



安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 [2569\(2021\)](#) 号决议第 2 段请第 [1874\(2009\)](#) 号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。安理会主席谨此而分发收自专家小组的报告(见附件)。



附件

2022 年 2 月 25 第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的最后报告。

已于 2022 年 2 月 4 日将报告提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2022 年 2 月 23 日审议了该报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信及报告并将它们作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

附文

2022 年 2 月 4 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

秘书处已应会员国要求、在安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组于 1 月 28 日以协商一致方式完成报告后对报告做了技术审查，专家小组谨此根据安理会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的最后报告。

请提请安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意本信及报告为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

摘要

在本报告所述期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反安全理事会决议，维持和发展核计划和弹道导弹计划。虽然并没有关于核试验或发射洲际弹道导弹的报道，但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续发展核裂变材料生产能力。新的短程、可能还有中程导弹的试验和展示明显加快，这些导弹既采用弹道技术，也采用制导技术，既使用固体推进剂，也使用液体推进剂，这一加速进程在 2022 年 1 月底仍在继续。所试验的新技术包括可能的高超音速滑翔弹头和可操纵再入飞行器。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国展示了其导弹部队更强的快速部署和广泛机动(包括海上机动)能力及更好的韧性。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续维持和发展核和弹道导弹基础设施，并继续在海外为这些计划寻求材料、技术和专门知识，包括通过网络手段和联合科学研究这么做。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续采取严格的封闭措施应对冠状病毒病(COVID-19)。在本报告所述期间，进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的货物和人员流量处于历史低位；奢侈品等物的合法和非法贸易已基本停止，尽管跨境铁路交通于 2022 年初重新开启。至于观察到的贸易活动，由于会员国对制裁制度各项规定的诠释不同，加上错误使用国家代码的问题，对非常低的贸易统计数据进行分析的工作继续因此而受影响。

虽然朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭海运出口在 2021 年下半年有所增加，但仍处于相对较低水平。同期，精炼石油非法进口量急剧增加，但仍远低于前几年。非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国直接交付活动已停止，可能是应对 COVID-19 之举；取而代之的是只有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮运送石油，表明方法显然有变。借助于故意混淆金融和所有权网络等手段，精心谋划的海上制裁规避行为仍在继续。虽然悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的商船队继续增加，但在该国水域观察到的外国渔船减少。

仍有一些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在海外赚取收入，COVID-19 封闭措施阻碍了将他们直接遣返。网络攻击，特别是对加密货币资产的网络攻击，仍是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府的一个重要收入来源。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义局势继续恶化，COVID-19 封闭措施可能是造成恶化的最重要因素。几乎完全没有来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的信息，这意味着仍然难以将联合国制裁对平民造成的长期和意外的人道主义影响与其他因素分开。专家小组再次在人道主义组织中做了调查，其中一些组织在 2021 年成功向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供了援助。本报告载有人道主义组织的回复摘要。

本报告载有向安全理事会、安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会和会员国提出的 30 项建议(见附件 93)。专家小组继续感谢那些建设性地支持专家小组执行任务的会员国，尽管一些会员国、实体和个人仍参与互动不力，尚待改善。

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一. 引言

1. 安全理事会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交一份载有专家小组调查结果和建议的最后报告。本报告所述期间为 2021 年 8 月 4 日至 2022 年 1 月 28 日。在本报告所述期间,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续采取限制措施,包括边境管制,以应对当前的冠状病毒病(COVID-19)疫情,但在 2022 年 1 月观察到跨境运输已有限开通(见附件 1)。

二. 近期与核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的活动

核

2. 专家小组继续监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核计划。在本报告所述期间虽没有关于核试验的报道,但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国各地与核相关的设施正在实施翻修和建造活动,而且有一些迹象与宁边 5 兆瓦(电)核反应堆运行以及平山铀矿和浓缩厂活动迹象一致。专家小组注意到,这一持续活动及核设施的发展似乎与 2021 年 1 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳动党第八次代表大会上宣布的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府的核计划战略目标一致(见附件 2)。

宁边场址

3. 一个会员国评估指出,轻水反应堆的外部施工已完成,内部施工仍在进行。专家小组分析的 2021 年 8 月至 9 月的卫星图像显示,正在轻水反应堆以南地区加紧建造一座建筑物(见附件 3)。这座建筑位于宁边核反应堆区域当前范围之外(见图一),因此可能并非至关重要。

4. 2021 年 7 月,一个会员国发现宁边实验核电站 5 兆瓦(电)反应堆恢复运行的迹象。根据专家小组的卫星图像分析(见附件 4),自 7 月以来观察到反应堆冷却水间歇性排放。11 月底观察到反应堆厅冒出蒸气柱,而 9 月至 11 月的热图像表明反应堆正在运行。¹ 专家小组未独立证实这一看法。

5. 卫星图像显示,2021 年 5 月至 9 月,其中一座 50 兆瓦(电)反应堆建筑的屋顶被部分拆除。一个智库² 评估认为,设计此建筑的初衷是容纳一个乏燃料储存池。2021 年 6 月和 9 月的卫星图像证实了这一评估,并显示了邻近地区的施工和挖掘活动。此反应堆综合体从未完工,此前曾被认为已废弃(见附件 5)。

6. 自专家小组上次报告以来,未观察到放射化学实验室或热电厂有重大活动。³ 国际原子能机构(原子能机构)总干事于 2021 年 11 月 24 日提到,自 2021 年 7 月初

¹ 见 www.38north.org/2021/11/north-koreas-yongbyon-nuclear-complex-further-evidence-of-5-mwe-reactor-operations 和 <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/thermal-imagery-analysis-of-yongbyon>。

² 见 www.38north.org/2021/09/dismantlement-of-spent-fuel-storage-building-at-yongbyons-50-mwe-reactor。

³ S/2021/777, 第 5 段和附件 5。

以来未发现实验室运作迹象(见附件 6)。一个会员国评估认为,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能对乏燃料棒进行了再处理,但专家小组无法核实这一评估。

7. 2021 年 9 月以来,发现宁边离心浓缩设施的冷却装置⁴ 可能被拆除,并观察到该设施附近有新的施工活动。从 3 月到 9 月,偶尔观察到二氧化铀生产大楼冒出蒸气柱。二氧化铀生产大楼持续有活动,这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能正在继续生产核裂变材料(见附件 7)。

8. 卫星图像表明,试点燃料组装厂正在进行新的施工活动,该厂在 1980 年代被用作最初的 5 兆瓦(电)反应堆燃料组装设施(见附件 8)。⁵

平山铀矿和浓缩厂

9. 专家小组的卫星图像分析显示,在一座建筑物有新的施工活动,在一个矿坑安装了一台输送机,该厂经常有轨车活动。专家小组观察到尾矿池中的固体废物不断增加。这些活动表明,该矿和该厂正在运行(见附件 9)。

丰溪里试验场

10. 专家小组未观察到该试验场正在运行的迹象。

其他场址

11. 专家小组继续监测降仙⁶ 疑似秘密铀浓缩设施附近的活动,包括 2021 年 7 月以来在该场地的持续车辆活动和主楼附近的新施工活动。这一施工工程的目的尚不清楚(见附件 10)。

12. 专家小组继续监测 Yongdoktong 地区,据信该地区与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核武器研制方案有关,包括被用作核武器储存设施。⁷ 专家小组观察到隧道入口附近有几辆汽车在活动。专家小组还证实了表明该地区可能储存有爆炸物的外部信息(见附件 11)。

⁴ S/2021/211, 第 3 段和附件 2。

⁵ 国际原子能机构, GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24 号文件, 第 29 段。


⁶ S/2021/777, 第 9 段和附件 10。

⁷ 同上, 第 10 段和附件 11。

图一

宁边的施工和翻修活动

位置坐标：西北(北纬 39°48'22"、东经 125°44'25")和东南(北纬 39°45'57"、东经 125°46'08")



资料来源：Planet Labs，2021 年 11 月 6 日。

技术无形转让和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关大学的活动

13. 专家小组继续调查涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家的技术无形转让活动，特别是安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 11 段所涵盖的活动领域。专家小组注意到，若干领域的高级学术研究(见 S/2021/777，第 11 段)可能与核武器开发、弹道导弹设计和可能的其他大规模毁灭性武器开发有关。专家小组还感到关切的是，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国学生或学者可通过进入科学数据库和学术社群收集与扩散有关的敏感信息。在此方面，专家小组查明了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国机构和几个中国大学在 2017 年至 2019 年期间联合发表的 16 项研究，其中有特定朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家的参与(见附件 12)。开源信息表明，至少有以下七名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家同时隶属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和中国的大学：Kim Myonghak、⁸ Ri Kwang、⁹ Ju Jong-Min、¹⁰ Pak Sung-Nam、Kim Myong Chol、Kang Kwang-song¹¹ 和 Choe Jongchol。专家小组致函中国，请求澄清这些联合研究的性质及现状。中国回复道：“据调查，中国的大学与朝鲜之间不存在被禁的学术交流或科学合作”(见附件 13)。对其他几个联合科学论文的调查仍在继续。¹²

14. 专家小组正在调查平壤科学技术大学与外国大学之间的学术交流以及在平壤科学技术大学提供不同领域讲座的科学家(见附件 14-16)。

15. 专家小组还要求马来西亚提供关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金策工业综合大学与吉隆坡一家公司之间据称的(可能是历史性的)技术交流的信息。专家小组正在调查该公司是否与 Glocom 公司有关(另见第 135-138 段；附件 17 和 18)。

16. 专家小组尚未收到对其此前提出的关于金策工业综合大学、金日成综合大学和外国学术机构之间学术交流的询问的回复。¹³

弹道导弹

17. 弹道导弹计划活动展示在 2021 年前 8 个月显然减少(S/2021/777，第 14 段)，但 2021 年 9 月至 2022 年 1 月，该计划的活动力度增强，反映于一场大型的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所有现代武器系统、包括所有新型弹道导弹的静态展览以及多种新型导弹系统的一系列发射试验(见图二-十四)。

18. 这一趋势与 2021 年 1 月 9 日金正恩在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳动党第八次代表大会上宣布的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国武器计划的战略动态一致(见附件

⁸ 公开的研究人员和学者身份识别号：0000-0001-6619-5670。

⁹ 公开的研究人员和学者身份识别号：0000-0002-3687-4602。

¹⁰ 公开的研究人员和学者身份识别号：0000-0003-0500-0125。

¹¹ 公开的研究人员和学者身份识别号：0000-0002-4907-1673。

¹² S/2021/211，第 13 段。

¹³ S/2021/777，第 12 和 13 段。

19)。宣布有五个战略军事目标。¹⁴ 似乎正在逐步实现与使用固体或液体推进剂弹道导弹的各种运载平台的开发有关的目标。

19. 专家小组分析的这些新情况强调的是具体的业务和技术成就：

- 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹部队的快速部署能力、广泛机动性和更强的韧性(反映于隐藏在铁路隧道中的铁路运载短程弹道导弹(见第 25 段及附件 20 和 21)以及在一系列发射中展示的其他技术)
- 采用新技术,把可能在工厂预先加燃料的液体推进剂弹道导弹助推器与可能的高超音速滑翔弹头和可操纵再入飞行器相结合(见第 23 和 24 段及附件 22 和 24)
- 尝试改装和使用一种新的固体推进剂短程弹道导弹,作为用于海上部署的潜射弹道导弹(见第 24 段及附件 23、25 和 26)。

¹⁴ 五个战略军事目标是：(a) 不断推进超大型核弹头的生产；(b) 提高精确度，足以精准打击和消灭 15 000 公里范围内的任何战略目标；(c) 研制和引进高超音速滑翔飞行弹头；(d) 研制固体燃料发动机推进的洲际水下和地面弹道火箭；(e) 拥有一艘核动力潜艇和一种水下发射核战略武器。

图二

2021 年 9 月至 2022 年 1 月期间弹道导弹发射试验和 2021 年 10 月 12 日
“2021 自卫”军火展¹⁵



资料来源：朝鲜中央通讯社和朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 9 月 16 日至 2022 年 1 月 18 日；¹⁶ Planet Labs，协调世界时 2021 年 10 月 17 日 01:46，协调世界时 2021 年 10 月 18 日 05:18，协调世界时 2021 年 10 月 20 日 04:43。

¹⁵ 曾发现朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在以前几次发射活动中修改或伪造照片图像，推想是出于宣传目的。

¹⁶ 见 www.nknews.org/pro/wp-content/uploads/kcna-watch/kcna_kp_en/images/MM00289748.jpg?t=1649371935222；朝鲜中央电视台，“三次革命展上的 2021 自卫军火展”，晚上 8 点，公告视频，可查阅 <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61658f2826e3a/>；《劳动新闻》2022 年 1 月 12 日的文章，可查阅 <https://kcnawatch.org/?t=1649723100702>；朝鲜中央通讯社，2022 年 1 月 15 日-17 日的图片，可查阅 <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-1> 至 <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-9>。

20. 在这方面，“2021 自卫”军火展(图三-十四和附件 20)与 2022 年 1 月之前的发射试验(见表 1 和表 2)之间有着协同关系。2021 年 9 月 15 日的铁路运载短程弹道导弹试验(见附件 21)是恢复武器系统动态试验的一部分，该试验早些时候于 9 月 11 日和 12 日开始，试验一种不同类型的新型导弹系统。¹⁷ 其后，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 9 月 28 日发射试验了一枚结合弹道和制导技术的新导弹，称为“火星-8”，它被描述为“高超音速导弹”(见附件 22)。据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的信息，9 月 30 日进行了一次新的“防空导弹”试验，展示了改进的控制系统，其后于 10 月 19 日在海上试验了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国称之为“新型潜射弹道导弹”的导弹(见附件 23)。¹⁸ 2022 年 1 月 5 日发射试验了另一种结合弹道和制导技术的新型导弹，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将它描述为搭载“高超音速可操纵再入飞行器”的导弹，1 月 11 日又一次发射试验了同类导弹，会员国认为可能是“高超音速导弹”，一个会员国称，这比 2021 年 9 月 28 日和 2022 年 1 月 5 日试射的导弹有所改进(见附件 24)。2022 年 1 月 14 日，又进行了一次铁路运载短程弹道导弹运行试验。这些导弹与 KN-23 型导弹类似(S/2021/211, 第 20 段)。随后于 2022 年 1 月 17 日发射试验了另外两个类似于 KN-24 的短程弹道导弹(S/2021/211, 第 20 段)(见附件 21)。¹⁹ 中国对导弹发射的看法载于附件 20-3。

¹⁷ 被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国描述为“重要战略武器”的远程巡航导弹的试验。据朝鲜中央通讯社 2021 年 9 月 13 日标题为“Long-range cruise missiles newly developed by Academy of Defence Science successfully test-fired”的报道，“远程巡航导弹是对实现党的第八次代表大会提出的国防科学发展和武器系统研发五年规划重点目标具有重要意义的战略武器，其发展在过去两年中按照科学和可靠的武器系统研发进程不断予以推进，在此过程中成功进行了导弹部件的详细试验、数十次发动机地点火试验、各种飞行试验、控制和制导试验，弹头动力试验等”。据一个会员国的信息，同一导弹似乎在“2021 自卫”展上展示过，该导弹似乎是一种亚音速巡航导弹，配备两个机翼、带进气口的涡轮喷气发动机和初始点火阶段使用的固体推进油门踏板；如果得到证实，这些规格将使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国拥有远超出金星-3 型巡航导弹等已有导弹的性能，并将使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国短程弹道导弹库增加品种而更有价值，因为它具有低空飞行和机动能力(报告的飞行距离为 1 500 公里，飞行时间为 7 580 秒)。如果朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将这种导弹视为“战略武器”，其可能的核能力将意味着核武器规模大幅缩小。另一会员国补充指出，导弹沿椭圆形和八条飞行路线飞越朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领土和水域，击中目标。试射结果表明，新研制的涡轮喷气发动机推力功率、导弹导航控制、组合制导方式的命中精确度等技术指标均达到设计要求。

¹⁸ 据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的朝鲜之声 2021 年 10 月 1 日标题为“Newly-developed anti-air missile test-fired”的报道，“国防科学院宣布，最新型防空导弹的显著战斗力得到确认，通过引入双舵控制技术和双脉冲飞行发动机等重大新技术，大大提高了导弹控制系统的快速反应、制导精度和目标命中距离。它说，最近的试射对不同类型的防空导弹系统的研发前景具有重要的现实意义”。

¹⁹ 两位专家表示，本段提及的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所发射的射弹的性质和技术并不完全清楚。

21. 此外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续改造工业生产基础设施和造船厂(见附件 25-27)。²⁰ 虽然国际制裁和会员国的管控使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的采购和扩散可能性大幅减少，但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续寻求其大规模毁灭性武器计划所需的两用组件和技术(见第 26-38 段及附件 28)以及科学合作(见第 13 段及附件 12)。

22. 据会员国认为，在“2021 自卫”展上展出每类几枚新型导弹，这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在国内经济形势严峻的情况下仍欲坚定维持和推进其弹道导弹计划。要同时开发非常不同的弹道导弹技术，例如使用液体推进剂发动机或固体推进剂发动机的弹道导弹技术、使用多种运输竖起发射装置的各类发射平台、轨基运载火箭或潜艇，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国便需同时实施涉及具体研发和生产的不同次级计划，由若干各具不同技能的工程和技术团队执行。

²⁰ 与弹道导弹计划有关的工业和基地的活动：新浦南方造船厂(北纬 40°01'20"、东经 128°09'47")，2021 年 2 月-6 月(附件 25)；南浦海军造船厂(北纬 38°43'08"、东经 125°23'28")，2020 年 11 月-2021 年 6 月(附件 26)；“龟城油罐厂”(95 号厂，北纬 40°03'23"、东经 125°13'20")和 112 号厂(北纬 40°04'07"、东经 125°11'52")(附件 27)。

“2021 自卫”军火展

图三

2021 年 10 月 12 日“三次革命展”上的“2021 自卫”军火展

(北纬 39°04'49"、东经 125°45'23")



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，²¹ 2021 年 10 月 12 日；Planet Labs，协调世界时 2021 年 9 月 5 日 02:10，协调世界时 2021 年 10 月 1 日 02:20。

²¹ 朝鲜中央通讯社，“三次革命展上的 2021 自卫”军火展，晚上 8 点，公告视频(北纬 39°04'49"、东经 125°45'23")，可查阅 <https://kcna.watch.org/kctv-archive/61658f2826e3a/>。

图四

“2021 自卫”展上的新型洲际弹道导弹²²




资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

²² 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国媒体最近把新型洲际弹道导弹称为“火星-17”，又称“火星-16”。

图五

2017 年 11 月 29 日试验的洲际弹道导弹“火星-15”和一台火箭发动机(可能以 RD-250 型发动机为原型)




资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

23. 被称为“高超音速火星-8型导弹”的新型导弹于2021年10月11日在“2021 自卫”展上展示，此前可能于2021年9月28日进行了试验(见图六)。

图六

可能于 2021 年 9 月 28 日进行了试验的新型高超音速弹道导弹“火星-8”



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日；朝鲜中央通讯社和《劳动新闻》。²³

24. 2021 年 10 月 11 日在“2021 自卫”展上展出了一种结合弹道和制导技术的新型导弹，并且可能于 2022 年 1 月 5 日和 1 月 11 日进行了试验，据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国称，这种导弹运载“高超音速滑翔弹头”(见图七右上方)。这种新的液体燃料中程弹道导弹似乎携带一个可操纵再入飞行器(图内带有橙色锥体)；图中还有远程弹道导弹火星-12(KN-17，黄色标记，上次发射试验可能是在 2017

²³ 朝鲜中央通讯社和《劳动新闻》(英文版)(原稿原版)，“Hypersonic missile newly developed by Academy of Defence Science test-fired”，2021 年 9 月 29 日。

年 9 月 15 日)、潜射弹道导弹北极星-5、潜射弹道导弹北极星-1(KN-11，上次发射试验可能是在 2016 年 8 月 24 日)和新型短程潜射弹道导弹(可能是在 2021 年 10 月 19 日进行了试验)(见图七)。

图七

远程弹道导弹火星-12(KN-17)(黄色标记)；可能携带可操纵再入飞行器(橙色锥体)的新型中程弹道导弹；潜射弹道导弹北极星-5；潜射弹道导弹北极星-1(KN-11)；新型短程潜射弹道导弹



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日；朝鲜中央通讯社。²⁴

25. 在“2021 自卫”展上展示了 2019 年至 2021 年期间阅兵式展示和试验的新型固体推进剂短程弹道导弹，例如一种类似于 KN-23 的新型短程弹道导弹(“新型战术制导导弹”，可能是改进和扩大版)，其上次发射试验可能是在 2021 年 3

