



安全理事会

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2018 年 7 月 23 日根据安全理事会第 2399(2018)号决议任务期限得到延长的中非共和国问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

根据安全理事会第 2399(2018)号决议任务期限得到延长的中非共和国问题专家小组成员谨此依照第 2399(2018)号决议第 32(c)段转递专家小组的中期工作报告。

所附报告于 2018 年 7 月 9 日提交安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2018 年 7 月 20 日审议了这份报告。

专家小组谨提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告，请将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

根据安全理事会第 2399(2018)号决议任务期限得到延长的中非共和国问题专家小组
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根据安全理事会第 2399(2018)号决议任务期限得到延长的中非共和国问题专家小组的中期报告

摘要

在本报告所述期间，爆发了严重的暴力事件，包括在班吉和班巴里等以前局势有所改善的地区，政府难以在推进和平方面取得进展得到证实。联合国中非共和国多层次综合稳定团(中非稳定团)、国内安全部队和中非共和国武装部队于 2018 年 4 月 7 日和 8 日在班吉 PK5 居民区联合开展的“苏库拉行动”引发了社区间紧张局势加剧，出现了煽动歧视和暴力的情况，4 月初至 5 月初发生了一系列暴力冲突，造成首都在 30 天的时间里出现了自 2014 年以来人数最多的伤亡，至少有 70 人丧生，330 人受伤，其中大多数是平民。中非稳定团和国家安全部队未能摧毁 PK5 自卫团体据点，并在该地区设立国内安全部队；相反，这次行动使自卫团体加强了对这些居民区的控制。

该国安全和武装部队在向安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会提出有关豁免请求和通知后，接受了俄罗斯联邦的训练和军事装备。加上欧洲联盟驻中非共和国军事训练团(欧盟中非训练团)等其他伙伴的支持，这些努力正帮助中非共和国武装部队重新运作起来。

前塞雷卡派别认为，中非共和国武装部队正在进行的重新部署和“苏库拉行动”，是敌视穆斯林社区的行动，促使这些团体、特别是中非复兴人民阵线的立场更加强硬。其结果，中非复兴人民阵线领导人和受制裁的个人阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因和努尔丁·阿达姆继续试图将塞雷卡各派重新团结起来，加紧努力获取武器，特别是从苏丹领土获取武器，并合并其控制地区的平行行政机构，以此作为一项重要的筹资战略。

不过，前塞雷卡各派与其他武装团体一样，继续与非洲联盟中非共和国和平与和解倡议保持接触，据其已于 2017 年 11 月开始开展协商，并计划在未来几个月内政府与 14 个公认的武装团体缔结一项协议。

持续不断的战斗导致侵犯人权和违反国际人道主义法的情况发生，涉及“反砍刀”组织和前塞雷卡战斗人员。这些情况包括经常发生的强奸和性侵犯(在博桑戈阿地区)、滥杀平民和对人道主义人员和人道主义基地的定向攻击(马昆达、班巴里和班加苏周围)。武装分子不尊重医疗设施，导致班吉和班巴里平民获得医疗保健的机会减少。自 2018 年初以来，由于定向攻击，已有 5 名维和人员丧生。

鉴于“反砍刀”组织战斗人员继续使用狩猎弹药，中非共和国问题专家小组与刚果共和国进行接触之后，刚果当局宣布采取措施，以更好地管制刚果武器弹药制造商的弹药销售。

报告还说明了解除金伯利进程规定的钻石出口暂停令所产生的积极势头受到破坏的情况。自 2017 年年底以来，由于各省大部分采购商的办公室关闭，合法贸易大幅减少，毛坯钻石贩运相应激增。报告还强调了国家对机场的控制不足对自然资源贩运的影响。

最后，报告谈到违反制裁的新案件，特别是前总统弗朗索瓦·博齐泽违反旅行禁令的案件。专家小组发现此人一直在使用一种南苏丹外交护照，护照所用姓名为塞缪尔·彼得·穆德。

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一. 背景

1. 2018 年 1 月 30 日，安全理事会通过了第 2399(2018)号决议，其中规定中非共和国问题专家小组的任务除其他外包括在与安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会讨论后，至迟于 2018 年 7 月 30 日向安理会提交一份中期报告。

2. 按照第 2399(2018)号决议的要求，本报告除其他外评估了安全理事会所规定的制裁措施(武器禁运、旅行禁令和资产冻结)的执行情况，并论及若干问题，目的是确定参与该决议第 20 和 21 段所界定的应予以制裁活动的个人和实体。

合作

3. 专家小组自其 2017 年最后报告(S/2017/1023)于 2017 年 12 月发布以来，已去过中非共和国 16 个省中的 14 个省(见附件 1.1 中的地图)。

4. 除了在中非共和国境内进行访问之外，专家小组还对刚果共和国、法国和意大利进行了正式访问。刚果民主共和国没有对专家小组提出的访问给予配合。专家小组感到遗憾的是，2018 年 4 月 22 日，专家小组的两名成员在最初获准入境后被驱逐出刚果民主共和国。两名专家拥有各种所需文件，包括刚果民主共和国国防部的正式邀请信。

5. 专家小组赞赏地注意到联合国中非共和国多层面综合稳定团(中非稳定团)给予的支持和协作。

方法

6. 专家小组努力确保遵守安全理事会关于制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组在其 2006 年 12 月 22 日报告(见 S/2006/997，附件)中提出的标准。专家小组虽然打算尽可能地保持透明，但在指明信息来源会使其或他人面临不可接受的安全风险时，则打算不指明信息出处。

7. 专家小组同样致力于做到最大限度的公平，酌情并尽可能地努力向有关各方提供报告中可能提到它们的信息，供其在规定的时限内查看、发表意见和做出回应。

8. 专家小组维护其工作的独立性，抵制任何有损于其公正立场或造成持有偏见印象的行为。专家小组依照其协调员将本报告转交安全理事会主席之前达成的共识，核准了本报告文本以及其中的结论和建议。

二. 执行制裁：武器禁运、资产冻结和旅行禁令

9. 根据安全理事会第 2399(2018)号决议，专家小组已获授权收集、研究和分析制裁措施(武器禁运、资产冻结和旅行禁令)执行情况的信息。

A. 武器禁运与国家安全和防卫部队

10. 本节介绍了与国家当局及其国际伙伴执行武器禁运相关的局势发展，并介绍了安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会的相关决定，如武器禁运的豁免以及有关安全部门改革的事态发展。下文第 69、81、106 和 107 段介绍了武装团体进行军火贩运的情况。

国家安全与防卫部队：训练、装备和部署

训练

11. 欧洲联盟中非共和国军事训练团目前正在班吉最后完成对中非共和国武装部队第三个营的训练。所有经过训练的营正逐步被重新部署在班吉及以外地区(见下文第 18 段)。训练团还支持对 232 名已复员的武装团体成员进行训练，并将其编入国家军队，这一工作是作为解除武装、复员、重返社会和遣返试点项目的一部分，于 5 月 11 日完成的(见 S/2017/639，第 26 段；S/2017/1023，第 18 段)。¹

12. 2017 年 12 月 26 日，制裁委员会收到俄罗斯联邦关于训练中非共和国防卫和安全部队的通知，其中涉及俄罗斯 5 名军事教官和 170 名文职教官，为期一年。俄罗斯教官分别于 2018 年 3 月 31 日和 5 月 30 日结束了对中非共和国武装部队和总统卫队在苏丹和贝伦戈(洛巴耶省)的第一期和第二期训练。第三期训练班于 5 月 30 日在贝伦戈开始。专家小组 2018 年 3 月 31 日在贝伦戈观察到，总统卫队中出现有俄罗斯联邦教官，而据报告，这是训练活动的一部分。²

13. 俄罗斯教官目前被安排驻在锡布和班加苏，以支持中非共和国武装部队最近的部署。³ 2018 年 5 月 7 日至 26 日，他们还参与护送一个运输医院修建物资的车队，该车队从 Am Dafok 出发，途经比劳、恩代莱、卡加班多罗、布里亚和班吉等城镇。⁴ 分别有 24 名和 20 名教官目前正在确保俄罗斯联邦在布里亚和瓦达(上科托省)捐赠的医院的安全。⁵

14. 2018 年 3 月 12 日，国家当局在中非稳定团的支持下，开始在班吉训练在全国各地招聘的 500 名警察和宪兵候选人(见 S/2017/1023，第 14-16 段)。⁶ 自 2018 年 4 月以来，俄罗斯教官也开始在贝伦戈训练 160 名警察和 50 名宪兵，作为其部署前向其分发武器的先决条件。⁷

¹ 与欧洲联盟军事训练团的会晤，2018 年 6 月 12 日，班吉。

² 与总统安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 4 月 6 日，班吉。

³ 专家小组对锡布的访问，2018 年 5 月 25 日。机密文件，2018 年 6 月 25 日。

⁴ 与秘密消息人士的通信联络，2018 年 5 月 9 日和 28 日。

⁵ 与总统安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 6 月 19 日，班吉。专家小组对布里亚的访问，2018 年 6 月 8 日至 11 日。

⁶ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 28 日，班吉。

⁷ 与总统安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 6 月 19 日，班吉。

15. 关于所有国际伙伴所开展训练的进一步情况见附件 2.1。

部署和装备

16. 部署的警察和宪兵面临更大的安全挑战，妨碍他们完成核心执法任务。2018 年 5 月 30 日，争取中非和平联盟武装分子在班巴里袭击了当地的宪兵和警察驻地，1 名宪兵被打死，数人受伤。⁸ 宪兵配有 27 支 AK 型突击步枪，但子弹很快就打光，他们逃到“反砍刀”组织成员控制区，后者没收了宪兵的 6 件武器。⁹

17. 此外，宪兵总监告诉专家小组，目前主要配备致命装备的宪兵由于缺乏适当的训练和物资，包括人群控制装备，目前无法开展执法活动。专家小组特别指出，迄今为止，军事装备的交付几乎完全着眼于中非共和国武装部队，而不是国内安全部队。

18. 在中非稳定团支持下，有时在俄罗斯教官陪同下，经过训练的中非共和国武装部队人员已被逐步重新部署到奥博、保瓦、锡布和班加苏。尽管国际合作伙伴对中非共和国武装部队在这些地点的表现的反馈相当正面，¹⁰ 但必须强调，如果没有中非稳定团和(或)俄罗斯教官的实质性持续支持，中非共和国武装部队目前没有足够的能力开展行动，或缺乏开展行动的后勤支持。¹¹

19. 2018 年 6 月 10 日，由俄罗斯教官陪同的中非共和国武装部队人员在经过班巴里前往班加苏途中，遭到争取中非和平联盟战斗人员的袭击，2 名中非共和国武装部队士兵和 1 名俄罗斯教官受伤。¹² 中非稳定团不得不促成俄罗斯代表团与争取中非和平联盟领导人阿里·达拉萨于 6 月 17 日在博科尔博会晤，以取得让中非共和国武装部队车队安全通行的保证。¹³ 6 月 22 日，中非共和国武装部队车队抵达班加苏。这一事件凸显了一些武装团体干扰中非共和国武装部队部署和扩展国家权力的能力。

豁免武器弹药的交付、检查和使用

20. 2018 年 1 月 26 日至 2 月 7 日，作为俄罗斯联邦政府与中非共和国政府军事合作的一部分，并经委员会于 2017 年 12 月 15 日豁免，9 架飞机抵达班吉姆博科国际机场运送武器弹药。有关各方一再承诺协助对储存在班吉鲁营地的储存进行详细检查，¹⁴ 但检查尚未进行。专家小组和联合国地雷行动处在鲁营地和锡布看

⁸ 与宪兵总监的会晤，2018 年 5 月 23 日和 24 日。

⁹ 同上。机密文件，专家小组于 2018 年 6 月 29 日收到。

¹⁰ 与欧洲联盟军事中非训练团的会晤，2018 年 6 月 12 日。保密会议，2018 年 5 月 23 日。专家小组对锡布的访问，2018 年 5 月 25 日。

¹¹ 2018 年 5 月 15 日秘书长给安全理事会主席的信。

¹² 机密报告，2018 年 6 月 11 日。与俄罗斯安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 6 月 14 日，班吉。

¹³ 与争取中非和平联盟领导人的会晤，2018 年 6 月 16 日，班吉。机密文件，2018 年 6 月 17 日。

¹⁴ 与总统安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 4 月 6 日、5 月 24 日和 6 月 4 日，班吉。与国防部长的会晤，2018 年 6 月 1 日，班吉。

到的几箱弹药武器与提交委员会的原始清单相符。¹⁵ 2018年6月18日,国防部长致函中非稳定团,请其协助迅速组织一次检查,以加快详细核查进程(见附件2.2和下文第119(a)段中的建议)。

21. 俄罗斯的武器弹药正逐步分发给部署在班吉及以外地区的经过训练的国防和安全部队。武器弹药业已分配给总统卫队、中非共和国武装部队、警察、宪兵和司法部人员。俄罗斯联邦驻班吉代表向专家小组详细介绍了分发情况,并说明了武器训练的确切次数。¹⁶

22. 经委员会2017年5月4日批准从喀麦隆运回的军事装备(见S/2017/1023,第25段;附件2.4)的一部分被运往保瓦,以便在“姆巴兰加行动”期间使用(见下文第97段)。¹⁷

23. 附件2.2提供了关于交付和使用上述豁免武器弹药的进一步资料。

B. 定向制裁(旅行禁令和资产冻结)的执行情况

24. 安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议所设委员会的制裁名单,确定了受旅行禁令和资产冻结限制的个人和实体,该名单可在2127委员会网站上查阅。¹⁸ 名单现含有11名个人和2个实体。

弗朗索瓦·博齐泽使用南苏丹外交护照

25. 专家小组在2017年最后报告中表示,受制裁的个人弗朗索瓦·博齐泽有可能在使用伪造证件旅行(S/2017/1023,第32和33段)。专家小组怀疑博齐泽先生一直是持姓名为塞缪尔·彼得·穆德的南苏丹外交护照旅行的。在向前总统去过的国家多次提出提供信息的要求后,肯尼亚于2018年2月2日分享了上述护照副本,使专家小组能够通过面部识别确认博齐泽先生确实在使用这本护照(见附件2.3)。

26. 因此,2018年2月16日,委员会修改了制裁名单上有关博齐泽先生的信息,并就此发布了新闻稿。¹⁹

27. 2018年2月8日,专家小组致函南苏丹常驻联合国代表团,要求提供有关博齐泽先生使用的护照的资料。南苏丹当局尚未作出答复(见下文第119(b)中的建议)。

28. 2018年6月29日,乌干达政府要求“联合国安全理事会和(或)专家小组协助将博齐泽先生转移到第三国”,以便在乌干达执行安全理事会决议方面“避免任何猜测或旁敲侧击”。

¹⁵ 专家小组对锡布的访问,2018年5月25日。专家小组2018年6月18日收到的机密文件。

¹⁶ 总统安全顾问向专家小组提供的文件,2018年6月23日。

¹⁷ 与秘密消息人士的会晤,2018年1月26日,班吉。

¹⁸ <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/sanctions-list-materials>。

¹⁹ 可查阅: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13212.doc.htm>。

29. 附件 2.4 提供了弗朗索瓦·博齐泽违反旅行禁令的进一步资料，表明后者很可能持其他伪造旅行证件旅行。其中还载有埃塞俄比亚航空公司 2018 年 3 月 23 日分享的博齐泽先生 2017 年 5 月旅行路线的信息，专家小组 2017 年的中期报告曾提到过这一旅行(见 S/2017/639，第 35 段)。专家小组感谢埃塞俄比亚航空公司在这方面的持续合作。附件 2.4 还提供了受制裁个人努尔丁·阿达姆违反旅行禁令的情况。

国家当局没有执行资产冻结

30. 2018 年 3 月 24 日，中非共和国外交部长夏尔·阿梅尔·杜巴纳告知专家小组，部长会议于 2018 年初首次讨论了资产冻结问题。²⁰ 这项讨论是在专家小组和 2127 委员会主席自 2015 年 12 月以来多次致函国家当局，强调有必要对名单所列个人和实体实施资产冻结之后启动的。但是，会议期间或之后没有作出决定或采取行动，因此，中非共和国当局继续违反安全理事会决议规定其应承担的国际义务。

三. 政治进程

A. 非洲联盟中非共和国和平与和解倡议和其他调解努力

31. 非洲联盟中非共和国和平与和解倡议的活动于 2017 年 11 月开始实施，该倡议在实现其路线图中规定的目标方面取得了一些进展。非洲联盟调解人小组通过在班吉举行会晤和对该国进行数轮实地访问(见附件 3.1)，记录了一些不满，这些不满现已成为为使政府与 14 个武装团体缔结和平协议而计划开展的对话的讨论基础。在“苏库拉行动”(见下文第 49 至 56 段)之后，调解人小组进行了更多的实地访问，目的是确认武装团体对和平进程的承诺。在编写本报告时，对话的日期和地点尚未商定。

32. 根据在非洲联盟倡议下通过的时间表，目前正在组织一系列讲习班和培训讨论会，为即将举行的对话做准备，并建设包括调解人小组、政府、14 个武装团体和民间社会在内的主要利益攸关方的能力。

33. 在开展非洲联盟倡议的同时，包括中非稳定团、国家当局和宗教领袖在内的各方面也在地方一级进行调解努力。这些倡议旨在建立一个处理地方冲突动态的有利环境，让各种行为体(武装团体、地方当局、民间社会和宗教团体)参与进来，并采取各种正式和非正式的形式。

34. 2017 年 12 月 15 日在布阿尔签署的协议由中非稳定团发起，涉及武装团体(见下文第 94 和 95 段)和地方当局，而 2018 年 4 月 9 日的班加苏协议则由宗教平台发起，涉及自卫团体以及境内流离失所者、民间社会和地方当局(见附件 3.2)。²¹ 在博桑戈阿和班巴里还缔结其他倡议，但没有签署正式协议。

²⁰ 与外交部长夏尔·阿梅尔·杜巴纳的会晤，2018 年 3 月 24 日，班吉。

²¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 14 日和 6 月 15 日，班吉。

35. 政府还通过总统的国家安全顾问与武装团体进行接触，该顾问是俄罗斯国民，作为中非共和国政府与俄罗斯联邦政府合作的一部分获得任命。这名顾问多次会晤武装团体领导人，讨论解除武装、复员和重返社会方案、民族和解以及地方和国家当局分享开采自然资源收入等问题。²² 然而，一些武装团体领导人告诉专家小组，他们没有将这些讨论视为与政府的直接谈判，而是视为与政府的外国伙伴的谈判。²³

36. 专家小组认为，参与调解相关活动的行为体多种多样，这一点可能是有益的。然而，这些行为体与非洲联盟倡议缺乏协调，可能起到反作用，因为这向武装团体传达了混乱的讯息。

B. 武装团体参与非洲联盟倡议

37. 大多数武装团体领导人继续表示支持非洲联盟倡议。然而，他们仍未展现出停止暴力的承诺。在非洲联盟调解人小组与武装团体举行的若干次会晤、如 2018 年 3 月 27 日在恩代莱举行的会晤中，武装团体携大量全副武装的人员出席，以展示其军事实力(见附件 6.3)。

38. 专家小组还注意到，国防和安全部队购置军事装备导致一些前塞雷卡派系纷纷重整军备(见下文第 81 段)，他们认为政府正在准备对他们发动战争。²⁴ 虽然这些团体并不质疑其对非洲联盟倡议的承诺，但前塞雷卡派系领导人向专家小组吐露，在没有政治协议的情况下，他们将目前旨在实现复员、解除武装和重返社会以及安全部门改革的努力视为一种挑衅。他们认为，政治协议的目标恰恰就是要规定实施这些改革的条件。

39. 武装团体成员还借与非洲联盟调解人小组会晤的机会，重申他们历来对政府和国际伙伴提出的要求。例如，中非复兴人民阵线发表了一份公报，除其他外，强调需要：(a) 解除对其领导人的制裁，并保证不会起诉致力于和平的中非复兴人民阵线领导人；(b) 在中非共和国武装部队新部署任何部队之前缔结一项政治协议；(c) 改革中非共和国武装部队，包括整编前战斗人员；(d) 建立制度，确保矿物产区从开采自然资源中获得公平份额的收入(见附件 3.3)。然而，非洲联盟调解人小组明确表示，不满只能在《宪法》和先前签署的协议、特别是 2015 年 5 月在班吉民族和解论坛上达成的协议(见 S/2015/344)框架内表达。

四. 区域动态

40. 最近几个月，各种因素导致中部非洲区域不安全状况加剧。冲突大部分与跨界动态有关，包括季节性牛群迁徙、外国战斗人员跨界流动以及小武器和轻武器及自然资源的非法贩运。专家小组在下文介绍了一些最近的区域事态发展。

²² 与总统安全顾问的会晤，2018 年 6 月 3 日，班吉。

²³ 与阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，卡加班多罗；与争取中非和平联盟领导人的会晤，2018 年 5 月 6 日，班吉。

²⁴ 与努尔丁·阿达姆的会晤，2018 年 1 月 23 日，比劳。

A. 跨界问题

中非共和国-喀麦隆边界

41. 中非共和国和喀麦隆边界的不安全状况因土匪行为、季节性牛群迁徙、非国家武装行为体流动和自然资源的非法贩运而加剧。沿喀麦隆边界设难民营使这些问题更加恶化，因为一些居住在难民营中的中非共和国国民据称参与了非法活动，包括 2018 年 1 月赤道几内亚的未遂政变。²⁵ 2018 年 3 月 12 日，边界地区的不安全状况促使喀麦隆当局在喀麦隆东部设立了一个特别步兵旅(第 12 摩托化步兵旅)，总部设在贝尔图阿。²⁶

中非共和国-乍得边界

42. 中非共和国和乍得之间的边界自 2014 年 5 月以来已正式关闭。2017 年 12 月至 2018 年 5 月期间，由于中非共和国解放全国运动(中非解放全国运动)和革命与正义组织这两个武装团体在瓦姆省和瓦姆-彭代省发生战斗，联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)在乍得戈雷地区新登记了近 30 000 名中非共和国难民。²⁷ 此外，还有报告称前塞雷卡派系正在招募乍得战斗人员，而且有报告称从乍得境内贩运了武器(例如见 S/2017/639，第 64 至 69 段)。

中非共和国-苏丹边界

43. 在专家小组 2018 年 4 月访问恩代莱期间，市长、苏丹和平民对最近苏丹战斗人员在该地区的渗透和武器贩运的增加表示关切(见下文第 81 段)。²⁸

B. 该区域的战斗人员

44. 专家小组在 2017 年中期报告(S/2017/639)中指出，2017 年 6 月 9 日在班吉逮捕了两名刚果国民， Freddy Libeba Baongoli 和 Alexandre Mitchiabu Mabiji。他们自称是刚果民主共和国武装部队前陆军上校 John Tshibangu 领导的武装反叛成员， John Tshibangu 于 2012 年擅自离开部队，随后一直在策划针对刚果民主共和国国家当局的反叛(见 S/2017/639，第 99 段)。刚果民主共和国政府试图将这两个人引渡回国，但没有成功。1 月 17 日，这两名刚果国民从班吉的监狱逃走，返回刚果民主共和国。²⁹

