investigate the crews' links to OMM.

20. In replying to the Panel, Senat's lawyer stated that Senat's business relations with OMM was terminated since December 2011. With respect to Senat's employment of Mr. Kim Yu Il (former OMM Singapore) until January 2014, it was explained that Mr. Kim was tasked to collect from OMM the outstanding bunker bills (US$ 2 million) (figure 10). At this point, the Panel has no further evidence showing Senat's direct link to OMM after the July 2014 designation.

Figure 1. Correspondence from Mr. Li Anshan

Correspondence of 23 December 2015

To: The Panel of Experts of UN
CC: Mr. Katsu Furukawa
Fm: HUA HENG SHIPPING LIMITED
Re: S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.81
Dear Mr. Katsu Furukawa

To my huge surprise when I received your email and attached documents in which we feel we have been involved in some political situation rather than business dispute according to your mentioned letter. We never expect that we will meet this kind of serious situation as we are just doing routine maritime business asper international shipping rules and laws.

My company mainly engaged in ISM operating business since established in Jun, 2012. And we only accept vessels which comply with flag state and IMO conventions requirement, and national laws and regulations, anyway we will try our best to cooperate with UN panel of experts, and clarify the actual information which you required in your letter.

A summary of our relationship with concernes:

1. I hereby declared that we have no any relationship and connection with OMM mentioned by you, and any business with them.

2. It was my first time to meet Mr. Kasatsugu in Jun. 2011, at that time he visited our office and discussed M.V GREAT HOPE's(IMO 8307492) ISM management business with Liaoning Foreign Trade Foodstuffs Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 1409699), and the company only provide the ISM management. The contract have been terminated since Jun 2012, the reason is that all shareholders including the G. manager have been retired, and the company suspended since that time.

   After that time, I established Hua Heng Shipping limited in Jun. 2012 , and re-signed contract of GREAT HOPE's ISM management with Mr. Kashatsuku to keep the ISM business. Actually Mr. Kashatsuku gave us some vessel's ISM management business(eg: GREAT HOPE, MASIK RYONG, GLORY MORNING, GLORY OCEAN and CHUN UN 68.) , but HE was out of any contact since Jun. 2015. All those company your mentioned are registry owners of above vessels, I only can carefully check who is the director and his nationality. I could not find any way to get more information about those company because it is commercially confidential. Copies of my company's contract with these companies (Annex I).

3. Mr. Hyun was introduced to me by Mr Kasatsugu and I met him in Jun.2014 in my office. I did remember he only asked some information about ISM management and cost, and we did not have any contact with him after that meet.

4. I know Mr. Lu Tie He, Mr. Fan Min Tian, and Mr. Dong Chang Qing. They provide consultation for us (eg: apply IMO no. for company). That's all.

I hereby claimed again that I have no any connection and business with OMM, so I have no any information on all individuals and entities that have worked for OMM.;

B. explain for your description

1. I as the scrapping buyer got MV GREAT HOPE from Mr. Kasatsugu in December, 2014 and then directly re-sold her for scrap to make profit. before that I have checked the website of OFCA, but nothing sanction information found. As you are aware we are business man, we do not concern more about and do not pay more attention to political matter. And indeed I would check each vessel before operation on the website of OFCA. If there is no sanction listed, then I will proceed. That's all.

2. Other Vessels:

MV Glory Morning and MV Masik Ryong have been sold by auction of High court of South Africa at Durban port in Aug. 2015.

And we have been lost contact with Glory Ocean and Mr. Kasatsugu since Jun.2015.

I have been terminated ISM management contract with Chun Un 68 in May, 2015 due to not pay management fee.

And I hereby declared that all crew manning and operating controlled by Mr. Kasatsugu and not controlled by our company. some information in IMO database is not fully correct. Because, flag states registry form and contents and explains are different.

M.V SOUTH HILL 2 is actually owned by CM CHARTERING LMITED and the director is Chinese. Our ISM management business with them started in june 2012, when the owner owned the ship.

M.V SOUTH HILL 5 is actually owned by Everfaith Trade Ltd and director is also Chinese. and our ISM management business with them started since Oct. 2014.

As regard of the "care of" address provided by Hua Heng Shipping Limited, it is a routine practice in shipping field , because usually the owners are not familiar with registry procedure, so we are authorized to do it, that is the reason why always showing HUA HENG as "care of ". Since economic crisis in 2008, the shipping market is getting worse and worse, the owners are saving cost, and I worked in shipping for more than 25 years and can provide good service and lower cost, so we got some owners support and get ISM management business.

Petrel Shipping Co Ltd. was registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in May 2013, and I'm the sole director and shareholder of this company. I bought M.V PETREL 1(IMO 9009085) in Jun.2013, M.V BLUENOVELL((IMO 8909575) in Apr. 2014. and M.V BENEVOLENCE 2 (IMO 8405402) in Dec. 2014. And the Kiribati flag state cancelled their registry because you mentioned something in your report issued last year, eventhough I have provided all supporting envidence and explained to them, but they insist doing it. And I lost a lot of money for this reason. The shipping market is quite bad now, and I have no way but to sell all of them.

You mentioned OMM's representative used my company name, I can ensure to say that I have never authorized to any body to perform any business of petrel shipping limited. Because I have never signed any authorized letter to any person. So, I don't know the case your mentioned. I found that you get too much information from IHS website, but I have never provide any information to them even though they required me. So, I think their information is not actually correct.

About Befirst Enterprises Ltd. and K&H Shipping Ltd (IMO 5535608), I only know they are vessel's registry owner and share holder is Mr. Hyun Hyun Bae from ROK. And these company have not been listed in OFCA. So, I think that I can perform ISM management for their vessels.

I don't know Profit Asia Shipping Limited, because I do not have any business with them.

My company got ISM management contract for Dawnlight in Feb. 2014, and have noticed them to terminate in Jul.2015 due to they have been in sanction list by the US Department of the Treasury, And I have not arranged annual audit for her DOC. So, I can't perform ISM management for her more.
And about Senat Shipping limited others information, I don't know well.

In light of the aforementioned information summarized above, I hereby declared that I disagree with any statements which I or my company have any relationship with OMM. And I accept that I have ever been managed some vessels which owned by Mr. Kashatsuku from JAPAN and Mr. Hyun Hyun Bae from KOREA. But I don't think I have violated any laws and international regulations.

Your faithfully

Li Anshan
2015/12/22

Annex:
1. ISM management agreement (M.V Great Hope, Glory Oceann, Chun Un68, Masik Ryong and Glory Morning etc.)
2. All vessels registry cert. and CSR.

Correspondence of 31 December 2015

To: The Panel of Experts of UN
CC: Mr. Katsu Furukawa
Fm: HUA HENG SHIPPING LIMITED
Re: S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.856

Dear Mr. Katsu Furukawa
Re follow-up letter inquiry, Your e-mail noted, and we would like to clarify following:
1. Explanation about the circumstances which led to your decision to purchase these vessels:
As we stated in last e-mail, mv great hope we act as scrapping buyer to re-sell her to make a profit, it is quite normal decision
And M.V Benevolence 2 had been lay up for 3months, we bought to re-sell her to make a profit. It's same quite normal decision.
we do not have correspondence records for year 2014, as these vessels are not under our ISM management already and our e-mail space is not enough to save 12months records.
Moreover SOPEP also not available in our office, as vessels are not under our management.
We disagree your view that we are helping OMM to evade UN sanction, we do not have any connection with OMM, how we can help OMM to evade UN sanction??

2 relationship with Mr Kasatsugu
As we stated in last message, we indeed act as ISM manager, and no more business involved, we also do not know whether Mr Kasatsugu have any connection with OMM or not??
Usually it may contain many content under management contract, such as operation of the vessel, chartering of the vessel, sale and purchase, crew manning, etc, but we just do their ISM management, this is definitely true.

3 the vessel dawnlight
We are just as ISM manager, crew are employed by owners , we do not know when and where crew coming from, this is not our concern.
It is very strange that we do not employ any DPRK crew, how you can ask us to prove an non-existing matter??

4, OMM connection to petrel shipping and cm chartering
We checked with the Director of CM Chartering, they told us they do not have business with OMM but they know OMM when they purchase mv south hill 2 (previous name mv ryongnam 2) in June 2012, at that time they contact MIRAE SHENZHEN OFFICE, the owner of mv ryong nam 2 in June 2012, after that they appoint us as ISM manager. MV south hill 5 was purchased by EVERFAITH TRADE LIMITED IN SEP 2014, after that also appoint us as ISM manager.
About Petrel shipping, I have been stated in my last email.

5. ANNEX matters:
We checked again with CMCHARTERING, they told us that they might fixed mv mu du bong as broker only but it was many years ago, they cannot remember details exactly, as they told us many DPRK flag ships traded in shipping market at that time. And voyage communication with vessel is a normal operation matter.
We asked the e-mail address matter, they said they have stopped this e-mail ID end of 2012 and told me they have replied to you in Jan 2015.

6. "*All crew manning and replacement…for this vessel should obey the order from Part B*". We are ISM manager, if have no some documents comply with convention requirement, how to get SMC for vessel, then vessels how to perform trading?

In general, our statement of above are true and we tried our best to provide all information you required, we hope those information can support you. We are not SPY AGENCY, we just doing small business under shipping rules and practice.

Your faithfully

2016/1/6

Figure 2. Information on Hua Heng

An example of the agreement of ship's safety management

Attachement II

M/V. GLORY OCEAN 委托代管协议书

Agreement of ship's safety Management

本协议由甲方: GLORY SHIPPING(H.K.) LIMITED (以下简称: 甲方, 地址: 14/F., CHUN WO COMMERCIAL CENTRE, 25 WING WO STREET, CENTRE, 25 WING WO STREET, HONG KONG

和乙方: HUA HENG SHIPPING LIMITED(以下简称: 乙方, 地址: RM 19C, LOCKHART CTR., 301-307 LOCKHART RD., WAN CHAI, HONG KONG), 共同签署, 就下列条款和条件达成共识.

The agreement is agreed and signed by GLORY SHIPPING (H. K.) LIMITED (hereinafter referred to as Part A, address: 14/F., CHUN WO COMMERCIAL CENTRE, 25 WING WO STREET, CENTRE, 25 WING WO STREET, HONG KONG

and HUA HENG SHIPPING LIMITED (hereinafter referred to as Part B, address: RM 19C, LOCKHART CTR., 301-307 LOCKHART RD., WAN CHAI, HONG KONG) as follows:

5. 甲方应当向乙方提供足够的资源, 确保乙方有效开展船舶安全与防污染及船舶保安的管理工作;

Part A shall provide adequate resource to Part B, so that ensure Part B effectively implement ship safety and pollution prevention and ship's security management.

All crew manning and replacement, ship and equipments maintenance and emergency response etc for this vessel, should obey the order from Part B.

Source: Mr. Li Anshan.

Articles of agreement between the master and seafarers of the *Glory Morning* referring to Hua Heng Shipping Limited as "employer"

KIRIBATI SHIP REGISTRY

Ministry of Communications Transport and Tourism Development

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MASTER AND SEAFARERS ON KIRIBATI SHIP

CA/10194

Name of vessel	Official No.	Port of Registry	GT	Propulsion Power
Glory morning	K-1786136S	TARAWA	13036	~~8641~~ 7350HP

Name & address of employer	Trading Area
HUAHENG SHIPPING LIMITED	A1, A2 A3

	Name of Masters	Date	Signature
1	Kim Kyong chol	9, 1, 2014	
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			

Source: The Panel.