²⁴ 见朝鲜中央通讯社，www.nknews.org/pro/wp-content/uploads/kcna-watch/kcna_kp_en/images/MM00289748.jpg?t=1649371935222 和 <http://kcna-watch.org/?t=1649723100702>。

月 25 日。²⁵ KN-23 型可能出现在 2021 年 9 月 15 日和 2022 年 1 月 14 日试验的铁路运载导弹系统上。展览还展示了近期其他一些使用弹道导弹技术的短程弹道导弹和火箭, 诸如 KN-24(可能于 2022 年 1 月 17 日再次进行了运行试验)、KN-25 和 KN-09,²⁶ 以及一系列巡航和防空导弹, 这些导弹的助推器或发动机均使用了也用于弹道导弹技术的固体推进剂技术和制导系统技术(见图八-十四)。

图八

类似于 KN-23 的新型短程弹道导弹(“新型战术制导导弹”), 上次试射可能是在 2021 年 3 月 25 日



资料来源: 朝鲜中央电视台, 2021 年 10 月 12 日。

²⁵ S/2021/777, 第 16 段。

²⁶ S/2019/691, 附件 32; S/2020/151, 第 194 段; S/2020/840, 第 11 段; S/2021/211, 第 11 段。

图九
短程弹道导弹 KN-23



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

图十

KN-24(也称为“地对地弹道导弹火星-11A”), 沙色(棕褐色)导弹, 上次试射可能是在 2022 年 1 月 17 日



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

图十一

KN-25(多管火箭炮系统, 600mm), 上次试射可能是在 2020 年 3 月 29 日



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

图十二

KN-09(多管火箭炮系统, 300mm 或 240mm)



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

图十三


巡航导弹：2021 年 9 月 12 日试射的反舰导弹和远程巡航导弹



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日。

图十四

防空：2021 年 9 月 30 日试射的地对空导弹

**New Surface-to-air missile**

- possible test on 30 Sep. 2021

- According to the DPRK's Voice of Korea on Oct. 1 "...The Academy of Defence Science announced that remarkable combat function of the latest anti-air missile was confirmed, which drastically increased the fast response, guiding accuracy and target hitting distance of the missile control system by introducing major new technology including the twin rudder controlling technique and double impulse flight mortar. It said the recent test-firing is of great practical significance in the prospective research and development of different kinds of anti-air missile system...." available at

<https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1633035648-326818987/newly-developed-anti-air-missile-test-fired/?t=1652651737790>

资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台，2021 年 10 月 12 日

表 1
2021 年 9 月 28 日至 2022 年 1 月 11 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹或使用弹道导弹技术和液体燃料推进剂的系统的发射情况汇总

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报		备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
						据报发射 距离(公里)	远地点 (公里)		
	次数	2021 年- 2022 年	2021 年以来发射 的液体燃料弹道 导弹：3						
第 1 次	第 1 次	2021 年 9 月 28 日 06:40 或 06:38	火星 -8 “高超 音速飞行器” 9 月 28 日发射 试验后，2021 年 10 月 11 日 在 “2021 自 卫” 导弹展上 展示(朝中社) - 短程弹道导弹 - 弹体直径为 1.4 米, 导弹总长 度约为 14.5 米 - 再入飞行器 长度约为 4.7 米，后部直径 约为 0.9 米 - 6 轴轮式运输竖 起发射装置	1	从慈江道 Mupyong-ni 以北向东进入东海岸 附近水域	200	60	- 朝鲜民主主义人民共和 国提到液体推进剂弹道导 弹所用的 “导弹燃料安 瓿” 使导弹能够在工厂装 载推进剂(朝中社) - 导弹主体似乎由液体推 进剂助推器制成，与单级 中程弹道导弹火星-12 相 似，但比其短 - 可能的高超音速飞行器 类似于现已有的高超音速 飞行器； ^a 它似乎处于开发 的早期阶段，实际部署需 要相当长的时间 - 已知当时以 3 马赫左右 的速度飞行	国防科学院于 28 日星期二 在 慈 江 道 Toyang-ni 进 行了高超音速 火星-8 导弹的 首次试射(朝 中社，2021 年 9 月 29 日) ^b

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射 距离(公里)	据报 远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
第 2 次	第 2 次	2022 年 1 月 5 日 08:10	短程弹道导弹或 中程弹道导弹 - 在 1 月 5 日 发射试验(朝中 社)之前在 2021 年 10 月 11 日 “2021 自卫” 导弹展上披露 的“高超音速 飞行器弹头” - 再入飞行器 似乎是一种可 操纵的再入飞 行器 - 6 轴轮运输竖起 发射装置	1	从慈江道向东进入东 海岸附近水域	500(或 以上)	50	- 9 月 28 日和 1 月 5 日试 射的导弹弹头形状不同。 据判断,这是 10 月首次亮 相的其他类型导弹之一 - 导弹主体似乎由液体推 进剂助推器制成,与单级 中程弹道导弹火星-12 相 似,但比其短 - 最大速度在 3 到 6 马赫 之间	高超音速滑翔 弹头(朝中社, 2022 年 1 月 7 日) ^c
第 3 次	第 3 次	2022 年 1 月 11 日 07:27	短程弹道导弹或 中程弹道导弹 - 在 1 月 11 日 发射试验(朝中 社)之前在 2021 年 10 月 11 日 “2021 自卫” 导弹展上披露 的“高超音速 飞行器弹头”	1	从慈江道向东进入东 海岸附近水域	700(或 以上)	60	- 导弹弹头的形状似乎与 2022 年 1 月 5 日测试的弹 头相似 - 导弹主体似乎由液体推 进剂助推器制成,类似于 单级中程弹道导弹火星- 12,但比其短 - 可能的最大速度约为 10 马赫(约 3 400 米/秒=12 240 公里/小时)	- “高超音速 导弹武器系 统……600 公 里和 240 公里 锐圆……击中 1 000 公里外 水域的目标”(朝中社, 2022 年 1 月 12 日) ^d

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
						据报发射 距离(公里)		
			- 再入飞行器 似乎是一种可 操纵的再入飞 行器				- 金正恩与政治局主席团 成员 Jo Yong-won 正式出 席了导弹试射(朝中社， 2022 年 1 月 12 日)	
			- 6 轴轮运输竖 起发射装置					

资料来源：会员国和专家小组。

简称：朝中社，朝鲜中央通讯社。

- ^a 这些高超音速飞行器是一个会员国在 2019 年一次阅兵式上展示的固体推进剂高超音速导弹。
- ^b 朝鲜中央通讯社，2021 年 9 月 29 日：“导弹工作段的导航控制和稳定性及其技术规格，包括分离式高超音速滑翔弹头的制导机动性和滑翔飞行特性”。“发动机以及首次引进的导弹燃料安瓿”已被“确定”。
- ^c 朝鲜中央通讯社，2022 年 1 月 7 日：“导弹从初始发射方位角作了 120 公里的横向移动”，“精准击中 700 公里外的设定目标”。“这次试射清楚展示了结合多级滑翔跳跃飞行和强烈横向流动的高超音速滑翔弹头的控制和稳定性”……“由国防科学院监制”。
- ^d 根据朝鲜中央通讯社 2022 年 1 月 12 日的一段节录，“高超音速滑翔弹头与发射的导弹分离，从 600 公里处滑翔反弹，从最初的发射方位角锐圆飞行 240 公里，精准击中 1 000 公里外水域的目标”；可查阅《朝鲜新闻》/朝鲜中央通讯社观察网站，<https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1641940310-600724419/distinguished-feat-of-wpk-in-history-of-leading-juche-based-defence-industry/?t=1649727166452>。

表 2
2021 年 3 月 25 日至 2022 年 1 月 17 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹或使用弹道导弹技术和固体燃料推进剂的系统的发射情况汇总 ^a

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射 距离(公里)	据报 远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
	次数	2021 年- 2022 年	2019 年以来发射 的固体燃料弹道 导弹：45						
第 18 次	第 1 次	2021 年 3 月 25 日	新型短程弹道 导弹	2	咸州地区	600	60 或 100	见 S/2021/777 ，表 1	
第 19 次	第 2 次	2021 年 9 月 15 日 12:34 和 12:39 或 12:32 和 12:37	短程弹道导 弹。这似乎是 以前展示和作 为一种铁路运 载导弹系统进 行试验的短程 弹道导弹 KN- 23，2021 年 10 月 11 日在 “2021 自卫” 导弹展上展出	2	从位于平安南道 Yangdok 地区位于北 纬 39°16'31"、东经 126°48'17" 的一个隧 道入口处一列铁路车 上发射， ^b 向东进入东 海岸，但在日本专属经 济区内的水域	800	60	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- 新型铁路运载导弹系统- 发射间隔时间：5 分钟- 这些弹道是 2019 年以来 所试验的固体燃料弹道导 弹中最长的弹道，发现有 “上拉动作”- 如果它是 KN-23 型导弹， 那与以前的试验相比，显 示射程增加，可能是因为 有效载荷减少- 使用铁路运载装置使朝 鲜民主主义人民共和国有 了一种运载各种导弹的方 式，它可以从其铁路网的 任何地方快速部署和发射 导弹，为隐藏和发射导弹 提供了另一种可选办法	“铁路机动导 弹团” ^c 。(朝鲜 之声，朝中社， 2021 年 9 月 19 日)

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射 距离(公里)	据报 远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
第 20 次	第 3 次	2021 年 10 月 19 日 10:17 或 10:15	潜 射 弹 道 导 弹。这似乎是 2021 年 10 月 11 日在 “2021 自卫” 导弹展 上展出的新型 短程潜射弹道 导弹 导弹长度，不 含 管 状 适 配 器， 约 为 6.8 米，弹体直径 为 1 米	1	从位于新浦地区(咸镜 南道)的 Gorae/Sinpo 级潜艇(或潜水试验台 驳船)向东进入东海岸 附近水域	600 或 430	60 或 50	新的小型潜射弹道导弹 - 发现上拉动作，但没有 明显的水平移动 - 它的设计体型小于潜射 弹道导弹北极星导弹系 列，与短程弹道导弹 KN- 23 和 KN-24 相似，并具有 类似的飞行特性。它可以 安装在朝鲜民主主义人民 共和国一艘更大型罗密欧 级潜艇的多个发射管中， 提高近海打击能力 - 据报，这枚导弹是从一 艘名为 “8.24 Yongung” 的 实 验 性 Gorae/Sinpo-B 级弹道导弹潜艇上发射， 该潜艇的发射管可能经过 了改装以适用于小于北极 星型的潜射弹道导弹 - 不过，导弹可能是从潜水 试验台驳船上发射	“新型潜射弹 道 导 弹 ” (朝 中社，2021 年 10 月 20 日) ^d
第 21 次	第 1 次	2022 年 1 月 14 日 14:41 和 14:52	短 程 弹 道 导 弹。这似乎是 同 一 类 型 的 KN-23 短程弹 道导弹，最近	2	从 Uiju 地区(可能位于 北纬 40°13'10"、东经 124°34'02" 西南角和 北纬 40°13'06"、东经 124°33'57" 东北角之	430 或 400	36 或 50	- 已在 2021 年 9 月 15 日 进行了试验的新型铁路运 载导弹系统 - 发射间隔时间：11 分钟	“铁路运载导 弹 团 发 射 演 习” 或 “铁路

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射 距离(公里)	据报 远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
			分别于 2021 年 9 月 15 日和 2022 年 1 月 14 日作为铁路运载导弹系统进行了两次试验。它在 2021 年 10 月 11 日“2021 自卫”导弹展上展出。这辆车似乎是由货车改装而成。		间的矩形地区)向东北进入东海岸附近水域, 击中一个无人居住的岛屿(可能的目标位置是北纬 40°38'50"、东经 129°33'02")			- 最大速度: 6 马赫 - 如果它是 KN-23, 则其弹道在射程和机动方面与此前在 2019-2020 年进行的试验相当, 包括发现有“上拉动作” - 使用铁路运载装置使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有了一种运载各种导弹的方式, 它可以从其铁路网的任何地方快速部署和发射导弹, 为隐藏和发射导弹提供了另一种可选办法	机动导弹团检查发射演习” (朝中社, 2022 年 1 月 15 日)
第 22 次	第 2 次	2022 年 1 月 17 日 08:49 和 08:52 或 08:50 和 08:54	短程弹道导弹。这似乎是 2020 年 3 月 21 日试射并在 2021 年 10 月 11 日“2021 自卫”导弹展上展出的同一类型 KN-24 短程弹道导弹 - 它也被称为“火星 -11 Na”或“火星	2	从位于平壤-苏南机场地区(可能位于北纬 39°15'44"、东经 125°40'34")的一个轨道运输竖起发射装置向东北进入东海岸附近水域, 击中一个无人居住的岛屿(可能的目标位置为北纬 40°38'50"、东经 129°33'02")	300 或 380	50 或 42	- 两次发射间隔时间: 3 或 4 分钟 - 最大速度: 5 马赫 - 如果得到证实, 发射地点非常靠近 2017 年 8 月 29 日火星-12 号发射试验场 (S/2019/171 和 S/2019/171/Corr.1, 第 174 段和附件 84) - 运输竖起发射装置底盘可能以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的暴风虎作战坦克	“两枚战术导弹”……“确认武器系统的精确性”(朝中社, 2022 年 1 月 18 日 [§])

2019 年以来 试验次数	第几次	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报		备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
						据报发射 距离(公里)	远地点 (公里)		
			-11 B” ^f					底盘为基础(改装自 T62 和 T72 型 坦 克) ； 见 S/2020/151 ，附件 58.4.2)	

资料来源：会员国和专家小组。

简称：朝中社，朝鲜中央通讯社。

^a [S/2021/777](#)，表 1；[S/2020/840](#)，表 1。

^b 据一个会员国所述，地点可能是北纬 39°16'2.04"、东经 126°47'17"。对坐标的这一评估与专家小组对朝鲜中央通讯社视频的分析略有不同，该视频提供了大概的隧道长度和轨道曲线。

^c “铁路机动导弹团参加了演习，任务是于 9 月 15 日清晨转移到中部山区，打击 800 公里外的目标地区” (朝鲜之声，朝鲜中央通讯社，2021 年 9 月 19 日)。

^d 《劳动新闻》/国防科学院，2021 年 10 月 20 日：朝鲜民主主义人民共和国表示，它“成功地”试射了一枚新型潜射弹道导弹。“新型潜射弹道导弹……将大大有助于我国国防技术进步和海军水下作战能力”。朝鲜中央通讯社，2021 年 10 月 20 日：“国防科学院从‘8.24 Yongung’进行了试射，以展示朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军事实力，第一枚潜射弹道导弹五年前便是从那里成功发射”。“它解释道，这一新型潜射弹道导弹引入了侧翼机动、滑跃机动等多种先进控制制导技术，将大大有助于提高我国的国防技术水平，提高我国海军的水下作战能力”。

^e 见附件 21。

^f 《朝鲜新闻》，“朝鲜说它在星期一成功发射了‘战术导弹’”，2022 年 1 月 18 日。

^g 朝鲜中央通讯社，“国防科学院确认了正在生产的武器系统的作业精确性、安全性和效率”，2022 年 1 月 18 日。

采购与大规模毁灭性武器有关的非法瓶颈商品

O Yong Ho

26. 据一个会员国的信息，O Yong Ho²⁷ 是目前派驻莫斯科的一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官，²⁸ 他通过支持被联合国指认的第二自然科学学院(又称“国防科学院”)，参与采购与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹计划有关的物项。²⁹

27. 据该会员国的信息，2016 年至 2020 年期间，虽然据报俄罗斯联邦曾“破坏”了此类采购图谋，但 O 试图且有时成功采购了俄罗斯芳纶纤维(凯夫拉尔)、用于生产芳纶纤维的卷绕机等设备、俄罗斯版纺锤形喷嘴、四种特定化学品、用于生产液体推进剂弹道导弹的不锈钢、用于制造朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹潜艇船体的特殊钢、轴承、固体推进剂生产说明书和技术专门知识以及巡航导弹和冷、热等静压机计算机辅助设计图纸。对于其中一些交易，O 使用了覆盖条款(详细信息，包括 O 的采购活动和联系方式，见附件 28)。

28. 俄罗斯联邦回复专家小组的询问如下：“俄罗斯当局没有关于他(O Yong Ho)参与非法活动的信息……俄罗斯海关当局没有关于信中所提之人签订的外贸合同或信中所列受国际制裁的货物从俄罗斯向北朝鲜出口的信息”(见附件 28 和 29)。

Kim Jong Dok

29. 专家小组继续调查³⁰ 可能与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的其他采购活动。专家小组已报告指出，由 Kim Jong Dok 代表的 Korea Machinery General Trading 定期发出采购敏感工业材料的订单，包括 1Cr18Ni9Ti 不锈钢订单。³¹ 据一个会员国的信息，Kim Jong Dok 通过其主要联系人 Jon Gon Hua³² 向位于丹东的 Dandong Jongsan Trading³³ 发出这些订单。据说有几家中国公司参与其中，包括 Zibo Stirling Mechanical Equipment Co. Ltd. 和 Shandong Jinjian Heavy Mining Equipment Co. Ltd. 这些公司尚未回复专家小组(见附件 30)。

²⁷ 出生日期：1961 年 12 月 25 日，外交护照号 108410041(2018 年 10 月 13 日签发，2023 年 10 月 13 日到期)。

²⁸ 据一个会员国所述，O 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆商务参赞办公室的雇员，负责在驻在国采购民用生产相关商品和消费品。俄罗斯当局没有关于他参与非法行动的信息。

²⁹ 分别以 KPe.018 和 KPe.021 列入委员会制裁名单。

³⁰ S/2021/777，第 22 段和附件 27。

³¹ 美利坚合众国政府发布的详述朝鲜民主主义人民共和国力图采购敏感材料和技术的联合公告提到，含钛的钢合金可能是为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹计划而进口的物项，并明确将 1Cr18Ni9Ti 列为此类合金之一。见 https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20200901_nk_ballistic_missile_advisory.pdf。

³² Jon Gon Hua 可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，Dandong Jongsan 是 Korea Machinery General Trading 在中国获取敏感材料的幌子公司。据说他和 Li Faming 均为公司董事之一。

³³ 丹东鼎山贸易有限公司。

Rim Ryong Nam

30. 多个会员国向专家小组提供信息表明,居住在沈阳的 Rim Ryong Nam³⁴ 一直以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军需工业部(KPe.028)采购代表的身份行事。Rim 不仅在 2018 年一直试图购买已知用于制造固体推进剂的商品,而且还成功购买并向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国火箭工业部运送了数吨铝粉。几家中国公司似乎也参与其中,包括 Shandong Zhangqiu Metallic Pigment Co.Ltd³⁵ 和 Shenyang Jingchengjin Import and Export Co. Ltd(见附件 30)。

31. 中国回复道,中方“根据专家小组提供的信息进行了认真调查,未发现 Rim Ryong Nam 在中国境内有任何铝粉交易,也未找到以此人名义注册的公司的任何信息。Rim 目前不在中国境内”。尚未收到这些公司的回复。

建议

32. 专家小组建议,因下列人员在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国被禁计划中发挥的作用和提供的支持而予以指认: O Yong Ho 先生,³⁶ 现驻莫斯科的一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官,他支持被联合国指认的第二自然科学院(又称“国防科学院”),参与采购与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹计划有关的物项。

三. 部门制裁和海上制裁**精炼石油产品**

33. 在专家小组上一次报告³⁷ 中注意到,2021 年前六个月向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的精炼石油产品(合法或非法)数量很少。向委员会正式申报的向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的精炼石油全年保持在历史低位(俄罗斯联邦申报没有进行交付),仍仅为 500 000 桶年度许可上限的 7.67%^{38, 39} (见图十五)。

³⁴ Rim 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民,出生日期是 1978 年 12 月 5 日。获得的信息还表明,他与一家称为 China Yantai Panoccean Shipping Agency Co. Ltd (烟台泛洋船务代理有限公司)的公司直接有关。

³⁵ 章丘市金属颜料有限公司铝粉厂。

³⁶ 一位专家表示,予以指认需要更多的证据。


³⁷ S/2021/777, 第 25-26 段。

³⁸ 如果精炼石油产品交货量为零,安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议并不要求申报,俄罗斯联邦在整个 2021 年继续没有任何交货的情况下申报每月交货量为零,过去中国没有像俄罗斯这样做。

³⁹ 安理会第 2397(2017)号决议,第 5 段。

图十五

2018-2021 年俄罗斯联邦和中国向委员会申报的向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的精炼石油