²⁵ 与军事和外交消息人士的会晤，2018 年 3 月 14 日，纽约；2018 年 2 月 23 日，班吉。

²⁶ 与外交消息人士的会晤，2018 年 3 月 14 日，纽约。

²⁷ 难民署的报告，2017 年 11 月 30 日和 2018 年 5 月 31 日。

²⁸ 专家小组对恩代莱和 Akoursoulbak 的访问，2018 年 4 月 3 日至 5 日。

²⁹ 见 <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180124-exclus-rfi-freddy-libeba-rebelle-congolais-cavale-exprime>，2018 年 2 月 3 日查阅。

45. 专家小组获悉，中非复兴人民阵线于 2017 年 6 月 13 日至 21 日在比劳接待了 Tshibangu，³⁰ 据报道，Tshibangu 的目的是利用中非复兴人民阵线在苏丹的网络购买武器。³¹ 他后来于 2018 年 1 月 30 日在坦桑尼亚联合共和国被捕。

46. 外国战斗人员构成的区域威胁在 2018 年 1 月达到高峰，当时赤道几内亚政府宣布破获了一场未遂政变，涉及包括在班吉和喀麦隆招募的中非共和国国民在内的外国战斗人员，这使人们更加认为中非共和国正被用作制造邻国不安全状况的温床。³² 中非共和国政府已就此事设立了一个调查委员会(见附件 4)。

C. 区域对策：跨界问题委员会

47. 为了解决各种非法跨界活动，中非共和国政府与邻国进行了接触，以期签署关于设立跨界问题委员会的双边和三边协定。³³ 2017 年 9 月 2 日至 4 日，中非共和国、刚果民主共和国和南苏丹三国政府在金沙萨举行三方会议。与会者建议设立一个特别混合委员会，负责与这三个国家有关的政治、外交、国防和安全事务。³⁴

48. 还计划在中非共和国、乍得和苏丹之间以及在中非共和国、喀麦隆和乍得之间设立三边委员会。此外，设想设立中非共和国与喀麦隆之间、中非共和国与乍得之间以及中非共和国与苏丹之间的双边委员会。³⁵ 然而，中非共和国外交部长告诉专家小组，邻国的有限参与正损害这一领域的进展(见下文第 119(c)段中的建议)。³⁶

五. 班吉再度发生暴力事件及其后果

49. 中非稳定团、国内安全部队和中非共和国武装部队于 2018 年 4 月 7 日和 8 日在班吉联合开展“苏库拉行动”，一系列暴力事件由此发生，首都自 2016 年 10 月爆发暴力事件(见 S/2016/1032，第 82 至 91 段)以来从未出现的社区间紧张关系重新抬头。行动的目标是以穆斯林居民为主的 PK5 居民区中的自卫团体据点，以便能够在该地区部署国内安全部队，并设立和中非稳定团临时行动基地(有关事件的时间顺序见附件 5.1)。

³⁰ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 1 月 24 日，比劳。

³¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 1 月 24 日，班吉。

³² 与外交使团成员在班吉举行的会晤，2018 年 1 月和 2 月。

³³ 与中非共和国外交部长的会晤，2018 年 3 月 24 日，班吉。

³⁴ 见 <http://smc.sd/fr/la-rdc-prete-signer-laccord-portant-creation-dune-commission-mixte-speciale-rdc-rca-soudan-du-sud/>，2018 年 4 月 26 日查阅。

³⁵ 与中非共和国外交部长的会晤，2018 年 3 月 24 日和 6 月 19 日，班吉。

³⁶ 同上。

A. 战斗的人道主义和社区后果

50. 2018 年 4 月至 5 月，仅在班吉就有约 70 人被打死，330 人受伤。³⁷ 鉴于 PK5 和 Castor 居民区在“苏库拉行动”之后发生冲突造成的伤亡没有计入官方数字，死亡人数很可能被低估。冲突动态再次出现，令人回想起 2013 年和 2014 年的暴力事件(见 S/2014/452，第 104 至 112 段)：平民因其宗教或族裔遭袭，保健设施和礼拜场所受到攻击，人道主义援助受阻。

51. 在“苏库拉行动”期间，4 月 7 日晚，有 2 人被打死，45 人受伤，其中许多人被流弹击中。³⁸ 中非稳定团无法执行计划中的保护平民应急措施(见附件 5.1)。在行动的第一阶段，即凌晨 2 时至 5 时，搜查了当地的几所房屋，寻找自卫团体成员；没有一名领导人被捕。

52. 专家小组观察到，在“苏库拉行动”之后，中非稳定团和国家安全部队在第三区周围设立了警戒线，³⁹ 这些警戒线经常得到周围地区当地青年的支持。⁴⁰ 设立警戒线是出于安全考虑，但却造成了 PK5 居民区的隔离，主要是在提供人道主义援助和供应当地市场方面。

53. 2018 年 4 月 10 日，一支由卢旺达维和人员组成的巡逻队进行干预，以平息混有自卫团体成员的一群人的愤怒，当时这群人正接近第五区警察局。干预引发了第三区内 4 小时的暴力冲突，造成 30 多人死亡，100 多人受伤，其中很可能包括大量平民伤亡。专家小组约谈了 10 名身为受害者本人或受害者亲属的平民。此外，1 名卢旺达维和人员在冲突中丧生，另有 8 人受伤。

54. 发生在班吉法蒂玛圣母教堂的事件应被视为“苏库拉行动”之后一连串事件的一部分。5 月 1 日上午 11 时左右，在教堂附近的一个检查站，当地警察试图逮捕一名与别称“Force”的 Nimeri Matar 自卫团体有联系的个人。⁴¹ 当来自 PK5 居民区的自卫团体作出反应时，警察逃入了教堂大院，⁴² 而当时大院内有 1 000 多人正在参加仪式。自卫团体随即包围了教堂，并使用自动武器和榴弹将教堂围困了 2 个小时之久。结果，包括 1 名牧师在内的 30 人死亡，185 人受伤。

55. 班吉民众对法蒂玛圣母教堂事件作出了极为暴力的反应，而反穆斯林情绪更是火上浇油。一群愤怒的民众把牧师的尸体带到总统府以示抗议，在 Lakouanga 居民区附近私刑处决了两名塞内加尔籍穆斯林。在此之后，Lakouanga 和 Ngaragba 居民区的两座清真寺遭到抢劫。

³⁷ 人道主义事务协调厅的报告，2018 年 4 月 16 日和 2018 年 5 月 7 日。

³⁸ 人道主义事务协调厅的报告，2018 年 4 月 16 日。

³⁹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 18 日，班吉。

⁴⁰ 专家小组对班吉的访问，2018 年 4 月至 5 月。

⁴¹ 与直接证人的会晤，2018 年 5 月 3 日，班吉。

⁴² 机密报告，2018 年 5 月 2 日。与直接证人的会晤，2018 年 5 月 3 日和 8 日，班吉。

56. 与此同时，数百名愤怒的民众闯入班吉社区医院，大部分伤员已转到了这家医院。人群首先用石块砸死了一名看护住院病人的穆斯林，然后跑到创伤病房搜索其他穆斯林病人，后者将自己反锁在一个房间里。⁴³ 此外，PK5 居民区亨利·迪南保健设施的伤员在长达 10 天的时间内都无法转到首都的专门保健设施，造成数名病人死亡。⁴⁴ 中非稳定团表示，由于安全形势，无法按照人道主义行为体的要求建立人道主义走廊。⁴⁵

B. 煽动歧视和暴力

57. 班吉的骚乱使以族裔和宗教为由煽动歧视和暴力的言论再度兴起，并愈演愈烈。2018 年 4 月和 5 月，报纸和社交媒体上充斥着对 PK5 居民区及其居民表达敌意的言论，其目的有两个：首先，造成一种歧视性论调，将中非共和国全体穆斯林与前来破坏该国稳定的外国雇佣军联系起来；其次，直接煽动他人对穆斯林实施暴力(见附件 5.2)。2018 年 4 月 1 日至 5 月 31 日期间，中非稳定团确定在 11 份全国性报纸上发表了 39 篇煽动歧视、敌对和暴力的文章(见附件 5.3)。

58. 在 PK5 居民区开展的军事行动的名称无意中助长了激进分子的言辞，因为“苏库拉”(sukula)一词在桑戈语中意为“清洗”。自“苏库拉行动”以来，媒体就呼吁将 PK5 居民区饿死、对其加以“清理”或予以摧毁，但在法蒂玛圣母教堂事件后，这种呼吁的力度大大强化，媒体普遍把自卫团体、有时甚至将整个穆斯林社区称为“恐怖分子”(见附件 5.4)。

59. 政治人物也采用了类似的仇恨言辞。例如，5 月 1 日，在法蒂玛圣母教堂事件发生后，国民议会的几名成员立即在向总理提问时间里发表了令人不安的言论。特别是，来自宾博的议员 Sylvain Ngoni 表示，“今天，PK5 已成为乍得”，“我在想，我们是否应该在某一天一起烧毁 PK5”(见附件 5.5)。提问以桑戈语进行，由中非电台现场直播。

60. 附件 5.6 提供了关于高级传播委员会预防活动和决定的资料，该委员会得到了中非稳定团的支持(见下文第 119(d)段中的建议)。

C. PK5 居民区的武装民兵

61. 目前有 5 个自封的自卫团体活跃在 PK5 居民区，成为“苏库拉行动”的目标。它们以其现任或前任领导人的姓名(或别名)称呼：“Force”、“You”、Moussa Danda、“Apo”和“50/50”(见附件 5.6)。它们的活动大都是犯罪活动，仅限于 PK5 地区。这些团体之间偶尔会发生冲突，因为它们正在争夺 PK5 地区市场和运输运营商的税收。⁴⁶

⁴³ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 5 日，班吉。

⁴⁴ 与秘密消息人士的电话交谈和电子邮件往来，2018 年 5 月 3 日。

⁴⁵ 同上。

⁴⁶ 机密报告，2018 年 2 月 23 日。

62. 中非稳定团称，之所以发起“苏库拉行动”，是因为商人长期以来一直呼吁行动自由和结束该地区自卫团体的非法征税。然而，一些 PK5 社区代表认为，该行动的发起与正在同中非稳定团进行的旨在和平解决该地区安全问题的对话背道而驰(见附件 5.7)。

63. PK5 居民区居民与自卫团体之间的关系很复杂。一些社区的代表，包括自卫团体行动的受害者，告诉专家小组，这些团体的存在及其暴力行为是“为感到受到保护而付出的代价”，因为居民生活在恐惧之中，害怕 2014 年和 2015 年针对该地区的暴力事件再次发生。他们还承认，中非稳定团巡逻队在减少这些团体的影响方面发挥了积极作用。

64. 在一些社区看来，自卫团体的重要性主要基于对国家安全部队的不信任感，国家安全部队以前在针对穆斯林社区的暴力行为中发挥了作用(见 S/2014/452，附件 5.4)。⁴⁷

65. 几名证人告诉专家小组，在“苏库拉行动”(4 月 7 日)当晚，一群身穿各种制服的人(他们描述为中非共和国武装部队人员，不属于行动的一部分)通过 Fondo 地区进入 PK5 居民区，并向塞内加尔居民区方向走去。据报告，所指称的中非共和国武装部队人员与当地居民发生冲突，抢劫了他们的住所。⁴⁸

66. 在“苏库拉行动”之后的一周内，Castor 居民区和 PK5 居民区之间的边界附近也发生了暴力冲突。随后，中非共和国武装部队和国内安全部队在“反砍刀”组织的支持下，据报在受制裁个人阿尔弗雷德·耶卡托姆领导率领下，与 PK5 的自卫团体发生冲突。⁴⁹

67. 这些事件加深了民众与国家安全部队之间的隔阂，加强了自卫团体在社区中的作用。无论是在“苏库拉行动”或随后发生的暴力事件期间，都有平民加入自卫团体并参与冲突。⁵⁰

68. 最近的事件提升了自卫团体领导人的形象；特别是，一些前塞雷卡派系领导人试图与自卫团体领导人重建联系，以加强他们在首都的地位。⁵¹ 虽然自卫团体领导人拒绝与前塞雷卡派系发生关联，但对他们所关切问题的处理仍与全面政治协议有关。例如，“Force”申明他愿意参加解除武装、复员、重返社会和遣返以及安全部门改革进程，他的主要目标是被重新编入中非共和国武装部队。⁵²

⁴⁷ 与 PK5 危机委员会的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13 日至 15 日，班吉。

⁴⁸ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 6 日和 6 月 14 日，班吉。

⁴⁹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13、14 和 15 日，班吉。

⁵⁰ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 5 日和 6 日以及 6 月 14 日，班吉。

⁵¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 6 日，班吉。

⁵² 与“Force”的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13 日，班吉。

D. PK5 居民区的武器和贩运

69. 附件 5.8 提供了有关 PK5 居民区的武器情况以及首都常规武器和弹药广泛可得情况的进一步资料。

六. 受前塞雷卡派系影响地区的事态发展

A. 前塞雷卡派系立场趋于强硬

70. 政府与前塞雷卡派系之间的关系日益紧张。前塞雷卡派系立场趋于强硬的主要原因是，它们认为，政府最近通过购置武器获得了作战实力(见上文第 20 至 23 段)，愿意优先考虑军事解决方案，并正在调整其立场，向专家小组在 2017 年最后报告中称为“战争贩子”的个人靠拢(见 S/2017/1023，第 62 至 65 段)。

中非复兴人民阵线继续寻求重新统一塞雷卡

71. 鉴于即将在非洲联盟倡议下举行对话，中非复兴人民阵线在阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因的影响下，加大了对政府的压力。⁵³ 2018 年 4 月初，侯赛因先生和来自恩代莱的中非复兴人民阵线战斗人员向南挺进，以便更加接近首都。他们停驻在卡加班多罗，因为本应与其共同前往锡布(距班吉 180 公里)的争取中非和平联盟人员没有到达。

72. 阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因在卡加班多罗游说中非爱国运动和争取中非和平联盟加入其行动，向锡布进发，强调所有前塞雷卡派系都对政府存在的不满。他还利用人们因“苏库拉行动”而对政府日益增加的不信任感，鼓励全国各地的穆斯林社区支持他们的努力(见附件 6.1)。⁵⁴

中非爱国运动与中非复兴人民阵线结盟

73. 5 月 1 日，专家小组与穆罕默德·哈特姆“将军”及中非爱国运动的政治代表会晤，他们断然拒绝了中非复兴人民阵线向锡布挺进的计划。⁵⁵ 但接下来的几天，在中非爱国运动于卡加班多罗召开大会(2018 年 5 月 2 日和 3 日举行)后，该团体任命了新的政治领导人，并公开表示支持中非复兴人民阵线的战略(见附件 6.2)。

74. 这种转变可以解释为，由于图瓦德拉总统在 5 月 1 日法蒂玛圣母教堂事件后发表的声明，构成中非爱国运动主要支持基础的“阿拉伯”社区以及大会与会者当中目前存在愤怒情绪。⁵⁶ 当时，图瓦德拉总统将中非爱国运动描绘为政府盟友，同时又发表被穆斯林社区视为歧视性的言论。⁵⁷ 中非爱国运动领导人默罕默德·哈特姆不得不接受该团体立场的改变。哈特姆的主要关切仍然是使国家当

⁵³ 与阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，卡加班多罗。

⁵⁴ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，卡加班多罗。

⁵⁵ 与哈特姆的会晤，2018 年 5 月 2 日，卡加班多罗。

⁵⁶ 见 <https://www.facebook.com/Renaissance.cf/posts/1658588347550650>，2018 年 6 月 28 日查阅。

⁵⁷ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 2 日，卡加班多罗。

局承认他对卡加班多罗地区的控制，他无意质疑政府的合法性，但若要维持其领导地位，他也需要考虑追随者和社区的意见。⁵⁸

争取中非和平联盟立场持续模糊

75. 争取中非和平联盟的立场更为不确定和复杂。尽管争取中非和平联盟未正式表示支持中非复兴人民阵线，但它一直在这方面持开放态度。虽然争取中非和平联盟战斗人员驻扎在卡加班多罗和锡布周边，以备中非复兴人民阵线向锡布进发，但争取中非和平联盟仍对侯赛因的战略表示怀疑，认为该战略在分配给争取中非和平联盟的角色等方面不够明确。⁵⁹

76. 自 2017 年 10 月伊皮协议签署(见 S/2017/1023, 第 136 和 137 段)以来，争取中非和平联盟一直致力于实现与其他前塞雷卡派系的关系正常化。2018 年 5 月 3 日，中非复兴爱国联盟领导人扎卡里亚·达曼“将军”与阿里·达拉萨在布里亚举行会议，以缔结古拉族和富拉尼族之间的协议。这项协议旨在保障两族行动自由，加强了争取中非和平联盟经由达曼控制的瓦达从苏丹领土获得物资的能力。

77. 尽管如此，争取中非和平联盟仍希望表现得像是政府和国际社会的理性合作伙伴。例如，尽管争取中非和平联盟于 6 月 10 日在班巴里与中非共和国武装部队士兵发生暴力冲突，但它最终还是允许中非共和国武装部队的车队抵达班加苏(见上文第 19 段)。⁶⁰ 这项决定引发了其他前塞雷卡派系和争取中非和平联盟内部的消极反应。⁶¹ 在缔结全面协议之前拒绝中非共和国武装部队部署任何人员是所有前塞雷卡派系的共同立场(见上文第 39 段)。

“内罗毕集团”和其他可能的联盟

78. 《内罗毕协议》各签署方(见 S/2015/936, 第 24 至 26 段)继续一致反对政府。据报与马克西姆·莫科姆和让-弗朗西斯·博齐泽有关联的“反砍刀”组织派系(见 S/2016/1032, 第 92 至 96 段)继续与中非复兴人民阵线协调行动。⁶² 据报告称，2018 年 4 月底，代表让-弗朗西斯·博齐泽的六人代表团在卡加班多罗与阿卜杜拉耶·侯赛因举行会议。⁶³ 这两个团体仍拥有类似的目标，但它们保持联盟关系的能力依然脆弱，特别是在族群间关系紧张的情况下。

79. 包括政界人士在内的班吉其他行为体与中非复兴人民阵线联络，表示给予其非正式支持，以图中非复兴人民阵线一旦颠覆政府，自己或可作为其合作伙伴。一些最近退役的中非共和国武装部队士兵尤其积极地向反对政府的各武装团体提供服务。⁶⁴

⁵⁸ 与哈特姆的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，卡加班多罗。

⁵⁹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13 日，班吉。

⁶⁰ 机密报告，2018 年 6 月 18 日。

⁶¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13 日，班吉。

⁶² 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 7 日，班吉。

⁶³ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 2 日，卡加班多罗。

⁶⁴ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月和 6 月，班吉和其他省。

中非复兴人民阵线对国际社会的态度

80. 前塞雷卡派系很少对中非稳定团开展军事行动。不过，在“苏库拉行动”以及中非稳定团于恩多梅特采取行动阻止中非复兴人民阵线向锡布挺进后，该团体便公开指责稳定团在军事上支持政府对其进行打击，失去了公正性(见附件 6.1)。中非复兴人民阵线领导人告诉专家小组，若中非共和国武装部队和中非稳定团在该团体控制区内或附近开展更多联合行动，则可能发生直接对抗。⁶⁵

B. 前塞雷卡派系的武器和贩运活动

81. 政府最近购置了武器，这促使前塞雷卡派系积极地进行重新武装。武装团体人员告诉专家小组，由于政府选择了军事方案(训练、重新武装和攻击)，而非政治进程，武装团体需要做好准备。⁶⁶ 附件 6.3 说明了武器流入情况，包括苏丹当局在达尔富尔发起的解除武装运动对中非共和国境内武装团体购置和购买军事装备的影响。

C. 设立平行的行政和税收架构

82. 专家小组继续观察到，前塞雷卡派系设立了平行的行政架构(例如，见 S/2017/1023，第 153 至 155 段)。这些团体的领导人告诉专家小组，此类架构的目标有两个：(a) 应对其控制区内持续缺乏国家存在的情况；(b) 创造收入，以便继续向民众提供公共服务，包括为此建立安全部队。⁶⁷

83. 一些前塞雷卡领导人声称，其影响区内的任何活动都必须经过他们同意。例如，中非复兴人民阵线领导人告诉专家小组，该团体之所以允许车队于 2018 年 5 月通过其控制区，为在布里亚和瓦达修建医院(中非共和国和俄罗斯联邦两国政府合作的一部分)运输物资(见上文第 13 段)，并派战斗人员为这支车队提供安保，只是为了获得经济报酬。⁶⁸ 俄罗斯联邦代表否认这些说法，并着重指出，中非复兴人民阵线予以合作、允许车队通过的唯一动机是为了在该武装团体控制区内建立医院，以便向民众提供支助。⁶⁹

中非复兴人民阵线在上科托省的平行行政机构

84. 中非复兴人民阵线上科托省财务管理委员会主席穆罕默德·赛义德“将军”告诉专家小组，他的行政机构分为五个部门，负责管理以下活动：咖啡贸易、畜牧业、征税、海关和植物检疫服务。附件 6.4 提供了关于该委员会税收制度和其他省份类似架构的更多信息。

⁶⁵ 与中非爱国运动、中非复兴人民阵线和争取中非和平联盟领导人的会晤，2018 年 5 月 3 日，卡加班多罗；2018 年 6 月 9 日，布里亚；2018 年 4 月 30 日，班吉。

⁶⁶ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 3 月 27 日、5 月 22 日以及 6 月 4 日和 16 日。

⁶⁷ 与穆罕默德·赛义德的会晤，2018 年 6 月 10 日，布里亚。

⁶⁸ 与中非复兴人民阵线领导人的会晤，2018 年 5 月 2 日，卡加班多罗。

⁶⁹ 与俄罗斯联邦代表的会晤，2018 年 6 月 13 日，班吉。

布里亚的钻石和黄金贩运

尽管来自该地区的毛坯钻石暂停出口，但一些收购者仍在布里亚活动。帕特里克·科宗古-亚坎吉便是如此，他于 2017 年 6 月 30 日在班吉被捕，被捕时持有未申报钻石，由于有关系，他在数日后获释(见 S/2017/1023，第 159 至 162 段)。此后，有人又在布里亚见到他，包括在 2018 年 3 月见到他。^a

中非复兴人民阵线的部分地方领导人，如穆罕默德·萨利赫和上科托区指挥官丹布查·侯赛因，也直接参与非法钻石贩运。^b

^a 与收购者和手工采矿者的会晤，2018 年 6 月 8 日至 11 日，布里亚。

^b 同上。

中非复兴人民阵线和争取中非和平联盟的平行采矿管理机构

85. 前塞雷卡派系还设立了专门监督采矿活动并与官方采矿管理机构相对应的架构。中非复兴人民阵线和争取中非和平联盟分别在布里亚和恩代莱以及班巴里任命了区域采矿主任，设立了采矿队，并向采矿者和收购者颁发许可证(见附件 6.5 和 6.6)。