Figure 3. Information on Mr. Ri Phyong Gu

An official document referring to Mr. Ri Phyong Gu's connection to Petrel Shipping Company Limited

A Thailand-based company's request for Thailand to issue visa for Mr. Ri Phyong Gu



บริษัท มารีนเนอร์ส ชิปปิ้ง แอนด์ เทรดดิ้ง จำกัด
MARINER'S SHIPPING & TRADING CO., LTD.

Ref: MST008/2312 24 December 2013

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
The Royal Thai Embassy,
Beijing, China

Dear Excellency,

We would like to request your Excellency to kindly issue visa to The Kingdom of Thailand to the following persons:

Name	Date of Birth	Passport No.
Mr. RI PHYONG GU	23 SEPT 1961	563420640
Mrs. RI SUN YONG (Spouse)	19 MAY 1961	563420641

Mr. RI PHYONG GU, the Chartering Manager of the PETREL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED, Pyongyang, D.P.R. of Korea and his spouse will visit our office for the purpose of Practicing in the field of Shipping and Chartering Operations of Thai's system for duration of about 90 days.

We, as their exclusive representative in Thailand will be fully responsible for the said persons during their stay in the Kingdom of Thailand.

Your kind attention would be greatly appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

[redacted]

M.S.T.

Managing Director

Source: The Panel.

Figure 4. CM Chartering's email address

A directory obtained by the Panel from the *Mu Du Bong* lists multiple OMM-associated entities connected to this vessel, which includes "MIRAE SHIPPING" and "CM Chartering".

MIRAE SHIPPING	E-Mail	MIRAESHPGOZ@MRSHIPPING.COM.CN	CHINA
REP MIRAE	E-Mail	miraerep@cmchartering.com	
CM CHARTERING	E-Mail	CHARTERING@CMCHARTERING.CON	CHINA
CM CHARTERING	E-Mail	OPERATION@CMCHARTERING.COM	CHINA

Source: The Panel

Reference

From: "Cmchartering" <chartering@cmchartering.com>
To: "Cmchartering" <chartering@cmchartering.com> <guoc@un.org>,
Cc: <furukawa@un.org>
Date: 08/01/2015 02:46
Subject: 答复: re Inquiries from 1874 Panel, United Nations Security Councile

Following was sent to you nominated e-mail address by hua heng shipping and it was returned, we we quote here below:

Qte

To: CM chartering LTD.
Fm: Hua Heng Shipping Limited
Dear Mr.FU
As we received your information and I have replied to them, but the system have been returned the email.
so please help me to T/S the explain to them.
tks for your good coop.!
b/regds
capt.li

发件人: huahengshipping
发送时间: 2015-01-08 15:17
收件人: guoc; furukawa

Figure 5. OMM Singapore's email instruction to Chinpo referring to *South Hill 2*



03/08/2015
Admitted as P34

Mary

From: Ocean Spore [oceanspore@starhub.net.sg]
Sent: Tuesday, 25 June, 2013 6:55 PM
To: chinpo beetin; Mary
Cc: Ocean Russia D
Subject: CCG FRT

To Chinpo
Fr Ocean Singapore

CCG FRT

Asper your request, checked with Ocean about cargo name and quantity and received reply asf,

CARGO DETAILS: 10201 MTS OF (1893 BUNDLES) HOT ROLLED STEEL PLATES.
CONSIGNEE NAME: METAL CUBA

In the meantime, pls advise if you declared Ship's name to bank as CCG and if not yet, pls mention ship's name MV <SOUTH HILL 2>.

Regards

Source: Singapore.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Figure 6.

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Figure 7. Information on Dalian Sea Glory

Through its investigation, the Panel has identified that Sea Star Ship Co Ltd and Hua Heng Shipping Limited are managed by the same three Chinese nationals who are linked to a Dalian-based company, Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd, which was possibly involved in an incident of violation in 2011.

Hua Heng Shipping Limited is registered both in Hong Kong and in Panama.
The Panamanian registration record provides the following three Chinese individuals as the "Authorized Official" for Hua Heng Shipping:

- **Lu Tie He**
- **Fan Min Tian**
- **Dong Chang Qing**

These individuals are also listed in the Hong Kong company registration database as the shareholders and current/former directors of Sea Star Ship Co., Ltd (Hong Kong company number).

They are registered in Hong Kong with an address "Room 09, Chengda Building, Renmin Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China". This address has been used by Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd, which shows that these three individuals are also affiliated with Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd.

From May 2006 to July 2011, Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co Ltd was listed in the IMO database as the ship manager and operator of the vessel *Light* (IMO 8415433). In May 2011, the United States Navy attempted to inspect this vessel because "it had reasonable grounds to believe the vessel was transferring proliferation-related items" (Letter from United States to 1718 Committee dated 24 August 2011 [ref./AC.49.2011/COMM.26]). After this incident, this vessel was renamed in July 2011 to *Victory 3* and re-registered in August 2011 with a new ship manager and operator of Sea Star Ship Co Ltd.

Figure 7-1. Correspondence from Mr. Fan Min Tan

Email correspondence from Mr. Fan of 23 December 2015.

Dear *[abbreviated]*,

刚与您办公室通电话，关于安理会调查一事， 本人澄清理顺以下：

1， Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co.,Limited 已于2015年10月正式注销，解体。
2， V - Star ships co.Ltd. 于2014年10 月更换股东， 目前只有股东一人（ 范民田），完全由 范民田 操作该公司。
3， Sea star ships Co Ltd 于2014年 更换股东， 范民田及董长青 不是该公司股东，不参与该公司任何事务。
4， 范民田/董长青/吕铁和 三人于2014 年9月分开，不在一起共事，各自独立工作。
5， 对于Hua heng shipping limited 是个管理公司，我们只做顾问咨询，协助船舶登记检验 事宜，因为 上述三人是船旗国验船师，做合理工作。
6， V-star ships co.,Ltd. 与OMMC 及Chinpo /cuba 没有任何联系，更不涉及这条船Chon Chong Gang 任何操作， 记得2013 年汇款一事， 有个公司 与 V-star ships Co.,Ltd 很相似，那家公司是blacklist , 美国以为是同一家公司，后来我 们解释一下就没事了，信箱出过问题，当时 回复内容都丢失了。
7， 关于Victory 3 ，再次澄清 我们以前只是做ISM &ISPS ， 不涉及任何商务及技术服务， 这条船是中国船东（Ever ocean shipping agency Co) , *[abbreviated]*， 如果违反联合国对朝鲜制裁政策，将通知*[abbreviated]*解除管理。

8， 如有任何想知道的， 随时联系我：*[abbreviated]*

顺祝圣诞快乐！

范民田

English translation

I have just spoken with your office by telephone. Regarding the Security Council investigation, I hereby make the following clarifications:

1. Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co., Limited formally cancelled its registration in October 2015 and has [thus] been dissolved.

2. V-Star Ships Co. Ltd. changed ownership in October 2014, and currently has a single owner (Mintian FAN). The company is solely operated by Mintian FAN.

3. Sea Star Ships Co. Ltd. changed ownership in 2014; Mintian FAN and Changqing DONG are not shareholders in that company, and they do not take part in any of its business.

4. Mintian FAN, Changqing DONG and Tiehe LÜ separated in September 2014. They do not work together, as each now has his own job.

5. Hua Heng Shipping Limited is a management company; we only provide consultancy and assistance in ship registration and inspection. As the above-mentioned three individuals are flag state ship surveyors, [we] work accordingly.

6. V-Star Ships Co., Ltd. has no connection of any kind with OMMC or Chinpo/Cuba, nor is it involved with any operations of the vessel Chon Chong Gang. I recall the 2013 wire transfer; because there was a company [whose name was] very similar to V-Star Ships Co., Ltd., and that company was on the blacklist, the U.S. believed they were the same; we later [provided] clarification and the issue blew over. As there have been problems with my email account in the past, [however,] my [email] responses at the time have all been lost.

7. As to the Victory 3, let me clarify once again that we provided ISM &ISPS only [for that vessel], and were not involved in [providing] any business or technical services. This vessel is owned by a Chinese ship owner (Ever Ocean Shipping Agency Co.), while *[abbreviated]* act as the general agent for its operations. If the vessel has violated UN sanctions policies regarding the DPRK, *[abbreviated]*will be notified that the management contract shall be terminated immediately.

8. For any further information, you can reach me any time at: *[abbreviated]*

Wishing you a Merry Christmas!

Mintian FAN

Figure 7-3. The IMO registration record for Hua Heng Shipping

Company Name:	Hua Heng Shipping Ltd
IMO Company Number:	5678925
Company Address:	Room 19C, Lockhart Centre, 301-307, Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China
Country of Registration:	Hong Kong, China

Source: IMO database.

Figure 7-4. The Panamanian registration record for Hua Heng Shipping

Full Term Certificate No.: PM-121131
Interim Certificate No.: PM-12 150 145

DOCUMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Issued under the provisions of the
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974, as amended,

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA

By: *Panama Maritime Documentation Services Inc.*

Name and Address of the Company:
(See paragraph 1.1.2 of the ISM Code)

HUA HENG SHIPPING LIMITED
RM 19C LOCKHART CTR 301-307 LOCKHART RD WAN CHAI HONG KONG

Company Identification Number: 5678925

Source: The Panel.

Figure 7-4 The Panamanian registration record for Hua Heng Shipping referring to "Authorized Official"



Full Term Certificate No.: PM12111

ENDORSEMENT FOR ANNUAL VERIFICATION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT, at the periodical verification in accordance with Regulation IX/6.1 of the Convention and paragraph 13.4 of the ISM Code, the Safety Management System was found to comply with the requirements of the ISM Code.

1st. ANNUAL VERIFICATION
Authorization No.: A/10/107
Name: LUTIEHE
Signed:
Signature of Authorized Official
By :
Place/Date : DALIAN, CHINA / JANUARY 13TH, 2010

2nd. ANNUAL VERIFICATION
Authorization No.: A/11/265
Name: FAN WENTIAN
Signed:
Signature of Authorized Official
By :
Place/Date : DALIAN, CHINA / APRIL 15TH, 2011

3rd. ANNUAL VERIFICATION
Authorization No.: A/12/471
Name: LUTIEHE
Signed:
Signature of Authorized Official
By:
Place/Date: DALIAN, CHINA / APRIL 24TH, 2012

4th. ANNUAL VERIFICATION
Authorization No.: A/13/469
Name: DONG CHANG BIAO
Signed:
Signature of Authorized Official
By:
Place/Date: HONGKONG CHINA / 29 APR, 2013

ISM/DOC/FTC/P (05/11)
2/2

Source: The Panel.

Figure 7-5. The Hong Kong registration record for Sea Star Ship Co., Limited (Annual return dated 20 October 2011)

CR

公司註冊處 Companies Registry

周年申報表
Annual Return
(《公司條例》第107(1)條 (Companies Ordinance s. 107(1))

表格 Form AR1

重要事項 Important Notes
- 填寫前請參閱《填表須知》。
  請用黑色墨水筆填寫。
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form.
  Please print in black ink.