资料来源：www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum；专家小组。

34. 2021 年 12 月，50 个会员国向委员会提交的一份报告(见附件 31)指出，精炼石油产品的上限在 2021 年下半年已经被突破。该报告载有这一时期内朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮未经报告 18 次向该国港口交付精炼石油产品的图像。这些船只如果负载 90%，估计交付了 323 865 桶非法进口石油。截至 2021 年 9 月 30 日，有 11 张图像显示悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只等待卸货，如果这些船只负载 90%，则意味着另有 202 102 桶。这些数量加在一起表明有 525 967 桶非法进口石油，突破了上限。两名委员会成员不同意报告的调查结果(见附件 32)，理由是缺乏确凿证据和事实不充分，特别是在交货方法(在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区内船对船转移)和每艘船估计运载的精炼石油数量方面。

35. 为了查明用于运输正式申报的交付精炼石油产品的船只，专家小组致函中国，要求提供参与合法交付的船只名称、所有权和管理详情，以及装载和交付的港口和日期。⁴⁰ 中国答复如下：

安理会通过第 2397 号决议后，中方立即发布通知，制定了关于向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口精炼石油产品的规定，确保中国企业和个人的活动符合决议。中国一直在向 1718 委员会通报中国向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口精炼石油产品的数量。中国对朝出口的精炼石油产品绝大多数是润滑油、沥青等产品，而不是汽油、柴油、煤油等燃料产品。总量始终保持在极低水平。

⁴⁰ 安理会第 2397(2017)号决议第 5(a)段规定了 500 000 桶的上限，条件是会员国应每 30 天向委员会通报向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转让精炼石油产品的数量及所有交易方信息。

36. 专家小组继续监测违反制裁制度的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口精炼石油产品情况(见第 38-41 段)。有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只最大限度地非法交付货物以弥补海上检疫所花时间的看法有一定的逻辑,但专家小组评估认为,每艘船只平均负载 90%,这个数字可能是高的。不过,专家小组注意到,50 个会员国的报告只估量了到 2021 年 9 月底为止的交货情况。⁴¹

37. 专家小组注意到,与前几年各会员国集团类似的基于证据的估计数相比,50 个会员国报告中的非法交货估计数在 2021 年处于极低水平(见图十六)。

图十六⁴²

2018-2021 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的非法精炼石油估计数,假定会员国观察到的油轮负载量为 90%、50%和 30%(桶)



资料来源:会员国和专家小组。

南浦石油码头

38. 由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采取的 COVID-19 缓解措施,该国 2021 年进口的石油比前几年大幅减少。自 2021 年 3 月以来,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国恢复了在其港口进行船对船移交和未报告的精炼石油交付活动。⁴³

39. 2021 年下半年,未报告的石油进口活动加快。例如,“Vifine”号⁴⁴ 现在悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗,以“Un Hung”号(海事组织编号 9045962)的身份

⁴¹ 一家智库单独得出结论认为,上限在 2021 年 9 月被突破。见 <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/north-koreas-oil-terminals-come-back-life-imports-breach-unsc-cap>。该智库随后收集的数据表明,向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口输送精炼石油的趋势一直持续到 2021 年底,即使各船只的负载量只有 60%左右,这一年的上限也已被突破。专家小组仍在审查这份未发布的材料。

⁴² S/2019/171 和 S/2019/171/Corr.1, 附件 2; S/2020/151, 附件 1; S/2021/211, 图六 a。

⁴³ 安理会第 2397(2017)号决议,第 5 段。

⁴⁴ S/2020/151, 第 18-19 和 32 段。

航行，6 月在南浦交付石油，三个月后再次这样做(见图十七)。10 月，还使用了南浦的备用石油码头(见图十八)。其他未报告的在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国各港口交付精炼石油的情况载于附件 33。

图十七

“*Un Hung*” 号，2021 年 6 月 21 日和 9 月 21 日，南浦



资料来源：(左) Maxar Technologies，由专家小组附加说明；(右)会员国。

图十八

南浦备用(左)和原有(右)石油码头的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮，2021 年 10 月 18 日




资料来源：Maxar Technologies，由专家小组附加说明。

西朝鲜湾作为船对船移交区

40. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国边境的关闭还以其他方式改变了该国的海上交易模式。船只继续在西海水闸地区和其他港口外进行长时间的隔离。直接交货⁴⁵ 和其他不悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮在该国专属经济区内和其他地点与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行石油移交，而不是像疫情之前那样在该国港口交货。例如，“Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612)自 2019 年起经常在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口交货，⁴⁶ 但 2021 年 8 月在该国专属经济区内观察到该船与受到指认的“Chon Ma San”号(海事组织编号 8660313)在一起(见图十九)。专家小组上次报告称“Diamond 8”号 2021 年 5 月⁴⁷ 在中国领海以伪造的识别信息进行传输。2021 年 8 月中旬，观察到“Chon Ma San”号在南浦闸门外等待卸货(见图二十)，2021 年 9 月 16 日，该船停泊在南浦港。

图十九

“Diamond 8”号和“Chon Ma San”号，2021 年 8 月 8 日



资料来源：Planet Labs，由专家小组附加说明。

⁴⁵ 专家小组使用“直接交货”一词来形容过去多次在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口交付精炼石油的非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。这些船只曾多次交付非法石油货物，已建议予以指认。见专家小组 2020 年以来的报告。

⁴⁶ S/2020/151、S/202/840、S/2021/211 和 S/2021/777。

⁴⁷ S/2021/777，第 44-47 和 50 段以及附件 30a 和 33a。

图二十

“*Chon Ma San*”号与其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只,2021年8月16日,西海水闸锚地



资料来源: Maxar Technologies, 由专家小组附加说明。

41. “Diamond 8”号的例子并非个例。2021年4月,在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区内或附近地区的卫星图像上观察到其他直接交货船,⁴⁸ 因此这成为监测未来可能的非法移交活动的另一个关注地区(见图二十一; 另见第 34 段)。⁴⁹

图二十一

与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的船只,2021年4月24日,西朝鲜湾



资料来源: Maxar Technologies, 由专家小组附加说明。

⁴⁸ 2021 年,在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区及其附近地区,观察到专家小组已建议指认的无国籍船只“Xing Ming Yang 888”号(海事组织编号 8410847)、“Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082)、“Hokong”号(海事组织编号 9006758)、“New Konk”号(海事组织编号 9036387)和“Unica”号(海事组织编号 8514306)。

⁴⁹ [S/2021/777](#), 第 57 段和图七。

可疑船只的行为模式

42. 直接交货船和其他可疑船只表现出类似的行为模式，涉及以下几方面：洗白的船只身份；到访的造船厂；经常前往的水域；与试图混淆自己身份的受关注船只进行的非法船对船转移活动。这些船还经常通过船只管理、所有权⁵⁰ 和(或)第三方服务提供商，包括共享的公司秘书服务实体相互关联。这些实体和个人在第三国注册，许多实际地址在亚洲。无国籍油轮“New Konk”号(海事组织编号 9036387)及相关受关注船只的行为模式是应作尽职调查和合规调查的一个实例。附件 35 列出了另一个实例，即直接交货船“Unica”号(海事组织编号 8514306)的例子。

船只身份洗白

直接交货船使用洗白后的数字档案

43. 专家小组在先前的报告中查明，为了给那些向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或其船只交付精炼石油的直接交货船提供洗白后的身份，采用了复杂周密的技术。⁵¹ 与此相比，对船只的自动识别系统特征进行数字篡改或欺骗式干扰的形式较为简单，在海事数据库中通常可以检测到。⁵²

44. 由于这些空置的自动识别系统档案不再与实体船只绑定，不止一艘船可以使用这些数字档案。表 3 列出了专家小组调查的无国籍直接交货船使用的空置识别信息(另见附件 36)。

表 3^a

不定期传输欺诈性识别信息的直接交货船

船名	海事组织编号	传输所用身份	海事移动业务标识码	最近一次港口国监督检查
New Konk	9036387	M0uson	511444000	2018 年 7 月
		F. Lonline	312162000	
Subblic	8126082	Hai Zhou 168	667001397	2004 年 5 月
Unica ^b	8514306	Liton	457106000	无数据
		Haishun 2	457400047	

资料来源：专家小组

^a 本表并非详尽无遗，载列专家小组报告中已提供的信息。

^b 见附件 37。

⁵⁰ 除非另有说明，所有权是指国际海事组织所列的注册船东。

⁵¹ S/2021/211，第 31-36 段和附件 22；S/2021/777，第 28-41 段和附件 28-29。

⁵² 从本质上讲，篡改船只身份不同于洗白身份，后者展现出的复杂性、所费精力和协调程度都相当高，其目的是创建欺诈性的空壳身份，为“脏船”保持清白的档案。见 *Unmasked: Vessel Identity Laundering and North-Korea's Maritime Sanctions Evasion* (C4ADS, 2021)。

“New Konk”号伪装成“F. Lonline”号

45. 专家小组以前报告称,“New Konk”号是一艘接驳油轮,与“Vifine”号(如今为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国旗的“Un Hung”号)进行了船对船移交(海事组织编号 9045962),⁵³ 然后由后者向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油。专家小组确定了两艘船只之间的共同所有权、管理和公司注册关联,⁵⁴ 揭示出涉及制裁相关活动的相似实体(见附件 38)。“New Konk”号本身此后开始多次向南浦直接交付非法货物,⁵⁵ 专家小组已建议予以指认。为了继续非法交货,该船此后采用了不同的洗白后船只身份,在 2020 年有时以“M0uson”号身份航行,⁵⁶ 最近又以“F. Lonline”号身份航行(另见第 59-63 段)。

46. 正在对“F. Lonline”号进行的调查揭示了另一起复杂的船只身份洗白案件,涉及前悬挂泰国国旗的“Smooth Sea 3”号(海事组织编号 8303616),洗白结果是创建了一个欺诈性的数字身份“F. Lonline”号,被“New Konk”号等可疑船只用来替换身份。这起身份洗白案也涉及以前曾因身份洗白活动而被专家小组调查过的相同实体和船厂/船坞(详情见附件 39a)。

利用船厂协助规避制裁活动

47. 据观察,为了在身份洗白后进一步加强伪装,“New Konk”号 2021 年上半年停靠在 Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd./福建省易和船舶重工有限责任公司拥有的一家造船厂(见图二十二),并涂上了另一种颜色。

图二十二

“New Konk”号伪装成“F. Lonline”号在 Fujian Yihe 重新涂漆,2021 年 3-4 月



资料来源: C4ADS; Planet Labs; Airbus DS。

⁵³ S/2020/151, 第 18 和 32 段及附件 8。

⁵⁴ 同上, 第 10-27 和 32 段。


⁵⁵ S/2020/840, 第 27 和 28 段。

⁵⁶ S/2021/211, 第 3-36 段和附件 22。

48. 对“New Konk”号和据称挂伯利兹国旗的“F. Lonline”号(海事移动业务标识码 312162000)进行的视觉分析显示,两艘船为同一艘船(见图二十三)。这种行动让“New Konk”号能够继续航行、交易和违反制裁,从而有助于规避制裁。

图二十三

2020 年“New Konk”号和“F. Lonline”号的对比



资料来源：会员国。

49. 有资料显示,直接交货船和其他可疑船只使用中国福建省白马河沿岸的三个造船厂进行维修和改装,时间可以追溯到几年前。⁵⁷ 这些船厂位于三沙湾和东引岛附近,这些船只经常在那里徘徊。⁵⁸

50. 2021 年,“New Konk”号返回白马河沿岸的船厂,然后出海与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行船对船移交。调查继续进行。专家小组调查的其他也到访 Fujian Yihe 船厂的船只包括:“Unica”号、“Rui Hong 916”号(海事组织编号 9058866)、“M0uson 328”号(海事组织编号 9021198)和“Hai Zhou 168”号(海事组织编号 8514045)(见附件 39b)。

51. 专家小组已致函拥有、管理或与协助这些船只有关的相关会员国、船厂、实体和个人。Fujian Yihe 尚未答复。关于此案的更多详情和答复情况载于附件 39a 和 39b。

船对船移交

“New Konk”号和“Kum Jin Gang 3”号

52. “New Konk”号到 2021 年 8 月 3 日时已离开 Fujian Yihe 船厂,以疑似欺诈的悬挂伯利兹国旗的“F. Lonline”号海事移动业务标识码(312162000)传输信息。“New Konk”号 8 月中旬停泊在中国三沙湾地区,这是其他直接交货船经常出现的地点。该船最近一次发出传输自动识别系统信号是在 2021 年 8 月 21 日。大约一个月后,“New Konk”号在西朝鲜湾与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Kum Jin Gang 3”号(海事组织编号 8791667)进行了船对船移交(见图二十四)。

⁵⁷ 专家小组调查的许多直接交货船被收购和移交给可能的幌子公司网络,然后到访白马河沿岸的特定造船厂,此后向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国走私精炼石油。

⁵⁸ S/2021/777, 第 50 段和附件 33a。

图二十四

“*New Konk*” 号和 “*Kum Jin Gang 3*” 号，2021 年 9 月 23 日，西朝鲜湾



资料来源：会员国。

“*New Konk*” 号和 “*Hai Jun*” 号

53. “*New Konk*” 号从其他油轮获得石油货物。自动识别系统跟踪和卫星图像显示，“*New Konk*” 号在 Fujian Yihe 船厂进行翻新工作之前，于 2020 年 6 月 19 日前后在中国台湾省高雄西南方水域与当时悬挂库克群岛国旗的 “*Hai Jun*” 号(海事组织编号 9054896)⁵⁹ 进行了一次疑似船对船移交活动(见图二十五)。这一地点与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船对船移交石油的活动有关。⁶⁰ 此后记录显示，“*New Konk*” 号到 2020 年 7 月 2 日时在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国松林港交付精炼石油。⁶¹ 在进行疑似移交活动的时间前后，“*New Konk*” 号以其已知的 “*M0uson*” 号欺诈性身份传输信息。

图二十五

“*Hai Jun*” 号和 “*New Konk*” 号(以 “*M0uson*” 号的身份传输信息)，2020 年 6 月 19 日



资料来源：Airbus DS，由专家小组附加说明。

⁵⁹ 由于该船出售，库克群岛于 2021 年 12 月 1 日注销其注册。

⁶⁰ S/2021/777，第 57 段和图八。

⁶¹ S/2021/211，附件 27。


“*Hai Jun*”号、“*Unica*”号和“*Sky Venus*”号

54. 与“*New Konk*”号接头并不是“*Hai Jun*”号进行的唯一一次疑似船对船移交活动。专家小组对“*Hai Jun*”号自2020年以来活动的跟踪⁶²表明,该船还多次与“*Unica*”号接头,而后者当时在传输与蒙古相关的属于“*Liton*”号(海事组织编号8346395)的海上移动业务标识码和欺骗性的“*Haishun 2*”号船只识别信息(见图二十六和附件37)。

55. 海事追踪数据还显示,“*Hai Jun*”号与悬挂帕劳国旗的“*Sky Venus*”号(海事组织编号9168257)在2021年反复接头(见图二十七)。专家小组正在对“*Sky Venus*”号进行调查,以查明目的地为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的多次船对船移交精炼石油的情况(另见第64-73段)。

图二十六

“*Unica*”号以“*Haishun 2*”号的身份传输信息,2021年9月18日,东引岛




资料来源:会员国。

⁶² 根据自动识别系统传输信息。

图二十七

“Sky Venus”号、“Hai Jun”号和“Unica”号(伪装成“Haishun 2”号), 2021年9月23-24日(左); “Unica”号, 2021年10月1-7日, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区附近(右)



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。


56. 据观察,“Hai Jun”号经常出现在三沙湾、东引岛和乌岫岛水域(见图二十八), 这些水域有其他直接交货船只和可疑船只出现(见附件 40 和 41)。此外,“Hai Jun”号疑似在 2021 年与传输欺诈性识别信息的直接交货船进行了更多的船对船移交。调查仍在进行中。

57. 专家小组已致函有关会员国和实体。库克群岛证实, 由于该船被转售, 已于 2021 年 12 月 1 日将其从船舶注册簿中删除。⁶³ 蒙古尚未答复。该船的注册船东 Ruicheng (HK) Shipping Co Ltd 通过船舶注册处答复说, “Hai Jun”号“没有从事任何非法作业, 也没有与所有涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船只进行任何交易”。该船东还指出, “为了节省运营成本, 该船经常在非运营条件下停止供电”。专家小组注意到, 在有关调查期间, 包括在开放水域, 信息传播中断。此外, 自 2020 年 12 月 4 日以来, 其船只保险没有续保, 其他船只认证继续逾期。详情载于附件 42a-e。

⁶³ 目前悬挂多哥国旗, Ruicheng Shipping 自 2020 年 12 月以来为其合规文件持有方。IHS Markit。

图二十八

“*Hai Jun*” 号和直接交货船，2021 年 7 月 22 日，乌岬岛附近



资料来源：Planet Labs，由专家小组附加说明。

注：“Hokong”号已拆卸(见附件 43)。

实体篡改船只身份

58. “New Konk”号并不是唯一一艘试图隐瞒身份的可疑船只。“*Hai Jun*”号也被拍到使用可移除识别信息这种违反海事组织规定的伎俩(见图二十九)。附件 44 和 45a 和 45b 分别载有专家小组先前查明的规避办法和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮混淆其身份的详情。

图二十九

“*Hai Jun*” 号照片，2020 年 10 月 3 日，东海



资料来源：会员国，由专家小组附加说明。

协助方

“*New Konk*” 号

59. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用第三方个人和实体让可疑船只能够进行非法交易。2021 年 8 月，“*New Konk*” 号离开中国福建白马河时，使用的是一艘洗白后的船只“*F. Lonline*”号的身份。正在进行的调查显示，前悬挂泰国国旗的“*Smooth Sea 3*”号的身份被洗白，其结果是创建了一个疑似欺诈性的身份“*F. Lonline*”号。悬挂泰国国旗的“*Smooth Sea 30*”号(海事组织编号 9892262)报称是一艘新建造的船只，疑似为前“*Smooth Sea 3*”号。

60. “*F. Lonline*”号的管理和所有权记录与专家小组以前调查过的其他同样洗白了自己身份的船只有关联。“*F. Lonline*”号目前所列信息显示其自 2019 年 10 月以来由香港注册的 Brilliant Trade International 拥有和管理，⁶⁴ 而在 2004 年 6 月至 2019 年 6 月期间，该船由 Smooth Sea Co Ltd. 拥有和运营，以“*Smooth Sea 3*”号身份航行，然后转让给 Rui He HK Marine Co Ltd., ⁶⁵ 以另一个船旗和船名航行。一个月后，该船被转让给 Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd., 三个月后重新悬挂伯利兹国旗，并重新命名为“*F. Lonline*”号。在香港注册成立的 Cheng Xin Shipping⁶⁶ 与专家小组在一起疑似船只身份洗白案件中对“*Smooth Sea 22*”号的调查有关联。⁶⁷

⁶⁴ 海事组织全球综合航运信息系统，截至 2022 年 1 月。

⁶⁵ Rui He HK Marine Co. Ltd. 过去还曾拥有和管理另一艘直接交货船“*Unica*”号，该船所有权后来被转让给在英属维尔京群岛注册成立的 Prospera Pacific International Company Limited。来自海事组织全球综合航运信息系统的信息。

⁶⁶ 该实体通常会持有一艘船几个月。

⁶⁷ S/2021/777，第 29-37 段和附件 28。

“New Konk”号、“M0uson 328”号和“Hai Zhou 168”号⁶⁸ 都停靠过 Fujian Yihe 船厂，离开时都传输了欺诈性的新数字身份。

61. 专家小组已致函泰国、相关船旗注册处、拥有或经营这些船只的实体和 Fujian Yihe。

62. 泰国尚未答复。在另一封信函中，泰国证实，泰国注册的 Smooth Sea Co. Ltd. 于 2019 年 7 月 18 日将“Smooth Sea 3”号的所有权转让给 Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd。专家小组继续与 Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd. 跟进。该公司尚未答复。

63. 更多详情以及各船旗注册处和实体的答复见附件 46a 和 46b。

“Sky Venus”号和“Sunward”号

64. 专家小组正在调查中国台湾省高雄的 Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd.⁶⁹ 疑似规避制裁的案件。根据一个会员国提供的信息，该公司运营的船只，包括悬挂帕劳国旗的“Sky Venus”号(海事组织编号 9168257)和当时悬挂巴拿马国旗的“Sunward”号(海事组织编号 8920115)通过非法船对船移交向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮移交石油。Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. 利用一系列空壳公司，便利与船对船移交活动有关的付款。专家小组继续调查涉及该公司的其他案件。

65. 专家小组重点指出下列据称用于为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购和交付非法石油的规避方法。

利用空壳公司

66. 参与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法船对船移交精炼石油的公司利用一系列空壳公司为据称目的地为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的货物付款。Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. 拥有两家这样的公司，在塞舌尔注册成立的 Ocean Energy International Corp 拥有和运营“Sky Venus”号，在萨摩亚注册成立的 Wills International Co Ltd 运营“Sunward”号，⁷⁰ 它们与 Everway Global Ltd 一样，被用作 Cheng Chiun Shipping 的别名。