86. 政府采矿管理机构分别于 2017 年 12 月和 2018 年 2 月派代表前往班巴里和恩代莱，以期最终宣布这些地区“符合”金伯利进程的规定。⁷⁰ 但由于武装团体的存在，他们无法完成任务和监督采矿活动。

D. 瓦卡省的战斗对平民、人道主义行为体和维持和平人员的影响

87. 2018 年 1 月至 6 月，瓦卡省经历了一波不稳定局势，这一局势从周边地区逐渐扩展至班巴里镇。社区与武装团体之间的紧密联系往往使冲突动态更加复杂。

班巴里-伊皮轴线沿线的致命暴力循环

88. 最血腥的事件发生在位于班巴里-伊皮轴线沿线的塔格巴拉和塞科(见附件 6.7 地图)。自 2018 年 1 月以来，争取中非和平联盟利用检查站和巡逻加强了对该地区的控制，而“反砍刀”组织战斗人员团体则在周边地区进行了重组。2018 年 3 月中旬左右，“反砍刀”组织人员袭击了位于姆拜杜的富拉尼人营地，造成包括妇女和儿童在内的约 15 人死亡(见附件 6.8)。⁷¹ 3 月 21 日清晨，来自延贝莱戈的“反砍刀”组织作战人员在埃德蒙·奥布鲁的率领下，袭击了位于塔格巴拉的争取中非和平联盟基地，在镇上处决了穆斯林平民并烧毁了几座房屋。⁷² 这

⁷⁰ 与班巴里区域采矿主任的会晤，2018 年 6 月 12 日，班吉。与采矿管理机构的会晤，2018 年 4 月 5 日，恩代莱。

⁷¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 4 月 30 日，班巴里；与境内流离失所者代表的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，塔格巴拉。

⁷² 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 4 月 28 日，班吉；与境内流离失所者代表的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，塔格巴拉和塞科。

引发了争取中非和平联盟的暴力反应，该团体从设在马卢姆和伊皮的基地派出增援部队。来自马卢姆的争取中非和平联盟战斗人员在塞科的圣嘉禄·卢安加教堂内和周围处决了包括牧师在内的 17 名平民，并放火焚烧了塔格巴拉和塞科的大量房屋。⁷³

89. 两周后，报复循环重新开始。4 月 2 日，争取中非和平联盟逮捕了几名被控与“反砍刀”组织团体有关联的人，并将其中一些人移交给位于塔格巴拉的中非稳定团维持和平人员。4 月 3 日清晨，数百名来自延贝莱戈的“反砍刀”组织作战人员袭击了位于塔格巴拉的中非稳定团基地。为应对攻击，中非稳定团召回了 3 月 21 日袭击发生后一直驻守在塞科圣嘉禄·卢安加教堂的装甲车。⁷⁴ 结果，来自马卢姆的争取中非和平联盟增援部队趁机对塞科民众进行了第二次报复，杀害了 23 名平民。⁷⁵ 塔格巴拉的袭击造成 1 名毛里塔尼亚籍维持和平人员丧生，另有 11 人受伤，约 33 名“反砍刀”组织作战人员丧生(见附件 6.9)。⁷⁶

90. 附件 6.10 说明了维持和平人员遭袭的情况。

班巴里的暴力活动

91. 2017 年 2 月，班巴里被宣布为无武装团体区(见 S/2017/639，第 53 段)，虽然此后班巴里局势相对平静，但争取中非和平联盟采取低调策略，继续留在该镇。2018 年 5 月 14 日和 15 日，由于在武装团体支持下爆发族群间冲突，9 名平民丧生，9 人受伤，约 7 000 人流离失所。⁷⁷ 夜晚，当地部分民众趁机抢掠了 3 个国际非政府组织和许多地方协会的办公室，以及私人房屋和公共建筑。尽管没有关于人身攻击的报告，但人道主义机构的应对能力受到严重影响。⁷⁸ 后来，在局势平静后，武装分子以若干非政府组织为目标，精心策划并以专业手法实施了一系列新的极为周密的抢劫，迫使这些组织减少或暂停活动。⁷⁹

92. 2018 年 5 月 29 日和 30 日，争取中非和平联盟人员与中非稳定团和国内安全部队发生暴力冲突，造成 20 多人死亡。⁸⁰ 大量受伤的争取中非和平联盟作战人员涌入该市医院，加剧了医院周围的紧张局势。6 月 6 日，为将一名同伴带出去，数十名争取中非和平联盟人员闯入该医院，并在楼内射击。所有穆斯林病人都因害怕报复而逃离。此后不久，当地一群“反砍刀”组织作战人员进入医院，

⁷³ 与卫生工作者的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，塞科。

⁷⁴ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，塔格巴拉。

⁷⁵ 与卫生工作者的会晤，2018 年 5 月 1 日，塞科。

⁷⁶ 机密报告，2018 年 4 月 4 日。

⁷⁷ 人道主义事务协调厅的报告，2018 年 5 月 16 日。

⁷⁸ 与非政府组织代表的会晤，2018 年 6 月 11 日，班吉。

⁷⁹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 9 日和 15 日，班吉。

⁸⁰ 机密报告，2018 年 5 月 30 日。

搜寻争取中非和平联盟作战人员，并洗劫大楼。对医疗设施的袭击和对保健人员的威胁极大地减少了班巴里民众、特别是穆斯林社区获取保健服务的机会。⁸¹

七. 中非共和国西部的事态发展

A. 武装团体的活动

西里里联盟，一个野心勃勃的新行为体

93. 2017 年底，一个称作西里里联盟的新武装团体在曼贝雷-卡代省成立。其成员主要为富拉尼人，与争取中非和平联盟联系密切。⁸² 他们宣称的目标是保护被当地“反砍刀”组织作战人员视为攻击对象的牛主。⁸³ 但自 2018 年 1 月以来，西里里联盟通过与中非人民民主阵线人员合作，扩大了在纳纳-曼贝雷省南部的地盘，以增加对季节性游牧和采矿活动非法征税的机会(见下文第 102 和 103 段)。

回归、索回和复原组织与恩达雷兄弟领导的“反砍刀”组织团体之间的协议

94. 2017 年 12 月 15 日，回归、索回和复原组织与恩达雷兄弟领导的“反砍刀”组织团体(见 S/2017/1023，第 202 至 208 段)在纳纳-曼贝雷省缔结了一项和平协议。⁸⁴

95. 这项协议实现了停火，并明确划分了两个团体的地盘，双方都维持着一套对季节性游牧活动非法征税的盈利制度。

中非解放全国运动与革命与正义组织的冲突

96. 2017 年 12 月 28 日，革命与正义组织和中非解放全国运动(中非爱国运动的前地方分支)(见 S/2017/1023，第 194 至 197 段)这两个前盟友在保瓦周边爆发暴力冲突。

97. 尽管中非稳定团于 2018 年 1 月启动了“姆巴兰加行动”，两个团体之间的冲突随后中止，但该地区仍不安全。

98. 附件 7.1 提供了关于上述武装团体活动的更多信息。

B. 由于不安全而发生的侵犯人权行为

99. 博桑戈阿-马昆达-楠加-博吉拉三角区的局势说明了该地区最近的政治-军事变化对平民和人道主义行为体的影响(见附件 7.2)。2018 年 3 月 3 日，基里维里

⁸¹ 与秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 6 月 15 日，班吉。

⁸² 与争取中非和平联盟代表的会晤，2018 年 4 月 27 日，班吉。机密报告，2018 年 3 月 26 日。

⁸³ 机密报告，2018 年 3 月 26 日。

⁸⁴ 机密报告，2017 年 12 月 18 日。

村(瓦姆省)据报发生一起大规模强奸案。⁸⁵ 专家小组的调查显示,过去两个月,一群牧民在名叫巴莱瓦的一个人的带领下,在不同场合对生活在纳纳-巴卡萨-布艾地区的许多妇女分几组实施了强奸和性侵犯(见附件 7.3)。

100. 此外,2018 年 2 月 25 日,6 名人道主义工作者在德菲和马昆达之间被人劫持并惨遭杀害。专家小组收集的证词指向了据报由中非爱国运动当地领导人阿卜杜拉直接指挥的 6 名武装分子(见附件 7.4)。⁸⁶

C. 采矿公司增加及其对安全的影响

101. 自 2016 年初以来,一些外国经营者获得了以半机械或工业化方式在中非共和国开采钻石矿和金矿的许可证。此类投资为国家提供税收。与此同时,在国家权威有限的地区,武装团体可通过勒索、非法征税或公司和武装团体之间的直接安排(2016 年私营安保公司 FIT Protection 便是如此(见 S/2016/694, 第 85 至 89 段))从所有经济经营者的活动中拿到钱。

对纳纳-曼贝雷省阿巴地区采矿公司的勒索

102. 2018 年 1 月 5 日和 6 日,西里里联盟和中非人民民主阵线的武装战斗人员在纳纳-曼贝雷省阿巴地区作业的三家采矿公司(IMC、Zighu Mining 和 Tieng Pao)的工人进行威胁。地方当局代表和参与在公司与武装团体之间调停的个人告诉专家小组,这些公司不得不向战斗人员支付 200 万非洲法郎(3 750 美元),这样战斗人员才同意离开该地区。⁸⁷

103. 虽然 Tieng Pao 的管理人员否认当时曾向武装团体提供过任何经济补偿,但他们承认曾于 2017 年 11 月和 12 月因一起类似事件而向武装分子支付 300 万非洲法郎(5 650 美元)。⁸⁸ 专家小组未能与 IMC 和 Zighu Mining 的管理人员会面,他们在专家小组访问中非共和国期间不在国内。

104. 附件 7.5 说明了利用“反砍刀”组织战斗人员以及国内安全部队和中非共和国武装部队人员为包括采矿公司在内的经济经营者提供安保的情况。

博桑戈阿地区

105. 附件 7.6 说明了采矿公司进驻“反砍刀”组织据点博桑戈阿地区的情况。

D. 赞加桑加国家自然保护区的偷猎和象牙贩运活动⁸⁹

⁸⁵ 见 <http://www.msf.org/en/article/central-african-republic-survivors-describe-mass-rape-ordeal-outside-bossangoa>, 2018 年 6 月 26 日查阅。

⁸⁶ 与秘密消息人士的会晤,2018 年 3 月 25 日至 26 日,马昆达。

⁸⁷ 与阿巴市长、宪兵、采矿管理机构和秘密消息人士的会晤,2018 年 3 月 26 日至 28 日,布阿尔和阿巴。

⁸⁸ 与 Tieng Pao 管理人员的会晤,2018 年 3 月 30 日,班吉。

⁸⁹ 见附件 7.7。

八. 贩运动态和路线：武器和自然资源

A. 常驻班吉的个人利用稳定团护送的车辆组织武器贩运

106. 2018 年 1 月 29 日，争取中非和平联盟成员告知专家小组，他们在位于伊皮的中非稳定团营地前拦截并搜查了由中非稳定团护送的 Ecolog International 车辆，结果发现了 1 727 发刚果武器弹药制造公司所造狩猎弹药、602 包曲马多和 1.5 公斤大麻。⁹⁰ 6 名司机和助理司机被捕，其中 4 人因非法持有弹药和违禁物品或合谋参与此类活动而被判刑。⁹¹

107. 据目击者称，其中一名被定罪者迪迪埃·扎拉经常利用中非稳定团承包商 Ecolog International 的卡车向布里亚镇、班巴里镇和伊皮镇走私狩猎弹药。扎拉据称在刚果罗波拉购买弹药，并转手将其卖给猎人和“反砍刀”组织作战人员(见附件 8.1)。⁹² 专家小组正在继续调查由中非稳定团护送的车队是否被贩运者用来走私武器弹药和自然资源。

B. 刚果为打击向中非共和国非法出口刚果武器弹药制造公司所造弹药而采取的措施

108. 刚果武器弹药制造公司所造狩猎弹药继续通过刚果和刚果民主共和国走私到中非共和国(见 S/2017/1023，第 106、107 和 248 段)，并在该国全国各地销售(见附件 8.2)，⁹³ “反砍刀”组织作战人员在塔格巴拉(见上文第 88 和 89 段)等地开展军事行动期间，就使用了这种弹药。

109. 专家小组访问了刚果的布拉柴维尔和黑角港，向政府和这家弹药制造商说明了“反砍刀”组织作战人员在中非共和国非法进口和使用刚果武器弹药制造公司所造弹药的情况，并指出弹药箱内没有按《中部非洲管制小武器和轻武器及其弹药和可用于制造、维修或组装此类武器的零部件公约》(《金沙萨公约》)的要求提供便于适当追查的必要信息(见 S/2017/1023，第 250 段)。⁹⁴ 访问结束后，刚果当局采取了一些措施，以便更好地管制此类弹药的销售(见附件 8.3)。

C. 金伯利进程、钻石贸易和钻石贩运

110. 2018 年 1 月至 6 月期间，中非共和国从正规渠道出口了约 74 000 克拉毛坯钻石。⁹⁵ 这一数字包括收购公司在前几年(出口暂停时)积累并于 2018 年初出口的库存(见附件 8.8)。自 2018 年初以来，实际提交供出口并合法出口的钻石不到 2 000 克拉，数量极少。

⁹⁰ 与争取中非和平联盟成员的电话通话，2018 年 1 月 29 日。

⁹¹ 班巴里大法院判决书，2018 年 2 月 14 日。

⁹² 与 5 名秘密消息人士的会晤，2018 年 5 月 28 日和 30 日以及 6 月 4 日和 18 日，班吉。

⁹³ 与海关官员的会晤，2018 年 6 月 1 日和 16 日，班吉。

⁹⁴ 专家小组对布拉柴维尔和黑角港的访问，2018 年 4 月 16 日至 22 日。

⁹⁵ 中非共和国官方数据。

111. 与专家小组在 2017 年最后报告中描述的积极态势(见 S/2017/1023, 第 224 至 226 段)截然不同, 合法钻石贸易的这种大幅减少与 2017 年下半年以来各省大部分收购公司关闭有关。⁹⁶ 收购公司管理人员告诉专家小组, 公司关闭是由于金伯利进程监测制度规定的出口清关程序发生延误, 造成现金短缺。⁹⁷ 金伯利进程监测小组成员表示, 这种延误是由于收购公司和国家当局在收集 2015 年 6 月业务框架规定的出口审批所需文件时遇到困难。

112. 缺乏收购公司的现状极大地助长了该国西部钻石走私活动的恢复, 因为手工采矿者和收购者别无他选, 要么只能停止活动, 要么就是非法出售钻石。

113. 尽管在被宣布“符合”金伯利进程规定的地区, 矿场不受任何武装团体控制, 但专家小组注意到, 曼贝雷-卡代省的大多数“反砍刀”组织领导人都参与了与钻石有关的活动。这些领导人包括“阿维洛”、“莫保”和凯文·帕多姆(又名“肯波”)。⁹⁸ 其中许多人过去曾在钻石部门工作, 如今继续以此牟利; 专家小组未收集到表明这些人为更广泛的“反砍刀”组织运动供资的证据。

114. 政府告知专家小组, 除阿马达-加扎等仍然极为不安全的几个市外, 该国西南部的大部分市不久将提交金伯利进程监测小组, 以供审批。⁹⁹

D. 黄金开采和贩运

115. 中非共和国的正式黄金出口继续增加(见 S/2017/1023, 第 223 段)。2018 年的数字可能超越 2017 年创下的纪录(108 公斤), 因为 2018 年 1 月至 5 月期间已出口 65 公斤。¹⁰⁰

116. 不过, 生产的可追查性非常有限, 绝大部分产品继续通过非法途径出口(见 S/2017/1023, 第 158 和 230 段)。在走私黄金流入的邻国中, 喀麦隆是首选目的地, 因为据报告称, 该国黄金购买价格(每克 23 000 至 24 000 非洲法郎, 即 40 至 44 美元)远高于班吉的价格(20 000 至 22 000 非洲法郎, 即 35 至 39 美元), 有时甚至远高于世界市场价格。¹⁰¹

E. 机场的钻石/黄金贩运和管制不力问题

117. 贩运者主要利用公路将黄金和钻石从开采区运至班吉或邻国。不过, 空运仍然是将货物从布里亚等公路不安全的地区运至班吉的受青睐的运输方式(见

⁹⁶ 专家小组对贝贝拉蒂和诺拉的访问, 2018 年 1 月 11 日至 16 日。

⁹⁷ 与收购公司管理人员的会晤, 2018 年 1 月 17 日和 21 日, 班吉。

⁹⁸ 与手工采矿者和秘密消息人士的会晤, 2018 年 1 月 11 日, 贝贝拉蒂。

⁹⁹ 与矿业部长的会晤, 2018 年 6 月 5 日, 班吉。

¹⁰⁰ 中非共和国官方出口数据。

¹⁰¹ 与手工采矿者和收购者的会晤, 3 月 24 日, 博桑戈阿; 3 月 26 日, 布阿尔; 2018 年 5 月 1 日, 班巴里。

S/2017/1023, 第 159 至 169 段)。空运还被用于从班吉国际机场将黄金和钻石走私出境。¹⁰²

118. 特别反欺诈股未在该国任何机场派驻人员, 只有班吉机场除外, 该机场的搜查管制仅针对出发旅客而不针对抵达旅客, 即使是来自黄金和钻石产区的旅客也不受搜查管制(见下文第 119(e)段中的建议)。¹⁰³ 专家小组观察到, 离开班吉的贩运者还可安排于登机前, 直接在机场停机坪上领取未经核查的包裹。

九. 建议

119. 专家小组建议安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会:

(a) 鼓励中非稳定团和国家当局制定标准程序, 以便在受豁免的军事装备运抵中非共和国境内后对其进行检查、处理和库存管理(见上文第 20 段和附件 2.2);

(b) 促请南苏丹政府向委员会提供信息, 说明名单所列个人弗朗索瓦·博齐泽使用的南苏丹外交护照以及吊销该护照的情况(见上文第 27 段);

(c) 鼓励中非共和国政府和邻国设立和(或)启动(或重新启动)委员会, 以处理跨界问题, 包括与联合国制裁制度相关或影响中非共和国不安全局势的事项, 例如执行对受制裁个人的旅行禁令、季节性游牧或武器和自然资源贩运问题(见上文第 47 和 48 段);

(d) 鼓励中非共和国高级传播委员会继续针对煽动歧视、仇恨和暴力, 特别是基于族裔或宗教原因进行此类煽动, 并破坏中非共和国和平、稳定或安全的公开言论, 加强监测、报告和惩处(见上文第 60 段);

(e) 鼓励中非共和国国家当局加强特别反欺诈股工作人员在机场对旅客及其行李、特别是从位于钻石和黄金产区的机场抵达班吉机场的旅客实施的管制(见上文第 118 段)。

¹⁰² 与贩运者的会晤, 2018 年 3 月 21 日, 班吉; 2018 年 6 月 9 日, 布里亚。

¹⁰³ 与特别反欺诈股的会晤, 2018 年 4 月 1 日, 班吉。

Annexes

Annexes to the midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2399 \(2018\)](#)

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Annex 1.1: Map of the Central African Republic



Annex 2.1: National security and defence forces: training, equipment and deployment.

1. Additional information on the training of FACA by the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM)

Since September 2016, EUTM has trained a total of 3,000 FACA soldiers:

- Qualifying courses for 344 FACA officers (i.e. 38% of the total officers) and 544 non-commissioned officers (i.e. 26% non-commissioned officers);
- Training for 1,600 FACA soldiers (a total of three battalions, the last battalion finishes training in early August 2018);
- Training of 232 FACA soldiers as part of the pilot project for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation;
- The validation of the training of 344 FACA soldiers organized in Rwanda and Equatorial Guinea.

2. Additional information on the training of FACA by instructors from the Russian Federation

The first training of personnel of the CAR national defence and security forces by the military (5) and civilian (170) instructors of the Russian Federation, as notified to the Committee on 26 December 2017, was concluded on 31 March 2018. The training took place in the CAR and in the Sudan. During an official ceremony at the training site on 31 March 2018 in Berengo, 65 km southwest of Bangui, 202 FACA soldiers and Presidential Guards demonstrated some of the operational skills acquired during their training.¹ Few days earlier, on 26 March, most of the National defence and security forces trained in the Sudan² flew back to the Central African Republic.³

The second training of 200 FACA soldiers and 54 Presidential Guards was conducted in Berengo between 30 March and 30 May 2018. The third training of 400 FACA soldiers and 62 Presidential Guards started in Berengo on 30 May 2018. This brings the total of FACA soldiers and Presidential Guards trained by Russian instructors to approximately 900.⁴

¹ Panel's visit to Berengo, 31 March 2018.

² 85 FACA from BIT3 battalion; 1 FACA from BIT4 battalion; 2 FACA from BIT5 battalion; 112 elements from the Presidential Guard.

³ Meeting with the Minister of Defence of the CAR, Bangui, 27 April 2018. Meeting with the then Head of the Russian training and weapons management mission, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁴ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 19 June 2018.

The presence of instructors from the Russian Federation amidst the Presidential Guard, as observed by the Panel in Berengo on 31 March, was reported to be part of the training exercise.⁵ Contrary to the information conveyed by several media sources,⁶ the then Head of the training mission of the Russian Federation told the Panel that there was no plan to include Russian nationals in the Presidential Guard or the close protection of the President.⁷

⁵ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁶ See, for instance, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/551743/politique/centrafrique-la-garde-rapprochee-russe-du-president-touadera/>; <http://107.189.40.50/ptv//program/20180417/afriquepress0128.mp4>, accessed on 20 April 2018.

⁷ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Meeting with the Director-General of the Gendarmerie, Bangui, 24 May 2018.

Annex 2.2: The delivery and use of exempted weapons and ammunition.**1. Chinko Project's arms and ammunition**

On 17 January 2018, firearms (total 135) and ammunition (total 91,240 rounds) for use by Chinko Project/African Parks Network - as exempted by the Sanctions Committee on 27 February 2017 - arrived at Bangui M'Poko International Airport from Borges, Bulgaria. Upon arrival, the aircraft was unloaded by Chinko personnel and the CAR armed and security forces, and brought to a secure UNMAS storage facility under MINUSCA escort.⁸ MINUSCA (UNMAS), in collaboration with inspectors of the Ministries of Water and Forestry, Defence and Interior, immediately proceeded with the detailed verification of the shipment, as planned in advance by all partners concerned. The next day, the weapons and ammunition were safely transported by air to Chinko Project, Haute Kotto and Mbomou préfectures. The weapons are currently being used by the 52 rangers of the Chinko Project.

Some minor differences between the amounts of ammunition ordered and those received were observed by UNMAS and Chinko. Moreover, the serial numbers on the weapons did not correspond to the serial numbers on the list received by Chinko from the supplier. The Panel urged Chinko to request the CAR authorities to send a letter to the Sanctions Committee to report this information, which they did on 19 April 2018.

The Panel notes that some members of the diplomatic community and MINUSCA staff have raised concerns regarding the use of conventional weapons of war by Chinko rangers in a park surrounded by areas with strong armed group presence, and have questioned the rangers' legitimacy to exercise law enforcement duties.⁹

The Chinko Project was founded as a Central African Republic non-governmental organization in 2013. It is managed by the African Parks Network that has obtained a license from the CAR Government until the year 2064 to sustainably manage a 17,600-sq. km area in eastern CAR, the Chinko Project Area (CPA). The CPA rangers have full authority to enforce Central African law inside the CPA by arresting and disarming poachers and transporting them to the responsible Central African authorities, according to the mandate issued by the CAR Government.