公司編號 Company Number: 1517895

1 公司名稱 Company Name: SEA STAR SHIP CO., LIMITED 海之星船務有限公司

2 商業名稱 Business Name: N/A

3 公司類別 Type of Company
請在適當的方格內加上「✓」號 Please tick the relevant box
☑ 有股本的私人公司 Private company having a share capital
☐ 其他 Others

4 本申報表日期 Date of this Return
本申報表所載公司資料是在何日期爲止的資料
The information in this return is made up to: 20 (日 DD) 10 (月 MM) 2011 (年 YYYY)

表格 Form AR1

公司編號 Company Number: 1517895

10 有股本公司的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) of a Company Having a Share Capital
(有股本的公司必須填寫此節。如此空間不足，請另建表格 A 填寫。 Company having a share capital must complete this section. Use Continuation Sheet A if there is insufficient space.)

截至本申報表日期的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) as at the Date of this Return

股份類別 Class of Shares: Ordinary

姓名／名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares: 現時持有量 Current Holding	股份 Shares: 轉讓* Transferred * 數目 Number	股份 Shares: 轉讓* Transferred * 日期 Date	備註 Remarks
范民田 FAN MINTIAN	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	4,000			
呂鐵和 LU TIEHE	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	3,000			
董長青 DONG CHANGQING	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	3,000			

Source: ICRIS website available at http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/.

Figure 7-6. Information on the *Victory 3*

Ship Particulars / VICTORY 3
IMO 8415433

Name:	VICTORY 3	*(effective 2011-07)*
	Light	*(effective 2006-05)*
Ship manager:	Sea Star Ship Co Ltd	*(effective 2011-08-01)*
	IMO company number	IMO 5570925
	Nationality of registration	Hong Kong, China
	Company status	
	Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co	*(effective 2006-05-23)*
	IMO company number	IMO 5233903
	Nationality of registration	China, People's Republic of
Operator:	Sea Star Ship Co Ltd	*(effective 2011-08-01)*
	IMO company number	IMO 5570925
	Nationality of registration	Hong Kong, China
	Company status	
	Dalian Sea Glory Shipping Co	*(effective 2006-05-23)*
	IMO company number	IMO 5233903
	Nationality of registration	China, People's Republic of

Source: IMO database.

Figure 7-7. Information on V-Star Ships Limited

Hong Kong company registration record for V-Star Ships Limited

CR

公司註冊處 Companies Registry

周年申報表
Annual Return
(《公司條例》第107(1)條)
(Companies Ordinance s. 107(1))

表格 Form AR1

重要須知 Important Notes
- 填妥前請參閱《填表須知》。
  請用黑色墨水列印。
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form.
  Please print in black ink.

公司編號 Company Number: 1456770

1 公司名稱 Company Name
V-STAR SHIPS LIMITED
海之星船業有限公司

2 商業名稱 Business Name
N/A

3 公司類別 Type of Company
請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box
☑ 有股本的私人公司 Private company having a share capital
☐ 其他 Others

4 本申報表日期 Date of this Return
本申報表列載公司截至右列日期為止的資料 The information in this return is made up to
14 (日 DD) 5 (月 MM) 2013 (年 YYYY)

截至本申報表日期的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) as at the Date of this Return

股份類別 Class of Shares: Ordinary

姓名／名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares		
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓* Transferred *	
			數目 Number	日期 Date
范民田 FAN MINTIAN	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	4,000		
呂鐵和 LU TIEHE	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	3,000		
董長青 DONG CHANGQING	ROOM M09, CHENGDA BUILDING, RENMIN ROAD, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA	3,000		

Source: The Hong Kong company registration database.

Figure 8. Aoyang International and East Grand Shipping

The contact person for Aoyang International Company Limited (澳洋國際有限公司) is listed on commercial company websites as Mr. Li Kun (李鵑). He is also listed as a designated person for the Fertility 9 of East Grand Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5720074) on the vessel's registration document.

Shipping document of the Fertility 9 referring to Mr. Li Kun

10. MANAGER'S / MANAGEMENT COMPANY'S PARTICULARS AND DECLARATION

Name of Manager / Management Company
EAST GRAND SHIPPING CO LIMITED

IMO Reg. Company Number
5720074

Address
ROOM 918 NAN FUNG CENTRE 264-298 CASTL
PEAK ROAD TSUEN WAN N.T. HONG KONG
Emergency contact details

Name of Designated Person (ISM Code)[4]
LI KUN

Designation to Management Company

Mobile phone 0086-13840817883

Telephone 0086-411-82727161

Fax 0086-411-82727160

E-mail AOYANGMARINE@HOTMAIL.COM

Source: The Panel.

Figure 8-1. Grand Karo

DPRK crew members affiliated with OMM-controlled vessels who were *Grand Karo*'s crew as of 2014

- Crew list of the *Grand Karo* of 2014

Mr. Pak Kwang Il (date of birth: 13 June 1979)

PAK KWANG IL		M	APP. Deck officer	D.P.R. KOREA	13 JUN 1979/ N.HAMGYONG	931399896 / 20 JUL 2019

Mr. Kang Yong Ho (date of birth: 5 January 1968)

KANG YONG HO		M	Deck Rating	D.P.R. KOREA	05 JAN 1968/ KANG WON	942324178 / 25 MAR 2018

- Crew list of the *Jang San* of 2011

Mr. Pak Kwang Il (date of birth: 13 June 1979)

DECK RATING	PAK KWANG IL		DPRK	1979.06.13	931399896	05 Nov 2014	16 Jul 2019

- Crew list of the *Po Thong Gang* of 2011

Mr. Kang Yong Ho (date of birth: 5 January 1968)

KANG	YONG HO		DECK RATING	KOREA	1968.1.5	942324178	Seamans Passport

Source: The Panel

Figure 9. Shenghao Marine

Shenghao Marine Hong Kong Ltd is connected to Mr. Kasatsugu through at least two companies and two vessels.

- Shenghao Marine Hong Kong Ltd provides a "care of address" for at least two Hong Kong-registered companies, Rich Step Shipping Limited (IMO 5647097) and New Champ Shipping Limited (IMO 5649955); Mr. Kasatsugu serves as the director of these two companies.

- Until early 2015, Shenghao Marine Hong Kong Ltd was listed as the ship manager and operator of the two vessels *Ocean Dawning* (IMO 8505329) and *Ocean Galaxy* (IMO 8418277); their registered owners were Rich Step Shipping Ltd and New Champ Shipping Ltd, respectively (both vessels were registered in the IMO database as "Broken up" in February 2015) (IMO database).

- Shenghao Marine's directors have also served as the directors or shareholders of Shenghao Shipping Limited. This company's director included Mr. Zhang Qiao.

Shenghao Marine Hong Kong Ltd's address used by Rich Step Shipping Limited and New Champ Shipping Limited

IMO number :	5647097
Name of company :	RICH STEP SHIPPING LTD
Address :	Care of Shenghao Marine (Hong Kong) Ltd Room 1105, Tower One, Lippo Centre, 89, Queensway, Central, Hong Kong, China. 999077,
Last update :	22/06/2015
IMO number :	5649955
Name of company :	NEW CHAMP SHIPPING LTD
Address :	Care of Shenghao Marine (Hong Kong) Ltd Room 1105, Tower One, Lippo Centre, 89, Queensway, Central, Hong Kong, China. 999077,
Last update :	22/06/2015

Source: Equasis database.

Figure 9-2. The Hong Kong company registration record for Shenghao Shipping Limited

CR

周年申報表
Annual Return
（《公司條例》第107(1)條）
(Companies Ordinance s. 107(1))

公司註冊處
Companies Registry

表格 Form AR1

重要事項 Important Notes

- 填表前請參閱（填表須知），
  請用黑色筆水列印。
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form.
  Please print in black ink.

公司編號 Company Number: 1461526

1 公司名稱 Company Name
SHENGHAO SHIPPING LIMITED
聖浩船務有限公司

2 商業名稱 Business Name
NIL

3 公司類別 Type of Company
請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box
☑ 有股本的私人公司 Private company having a share capital
☐ 其他 Others

4 本申報表日期 Date of this Return
本申報表列載公司截至右列日期為止的資料
The information in this return is made up to
27 (日 DD) 5 (月 MM) 2013 (年 YYYY)

個人董事詳情（第 12A 項） Details of Individual Director (Section 12A)

請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box(es)

身份 Capacity
☑ 董事 Director
☐ 候補董事 Alternate Director
代替 Alternate to

中文姓名 Name in Chinese: 張橋

英文姓名 Name in English: ZHANG (姓氏 Surname) QIAO (名字 Other Names)

Figure 10. Bene Star and Baili Shipping

Bene Star Shipping & Trading Ltd

- In Chinese: 吉星船舶貿易有限公司
- IMO Company Number: 5764656
- Hong Kong company number 1599520
- Address: Room 2105, JDL 782, Trend Centre, 29-31, Cheung Lee Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, China (same address with Baili Shipping)
- **Mr. Zhang Qiao 張橋**
  - Shareholder (12 May 2013-)
  - Director (12 May 2013-)

- Bene Star Shipping & Trading Ltd is listed as the ship manager and registered owner of the *Orion Star* (IMO 9333589) since 6 November 2013. According to information provided by a Member State, this vessel was controlled by OMM as of September 2015.

- According to information provided by Senat Shipping Limited's solicitors, Senat Shipping signed a bareboat charter agreement dated 14 August 2014 with Bene Star Shipping and Trading Limited for the vessel *Dawnlight*.

Figure 10-2. Senat-Bene Star

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9110236	DAWNLIGHT	361014494/2015/Ulaanbaatar	Single deck bulk carrier	3800HP(2794KW

Length (Article 2(50))	Breadth (Regulation 2(73))	Moulded Depth (Regulation 2(22))	Number of Tons	
334	04	23	Gross	Register NT
21	23	10	8437	5036

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We, (a) *SENAT SHIPPING LIMITED* (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at British Virginia Islands in consideration of the sum of *USD 2,200,000.00 - (United States Dollars Two Millions Two Hundred Thousands Only)* paid to us by (1) BENE STAR SHIPPING AND TRADING LIMITED of RM 2105 JDL782 Trend Centre 29-31 Cheung Lee St. Chai Wan, Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the transferees") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledge, transfer *ALL (100%)* shares in the ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) their assigns, that we have power To transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from *all* encumbrances (d) *charters, maritime liens, mortgages, claims and any other debts whatsoever.*

In witness whereof we have executed this bill of sale on the *21st day of September 2015.*

By: _(Sign&stamp)
Name: Mr. Lai yong Chiam
Title: Attorney-in-fact

Source: The Panel.