石油供应

67. 对“Sunward”号、“Sky Venus”号以及相关的直接交货船和可疑船只的调查显示，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的大部分石油产品来自东亚各地的石油码头，并通过船对船移交方式交付。违反制裁者利用合法的船对船移交业务⁷¹ 向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国走私石油(见附件 47)。

⁶⁸ 关于“Smooth Sea 28”号/“Hai Zhou 168”号/“Smooth Sea 22”号的船只身份洗白问题，泰国向专家小组提供了船只尺寸。另见附件 46b。

⁶⁹ 程群船务代理有限公司。

⁷⁰ 同上。


⁷¹ 采用船上交货的做法，在船对船移交期间，当石油货物越过护栏从一艘船转移到另一艘船时，货物的责任从卖方转移到买方。另见 S/2019/171 和 S/2019/171/Corr.1，第 11 段和附件 7。

多阶段移交石油

68. 在专家小组查明的情况中，“Sunward”号和“Sky Venus”号被用作母船，从台中港装载精炼石油，然后据称通过一连串船对船移交将货物交付给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮(见图三十)。母船及其协助者借此造成距离将石油移交给可疑船只还相隔一个或几个步骤的假象。专家小组以前曾报告过，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国偏好用较小船只作为中间船只接收石油货物，因为这些船只更难追踪和识别，往往没有海事组织编号。这些船只再将石油移交给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的船只。

图三十

目的地为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的多阶段移交石油



资料来源：专家小组。


69. 例如，2021年8月8日至10日期间，“Sky Venus”号连续几天多次向身份不明的较小型船只移交石油，⁷² 而这些较小型船只又向同一艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只“Sin Phyong 5”号(海事组织编号 8865121)移交精炼石油(见图三十一)。“Sin Phyong 5”号本身也因向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转售而另受到专家小组的调查。⁷³

70. 一个会员国评估认为，Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. “知晓规避制裁的活动，并试图掩盖这些活动”。

⁷² 据一个会员国观察。

⁷³ S/2021/777，第 76-79 段和附件 38。

图三十一
非法移交精炼石油



资料来源：专家小组。

71. Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd.通过一家律师事务所否认其“曾通过[其]油轮‘Sunward’号和‘Sky Venus’号向与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的船只运送精炼石油产品”，并否认该公司在中国福建省附近为粗柴油客户担任采购代理和货运代理。据该公司称，在专家小组要求调查的有关期间，该公司仅向来自一家香港注册公司的刘先生一人出售过粗柴油。这些油被移交到刘先生指定的“内河船”和“渔船”上。接收这些粗柴油的船只识别信息并未提供。Cheng Chiun Shipping 称，“刘先生总是派来他的船，这些船上的标志和编号被遮住”。这些接收船只代用的识别方式是，它们会出示一张“人民币纸币”，其序列号将与刘先生提供的序列号一致。

72. 专家小组继续审查该公司提供的资料。

73. 关于本节的更多详情载于附件 48。

船只转售

74. 专家小组记录了多起案件，其中最终由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购得的船只没有更新所有权或管理历史。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用这种使用第三方经纪人和实体的做法掩盖其在此类交易中的存在。该国还利用幌子公司使船只销售审查复杂化。拖延或不提供报告，以及废弃或使用错误的电子邮件联系信息，是那些试图遮掩逃避制裁活动的人积极利用的手段。

75. 专家小组重点指出了“Rui Hong 916”号(海事组织编号 9058866)和“Ri Hong”号(海事组织编号 9162318)的销售情况作为实例(见附件 49 和 50)。

船只购置情况


“Su Ryong San” 号和 “Ocean Sky” 号

76. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反安全理事会相关决议，为本国船队添加油轮和货船。专家小组根据异常的自动识别系统传输信息，首次发现新近转换身份的悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Su Ryong San”号(海事组织编号 9016430)(见图三十二)。专家小组还追踪了该船在进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队之前最后的注册船东 HongKong Great Fortune Development Co. Limited. (香港吉运发展有限公司)。⁷⁴ 详情和答复载于附件 51。

77. 一个会员国怀疑香港注册的 Asia Ocean Shipping Ltd. (亚洲远洋运输有限公司)为涉嫌在海上将悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Ocean Sky”号(海事组织编号 9125308)移交朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供便利。根据海事记录，该船目前的船东仍为 Asia Ocean Shipping Ltd.。⁷⁵ “Ocean Sky”号与专家小组先前调查的其他一些油轮和货船一样，最后经过中国石岛后，再抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。详情和答复载于附件 52a 和 52b。

图三十二

“Su Ryong San” 号的航程，2021 年 7-9 月



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

⁷⁴ 海事组织全球综合航运信息系统。

⁷⁵ 截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日。

捕鱼权转让

78. 专家小组正在继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售或转让捕鱼权的情况，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售或转让捕鱼权是安全理事会第 2371(2017)号决议第 9 段所禁止的，第 2397(2017)号决议第 6 段对此作了进一步澄清。根据一个会员国提供的资料，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反决议出售和(或)转让捕鱼权的行为 2021 年仍在继续。一个会员国查明，2021 年 4 月至 6 月期间，至少有 428 艘船只进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域，其中一些船只从中国山东省和辽宁省出发(见附件 53a)。⁷⁶ 专家小组致函中国，要求提供进一步资料，说明这些船只的身份、相关实体、母港和在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域的捕鱼活动。中国答复说，“中国渔业主管部门和沿海有关省份已采取措施加强管理，要求渔业公司和渔民严格遵守安全理事会决议的规定”(见附件 53b)。

79. 该会员国观察到，进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域的第三国渔船数量大幅减少(见表 4)，2021 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域允许捕鱼区的面积缩小(见附件 53c)。

表 4

观察到进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域的第三国渔船数量

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
渔船数量	1 711	2 611	1 882	2 389	554
每年开始行动日期	5 月 2 日	4 月 18 日	4 月 23 日	5 月 10 日	4 月 21 日

资料来源：会员国。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海运出口

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的煤炭出口

80. 根据一个会员国的评估，2020 年 9 月至 2021 年 8 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向中国领水和港口出口了至少 64 批约 552 400 公吨的煤炭⁷⁷ (见附件 54-61)。鉴于该国的 COVID-19 限制措施，其中包括对煤炭出口船只相当长的检疫隔离期，2020 年 10 月至 2021 年 1 月期间没有煤炭出口。专家小组继续监测大安江沿岸装载煤炭出口的船只。自 2021 年 4 月起，连续几个月观察到许多满载煤炭的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只离开大安江，其中一些船只多次前往宁波-舟山水域(见图三十三)。

⁷⁶ S/2021/777，第 82 段。

⁷⁷ 两位专家认为，这一信息需要进一步证实。

图三十三
大安江沿岸的船只，2021 年 4 月和 11 月




资料来源：会员国(上)和 Maxar Technologies(下)，由专家小组附加说明。

81. 例如，“Tae Dong Gang 9”号(海事组织编号 8408791)2021 年 4 月 4 日在大安(见图三十四)，在 10 月过境至宁波-舟山水域后，于 2021 年 11 月 5 日返回。该船还操纵其标识信息，以“Or”的船名航行，并且在整个航行期间只是短暂地传输信息(见图三十四)。

图三十四

“Tae Dong Gang 9”号的航程，2021 年 10-11 月




资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明；会员国(卫星图像)。

82. “Kum Ya”号(海事组织编号 9004073)等朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只也从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国东部沿海的其他港口出发进行煤炭出口(见图三十五)。2021 年 5 月至 9 月期间出口煤炭到宁波-舟山水域的其他例子载于附件 55。

图三十五


2021 年 4-5 月 “Kum Ya” 号出口煤炭图示



资料来源：IHS Markit Sea-web，由专家小组附加说明；会员国(卫星图像)。

83. 专家小组继续请中国提供协助，以了解在宁波-舟山水域反复出现的多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只(见图三十六)通过船对船移交出口煤炭的情况，包括朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在这些水域通过船对船移交卸载的任何货物，收货船的识别信息，拥有、经营和采购朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的任何货物的实体和个人，以及相关的货运单据和金融交易。⁷⁸ 一个会员国报告说，所有船只都装载了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭。其中一些船只在宁波-舟山区域停留了一段时间(见附件 56)。

图三十六
悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只，2021 年 10 月 5 日，中国宁波-舟山



资料来源：会员国。

84. 专家小组请中国提供资料，说明在中国水域的每艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只、它们传输信号所用的识别信息、在中国水域进行的任何船对船移交、卸载的货物、收货船身份及其所有人和经营人、从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口煤炭的个人或实体的详情以及有关的航运和财务记录。专家小组在下面相关段落中请中国协助为其他一些船只提供同样的资料。


⁷⁸ 根据安全理事会第 2371(2017)号决议第 8 段、第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段以及第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 和 20 段。

85. 中国答复说,“‘ZAI ZHOU 2’号、‘TOMYONG’号、‘SAMJIN 8’号、‘NAN DAE CHON’号、‘KANG HUNG’号和‘UNHA’号等船只空载进入烟台港,装载化肥、农药和其他农用品后离开该港”。对于图三十六所示的其余悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只,中国“没有它们在中国停靠港口的记录”。

86. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只还继续传输专家小组前几次报告中查明的伪造识别信息(见附件 57)。例如,“Asia Honor”号(海事组织编号 8405220),在宁波-舟山水域与其一年多前首次创建其虚假的自动识别系统档案时所在位置几乎相同的位置传输信号(见图三十七)。

图三十七

“Asia Honor”号长期在中国水域发送欺诈性识别信息




资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明; 会员国(内嵌图像)。

87. 专家小组向中国询问了“Asia Honor”号的情况。中国答复称,没有“Asia Honor”号在中国港口停靠的记录。

88. 截至 2021 年 10 月 2 日,有 35 艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只停泊在南浦船闸外接受检疫隔离(见图三十八)。其中一些船只曾出现在宁波-舟山。专家小组上一份报告提到其中几艘船只于 2021 年 4 月 5 日在宁波-舟山出口煤炭。⁷⁹

⁷⁹ S/2021/777, 图十二。

图三十八
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国西海拦河大坝检疫隔离中的船只



资料来源：会员国。

89. 专家小组向中国询问 2021 年出现图三十八中所列朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的情况，包括参与运输人道主义货物或其他货物的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只中有哪些也参与运输朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭，并停靠过中国港口。中国答复说，“无法获得包括 ‘MYONG SA SIM NI’ 号和 ‘JA SONG’ 号在内的 35 艘船只在中国停靠港口的记录，因为没有提供海事组织信息”。专家小组注意到，这些悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的具体货船的海事组织编号都在海事组织网站上登记并列出。专家小组以前的报告曾报告过其中几艘船只。⁸⁰

中国港口悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的煤炭出口船只

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国——宁波-舟山水域——中国港口——朝鲜民主主义人民共和国

90. 一些在宁波-舟山水域出口煤炭的船只随后驶往中国其他地方的港口，包括龙口港和莱州港。这些船只包括悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 “Su Ryong San” 号(另见第 76 段)、“Pho Phyeong” 号(海事组织编号 8417962)、“Samjin 8” 号(海事组织编号 8810578)、“Kang Hung” 号(海事组织编号 9340257)和 “Un Ha”

⁸⁰ 例如，曾报告过 “Myong Sa Sim Ni” 号(海事组织编号 9010058)，见 [S/2021/777](#)，第 89-92 段及图十三和十四。


号(海事组织编号 8310281), 它们由宁波-舟山水域驶往龙口港; “To Myong” 号(以前称为 “Ri Hong” 号)(海事组织编号 9162318)和 “Northern Luck” 号(海事组织编号 9061227), 它们由宁波-舟山水域驶往莱州港(见附件 58)。专家小组以前曾对在往返一趟行程中在宁波-舟山水域出口煤炭并在龙口港装载人道主义援助货物的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行过调查。⁸¹ 中国答复说, “‘PHO PHYONG’ 号于 2021 年 9 月空载进入烟台港, 2021 年 11 月装载杂货离港”。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国——中国港口——朝鲜民主主义人民共和国

91. 根据一个会员国提供的信息, 一些煤炭出口也由悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只直接运往中国的港口。专家小组的自动识别系统追踪显示, “Hung Bong 3” 号(海事组织编号 8603286)于 2021 年 7 月 26 日离开南浦前往中国烟台港, 2021 年 8 月 2 日在码头观察到该船载有煤炭。该船随后驶往龙口, 10 天后在码头观察到该船装载了似乎是白色的袋装货物(见图三十九), 之后驶离港口。附件 59 陈述了一个类似案件, 涉及专家小组调查的一艘出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的船只 “Tae Phyong 2” 号(以前称为 “Ming Zhou 6” 号)(海事组织编号 8602763)。⁸²

图三十九

出口煤炭和进口其他货物的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只, 2021 年 7-8 月, 中国烟台



资料来源: Windward, IHS Market, Planet Labs, 由专家小组附加说明; 内嵌图像, 会员国(顶部图像)。(底部图像代表位置, 而不是自动识别系统信号覆盖的实际日期。)

⁸¹ S/2021/777, 第 100 和 101 段; S/2021/211, 第 58、63 和 64 段。

⁸² S/2021/211, 第 70-72 段; S/2021/777, 第 80 和 102 段及附件 39。

92. 专家小组请中国提供有关资料，包括有关装运文件，说明在码头装卸或在中国各港口通过船对船移交的任何违禁货物。中国答复说，“Hung Bong 3”号“分别于 2021 年 3 月和 7 月空载进入烟台港，分别于 3 月和 8 月装载化肥和其他农产品离港”。调查仍在继续。

供应链网络

香港吉运发展有限公司

93. 一个会员国声称，为进一步便利对“Su Ryong San”号的收购，香港吉运发展有限公司还投资了几艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只，包括进行联合维护和运营工作；参与将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭进口到中国的其他活动；从事向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口化肥的易货贸易；向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售和运输被禁物项，包括钢、燃料以及运输和建筑相关车辆。⁸³ 该公司在香港公司注册处的注册人是中国辽宁省的 Li Xiangmin(李祥民)。⁸⁴ 易货贸易避免利用国际金融体系，从而进一步逃避制裁。

94. 专家小组从几个来源获得的信息表明，设在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 Yonggwang Furniture and Building Materials Corporation (영광가구건축재회사)参与向香港吉运发展有限公司出口 100 000 至 200 000 吨朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭。这一数量包括该会员国提供的三个例子中悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只据称已运输煤炭的数量：“Jang Un”号(海事组织编号 8822260)约 20 000 公吨；⁸⁵ “Kum Song 7”号(海事组织编号 8739396)约 5 000 公吨；“Ryon Hwa 3”号(海事组织编号 8312227)约 6 000 公吨。专家小组借助自动识别系统对这些船只的分析表明，2021 年“Ryon Hwa 3”号在中国领水航行。自动识别系统数据还显示，“Ryon Hwa 3”号在 3 月 18 日至 27 日期间访问了龙口港区。到 8 月，该船在宁波-舟山水域出口煤炭，9 月 18 日该船搁浅(见图四十 a)。

⁸³ 专家小组先前曾报告了建筑相关车辆出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的情况(见 S/2021/211，第 68 和 69 段及附件 36)。

⁸⁴ 被列为创始成员董事，地址：39-3-208, Qingnian Street, Zhenxing District, Dandong City, Liaoning Province, China。

⁸⁵ 据报告，价值为每公吨 88 美元。

图四十 a

“Ryon Hwa 3” 号搁浅，2021 年 9 月 18 日，宁波-舟山




资料来源：(上)会员国，(下)Maxar Technologies 和 Windward。

95. “Jang Un” 号和 “Kum Song 7” 号多年来没有报告自动识别系统信号，要么“暗中”行驶，要么冒用其他识别信息，以躲开海事数据库的检测(见图四十 b)。专家小组报告说，这三艘船都在宁波-舟山地区出口煤炭。⁸⁶ 香港吉运发展有限公司尚未作出答复。

⁸⁶ 专家小组的报告曾提到，“Jang Un”号出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭的时间可以追溯到 2018 年，自 2020 年以来，在宁波-舟山水域观察到“Kum Song 7”号和“Ryon Hwa 3”号。

图四十 b
“Kum Song 7” 号冒用身份，2021 年 2 月 26 日，中国石岛附近



资料来源：会员国。


96. 专家小组请中国核查香港吉运发展有限公司的所有权、该公司在煤炭采购中的作用及其参与任何与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关活动的情况。中国答复说：“中方目前没有香港吉运发展有限公司的信息”（见附件 61）。

97. 通过审查多个数据点，专家小组评估认为，香港吉运发展有限公司可能是与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在中国水域向悬挂中国国旗的“Qun Rong Xiang”号货船(未报告海事组织编号,海上移动业务标识码413213290)出口煤炭有关的实体。专家小组此前进行了调查，但由于中国正在进行调查，应中国的要求，专家小组没有点明该中国船只的身份(见图四十一)。⁸⁷ 该中国船只于 2021 年 3 月 23 日前将煤炭运到钦州港。有关详情及补充图像载于附件 60 和 61。

⁸⁷ S/2021/777，第 96-98 段。

图四十一

“Qun Rong Xiang” 号在三艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只附近，2021 年 3 月 15 日，宁波-舟山



资料来源：会员国。

98. 中国回复说：“对……‘QUN RONG XIANG’ 号的调查仍在进行中，我们目前没有信息可以分享”。

99. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国所有涉嫌出口原产于该国的煤炭的船只均应受到安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 段⁸⁸ 的约束(详见附件 61)。

建议

100. 由于海上贸易是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购和销售受制裁商品的主要载体，提醒公共和私营部门在与船舶运营和商品交易有关的各个层面执行必要的监管标准和尽职检查，特别是在已查明的水域⁸⁹ 进行的涉及违禁或受限制的产品和服务的船舶运营和商品交易。专家小组强调，前几次报告所载的许多与海上活动有关的建议仍然具有现实意义。

⁸⁸ 该段规定，若会员国有合理理由认为其港口内任何船只参与违反安全理事会各项决议的活动，则会员国应扣押、检查和查封该船只，并可在其领水内扣押、检查和查封此类船只。

⁸⁹ S/2021/777，第 57 段和图八。

101. 其他建议如下。

关于船舶身份洗白和操纵自动识别系统

102. 专家小组建议会员国和船舶登记处在船舶通告中增加关于已发现的船只身份洗白或篡改案件的信息，并确保广泛传播，包括向海事当局传播。此类信息应包括：

- 登记册中曾传输伪装身份的船只的识别信息
- 登记册中识别信息可能已被其他船只利用的船只的识别信息
- 其船只曾传输伪造识别信息的船舶登记人姓名

103. 专家小组建议船旗国及其得到承认的组织保存它们所核证并悬挂其国旗的船只经核实的记录和带有最新时间戳的照片，包括定期将其提交海事组织。这些记录的图像应包括：

- 船只名称和海事组织编号的所有永久标记
- 船只各个角度的照片
- 船只发动机的照片，包括发动机编号

104. 专家小组建议海事组织考虑审查硬件和软件安全标准，以防止自动识别系统应答器被篡改。

105. 专家小组建议海事组织敦促所有船旗国确保连续概要记录要求得以遵守，包括在海事组织全球综合航运信息系统网站上相应更新此类信息。

关于船只转售

106. 专家小组建议卖方检查船只销售信息是否及时反映在海事组织全球综合航运信息系统网站上。

107. 专家小组建议船东和管理方利用必要的培训和资源，对制裁合规方案进行持续的内部审查。

关于石油供应链和船上交货做法

108. 专家小组重申，在各自管辖范围内在船上交货市场存在风险的环节开展业务和(或)在有关国际水域从事船对船移交活动的商品贸易公司和油轮船队，应采用包含有效最终用途交货核查的合同语言。

109. 专家小组建议，商品贸易公司、油轮船队和有关的船上交货市场环节应审查自动识别系统的历史记录，以及它们准备用来供应或接收决议所禁产品/商品的所有船只的任何已知使用伪造身份的情况。

110. 专家小组建议，金融机构应在发放给在受影响地区参与石油和石油产品行业的商品贸易商的信用证、贷款和其他金融工具中，纳入自动识别系统筛查和船只尽职调查风险评估条款。

111. 专家小组建议在受影响地区参与商品交易的金融机构扩大交易监测方案，纳入对客户和交易对方船只的自动识别系统筛查。

关于加强尽职调查和数据共享

112. 专家小组建议, 船旗国应拥有必要的工具, 在发现冒用海上移动业务标识码的可疑情况时, 查明和调查这种情况, 并与其他海事当局以及专家小组分享调查结果。

113. 专家小组建议海事组织全球综合航运信息系统列入资料, 说明船只的船旗登记是临时的还是永久的, 以及有效日期范围。

114. 专家小组建议船东、承租人和营运人继续加强针对船对船移交的“了解你的客户”和“了解你的交易对方船只”尽职调查。在移交期间, 应记录有时间戳的照片, 包括可核查的船只识别信息和传输的相关自动识别系统档案、金融交易记录以及其他相关船员详细资料, 以达到合规的要求, 并在必要时与执法部门和专家小组分享。