⁸ The Panel was present at the Bangui airport to observe the delivery on 17 January 2018.

⁹ Meeting of the Arms Embargo Working Group, Bangui, 29 January 2018. Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 17 January 2018.

2. Arms and ammunition from the Russian Federation


The first phase of the delivery of weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation was completed on 7 February 2018. A first aircraft arrived at Bangui M'Poko International Airport on Friday 26 January; two other aircraft arrived during the night from Tuesday 30 to Wednesday 31 January; two aircraft arrived in the night from Thursday 1 February to Friday 2 February; two aircraft arrived in the late afternoon and evening of 5 February 2018; and two aircraft arrived on 7 February 2018.

The aircraft were unloaded by nationals of the Russian Federation in the military area of the airport, in the presence of the CAR security and armed forces providing perimeter security and, at times, in the presence of EUTM and/or UNMAS staff as well as the Panel of Experts.¹⁰ The Government of the CAR requested and received the support of MINUSCA to escort the weapons from the M'Poko Airport to Camp de Roux. Given that all the flights reached Bangui after sundown, it was not possible to proceed with a proper inspection of the stockpile upon arrival. CAR and Russian officials indicated that, upon completion of the transfer of the exempted materiel, UNMAS and the Panel would have access to the entire stockpile for inspection and accounting.¹¹ As indicated in paragraph 20 of the report, on 18 June 2018 the Minister of Defence sent a letter to MINUSCA requesting an expeditiously inspection (see below).

¹⁰ The Panel of Experts was present at the Bangui M'Poko International Airport when the first aircraft arrived on 29 January 2018.

¹¹ Communication with UNMAS, 3 February 2018 and phone conversation with a representative of the Embassy of the Russian Federation, Bangui, 29 January 2018.

Letter dated 18 June 2018 from the Minister of Defence of the CAR regarding the inspection. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 19 June 2018.



Below photographs of a Russian 7,62 mm Kalashnikov PK machine-gun with serial number CF400 taken by the Panel in Sibut on 25 May 2018.



The distribution method of the weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation is such that each individual recipient will be responsible and accountable for the received weaponry: a form with detailed information (identity picture, number and type of equipment received, serial number of each weapon) is prepared for each individual receiving equipment and signed by the beneficiary.¹²

¹² Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Meeting with EUTM, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Correspondence with confidential source 12 April 2018.

Copies of the individual fiches. Document obtained by the Panel from the Presidential security adviser 4 June 2018.

Карточка закрепления оружия

Фамилия [REDACTED]

Имя [REDACTED] 060

Личный номер 94.005780

№ п/п	Наименование оружия	номер оружия	Роспись	Отметка о сдаче
	Пистолет ПМ	МД 0150		
	9,0 пст	48		

Карточка закрепления оружия

Фамилия [REDACTED] Коссов

Имя [REDACTED]

Личный номер 98.005883

№ п/п	Наименование оружия	номер оружия	Роспись	Отметка о сдаче
	Пистолет ПМ	БА 2051		
	9,0 пст	48		


4. Proposal for a protocol governing exempted arms, ammunition and military equipment

The latest transfer of military equipment from Cameroon, Bulgaria (Chinko project) and the Russian Federation demonstrates the need for MINUSCA, in cooperation with the CAR authorities, to develop a protocol governing the inspection and stockpile management of exempted military equipment.

The purpose of such an inspection protocol would be to clearly establish the responsibilities and tasks of the (i) CAR security and armed forces, (ii) exporting State or private enterprise, and (iii) MINUSCA. The protocol would also set a standard procedure regarding (a) timely information sharing on the exact time of the arrival of the military equipment and the details of each shipment; (b) security measures to be adopted; (c) transport and verification of the imports; (d) safe storage of the imports; and (e) subsequent inspections and registration of the imports.

To date, imports of exempted military equipment are processed on an *ad hoc* basis, which has, at times, resulted in questions by some individuals or entities of the legitimacy of some actions (such as the presence of, and inspection by, MINUSCA staff) and the measures that need to be taken for the purpose of mitigating the possible diversion of imported armaments (such as ensuring the security, inspection and safe storage of weapons and ammunition). The involvement of the newly-established National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons would also be essential for ensuring a smooth management of imported armaments.

Annex 2.3: Copy of passport used by sanctioned individual François Bozizé.



Below pictures of Mr. François Bozizé



Available at
www.jeuneafrique.com/136523/politique/fran-ois-boziz-t-t-ou-tard-je-reviendrai/
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=596660683854132&id=100005306176367&pnref=story

Accessed on 26 June 2018.

Annex 2.4: Additional information on travel ban violations by François Bozizé and Nourredine Adam.

1. Travel ban violations by François Bozizé : additional information

1.1. Information provided to the Panel by Member States

Between 26 February and 1 March 2018, the Panel transmitted official communications underlining the need to enforce the travel ban against “Samuel Peter Mudde” and requested additional information on possible travel by Mr. Bozizé using Mr. Mudde’s identity. Letters were sent to the Governments of countries reportedly visited by Mr. Bozizé since his listing by the 2127 Committee on 9 May 2014, namely Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, as well as to airlines that the former President may have used to travel, namely Askya, Ethiopian Airlines, Rwandair and Kenya Airways.

On 17 April 2018, the Cameroonian authorities informed the Panel that Mr. Bozizé had not visited Cameroon since 2013, when the former President was briefly granted asylum in this country. They also confirmed that the name François Bozizé was included in the list of individuals whose entry on the Cameroonian territory was banned.

In its December 2017 final report, the Panel indicated that in October 2017, Mr. Bozizé had reportedly travelled to Benin (S/2017/1023, para.33), where he would have participated in religious ceremonies. In response to an information request by the Panel, on 15 May 2018 the Government of Benin informed the Panel that its Immigration and Emigration Services had found no record of Mr. Bozizé’s entry into or exit from Benin’s territory.

Ethiopian Airlines provided on 23 March 2018 the full itinerary of Mr. Bozizé’s travel of May 2017 (using Mr. Mudde’s identity) as cited in the Panel’s 2017 midterm report (S/2017/639, para. 35). Mr. Bozizé travelled from Entebbe (Uganda) to Lagos (Nigeria) on 6 May 2017 and returned to Entebbe from Lagos on 10 May 2017. He connected through Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) for both flights. The ticket was purchased in cash at the Ethiopian Airlines office in Kampala. On 23 June 2018, Ethiopian Airlines also confirmed having included Mr. Mudde on its no-fly list.

Mr. Bozizé’s presence was also observed in late March 2018, in Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, where Mr. Bozizé reportedly also took part in religious ceremonies.¹⁵ The Panel sent letters to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 30 November 2017, 26 February and 16 April 2018 to request information on this trip, as well as on the presence of Mr. Bozizé (using Mr. Mudde’s identity) on Nigerian territory between 6 and 10 May 2017. On 19 April 2018, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confirmed that “Mr. Mudde” had travelled to Nigeria on 6 May 2017 through Murtala Muhammad airport; his departure, however, was not registered by the authorities. The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also confirmed having included “Mr. Mudde” on its watch list.

The Panel recalls that pursuant to paragraph 14 (a) of resolution 2399 (2018), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, listed individuals can travel in certain circumstances, including in the context of “religious obligations”, albeit by requesting a travel exemption through their state of residence.

¹⁵ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 28 March 2018. Meeting with a diplomatic source, Bangui, 31 March 2018.

The Government of South Africa, as well as the companies Askya, Rwandair and Kenya Airways, have yet to provide a response to the Panel.

1.2. Possible use of other passports by François Bozizé

The Panel is of the view that Mr. Bozizé is most likely using several identification documents featuring different names. For instance, while the Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that the South Sudanese passport featuring Mr. Mudde's name was used at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (Nairobi) only once, i.e. on 22 July 2013, the Panel had been earlier informed that Mr. Bozizé had also reportedly travelled to Nairobi in November 2016 (S/2017/639, para.34). Furthermore, the above-mentioned passport of "Mr. Mudde" expired on 11 June 2017.


1.3. The decision of the CAR national authorities to forbid airline companies to board François Bozizé on their flights

On 17 November 2016, the national authorities of the Central African Republic issued a circular instructing airline companies flying to the CAR territory not to accept listed individual François Bozizé aboard their planes.

The circular refers to Security Council resolutions 2196 (2015) and 2127 (2013). In this connection, the Panel recalls that paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2399 (2018) pertaining to the travel ban indicates that "nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory". Similar language was included in prior resolutions on the sanctions regime, including resolutions 2196 (2015) and 2127 (2013) mentioned in the circular.

Security Council resolutions therefore do not prevent listed individual François Bozizé from returning to the Central African Republic. It rather bans travels to other countries. However, if Mr. Bozizé endeavours to return to CAR via a third country, a travel exemption request would have to be submitted by the State of residence (Uganda) on his behalf.

Document obtained by the Panel from the CAR Ministry of Transports on 20 June 2018.



3. Travel ban violation by Nourredine Adam

Listed individual Nourredine Adam reportedly travelled to Khartoum, the Sudan, in late January 2018. The travel was facilitated by unidentified individuals who picked him up in Nyala, the Sudan, and transported him to Khartoum by plane.¹⁶ Mr. Adam also reportedly travelled to Am Dafok, the Sudan, in late January 2018.

In this connection, the Panel reiterates that pursuant to paragraph 14 (c) of resolution 2399 (2018), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, listed individuals can travel in certain circumstances, including to take part in meetings furthering the objectives of peace and national reconciliation.

¹⁶ Meeting with diplomatic sources, Bangui, 21, 22 and 31 March 2018.

Annex 3.1: Visits undertaken by the African Union Panel of Facilitators.**First series of visits (November-December 2017)**

- 27 November 2017, MPC in Kaga Bandoro;
- 29 November 2017, Séléka Renovée, Bangui;
- 29 November 2017, anti-balaka Ngaissona branch, Bangui;
- 30 November 2017, UFR-UFRF, Bangui;
- 30 November 2017, anti-balaka Mokom branch, Bangui;
- 2 December 2017, UPC, Alindao;
- 5 December 2017, MLCJ in Birao;
- 6 December 2017, FPRC in Birao;
- 7 December 2017, CNDS coalition in Bria in lieu of RPRC;
- 9 December 2017, RJ Belanga in Paoua;
- 9 December 2017, RJ Sayo in Paoua;
- 9 December 2017, 3R in Kouï;
- 11 December 2017, FDPC in Bouar.

Second series of visits (February-April 2018)

- 19 February 2018, MPC in Kaga Bandoro;
- 20 February 2018, Séléka Renovée in Bangui;
- 21 February 2018, FDPC in Bouar;
- 22 February 2018, 3R in Kouï;
- 24 February 2018, anti-balaka Ngaissona branch in Bangui;
- 26 February 2018, RPRC in Bria;
- 28 February 2018, MLCJ in Birao;
- 5 March 2018, UPC in Alindao;
- 6 March 2018, anti-balaka Mokom branch in Bangui;
- 10 March 2018, UFR and UFR-F in Bangui;
- 27 March 2018, FPRC in Ndele;
- 1 April 2018, RJ Sayo and RJ Belanga in Paoua.

Field-visits undertaken by the AU Panel of Facilitators in the aftermath of the “Operation Sukula” and the Fatima incident in order to ease the tensions resulting from these events

- 16 May and 04 June 2018: Meeting with MPC leadership in Kaga Bandoro.
- 23-24 May 2018: Meeting with FPRC leadership in Birao.
- 24 May 2018: Meeting with RPRC leadership in Bria.

Meetings with former Presidents

- 15 May 2018: Meeting with Michel Djotodia.

Annex 3.2: Analysis of the recent events in Bangassou (Mbomou prefecture)

After a turbulent year (S/2017/1023, paras. 74-91), the security situation in Bangassou has improved. Three recent events have created a window of opportunity in town: the signature of a local peace agreement (see below); the arrest of the self-defence leader Crépin Wakanam, alias “Pino Pino”; and the launch of a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme.

On 9 April 2018, after two days of negotiation under the good offices of the cardinal Nzapalainga and the imam Kobine, self-defence groups, local authorities, civil society and MINUSCA signed an agreement including various mutual engagements to guarantee the end of hostilities and freedom of movement in the town.¹⁷ The agreement was seriously compromised by some inter-communal incidents in May,¹⁸ after which MINUSCA organized a 2-day inclusive dialogue and created a follow-up committee on 4-5 June.¹⁹

The return of relative stability in town has also been facilitated by the progressive disappearance of the most dangerous self-defence group leaders: “Ngadé” was killed in inter-group clashes in December 2017; “Bere-Bere” surrendered to MINUSCA in January 2018; and “Pino Pino” fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where he was arrested together with 37 members of his group, on 16 May 2018.²⁰ However, the main instigators of the attack on Tokoyo neighborhood in April 2017, such as Yvon Nzéléte or Deputy Mayor Michel Baguinati (S/2017/1023, paras. 88-99), still occupy their positions as local leaders and continue to build on the economic gains they obtained from the shutdown of Muslim businesses in town.

“Pino Pino” was responsible for most of the violent robberies and lootings that forced international NGOs to suspend their activities at the end of 2017.²¹ On 14 May 2018, prior to leaving the country, he engaged in fighting with local self-defence groups around Béma and burned down more than 550 houses in the area.²² On 27 June, “Pino Pino” and 33 members of his group were extradited from the DRC, at the request of the CAR Government. “Pino Pino” was transferred to Camp de Roux prison, while the others to Ngaragba and Bimbo prisons.²³

The last factor contributing to the current stability in Bangassou town is the CVR program launched in May by MINUSCA for 700 beneficiaries. People included in the program receive a paid training for three months to learn a profession in exchange of handing over their weapons. To date, MINUSCA has collected almost 1,500 weapons and is considering launching a second CVR phase in August 2018. However, the positive effect of this injection of money to Bangassou may be offset by the fact that only very few automatic weapons have been collected.²⁴

¹⁷ Meeting with local authorities, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

¹⁸ In particular, on 10 May, self-defence elements shot and killed an IDP near the site at the cathedral. In retaliation, IDPs stabbed a young man and threw him into a well, confidential report, 11 May 2018.

¹⁹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²⁰ Confidential report, 16 May 2018.

²¹ Meeting with NGO representative, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²² Meeting with local authorities, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²³ Confidential report, 28 June 2018.

²⁴ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 14 June 2018.

The improvement in the security situation has not yet had an impact on the living conditions of the Bangassou Muslim community, whose members have been confined to the “Petit Séminaire” site since May 2017.²⁵ The number of IDPs decreased from around 2,700 to 1,546 in June 2018, mainly because of spontaneous departures to Bangui or to the regional countries (DRC, but also Cameroon and Mali).²⁶ Even though a certain freedom of movement in Bangassou town was guaranteed, following the 9 April agreement, and IDPs could access the city’s market, during the Panel’s visit on 12-14 June 2018 the site was again isolated from the rest of the town, mainly because of the impact of the incidents which occurred in May 2018.

Also, the presence of weapons in the IDP site is creating growing tensions with both local authorities and church representatives, who accuse some of the displaced persons being behind certain criminal acts.²⁷ Calls for the commencement of The demand to carry out a disarmament operation in the IPD site and accelerate the return of the Muslim community to the Tokoyo neighbourhood is rising among Bangassou’s local population.²⁸ On the other hand, the IDPs accuse the members of the local church of supporting the self-defence groups and of spreading discriminatory discourse against the Muslim community (S/20171023, paras. 92-97). The arrival of the FACA contingent in town on 22 June 2018 may have an impact on the situation of the IDPs in the coming months, which will be monitored by the Panel.

Even though some international NGOs are slowly returning to Bangassou, assessing the security situation and planning the reopening of their programmes, aid agencies in town continue to maintain a low profile. Because of their isolation, IDPs are completely dependent on the limited humanitarian assistance for food and water. The SDGs prevent Muslims to access to health care: if external consultations are carried out inside the IDP site by an international NGO, emergencies and serious cases have almost no access to the local hospital. Also, IDP have limited access to education as the secondary school close to the site was closed at the end of 2017 because of inter-community tensions. However, Bangassou remains privileged compared to the rest of the Mbomou prefecture, which remains cut off from humanitarian assistance as both MINUSCA and NGO access are obstructed due to the presence of self-defence groups.²⁹

²⁵ Meeting with IDPs representative, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.


²⁶ Meeting with IOM representative, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁷ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁸ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁹ Meeting with NGO representative, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

Text of the agreement signed in Bangassou on 9 April 2018, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 13 June 2018.



3. AUX GROUPES ARMES :

- La libre circulation des humanitaires
- Cessation immédiate des hostilités
- Ouverture du couloir Humanitaire (marché du site petit séminaire)
- Libre circulation des biens et des personnes
- Accepter le processus de réduction de violence communautaire (CVR)
- Démentèlement des barrières illégales dans Bangassou et les périphéries

4. POUR LA PLATEFORME DES CONFESSIONS RELIGIEUSES DE CENTRAFRIQUE (PCRC) :

- Accompagnement psychosocial des victimes de la crise à Bangassou
- Formation des jeunes et adultes sur la gestion et prévention des conflits

5. AUX HUMANITAIRES :

- Appuyer les initiatives communautaires
- Recrutement local du personnel
- Sensibilisation de la population sur l'importance des Humanitaires

Au regard de toutes ces recommandations, nous nous engageons à les respecter et à dire : **PLUS JAMAIS CA.**

Fait à Bangassou le 09 Avril 2018


Ont signé :


- 1- Pour la jeunesse : ~~François~~ NISSEI - FREN
- 2- Pour les auto-défenses : ~~Yves~~ ZINET - ROGER ^{de la}
- 3- Pour l'organisation des femmes centrafricaines (OFCA) : ~~Yves~~ ^{Libe}
- 4- Pour les chefs de quartiers et des villages : ~~AS~~ ABROU Diendou
- 5- Pour les déplacés du site Saint Louis de Bangassou : BJA MAHAMATI A.
- 6- Pour la Plateforme des Confessions Religieuses de Centrafrique (Bangassou) (PCRC) : ~~Ab. Martin~~ Ab. Martin MADOUÉ
- 7- Pour les opérateurs Economiques de Bangassou : ~~DIARRA~~ DIARRA PHIL
- 8- Pour les Fonctionnaires : ~~Jacques~~ Jean Jacques DOUANGO A
- 9- Pour les députés : ~~NDAGUIAMA~~ NDAGUIAMA - Paul
- 10- Pour les humanitaires : ~~GRET~~ GRET Crépén
- 11- Le Maire de la ville : ~~Théophile~~ Théophile
- 12- Le Préfet de Mbomou : ~~Richard~~ Richard NOUIDEMONA
- 13- Le chef de Bureau MINUSCA

Rosevel Pierre Louis, Chef de Bureau
Pr le MINUSCA ~~Rosevel~~, Observa
leur du Processus de Dialogue -
~~Rosevel~~

Annex 3.3: FPRC meeting with the AU Panel of Facilitators, Ndélé, 27 March 2018.

Excerpts from FPRC communiqué dated 27 March 2018 and shared with the AU Panel of Facilitators. Document provided to the Panel of Experts by a confidential source on 30 March 2018.








- L'organisation d'une conférence des donateurs pour la mobilisation des fonds dédiés au développement du nord
- La création d'un fonds spécial d'aménagement et de désenclavement du nord-est
- La construction d'une université régionale et des centres de formation professionnelle dans le nord-est
- La prise en charge ou dédommagement des combattants plus âgés, des orphelins, veuves et victimes des violences post conflit ;
- La constitution des minorités en partie civile devant les juridictions compétentes afin de réclamer leurs droits et leurs biens détruits par haine ;
- La création dans le nord-est des entreprises ou sociétés de sécurité et de surveillance dans le cadre de la protection de l'environnement, des Parcs nationaux, des réserves des faunes et des aires protégées, les domaines forestiers, les ressources naturelles et énergétiques du sous-sol pour un emploi de main d'œuvre afin d'absorber une partie des ex-combattants n'ayant pas bénéficié de l'insertion dans les forces de défense et de sécurité.

Fait à Ndele, le 27 Mars 2018

Le Vice-Président




Généralnoureidine ADAM



Pictures of FPRC leaders and listed individuals Abdoulaye Hissène, Nourredine Adam and Haroun Gaye during the meeting with the AU Panel of Facilitators in Ndélé on 27 March 2018. Available at <https://www.facebook.com/1675329812539507/photos/a.1678404342232054.1073741828.1675329812539507/1901204249952061/?type=3&theater>, posted on 28 March 2018.



Annex 4: National Commission of Inquiry established by the CAR Government on the failed coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea.



ARRETE

Art. 1^{er} : Il est créée une commission d'Investigation Judiciaire Nationale chargée de faire la lumière sur l'acte de Tentative de Coup d'Etat manqué (acte de Terrorisme) en Guinée-Equatoriale.

Art. 2 : la Commission d'investigation Judiciaire Nationale est placée sous l'autorité directe du Ministre de la Justice des Droits de l'Homme, Garde des Sceaux, et sous la surveillance et la coordination du Parquet Général près la Cour d'Appel de Bangui.

Art. 3 : Compte tenu de la pluralité des ressortissants de différentes nationalités impliqués, la Commission d'Investigation Judiciaire Nationale a pour mission de :

- Procéder à la recherche et à l'arrestation des présumés commanditaires, auteurs, coauteurs et complices des ressortissants des différentes Nationalités sur le territoire Centrafricain
- Auditionner les témoins,
- Interroger les présumés commanditaires, criminels arrêtés, et leurs confrontations avec les témoins, tout en respectant les règles édictées par le code de procédure pénale Centrafricaine.
- De dresser les procès-verbaux d'enquête

Dans le cadre de cette enquête, la commission mènera les investigations en collaboration avec les commissions d'enquêtes des autres Etats dont les ressortissants sont impliqués.

Le Cadre Juridique de la Collaboration Judiciaire demeure :

- a) La convention de TANANARIVE sur la coopération en matière de Justice du 12 Septembre 1961
- b) L'accord de coopération en matière de Justice France-RCA.
- c) L'accord de coopération judiciaire entre les Etats membres de la CEMAC du 28 Janvier 2004.
- d) L'accord d'extradition entre les Etats membres de la CEMAC de 28 Janvier 2004.

ART. 4 : La Commission est composée de :

- 1- Un (1) Coordonnateur
- 2- Un (1) Coordonnateur adjoint
- 3- Trois (3) Magistrats (Juge d'instruction, et deux Magistrats du Ministère Public)
- 4- Un (1) expert du Ministère de la Défense Nationale et de la reconstruction de l'armée
- 5- Un (1) Expert de la Gendarmerie Nationale
- 6- Un (1) Expert de la Police Centrafricaine
- 7- Six (6) Officiers de Police Judiciaire
- 8- Un (1) Greffier
- 9- Une (1) Opératrice de Santé

ART. 5 : Le Mandat de la Commission prendra fin après le dépôt de son rapport à la Commission Régionale d'Enquête de la CEMAC.