Figure 10-2. Dawnlight

DPRK crew members formerly affiliated with OMM-controlled vessels that are currently operating the *Dawnlight*

A crew list for the *Dawnlight*

52 VOYAGE LIST

No	NAME	RANK	NATIONALITY	BIRTHDAY	S.PASSPORT
1	AN YONG GYUN	MASTER	KOREAN	1957.11.16	953355780
2	KIM GANG CHOL	CHIEF MATE	KOREAN	1961.08.13	949320892
3	JO POK NAM	DECK OFFICER	KOREAN	1971.02.18	930301096
4	RI YONG CHOL	DECK OFFICER	KOREAN	1968.03.09	942326230
5	KIM JIN MYONG	BOATSWAIN	KOREAN	1974.10.15	936391770
6	RI JONG CHOL	DECK RATING	KOREAN	1969.09.06	941325820
7	RI JONG CHON	DECK RATING	KOREAN	1963.10.25	947329970

Source: Senat Shipping

A crew list for the *O Un Chon Nyon Ho* as of 14 April 2011

LAST NAME *	1ST NAME *	CAPACITY *	BIRTHDAY* (dd/mm/yyyy)	NATIONALITY* (Country)	ID* (Number)
YONG NAM	JONG	MASTER	1960.11.14	DPR KOREA	950354746
HAK	JANG HAK	CHIEF MATE	1965.2.1	DPR KOREA	945328883
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
YONG CHOL	RI	DECK OFFICER	1968.3.9	DPR KOREA	942326230

Source: The Panel

A crew list for the *Chon Chong Gang* as of 9 July 2013

M/V; CHONG CHON GANG
FLAG: DPR KOREA

CREW`S LIST

PANAMA CANAL
DDATE,09.07.2013

No	LAST NAME *	1ST NAME *	CAPACITY *	BIRTHDAY* (dd/mm/yyyy)	NATIONALITY* (Country)	ID* (Number)	ID TYPE * (Passport or Seamans License)
1	RI	YONG IL	Master	02.05.1961	DPR Korea	949321568	Seamans Passport
2	HONG	YONG HYON	Chief Mate	10.07.1960	DPR Korea	950357290	Seamans Passport
3	JON	HYONG BOK	Deck Officer	09.09.1961	DPR Korea	949324467	Seamans Passport
4	KIM	MYONG GWANG	Deck Officer	12.11.1972	DPR Korea	938393162	Seamans Passport
5	RI	JONG CHON	Deck Officer	25.10.1963	DPR Korea	947329976	Seamans Passport

Source: The Panel

Annex 90 : The Panel's views of the OMM-associated vessels

According to recent information from specialized maritime databases, the vessels *Chol Ryong*, *Hui Chon, Kang Gye, Ryong Rim*, and *Tae Ryong Gang* visited or were sighted near the ports of Russia and China in 2015. Previously, the Panel concluded that these vessels were included in the 14 vessels that were owned and/or controlled by OMM or by entities acting on its behalf or at its direction in assisting the evasion of sanctions, and that therefore they should be subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013).[27]

In that regard, the Panel's reasoning is provided below.

1. The vessels *Chol Ryong*, *Hui Chon, Kang Gye, Ryong Rim*, and *Tae Ryong Gang*

- The vessels' connections to OMM as of 28 July 2014

  As of 28 July 2014, when OMM was designated by the 1718 Committee, specialized maritime databases provided the following information about each vessel:

  a) *Chol Ryong* (formerly known as *Ryong Gun Bong*) (IMO 8606173)
     - OMM was listed as the vessel's International Safety Management (ISM) Manager;
     - Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd (IMO 1845139) was listed as the group beneficial owner, the ship manager and operator for the vessel (this entity has been also listed as the ship manager and operator for the *Mu Du Bong* (IMO 8328197) which was determined by the 1718 Committee as "a vessel owned and controlled by OMM", showing that Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd has been acting on OMM's behalf or at its direction or has been controlled by OMM); and
     - The vessel's registered owner was Ryonggunbong Shipping Co., Ltd. which has used a "care of" address provide by Taedonggang Sonbak Co Ltd.

  b) *Hui Chon* (formerly known as *Hwang Gum San 2*) (IMO 5817790)
     - From October 2012 to September 2014, the *Hui Chon* (IMO 8405270) was registered in the IMO database with the name *Hwang Gum San 2*, whose ship manager and operator were registered as OMM. During this period, the vessel's registered owner was also listed in the IMO database as Hwanggumsan Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5701481) with a c/o address provided by OMM.
     - Following the July 2014 designation of OMM in September 2014, the *Hwang Gum San 2* was renamed to the *Hui Chon* in the database of the Maritime Administration of DPR Korea. The renaming was officially registered in the IMO database in October 2014, and the vessel was re-registered with a new ship manager and operator as Pyongjin Ship Management Co (IMO 5817790) and a new registered owner as Huichon Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817812). According to the IMO database, Huichon Shipping Co Ltd was incorporated on 5 August 2014, just eight days after the Committee's designation of OMM, using a c/o address provided by Pyongjin Ship Management Co Ltd.

[27] S/2015/131, pg. 47-49 and 56, and Recommendation 3 (b).

- OMM was also identified as the *Hwang Gum San 2*'s operator and/or owner (or ISM Manager) by the port state control inspection authorities under the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding (Tokyo MOU).

c) *Kang Gye* (formerly known as *Pi Ryu Gang*) (IMO 8829593)
- This vessel, formerly known as *Pi Ryu Gang*, was renamed to *Kang Gye* in September 2014. OMM was listed as the vessel's ship manager and operator in the IMO database and the Port State Control Inspection records between 2011 and 10 September 2014.
- The registered owner of the *Pi Ryu Gang* was a DPRK entity, Biryugang Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5434313), which is registered in the IMO database with an address that is "care of" OMM. The vessel's ship manager and operator as registered in the IMO database since 11 September 2014 is a DPRK entity, Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd (IMO 5814883), and its registered owner since 11 September 2014 is a DPRK entity named Kanggye Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5822804).

d) *Ryong Rim* (formerly known as *Jon Jin 2*) (IMO 8018912)
- OMM was listed as the ship manager and operator for the vessel;
- OMM was identified as the vessel's ISM Manager by the port state control inspection authorities under the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding; and
- The vessel's registered owner was Jonjin Shipping Co Ltd which has used a c/o address provided by OMM.

e) *Tae Ryong Gang* (formerly known as *Ap Rok Gang*) (IMO 8132835)
- OMM was listed as the ship manager and operator for the vessel;
- OMM has been identified as the vessel's ISM Manager by the port state control inspection authorities under the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding; and
- The vessel's registered owner was Amnokgang Shipping Co., Ltd. which has used an address provided by OMM.

According to International Safety Management Code's Resolution A.741(18) as amended by MSC.104(73), MSC.179(79), MSC.195(80) and MSC.273(85), the ISM Manager (or "Company") is defined as the following:

> "1.1.2 *Company* means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility imposed by the Code."

In light of the abovementioned information, the Panel concluded that as of 28 July 2014, these vessels were owned and/or controlled by OMM.

- Renaming and re-registration of OMM-controlled vessels after 28 July 2014 to evade the sanctions

Following the 28 July 2014 designation of OMM, all these vessels were renamed and re-registered in the IMO database with new registered owners, ship managers and operators, as summarized below:

a) *Ryong Gun Bong*
- The vessel was renamed as *Chol Ryong* on 1 August 2014;
- Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new ISM Manager, ship manager and operator on 1 August 2014; and
- Cholryong Shipping Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new registered owner on 1 August 2014, which has used a c/o address provided by Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd.

b) *Hui Chon* (formerly known as *Hwang Gum San 2*) (IMO 5817790)
- The vessel was renamed as Hui Chon in September 2014.
- A new ship manager and operator as Pyongjin Ship Management Co (IMO 5817790) and a new registered owner as Huichon Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5817812).

c) *Kang Gye* (formerly known as *Pi Ryu Gang*) (IMO 8829593)
- This vessel, formerly known as *Pi Ryu Gang*, was renamed to *Kang Gye* in September 2014.
- The vessel's ship manager and operator as registered in the IMO database since 11 September 2014 is Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd (IMO 5814883), and its registered owner since 11 September 2014 is Kanggye Shipping Co Ltd (IMO 5822804).

d) *Jon Jin 2*
- The vessel was renamed as *Ryong Rim* on 1 September 2014;
- Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new ISM Manager, ship manager and operator on 5 September 2014; and
- Ryongrim Shipping Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new registered owner on 5 September 2014, which has used a c/o address provided by Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd.

e) *Ap Rok Gang*
- The vessel was renamed as *Tae Ryong Gang* on 1 October 2014;
- Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new ISM Manager, ship manager and operator on 26 September 2014 ; and
- Taeryonggang Shipping Co Ltd is listed as the vessel's new registered owner on 26 September 2014, which has used a c/o address provided by Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd.

The Security Council has officially included the "renaming or re-registration of…vessels" in the category of "transfer of DPRK…vessels to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions" (paragraph 19 of resolution 2094 (2013)). Renaming and re-registration of vessels have been officially determined by the Security Council as one of the various means to evade sanctions.

As noted, these vessels were among the 14 vessels controlled by OMM that were renamed and re-registered in the IMO database with other DPRK ship managers, operators and registered owners, following the July 2014 designation of OMM (see, S/2015/131, paragraph 110).

As a result of these re-registrations of OMM-controlled vessels, OMM was dissolved in the IMO database, and these vessels and the DPRK entities that control and/or own the vessels have successfully evaded the UN sanctions. For example, the *Hui Chon, Ryong Rim* and the *Tae Ryong Gang* were inspected by the port state control inspection authorities in October 2014 and January 2015. But the vessels were never subjected under the assets freeze.

In light of this, in its 2015 Final Report, the Panel considers that the renaming and reregistration of OMM-controlled vessels after 28 July 2014 is an attempt to evade sanctions by OMM, and that these DPRK companies -- which have been newly registered for these vessels – have been acting on OMM's behalf or at its direction and assisting OMM in the evasion of sanctions.

- Member States obligations under relevant provisions in the resolutions

Pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 8 of resolution 2094 (2013), Member States are obliged to immediately freeze assets and economic resources on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated entities or individuals or any individual or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction. Member States are also obliged by paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) to prevent the transfer from their territories of any assets or resources that could contribute to the evasion of sanctions, including by freezing such assets or resources.

The Panel notes that Member States' obligations for assets freeze are not limited to those owned or controlled directly by OMM, but also apply to those owned or controlled by entities acting on OMM's behalf or at its direction, as well as those that could contribute to the evasion of sanctions.

As noted, the these vessels are assets currently owned and controlled officially by the aforementioned DPRK entities (the newly registered owners, operator and managers for the vessels) which have been acting on OMM's behalf and assisting OMM in the evasion of sanctions.