给委员会的建议

115. 专家小组重申其先前关于根据安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段指认下列船只的建议, 并进一步建议根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段指认该船只: “Un Hung”号(以前称为“Vifine”号)(海事组织编号 9045962), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。

116. 专家小组回顾其先前关于根据安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段指认下列船只的建议, 并进一步建议根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段和第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段指认这些船只:

- “Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612), 悬挂不明旗帜
- “New Konk”号(海事组织编号 9036387), 悬挂不明旗帜
- “Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082), 悬挂不明旗帜
- “Xing Ming Yang 888”号(海事组织编号 8410847), 悬挂不明旗帜

117. 专家小组建议根据安全理事会第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段和第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段指认下列船只: “Sun Ryong San”号(海事组织编号 9016430)。

118. 专家小组再次建议根据安全理事会第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段进一步指认下列船只: “Pho Phyong”号(海事组织编号 8417962), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。

119. 专家小组重申其先前关于根据安全理事会第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段指认下列船只的建议, 并建议根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段进一步指认这些船只:

- “To Myong”号(以前称为“Ri Hong”号/“Klausen”号)(海事组织编号 9162318), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗
- “Tae P(h)yong 2”号(以前称为“Ming Zhou 6”号)(海事组织编号 8602763), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗


贸易统计和海关问题

120. 2021 年记录的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对外贸易额继续减少，大幅低于前几年，包括 2020 年封闭期间(见图四十二)。专家小组评估认为，这是由于为应对 COVID-19 大流行而事实上关闭了所有商品、运输和人员的跨境流动。

图四十二

2013-2021 年记录的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易

(百万美元)



资料来源：国际贸易中心(国贸中心)贸易图，2021 年 12 月 31 日查阅。

121. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有限的对外贸易从 2021 年 6 月开始出现一些复苏迹象(见图四十三)，但 2021 年 1 月至 9 月的贸易额与上一年同期相比减少了三分之二。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易活动似乎主要是通过海上贸易进行的。中国向专家小组通报了 2021 年的几批海运货物，主要是农用品和“杂货”。⁹⁰

122. 据媒体报道，2022 年 1 月 16 日，从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出发的货运列车越过边境前往中国丹东，运载医疗用品和日常必需品前往新义州。⁹¹ 中国外交部表示，“丹东至新义州铁路口岸货运已经重启”。⁹²


⁹⁰ 在对专家小组关于具体船只的海事询问(见第 85、90 和 92 段)的答复中，中国表示，2021 年有几艘船只空载进入烟台港，装载化肥、农药和其他农用品后离港。一艘船只 8 月进入龙口港，卸载手表机芯，9 月装载文具后离港。还有其他运送化肥和其他农用品的情况。

⁹¹ 韩国联合通讯社，“消息人士称：另一列朝鲜货运列车抵达中国边境城市”，2022 年 1 月 17 日。

⁹² “受疫情影响，中朝铁路货运暂停了一段时间，经过双方友好协商，丹东至新义州铁路口岸货运已经重启。双方将在确保防疫安全的基础上做好这项工作，助力中朝正常贸易往来”(2022 年 1 月 17 日)。

图四十三
2021 年 1-9 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据(月度)

(百万美元)



资料来源：国贸中心贸易图，2021 年 12 月 31 日查阅。

123. 专家小组在本报告中对违禁进出口的分析主要涵盖 2021 年 1 月至 9 月期间。

124. 根据国贸中心关于国家贸易数据的记录(其中一些贸易物品似乎属于制裁类别)，专家小组请 46 个会员国提供与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交易的资料，以及任何出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口的货物被拒绝清关或扣押的详细情况。关于专家小组用来监测部门禁令的受限的协调制度(HS)编码商品清单，见附件 62。

125. 专家小组还请会员国海关当局提供资料，说明其实际履行制裁义务的情况，例如根据安全理事会第 2270(2016)号决议第 18 段和第 2397(2017)号决议第 20 段，要求检查进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的所有货物，并在发现违禁物品时予以扣押和处置。总体而言，会员国海关当局遵守了对禁令的执行，尽管有时它们在确定某些物项是否被禁止进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国时感到棘手。

126. 许多会员国表示，2021 年记录的与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易活动主要是由于在各自的报关过程中错误使用了国家代码，造成贸易统计数据错误。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的国家代码(KP)被当作实际的贸易伙伴大韩民国的国家代码(KR)而被错误地输入。⁹³ 泰国向专家小组通报了数起涉及当地公司的此类案件(见附件 92)。其他会员国声称，所进行的交易符合联合国制裁制度。一些会员国向专家小组通报了对可能的不遵守制裁案件的调查结果(见表 5)。

⁹³ 例如，S/2021/777，第 117 段；S/2021/211，附件 41。

表 5
2021 年 1-9 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国双边贸易对比表⁹⁴

(千美元)

编号	会员国	与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 的贸易额		与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的受限制 协调制度编码商品贸易		会员国的回复
		出口至朝鲜民主 主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义 人民共和国进口	出口至朝鲜民主 主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义 人民共和国进口	
1	亚美尼亚	0	18		1(HS 编码 12) 1(HS 编码 84) 3(HS 编码 85)	由于货物申报中的技术错误造 成的数据不准确/物项的来源 国为大韩民国和日本
2	巴巴多斯	200	951		22(HS 编码 61) 1(HS 编码 63) 581(HS 编码 84) 274(HS 编码 85)	
3	比利时	0	203		15(HS 编码 73)	
4	伯利兹		14		14(HS 编码 84)	
5	贝宁	0	41			不适用/无案例
6	多民族玻利维亚国	0	20			不适用/无案例
7	波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那	0	16		5(HS 编码 84) 4(HS 编码 85)	
8	巴西	564	97	539 (HS 编码 2710)	2(HS 编码 61)	
9	保加利亚	0	4		1(HS 编码 85)	报环节的技术错误/物项自 大韩民国进口
10	佛得角	0	110			不适用/无案例
11	柬埔寨	453	61		41(HS 编码 72)	正在进行调查
12	加拿大	0	52		2(HS 编码 72)	货物实际来源地为大韩民国， 提交国际贸易中心的报告不 准确
13	智利	36	0			不适用/无案例
14	中国	151 739	33 595	2 229 2 442(HS 编码 50) (HS 编码 2710) 48(HS 编码 2712) 3 292 (HS 编码 2713)	19(HS 编码 62) 11 388 (HS 编码 72) 7(HS 编码 85)	丝绸(HS 编码 50)是原材料， 不是纺织品/铁合金(HS 编码 72)不同于铁和铁矿石/女装 (HS 编码 62)和电气设备(HS 编码 85)来自大韩民国，申报 错误
15	哥伦比亚	21	84		3(HS 编码 73) 1(HS 编码 52)	

⁹⁴ 见附件 63。

编号	会员国	与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 的贸易额		与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的受限制 协调制度编码商品贸易		会员国的回复
		出口至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口	出口至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口	
					8(HS 编码 56)	
					2(HS 编码 61)	
					36(HS 编码 84)	
16	哥斯达黎加	26	240			不适用/无案例
17	克罗地亚	0	16		16(HS 编码 87)	申报错误/来源国为大韩民国
18	丹麦	0	99		5(HS 编码 59)	国家代码输入错误/来源国为大韩民国
19	厄瓜多尔	0	13			不适用/无案例
20	萨尔瓦多	0	817		38(HS 编码 84)	
21	斯威士兰	0	12		1(HS 编码 61)	归咎于申报者无法区分朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和大韩民国/供应商为大韩民国
					2(HS 编码 84)	
22	埃塞俄比亚	267	1 049		562(HS 编码 72)	
					207(HS 编码 79)	
					51(HS 编码 84)	
					59(HS 编码 85)	
23	斐济	87	594	2(HS 编码 84)	332(HS 编码 72)	
				43(HS 编码 72)	169(HS 编码 73)	
					9(HS 编码 55)	
					15(HS 编码 60)	
24	芬兰	0	6			不适用/无案例
25	格鲁吉亚	0	11			不适用/无案例
26	德国	16	1			不适用/无案例
27	希腊	2	0			不适用/无案例
28	匈牙利	0	1		1(HS 编码 85)	国家代码输入错误
29	印度尼西亚	0	259		5(HS 编码 73)	将安全理事会决议理解为不禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口 HS 编码 73 下的物项/正在对其他贸易物项进行调查
					39(HS 编码 84)	
					30(HS 编码 85)	
30	意大利	0	6		1(HS 编码 84)	供应商是大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国一家公司 (联合王国：未发现来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的进口)
31	卢森堡	12	0	1(HS 编码 84)		编码错误/货物的目的地为大韩民国
				9(HS 编码 85)		
32	马达加斯加	0	176		1(HS 编码 84)	
					3(HS 编码 63)	

编号	会员国	与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 的贸易额		与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的受限制 协调制度编码商品贸易		会员国的回复
		出口至朝鲜民主 主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义 人民共和国进口	出口至朝鲜民主 主义人民共和国	从朝鲜民主主义 人民共和国进口	
33	纳米比亚	0	6		4(HS 编码 84) 2(HS 编码 85)	
34	荷兰	413	33		1(HS 编码 52)	
35	尼日尔	0	66		62(HS 编码 85)	
36	波兰	116	85			不适用/无案例
37	罗马尼亚	0	1		1(HS 编码 73)	有关当局尚未证实从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转让钢铁产品
38	俄罗斯联邦	0	2		1(HS 编码 84)	
39	塞舌尔	0	1 156		726(HS 编码 72) 11(HS 编码 84)	数据不准确/进口的是 HS 编码 72、84 和 85 下的物项
40	斯洛伐克	0	6			不适用/无案例
41	南非	61	39	5(HS 编码 84) 7(HS 编码 73)	7(HS 编码 56) 7(HS 编码 84) 16(HS 编码 85)	
42	西班牙	256	68	231(HS 编码 84) 2(HS 编码 85)	1(HS 编码 58) 40(HS 编码 84) 26(HS 编码 85) 1(HS 编码 63)	
43	泰国	1 637	78	2(HS 编码 74)	19(HS 编码 84) 12(HS 编码 85)	一些申报表将目的地国和来源国误报为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，现已修正
44	土耳其	49	538		41(HS 编码 72) 10(HS 编码 73) 45(HS 编码 84) 212(HS 编码 85) 187(HS 编码 55)	申报时的疏忽错误/来源国是其他国家，如大韩民国
45	大不列颠及北爱尔兰 联合王国	0	1 536		5(HS 编码 73) 1 503(HS 编码 84) 9(HS 编码 85)	提交的国家代码不准确/已确认所有的贸易都是与大韩民国的贸易
46	赞比亚	1 085	5 585	1 085(HS 编码 84)	13(HS 编码 84) 19(HS 编码 85)	
共计		157 040	47 765			

注：截至 2022 年 1 月的资料。

缩写：HS，协调制度。

127. 印度尼西亚告知专家小组，安全理事会各项决议并不禁止从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购协调制度编码 73 下的物项(钢铁制品)。虽然在禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口方面明确列出了协调制度编码 73，但在禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口方面却没有具体提到协调制度编码 73。⁹⁵ 专家小组的非正式指导意见(见附件 62)将协调制度编码 73 列入其监测对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口的部门禁令执行情况的清单。

128. 中国同样指出，决议没有禁止从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口铁合金(协调制度编码 72)，因为决议规定禁止铁和铁矿石，但没有明确提及协调制度编码 72。⁹⁶

129. 由于没有为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口提出明确的协调制度编码，会员国继续以不同方式解释决议的规定。

130. 与往年一样，从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法出口的主要货物包括煤、矿物、铁和纺织品(例如，见关于海上非法出口煤炭的第 80-92 段)。

131. 专家小组注意到，许多会员国无法及时分享其贸易统计数据。因此，专家小组打算继续对开放源码统计数据和会员国提供的数据进行比较分析，以警惕任何可能的差异并调查其原因。

建议

132. 专家小组建议国际标准化组织采取适当措施，防止错误使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和大韩民国的国家代码⁹⁷ (分别为 KP 和 KR)。

133. 专家小组建议会员国精简进出口管制清单，使用违禁商品的非正式清单作为辅助材料(见附件 62)。

134. 专家小组建议会员国海关当局利用上述清单为其管辖范围内的贸易代理人提供信息，以进行尽职调查，特别是在受制裁管辖区附近处理此类商品时。

⁹⁵ 安全理事会第 2371(2017)号决议第 8 段规定，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不得供应、销售或转让……铁和铁矿石，所有国家须禁止从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购买这些材料。第 2397(2017)号决议第 7 段则指出，会员国应禁止直接或间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转让……铁、钢和其他金属(协调制度编码 72-83)。

⁹⁶ 中国还指出：“例如，从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口的协调制度编码 50 下的生丝和废丝属于原材料类别，而不属于安全理事会决议禁止出口的纺织品。”

⁹⁷ 国家代码详见附件 64。

四. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人以及海外工人


禁运

Global Communications (Glocom)

135. 根据专家小组的初步调查、一个会员国提供的信息和媒体报道，⁹⁸ Glocom 公司仍在运营(见图四十四中的网页)，并继续利用其品牌提供和推销越来越多类型的军用无线电、战场雷达和软件控制系统(见附件 65)。

图四十四

Glocom 网站



资料来源：<https://glocom-corp.com>。

136. 专家小组不清楚 Glocom 公司目前所在地，曾试图与该公司联系，以了解其注册详情、公司组成和运营状况，但未收到答复。

137. 设在美利坚合众国马萨诸塞州的 Privacy Protect Business Development 公司注册了 Glocom 的域名证书。专家小组向这家公司询问了它为 Glocom 提供域名

⁹⁸ 见 www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-linked-firm-offering-expanded-range-of-radio-hardware-online。

服务的情况。专家小组还向 Glocom 先前运营所在地马来西亚询问了该国当局近年来对该公司及其关联方采取具体行动的最新情况。据一个会员国称，Pan Systems Pyongyang 自 2019 年以来一直向厄立特里亚的“Zagre Computer Components and Assembly Line Company”出售军用无线电和配件。专家小组向厄立特里亚询问了从 Pan Systems(Glocom)或其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体采购的情况。专家小组尚未收到有关上述所有三个案件的答复。

138. 据一个会员国称，过去几年里，Pan Systems Pyongyang 使用多个幌子公司的名称，向 7 家中国公司订购了军用无线电部件。专家小组要求这些公司提供相关信息。只有 Shenzhen Air Digital Technology Co. Ltd.作了答复，称“本公司从未与朝鲜做过任何生意”。

与《鼯鼠：在朝鲜卧底》有关的案件

139. 纪录片《鼯鼠》显示，2017 年，一名来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军火商和一个由丹麦演员扮演的人物曾商讨在乌干达维多利亚湖的一个岛上建造一处设施，拟用于制造甲基苯丙胺和军火，组件由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供或来自该国。这部纪录片表明，该项目从未付诸实施。⁹⁹ 乌干达在答复专家小组的询问时称，该名演员和这个团队“介绍自己来自挪威皇室……，表示有兴趣购买该岛……[并]承诺会再来乌干达，但这个承诺没有兑现。他们从未透露其真实身份和意图”(见附件 66；关于与该纪录片有关的涉及柬埔寨的一起案件，另见附件 67)。

与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军事合作

140. 专家小组继续调查委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间可能的军事和技术合作，以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能向索马里出口武器的情况(详情见附件 68)。

Chan Han Choi

141. 专家小组此前报告称，代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国开展活动的澳大利亚商人 Chan Han Choi¹⁰⁰ 因从事向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售军火及相关材料等违禁商品的中介活动，于 2017 年 12 月被澳大利亚当局逮捕。2021 年 7 月 23 日，新南威尔士州最高法院判处 Chan 三年零六个月监禁。¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ S/2021/211，附件 88；S/2021/777，第 137 段。

¹⁰⁰ S/2018/171，第 87 和 88 段。

¹⁰¹ 关于 Chan 先生的判决书摘要见附件 69(判决书全文详见 www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/17acff4723618647ad83e770)。

奢侈品禁令执行情况

142. 由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国关闭了边境并几乎完全停止了消费品进口，专家小组没有收到任何关于运送奢侈品(根据安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(iii)段被禁止)的新信息。

143. 据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的消息来源称，消费品(包括酒类)进口几乎完全停止，导致市场价格急剧攀升，电气设备、化妆品、洗涤剂和文具用品等商品的供应普遍不足。¹⁰² 这些消息来源指出，即使是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最富有的消费者也无法买到奢侈品，对奢侈品的市场需求蒸发，私人进口或走私的可能性也已不存在。

144. 一些媒体报道称，由于贸易活动在 2021 年下半年曾得到短暂和有限的恢复，一些面向精英阶层的品牌消费品和奢侈品由运送人道主义援助和医疗用品的船只秘密运到朝鲜，但专家小组无法证实这些报道。

145. 专家小组继续调查 2017-2019 年期间从意大利向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应奔驰豪华轿车背后的网络(见附件 70 和 71)。

146. 专家小组注意到媒体报道称，有人看到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官员使用奔驰 G 级越野车(见附件 72)。应专家小组的要求，戴姆勒公司答复称：“关于所描述的梅赛德斯-奔驰 G 级车……没有任何迹象表明那是防弹车。从车身设计来看似乎是 2013-2018 年间出产的车型。然而，图片上看不到任何技术迹象表明戴姆勒或梅赛德斯-奔驰原始设备制造商对车辆进行了装甲或改装”。

147. 根据会员国的信息，2021 年 4 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国民航总局与中国 Shenyang Power Company Ltd.¹⁰³ 协调，以购买 4 辆价值 60 多万美元的丰田豪华越野车。专家小组正在调查这一信息。专家小组还获得信息称，2021 年 5 月，同一买家与 Jintianda Import and Export Trading Company Ltd.¹⁰⁴ 协调，以购买 10 辆价值约 40 万美元的工业车辆和卡车。该公司没有对专家小组索取资料的要求作出答复。专家小组继续调查 2020 年底疑似从宁波向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运丰田雷克萨斯汽车的事件，它可能涉及 Jiangsu Overseas Group Foreign Economic and Technical。专家小组没有收到对其索取资料要求的任何答复。

148. 专家小组继续调查一起可能的违反事件，涉及一架高端三角钢琴的供应。在 2021 年当地电视网络播放朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国务委员会乐队的音乐会

¹⁰² 见 www.dailynk.com/english/pyongyang-moves-to-increase-imports-of-chinese-consumer-goods-as-market-prices-soar。

¹⁰³ 沈阳力天商贸有限公司。

¹⁰⁴ 沈阳市金天达进出口贸易有限公司。地址：No.6 Changjiang Nanjie, Huanggu district, Shenyang, Liaoning, China (沈阳市皇姑区长江南街 6 号)。

时，画面中出现了这样一架钢琴。¹⁰⁵ 媒体报道称，这是一架施坦威三角钢琴。¹⁰⁶ 专家小组多次向施坦威乐器公司询问情况，但至今未得到答复。

建议

149. 专家小组建议会员国考虑更新出口管制清单，以符合安全理事会第 1718(2006)、1874(2009)、2094(2013)、2270(2016)和 2321(2016)号决议目标的方式反映违禁奢侈品清单，但要避免不必要地扩大清单范围，目的是在贸易恢复后，不限制向平民供应未受禁止的货物，并且不产生负面的人道主义影响。

150. 专家小组再次建议，会员国应鼓励本国从事奢侈品出口的商业实体和国民在合同中列入防止转运到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的条款。

151. 专家小组再次建议，会员国和相关组织应鼓励航运和运输公司提供详尽的最终用户检查系统，同时考虑到转运风险，包括船对船移交和人道主义货物运输方式。

朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司(KPe.001)

152. 专家小组正在调查与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司有关的案件。一起案件涉及朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的一名代表 Kil Jong Hun，此人驻赤道几内亚并在该国开展活动。另一起案件涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Hyong Thae，此人先后在朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司及其在古巴、伊朗伊斯兰共和国和马来西亚的多家关联公司任职(详见附件 73 和 74)。

军需工业部(KPe.028)

153. 专家小组收到的资料显示，2021 年，一家名为 Breeze Group International Trade¹⁰⁷ 的中国公司试图向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售气动气锤。被联合国指认的军需工业部下属两家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公司 Korea Ryonhap Trading Corporation¹⁰⁸ 和 Yanghung Trading Corporation 也参与其中。这些型号为 C41-2000 的气动气锤将从中国丹东运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新义州。这些气锤属于工业机械(协调制度编码 84)，根据安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 7 段被禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口。专家小组尚未收到 Breeze Group International Trade 的答复。