ART. 6 : Le fonctionnement et les charges liés aux investigations sont imputés au Budget de l'Etat.

ART. 7 : Le présent Décret qui prend effet à compter de sa date de signature sera enregistré et publié partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le 23 JAN 2018

Le Ministre de la Justice, des Droits
de l'Homme, Garde des Sceaux.




Flavien MBATA

Annex 5.1: Chronology of events in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui from January to April 2018.

Information below was obtained by the Panel from confidential sources.

On 17 January, a dispute between self-defence groups (SDGs) following a football game triggered violent clashes and the torching of dozens of boutiques in the PK5 market.

On 18 January, a group of PK5 merchants stopped paying taxes to the self-defence groups. “Force” gave a one-week ultimatum to the merchants to resume the collection of taxes, heightening tensions between some communities and SDGs.

On 18 January, MINUSCA met a group of PK5 merchants. This was the first of a series of meetings between MINUSCA and PK5 civil society, during which the “Collectif des Victimes de l’Incident du 17 Janvier” officially requested the intervention of MINUSCA and the Government to arrest “Force”. During the month of February, a number of incidents involving SDGs was registered.

On 22 February, clashes erupted between the SDGs under “Force” and “You” over a dispute for the control of the PK5 market.

On 28 February, the rival SDG factions of “Force” and “You” concluded a peace agreement to end hostilities.

On 12 March, representatives from the various ethnic groups of the PK5 area and individuals viewed as influent members of SDGs created the PK5 Crisis Prevention Committee (CPC). This committee started a series of meetings with MINUSCA to find a solution to counter the SDGs’ predatory activities.

On 5 April, the CPC advised MINUSCA not to launch a military operation against the SDGs due to the possible impact of such an initiative on the civilian population.

On 8 April, at 2:00 a.m., MINUSCA, FACA and ISF launched a joint disarmament and arrest operation (the “Operation Sukula”), targeting the bases of criminal groups in the PK5 neighbourhood. As for contingency measures for protection of civilians, it was planned to: ask the population to remain in lock-down in case of cross-fire; evacuate the populations close to the SDG’s bases towards places previously identified; and support humanitarian actors to bring assistance to displaced populations. The operation resulted in the arrest of low-profile criminals and the seizure of arms, ammunition and drugs, while the self-defence chiefs and principal targets of the operation, including Nimery Matar Jamous alias “Force”, managed to escape. During the raid, two SDG fighters died and 45 persons (including civilians) were wounded, while 12 peacekeepers sustained injuries. The police station of the 3rd district was also burned, reportedly by SDG members after the departure of MINUSCA and national security forces from the area.

Later in the night, at 11:15 p.m., unidentified armed elements opened the fire against the base of the Egyptian and Jordanian police contingents located at Camp Fidel, in the capital’s 1st district. One peacekeeper suffered a minor injury.

On 9 April, the CPC published a communiqué condemning “Operation Sukula” and asking for its suspension due to the possible impact on the civilian population.

On 10 April, around 1 p.m., the abduction of a Fulani woman and her child on the outskirts of the PK5 neighbourhood reportedly provoked the angry reaction of the local population. About a hundred people marched towards the police station of the 5th district, controlled by FACA since the beginning of the operation. A patrol of Rwandan peacekeepers, that had intervened to interpose, engaged in a firefight with armed men in the crowd. The deadly clash lasted more than two hours resulting in 30 people reportedly killed and 100 injured, while one Rwandan peacekeeper was killed and 8 were injured. On the same afternoon, during a search operation conducted by national authorities and MINUSCA to prevent an alleged uprising in the Ngaragba prison, several inmates opposed MINUSCA’s and national authorities’ actions and tried to escape. During these events two inmates were killed.

On 11 April, in the morning, a crowd of about 1,000 people marched from the capital’s 3rd district towards MINUSCA headquarters and, in a sign of protest, deposited the bodies of 16 people killed during the previous day’s clashes in front of the Mission’s gate. They claimed that the victims were civilians killed during the operation conducted by MINUSCA and Central African security forces. Several anti-MINUSCA slogans and placards were displayed during the demonstration, while MINUSCA considered the use of dead bodies as propaganda against the Mission.³⁰

³⁰ See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43735333>, consulted on 15 April 2018.

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 29 June 2018.

**PROCES VERBAL DE LA REUNION DU COMITE DE
PREVENTION DE CRISE
DANS LE TROISIEME ARRONDISSEMENT DE BANGUI**
Solidarité-Paix-Liberté

En 2018 le lundi 12 Mars à Quinze heures trente minute s'est tenu dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui une réunion initiée et ouverte par Monsieur OUSMANE Mahamat Ousmane Conseiller spécial à la Présidence de la république.

Un seul point était à l'ordre du jour : Le renouvellement du Bureau de prévention de crise dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui.

Après une discussion constructive il était convenu du renforcement du bureau sortant afin de le rendre plus dynamique et très proches des auto-défenses et de permettre la prévention et la résolution des problèmes dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui.

Ainsi un bureau a été mis en place, ce bureau est composé comme suit :

BUREAU EXECUTIF :

Président: ATAJIR BALA DOIXO

1^{er} Vice-Président: Colonel NDIADER LAZARE

2^{ème} Vice-Président: THAROUN AMALAS- AMLAS

Secrétaire General: KOLOSTRÉ ABDOULAYE DJONGO

Secrétaire General Adjoint: MAHMÔUD RIYAD

Charger des Affaires Civils et Politiques: MALICK KAROMCHI

Charger de Communication: DJAMIL BABA NANI

Charger de Sencib. Et Mobilisation: ISMAÏLA LAWANE

LES CONSEILLERS

1. ABDOULAYE SADIO
2. Pasteur KOSSINGOU Albert
3. ALI OUSMANE
4. ABDOULAYE CHAIBOU
5. EL-HADI MABROUK HASSANE
6. HASSANE AMADOU
7. EL-HADJ AMADOU BOUBA YAKA
8. ZAKARIYA DJALABY
9. BABAKAR HAROUNE

SOUS COMITE DE SAGE DU 3^{em} ARRONDISSEMENT

Président: IMAM : AHMAT MOUSSA

Vice-Président: IMAM AWADALKARIM

Secrétaire General: ISSA OUMAROU

MEMBRES

IMAM : ABAKAR HAKOUNE

IMAM : MAHARAT TAHER

IMAM : MAMADOU CAMARA

IMAM : ZAKARIYA

IMAM : ABDELKARIM INYAS

IMAM : OUSMANE HASSANE

IMAM : MAHAMAT ADAM

IMAM : MAHAMAT ISSA

IMAM : ABDALAH MATAR

Sous Comité Des Notables Du Troisième Arrondissement

Président: EL-HADI IBRAHIM BOUBA YAKA

Vice-Président: DALA ABANA

Secrétaire General: KOYAGB'A MAHAMAT MOCTAR

MEMBRES

- ADAMOU DANDJOUA
- MARCELINE KOLONGO

**SOUS COMITE DE DISCIPLINE ET DE SUIVI DES ACCORDS DE PAIX AU
KILOMETRES CINQ DANS LE 3^{eme} ARRONDISSEMENT DE BANGUI**

Président: ISSA BOURMA

Vice-Président: DIDA ALI ABAKAR

Secrétaire General: IBRAHIM ZERAZOU

Les Conseillers

- OUSMANE SOULEYMANE ABONDOSI
- SALL ET DARDAM
- MAHAMAT FADOUL YAKHOUB

SOUS COMITÉ DE LA JEUNESSE DU 3^{em} ARRODISSEMENT

Président : MOUSSA HASSABARASSOUL

1^{er} Vice-Président : AROUFAY ABDEL-AZIZ

Secrétaire Générale : MOUSTAPHA YOUNOUS

Secrétaire Générale Adjoint : ANGUR RYAD

Les Conseillers :

- BAHAR MOUSSA
- MACULOU ASSAÏ

Sous Comité Des Opérateur Economique : DU 3^{em} ARRODISSEMENT

Président : SABOURA BEYINE

Vice-Président : AMAT ANOUR

Secrétaire Général : BOURMA ADAM

Les Conseillers

- MAHAMAT-ZENE ISSAKHA
- ADAMOU BABA BARAO
- ANOUR ATERMEZI
- ISSAKHA BEN SAHIR

SOUS COMITE DES FEMMES DU 3^{em} ARRODISSEMENT

Présidente : HADJA SADA

Vice-Présidente : HADJA MARIAM CHAIBOU

Secrétaire Générale : FATOUMATA WADA

Secrétaire Générale Adjointe : ACHTA ABAKAR Laure

Les Conseillers

- KADJI MORO
- RAMATOU BAKO
- BATOUL YONGORO
- SARIRATOU ROUFAY
- MME. FITA KONA MARIE JOSEPH
- MARIAM MOUSSA KALAMOU
- KEDNA MARIE
- DEBONE ODETTE
- RACHIDA MAMADOU

SOUS COMITE DE TRASPORTEUR (TAXI MOTO) DU 3^{em} ARRONDISSEMENT

Président: MOUSSA CHAIBOU

Vice-Président: AMAIDOU SEIDOU


Secrétaire Général: ABOUBAKAR ALAMINE

Les Conseillers:

- HASSANE MAHAMAT
- DEIDA HASSANE

L'Ordre du jour étant épuisé la séance a été levée à 17 h 55 mn

Fait à Bangui, le 12 mars 2018

Le Président de la Séance

Moussa Chaibou
OUSSOU MAHAMADI GUZMAN

Rapporteur de la Séance

KOLOURI ABDOLAYE DIONGO

Comité de Prévention
De Crise au pk5 dans le
3^{ème} Arrondissement
Tel : (00236) 75 05 33 51

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 002/2018

Dans la nuit du 7 au 8 Avril 2018 le Pk5 dans le 3^{ème} arrondissement de Bangui a été le théâtre d'actes de violences tendant à fragiliser la paix et la cohésion obtenues au prix d'un effort déployé par la société civile, les autorités et la MINUSCA ; malheureusement, et une fois de plus dans le cadre d'une opération de la MINUSCA visant à arrêter un responsable de groupe armé ayant échouée, la ville de Bangui en général et le Pk5 en particulier sont replongés dans un chaos rappelant les moments les plus sombre de la crise.

C'est ainsi que le Km5 étant une zone urbaine et densément peuplée avec une population pour la plupart vulnérable (Femmes, Enfants, personnes âgées et personnes déplacées) a été transformé en véritable champs de bataille risquant la vie de toute une population à travers des usages disproportionnés de la force de la part des deux camps en conflit.

Par ailleurs, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement condamne avec la dernière énergie l'option de la MINUSCA qui privilégie la force au détriment de la population civile.

Enfin, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement lance un appel urgent au Gouvernement et à la MINUSCA de privilégier le dialogue en vue trouver une solution pacifique à cette crise pour le bénéfice de la population civile.

Fait à Bangui, le 09 Avril 2018

Pour le Comité de Prévention de Crise
Le Rapporteur Général


KOLOSTRE ABOULAYE DJONGO

MEMORANDUM

A

**La Très haute attention du Représentant Spécial
Du Secrétaire Générale de l'ONU,
Chef de la MINUSCA**

09.04.18
425

- Considérant la dernière crise survenue dans la nuit du 7 au 8 Avril 2018 au Pk5 dans le 3^{ème} arrondissement de Bangui ;
- Considérant la densité de la population civile dans cette partie de la capitale ;
- Considérant le risque élevé de perte en vies humaines civiles d'une intervention militaire dans cette zone.

Nous, membres du Comité de Prévention de crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement, demandons ce qui suit :

- L'arrêt immédiat de l'opération en cours que nous dénonçons énergiquement de par sa nature à mettre en péril des centaines voire des milliers de vies innocentes ;
- La suppression de l'option du désarmement forcé qui se trouve être une option périlleuse pour la population civile ;
- L'ouverture d'un dialogue franc et serein entre les autodéfenses et le Gouvernement et la MINUSCA pour le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité entre ;
- D'inscrire les autodéfenses dans le processus DDR en vue d'un désarmement pacifique et volontaire.

Enfin, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement lance un appel urgent au Gouvernement et à la MINUSCA de privilégier le dialogue en vue trouver une solution pacifique à cette crise pour le bénéfice de la population civile.

Fait à Bangui, le 09 Avril 2018

Pour le Comité de Prévention de Crise

Le Rapporteur Général


KOLOSTRE ABDOULAYE DJONGO

Comité de Prévention De Crise au pk5 dans le 3^{ème} Arrondissement Tel : (00238) 75 05 33 51 / 75


Annex 5.2: Incitement to discrimination and violence against the Muslim community published on Facebook in April and May 2018.

Photographs available at: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/936076066415025/>, accessed on 30 June 2018. Some of the posts were subsequently removed by the website's administrators.





Screenshot sent to the Panel by a confidential source on 8 May 2018.




Annex 5.3: Extract of the “Analysis of the press articles including discourses and appeals to discrimination, hostility and violence”, as prepared by MINUSCA.

Auteur du discours	Moyen de diffusion	Contenus incriminés
Judes Zosse	L’Hirondelle du 26/04/2018 Titre : Nouveau massacre à Ippy: Des peulhs armés tirent sur une foule dans une cérémonie funéraire.	« <i>Jamais les autorités centrafricaines ne ramèneront les extrémistes des groupes armés à la raison par le dialogue. Des vrais barbares ni loi ni foi qui se croient tout permis. Leur seul remède c’est la force</i> »
Shalom Beraka	L’Hirondelle du 12/04/2018 Titre : Le feuilleton Djamous alias Force lève un coin de voile sur le rôle de la colonie tchadienne en RCA	« <i>Djamous fait partie de cette colonie, à la limite mégalomane, au reflexe sahélien brutal et belliqueux qui arrache la vedette à la communauté musulmane purement centrafricaine. Ces immigrés abusant de la solidarité, de l’hospitalité pour ne pas dire de la docilité des coreligionnaires nationaux, ils se sont arrogés le leadership à l’échelle communautaire. Ce positionnement relègue au second plan les intérêts des musulmans centrafricains</i> »
Elton Caleb	L’Hirondelle du 15/05/2018 Titre : Les arabes tchadiens en RCA et l’axe du mal	« <i>Par vocation, la RCA est réputée être une terre hospitalière. Sa nature laïque est, pour autant, une richesse. Sont de ce fait, centrafricain de souches, les communautés musulmanes Goula, Rounga, Kara, Youlou... si d’autres communautés musulmanes s’y sont associées, c’est logiquement par naturalisation ou par islamisation. C’est le cas des arabes tchadiens arrivés en Centrafrique par aventure, par nécessité de regroupement... Mais un fois en RCA, cette communauté s’est constituée, au fil du temps, en lobby islamiste pro-tchadien, devenant ainsi une grise pierre dans le jardin du pays de Boganda. De prime abord, c’est la communauté musulmane de Centrafrique qui en prend un sacré coup. Ces Tchadiens se sont fait passer pour des supers musulman, ostracisant les musulmans centrafricains de souche ainsi que les islamisés voire les musulmans d’autres nationalités installés en RCA</i> »
LC	Le citoyen du 15/05/2018 Titre : Centrafricains, centrafricaines, chers compatriotes : Voici la liste des douze apôtres du mal, ennemis de la république, complices des terroristes et mercenaires qui s’organisent en ce moment pour déstabiliser la RCA.	Le journal dresse une liste de 12 personnes d’origine étrangère, tchadienne et soudanaise notamment qui seraient à l’origine de la crise au km5.
Guy Mbiyeo	Le pays du 14/05/2018	« <i>Dès lors, la conscience de la population lamda est bouleversé à tel enseigne que l’esprit de</i>

	Titre : L'esprit de colère et de la vengeance continuent de dominer le caractère quotidien de la population de Bangui suite aux massacres à la paroisse de Fatima	<i>vengeance et de... se sont nettement imposés au cas où. [...] Pour l'honorable député de Bossangoa 2, les sujets musulmans qui ne se sentent pas concernés par la guerre sinon innocents doivent quitter le Km5. Le gouvernement doit prendre des mesures pour leur trouver un endroit protégé. Tous les extrémistes et criminels du Km5 seront tous neutralisés. Car, il faut racler cette zone avec un Caterpillar »</i>
Jérémie Walanda	Le confident du 08/05/2018 Titre : Les terroristes du km5 continuent de semer la mort et la désolation dans les quartiers de Castors	<i>« Les terroristes musulmans bien connus du km5 continuent en toute impunité de tuer et de massacrer les populations civiles non musulmanes aux quartiers de Castors, sous le regard impuissant du gouvernement et de la MINUSCA qui sont débordés par la puissance de feu satanique de ces agents du diable »</i>
Makaya Mopaya	Le Démocrate du 07/05/2018	<i>« En effet, depuis la prestation de serment du président Touadéra. [...] Le peuple africain en général et tout dernièrement les populations de PK5 sont prisonniers malgré eux, sur la terre de leurs aïeux et de leurs ancêtres de ces djihadistes et de ces terroristes venus du Darfour, Tchad, Niger et Soudan pour semer la terreur et faire basculer le pays dans une instabilité chronique politique et militaire qui ne dit pas son nom. Dans leur manœuvre de déstabilisation de la République ils ont réussi à créer une légion de mercenaires étrangers lourdement armés au KM5 »</i>
Benistant Mballa	Centrafrique matin du 23/05/2018	<i>« Selon un responsable des Nations Unies, il y aura un génocide planifié en RCA. [...] Nimery Matar alias « Force » et ses éléments ont planifié et mis en exécution le génocide à la paroisse Notre Dame. [...] C'est toujours le schéma d'un génocide planifié et mis en exécution par Ali Darassa »</i>

Annex 5.4: Caricature published by the CAR newspaper L'Ecureuil four times between 25 and 31 May 2018.



Annex 5.5: Transcription of the speech of Sylvain Ngoni, Member of Parliament from Bimbo, during the Prime Minister's question time on 1 May 2018.

Transcription obtained by the Panel from a confidential source.

Honorable Sylvain Ngoni Bimbo : (Sango) Le Km5 aujourd'hui est devenu le Tchad, avons-nous deux pays dans la RCA ? Selon mon observation ce que nous prenons comme une blague est en train de devenir la vérité. Nous, les députés, ne devons pas blaguer avec cela. La semaine passée, avec la population, nous étions en débandade. Nous sommes devenus bêtes avec nos populations. Aujourd'hui, au Km5 qui s'est transformé en Tchad, personne ne peut entrer, ni circuler. Ils chassent des frères qui résident encore là-bas pour acheter des maisons et ils ne construisent que des grosses maisons. Ceux qui viennent construire ces maisons et ce ministre, tu les connais ? actuellement, là-bas, ce n'est pas la RCA, mais le Tchad. Je sais qui sont nos frères, les Goula, les Rounga et les Banda Ndélé, nous les connaissons. Mais les Tchadiens qui sont venus ne sont pas nos frères. Aujourd'hui, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, vous « amusez » avec votre travail, nous les députés aujourd'hui, nous sommes fâchés parce que nous aidons le Président de la République et le Gouvernement ; mais ils n'ont pas rendu service à la population qui nous a élus. Aujourd'hui nous sommes appelés député, aujourd'hui quand vous passez, on vous honore comme ministre. Mais je demande, le 5 kilo d'aujourd'hui, un jour avec vous, il faudrait le bruler. Au niveau des quartiers Boeing, Kattin, jusqu'à Ramandji, est-ce que vous avez envoyé vos ministres contrôler ces personnes qui avaient fui ? On ne sait pas où ils demeurent ? De quartier Boulata, jusqu'à Boeing, il n'y a plus personne. Ces frères ont occupé tout le secteur. Personne du Gouvernement n'a cherché savoir où sont parties ces gens, des personnes souffrent. Le mois passé, les Arobo (musulmans) sont venus tenter d'attaquer la base de MINUSCA. De là, le palais (présidentielle) n'est pas loin. Ils sont en train de s'approcher pour y aller. Monsieur le Premier Ministre, je demande que, même si les policiers et les gendarmes ne sont pas nombreux, ils doivent être basés à Catin, d'autre devant l'église Ali et l'entrée de la concession de l'aéroport pour que cette population soit en paix ; parce que rien ne les protège. Je vous demande, concernant le Km5, de trouver une stratégie pouvant consister à extraire ceux qui ne veulent pas rester au km5, de trouver un endroit pour eux et d'occuper (?) des bandits qui sont entrés dans 5 kilo. Je demande à mes frères les députés de se donner pour notre pays. A chaque fois que nous interpellons les Ministres, nous n'avons pas de bonne suite. La population au quartier nous demande « qu'est-ce que vous faites ? ». 5kilo tout le temps Tchad, c'est difficile, c'est difficile.

Annex 5.6: The High Commission of Communication.

The High Commission of Communication (HCC) was created in 2017 (Law N.17.006, 15 February 2017) to monitor the respect of the communication laws and to assure the independence and the freedom of press. The Commission is composed of nine members, of whom three are named by the President, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate, and the others are elected by the professional associations. This should assure the independence of the HCC from the executive power.

Since the beginning of the year, the HCC has become an active player on media regulations. So far, the Commission has addressed a number of cases and issued sanctions – such as a warning and press ban – on individuals (Didacien Kossimatchi) and both national (Radio Ndeke Luka) and international (Radio France Internationale) media.

More recently, the HCC has launched, in collaboration with MINUSCA, a campaign to combat hate speech.³¹ On 30 June, the HCC adopted a National Action Plan on the prevention of public incitement to violence and hate speech in the country. However, the HCC has yet to take any decision on the discourses of incitement to discrimination and violence against the Muslim community.

³¹ Meeting with HCC President, Bangui, 7 June 2018.

Annex 5.7: Profile of the five main SDG leaders.**Nimeri Matar Djamouss alias “Force”**

Nimeri Matar Djamouss, alias “Force”, is a former FACA soldier and “liberator” who supported the arrival of François Bozizé to power in 2003. He was the driver of Anatole Ngaya, former head of “Commando d’Intervention Rapide” (Rapid Intervention Unit) in the Presidential guard of François Bozizé. He integrated into the FACA and then joined the Séléka. After the departure of President Djotodia, he was stationed in Camp Béal until 2015 and later started operating as a militia leader in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui. During that period, he was never formally a member of any armed group. Like other SDGs, he gained importance in PK5 after the departure of Hamit Tidjani and listed individuals Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye from Bangui in August 2016 (S/2016/1032, para 65-67). “Force” collects taxes from the market and merchants. He commands around 80 elements who are mostly armed with automatic weapons. He has no clear political agenda, but he requests his reintegration within FACA. He has strong connections with some Government officials.

Yousseuf Ayatoulah Adjaraye alias “You”

Yousseuf Ayatoulah Adjaraye is based in Bulata. His weapons arsenal is significant, enabling his men to resist significant attacks and challenge the SDG of “Force” for the control of the PK5 market. His authority is well-respected within the area.

Mohamed Appo alias “Appo”

Mohamed Appo is based at Koudoukou Crossroads, with about 30 elements. His group uses small calibre rifles and grenades. Recently, the group was responsible for the abduction and killing of a FACA female officer enrolled in the DDR pilot project.