Port state control inspection records from the Tokyo MOU database

Hui Chon (18 November 2015)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
ASIA PACIFIC COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM

INSPECTION DETAILS

name of ship:	HUICHON	call sign:	HMZI
date keel laid:	18.11.1983		
gross tonnage:	3463		
deadweight:	5686		
type of ship:	General cargo/multipurpose		
flag of ship:	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of		
classification society:	Korea Classification Society		
company IMO No:	5817790		
particulars of company:	Pyongjin Ship Management Co Ltd		
name of reporting authority:	Russian Federation		
place of inspection:	Nakhodka		
date of inspection:	11.09.2015		

Kang Gye (11 December 2015)

INSPECTION DETAILS

name of ship:	KANG GYE	call sign:	HMAK
date keel laid:	30.05.1984		
gross tonnage:	6582		
deadweight:	9589		
type of ship:	General cargo/multipurpose		
flag of ship:	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of		
classification society:	Korea Classification Society		
company IMO No:	5814883		
particulars of company:	Yongjin Ship Management Co Ltd		
name of reporting authority:	Russian Federation		
place of inspection:	Vladivostok		
date of inspection:	11.12.2015		
deficiencies:	yes		
ship detained:	no		
number of deficiencies	8	including:	

Ryong Rim (12 October 2014)



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
ASIA PACIFIC COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM

SHIP DETAILS
(according to last update)

Ship Name: RYONG RIM	IMO No.: 8018112	Call Sign: HMYH	
Ship Type: 340 - Bulk carrier		Gross Tonnage: 15384	
Flag: KP - Korea, Democratic People's Republic of		Deadweight: 26450	
Classification Society: 196 - Korea Classification Society		Date Keel Laid: 23.03.1981	
Company Name: Haejin Ship Management Co Ltd		Company IMO Number: 5814066	

Click to get details ----> High Risk Ship, Priority I, Window Inspection Range: 12.12.2014 - 12.02.2015

Inspection List

Legend: □ - initial inspection ■ - follow-up without new deficiencies recorded ☑ - follow-up with new deficiencies recorded

	Inspection Date	Inspection Place	Ship Name (at the moment of inspection)	Call Sign (at the moment of inspection)	Flag (at the moment of inspection)	No. of Deficiencies (total / new)	Detention
□	12.10.2014	Rizhao, China	RYONG RIM	HMYH	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	16 / 16	no
□	04.08.2011	Zhanjiang, China	JON JIN 2	HMBI	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	12 / 12	no

Tae Ryong Gang (12 October 2014; 19 and 30 January 2015)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
ASIA PACIFIC COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM

SHIP DETAILS
(according to last update)

Ship Name: TAE RYONG GANG	IMO No.: 8122835	Call Sign: HMBG	
Ship Type: 300 - General cargo/multipurpose		Gross Tonnage: 9149	
Flag: KP - Korea, Democratic People's Republic of		Deadweight: 12200	
Classification Society: 196 - Korea Classification Society		Date Keel Laid: 01.01.1979	
Company Name: Yonsin Ship Management Co Ltd		Company IMO Number: 5816802	

Click to get details ----> High Risk Ship, Priority I, Window Inspection Range: 19.03.2015 - 19.05.2015

Inspection List

Legend: □ - initial inspection ■ - follow-up without new deficiencies recorded ☑ - follow-up with new deficiencies recorded

	Inspection Date	Inspection Place	Ship Name	Call Sign	Flag	No. of Deficiencies (total / new)	Detention
■	30.01.2015	Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China	TAE RYONG GANG	HMBG	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	27 / 0	no
□	19.01.2015	Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China	TAE RYONG GANG	HMBG	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	15 / 15	yes
□	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	no
■	06.04.2014	Yingkou, China	AP ROK GANG	HMYF	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	7 / 0	no
□	04.04.2014	Yingkou, China	AP ROK GANG	HMYF	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	18 / 18	yes

Annex 91 : Korea Ryongaksan General trading Corporation

Korea Ryonbong General Corporation



Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, March 1996.

Korea Ryongaksan General Trading Corporation

Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, June 1993.

Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, February 1993.

Annex 92 : Lyongaksan's branch in Zhuhai

(Unofficial translation)
Operation period of business: From Dec. 13, 2005 to Dec. 2011
Business Operation Status: Still active

(Unofficial Translation)
Corporate name: 朝鲜龙岳山贸易总会社珠海代表处
Corporate type: Permanent Representative of Foreign company
Representative: Kim Pyong Chan

Source: Guangdong Company Credit Information database available at http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/CheckEntContext/showInfo.html.

Annex 93 : Lyongaksan's other branches

Jian-based branch

Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com.

Dandong-based branch

Source: http://dandong07899.11467.com/about.asp.

Annex 94 : Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company

Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation (KICJVC).

The Panel has confirmed Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company (KICJVC) as a Ryonbong-controlled entity which has produced nuclear-related rare earth phosphate and also advertised its sales of a processed form of yellow cake, ("yellow cake") in an official publication. The KICJVC was originally established by Ryonbong and a Japan-based company.[28] According to the former KICJCC director, the entity founded the Hamhung Chemical Joint Venture Factory in April 1991. Official publications show that KICJVC has produced various rare metals, including monazite which contains 5-12% of thorium which is used in nuclear programmes.[29] KICJVC's products have also included ammonium diuranate (ADU), a processed form of yellowcake which is also used in nuclear programmes.[30]

Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation and Korea Pugang Trading Corporation

Hyoksin Trading Corporation was designated by the Committee on 16 July 2009 as Ryonbong's subordinate. Hyoksin has shared its contact information with Korea Pugang Corporation (KPC) and its subsidiary, Pugang Pharmaceutic Company. The Panel confirms that Hyoksin has provided administrative assistance to Pugang. In addition, state media shows that another KP subsidiary, Korea Pugang Trading Corporation (KPTC), used Ryonbong's contact numbers until as early as 2002. The Panel continues to investigate Pugang's relationship with Ryonbong.

[28] The Panel confirmed that the Japanese company terminated the joint venture prior to 2006.
[29] World Nuclear Association, "Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Material" available from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf30a.html.
[30] See: https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC41/Documents/2914annex2.html.

Figure 1. A DPRK publication referring to the International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation which was established by Ryonbong and a Japanese company.

"The International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation is run in joint investment of funds between the Korean Ryonbong General Trading Corporation and the Kokusai Trading Co., Ltd. headed by Ryo Song Gun, vice-president of the Association of the Korean Traders and Industrialists in Japan."

High-quality Rare Earth Products Exported

The International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation is run in joint investment of funds between the Korea Ryonbong General Trading Corporation and the Kokusai Trading Co., Ltd. headed by Ryo Song Gun, vice-president of the Association of the Korean Traders and Industrialists in Japan.

The corporation deals in more than 20 kinds of rare earth products made of monazite which is abundant in Korea. The export of rare earth products conforming to requirements of ultra-modern science and technology enjoy special attention on international markets for their wide applications and highly utility value.

With an annual production capacity of hundreds of tons of rare earths, the corporation has many regular buyers in many countries and regions of the world including China, Japan, Spain and Hong Kong.

The export of the products is on the steady increase.

For more information, write to:

Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK
Telex: 36007 KUKZEI KP
Tel: 850-2-3814256
Fax: 850-2-3816124

An Sul Sop, Vice-president of International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation

Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, February 1996.

Figure 2. A DPRK article referring to International Chemical J.V. Co.'s production of monazite

At present, our country is making every effort to develop equity and contractual joint ventures in the field of metal industry with many countries of the world.

The Namsan Joint Venture Company and the Kwangman Joint Venture Company newly established in our country are steadily increasing the production and export of rare metals, electrolytic zinc, zinc slag and their products in collaboration with overseas Koreans in commerce and foreign entrepreneurs.

The Machon Electric-fused Clinker Joint Venture Company and the Korea Chilbo-Kwangmyong Collaboration Company raise the production of electric-fused clinker, stainless steel and their products for export by joint investment with foreign companies.

The Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation is stepping up the production of monazite concentrates and rare-earth metals in partnership with an overseas Korean in commerce under Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan).

The equity and contractual joint ventures established between the DPRK and foreign countries in the field of metallurgical industry have brought about satisfactory results to both sides.

Today, a large number of foreign countries hope to carry out equity and contractual joint ventures with the DPRK having great potentials of production of iron and steel, and nonferrous metals and their products.

The production bases of iron and steel such as the Songjin Steel Complex and Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex exert all their efforts to boost the production of steel sheets and plates, round steel, standardized steel, wire ropes, galvanized steel plates, high-speed steel, carbon tool steel, hollowless steel, etc., in the form of joint ventures.

The Nampho General Smeltery, Tanchon Smeltery and many other nonferrous metal production bases are also turning out a large quantity of high-grade electrolytic zinc, electrolytic lead and cadmium, in cooperation with foreign entrepreneurs as well as overseas Koreans in commerce.

With the strengthening of production potentials of metallurgical industry, our country will develop still further equity and contractual joint ventures in the manufacture of ferrous and nonferrous metals and their processed goods with many countries of the world.

Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, March 1997.

Figure 3. A DPRK article referring to International Chemical J.V. Co.'s production of monazite

共和国で創設されたレア・アース生産基地

'91 科協学術報告会

国際化学合弁会社、咸興化学合弁工場

特別講演 趙康遠

世界に通用する品質を保証

8月、十数トンの製品を日本に初輸入

Source: Chosun Commerce and Industry Newspaper (朝鮮商工新聞), 23 July 1991, made available by North Korea Today.

Figure 4. A DPRK article referring to International Chemical J.V. Co.'s production of ammonium diuranate



Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, April 2002.

Annex 95 : Korea Equipment & Plant Corporation

Business cards of the representatives of Korea Equipment & Plant Corporation (KEPC) rovide the company's name in Korean "종합설비수출입회사" which is the same name as Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation.

Figure 1. KEPC's name in Korean script

Source: The Panel.

Korean script of the Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation from the 1718 Committee's informal list



Source: 1718 Committee's website available from https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/20141030_updated_list_entities_and_individuals_korean_new_format_rev_1.pdf

Annex 96 : Korea Pugang Trading Corporation

Figure 1. Pugang Corporation

朝鮮富強会社 http://www.pugangcorp.com/

Korea Pugang Corporation was incorporated on July 3, 1979 with a commitment to render a service to the nation for its economic prosperity.

The Corporation's registered capital is 3 billion Won (some US$ 20 million) and its annual average turnover foots up to 22.5 billion Won (some US$ 150 million).

Korea Pugang Corporation comprises some management sections and such component companies as Pugang Trading Corp., Pugang Motorbike Co., Ltd., Pugang Hwangchiryong Co., Ltd., Pugang Pharmaceutic Co., Ltd., Pugang Electronic Co., Ltd., Pugang Coins Corp., Pugang Crystals Co., Ltd., and Pugang Natural Food Co., Ltd.

The Corporation runs gold mines, mints, factory of alcohol, pharmaceutical plants, drinking water factories, and other large number of factories of various industries such as metallurgy, mining, machinery, chemicals, electric, electronic, glassware, and timber.

The Corporation has off-shore branch offices or agents in Beijing, Dandong, Ji'an, Shanghai, Moscow, Nakhodka, Havana, Berlin, Sofia, Fribourg(Switzerland), Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, Cairo, Damascus, and Addis Ababa.

Ever since its birth, Korea Pugang Corporation has been doing its best to command a streamlined business making steady investments in order to keep its facilities and factory equipment up to date, provide a wider selection of its export products, and optimize their qualities, thus making them all highly competitive.

In the years to come, we will further contribute to the ever-prosperity of our nation by constantly updating our business operations and factory equipments, developing new high-tech products and by maximizing the variety, volume and frequency of our transactions with our customers and suppliers worldwide.

On this occasion, we express great thanks to all those who have done any business with us and who, by so doing, have provided us with easier access to the world market and business expertise.

Dr Jon Sung Hun, President

Source: http://www.pugangcorp.com/ of 11 June 2008, accessed through WaybackMachine.com.

Figure 2. Hyoksin sharing contact information with Pugang Corporation's subsidiaries



Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, 2008, No. 1 (left) and 2013, No. 1 (right).

Source: http://www.cxtzw.com/ShowTequNews.asp?id=688.

Figure 3. Pugang Trading using Lyongaksan's telex number "36053 LS KP"

Source: Foreign Trade of the DPRK, February 2002.

Annex 97 : Mr. Piao's companies and connection with Mr. Ma and Mr. Li

Mr. Piao Chengyuan (or Park Seung Won) is listed as the director of Dalian Union with Mr. Cai Guang, and as shareholder of Dandong Yongxinghe, together with Mr. Ma and Mr. Li.