¹⁰⁵ S/2021/777，第 149 段。

¹⁰⁶ 见 www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos。

¹⁰⁷ 微风社国际贸易(北京)有限公司。

¹⁰⁸ 런합무역회사。在专家小组先前的报告(S/2020/840 和 S/2020/840，附件 46)中，该公司被列为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一家隶属于军需工业部的贸易公司。

侦察总局(KPe.031)

网络威胁行为体

154. 专家小组继续调查隶属于侦察总局¹⁰⁹ 的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体，如 Lazarus Group 和 Kimsuky 进行的网络攻击。^{110、111} 2021 年，该国的网络威胁行为体违反相关决议，对全球各地的多类实体，包括与国防有关的重要基础设施进行了攻击，试图获取敏感技术。

155. 专家小组试图获得关于针对大韩民国核工业和国防相关产业的网络攻击的信息。据网络安全公司和媒体报道称，一个网络威胁组织于 2021 年 5 月侵入了韩国原子能研究所的内部网络。¹¹² 据报道，参与发起这次攻击的互联网协议地址与 Kimsuky 使用的攻击基础设施有关。专家小组获悉，同一组织可能曾试图入侵 Korea Aerospace Industries 的虚拟专用网络设备，以获取来自内网的技术数据。

156. 专家小组获悉，Kimsuky 能建立“网络钓鱼”基础设施，模仿知名网站和应用(如微软 Outlook)，诱使受害者输入自己的认证信息。该行为体利用这些盗取的认证信息进行有针对性的攻击。一家网络安全公司报告称，在其中一起案件中，该行为体不仅收集了政府实体的电子邮件地址，而且还收集到了与国际原子能机构一名安保官员有关的电子邮件地址。¹¹³ 据这家网络安全公司称，Kimsuky 据信后来利用这些信息对原子能机构进行了有针对性的攻击。

157. 另一家网络安全公司的调查结果显示，在 2021 年 4 月对一家南非货运和物流公司的攻击中追踪到了名为“Vyveva”的后门恶意软件(极大可能是 Lazarus Group 所为)。¹¹⁴ 此外，专家小组另外收到的信息称，“Vyveva”恶意软件能够渗出文件和修改文件戳记，并利用暗网“TOR”平台进行指挥和控制。进入物流公司网络使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国能够事先获悉货物地点和运输详情，增强规避制裁的能力，也使该国黑客能够部署旨在产生非法收入的勒索软件。

158. 上述企图，包括企图非法获取敏感技术，可能构成朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(c)段和第 2270(2016)号决议第 27 段

¹⁰⁹ 关于侦察总局和其他组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行动中的作用，见 S/2020/840，附件 48。

¹¹⁰ 根据来自多个会员国和公开来源的信息，侦察总局的所谓“第三局”包括不同的网络威胁组织，即 Lazarus Group、Kimsuky、Bluenoroff 和 Andariel。Lazarus Group 以 2014 年对索尼影视娱乐公司的破坏性攻击闻名。Kimsuky 的鱼叉式网络钓鱼攻击臭名昭著，它指导或开展了针对专家小组的网络攻击。Bluenoroff 和 Andariel 是 Lazarus Group 的子组织。

¹¹¹ 关于这些网络威胁团体的详情，见美利坚合众国财政部，“财政部制裁朝鲜国家支持的恶意网络团体”，新闻稿，2019 年 9 月 13 日。

¹¹² 例如见 <https://therecord.media/north-korean-hackers-breach-south-koreas-atomic-research-agency-through-vpn-bug>。

¹¹³ 见 <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/06>。

¹¹⁴ 见 www.welivesecurity.com/2021/04/08/are-you-afreight-dark-watch-out-vyveva-new-lazarus-backdoor。

的行为。一个会员国告知专家小组，目前正在进行调查，以确认是否发生了任何实质性的数据泄露。

159. 一家网络安全公司描述了¹¹⁵ 与 Kimsuky 有关联的网络行为体“TA406”和“TA427”如何使用虚假电子邮件账户，这些账户利用了大韩民国、美国和俄罗斯联邦等国合法个人和实体的身份。多类实体已成为这些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体发起的非法网络活动的目标。一个网络安全组织 2021 年 3 月发表的报告显示，Lazarus Group 又名“Hidden Cobra”，它针对一些日本组织开展了多次攻击行动。¹¹⁶ 一个会员国还告知专家小组，自 2021 年年初以来发生了 350 起来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络活动，目标是该会员国的一家政府机构。几乎所有这些尝试都是针对官方电子邮件的鱼叉式网络钓鱼攻击。另一家网络安全公司于 2022 年 1 月发布报告¹¹⁷ 称，一个名为“Konni”¹¹⁸ 的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体以俄罗斯外交部门为目标，利用新年问候作为鱼叉式网络钓鱼的诱饵。

160. 这些活动构成了间谍行为，旨在为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国规避制裁的策略提供信息和协助。网络行为体以相关实体为目标，以欺诈方式获取相关信息，其目的包括规避制裁的影响以及牟取经济利益，以便为该国的行动提供资金。网络活动的其他趋势包括使用假身份以建立关系，然后发送恶意软件或恶意链接。这也可能导致通过“网络钓鱼”网站获取认证信息。通过成功部署勒索软件产生非法收入的案件构成了违反金融制裁，包括违反安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 11 段(见关于盗窃加密货币的第 182-184 段)。

161. 与专家小组有关的网络攻击仍在继续。专家小组接获了来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体的黑客攻击企图，¹¹⁹ 这些行为体使用经过掩饰的电子邮件账户，以专家小组成员的名义发出网络钓鱼讯息。

¹¹⁵ 见 www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/triple-threat-north-korea-aligned-ta406-scams-spies-and-steals。

¹¹⁶ 见 https://blogs.jpccert.or.jp/en/2021/03/Lazarus_malware3.html。

¹¹⁷ 见 <https://cluster25.io/2022/01/03/konni-targets-the-russian-diplomatic-sector>。

¹¹⁸ 关于专家小组以往报告中对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国该网络行为体的介绍，见 S/2021/211，第 128 段。

¹¹⁹ 见 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/28/north-korea-sanctions-experts-united-nations>。

Sok Kha

162. 根据会员国提供的信息，截至 2020 年年中，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国侦察总局情报人员 Kim Chol Sok(别名 Sok Kha)¹²⁰ 在柬埔寨经营酒店、赌场、餐馆和酒吧，并试图扩大在旅游业以及贵金属开采等其他商业部门的经营活动。¹²¹

163. 柬埔寨当局经过细致调查后得出结论认为，Kim Chol Sok 和 Sok Kha 是同一人，并澄清指出 Sok Kha 持有一本柬埔寨外交护照(编号 D0004492)。¹²² 他们发现 Sok Kha 的出生证明、家庭登记簿和身份证均系伪造，并注销了所有这些证件，包括上述外交护照。

164. 调查结果还显示，Sok Kha 是 C.H. World Travel Co. Ltd.¹²³ 的董事。该公司在柬埔寨大众银行有一个账户。当局关闭了该公司，并冻结了它的账户。

165. 截至 2021 年 10 月，柬埔寨当局正采取法律行动，以使 Sok Kha 归案受审。然而，他自从 2020 年 11 月离开柬埔寨后一直没有返回。¹²⁴ 专家小组对 Sok Kha 案的商业和财务方面的调查仍在继续。

万寿台海外开发会社(KPe.050)**贝宁**

166. 专家小组继续调查在贝宁建造青铜雕像的情况。¹²⁵ 专家小组分析的卫星图像显示，雕像是在 2020 年 6 月至 9 月期间筑起(见附件 77)。

纳米比亚

167. 专家小组向纳米比亚询问了赫鲁特方丹空军基地中据称由万寿台海外开发会社建造的机库(见图四十五)和位于温得和克的纳米比亚国防军新总部的相关情况——这两处工程都于 2017 年建造，此外还询问了万寿台海外开发会社在纳米比亚的其他建筑项目。专家小组尚未收到答复。

¹²⁰ 其他已知的别名包括 Lee Un-Kang、Chang Sok-kha、Kang Hyok、Li Yun-chiang 和 Steven Lee。出生日期：1970 年 1 月 1 日(根据护照)。

¹²¹ 2019 年因腐败被美国财政部指认的 Try Pheap 是 Sok Kha 的商业伙伴。见美国财政部，“财政部制裁腐败和物质支持网络”，新闻稿，2019 年 12 月 9 日。

¹²² 据柬埔寨称，Kim Chol Sok 名下没有护照，但 Sok Kha 名下有 10 本护照(其中 2 本护照有效，因此被注销作废)。护照清单及复印件见附件 75。

¹²³ 公司简要信息见附件 76。

¹²⁴ 根据柬埔寨提供的资料，2003 年至 2020 年期间，Sok Kha 曾前往东南亚和东北亚的多个城市，包括曼谷、胡志明市、吉隆坡、北京、香港和台北。

¹²⁵ [S/2020/840](#)，第 105 段和附件 45；[S/2017/150](#)，第 115 段。

图四十五

赫鲁特方丹空军基地中疑似由万寿台海外开发会社建造的机库
(南纬 19°35'37.64" 东经 18°7'21.86")



资料来源：谷歌地球，由专家小组附加说明：红圈内为疑似新建机库。

海外工人

168. 专家小组进一步调查了在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(海外工人)。由于自 2020 年 1 月起朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实行防疫封闭措施，专家小组注意到人员跨境流动普遍被禁。¹²⁶ 会员国向专家小组报告称，2021 年，有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民仍留在几个国家并继续赚取收入，这违反了安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段。

169. 据一个会员国称，“似乎仍有大量朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人留在中国和俄罗斯的一些地区”，他们因 2020 年初以来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国边境关闭而无法回国。

¹²⁶ S/2021/777，附件一。

中国

170. 会员国向专家小组提供的资料称, 2020 年至 2021 年期间, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体与位于中国的实体合作, 雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(见附件 78)。

171. 根据另一个会员国提供的信息, 2019 年, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体 **Koryo Commercial Bank Ltd.** 同意与一家中国公司建立合资企业, 主要从事大豆油生产和销售(见附件 79)。

172. 专家小组已致函中国及相关实体, 要求提供有关其活动的进一步资料。中国答复专家小组称, “中国一直严格执行关于朝鲜移民工人的相关规定。他们的工作许可证均已在安全理事会决议规定的最后期限前到期”(见附件 80)。专家小组尚未收到相关实体的答复。调查还在继续。

赤道几内亚

173. 据一个会员国称, 至少有 13 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人在赤道几内亚的马拉博和奥亚拉工作(见附件 81)。

老挝人民民主共和国

174. 专家小组从一个会员国获得的资料称, 即使在 2019 年 12 月遣返最后期限之后, 老挝人民民主共和国几家餐馆仍在雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民担任服务员和舞者(见附件 82)。

俄罗斯联邦

175. 根据会员国提供的信息, 担任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 **Ponghwa General Corporation** 驻莫斯科官方代表的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 **Kim Ju Sok**¹²⁷ 促成了多份合同, 以在 2020 至 2021 年期间派遣朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民到俄罗斯联邦从事农业和建筑活动。

176. 该会员国报告称, **Kim** 与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 **Uljibong Cooperation Corporation** 合作, 并与俄罗斯公司 **SMU-07 LLC**¹²⁸ 订立合同, 以在 2020 年 6 月期间向莫斯科及其周边地区的建筑项目派遣最多 100 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民。**Kim Ju Sok** 还与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 **Korea Rungra-888 Trading Corporation** 合作, 以在 2020 年 7 月期间向俄罗斯公司 **Stroy Servis LLC** 派遣至少 60 名学员。¹²⁹

¹²⁷ 据一个会员国称, **Kim Ju Sok** 于 2016 年 10 月以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆官员的身份抵达俄罗斯联邦。

¹²⁸ ООО “СМУ-07”: INN 7725403828。根据国家法人统一登记簿, **SMU-07 LLC** 于 2021 年 4 月 1 日解散。

¹²⁹ ООО “СТРОЙ СЕРВИС”: INN 5015015182。根据国家法人统一登记簿, 截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日, **Stroy Servis LLC** 正在解散中。

177. 俄罗斯联邦答复称“没有关于他(Kim Ju Sok)从事违反安全理事会决议的活动的信息”，并告知专家小组，“询问中提到的两家建筑公司——SMU-07 LLC(未在所述地址注册)和 Stroy Servis LLC——今年都已停止业务。没有关于它们与朝鲜国民接触的信息”(见附件 83)。

越南

178. 据一个会员国称，2021 年留在越南的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民继续在 Koryo 餐厅工作。此外公开资料称，该餐厅出售艺术品，包括万寿台创作社制作的画作(见附件 84)。

五. 金融

179. 专家小组就一项金融调查致函中国(见附件 85a)，该调查涉及与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法采购石油产品有关的资金转移。中国的答复载于附件 85b。

180. 阿拉伯联合酋长国答复了专家小组关于另一项金融调查的询问(见附件 86a)，该调查涉及为船对船移交石油产品支付的款项。阿拉伯联合酋长国的答复载于附件 86b。

银行部门

181. 2021 年 12 月，美国主管部门对一家加拿大跨国银行的美国子公司进行了监管处罚，原因是该行为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻联合国代表团的 5 名雇员办理了 1 479 笔总额为 382 685 美元的交易，并维护这些雇员在该行的 9 个账户。¹³⁰ 根据新闻稿，该行未从美国监管当局获得所需的许可证，该行将此归因于人为错误和过度依赖供应商提供的筛查名单。美国主管部门指出，该行自愿自行披露了违规行为，而且就这些违规行为而言，这是一起“情节不严重的案件”。监管处罚的理由是该行违反了美国对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的制裁制度，但账户数量可能也违反了安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段。¹³¹ 美国主管部门和涉事银行都已采取行动。

通过网络活动非法创收

182. 专家小组收到的资料显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体继续将金融机构以及加密货币公司和交易所作为攻击目标。据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体在 2020 年至 2021 年年中期间从北美、欧洲和亚洲的至少三家加密货币交易所窃取了 5 000 多万美元，这可能反映了朝鲜网络犯罪行为正趋于多样化。

¹³⁰ 见美国财政部，“OFAC settles with TD Bank, N.A. for \$115,005.04 related to apparent violations of the North Korea sanctions regulations and the foreign narcotics kingpin sanctions regulations”，2021 年 12 月 23 日。可查阅 https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20211223_TDBNA.pdf。

¹³¹ 安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段规定，各国应采取措施，限定朝鲜民主主义人民共和国派驻的每个外交官在驻在国境内银行只有 1 个账户。

183. 一家网络安全公司最近的一份报告¹³² 指出, 2021 年, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络行为体对加密货币交易所和投资公司进行七次入侵, 共窃取了价值 4 亿美元的加密货币。这些网络攻击“利用网络钓鱼诱饵、代码漏洞、恶意软件和先进的社会工程学手段, 将资金从这些组织与互联网连接的‘热’钱包中抽走, 并使其进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的地址”。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体获得的加密货币资金要经过一个慎密的洗钱过程, 以便最后套现。¹³³

184. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体开展的谋取收入非法活动。

六. 制裁的意外影响¹³⁴

185. 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段重申, 联合国制裁无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义影响, 也无意对决议没有禁止的活动, 包括经济活动与合作、粮食援助和人道主义援助产生不利影响或作出限制, 并强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国须充分满足朝鲜人民的生活需要, 对此负有首要责任。

186. 观察家将该国目前的状况描述为几近人道主义危机。原因有多个方面, 包括 COVID-19 大流行和由此导致的边境关闭(这可能是过去两年里最重要的因素)、制裁和自然灾害, 以及内部经济政策发生变化, 偏重使用行政指挥方法。¹³⁵

187. 不过, 专家小组的分析侧重于联合国制裁的意外影响。获得这方面数据和证据的渠道有限, 而且没有可靠的方法将联合国制裁的影响与单边制裁制度和国内社会经济问题等其他因素的影响区分开来。

188. 然而毫无疑问, 联合国的制裁无意中影响了人道主义状况和发展权,¹³⁶ 加剧了由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府对经济的内向型和集中化不当管理而造成的问题。尽管制裁的影响并不是导致糟糕人道主义局势的最重要因素, 但它仍不容忽视(见图四十六)。由于安全理事会 2016 年和 2017 年的制裁相关决议, 该

¹³² 见 Chain Analysis, “North Korean hackers have prolific year as their unlaundered cryptocurrency holdings reach all-time high”, 2022 年 1 月 13 日。

¹³³ 在全球范围内强制履行反洗钱义务并将非银行金融机构的活动涵盖在内, 对于打击朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用全球金融系统创收至关重要。

¹³⁴ 两位专家认为, 这一节的标题应与决议的用语一致(本节英文标题使用“impact”一词, 而英文版决议中使用了“consequences”一词)。另一位专家认为, 这个问题需要进一步讨论。

¹³⁵ 在 2021 年底举行的朝鲜劳动党第八届中央委员会第四次全体会议上, 限制市场机制并重新引入国家对经济、特别是对农业的控制权的倾向十分明显。见“Let us strive for our great State’s prosperity and development and our people’s wellbeing: report on 4th plenary meeting of 8th C.C., WPK”, 《劳动新闻》, 2022 年 1 月 1 日。


¹³⁶ 民族国家的这项权利载于《发展权利宣言》, 见大会第 41/128 号决议, 附件; A/41/53。另见联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办), “讨论文件: 发展权对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和其他联合国会员国的影响”, 2021 年 8 月, 第 11 页, 其中宣布“制裁应始终充分考虑到《经济社会文化权利国际公约》的规定”。另见 www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx。

国出口和外汇收入下降，跨境金融业务停止，交通运输受到的限制增加，外国经济和金融实体开始避免任何涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的经营风险。由于这些因素的作用，该国合法获得人道主义必需品和医疗商品的能力受到限制，包括医疗保健在内的社会服务每况愈下(见附件 87；关于专家小组在疫情前对制裁对人道主义领域的可能影响因素的分析，另见附件 88)。

图四十六

联合国制裁是造成人道主义问题的几个因素之一(示例)

(因素追溯自 2018 年(安全理事会决议之后)，2020-2021 年期间后果)



资料来源：专家小组。

189. 任何由制裁造成的负面人道主义影响都可能是长期的，而且与疫情隔离措施没有直接联系。专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人权状况特别报告员托马斯·金塔纳对这些问题的评论意见。¹³⁷ 2021 年 10 月，中国和俄罗斯联邦向安全理事会提交了一份决议草案，呼吁减轻与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的制裁，理由是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国自 2017 年以来没有进行核试验和远程导弹试验。^{138、139}

190. 有助于减轻上述负面影响的国际援助行动目前已大幅减少。为了评估制裁和 COVID-19 大流行对人道主义行动的影响，专家小组调查了大约 40 个组织(包括联合国和非政府援助组织)，其中大部分组织已直接向委员会或通过联合国驻

¹³⁷ 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人权状况特别报告员托马斯·金塔纳在 2021 年 10 月指出“应审查并在必要时放宽安全理事会实施的各项制裁，以便利提供人道主义援助和生存援助，并促进普通公民的适当生活水准权”(A/76/392)。

¹³⁸ 见 www.nknews.org/2021/10/china-and-russia-submit-proposal-to-ease-un-sanctions-on-north-korea-sources。

¹³⁹ 四名专家反对这句话，认为专家小组报告不是发表政治声明的地方。

地协调员或会员国申请了豁免请求(问题清单见附件 89)。¹⁴⁰ 以下分析主要基于所收到的信息(见附件 90):

- 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对所有跨境流动的限制使人道主义行动变得复杂。大多数组织不得不在 2021 年暂停执行和监测工作。一些组织在国际工作人员离开后保留了少量的当地人员
- 缺乏银行业务渠道仍然是导致现金储备耗尽的一个主要问题¹⁴¹
- 即使边境重新开放,各组织对恢复自身业务的可能性仍不抱太乐观态度

191. 2021 年 8 月和 9 月,世界卫生组织和联合国人口基金向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付了约 50 个装有药品的集装箱,但它们后续须经过 90 天的检疫处理和冗长的消毒程序。截至 2022 年 1 月,没有报告称有任何物资到达了目的地(见附件 91)。¹⁴²

192. 非政府组织总体上赞成委员会为简化获得豁免的程序而采取的措施,¹⁴³ 但认为有必要进一步简化程序。一些非政府组织建议对项目给予“永久”或“全面”豁免。¹⁴⁴

建议

193. 专家小组建议委员会审查非政府组织对专家小组调查的答复(见附件 90),并考虑与民间社会接触,以解决朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人道主义危机所涉及的复杂问题,帮助为今后的决策提供依据,并更好地评估人道主义援助需求。

194. 专家小组强调指出,迫切需要采取具体措施,重新建立银行业务渠道。

195. 专家小组赞赏联合国有关机构一年两次就制裁的意外影响进行通报,建议委员会继续这一做法。

196. 专家小组建议安全理事会继续处理各种问题和流程,以减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助行动可能产生的意外不利影响,从而使该国的弱势民众受益,并克服 COVID-19 大流行的后果。

¹⁴⁰ 各组织对专家小组询问的答复是可选择性的,对豁免核准程序没有影响。

¹⁴¹ 世界粮食计划署(粮食署),“粮食署朝鲜国家简报”,2021 年 12 月,可查阅 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000135453.pdf>。

¹⁴² 见 www.nknews.org/2022/01/unicef-says-aid-has-cleared-north-korea-quarantine-on-its-way-for-distribution。

¹⁴³ 非政府组织认可委员会根据其第 7 号执行援助通知对豁免程序作出的显著改进以及在 COVID-19 大流行期间采取的措施,特别是“将豁免有效期从 6 个月延长到 1 年”。然而,如先前分析所述,“对人道主义组织给予永久豁免”和引入医疗和农业设备“白名单”的构想有很多反对者。

¹⁴⁴ 一个非政府组织提到,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国问题全国委员会(见 www.ncnk.org)汇编了关于制裁对国际组织和非政府组织工作的意外影响的资料。

197. 专家小组注意到委员会为简化人道主义豁免申请流程和程序所做的努力取得了积极成果，建议委员会继续这些努力，同时考虑到各个人道主义行为体的建议。

七. 国家执行情况报告

会员国报告相关决议执行情况的现况

198. 截至 2022 年 1 月 28 日，有 66 个会员国提交了关于安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段执行情况的报告，81 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段执行情况的报告，95 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，90 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，107 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况的报告，115 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况的报告。尽管报告总数有所增加，但专家小组注意到，仍有很多会员国(127 个，其中 1 个在 2020 年担任安理会非常任理事国)未就第 2397(2017)号决议提交报告。

199. 另外，会员国、实体和个人对专家小组调查询问的总体答复率仍然偏低。专家小组指出，会员国、实体和个人应遵守安全理事会有关决议，充分配合专家小组的调查。

八. 建议

200. 建议综合清单见附件 93。

Annex 1: COVID-19, Democratic People's Republic of Korea border measures

During the reporting period DPRK maintained its strict COVID-19 blockade imposed in January 2020. Cross-border movement of people and trade were forbidden, and transport links into and out of the country have been frozen. It was only in mid-January 2022 that the cross-border rail link was cautiously re-opened and the “disinfection centre” at Sinuiju, constructed in March-April 2021, was probably used for the first time.