Djido alias “5 minutes”

Djido is the new leader of the 50/50 group, which had been created by Issa Kappy (alias “50/50”). He is based in the Cameroonian district of the PK5 area, with about 50 elements. He controls the New York, Cameroonian and Jamaican neighborhoods. His group uses AK47 assault rifles, grenades, RPG and automatic rifles. His relations with “Force” have been strained.

Moussa Kana alias “Moussa Danda”

Moussa Kana is based at Yakite Bridge, with about 25 elements. He took the name of the former leader of the SDG (Danda). The group uses small calibre rifles and grenades. It has lost most of its capacity and influence since the killing of its leader Abdoul Danda on 30 October 2016.

Additional information on SDGs can be found in the 2016 Panel’s final report (S/2018/729S/2016/1032, para 77-83).

Annex 5.8: PK5 neighbourhood weaponry and arms trafficking.**1. Weaponry in the PK5 area**

The episode of fighting in Bangui's 3rd district demonstrated the wide availability of conventional weapons and ammunition in the capital. From 8 April 2018 onwards, several grenades exploded in and around the 3rd district, and dozens of people from this district were seen carrying AK-type assault rifles and hand grenades, as illustrated in the picture below.³²

Photograph of individuals belonging to PK5 SDGs carrying AK-type assault rifles in and around Fatima Church on 1 May 2018; screenshots from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 May 2018.



³² Phone discussion with eyewitness, 11 April 2018. Confidential reports, 11 April and 14, 22 May 2018.



On 8 April 2018, MINUSCA, FACA and ISF seized a number of weapons belonging to the armed elements of “Force”. The few seized items were all non-functional.³³ It must be recalled that the weapons stockpile of “Force”, as observed by the Panel in October 2016 and June 2018 (see S/2016/1032, annex 3.4), included machine guns, RPG launchers and numerous AK type assault rifles, and thus was much larger than the few seized items, as shown in the picture below.

Weapons and items belonging to the armed elements of Matar Anemeri, alias “Force” seized by MINUSCA on 8 April 2018 in Bangui’s 3rd district, PK5 neighbourhood. Picture obtained from a confidential source on 8 April 2018.



³³ Confidential document, 8 April 2018.

2. Involvement of a peacekeeper in arms trafficking

On 13 April 2018, a MINUSCA peacekeeper from Gabon travelling on a motorcycle in civilian clothes was arrested by the national security forces in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui while transporting ammunition.³⁴ According to several sources, the peacekeeper intended to sell 1,100 rounds of 7,62 mm ammunition to individuals linked to “Force” in PK5.³⁵ The peacekeeper had stolen the ammunition from the Gabonese contingent.³⁶ MINUSCA immediately condemned the actions of the suspect and launched an investigation into the alleged actions of the Gabonese blue helmet, who was repatriated.³⁷

Photograph of the MINUSCA peacekeeper and the ammunition obtained from a confidential source on 15 April 2018.



³⁴ MINUSCA press release, 14 April 2018.

³⁵ Confidential correspondence, 20 April 2018. <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-le-pays-est-partie-civile-dans-le-proces-contre-le-gabonais-poursuivi-pour-traffic-de-munitions-darmes-de-guerre/>; <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-un-casque-bleu-gabonais-arrete-par-la-gendarmerie-pour-vente-illicite-des-munitions-de-guerre/>, accessed on 22 April 2018.

³⁶ Confidential report, 14 April 2018.


³⁷ MINUSCA press release, 14 April 2018.

Photograph of the ammunition box found in the room of the peacekeeper. Source: confidential report, 14 April 2018.



Annex 6.1: Communiqués of FPRC.

Document obtained by the Panel on 3 April 2018 from a confidential source.



Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 April 2018.



Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 April 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
PRÉSIDENCE

NO. 0002 FPRC BENDIE



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité - Dignité - Travail

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Le Bureau politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) condamne avec la dernière énergie l'attaque perpétrée contre les éléments d'autodéfense qui ont défendu et qui continuent de défendre la minorité musulmane du km5 du génocide, par la MINUSCA, les FACA, la Gendarmerie et la Police occasionnant des pertes en vie humaines.

Ayant échoué dans leur mission, le gouvernement et la MINUSCA veulent à tout prix boycotter l'initiative africaine afin de parvenir à leurs besoins.

C'est pourquoi le bureau politique du FPRC exhorte le gouvernement et la MINUSCA d'observer une retenue afin que l'initiative africaine parvienne à son processus pour un retour définitif de la paix en Centrafrique.

Le Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique reste attaché à l'initiative africaine, seule issue de sortie de la crise centrafricaine et prend à témoin la Communauté Internationale, l'Union Africaine, la CEEAC, la CEMAC et la CIRGL de la politique du gouvernement avec l'appui de la MINUSCA de faire replonger la RCA dans une crise confessionnelle.

Fait à Bangui le 08 Avril 2018



Le Vice-Président
G. NOUREIDINE ADAM

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.



Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 7 May 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENNAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE

COORDINATION GENERALE

SECRETARIAT

N° 04/FPRC/CG/SG-2018



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité-Dignité-Travail



**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COORDINATION GENERALE
DU FPRC**

Suite aux questions se posent sur le regroupement des ex-sélékas à Kaga-Bandoro, le FPRC rappelle l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'il est de la coutume dans un milieu normal les hommes se réunissent pour réfléchir, échanger et prendre des décisions qui s'imposent afin de chercher des solutions aux problèmes.

Le FPRC s'est réuni à Kaga-Bandoro suite à la récente dérive politique du régime en place. À titre de rappel, l'histoire démontre que l'émergence des révoltes en République Centrafricaine est toujours due à la mauvaise gouvernance des dirigeants politiques et demeure jusqu'à ce jour. En d'autre terme, le non- respect de la Constitution par les dirigeants politiques.

Pour le FPRC, suite aux déclarations des illustres autorités du pays qualifiant les acteurs politico-militaires de bandits et de criminels seront mis hors d'état de nuire et la mise en exécution de leur menace entraînant la mort de beaucoup de civils nécessite la prise des dispositions nécessaires du CNDP.

Le FPRC s'étonne des voix limitant les zones de circulation au Conseil National de Défense et Sécurité en abrégé CNDP (branche armée du FPRC) et, en outre aucune loi ni un texte interdisant aux centrafricains de circuler du Nord au Sud, de l'Est à l'Ouest et vice versa. Plus pire encore, pourquoi interdire aux centrafricains du Nord d'aller au Sud ? et d'autres encore interdits d'aller ou de circuler dans la capitale ? N'est-il pas une tendance à la xénophobie, à la croisade ?

Le FPRC se pose toujours des questions suivantes :

- 1-Y a-t-il une zone délimitée au CNDP?
- 2- Qui détient le monopole de la Centrafrique?
- 3-Pourquoi dit-on Centrafrique pays de ZO KWE ZO?

Le FPRC reste attaché à l'Initiative de l'Union Africaine qui demeure le seul espoir de la Renaissance de la Centrafrique.

Fait à N'dele, le 06/05/2018

Le Coordinateur Général



DJAFAR ADOUM



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Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 18 May 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENNAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE

COORDINATION GENERALE

SECRETARIAT

N° 005/FPRC/CG/SG-2018



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité, Dignité-Travail


**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COORDINATION GENERALE
DU FPRC**

Par rapport à l'évolution et à l'analyse de la situation politique en RCA, le FPRC déplore l'attitude passive et négative des dirigeants actuels qui a pour conséquence la persistance de la crise qui nécessite une politique de reconstruction urgente. Le Gouvernement reste quoi et ne réagit pas positivement devant cette situation. À titre d'exemple : à l'intérieur même de la capitale, des barricades sont érigées entravant la libre circulation des biens et des personnes.

Le FPRC regrette l'attitude négative envers les autorités supérieures de la Nation.

Le FPRC note l'existence partielle de l'Autorité politique mettant en cause la dignité du Chef de l'Etat.

Le FPRC attaché au système et au principe de la paix s'accorde à la démarche de l'Union Africaine pour la résolution définitive de la crise centrafricaine.

Le FPRC condamne avec toutes les énergies possibles les violences perpétrées partout dans le pays.

Le FPRC demande au Gouvernement à quand la date du Dialogue Inclusif tant attendu ?

Le FPRC souhaite que l'Union Africaine et certaines organisations internationales accélèrent le processus de la résolution de la crise en Centrafrique que le Gouvernement tente de rendre confessionnelle.

Le FPRC rejette l'idée de la crise confessionnelle, dénonce la xénophobie et appelle la population à la vigilance.

Le FPRC s'inquiète de la préoccupation de la Communauté Internationale faisant état de ce que ce sont les groupes armés qui déstabilisent le pays, or en réalité c'est la Communauté Internationale avec leur Vieille Politique et, la mauvaise gouvernance, la marginalisation et l'injustice sociale prônées par les régimes successifs qui sont à l'origine de la persistance de la violence en Centrafrique.


Les centrafricains sont capables pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique.

La Communauté Internationale doit renoncer à l'ambiguïté.

Fait à N'dele, le 17/05/2018

CONTACT
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Tel : (+236) 75- 83- 97- 95



Le Coordinateur Général

BIAFAR'ADJOM

Annex 6.2: Communiqués on the cooperation of MPC and FPRC.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.



MOUVEMENT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LA CENTRAFRIQUE

MP
C

PAIX **UNITE** **LIBERTE**

GENERALDES ARMES
 ALKATIM MAHAMAT
 TEL: 75 50 52 84

03 AVR 2018

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Le 03 MAI 2018 à 08H00 S'est tenue une réunion extraordinaire au siège du mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (**MPC**) sise quartier Abakar à KAGA BANDORO, sous la présidence du **General ALKATIM MAHAMAT** l'ordre du jour était la réorganisation du Bureau politique

Il est décidé ce qui suit :

ABAKAR SABONE Secrétaire General

GHISLAIN BRIA Coordonateur General

ABOULKASSIM ALGONI TIDJANI Coordonateur GI adjt.

ALI YACKOUB SANOUSI Porte parole

Le présent communiqué prend effet immédiatement et prions l'opinion national et international de veiller sur la stricte conformité de cette décision

Ampli

MINUSCA

UNION AFRICAINE


PRESSE

ARCHIVES

03 AVR 2018


Fait à Kaga Bandoro, le 03 Mai 2018

LE
 CHEF ETAT MAJOR
 DES ARMES
 MPC



Le Général **ALKATIM MAHAMAT**

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.



V. Interdiction formelle aux civils de circuler avec les armes dans la zone.

VI. En dehors de la ville de Kaga-Bandoro, L'ordre de Mission sera signé par les Com-Zone des différentes localités.

Fait à Kaga-Bandoro, le 31/05/2018

Ont Signé :

LES RESPONSABLES MILITAIRE

Excellence ABDOULAYE ISSENE



Gnl ALKHATIM MAHAMAT

Gnl SALEH AZABADI

Gnl AL ISSEL KHALIL

Gnl OUMAR KAFINE



Annex 6.3: Ex-Séléka weaponry and arms trafficking.

1. Acquisition of weaponry by ex-Séléka factions

Since late January 2018, there have been a growing number of reports of FPRC and UPC arms-trafficking activities, in particular from Am Dafok and Sikki Kede (Vakaga prefecture) to the towns of Ndélé, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro, Bokolbo and beyond.³⁸

The influx of weapons in the area has resulted in UPC and FPRC elements increasingly seen as carrying pistols and AK-type assault rifles, for example as observed by the Panel in the Ouaka prefecture, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro, Ndélé and its surroundings.³⁹ In March, Nourredine Adam, Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye had travelled in and out of Ndélé with several vehicles with machine guns mounted atop and accompanied by an estimated 300 fighters, armed with both pistols and AK-type assault rifles, in preparation for the meeting with the AU's Panel of Facilitators on 27 March 2018.⁴⁰ The reported origin of both the vehicles and the weapons is the territory of the Sudan.

In its previous reports, the Panel highlighted that Sudanese armed fighters and weaponry entered the CAR in support of the FPRC-led coalition (S/2017/1023, para. 172 and S/2017/639, annex 5.9). In October 2017, the Sudanese authorities launched the forcible phase of a disarmament campaign to eliminate illegal weapons in the Darfur region.⁴¹ To rapidly obtain important volumes of weaponry, sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène reactivated his connections with Sudanese individuals eager to sell their weapons.⁴²

Given the oversupply of available weapons, Hissène began to act as an intermediary between the Sudanese traffickers and the UPC as well as with other armed groups, including anti-balaka groups (see below).⁴³ In April, the Panel was informed that UPC had acquired Sudanese weapons, including 200 AK-type assault rifles, six machine guns and 25,000 rounds of ammunition, through a deal with Abdoulaye Hissène.⁴⁴ In mid-June, the Panel was provided with pictures of the weapons (see below) and informed that new weapons deals were being concluded by UPC with Sudanese traffickers directly.⁴⁵

³⁸ Confidential report, 23 and 30 March 2018; confidential reports, February-April 2018; confidential report, 5 June 2018.

³⁹ Panel's mission to Ouaka prefecture, 19-24 January 2018. Panel's mission to Ndélé and Akroussoulbak, 3-5 April 2018. Panel's mission to Bria, 8-11 June 2018.

⁴⁰ Panel's mission to Ndélé and Akroussoulbak, 3-5 April 2018; Correspondence with confidential source, 2 April 2018.

⁴¹ Meeting with diplomatic sources, 6 April 2018; <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63860>; <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64857>, accessed on 30 June 2018.

⁴² Meeting with confidential sources, 27 March and 15 June 2018.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Meeting with diplomatic sources, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁴⁵ Meetings with confidential sources, 27 March, 22 May, 4 and 16 June 2018.

In Bria, the Panel also noticed a substantive upgrade in the weapons arsenal of “General Bokassa”’s anti-balaka group. The approximately 20 armed fighters observed by the Panel in Bria all carried an AK-type assault rifles reportedly purchased from a Sudanese arms trafficker.⁴⁶

In a communiqué dated 31 May 2018, the Sudanese Embassy in Bangui noted that “the presence of mercenaries of Sudanese nationality within the ranks of armed groups has nothing to do with the Sudanese Government which is a State institution” (see below).

2. UPC fighters equipped with conventional arms, military uniforms and satellite phones

Photographs taken by the Panel in Maloum, Bokolbo and Djoubissi; Panel’s mission to Ouaka prefecture from 19-24 January 2018.



⁴⁶ Meeting with confidential source, Bria, 9 June 2018.



3. FPRC vehicles and FPRC elements with AK-type assault rifles, pistols and machine guns in the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture

Photographs of new FPRC vehicles and armed FPRC elements in new military attire, with sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye. Pictures obtained from a confidential source on 29 March 2018.





Photograph of FPRC fighter in Akoursoulbak taken by the Panel on 5 April 2018.



4. Weapons and ammunition reportedly purchased by UPC from Sudanese arms traffickers

Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 12 March and 19 June 2018.



5. Press Communiqué from the Embassy of the Sudan in Bangui, 31 May 2018.

COOPÉRATION	
Ambassade de la République du Soudan Bangui Tél: 236 613821-75208291 B.P: 1351	 سفارة جمهورية السودان بانغي هاتف : 236613821+ ص. ب : 1351
COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE	
Se référant au mémorandum de la plateforme des confessions religieux publié dans les journaux privés en date du 28 mai 2018 concernant la situation sécuritaire persistant depuis 2012 jusqu'à ce jour, parle de la présence des mercenaires soudanais et tchadiens parmi les groupes armés opérant sur le territoire centrafricain et recommande à ces deux pays d'arrêter de s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures de la République Centrafricaine. L'Ambassade du Soudan à Bangui dénonce avec fermeté cette fausse accusation et saisit cette occasion pour éclairer l'opinion nationale et internationale de ce qui suit : - Le Gouvernement du Soudan s'est engagé avec détermination dans la politique de bon voisinage avec la RCA, en entretenant des efforts pour maintenir cette excellente relation, il a pris l'initiative de signer en 2011 le protocole de la force tripartite (Soudan – Tchad – RCA) en vue de contrôler la frontière commune de ces trois Etats. Pour la réussite de la mission de la force tripartite, le Gouvernement du Soudan prend l'engagement d'envoyer chaque six (06) mois un avion militaire pour transporter les forces armées centrafricaines. - La République du Soudan est soucieuse d'un prompt retour de la sécurité et de la stabilité en République Centrafricaine. La République du Soudan a exprimé sa disponibilité à aider la République Centrafricaine dans la médiation avec les groupes armés, sous l'égide de l'Union Africaine ainsi, le Soudan fait partie du panel des experts africains pour la médiation auprès des groupes armés. - La présence des mercenaires de nationalité soudanaise au sein des groupes armés n'a rien avoir avec le Gouvernement Soudanais qui est une institution étatique. Vu les relations historiques et fraternelles, le Gouvernement du Soudan ne peut pas se permettre de s'ingérer négativement dans la crise centrafricaine. L'Ambassade de la République du Soudan à Bangui est mécontent et demande aux médias, aux organisations non gouvernementale et gouvernementale de ne pas promouvoir des allégations qui affectent négativement les relations entre ces deux pays frères.  23/5/2018	
Page 8	Le Confident N° 4425 du 31 Mai 2018

Annex 6.4: FPRC parallel administration.

1. FPRC Financial Management Committee in Haute Kotto

1.1 Organizational chart

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 15 February 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
PRESIDENCE
HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEFENSE ET DE
SECURITE
N° 002 /FPRC/SEN018

Republique Centrafricaine
Unité - Dignité - Travail



NOTE DE SERVICE

A compter de la date de signature de la présente note de service, les personnalités dont les noms suivent sont nommés aux postes ci dessous .

Il s'agit de :

A-COMITE DE GESTION FINANCIERE DE LA HAUTE-KOTTO

- 1-) Président : MAHAMAT SEID ABDELKANI
- 2-) Vice-président : MAHAMAT ALI SELEKA
- 3-) Secrétaire General : BILAL AMANE
- 4-) Secrétaire General Adjoint : NASSIR KARAMA
- 5-) Trésorier General : OUMAR TIDJANI
- 6-) Trésorier General Adjoint : AMADOU OUSMANE
- 7-) Contrôleur Financier : MOUSSA MISSI
- 8-) Contrôleur Financier Adjoint : MAHAMAT-ZENE ABACHE

B- DIRECTION REGIONAL DES MINES
Directeur Régional : HISSEN ZACKARIA

Fait a Birao le 02 février 2018

Le Président du Conseil National de Défense et de Sécurité



ABDOULAYE ISSENE RAMADAN

1.2 Taxation system

“General” Mahmat Seid, President of the Financial Management Committee in Haute-Kotto, provided the Panel with the following information regarding the functioning of the administration under his control:

- The so-called “tax office” collects tolls from all traders and merchants. For instance, depending on the size of the trucks, each truck owner pays between FCFA 200,000 and 300,000 (USD\$350 - 530) per year to operate in the Haute-Kotto prefecture.
- Customs offices in Bria check whether economic operators coming from abroad (mainly Sudanese) have paid their taxes at FPRC customs offices in Tissi and Am Dafock (Vakaga prefecture).
- The “coffee trade” office collects taxes from coffee traders (mainly from the Sudan) who buy coffee in the CAR. The traders pay taxes at 3 levels: in Bambari (FCFA 25,000, \$44), in Bria (FCFA 15 000, \$26) and in Am Dafok (FCFA 15,000, \$26). The revenues generated by tolls from the coffee trade is shared between UPC and FPRC.
- The phytosanitary services check of food delivered in Bria and collect taxes from the traders delivering the food.
- Livestock: Revenues generated from the livestock market in Bria are collected by UPC. Part of the revenues is shared with FPRC.

1.3 Copies of receipts delivered by FPRC structures

Documents obtained by the Panel from “General” Mahmat Seid on 11 June 2018.

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRICAINE SECRETARIAT GENERAL DIRECTION SANITAIRE	REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE UNITE-DIGNITE-TRAVAIL N° 000651
REÇU PHITO SANITAIRE N°.....	
Nom et prénom : Im.	
Marque :	
Montant :	
Direction : Provenance :	
LE RESPONSABLE	

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
 PRESIDENCE N° 004551 UNITE -DIGNITE-TRAVAIL
 EAUX ET FORETS

RECU DE CAISSE

REDEVANCEES EAUX ET FORETS

NOM DU CLIENT :

MODE DE PAIEMENT :

MONTANT EN LETTRE :

MONTANT EN CHIFFRE :

FAIT A : LE :

LE CAISSIER

___ NOM, SIGNATURE ET CACHET

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
 PRESIDENCE N° 001801 UNITE -DIGNITE-TRAVAIL
 DEPARTEMENT DES REGIES FINANCIERES QUITTANCE N° :

BUREAU DES IMPOTS DE :

TAXES FISCALES

PERIODE DU AU Y.

NOM ET PRENOM :

DOMICILE :

MONTANT VERSE (EN LETTRES ET EN CHIFFRES) :

DATE :

CACHET ET SIGNATURE DU RESPONSABLE

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
 PRESIDENCE N° 003351 UNITE -DIGNITE-TRAVAIL
 CAISSE CAFE

BON APERCEVOIR N°

REDEVANCE CAISSE CAFE

EXPORTATEUR :

PRODUIT :

N° LOT :

N° BV :

NOMBRE DE COLIS : POIDS NET :

MONTANT REDEVANCE :

FAIT A : LE :

VISA CAISSE VISA CHEF DE POSTE
 (NOM, SIGNATURE ET CACHET) (NOM, SIGNATURE ET CACHET)

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

PRESIDENCE UNITE - DIGNITE - TRAVAIL

DOUANE DE

FEUILLE DE ROUTE N° N° 0002751

BUREAU DE TRANSIT PAR ROUTE

NOM DU TRANSPORTEUR

MARQUE DU VEHICULE IMMATRICULATION

CHARGE UTILE NOM ET PRENOM DU CHAUFFEUR

ATTELEE D'UNE REMORQUE IMMATRICULEE CHARGE UTILE

NOM DU DESTINATAIRE

QUANTITE	DESIGNATION DE LA MARCHANDISE	POIDS TOTAL	VALEUR	OBSERVATION

LE DECLARANT FAIT A LE:

LE CHEF DU BUREAU

SIGNATURE ET CACHET

2. FPRC parallel administration in other prefectures

Similar parallel structures have been established by FPRC in other prefectures (see Panel's midterm report for the case of the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture; S/2017/629; para. 71 and annex 5.10). "General" Mahmat Seid told the Panel that FPRC political coordinator Djafar Adouma and listed individual Haroun Gaye were heading the Financial Management Committees in the Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures, respectively.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Meeting with Mahmat Seid, Bria, 10 June 2018.

Annex 6.5: FPRC parallel mining administration in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture).

1. FPRC mining brigade in Ndélé

The FPRC mining brigade collects taxes on various mining activities (gold and diamonds), as well as on trade of other commodities like cement and oil.⁴⁸ The head of the mining brigade is Abdullaye Ataip.