丹东市永联贸易有限公司　注册号：210600004026293

工商公示信息 | 企业公示信息 | 其他部门公示信息

登记信息 | 备案信息 | 动产抵押登记信息 | 股权出质登记信息 | 行政处罚信息 | 经营异常信息 | 严重违法信息 | 抽查检查信息

基本信息

注册号	210600004026293	名称	丹东市永联贸易有限公司
类型	有限责任公司（自然人投资或控股）	法定代表人	马秀文
注册资本	50 万人民币	成立日期	2007年06月22日
住所	丹东市振兴中路861号1106室		
营业期限自	2007年06月22日	营业期限至	2017年06月19日
经营范围	批发、零售：建筑材料、钢材、金属材料（专项规定除外）、装饰材料、五金交电、日用百货、针织品、服装鞋帽、机械电器、塑料制品、办公用品、化工原料及产品（不含危险品）、电脑及辅助设备、农副农畜产品（专项规定除外）、货物及技术进出口（法律、法规禁止的项目除外，法律、法规限制经营的项目取得许可证后方可经营）。（对外经贸小额贸易）		
登记机关	丹东边境经济合作区市场监督管理局	核准日期	2013年05月22日
登记状态	存续（在营、开业、在册）		

股东信息

股东的出资信息截止2014年1月1日，2014年1月1日之后（含当日）公示股东基本信息，其他出资信息由企业自主公示。

股东类型	股东	证照/证件类型	证照/证件号码	详情
自然人股东	程承阵	中华人民共和国居民身份证		详情
自然人股东	马秀文	中华人民共和国居民身份证		详情

变更信息

变更事项	变更前内容	变更后内容	变更日期
经营范围变更（含业务范围变更）	批发、零售：建筑材料、钢材、金属材料（专项规定除外）、装饰材料、五金交电 展开	批发、零售：建筑材料、钢材、金属材料（专项规定除外）、装饰材料、五金交 展开	2008年07月21日

Source: The Chinese company registration database available from http://gsxt.lngs.gov.cn/.

Mr. Piao Chengyuan is listed as shareholder of Dandong Union with Mr. Ma Gewen.

Annex 98 : Dandong Union and Dandong Yongxinghe's connection with Korea Taesong

Korea Daesong (Taesong) from commercial business registry database

Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company.

Dandong Union from Official Chinese Company Registry Database

Source: http://gsxt.lngs.gov.cn/saicpub/entPublicitySC/entPublicityDC/sEntDetail.action.

Figure 2: Dandong Union address Information from Commercial Website, showing relationship between address 滨江中路 64 号 and 佳地广场 B 座

The Panel found that Dandong Union's address is registered as both "Room 1106, 64 Bin Jiang Zhong Ru (滨江中路 64 号) Dandong City" and "Room 1106, Jiadi Plaza B (佳地广场 B 座) Dandong City" at official Chinese Company registry database and various commercial company registry. The Panel also found that other companies of Dandong City use these two addresses without distinction or at the same time in advertising them. The Panel confirmed through geographic search on line that "Bin Jiang Zhong Ru (滨江中路 64 号)" and "Jiadi Plaza B (佳地广场 B 座)" is the same place.

Figure 3: Address Information from Commercial Website, showing relationship between address 滨江中路 64 号 and 佳地广场 B 座



Address showing 滨江中路 64 号 is 佳地广场 B 座

Source: Official website of private company from http://www.ltndt.com/cn/gywm/gsjj/.

Figure 4: Dandong Yongxinghe and Korea Daesong (or Taesong) Trading Company

Korea Daesong from Commercial Business Registry Database

Source: http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/index.html.

Dandong Yongxinghe from the Official Company Credit and Registry Database

Source: http://gsxt.lngs.gov.cn/.

Figure 5: Korea Cholbong and Dandong Yongtong

Dandong Yongtong from the Official Chinese Company registry

Source: http://gsxt.lngs.gov.cn/saicpub/entPublicitySC/entPublicityDC/sEntDetail.action.

Korea Cholbong from commercial company registry database



Source:
http://www.zhiqiye.com/company/6A8DC9EEE31A4E27B4F2416610F49AF2/index.html.

Annex 99 : Hong Kong-registered Companies controlled by individuals connected to Leader and/or Mr. Cai Guang

The Panel has identified multiple Hong Kong-registered companies connected to Leader and/or Mr. Cai Guang. Further details of each company are summarized below.

1. Sunny (HONG KONG) Int'l Development Co. Ltd.
Address: LM 873, Room B, 14/F, WaH Hen Commercial Centre, 383 Hennessy Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong
Individual involved:

- Mr. Li Hong Ri (Chinese: 李紅日) (director and shareholder)

2. Xiuhua International Company Limited
Address: Unit 04, 7/F, Bright Way Tower, No. 33, Mong Kok Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Individual involved:

- Mr. Li Hong ri (Chinese: 李紅日) (director and shareholder)

3. Hong Kong Max Moon Trading Co., Limited.
Address: Room 1701(071), 17/F, Henan Building, No.90, Jaffe Road, Wanchai, Hongkong, China
Individual involved:

- Mr. Ma Gewen (Chinese: 马革文) (director and shareholder)

4. Longjin (HongKong) International Trading Co., Limited
Address: Rm 907, JDL 495, Wing Tuck Commercial Center, 177-183 Wing Lok Street, Hong Kong
Individual involved:

- Mr. Piao Chengyuan (or Park Seung Won) (Chinese: 朴承源) (director and shareholder)

Longjin (Hong Kong) International Trading Co., Ltd.

CR

公司註冊處
Companies Registry

法團成立表格
(股份有限公司)
Incorporation Form
(Company Limited by Shares)

(《公司條例》第14A條)
(Companies Ordinance s. 14A)

公司編號 CR No.
1401433

表格 Form **NC1**

重要事項 Important Notes

- 填表前請參閱《填表須知》。
  請用黑色墨水列印。
- Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form.
  Please print in black ink.

1 擬採用的公司名稱 Intended Company Name

擬採用的公司英文名稱 Intended English Company Name

LONGJIN (HONGKONG) INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO., LIMITED

3 公司在香港的註冊辦事處擬採用的地址
The Intended Address of the Company's Registered Office in Hong Kong

Rm 907, JDL495, Wing Tuck Commercial Centre, 177-183 Wing Lok Street, Hong Kong

個人董事 Individual Director
(如只有超過一名個人董事，請用續頁 C 填報 Use Continuation Sheet C if more than 1 individual director)

中文姓名 Name in Chinese	朴承源	
英文姓名 Name in English	PIAO (姓氏 Surname)	Chengyuan (名字 Other Names)
前用姓名 Previous Names	--	
別名 Alias	--	
住址 Residential Address	Rm 907, JDL495, 177-183 Wing Lok Street, Hong Kong	-- (國家 Country)
電郵地址 E-mail Address	--	
身份證明 Identification	China ID no.: 120104196601256358	

(「轉交」地址及郵政信箱號碼恕不接受 'Care of' addresses and post office box numbers are n

Source: The Hong Kong company registration record available from http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/.

Hong Kong Max Moon Trading Co., Ltd

CR
公司註冊處
Companies Registry

法團成立表格
(股份有限公司)
Incorporation Form
(Company Limited by Shares)
(《公司條例》第14A條)
(Companies Ordinance s. 14A)

公司編號 CR No.
1717879

表格 Form **NC1**

填表前請參閱（填表須知）。
Please read the Notes for Completion before completing this form.

1 擬採用的公司名稱 **Intended Company Name**

擬採用的公司英文名稱 **Intended English Company Name**

HONG KONG MAX MOON TRADING CO., LIMITED

公司在香港的註冊辦事處擬採用的地址
The Intended Address of the Company's Registered Office in Hong Kong

Room 1701(071), 17/F., Henan Building, No.90, Jaffe Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong, China

個人董事 **Individual Director**
(如有超過一名個人董事，請使用續頁C) *Use Continuation Sheet C if more than 1 individual director)*

中文姓名 Name in Chinese	馬革文	
英文姓名 Name in English	MA 姓氏 Surname	GEWEN 名字 Other Names
前用姓名 Previous Names	N/A	
別名 Alias	N/A	
住址 Residential Address	ROOM 1101, BLOCK B, JIADI SQUARE, YANJIANG KAIFAQU, DANDONG CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE	CHINA 國家 Country
電郵地址 E-mail Address	N/A	
身份證明 Identification	CHINA ID:220102196608043 33X	

Same Address as Dandong Yongxinghe

addresses and post office box numbers are not a

Source: Hong Kong companies registration records available from http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/.

Annex 100 : Namibia's Note Verbale dated on 13 February 2015 addressed to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in South Africa

REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Tel: (061) 282 9111
Fax: (061) 221145 / 223937 / 220265
E-mail: headquarters@mfa.gov.na

Private Bag 13347
WINDHOEK
NAMIBIA

Ref.:

Enquires: 3/1/1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Namibia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has the honour to inform that the Government of the Republic of Namibia has terminated the diplomatic status of Kim Kwan Yon, Second Secretary, Economic and Commercial, and Kil Jong Hun, Third Secretary, Economic and Commercial.

In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to advise that the two individuals leave Namibia. The Ministry seeks the cooperation of the Embassy on this matter.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Namibia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the assurances of its highest consideration.

February 13, 2015

The Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Pretoria, South Africa

REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA MINISTRY OF FC AFFAIRE

Source: The Panel.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 101

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 102 : Global Airlines Project methodology and United Nations data protection law exemptions

The Panel identified 170 global, regional and national airlines on the basis of global passenger market share as well as those smaller airlines operating on routes and third countries where Democratic People's Republic of Korea entities or nationals are known or suspected to have been based while engaged in the direct violation or evasion of sanctions in the past. Requests for information were also sent to airlines operating from the limited number of transit hubs that serve air routes to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

While a number of airlines or their respective Member states cited data protection laws as legal impediments to the provision of information, the Panel notes that pursuant to the sanctions regime adopted by the Security Council in respect of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) under resolution 1718 (2006), as extended by resolution 1874 (2009), the Security Council has imposed obligations upon Member States in respect of compliance with that regime. Specifically, in paragraphs 26 and 27 of resolution 1874 (2009), the Security Council established the Panel and urged all States to cooperate with it, "in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed". In accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, Member States are obliged to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council.

Pursuant to its Charter and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the United Nations is not subject to the national jurisdictions of Member States, and as such, is not bound by national or regional legislative instruments, including the provisions regarding the transfer of personal data.

The Panel is continuing GAP-related investigations by extending and expanding its follow-up with the airline industry.

Annex 103 : Travel movements of reported KOMID representatives

Reported possible KOMID representatives in Iran Son Yong and Kim Young Chol travelled to, from or transited Iran, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, China, Singapore and Malaysia. Reported KOMID representatives in Syria, Kang Ryong and Ryu Jin travelled to, from or transited Lebanon, China, Uganda and Egypt. Reported KOMID Namibia representative Kil Jong Hun travelled to, from or transited Namibia, South Africa, China and Zimbabwe. Reported KOMID Namibia representative, Kim Kwang Yon, travelled to, from or transited South Africa and China with documentation indicating that this travel was in five of six instances part of an itinerary for Namibia. The Panel obtained evidence that another reported KOMID representative allegedly based in Russia, Mr. Jang Song Chol flew to Khartoum, Sudan on two occasions in 2014.