The diplomatic presence in Pyongyang shrunk still further; NGOs are represented by local staff.

Maritime trade is at extremely low levels and has been fundamentally affected by the need for extended periods of off-shore quarantine, followed by time-consuming disinfection of cargoes. Foreign vessels are not permitted to enter DPRK ports.

Brief periods of apparent relaxation of these rules in order to permit extremely limited upticks in trade (for example in May 2021, and then again in September 2021) have been rapidly brought to an end. The global emergence of the Omicron variant appeared to have had a particularly strict impact on the imposition of the border closure.

DPRK continues to claim zero COVID-19 infections to WHO, although the numbers of those tested remains extremely low. The longer term plans of the DPRK government with regard to vaccination or relaxation of the blockade are not known. Media reports suggest that the DPRK government appears to be prepared to maintain the current disposition for several years.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 2: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to nuclear and military developments)

Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK

Date: 09/01/2021 | Source: Minju Choson KCNA

The report detailed the historic course of masterminding a great revolutionary turn for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force.

Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style to meet their unique operational missions. This gave a clearer description of the status of our state as a nuclear weapons state and enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield.

In the period under review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb. By succeeding in the test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-15 on November 29, 2017, the Party Central Committee declared with pride to the world the accomplishment of the historic cause of building the national nuclear force and the cause of building a rocket power.

The great cause of building the national nuclear force, which was impossible to achieve even in 20 to 30 years in terms of existing formula, was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear buildup was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party. This is a miracle unprecedented in history and the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation the Seventh Central Committee performed for the Party and revolution, the country and people and posterity.

The Party Central Committee achieved new great victories by vigorously leading the struggle for upgrading the nuclear force even after the great historic November event in 2017.

Recalling that the Party Central Committee decided to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system and carried out this historic task by relying on the patriotism and loyalty of national defence scientists, the report affirmed that the new-type gigantic rocket on an 11-axis self-propelled launcher displayed during the military parade in celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party fully demonstrated the ultra-modernity and great striking capability of our nuclear force.

The accomplishment of the great cause of building the national nuclear force and its continued development constitute a victory of the organizational and leadership abilities of the Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong Un and a great victory of the national defence scientists and all other Koreans who waged a death-defying struggle with an indomitable faith in independence and valiant spirit.

The report reviewed the fact that new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science one after another to cope with the enemy's desperate arms buildup, thus making our state's superiority in military technology an irreversible one and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting a war on the highest level.

The national defence science sector developed the super-large MLRS, a super-power attack weapon the world's weaponry field had never known, and proceeded to develop ultra-modern

tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.

This enabled us to gain a reliable edge in military technology.

National defence scientists and workers in the munitions industry properly set the orientation of developing main tank of our style following the world's development trends and have begun to enter a new track of development while upgrading production processes. They also achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex, self-propelled gun howitzer and anti-armour weapons.

The report also noted that in the period under review the sector of national defence scientific research was conducting research into perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage, finished research into developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets and was making preparations for their test manufacture.

The report made public with pride that the standard of the goal in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly and it was remodelled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy, that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched and was in the stage of final examination and the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed, and that other achievements were made in national defence research of gigantic significance in developing the People's Army into a powerful one with the strongest military muscle in the world.

The report evaluated that the bold leap forward brought about in the national defence science and munitions industry made sure that the country ranked high in the world in terms of defence capabilities and, at the same time, it was of great significance in realizing the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee for developing the overall Korean revolution.

The report said that a great advance was made in the work of turning the People's Army into elite forces in the period under review.

It is necessary to develop the nuclear technology to a higher level and make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter for more tactical uses. This will make it possible to develop tactical nuclear weapons to be used as various means according to the purposes of operational duty and targets of strike in modern warfare, and continuously push ahead with the production of super-sized nuclear warheads. In this way we will be able to thoroughly contain, control and handle on our own initiative various military threats on the Korean peninsula, which are inevitably accompanied the nuclear threat.

Source: Minju Choson KCNA (in bold and underlined by the Panel).

Annex 3: Construction activities in the southern area of the LWR (39°47'40"N 125°45'18"E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 4: 5MW(e) intermittent cooling water discharge (39°47'53"N 125°45'24"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 5: 50MW(e) reactor spent fuel storage building (39°47'17"N 125°45'43"E)

The Panel notes that the 50MW(e) reactor complex was previously believed to be abandoned and its construction was never completed. After the visit by a delegation from Stanford University to Yongbyon and their discussions with DPRK officials in August 2007, Stanford experts concluded that 50MW(e) reactor was “likely no longer salvageable”.¹



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

¹ Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/khucisacfinalreport_compressed.pdf.

Annex 6: Excerpt of IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (24 November 2021)


Since my report to the Board and General Conference in August of this year we have continued to monitor the DPRK nuclear programme. There are ongoing indications consistent with the operation of the 5MW(e) reactor at the Yongbyon site. There continue to be no indications of operation of the Radiochemical Laboratory since early July 2021. We have observed new and ongoing construction activities at the Yongbyon site, including construction of an annex to the Yongbyon reported Centrifuge Enrichment Facility, the purpose of which has yet to be determined. Near the light water reactor (LWR) under construction a new building is being built, possibly to support reactor construction or maintenance activities. There are ongoing indications of activities at the Kangson complex and the Pyongsan Mine and Concentration Plant.

The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country.

The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme.

Source: IAEA, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (24 November 2021) <https://www.iaea.org/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-24-november-2021> (accessed on 10 December 2021).

Annex 7: Activities at the Yongbyon Centrifuge Plant (39°47'17"N 125°45'43"E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. (15 September 2021).

1) The removal of remaining cooling devices (39° 46' 15" N 125° 44' 56" E)²



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

² According to Member State information, one of the six cooling devices at this uranium enrichment facility was removed in March 2020 and satellite imagery from March to June 2020 analyzed by the Panel showed the removal of one of the devices (see S/2020/840, para. 3).

2) Construction adjacent to uranium enrichment facility (39°46'15"N 125°44'58"E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc.

3) Plumes of steam from UO₂ production plant (39°46'12"N 125°44'55"E)



March 8, 2021



April 6, 2021



April 9, 2021



August 3, 2021



September 15, 2021



September 17, 2021



September 18, 2021

Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 8: Construction at pilot fuel fabrication plant (39°48'06"N 125°45'17"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 9: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38°19'04"N 126°25'54"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. (26 September 2021).

1) New construction of building and the installation of conveyor at the mine (38°20'00"N 126°27'24"E)




Source: Planet Labs Inc.

2) Railcar activities at Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38°19'03"N 126°25'56"E and 38°18'59"N 126°25'52"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

3) Tailings pond of Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38°18'40"N 126°25'44"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 10: Activities at Kangson (38°57'29"N 125°36'43"E and 38°57'29"N 125°36'44"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 11: Activities at Yongdoktong

1) Near the entrance of tunnels (40°01'51"N 125°18'28"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

2) Around the entrance of tunnels (40°01'50"N 125°18'35"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

3) Possible storage for explosives in Yongdoktong area (40°01'50"N 125°18'35"E)

Possible storage for explosives has been observed. The purpose of this facility remains unclear, however, the Panel corroborated the observation of outside expert.



September 26, 2021





September 26, 2021






Source: Planet Labs Inc.



Annex 12: Table summarizing specific scientific collaboration projects between institutes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and universities in China




(1) List of joint studies³. DPRK scientists with underlined names are concurrently affiliated with Chinese universities.






No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject -source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
11		Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	2019	Thin-Walled Structures Volume 142, September 2019, Pages 262-276	A domain decomposition method for elastodynamic problems of functionally graded elliptic shells and panels with elastic constraints https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263823119300370	Choe Kwangnam Department of Light Industry Machinery Engineering, Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering, Pyongyang, 999093. Ri Kwangchol Department of Light Industry Machinery Engineering, Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering, Pyongyang 999093. 



³ About **Choe Kwangnam**; **Ri Kwangchol**; **Yun Kumchol**; S/2021/777, annex 13.




No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
13		Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	2018	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 155, 15 December 2018, Pages 369-381	Three-dimensional exact solution for vibration analysis of thick functionally graded porous (FGP) rectangular plates with arbitrary boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359836818325836	 Choe Kwangnam, Department of Light Industry Machinery Engineering, Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering, Pyongyang, 999093 
19		Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	2018	Composite Structures Volume 194, 15 June 2018, Pages 413-432	Free vibration analysis of coupled functionally graded (FG) doubly-curved revolution shell structures with general boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318307232	Choe Kwangnam Department of Light Industry Machinery Engineering, Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering, Pyongyang, 999093 




No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
22		Kim Il Sung University	2019	International Journal of Modern Physics B Vol. 33, No. 21, 1950235 (2019)	Entanglement of two distant quantum dots with the flip-flop interaction coupled to plasmonic waveguide https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0217979219502357	Ko Myong-Chol Faculty of Physics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Nam-Chol (nc.kim@ryongnamsan.edu.kp) idem Ryom Ju-Song idem Ri Su-Ryon idem 



No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
35		Kim Il Sung University & Kim Chaek University of Technology;	2019	Science & Technology - Other Topics	Study on synthesis and application of tetrabasic lead sulfate as the positive active material additive for lead-acid batteries https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.190882	Kim Myonghak; (kmh311@163.com) Faculty of Applied Chemical Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology, No. 60 Pyongyang Kyogu, and  Kim Mungi Faculty of Applied Chemical Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology, No. 60 Pyongyang Kyogu, Jong Songchol idem Pak Ilman idem Kim Ganghyok idem  Ri Cholnam Institute for Electronic Materials, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang,

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
44		Pyongyang University of Architecture	2018	IEEE-Sensors Journal (Institute of electrical and electronics engineers) Volume: 18, Issue: 11, June 1, 1 2018). DOP: 18 April 2018; DOI: 10.1109/JSEN.2018.2828139	Structural Displacement Monitoring Using Smartphone Camera and Digital Image Correlation https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8340774	 Ri Kwang School of Civil Engineering, Pyongyang University of Architecture, Pyongyang 1001 and 
52		Kim Il sung University & Kim Chaek University of Technology	2019	Applied Sciences Volume 9 Issue 2 10.3390/app9020314	A Damage Model Reflecting the Interaction between Delamination and Intralaminar Crack for Failure Analysis of FRP Laminates https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/9/2/314	Yun Kumchol; (yunkumchol@163.com) Faculty of Mechanics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang 950003 Kwak Songhun Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 950003,  Kim Jonggun Information Center, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang 950003. Ri Cholsu Faculty of Mechanics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang 950003.







No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
53		Kim Chaek University of Technology & Department of Chemistry, University of Science, Pyongyang	2018	Chemical Physics Letters Volume 699, May 2018, Pages 199-207	Adsorption of 1-naphthyl methyl carbamate in water by utilizing a surface molecularly imprinted polymer https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0009261418302422	<p>So Juhyok (so_juhyok@163.com) Department of Chemistry, University of Science, Pyongyang 950003.</p> <p>Pang Cholho Department of Material Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 950003</p> <p></p> <p>Jang Paeksan Nano-physical Engineering Institute, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 950003</p> <p>U Juhyok Kimchaek University of Technology Library, Pyongyang 950003</p> <p>Ri Kumchol Department of Life Science, University of Science, Pyongyang 950003</p> <p>Yun Cholyong Physical Engineering Department, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 950003, and Faculty of Mechanics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang.</p>

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
54		Kim II Sung University & Kim Chaek University of Technology & Chongjin Mine & Metal University	2019	Computers & Structures Volume 215, 15 April 2019, Pages 65-79	A computational methodology for simulating quasi-brittle fracture problems https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S004579491831513X	<p>Yun Kumchol (yunkumchol@163.com) Faculty of Mechanics, Kim II Sung University, Pyongyang 950003, Democratic People's Republic of Korea</p> <p></p> <p>Kim Tae-Jong Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang.</p> <p>Son Namjin Faculty of Mechanics, Kim II Sung University, Pyongyang.</p> <p>Ji Kyongsu Department of Information Engineering, Chongjin Mine & Metal University, Chongjin.</p> <p></p>

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
65		Kim Chaek University of Technology	2019	Fullerenes, Nanotubes and Carbon Nanostructures Volume 27, 2019 - Issue 4	The enhanced and polarized Raman spectra on the spherical aluminum powders encapsulated within graphene nanosheets https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1536383X.2018.1480477	Ju Jong-Min (jjm218@163.com) Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang, and from   Kim Dang-Ho Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang Yu Tok-Chol Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang Pak Kyong-Song Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
77		Kim Il Sung University & Kim Chaek University of Technology	2018	Protection of Metals and Physical Chemistry of Surfaces volume 54, pages 1059–1065 (2018)	Excellent Anti-Corrosive Composite Coating Containing Iron Oxide on AZ31B Mg Alloy https://link.springer.com/article/10.1134/S2070205118060199	<u>Pak Sung-Nam</u> Department of Energy Science, Kim Il Sung University, 999093, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and  Ju Kyong-Sik Institute of Advanced Science, Kim Il Sung University, 999093, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Yun Chol-Yong Kimchaek University of Technology, 950003, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Man-Ho Department of Energy Science, Kim Il Sung University, 999093, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ko Myong-Son idem Ryang Sok-Jin idem Kim Chol-Jin idem U Ju-Hyok Kimchaek University of Technology, 950003, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea Pak Kyong-Song Idem

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
92		Kim Il Sung University	2017	International Journal of Systematic and Evolutionary Microbiology Volume 67, Issue 10	Sphingomonas antarctica sp nov., isolated from Antarctic tundra soil https://www.microbiologyresearch.org/content/journal/ijsem/10.1099/ijsem.0.002253?crawler=true	 Kim Myong Chol College of Life Sciences, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang, DPR of Korea, and
95		Kim Chaek University of Technology	2019	Chinese Journal of Geophysics (in Chinese) 2019, Vol. 62 Issue (6): 2139-2149	2D joint inversion of MT, gravity, magnetic and seismic first-arrival wave travel time with cross-gradient constraints http://en.igg-journals.cn/article/doi/10.6038/cjg2019L0713	 Pak YongChol Resource Exploration and Engineering Department, Kimchaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 999093

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
123		Kim Chaek University of Technology & Hamhung University of Chemical Industry	2018	岩土力学 Rock and Soil Mechanics 39(6):2211-2218	Determination of rock mass mechanical parameters based on quantification and correction method of GSI value http://ytlx.whrsm.ac.cn/EN/10.16285/j.rs.m.2016.2174	<u>Kang Kwang-song</u> School of Mining Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 999093, DPR of Korea, and  <u>Hong Gun-yi</u> School of Mining Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang 999093, DPR of Korea  <u>Pang Gyong-jin</u> Information Technology Exchange Center, Hamhung University of Chemical Industry, Pyongyang 999093, DPR of Korea
127		Department of Engineering, University of Science	2019	International Journal of Engineering Science Volume 142, September 2019, Pages 20-35	An efficient approach for post-buckling analysis of sandwich structures with elastic-plastic material behavior https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0020722519308900	 <u>Choe Jongchol</u> Department of Engineering, University of Science, Unjong District, Pyongyang, and 

No.	Institute in China	DPRK Institutes	Year	Journal or Subject - source of information-	Title and web reference of the source of information	Authors
128		Department of Engineering, University of Science	2019	Thin-Walled Structures Volume 143, October 2019, 106204	The effects of kinematics on post-buckling analysis of sandwich structures https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263823119303076	 Choe Jongchol Department of Engineering, University of Science, Unjong District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and

Source: The Panel from various scientific article databases (see inside the table).

Annex 13: Reply from China to the Panel**6. ITT (OC.324)**

China has always been strictly implementing the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions and has stepped up examination over academic exchanges and cooperation. According to the investigation, there are no prohibited academic exchanges or scientific collaborations between Chinese universities and the DPRK side.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 14: Pyongyang University of Science & Technology (PUST)

(1) About PUST

PUST was established after the agreement between the DPRK authorities and the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture (NAFEC), a non-profit organisation located in Seoul, the Republic of Korea, in 2001 prior to the opening of the University in 2010. PUST operates under the leadership of the NAFEC Board of Directors.

Year	Event
2002/08	Groundbreaking ceremony in Pyongyang
2002/11	Consignment of construction equipment to Pyongyang
2003/10	Road construction
2003/11	First academic meeting (Yanji, China)
2004/04	Building construction commencement
2004/12	Completion of main administration building frame
2005/02	Second academic meeting (Yanji, China)
2005/12	Completion of 10 more building frames
2005/12	PUST Founding Committee Co-Chairmen Inauguration
2006/01	Third academic meeting (Pyongyang)
2007/01	Agreement for Digital Campus establishment
2008/12	Construction of 17 buildings completed 96%
2009/09	PUST Co-Operations' President Inauguration & Grand Opening
2010/04	Fifth academic meeting (Yanji, China)
2010/06	First Graduate Students Admission
2010/10	Official opening
2014/03	Graduation of first 50 graduate students
2014/11	Graduation of the first 100 undergraduate students
2015/03	Graduation of 37 graduate students
2016/04	First 10 female students welcomed as undergraduate students
2016/10	First 3 Dental students began classes in Division of Medical Sciences (DMS)
2016/02	Two more Dental students began classes in DMS
2016/03	Graduation of 12 graduate students and the second set of undergraduate 100 students

Source: PUST website, <https://pust.co/index.php/about-pust/leadership/> (accessed on 29 December 2021).

Source: PUST website, <https://pust.co/index.php/about-pust/facts/> (accessed on 29 December 2021).

(1) Exchange cooperation by “Studying abroad”

The NAFEC website says “Study Abroad: Since 2012, we have been studying for master's degrees at several excellent universities such as Sweden and Brazil, starting with Manchester University and University of Cambridge in the UK. As of 2020, a total of 6 students are studying abroad at the Faculty of Agriculture and Life Sciences, including two PhD students at the University of Cambridge, 2 people at Northeast Forestry University (Harbin), and 2 people at Yanbian University”.



Source: Northeast Asia Education and Culture Cooperation Foundation website, http://neafound.org/_new/bbs/board.php?bo_table=pust4 (accessed 29 December 2021).