The main diamond sites controlled by FPRC in the Ndélé area are located in Ndao (45 kilometers of Ndélé), Manovo (40 kilometers east of Ndélé), Sangha-Carrière (85 kilometers south-east of Ndélé), and Gounda (200 kilometers north-east of Ndélé). Gold sites are located on the Ndélé-Birao axis (25 kilometers of Ndélé).

2. Documentation of the FPRC mining brigade (licenses and register)

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 5 April 2018.

Copy of a license issued to mine workers by FPRC in Ndélé.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RECONNAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE

DIRECTION REGIONAL DES MINES N° 8

SECRETARIAT GENERAL
N° _____ /FPRC/DRM/N°8/SG

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAQUE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

CARTE D'OUVRIER MINIER

Nom (s)et Prénom(s) de l'Exploitant Artisan : _____
Nom (s)et Prénom (s) de l'ouvrier : _____
Chantier : _____, Domicilié à : _____
Fait à _____ le _____ 2018
Signature et Cachet de l'Autorité

⁴⁸ Meeting with a member of the FPRC mining brigade, Ndélé, 5 April 2018; meeting with representative of the mining administration, Ndélé, 5 April 2018.

Excerpts from the registers of the FPRC mining brigade in Ndélé, reflecting the names of mine workers and artisanal miners who have paid their taxes to the armed group.

LISTES DES ARTISANT MINIERES DE PATENTE							
NOM	PRENOM	PATENTE	PROFESION	Comme a verser	Reste a verser	DATE DE VERSEMENT	REponse
01	TISSAHE	SAMUEL	001	ARTISANT	20.000F	10.000F	5000F
02	ANKPA	MECHANIC	002	ARTISANT	15.000F	15.000F	5000F
03	PAPOU	BALA	003	ARTISANT	15.000F	15.000F	5000F
04	AMANCHÉ	STABOU	004	ARTISANT	25.000F	5.000F	5000F
05	BOSSALD	ABAKKE	005	ARTISANT	25.000F	5.000F	5000F
06	ILHI	ASSANE	006	ARTISANT	10.000F	20.000F	
07	FEISOLE	YOUSSEF	007	ARTISANT	10.000F	20.000F	
08	AMAT	TINTANI	008	ARTISANT	12.000F	23.000F	
09	ABAM	MAHAMAT	009	ARTISANT	10.000F	20.000F	
10	MODOU	ABAKAR	010	ARTISANT	15.000F	15.000F	
11	SOLEMANE	AMAT					
12	ZAKARI	WILFEL					
13	ABDINE	DOUDOU					
14	MADI	KAMBA					
15	BAHIN	ISAKA					
16	ISSENE	GORI					
17	ABBO	ASSANE					
18	MAHAMAT	MOUSSE	11-11-11	Artisan M			
19	MAHABIRE	AMAT					
20	AMAR	Abel Kudu	011	Artisan M	20.000F	15.000F	28/02/018
	MAHAMAT	MOUSSE	012	Artisan			Payer par click-click à C/Bale Mine

LISTES DES OUVRIERS MINIERES CARTE OUVRIERS							
NOM	PRENOM	FONCTION	CHANTIER	DATE DE C	SOMMES	RESTE A V	RS
01	TISSAHE	AMAT	OUVRIER	NANKO	06/02/018		
02	AMAR	ABRAMANE	OUVRIER	MANOVO	06/02/018		
03	ISMAEL	ZAKARI	OUVRIER	MANOVO	06/02/018	2000F	OK-11-
04	AMAT	ALI	OUVRIER	GBOUOU	07/02/018	2000F	OK-11-*
05	AMAT	ALI	OUVRIER	GBOUOU			OK-11-*
06	BOSSI	TERRE	OUVRIER	GBOUOU		2000F	OK-11-*
07	ABOUWA	BOUGOU	OUVRIER	MANOVO			
08	MAHAMAT	AMZU	OUVRIER	MANOVO			
09	BOUO	OSMANE	OUVRIER	NYAKO			
10	AMAT	ABRAMANE	OUVRIER	NYAKO	06/02/018		
11	MUSTAPHA	SOUMBI	OUVRIER	NYAKO	06/02/018		
12	AMAR	ALI	OUVRIER	GBOUOU	10/02/018	2000F	OK-11-11-*
13	JENOUSSI	KAMARA	OUVRIER	NYAKO	10/02/018		
14	TOLARKY	FRANÇOISE	OUVRIER	GBOUOU	11/02/018	2000F	OK-11-*
15	KOUTOU	MBOROU	OUVRIER	MANOVO	11/02/018		+
16	KATRE	WIKY	OUVRIER	WOUNGOU	14/02/018		
17	YAYA	WEGA	OUVRIER	WOUNGOU	19/02/018		
18	NDOUNGUE	MORICE	OUVRIER	Koumbala	17/02/018		
19	ALAIN	NARCISE	OUVRIER	Koumbala	17/02/018		
20	ROMARICK		OUVRIER	Koumbala	17/02/018		
21	OSMANE		OUVRIER	Koumbala	17/02/018		
22	ALI	ABRAMANE	OUVRIER	Comp. Kudu	17/02/018	2000F	11-OK-11-*
23	KETEGWA	FELIX	OUVRIER	MANOVO	17/02/018		
24	SAU-LOU	KOTYSA	OUVRIER	MANOVO	17/02/018	2000F	OK-11-11-*
25	NADINE	PAUL	OUVRIER	FEISSA	17/02/018		
26	BALEKOUZOU	PIERRE	OUVRIER	FEISSA	17/02/018		
27	KAYA	BONIFACE	OUVRIER	PEDE	15/02/018		

Annex 6.6: UPC parallel mining administration in Ouaka prefecture.**1. Organizational chart and taxation system**

The UPC mining administration is reportedly composed of two levels⁴⁹ :

- A central management team reportedly based in Bokolobo and working closely with UPC chief Ali Darassa. Abdoulaye Hamidoulaye is believed to be one of the team leaders.
- Local managers, including a head of the mining service in Bambari (Adamou Ngatoua) and regional directors. Abdoul Shafi Abakar Youssef is reportedly the UPC regional director in Ndassima.

UPC has also established a mining brigade which documents whether miners and collectors have paid their taxes and obtained their licenses from the UPC administration. Artisanal miners reportedly pay between FCFA 50,000 and 62,000 (\$91 and \$110) per year to operate on the Ndassima mining site.⁵⁰ The level of taxes has increased since the control of the site was shared among UPC and FPRC. Collectors reportedly pay around FCFA 450,000 (\$795) per year. Racketeering of gold extracted by the miners and arbitrary penalties constitute additional tolls for miners.

2. Mining sites under UPC control

In the context of UPC's resurgence in the Ouaka prefecture, the armed group has regained control over several mining sites which had been lost to anti-balaka combatants.⁵¹ This includes the gold site of Ndassima, where UPC shares control and revenues with FPRC. Furthermore, UPC maintains control over diamond sites in the Ngakobo area and gold sites in Agoudou-Manga. UPC also supervises activities of a newly-discovered diamond mining site located in the vicinity of Bambari, in the Wangaye neighbourhood.

UPC is also trying to regain control over mining sites located in the Bakala area, which to date have remained under control of anti-balaka local leaders including "General Réal", "Chien Méchant" and "Risqueur".

⁴⁹ Meeting with confidential sources, artisanal miners and economic operators, Bambari, 30 April-2 May 2018.

⁵⁰ Idem.

⁵¹ Panel's mission in Bambari, 30 April-2 May 2018.


3. Copies of receipts delivered by UPC

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 23 May 2018.

As indicated above, FPRC and UPC share control over the Ndassima mining site, hence the mention of FPRC on the receipt below signed by UPC element Abdoul Shafi Abakar Yousseuf.

FRONT PRESIDENTIEL DE LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
 PRESIDENCE DE
 BUREAU DES MINES
 NDASSIMA
 N° 0000525
 NOM ET PRENOM: POUMENATI VIRGINIE
 RAISONS SOCIALES:
 NATURE D'ACTIVITES:
 ADRESSE: BANTOU
 PERIODE DU 1^{er} 10 2017 AU 31 10 2017
 CHIFFRE D'AFFAIRES PREVISION RELLES: 20.000 FCFA
 ETES VOUS PROPRIETAIRES II LOCATAIRES II
 EN CAS DE LOCATAIRE, INDICHER LE NOM ET PRENOM ADRESSE DU PROPRIETAIRES:
 DATE: 03 10 2017
 LE RESPONSABLE
 CACHET ET SIGNATURE: ABDOUL SHAFI ABKAR YOUSSEUF
 TEL:

029
 DJAFAR
 AMANY
 Centrafrique
 artisan minier
 KARANDJA 4x4
 quarante mille francs
 40.000 Fcfa
 16 4 2017

Annex 6.7: Map of Tagbara and Seko, Bambari-Ippy road.

Annex 6.8: Pictures of victims of the anti-balaka attack on the Fulani camp in Mbaidou.

Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 30 April 2018.



Annex 6.9: Pictures of Tagbara and Séko after the clashes of 3 April 2018.

Photographs of Tagbara obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 April 2018.





Photographs of the mass graves in Séko obtained by the Panel from a confidential source and taken by the Panel on 1st May 2018.



Annex 6.10: Deadly attacks against peacekeepers from 1 January to 21 June 2018.

Information obtained by the Panel from a confidential source.

3 April 2018 – Tagbara (Ouaka prefecture)

At approximately 5:30 a.m., anti-balaka combatants attacked the MINUSCA base in Tagbara, resulting in the death of one Mauritanian peacekeeper and 11 others injured. MINUSCA Force exchanged fire with the attackers that lasted for one hour and a half.

10 April 2018 – Bangui

From 4 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., MINUSCA Force and armed elements from the PK5 neighbourhood engaged in an intensive exchange of fire in the 3rd district. The firefight resulted in one Rwandan peacekeeper being killed and eight injured.

17 May 2018 – Alindao (Basse Kotto prefecture)

At around 9 a.m., approximately 27 km southeast of Alindao, anti-balaka combatants attacked a MINUSCA escorted convoy which was coming from Dimbi to Alindao. One Mauritanian peacekeeper was killed and seven injured, including four seriously.

3 June 2018 – Dilapoko (Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture)

At 4:30 p.m., at approximately 5 km south of Dilapoko (80 km north of Berberati), armed Siriri elements ambushed and opened fire on a MINUSCA Force patrol coming from Gamboula. MINUSCA Force returned fire. Upon the exchange of fire, one Tanzanian peacekeeper was killed and seven injured.

10 June 2018 – Bambari (Ouaka prefecture)

At 5:45 p.m., anti-balaka opened fire at a vehicle with two Burundian peacekeepers, injuring both. At 1:25 a.m. on 11 June, one of the peacekeepers died due to severe injuries.

Annex 7.1: Armed groups in the west of the CAR.

The presence of armed groups in the western part of the country continues to grow. Three of the four prefectures bordering the frontier with Cameroon witnessed important armed group activities. On 12 March 2018, Cameroon deployed the newly formed 12th Motorized Infantry Brigade based in Bertoua. This new operational unit was created by the President of the Republic of Cameroon to secure the border with the CAR where numerous armed groups operate.

The armed groups, while not having a well-defined political agenda, generate revenues through transhumance and undertake activities of illegal taxation.

1. Siriri

The Mamberei-Kadei prefecture has witnessed the creation and development of a group called Coalition Siriri (“Peace” in Sango). Former UPC members and new recruits mainly from the Fulani community comprise this group.⁵² Their proclaimed goal is to protect the cattle owners targeted by local anti-balaka groups in the area west of Berberati. The armed group seems well organized with ID cards (see below) issued for each member as well as a defined chain of command, headed by General Djaligue and his second General Djibril (a former UPC Zone Commander).⁵³

In January 2018, Siriri established connections with FDPC and 3R. They held meetings in the town of Nguia-Bouar near the Cameroon border. The results of those meetings remain unclear, but elements of FDPC are now conducting operations with Siriri and the two groups operate in the same area without conflict. The FDPC État major publicly denied any agreement with Siriri,⁵⁴ but an alliance between the two groups could facilitate control of a greater territory where illegal taxation on transhumance and mining activities represent an important source of revenue.⁵⁵

The UPC and Siriri maintain strong ties and at the time of the drafting of this report, discussions were ongoing for a possible absorption of a branch of Siriri into the UPC. This is partly due to internal tensions within Siriri. Siriri’s expansion towards Nana-Mambéré prefecture generated tensions with local authorities and several clashes with MINUSCA forces. During one of those clashes, on 3 June 2018, one Tanzanian peacekeeper was killed, as well as a Siriri leader.⁵⁶ As the Siriri leadership in the Mambéré-Kadei prefecture is reluctant to face the political and military consequences of actions undertaken by the group’s branch active in the Nana-Mambéré prefecture, they consider disassociating themselves by joining UPC.

Photograph provided to the Panel by MINUSCA on 27 March 2018.

⁵² Meeting with UPC representative, Bangui, 27 April 2018.

⁵³ Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

⁵⁴ Meeting with Nana-Mambéré Prefect, Bouar, 25 March 2018.

⁵⁵ Meeting with Abdoulaye Miskine, Brazzaville, 18 April 2018.

⁵⁶ Confidential report, 4 June 2018.




2. Peace agreement between 3R and the Ndalé brothers

Under the peace agreement signed on 15 December 2017 (see below), obstacles to freedom of movement are banned, and armed groups' combatants shall not carry weapons openly.

This peace agreement enabled the establishment of clear division of territories between the two groups where they have put in place illegal taxation on transhumance alongside a system of fees and penalties including taxes at roadblocks and on markets for traders. This system weighs heavily on the cattle owners who are constantly forced to cede part of their herds, especially in territories controlled by the 3R (one penalty may represent the confiscation of up to 6 beefs).⁵⁷

Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source on 22 December 2017.



⁵⁷ Meeting with confidential source, 2 April 2018.

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PREAMBULE

Nous, Adamou Sylvain GBOKAO NDALE et SIDIKI ABBASSI, représentants respectivement les groupes armés 3R (Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation) et les Anti-Balakas dans la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré, ci-après « les Parties » ;

Considérant les initiatives précédentes prises par la communauté internationale en vue d'instaurer un règlement négocié des hostilités en RCA, signé le 23 juillet 2014 à Brazzaville ;

Considérant les efforts de la MINUSCA dans le cadre de son mandat de soutenir les autorités de la Centrafrique en général et les autorités de la Nana-Mambéré en particulier pour la paix et la réconciliation dans le pays ;

Considérant la dynamique nationale, notamment celle des forces vives de la nation y compris la plateforme des Autorités religieuses, la société civile et les partis politiques à construire une société de paix et de concorde nationale en soutien au processus de Réconciliation nationale ;

Considérant les Recommandations du Forum National de Bangui du 04 au 11 mai 2015 dont les plus importantes sont consignées dans le Pacte républicain pour la paix, la Réconciliation Nationale et la Reconstruction en RCA ;

Considérant la volonté constante de son excellence, le professeur Faustin Archange TOUADERA, chef de l'Etat, réitérée dans ses différentes déclarations (Investiture du 30 mars 2016, Kigali, Bruxelles) et les dernières adresses à la nation du 31 décembre 2016 et du 1 décembre 2017, de promouvoir le dialogue et la réconciliation nationale de tous les fils et toutes les filles de Centrafrique ;

Exprimant notre profond regret quant aux violations persistantes des Accords précédents de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités, ainsi que les pertes déplorables de vies et de biens engendrées par les derniers conflits ;

Conscients du fait que sans notre engagement aux principes cardinaux de bonne gouvernance, de tolérance, et de coexistence pacifique, les populations de la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré ne peuvent réaliser, ni une croissance globale ni des progrès sociaux économiques pour les générations actuelles et futures ;

Conscients du fait que la responsabilité de déterminer le destin de notre région nous incombe, selon les réalités de notre pays et sur la base des valeurs de justice, d'état de droit, de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance, du respect des droits et libertés fondamentaux de la personne, d'unité et de solidarité, d'entente mutuelle et de coopération parmi les différentes communautés ethniques, et groupes religieux ;

3 sur 6

Réaffirmant notre engagement à renoncer à la violence et décidant, par la présente, de nous inscrire résolument dans la dynamique de paix, de cohésion sociale, de réconciliation et du bien-être des populations de la Nana-Mambéré ;

Par la signature du présent acte, nous prenons l'engagement solennel devant les autorités gouvernementales, les représentants de la MINUSCA et les populations, de renoncer à toute action de notre part pouvant porter atteinte à la sécurité et au bien-être des populations.

Nous convenons de ce qui suit:

Article 1 Les Parties s'engagent à un accord de non-agression à compter de la date de signature du présent acte (si après Accord).

Article 2 Dès la signature de l'Accord, les Parties sont tenues d'observer conjointement un ordre inconditionnel de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités ou des agressions contre le personnel armé de l'une et de l'autre partie, et contre les populations civiles de toutes les localités de la Nana-Mambéré.

Article 3 Dès la signature de l'Accord, l'usage des armes, ainsi que les actes offensifs tels que : l'incendie des villages et greniers, le vol de bétail, le lancement de nouvelles attaques contre les civils et le fait de commettre tout autre acte pouvant constituer ou faciliter une violation de l'Accord doivent cesser de suite.

Article 4 Dans les trente (30) jours qui suivent la date d'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord, les Parties établissent avec l'appui du Centre HD:

1. Un **réseau d'échange d'informations** composé des leaders communautaires avec l'implication des leaders des Parties ;
2. Une cartographie détaillée qui définira :
 - Les zones à partir desquelles ou vers lesquelles les groupes doivent se retirer ;
 - Les zones démilitarisées devant servir de zone tampon entre les combattants armés respectifs des Parties. Une zone démilitarisée dans le

3



4 sur 6

sens de cet article est une zone sans base temporaire ou permanente des Parties.

Article 5 Les Parties sous la supervision du Centre HD définissent ensemble avec les leaders communautaires, les conditions pour le fonctionnement de ces mécanismes locaux de prévention et de gestion des problèmes liés à la violence en cas d'agression ou d'intimidation, de l'extorsion et du vol de bétail, souvent sources de tensions intercommunautaires et d'affrontements sanglants entre les Parties.

Article 6 Le convoyage des animaux doit être accompagné par un Certificat d'Origine à l'intérieur de la Nana-Mambéré ou à partir de la Nana-Mambéré vers les autres localités de la RCA afin de mieux contrôler le mouvement de bétail et d'éviter les cas de vol.

Article 7 L'engagement des Parties pour la paix, la réconciliation et la cohésion sociale sous-entend entre autre :

- a) La libre circulation des personnes et des biens y compris des organisations humanitaires dans la Nana-Mambéré;
- b) L'accès libre aux établissements de santé, tels que les hôpitaux et les postes médicaux ;
- c) L'accès libre aux établissements scolaires et à tout autre édifice public ;
- d) L'engagement pour le retour de tous les déplacés dans la Nana-Mambéré du aux hostilités entre les Parties;
- e) L'abstention d'atteinte aux biens et propriétés privés (maisons, motos, parcelles agricoles, bétails, etc.) ;
- f) Le recours aux mécanismes traditionnels locaux des règlements des conflits en cas de litiges liés à l'exploitation des ressources naturelles;
- g) Le recours systématique au réseau d'échange, établi par cet accord en cas de disputes.

Article 8 Les Parties s'engagent à respecter et à mettre en exécution les dispositions de l'Accord afin d'assurer avec succès, l'instauration et la

consolidation de la paix et de la cohésion sociale dans la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré.

Article 9 Dès la signature de l'Accord, les Parties, prennent individuellement et collectivement, des mesures conjointes spécifiques pour sensibiliser leurs combattants et partisans respectifs et les populations en général des localités concernées, pour qu'ils cessent des actes hostiles les uns contre les autres et tout autre acte apte de mettre en danger la paix dans la Nana-Mambéré tels que les actes sur la base de l'ethnicité, de la religion et de toutes autres motivations, y compris l'intimidation, les prises d'otage, l'extorsion ou vol, l'usage de propagandes hostiles et l'incitation pouvant porter atteinte à la vie ou causer des dégâts aux biens.

Article 10 Les termes de l'Accord doivent être simultanément communiqués à la population civile par les radios locales, la presse écrite ainsi que par d'autres moyens de communication.

Article 11 Les Parties conviennent de se réunir mensuellement dans le cadre du réseau d'échange établi par cet Accord comme mesure de rétablissement de confiance entre les Parties.

Article 12 Le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Fait à Bouar (Nana-Mambéré), le 14 Décembre 2017

Pour le groupe ANTI-BALAKA
représenté par
**M. Adamou Sylvain GBOKAO
NDALE**



Pour le groupe 3R représenté
par
M. SIDIKI ABASSI

P.O. 31
Saïdou Aliyou

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
Témoins

M. Jonas DONON


Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale

**M. Amadou ISSA BI ADAMOU**Conseiller du Chef de l'Etat en Matière
de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage**M. Alexis NAGUEZANGBA**

Préfet de la Nana-Mambéré

**M. Paul Shaba BAGAZA YADERE**

Sous-Préfet de Bouar

**M. Lazare NAMBENA**Président de la Délégation Spéciale de
la Ville de Bouar**M. Roger GODONGAI**Commandant de la FACA dans la Nana-
MambéréCPT LANKAGUE
TANDOR**Mme. Christine KAPALATA**Chef de Bureau de la MINUSCA à
Bouar**M. Augustin KOULAS**Représentant du Centre pour le
Dialogue Humanitaire (HD)

3. Confrontation between Bahar's MLNC and Sayo's RJ in the Paoua area

Since 2016, the Paoua sub-prefecture had been under the control of a coalition of RJ led by Armel Sayo and an MPC faction led by "General" Ahmat Bahar (S/2016/694 para 91), which became the MNLC in October 2017. This cooperation was based on the sharing of resources from the illegal checkpoints and the transhumance activities coming from Chad.⁵⁸ Officially the RJ split into two branches in 2016 (S/2016/1032, para 208-2012) – one under Sayo, the other under colonel Belanga - but this separation had no impact from an operational point of view, as both branches continued to operate in the field under "General" Luther, Sayo's Chief of Staff.

Tensions between MNLC and RJ grew in late 2017 as a result of the continuous reinforcement of MNLC through the recruitment of fighters from Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé. Despite its separation from Mahamat Al-Khatim's MPC, the MNLC continues to be provided with ammunition from and recruit fighters in MPC-controlled areas in Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé. With Bahar's allegedly willingness to change the demographic of the area and reinforce its positions, RJ leaders have become fearful that MNLC will take control over the Paoua sub-prefecture and of all revenues previously shared with them.⁵⁹

After the killings of cattle herders in November 2017, MNLC killed a RJ leader (Colonel Belanga) in reprisal at the end of the month. On 28 December 2017, RJ attacked MNLC's positions in several locations. RJ's unprecedented operational capacity displayed during the combats demonstrates that the group has received support both in men and weapons. The Panel has identified Bangui as the main origin of supply for RJ.