According to information obtained by the Panel, Mr. Jang and Mr. Kim transited Islamabad and Karachi on at least 28 occasions between 10 December 2012 and 25 October 2015. They often travelled on the same flights with consecutively numbered tickets issued by the same travel agency. Together they had entered Pakistan at one airport and departed Pakistan from another airport. Pakistan stated to the Panel that the reported KOMID representatives were issued visas "by our Mission in Tehran at the request of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Tehran. The individuals were introduced as Second and Third Economic and Commercial Secretaries of the Embassy." In the visa application forms Pakistan noted that the addresses "included the Embassy of DPRK in Islamabad and Economic Section of DPRK in Karachi". Pakistan also noted that "in the visa forms no mention has been made of their linkages to Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).[31]

Seven of the individuals had transited, entered or exited China on a total of at least 59 occasions between 19 October 2012 and 19 October 2015.[32] Some of the individuals used different passports for certain flights in a non-linear fashion, indicating that they were in possession of two or more passports.

Mr. Ryong Kang flew into Entebbe, Uganda on 14 June 2014 and departed three days later. Uganda informed the Panel that it was undertaking an investigation and would revert when it was completed.[33]

Mr. Jang, Mr. Kim and Mr. Kwang Yong Kim transited Singapore on at least 12 occasions between 18 July 2013 and 28 November 2014. Mr. Kim flew to Kuala Lumpur on at least 3 occasions between 20 May 2013 and 23 November 2013.Mr. Jong Hun Kil travelled to Harare on 25 October 2014 and departed four days later.Mr. Song Chol Jang flew from Moscow on 21 September 2014 to another country. Mr. Song Chol Jang returned to Khartoum, Sudan on 21 September 2014 and departed 28 September 2014. Ms Kim Su Guang with alleged connections to RGB arrived in Moscow on 16 June 2015. Mr. Song Chol Jang travelled to Khartoum on 10 June 2014 and departed on 24 June 2014. Mr. Ryong Kang travelled to Cairo on 3 July 2014, departing three days later.

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[31] Letter to the Panel from the Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, No. First-5/3/2015, 7 January 2015.

[32] Mr. Song Chol Jang,Mr. Yong Son Jang, Mr. Yong Chol Kim, Mr. Ryong Kang, Mr. Jin Ryu, Mr. Jong Hun Kil, and Mr. Kwang Yon Kim.

[33] Evidence obtained by the Panel shows that the other individual designated by the United States as KOMID's representative in Syria also travelled on the same flights as Mr. Kang to Uganda.

Annex 104 : United Arab Emirates (UAE) response to the Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

البعثة الدائمة
لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Ref: 2016/24

5 January 2016

Mr. Griffiths

In reference to letter S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC. 608 of 3 December 2015, and further to the meeting held on 30 December 2015, regarding the investigations of the Panel of KOMID, I would like to transmit to you the unofficial translation of the UAE's authorities' response:

- Information on two DPRK nationals reportedly working on behalf of Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).
- Information and data on the shipment of arms and related material onboard the vessel ANL Australia.
- Information on reported arms trade involving KOMID, UAE-based companied and UAE nationals

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate once again my country's continued cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the DPRK in implementing its mandate.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Saod AlMazrooei
Charge d'Affairs

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874(2009)
United Nations
New York

First: Information on two DPRK nationals reportedly working on behalf of Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID)

No movement by the two individuals in or out the UAE was confirmed recently. However, I would like to transmit to you the following information obtained from the UAE concerned authorities regarding those individuals:

Yong Son Jang
Personal data

Nationality: DPRK
DOB: 20 February 1957
Professional: Third Secretary at the North Korean Embassy in Iran and a businessperson.
Residency: He previously visited the UAE.
Passport number: 563110024, expires on 14 January 2018. (He is also a holder of a diplomatic passport No. 654210164, expiration date: 2 June 2019).
Marital status: Married – number of children: unknown.
Religion: Buddhism.
Phone number: unavailable.
Current position: Out of the UAE.

Records of Yong Son Jang's entering and exiting the UAE, expect transits through the UAE, noting that the visas were issued by the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs.

#	Visa Dates		Type and number of visa	Sponsored by
	Issuance date	Expiration date		
1	7 Oct. 2014	5 Dec 2014	Tourism 2102014043400287	Sun and Sky Tourism & Travel PO Box: 40583 Tel: +97143516300
2	25 Sept. 2014	8 Nov. 2014	Tourism 2102014043246998	Same as above
3	3 Sept. 2014	30 Oct. 2014	Tourism 2082014043874333	Same as above

4	28 Aug. 2014	10 Oct. 2014	Tourism 2082014043779453	Same as above
5	12 Aug. 2014	3 Oct. 2014	Tourism 2082014043554431	Same as above
6	5 Aug. 2014	19 Sept. 2014	Tourism 2082014043427250	Same as above
7	9 July 2014	28 Aug. 2014	Tourism 2082014043122845	Same as above
8	8 June 2014	14 Aug. 2014	Tourism 2062014043759706	Same as above
9	28 May 2014	11 July 2014	Tourism 2062014043588620	Same as above
10	1 May 2014	29 June 2014	Tourism 2062014043222379	Same as above
11	4 March 2014	27 May 2014	Tourism 2042014043164663	Same as above
12	23 Feb. 2014	5 April 2014	Tourism 2012014043966523	Same as above
13	16 Feb. 2014	30 March 2014	Tourism 2012014043744310	Same as above
14	4 July 2013	1 Sept. 2013	Permission to enter for a short visit – one tourist trip 2062013043490161	Golden Coast Travels Tel: +97142810333
15	4 June 2013	9 August 2013	Tourism 2062013043134625	Same as above
16	21 May 2013	7 July 2013	Tourism 2062013043013910	Same as above
17	2 May 2013	6 May 2013	A 96 hour visit 2012013016265971	Emirates Airlines – Arabian Adventures Tel: 600555555
18	16 April 2013	20 April 2013	A 96 hour visit 2012013016231979	Same as above

Transits of Yong Son Jang through the UAE:

#	Date (arrival and departure)	From	To
1	Arrival - 30 Sept. 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Al Maktoum Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure - 30 Sept. 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
2	Arrival - 21 Sept. 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure - 21 Sept. 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
3	Arrival - 1 Sept. 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure - 1 Sept. 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
4	Arrival – 25 Aug. 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 25 Aug. 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
5	Arrival – 11 Aug. 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 11 Aug. 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Tehran Int'l Airport - Iran
6	Arrival – 20 July 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 20 July 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
7	Arrival – 6 July 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 6 July 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
8	Arrival – 2 June 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 2 June 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	

9	Arrival – 21 May 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 21 May 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
10	Arrival – 18 April 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 18 April 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
11	Arrival – 25 Feb 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 25 Feb 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Tehran Int'l Airport - Iran
12	Arrival – 19 Feb 2014	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 19 Feb 2014	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	
13	Arrival – 1 July 2013	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 1 July 2013	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran
14	Arrival – 29 May 2013	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 29 May 2013	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran
15	Arrival – 2 May 2013	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran
	Departure – 3 May 2013	Quaid-E-Azam International Airport - Pakistan	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
16	Arrival – 16 April 2013	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE
	Departure – 16 April 2013	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	IKA Imam Komeini Int'l Airport - Iran

A – The two individuals did not stay in hotels in the UAE; therefore, there is no information available on any reservations. Moreover, no activities by neither individuals were monitored in the UAE, as usually travelers await for their flights outside the airport.

Q – Records of crossing any UAE borders.
A – No information is available on their travels through UAE land or maritime borders.

Q – Any financial records of the individuals.
A – They do not hold any bank accounts in the UAE.

Second: Information and data on the shipment of arms and related material onboard the vessel ANL Australia, which was seized in the UAE on 22 July 2009

Q – Any information on the two corporations or Mr. Ri Hyong
A –

- No information is available on the two corporations; also, there are no dealings or associations between the UAE and the mentioned corporations or Mr. Hyong.
- Personal date on Ri Hyong:
  - Nationality: DPRK
  - DOB: 10 February 1956
  - Passport number: 827310102, expired on 12 September 2012.
  - Last time he departed from Dubai to Iran was on 12 May 2009.
  - Records of Ri Hyong's entry into and departure from the UAE:

Date	Movement	Country of Departure	Country of Arrival
3 April 2009	entry	Iran	UAE
4 April 2009	Departure	UAE	Unknown
20 April 2009	entry	Iran	UAE
11 May 2009	entry	Iran	UAE
12 May 2009	Departure	UAE	Unknown

Third: Information on reported arms trade involving KOMID, UAE-based companied and UAE nationals

Q – Information and documentation on past or currently planned arms trade involving KOMID, Al Mutlaq Technology and International Golden Group.
A – No such dealings between the above parties was detected.

Q – A list of all other entities and individuals involved since October 2006 in past and planned KOMID related arms trade activities.
A – No list is available on names of individuals or entities involved in arms trade with KOMID since October 2006.

Q – Information on registration records for Al Mutlaq Technology and International Golden Group.
A – Al Mutlaq Technology:

- Private company.
- Based in Dubai, Al Kuthban Bldg., Sheikh Zayed Rd.
- PO Box. 37562.
- Tel: 043383886
- Activity: General Trading.
- License number: 201887
- License issuance date: 11 August 1982
- License expiration date: 10 August 2016
- (A copy of the license was submitted to the Panel during the meeting on 30 December 2015).

Q – Information on Mr. Abdulrahman Baqer:
A –

- Nationality: UAE.
- DOB: 1 January 1953
- Passport number: HFR234276
- Position: Executive Director of Al Mutlaq Technology
- (A copy of the passport was submitted to the Panel during the meeting on 30 December 2015).

Q – Any information available to the UAE authorities regarding transfers or attempted transfers to/from DPRK after October 2006 of any arms or related material which were brokered by Al Mutlaq Technology or Mr. Baqer.
A – No such activities were detected after October 2006.

Q – Any information available to the UAE authorities regarding any financial and trading transactions after April 2009 between KOMID and Al Mutlaq Technology or Mr. Baqer.
A – No information is available on any financial and trading transactions after April 2009 between KOMID and Al Mutlaq Tech. or Mr. Baqer, or on behalf of them.

Q – Any additional information available to the UAE authorities regarding KOMID's relationship with Al Mutlaq Tech or Mr. Baqer.
A –

- No relationship was detected between KOMID and Al Mutlaq Tech or Mr. Baqer since October 2006.
- During the investigations, it was found that a quotation offer was requested from an individual named Mr. Yoon Song Kim, from North Korea based in China, on equipment. Mr. Kim presented an offer; however, his offer did not go through and no transaction was made. A European company was also contacted regarding the same equipment. The company presented an offer, but it did not go through neither.
- Entities that were involved in the $100,000,000 offer are:
    - Mr. Abdulrahman Baqer.
    - Mr. Yoon Song Kim.
    - Al Mutlaq Technology.

Mr. Yoon Song Kim's personal data:

- Nationality: North Korea.
- DOB: 11 February 1960.
- Passport number: 381220190.

Measures taken by the UAE authorities in this regard:

- Investigations were conducted with members of Al Mutlaq entity.
- The entity was closed, as a precautionary measure.
- Documents and computers of the entity were seized.

Annex 105 : United Arab Emirates documents related to arms trading entity Al Mutlaq Technology and its closure

حكومة دبي
GOVERNMENT OF DUBAI

دائـــــرة التنميـــــة الاقتصـــــادية
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

10/12/2015

To whom it may concern

لمن يهمه الأمر

RE: Trade License Cancellation

الموضوع :الغاء رخصة

This letter confirms that the Trade License AL MUTLAQ TECHNOLOGICAL EST. (License No. 201887) was cancelled on 10/12/2015.

بإسم السادة : مؤسسة المطلق للتكنولوجية

نفيدكم علما أنه بتاريخ 10/12/2015
ألغت الدائرة الاقتصادية بدبي بالغاء الرخصة تجارية رقم (201887)

License owner(s) / صاحب / اصحاب الرخصة	Role / الصفة	Nationality / الجنسية
حسين محمد بن مطلق الخلي	Est. Owner / مالك مؤسسة	United Arab Emirates / الامارات

This letter is furnished upon customer request without any further obligations towards the Dubai Department of Economic Development.

حررت هذه الشهادة بناءا على طلب صاحبها دون تحمل الدائرة أدنى مسؤولية تجاه الغير .

Any alteration to this document voids its content.

ملاحظة : أي كشط أو تغيير في هذه الشهادة يلغيها .

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام ،،،

Handling Officer - المسؤول المختص

Mohamed Rafeek


UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UAE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
VISAS
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Type
P
Country Code
ARE
Passport No.
Name
ABDULRAHMAN ABDULLA ABDULRAHMAN BAQER
Date of Birth
01/01/1953
Sex
M
Place of Birth
KUWAIT
Date of Issue
29/12/2013
Date of Expiry
28/12/2015
Issuing Authority
DUBAI
Holder's Signature
P<AREBAQER<<ABDULRAHMAN<ABDULLA<ABDULRAHMAN<
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

البعثة الدائمة
للإمارات العربية المتحدة
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Ref: 2016/38

8 January 2016

Mr. Griffiths

In reference to the meeting held on 30 December 2015 with the Panel of Experts of the DPRK Sanctions Committee, I would like to transmit herewith additional information provided by the UAE concerned authorities on the movement of Mr. Abdulrahman Baqer between the period from 2 August 2012 to 1 January 2016, as well as additional information which could be of use to the Panel.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate once again my country's continued cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the DPRK in implementing its mandate.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Saod AlMazrooei
Charge d'Affairs

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874(2009)
United Nations
New York

Mr. Abdulrahman Baqer has not been in communication with any North Korean company. He was only in communication with Mr. Yoon Song Kim. Also, there is no additional information on Mr. Kim's address in China.

Travels of Mr. Abdulrahman Baqer from 2 August 2012 to 1 January 2016
(Starting from the most recent travel date)

#	Country of departure/ Point of exit	Country of arrival/ Point of entry	Dates Exit/Entry
1	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Vienna Airport - Austria	1 January 2016
2	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	4 December 2015
3	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Hamad Int'l Airport - Qatar	23 October 2015
4	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	1 October 2015
5	Hamad Int'l Airport - Qatar	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	26 September 2015
6	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Hamad Int'l Airport - Qatar	23 September 2015
7	London Heathrow Airport - UK	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	20 September 2015
8	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Leonardo da Vinci–Fiumicino Airport - Italy	5 September 2015
9	Atatürk Int'l Airport - Turkey	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	18 August 2015
10	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	3 August 2015
11	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	30 July 2015
12	Hamad Int'l Airport - Qatar	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	17 June 2015
13	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	13 June 2015
14	Vienna Airport - Austria	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	31 May 2015
15	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	13 May 2015
16	Kuwait Int'l Airport - Kuwait	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	27 April 2015
17	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Kuwait Int'l Airport - Kuwait	23 April 2015
18	Chhatrapati Shivaji Airport - India	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	14 April 2015
19	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Rajiv Gandhi Int'l Airport - India	6 April 2015
20	Changi Airport - Singapore	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	10 March 2015
21	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Changi Airport - Singapore	3 March 2015
22	Prague Ruzyně Int'l Airport – Czech	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	2 February 2015

23	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Prague Ruzyně Int'l Airport – Czech	27 January 2015
24	London Heathrow Airport - UK	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	2 January 2015
25	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	London Heathrow Airport - UK	20 December 2014
26	Incheon Int'l Airport – South Korea	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	14 December 2014
27	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Incheon Int'l Airport – South Korea	9 December 2014
28	Vienna Airport - Austria	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	1 December 2014
29	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Vienna Airport - Austria	23 November 2014
30	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	1 November 2014
31	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	29 October 2014
32	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	25 October 2014
33	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Hamad Int'l Airport - Qatar	25 October 2014
34	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	11 October 2014
35	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	25 September 2014
36	Vienna Airport - Austria	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	10 September 2014
37	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Vienna Airport - Austria	31 August 2014
38	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	91 June 2014
39	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	9 June 2014
40	Kuala Lumpur Airport – Malaysia	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	18 April 2014
41	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Incheon Int'l Airport – South Korea	5 April 2014
42	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	9 March 2014
43	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	Charles de Gaulle Airport - France	28 February 2014
44	Bahrain Int'l Airport - Bahrain	Dubai Int'l Airport - UAE	2 August 2012

Mutlaq Technology

From: Mutlaq Tecnology [mailto:mutlaqgp@eim.ae]
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2015 1:29 PM
To: 'freedom6like' <freedom6like@163.com>
Subject: Products
Attachments: Products List.Pdf

Dear Mr. Kim,

Following my telephonic conversation of today, Please find attached a list of products that are needed immediately from your stock.

We need your response at the earliest and as soon as possible.

Thanks and Regards.

Abdul Rahman Abdulla Baqer

Requirement list

S	Item	Qty.
1	M92 Cal 7.62x39	5,000
2	7.62X39Ammunition	5,000,000
3	Sniper Rifle 7.62x54 (Draganov)	150
4	7.62x54 R ammunition	15,000
5	7.62PKM Machine Gun	1,000
6	7.62x54 ammunition	10,000,000
7	Sniper Rifle 12.7x108	50
8	Ammunition 12.7x108	10,000
9	Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote Cal 12.7x108	200
10	12.7mmx108 Ammunition	10,000,000
11	Mortar 60mm M57	100
12	Mortar Shell 60mm	50,000
13	Mortar 82mm M69	100
14	82mm Mortar Shells	50,000
15	120mm PM-38 Mortar	40
16	120mm Mortar Shell	30,000.00
17	14 5x114mm B-32, BZT Cartridges	2,000,000.00
18	23mm HEI with Link	1,500,000.00
19	107 MULTIROCKET Launcher	30.00
20	107mm Rocket	40,000.00
21	122MM rocket Projectile M210	40,000.00
22	Hand Grenade	3,000.00
23	Armor Vest	5,000.00
24	Anti-Tank 106mm HEAT Ammunition	5,000.00

Annex 106 : The Russian Federation's Letter to the Panel's air travel enquiry on KOMID and RGB unilaterally designated individuals

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при Организации
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900
Fax: (212) 628 0252

Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10065

№ 111 /n

New York, "13" January 2016

Dear Mr.Griffiths,

With reference to your letter S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.810 dated 3 December 2015 I am instructed to inform you of the following.

We believe that there is no reason for us to make an investigation following your inquiry. Judging by the content of your letter, the Panel had not conducted an independent research of activities of the two North Korean citizens that we were requested to provide information about. Unilateral sanctions that were imposed by the USA and France against those individuals for the reasons that we are unaware of, do not serve for us as an argument for suspicion of their unlawful activities on Russia's territory. We are invariably ready to cooperate with the Panel when its inquiries are clearly fitted into the framework of the current United Nations Security Council Sanctions List and have substantial evidence. In this case we are not in a position to do so.

Truly Yours
V. Safronkov

Vladimir Safronkov
Deputy Permanent
Representative

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Annex 107 : The Russian Federation's Letter to the Panel's enquiry on OMM associated vessels

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при Организации
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900
Fax: (212) 628 0252

Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10065

No. 112 /n

New York, 13 January 2016

Dear Mr.Griffiths,

With reference to the Panel's letters S/AC.49/2014/PE/OC.187 dated 12 September 2014, S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.146 dated 2 July 2015, S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.150 dated 8 July 2015 and S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.310 dated 29 July 2015 requesting information about North Korean vessels and in addition to our previous letter of response I am instructed to inform you of the following.

We continue to demand from the Panel of Experts to present substantial evidence on the connection between various business enterprises that own the vessels, and their assets, to the activities of OMM. We do not possess such evidence.

The Panel's information on the renaming and the new ownership (sometimes with the same legal addresses) of the vessels previously owned by OMM, though it could provoke certain suspense with regard to DPRK companies, cannot serve for us as a justification to apply the provisions of UN sanctions regime against those entities.

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York



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If there is substantial evidence we would be ready to discuss possible inquiries for designating these legal entities to be included into the UNSC 1718 Committee's Sanctions List. Once they are designated by the Committee, the necessary restrictive measures stipulated by the UNSC resolutions would be applied against those entities.

Yours truly

Vladimir Safronkov
Deputy Permanent
Representative

Source: The Panel.

Annex 108 : RTC's initial information about the financial transactions related to the RTC's May 2010 export to Chonbok

Based on the information provided by RTC, the Panel understood that RTC undertook the following financial transactions related to the May 2010 export:

- RTC has been serving as the agent for Korea International Exhibition Corporation (KIEC) to arrange the participation by the companies based in Taiwan Province of China for International Trade Fairs in Pyongyang.

- At that time, RTC helped another Taipei-based travel company (hereafter "company T"), and their customers to attend the Pyongyang International Trade Fair (which RTC also attended). Company A sent RTC airline tickets and "related charges" which RTC was tasked to transfer to KIEC in Pyongyang. Company A transferred to RTC on 13 May 2010 € 28,002.

- On the other hand, Chonbok was obliged to pay RTC the amount of funds € 28,350 at that time (according to the invoice issued by RTC dated 18 May 2010). At the request from RTC, Chonbok forwarded the funds to KIEC who was tasked to hand over the funds to RTC's representative at the occasion of the Pyongyang International Trade Fair.

- Then when RTC attended the trade fair in Pyongyang, RTC's representatives met with KIEC's representatives and calculated the amount of difference, which the Panel understands to be € 348. The Panel also understands that this was the amount of money RTC received from KIEC.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

Annex 109

*The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 110: Egypt's 15 February 2016 response to the Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
304 East 44th Street
New York, NY 10017
Tel No. (212) 355-0300; Fax No. (212) 949-5999

CHANG2 10/EM

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), and with reference to the Panel's letter S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.755 concerning a 2013 shipment of cargo from a DPRK company named Ryongsong Trading Co. Ltd to an Egyptian company named MODA Authority International Optronic Company and requesting information on MODA's company registration records, identities and contacts details, the Permanent Mission is honored to inform the Panel of Experts of the following information provided by the relevant Egyptian national authorities in response to the Panel's request:

"تم البحث في قاعدة البيانات ذات الصلة بالشركات المصرية والسجل التجاري لم يُسْتدل على وجود شركة باسم MODA Authority International Optronic Company. كما أنها ليست شركة حكومية، وان جميع التعاقدات الحكومية تتم من خلال الإجراءات القانونية المعمول بها دولياً بعد الحصول على ترخيص التصدير من حكومات الشركات الأجنبية"

The Permanent Mission requests that the above mentioned information are reflected in the Panel of Experts annual report.

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 15 February 2016

The Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).
Fax: 917 3672347

16/02/2016 1
160224SE

Translated from Arabic

On examination of the database of Egyptian companies and the trade register, no reference to a company under the name of MODA Authority International Optronic Company was found. The company in question is not a Government company. All Government contracts are handled in accordance with the legal procedures in force at the international level, and export licences are first obtained from the Governments of the foreign companies.