On 12 January 2018, in an effort to restore stability in the area, MINUSCA launched "Operation Mbaranga". The operation forced Bahar's group to leave Paoua's surroundings and relocate near the Chadian border.⁶⁰ RJ stopped its activities but has remained mobilized in the event that the end of the "Operation Mbaranga" enables the MNLC's return.⁶¹

Facing difficulties in the northwest and seeking to reposition himself in the political process, Ahmat Bahar recently joined FPRC and expressed support for its political strategy (see below).

⁵⁸ Meeting with community leaders and local officials, Paoua, 29 January-1 February 2018.

⁵⁹ Meeting with General Armel Sayo, RJ President, Bangui, 18 January 2018.

⁶⁰ Confidential report, 15 January 2018.

⁶¹ Meeting with Colonel Bessain Urbain, General Coordinator of RJ, Paoua, 29 January 2018.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 June 2018.



Annex 7.2: Bossangoa-Markounda-Nana Boguila triangle map and context.

As a side-effect of MINUSCA’s “Operation Mbaranga” in Paoua, armed elements formerly belonging to MNLC have been raiding the area, attacking villages and stealing cattle that local people used for farming.⁶² The breach of the alliance between RJ and MPC led to clashes in Bodjomo on 29 December 2017 and Markounda on 2 January 2018.⁶³ After this split, between 29 December 2017 and 1 March 2018, 17 civilians were reportedly killed.⁶⁴ As consequence, the town of Markounda turned into an IDP camp hosting 8,381 people from the city and the surrounding areas,⁶⁵ where the delivery of humanitarian assistance was highly challenging.

On 24 March 2018, an ICRC convoy was hijacked on the road between Nana Boguila and Markounda, delaying the provision of aid to the displaced population.⁶⁶ After the signature of the local peace agreement on 3 May 2018, the security situation in Markounda has improved and people were slowly going back to their houses.

⁶² Meeting with IDP representative, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶³ Meeting with sub-prefect, Markounda, 25 March 2018; Meetings with MPC Zone Commander in Kouki, RJ Zone Commander in Bodjomo and MPC Zone Commander in Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁴ Meeting with Catholic Priest, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁵ Meeting with IDP representative, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁶ Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

Annex 7.3: Cases of rape and sexual assault in the Bossangoa area.

Another consequence of the instability in the area is the increase in the number of rapes and cases of sexual assault.⁶⁷ In this regard, a mass rape was reported in the village of Kiriwiri (involving 86 inhabitants), on the road between Nana Bakassa and Bouaye (Ouham prefecture). On 3 March 2018, the MSF-supported hospital in Bossangoa treated 10 women who had reported having been assaulted on 17 February in the bush surrounding the village. Two women were pregnant at the time of the attack, one had fresh knife wounds, and many were in shock.⁶⁸ Eight new victims were found on the villages of Kiriwiri and Houssem the week after, as a result of sensitization sessions.⁶⁹

The Panel gathered evidence of at least three other cases of rape against groups of 3-4 women, who were assaulted in the same area and sometimes abducted for several hours.⁷⁰ Villagers were not able to specify on which dates these attacks occurred. They told the Panel that a group of heavily armed herders whose leader is known as Balewa had been coming to the area during the dry season for the past three years, threatening the population but never targeting local women on such a large scale.⁷¹

According to the Panel's findings, it is most likely that a significant number of women living in the Nana Bakassa-Bouaye area have been raped and sexually assaulted in small groups and on different occasions over the first months of 2018. Also, based on the testimonies of survivors and village residents, as well as contextual evidence, herders from Balewa's group are likely to be the main perpetrators.

⁶⁷ MSF reported 56 cases in Bossangoa from September 2017 to 4 March 2018, compared to the 13 treated from January to August 2017.

⁶⁸ See <http://www.msf.org/en/article/central-african-republic-survivors-describe-mass-rape-ordeal-outside-bossangoa>, accessed on 15 March 2018.

⁶⁹ Meeting with MSF representative, Bossangoa, 23 March 2018.

⁷⁰ Meeting with survivors, Kiriwiri and Houssem, 24 March 2018.

⁷¹ Meetings with a group of local chiefs, Houssem, 24 March 2018.

Annex 7.4: Attack against humanitarian actors in Defei (Ouham prefecture) on 25 March 2018.

On 25 February 2018, six local humanitarian workers⁷² were carjacked and brutally killed between Defei and Markounda. They were going to launch an emergency education programme for IDPs and were therefore carrying a large amount of money (around \$5,500).⁷³ During its investigations at the scene on 26 March 2018, the Panel found several documents and personal belongings of the humanitarians. This demonstrates that the vehicle was most likely halted and searched on the main road, and later moved a few hundred meters into the bush. Once there, the six civilians were shot in the head and the vehicle burned.

Even though there were no direct witnesses of this massacre, the Panel gathered testimonies pointing to six armed elements associated with the local MPC and reportedly under the direct command of Abdallah, an arms trader reportedly of Chadian origin.⁷⁴ According to IDP testimonies, these men were also responsible for a raid in the villages of Gbangoro and Defei held on 21-22 February 2018, along the same road.⁷⁵

The latter incident was discovered by a MINUSCA patrol on 26 February, but local authorities were not informed until the following day. The bodies of the victims were collected on 1 March only.⁷⁶

⁷² The team was composed of two members of the national NGO Bangui Sans Frontières, one UNICEF consultant, two civil servants from the Ministry of Education and one assistant.

⁷³ Meeting with BSF representative, Bangui, 29 March 2018.

⁷⁴ Meeting with confidential source, Markounda, 25 and 26 March 2018.

⁷⁵ Meeting with confidential source, Markounda, 26 March 2018.

⁷⁶ Meeting with sub-prefect, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

Annex 7.5: Use of anti-balaka fighters, ISF and FACA elements as security providers for economic operators.

To operate in the CAR, especially in the provinces, economic operators, including mining companies, need to take measures to ensure their security. Some mining companies or cooperatives employ private security companies. As mentioned in the 2017 Panel's final report (S/2017/1023, para. 235), one such private security company operating in Sosso-Nakombo was employing former anti-balaka soldiers.

Other mining companies reportedly directly recruit anti-balaka or former anti-balaka fighters. Anti-balaka leaders in Bouar and some local authorities told the Panel that the use of former anti-balaka combatants as security providers was common practice for mining companies operating in the Abba area.⁷⁷

Some companies rather secure the provisioning of National defence and security forces through agreements with the Ministries of Defence and/or Interior. Such practices enable the companies to ensure their security without resorting to protection by armed groups; at the same time, they create additional tasks for FACA and ISF whose human resources and capabilities are limited. In Bouar, for instance, the FACA Deputy Commander told the Panel that more than a third of FACA deployed in the area were involved in the protection of mining companies.⁷⁸

In south-western CAR, the freedom of movement of many individuals and economic operators remain constrained due to insecurity and criminality (S/2017/1023, paras. 227-228). The Panel notes that, in the area of Berbérati and Nola, national defence and security forces often take advantage of this situation by providing paid escorts to Muslims willing to move in the area, including diamond and gold collectors.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Meeting with anti-balaka leader Bello and Patrick, Bouar, 26 March 2018; Meeting with a gendarme officer, Abba, 27 March 2018.

⁷⁸ Meeting with FACA Deputy Commander, Bouar, 27 March 2018.

⁷⁹ Meeting with FACA Commander, Nola, 13 January 2018. Meetings with economic operators and collectors, Nola, 12-13 January 2018, and Berbérati, 15-16 January 2018.

Below the list of gendarme elements put at the disposal of mining companies and buying houses. Document obtained by the Panel from the Deputy Director General of the Gendarmerie on 18 June 2018.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Union - Dignité - Travail
MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR, CHARGE DE LA
SECURITE PUBLIQUE
DIRECTION GENERALE GENDARMERIE NATIONALE
CADDIST
LISTE DES GENDARMES DETACHES COMME ELEMENTS DE SECURITE AUPRES DES BUREAUX D'ACHAT

SOCIETE SOBIAM			
GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. MDL/C	PASSIRI Prisca Parmenas		
2. MDL	GAZAYOMBO Vioce Alpha		09/12/2017
3. MDL	MVOUNA Maxime		19/04/2018
4. 1 ^{er} CL	DOLAKA Marcelin Chrysostome		08/07/2015
5. 2 ^e CL	DOLIMALAKPE YAKOVASSO Charles Fernand		08/01/2015
6. 2 ^e CL	FEDANGAI-NAMDOKINENYA Thierry Mesmin		08/07/2017
7. 2 ^e CL	LEKATE Hervé		

DUNTA SARL (Société de Diamant)			
GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. ADJ	KAROBANGA Valentin		09/12/2016
2. MDL/A	BOUANDA WAYELE Majewin Florin		15/10/2016
3. MDL	KOI Narcisse Bienvenu		10/10/2016
4. 1 ^{er} CL	KIEFO Alban		11/08/2016
5. 2 ^e CL	GASSIER Kevin		19/10/2016

Bureau d'achat de Diamants et Or : PRIMO BADO

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. ADJ	DOUANZOGNA Anselme Thierry		05/02/2018
2. 1 ^{er} CL	MODOEMONO Fred Cyrille le Second		01/02/2018

SOCIETE MAZEN MOUSSA DIAMANT (MMD)

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. MDL	PASSI Germain		20/02/2017
2. MDL	NDOKIAZINA Jonas		04/06/2017
3. MDL	TOUANGAI Vianney		05/06/2018
4. MDL	KODOBI Armand		02/06/2018
5. 1 ^{er} CL	FEDANGAI MOKOI Narcisse de Houtheur		20/02/2017

SOCIETE LAACO-RCA

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. 1 ^{er} CL	NGAKOE KOROHE MAY Dimas		15/03/2017
2. 1 ^{er} CL	MADJOU Amicet		12/03/2016

SOCIETE DEWAY SERVICE DE SECURITE RCA

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. MDL/C	HOUTOUKOU SIPITAN Prosper Bienvenu		05/05/2017
2. MDL	NGONZO Jean Firmin		05/05/2017
3. MDL	OULIBOZOUNA NAMBEAM Séphane		05/05/2017
4. MDL	ZOUHOULI-KANGBOUNDOU		20/11/2017
5. 1 ^{er} CL	KOUJETY Patrick Christian		05/05/2017
6. 1 ^{er} CL	MESSAKO Thierry Bertrand		20/11/2017

SOCIETE TSA GLOBAL SERVICE AFRICA

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. MDL/C	DIURANGAR Benoît		27/01/2018
2. MDL/C	DANGAVO Libération		27/02/2018
3. 1 ^{er} CL	MONGO Guy Maixent		27/02/2018

INDUSTRIE MINIERE DE CENTRAFRIQUE : IMC

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. 1 ^{er} CL	TANGBAGO-KOMAZE I Grace à Dieu Régis		14/05/2018

SOCIETE CENTRAL WORLD GROUP SARH

GRADE	NOMS ET PRENOMS		OBSERVATIONS
1. MDL	OUAGUIA LOUPDOU Martial		
2. MDL	HOPA Hervé Jean		

Le Lieutenant-colonel, Directeur Général Adjoint
de la Gendarmerie Nationale
R.E. BENO OUYOLO

Annex 7.6: Gold mining in the Bossangoa area: the arrival of mining companies in an anti-balaka stronghold.

1. Anti-balaka involvement in gold exploitation in the Ouham prefecture

As indicated in the Panel's previous reports (S/2017/639, paras. 95-98 and S/2017/1032, paras. 230-232), gold exploitation has boomed in the Ouham prefecture since mid-2016.

At the time of the Panel's visit to Bossangoa (23-25 March 2018), the presence of the State authorities remained limited on the "Wili" mining site, with only a few USAF elements ensuring that miners have paid their licenses. Armed elements under local anti-balaka leaders remained in control of the site and its access (see S/2017/639, paras.95-98 and S/2017/1032, paras. 230-232).

A largely similar situation is now prevailing at "Bolakaba", a site located close to Ben Zembe, about 40 km northwest of Bossangoa. Security, access to the site and gold exploitation at "Bokalaba" are managed by local anti-balaka leaders (Ouham Zone Commander called "Romain"), former FACA elements (including Ghislain Danboy) and their associates (including Christian Ngana alias "Toko"), while representatives of local authorities recognize having very limited visibility on current activities.⁸⁰ Ben Zembe is the hometown of former President François Bozizé and anti-balaka combatants from the area are reportedly still connected to his family.⁸¹

Exploitation in Zere (25 km east of Bossangoa), the third main site previously identified in the Bossangoa area (S/2017/1032, paras.233), has ceased since early 2018.⁸²

2. Mining companies' operations in the area

While exerting limited control over the area, the CAR Government has granted mining permits to two companies – i.e. Zighu mining and Tieng Pao - to operate on and around the "Wili" site. This decision has created discontent among the site managers, artisanal miners and anti-balaka elements who are anxious not to lose control over the area and their source of revenue;⁸³ it is therefore likely to generate tensions in the area.

On 22 May 2018, workers employed by Tieng Pao constructing a road to access the "Wili" mining site were harassed by locals.⁸⁴

Zighu Mining has decided to delay its activities in the area, considering operating in the area could put its staff at risk.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Meetings with Ouham Prefect, gendarme officers, and confidential sources, Bossangoa, 24 March 2018

⁸¹ Meeting with local authorities and confidential sources, Bossangoa, 23-24 March 2018.

⁸² Meeting with the Zere site chief, Bossangoa, 24 March 2018.

⁸³ Meeting with Member of Parliament from Bossangoa, Bangui, 6 June 2018.

⁸⁴ Confidential report, 22 May 2018. Meeting with Member of Parliament from Bossangoa, 6 June 2018.

⁸⁵ Phone conversation with Zighu mining manager, 25 June 2018.


Annex 7.7: Poaching and ivory trafficking in the Dzanga Sangha National reserve.

Poaching and wildlife trafficking around the Dzanga Sangha Special Reserve, as cited in previous Panel reports (S/2014/452, paras 74-76; S/2014/762, paras. 149-150), continues. Poachers do not belong to organized armed groups but are rather related to criminal networks. The ivory from the CAR is trafficked into the Republic of the Congo and, to a larger extent, to Cameroon.⁸⁶

As noted in previous reports (S/2014/762, para. 149), representatives of the CAR local authorities, and in particular internal security forces, are at times supporting, if not actively participating, in such activities. On 14 January 2018, the Panel interviewed three individuals imprisoned in Bayanga for poaching activities; they reported having acted on behalf of a retired police officer named “Anatole” who previously headed the Bayanga police station.

Map of the Dzanga-Sangha Reserve and the Dzanga National Park.

Available at <http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/content/maps>, accessed on 22 June 2018.



⁸⁶ Meeting with rangers and local authorities, Bayanga, 14 January 2018. Meeting with conservationists, Bangui, 16 January 2018.

Annex 8.1: Additional information on, and pictures of, arms trafficking organized by Bangui-based individuals on MINUSCA escorted vehicles.

On 29 January 2018, UPC members informed the Panel that they had stopped and searched vehicles escorted by MINUSCA in front of a MINUSCA camp in Ippy, in which they found hunting ammunition and other items.⁸⁷ When MINUSCA Force realized that the armed group was searching the vehicles, they pushed them away and secured all vehicles and items.⁸⁸ Upon further investigation by MINUSCA and national security forces coming from Bambari, it was established that 1,727 rounds of hunting ammunition from the Manufacture de cartouches congolaise (MACC),⁸⁹ 602 packages of tramadol and 1,5 kg of marijuana were in the vehicles and subsequently brought to Bambari on 1 February 2018.

Six persons were arrested. On 14 February, the Grand Court of Bambari sentenced two of the arrested for complicity to the illegal detention of hunting ammunition, psychotropic substances and narcotics; one of the arrested for the illegal detention of hunting ammunition; and Zala Didier for the illegal detention of hunting ammunition, psychotropic substances and narcotics.⁹⁰ ECOLOG was exonerated of any responsibility in the trafficking of prohibited items in its trucks.

According to witnesses, one of the convicted persons, Didier Zala, regularly used the trucks of ECOLOG, a MINUSCA contractor, to smuggle hunting ammunition, commonly used by both hunters and anti-balaka fighters, to the towns of Bria, Bambari and Ippy. Prohibited items were used to be hidden in the trucks' cab and under the trucks where a false wooden floor was installed (see picture below). One of the persons met by the Panel declared that on several occasions, he went to Lopola, the Republic of the Congo, with Didier Zala where he bought MACC hunting ammunition which was later put in his truck's cab and later joined the convoy to Bambari, Bria and Ippy. There, part of the ammunition and tramadol was sold to individual hunters while other boxes were provided to anti-balaka fighters.⁹¹ The Panel continues to investigate whether, and to what extent, vehicles escorted by MINUSCA are used by individuals to traffic weapons, ammunition and/or gold and diamonds which benefit armed groups.

⁸⁷ Phone communication with UPC members, 29 January 2018.


⁸⁸ Phone communication with confidential source, 7 February 2018.


⁸⁹ This type of ammunition was observed by the Panel on many occasions (see for instance, S/2017/1023, para. 107; S/2017/639, paras. 92 and 93 and annex 6.4).

⁹⁰ Confidential correspondence, 1 February 2018.

⁹¹ Meeting with five confidential sources, Bangui, 28 and 30 May, 4 and 18 June.

Rounds of MACC hunting ammunition, packages of tramadol, marijuana and vehicles seized in Ippy on 29 January 2017. Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 February 2017.





Annex 8.2: Trafficking and selling of hunting ammunition.

Photograph of boxes of MACC ammunition seized by customs in Port Beach in Bangui, taken by the Panel on 31 May 2018.



Photographs of MACC hunting ammunition being sold at local market in Kaga Bandoro on 2 June 2018. Photograph obtained by the Panel from confidential source on 3 June 2018.





The Panel witnessed the selling of MACC ammunition on local markets in Bria and Kaga-Bandoro.⁹²

⁹² Panel's mission to Bria, 8-11 June 2018. Panel's mission to Kaga Bandoro, 31 April-3 May.

Annex 8.3: Temporary measures taken by Congolese authorities to limit diversion of MACC ammunition.


On 17 April 2018, during the Panel's visit to the Republic of the Congo, the Congolese authorities realized that the national legislation governing the manufacture of ammunition was in many ways not compatible with the Kinshasa Convention. It namely does not require manufacturers to equip their goods with the necessary marking information that allows for an easy tracking of ammunition.

Pending legislative reform, the Congolese Government adopted a circular note sent to the Director-General of the MACC Manufacture in Pointe Noire and the Director-General of Grasset Sporafric (the only authorized distributor) in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire informing them about the following administrative measures:

- Holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop cannot anymore purchase ammunition directly from MACC, the only manufacturer of the hunting ammunition in the Republic of the Congo;
- Grasset Sporafric becomes the only supplier/distributor of hunting ammunition to the holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop;
- Holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop, when purchasing hunting ammunition from Grasset Sporafric, must provide required documents without which they are not allowed to purchase ammunition;
- Grasset Sporafric must, at regular intervals, provide all information on the sold MACC ammunition to the Directorate-General of the Ministry of Territorial Administration;
- The hunting ammunition must be transported according to existing regulations;
- Foreign merchants and companies willing to purchase MACC ammunition must abide by the existing regulatory framework.

The Congolese authorities also informed the Panel that the national legislation would be modified so as to take into account all obligations under the Kinshasa Convention.

Document obtained by the Panel from the Congolese authorities in Brazzaville on 19 April 2018.



Article 13 : « La vente sur le territoire de la République du Congo des armes et munitions classées dans les autres catégories ne peut être effectuée que par l'intermédiaire :

- des importateurs agréés conformément aux dispositions de l'article 8 ;
- des commerçants ou sociétés de commerce préalablement autorisés par arrêté du ministre de l'intérieur ».

Article 14 : « Le commerce des armes et munitions visé à l'article précédent est soumis à contrôle ».

A cet effet, pour renforcer les mesures de sécurisation relatives à l'activité de vente de munitions de chasse sur le territoire national, l'achat par vos clients, détenteurs de l'arrêté autorisant l'ouverture d'un dépôt de vente de munitions de chasse s'effectuera dorénavant de manière suivante :


- 1- aucun détenteur de l'arrêté ne devra plus s'approvisionner directement à la Manufacture de Cartouches Congolaise (MACC) à Pointe-Noire qui reste le seul fabriquant ;
- 2- Grasset Sporafric Pointe-Noire et Brazzaville est le fournisseur auprès de qui, tous les détenteurs d'arrêté autorisant l'ouverture d'un dépôt de vente de munitions de chasse doivent s'approvisionner, selon les quantités clairement exprimées ;
- 3- aucun détenteur d'arrêté ne peut être servi s'il n'a au préalable, présenté à Grasset Sporafric Pointe-Noire ou Brazzaville, les documents ci-après :
 - la pièce d'identité en cours de validité et deux (2) photocopies ;
 - le certificat de vie signé du sous-préfet, du maire de la commune sans arrondissement, de l'administrateur-maire de l'arrondissement ou de la communauté urbaine du lieu où le dépôt est effectivement ouvert ;
- 4- après livraison par Grasset Sporafric Pointe-Noire ou Brazzaville, cette société a l'obligation de transmettre à la direction générale de l'administration du territoire, par courrier régulièrement adressé, copies des documents des livraisons effectives avec précision du jour, du mois, de la date, de l'année et de l'heure de livraison ;
- 5- le transport devra être assuré conformément à la réglementation en vigueur ;

6- enfin, les livraisons dont pourraient être demandeurs les commerçants et sociétés commerciales des pays limitrophes doivent obéir à la réglementation en vigueur en République du Congo.

Ces mesures doivent être largement vulgarisées auprès de vos clients ainsi qu'auprès des cadres et agents relevant respectivement de vos administrations.

Leur inobservation pourrait m'obliger à me retourner sévèrement contre la société défaillante.

Fait à Brazzaville, le 17 AVR. 2018



Raymond Zéphirin MBOULOU

Copies :

- préfet directeur général de l'administration du territoire ;
- préfets de département ;
- maires de commune ;
- sous-préfets ;
- administrateurs-maires d'arrondissement et de communauté urbaine

Annex 8.4: Audit and export of the diamond stockpiles.

Pursuant to the Operational Framework of June 2015,⁹³ the KP Monitoring team contracted a company to conduct an audit of the diamonds stockpiled by buying houses during the period when exports of CAR diamonds were suspended.

The company audited the stocks of two buying houses, Sodiam and Sud Azur, while the third buying house owning stocks – i.e. listed entity BADICA – did not participate in the exercise. BADICA's managing director, Abdoukarim Abbas, told the Panel that he had not been properly informed by the CAR national authorities of the auditors' arrival and that, in his absence from Bangui, no one had the authority to grant the auditors' access to the company's stocks.⁹⁴ He told the Panel that the stocks remained available for audit.

During the KP Plenary meeting held on 10-14 December 2017 in Brisbane, Australia, it was decided that only diamonds from the western CAR, with a paper trail confirming that their mining and purchase did not benefit armed groups, would be cleared for export. As a result, 66,737 carats were exported in early 2018.

In the Panel's view, this decision is in conformity with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions which state that providing support for armed groups through the illicit exploitation of natural resources is a sanctionable act.

⁹³ Available from <https://kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car>.

⁹⁴ Meeting with BADICA manager, Bangui, January 2018.