(2) International Conference

The website explains about the 4th International Conference:

- Period: 3-4 October 2019
- Content: Keynote speech and thesis presentation in five divisions (Computer Science, General Engineering, Agriculture & Life Science, Medical Science, Int'l Finance & Management)
- Participant: Novoselov Konstantin (Nobel Prize in Physics), 42 speakers from 15 countries including Paserin Vladimir, 51 participants from 13 countries, 38 participants from embassies.

●제4차 국제학술대회

- 기간: 2019.10.3-4
- 내용: Key note speech 및 5개분야별 논문발표(Computer Science, General Engineering, Agriculture & Life Science, Medical Science, Int'l Finance & Management)
- 참가자: Novoselov Konstantin(노벨 물리학상 수상), Paserin Vladimir 외 15개국 42명의 발표자, 13개국 51명 참석, 각국 대사관 38명

[이용약관] [개인정보처리방침]

사단법인 동북아교육문화협력재단 (대표자명: 곽선희) 사업자등록번호: 220-82-01064

사업장 주소: 서울시 강남구 영동대로 112길 42, 2층(삼성동, 인우빌딩) 전화: 02-561-2445 메일: pustnafec@gmail.com


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Source: Northeast Asia Education and Culture Cooperation Foundation website,
http://neafound.org/_new/bbs/board.php?bo_table=pust4 (accessed 29 December 2021).

Annex 15: Websites of Pyongyang University of Science & Technology (PUST) and Erasmus+

The PUST website also refers to funding from Erasmus+ or academic exchange projects (see figure 15-1), whilst the Erasmus+ website lists DPRK as an “eligible country” for sponsorship (see figure 15-2). The Panel asked the EU about the status of academic exchanges involving DPRK scientists, and whether these exchanges have continued in any field or activity relevant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2017). The EU has yet to respond.

Figure 15-1: PUST website about the funding from Erasmus+



Source: Pyongyang University of Science & Technology, <https://pust.co/index.php/2016/12/08/apply-for-european-union-funding-to-come-to-pust/> (accessed 29 December 2021).

Figure 15-2: Erasmus+

The screenshot displays the Erasmus+ Programme Guide website. The header includes the European Commission logo and a language selector set to 'English'. The main navigation bar lists sections: Introduction to the Programme Guide, Part A: General information about the Erasmus+ Programme (selected), Part B: Information about the actions covered by this guide, Part C: Information for applicants, and Part D: Glossary of terms. A breadcrumb trail shows 'You are here: Home / Part A: General information about the Erasmus+ Programme'. A search bar is present with the text 'Search the guide'. The main content area is titled 'Eligible countries' and includes a table of contents on the left with links to Overview, Eligible countries, Important characteristics of the Erasmus+ Programme, Priorities of the Erasmus+ Programme, What are the objectives and important features of the Erasmus+ Programme?, and What is the budget?. The 'Eligible countries' section text states: 'EU Member States take part in the Erasmus+ Programme. In addition, in accordance with article 10 of the Erasmus+ Regulation, the following third countries are associated to the programme¹:' followed by two bullet points: 'members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which are members of the European Economic Area (EEA): Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein;' and 'acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates: Republic of North Macedonia, Republic of Turkey and Republic of Serbia;'. A note mentions that the EU Member States and the above mentioned third countries associated to the programme will be hereafter called 'Programme Countries'. Below this, a list of regions and their associated countries is provided:

- Region 6 Asia⁸**
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, DPR Korea, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam
- Region 7 Central Asia⁹**
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
- Region 8 Latin America¹⁰**
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela
- Region 9¹¹**
Iran, Iraq, Yemen
- Region 10¹²**
South Africa

Source: EU, https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/programme-guide/part-a/eligible-countries#footnote8_7aqtz11 (accessed 29 December 2021).

Annex 16: Excerpt of the reply from the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture (NAFEC)

1) PUST students studying abroad

The Panel asked NAFEC concerning the status of academic exchanges involving DPRK scientists and whether these exchanges have continued in any field or activity relevant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2017). According to the Reply from the NAFEC to the Panel's enquiry, "Since the North Korea's border shutdown, upon the onset of the COVID pandemic on December 2019, no single academic exchange program was undertaken with foreign universities/research institutes...". NAFEC explained that no single lecturer was recruited from the Erasmus projects since 2016. NAFEC provided the Panel with the information of the 19 PUST (students' names, period of their study, degree, major and foreign universities' names) studying abroad since 2016 (see below).

Table : PUST students studying abroad

Location of university	Major	Degree	Period	Number of students
Europe	ALS	Ph.D.	2019.8-present	2
Europe	ALS	Ph.D.	2017.3-2019.12	2
South America	MBA	Master	2017.3-2019.10	2
Europe	ALS	Joint Research	2018.10-2019.4	3
Asia	ALS	Joint Research	2015.12-2016.9	2
Asia	ALS	Master	2016.8-2020.6	2
		Master	2019.9-present	2
Asia	ALS	Joint Research	2017.10-2019.10	2
		Ph.D.	2019.10-present	2

Source: NAFEC, annotated by the Panel.

NAFEC stressed that "...PUST students have nothing at all to do with the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related programs and other weapons of mass destruction programs. Other than PUST students, there are no cases DPRK academics coming through PUST programs for overseas exchanges."

2) Lecture subjects delivered at the PUST

Reply from the NAFEC stated that "...the lecture subjects delivered by the PUST include Basic Physics (lectured by a DPRK faculty member), Basic Computer Sciences, Basic Electrical Engineering, and Basic Industrial Engineering. Geospatial Navigation, Nuclear Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Aeronautical Engineering, Advanced Material Science, Advanced Chemical Engineering, and Advanced Mechanical Engineering are not taught by the PUST at all."

3) Programme of “The 4th International Conference in 2019” held at PUST, DPRK

NAFEC provided the Panel with a comprehensive list of lectures of “The 4th International Conference in 2019” held at the PUST during October 3-4, 2019. Themes of each lecture are as follows:

Theme
Tunnelling Van Der Waals Heterostructures based on Graphene and Hexagonal Boron Nitride
Industry-University Collaborations: the driving force in new technology development
Deep Learning: Keeping it Simple
State of the Blockchain Industry
Smart Building & building transformation
Automation Engineering Education using multibody dynamics tool: A simulation-based Lab Case for inverted pendulum system
Development of flexible electrochemical heavy metal detection and glucose sensors using carbon non-composited and their facile microfabrication techniques
A new type of industrial robot control system based on motion modularity technology
3D technology for dental application
Bioinformatic predictions of the Novel lncRNA encoded water channel in Gilmoa
Chemico-physical method for the transformation of various bacterial species
Local Feed resources base and range improvement for native pigs in Easter Samar, Philippines
Amperometric S-Nitrosothiol Sensor with big enhanced sensitivity using outer Dialysis membrane with Covalently linked Organoselenium Catalyst
Polarimetric Radar Vegetation Index for Biomass estimation in Semi-arid region
Current trends of implant dentistry: To maintain or establish and interproximal Papilla around integrated Implants – A Case Series
Molecular biological analysis of chronic hepatitis B with Delta
Demand Optimisation in diagnostics: Reducing Variation in diagnostic testing in NHS Western Isles
Knowledge, Attitudes and practices towards Antibiotic Use in Upper Respiratory Tract infections among patients seeking primary health care in Singapore
Monitoring of Cholesterol levels in a remote and rural population of patients, pre and post treatment with statins
What are the barriers to antenatal care utilization in Rufisque district, Senegal?: A bottle analysis
Designing powerful brand experiences that shape brand relevance
A global frontier analysis of untapped Regional economic integration Potential
International Build-Operate-Transfer Infrastructure Projects-The experience of China
A study on the conformity of goods and standards established by public law under the CISG
The role of academic society in promoting economic and humanitarian projects internationality

*The table was reconstructed by the Panel based on the information provided by the NAFEC.

Source: NAFEC, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 17: Website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

The website of Kim Chaek University of Technology (KCUT) currently indicates that ten people have been exchanged with “Malaysia IGS company (말레이시아IGS 회사)”, with an address in Kuala Lumpur. The Panel is investigating whether this company is related to the previously investigated front companies of Pan Systems Pte Ltd (aka Glocom), a DPRK manufacturer of military communications equipment. The Panel requested information from Malaysia on alleged (and possibly historical) technical exchanges between KCUT and “Malaysia IGS company”. Malaysia has yet to respond.




Source: Kim Chaek University of Technology, <http://www.kut.edu.kp/index.php/page/index?si=22> (accessed 30 December 2021).

Annex 18: Front companies of Pan Systems Pte Ltd (aka Glocom)

The Glocom website accessed by the Panel shows that International Golden Services Sdn Bhd represented Glocom (figure 18-1). Its address is identical to the address of International Global System Sdn Bhd, which is registered in the Malaysian corporate registry document (figure 18-2). Both companies were recommended for designation in previous Panel reports for involvement in the financing and sale of arms and related materials (figure 18-3).


Figure 18-1: Glocom website⁴



Same address

Source: The Panel

Figure 18-2: Corporate registry of International Global System Sdn Bhd



Business Address : NO.75-2, TINGKAT 2
JALAN THAMBYPILLAI
OFF JALAN TUN SAMBANTHAN
KUALA LUMPUR
WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN

Postcode : 50470

Source: Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM).

⁴ S/2017/150, annex 8-5.

Figure 18-3: The previous Panel's report

139. Although its activities constitute activities prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its Pyongyang operations were run by a Reconnaissance General Bureau agent (Ryang Su Nyo), Glocom has not been designated, despite the Panel's previous recommendation for such action. **The Panel therefore reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services and International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.**

Name:	<u>Pan Systems Pte Ltd (Pyongyang branch)</u>
A.k.a:	<u>Wonbang Trading Co., Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System</u>
Address:	Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Director:	Ryang Su Nyo
Employees:	Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol
Telephone:	+850-218-111 (ext. 8636)

Source: The Panel (S/2019/171, para. 159 and annex 89 recommendation 6; S/2018/171, paras.174-176).

Annex 19: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to military developments)

Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK

Date: 09/01/2021 | Source: Minju Choson KCNA

*The report detailed the historic course of masterminding a great revolutionary turn **for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force.***

*Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, **intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style** to meet their unique operational missions. This gave a clearer description of the status of our state as a nuclear weapons state and enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield.*

*In the period under review **the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb.** By succeeding in the test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-15 on November 29, 2017, the Party Central Committee declared with pride to the world the accomplishment of the historic cause of building the national nuclear force and the cause of building a rocket power.*

*The great cause of building the national nuclear force, which was impossible to achieve even in 20 to 30 years in terms of existing formula, **was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear buildup was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party.** This is a miracle unprecedented in history and the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation the Seventh Central Committee performed for the Party and revolution, the country and people and posterity.*

The Party Central Committee achieved new great victories by vigorously leading the struggle for upgrading the nuclear force even after the great historic November event in 2017.

*Recalling that the Party Central Committee **decided to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system** and carried out this historic task by relying on the patriotism and loyalty of national defence scientists, the report affirmed that the new-type gigantic rocket on an 11-axis self-propelled launcher displayed during the military parade in celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party fully demonstrated the ultra-modernity and great striking capability of our nuclear force.*

The accomplishment of the great cause of building the national nuclear force and its continued development constitute a victory of the organizational and leadership abilities of the Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong Un and a great victory of the national defence scientists and all other Koreans who waged a death-defying struggle with an indomitable faith in independence and valiant spirit.

The report reviewed the fact that **new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science** one after another to cope with the enemy's desperate arms buildup, thus making our state's superiority in military technology an irreversible one and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting a war on the highest level.

The national defence science sector **developed the super-large MLRS**, a super-power attack weapon the world's weaponry field had never known, and proceeded to **develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons** including **new-type tactical rockets** and **intermediate-range cruise missiles** whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.

This enabled us to gain a reliable edge in military technology.

National defence scientists and workers in the munitions industry properly set the orientation of developing main tank of our style following the world's development trends and have begun to enter a new track of development while upgrading production processes. They also **achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex**, self-propelled gun howitzer and anti-armour weapons.

The report also noted that in the period under review the sector of national defence scientific research was conducting research into **perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket** at the final stage, finished research into **developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets** and was making preparations for their test manufacture.

The report made public with pride that the standard of the goal **in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly** and it was remodelled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy, **that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched** and was in the stage of final examination and the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed, and that other achievements were made in national defence research of gigantic significance in developing the People's Army into a powerful one with the strongest military muscle in the world.

The report evaluated that the bold leap forward brought about in the national defence science and munitions industry made sure that the country ranked high in the world in terms of defence capabilities and, at the same time, it was of great significance in realizing the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee for developing the overall Korean revolution.

The report said that a great advance was made in the work of turning the People's Army into elite forces in the period under review.

Source: Minju Choson KCNA (references to Ballistic Missiles in bold annotated by the Panel).

Annex 20: “Self-Defence 2021” arms exhibition on 12 October 2021 and the series of launch tests

Annex 20-1: New *hypersonic ballistic missile Hwasong-8*: last reported launch test on 28 Sept. 2021

The new “*hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile*” so called by the DPRK media was showcased at the exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021 and beforehand was probably tested on 28 September 2021 (see para. 23, annex 22)

As demonstrated in KCNA pictures of the launch and as emphasized by KCTV coverage of the exhibition, the main missile body appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but was probably shorter than, the single-stage Intermediary Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12⁵.

The re-entry vehicle displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” appears to be the same as the one pictured on top of the tested booster, according to the KCNA picture (see figure 20-1-1). According to a Member State, the Hwasong-8 total length is around 14.5 m, with a diameter of 1.4 m. Concerning the re-entry vehicle, its length is around 4.7m with a rear diameter of around 0.9 m. The missile was reported by KCNA, citing Pak Jong Chon, to be a *Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)*. According to the observation of several Member States and experts, this HGV resembled the hypersonic ballistic missile showcased by a Member State at a military parade in 2019.

According to several Member States, the Hwasong-8 is at the early stage of development. The first flight test on 28 September 2021 may not have been successful as shown by the range and altitude flight of the missile. The hypersonic missile is a ballistic missile whose body is similar to that of the Hwasong-12. According to a Member State, the DPRK probably used the support of its cyber hackers to acquire or steal the technological information it needed to develop such a new weapon system, including the design of the hypersonic glide vehicle.

⁵ Hwasong-12 has been tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017, see S/2021/777 para.26, S/2019/171 para.174; S/2018/171 para.7, 12; S/2017/742 para.7-13. A Member State confirmed many similarities identified between the Hwasong-8 and Hwasong-12, with a similar diameter and motorisation based on the DPRK version of the USSR RD-250 engine.

Figure 20-1-1: New Hypersonic BM Hwasong-8 : last reported launch test on 28 Sept. 2021




Source: KCTV, 12 October 2021, 8pm, and Rodong Sinmun (En), 29 September Juche 110 (2021)⁶.

⁶ Video on the "Self-Defence 2021" arms exhibition at "Three revolution Exhibition" (39° 04' 49" N 125° 45' 23" E) available at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61658f2826e3a/> and Article (original version at source): Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-fired, Date: 29/09/2021, available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1632886875-742443353/hypersonic-missile-newly-developed-by-academy-of-defence-science-test-fired/?t=1642625103563and>

Annex 20-2: New SLBM launched from a submarine on 19 October 2021

It is smaller than the SLBM Pukguksong series, whose versions 5 and 1 are shown (from left) in the figure below to the left of the new SLBM. Its shape appears to be based on that of the SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 (see figure 20-2-1).

Figure 20-2-1: New SLBM test on 19 Oct. 2021



Source: KCTV, 20 October 2021, Full Broadcast; KCTV, 12 October 2021, 8pm video on the "Self-Defence 2021" arms exhibition at "Three revolution Exhibition" (39° 04' 49" N 125° 45' 23" E) available at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61658f2826e3a/>, annotated by the Panel

Annex 20-3: China's views on the missile launches**8. Launch activities (OC.300)**

Identifying the nature of the DPRK projectiles is a technical issue, and requires prudent assessment. Further research and assessment is also needed

8

to evaluate the DPRK's missile technology and military capability. Before coming to a clear conclusion, all sides should avoid identifying the nature of projectiles in a hasty manner or overacting, and prevent the escalation of tensions on the Peninsula. We hope the Panel of Experts could perform its duties in an objective and impartial manner, and play a constructive role in advancing the political settlement process of the Korean Peninsula. Malicious speculations should be avoided and controversial contents should not be included in the report.

Annex 21: From September 2021 to January 2022, the DPRK repeatedly tested two types of its new solid-fuelled SRBMs, which it called “*new tactical guided missiles*” (S/2021/211, figure 2). A railway-borne SRBM system⁷ (possible KN-23) was tested twice on 15 September 2021, as well as on 14 January 2022. A track-TEL borne system (possible KN-24) was tested again on 17 January 2022 (S/2020/151, para.194).

On 15 September 2021 (see figure 21-1)⁸ and 14 January 2022 the DPRK launched twice two solid-propellant short-range missiles combining ballistic missile and guidance technology identified by five Member States as SRBMs, and whose shape and flight characteristics (pull-up manoeuvre during flight) resembled the KN-23 with a reduced payload for the test of 15 September 2021 to be able to reach the unusual longer range. Its flight could also be similar to that of the new SRBM launched on 25 March 2021, identified as a possible modification and enlargement of the previously displayed and tested KN-23 SRBM.⁹

The two missiles of the 15 September 2021 (KN-23) were fired in five minutes from a railway-borne launcher located at 39°16'31"N 126°48'17"E (Yangdok area of South Phyongan, see figure 21-2)¹⁰, travelling in an easterly direction around 800 km with an apogee at around 60 km and impacting in the exclusive economic zone of Japan, 300 km north to Hegurajima island off the coast of Noto Peninsula after “a pull-up manoeuvre” detected during the flight.

⁷ A possible modified P61 railcars, see article “North Korea tests multiple long-range missile systems”, Janes on 2 November 2021 available at https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP_8038-JIR and see <http://www.railway-parts.com/news/introduction-of-china-covered-wagon.html>

⁸ Pak Jong-chon, member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the Workers' Party and secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, guided the latest drills, along with other top officials of the Department of Political Leadership over Military Affairs, and officials of the Department of Munitions Industry (KPe.028)¹⁹ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and leading officials of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, and leading officials of the sector of research on national defence science. (KCNA)

⁹ The new SRBM was tested on 25 March 2021. See S/2021/777, para.16, table 1 and annexes 18-1 and 18-2.

¹⁰ Another location nearby was identified by a Member State at 39°16'2.04"N 126°47'17"E but this location is not totally relevant with the KCNA video giving an idea of the length of the tunnel and the curve of the track

The two missiles of 14 January 2022 (KN-23) were fired in 11 minutes from a railway-borne launcher (display at the “self-defence 2021” exhibition, see figure 9 from the main text) located in the area of Uiju, Phyongsan Province possibly in the rectangle S-W corner 40° 13' 10" N 124° 34' 02" E, N-E corner 40° 13' 06" N 124° 33' 57" E, see figure 21-3), travelling in an north-easterly direction around 400 to 430 km with an apogee between 36 and 50 km and impacting an uninhabited island (possible location 40° 38' 50" N 129° 33' 02" E") after a possible “pull-up manoeuvre” during the flight.

The two missiles of 17 January 2022 (KN-24) were fired in less than four minutes from a tracked TEL¹¹ (displayed at the “Self-defence 2021” exhibition, see figure 10 from the main text) located in the area of the Sunan Pyongyang international airport, possibly in the extreme north of the unused runway (39° 15' 44" N 125° 40' 34" E, see figure 21-4), traveling in an easterly direction around 300 to 380km with an apogee between 42 and 50km and impacting an uninhabited island (possible location 40° 38' 50" N 129° 33' 02" E") after a possible “pull-up manoeuvre” during the flight.

¹¹ The TEL chassis may be based on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis, derived from T62 and T72 (S/2020/151, annex 58.4.2).

Figure 21-1: 15 Sep .2021 - Two ballistic missiles launched from a railway-borne platform




Source: KCTV, 16 September 2021 (39° 16' 31" N 126° 48' 17" E), and KCTV, 12 October 2021, 8pm ("Three revolution Exhibition", 39° 04' 49" N 125° 45' 23" E).

Figure 21-2: The rail network provides another option for concealing and launching DPRK missiles



Source: Google Earth, 30 December 2016; Planet Labs Inc. 18 September 2021, 02 02 54 UTC; 2 October 2021, 03 00 UTC.

Figure 21-3: 14 Jan. 2022 – Operational launch test of two SRBMs (possible KN-23) from a railway-borne missile system



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 14 January 2022, 02 27 UTC; 12 January 2022, 01 44 UTC; 22 August 2021, 02 29 UTC; KCNA picture from <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-1> to 7 and from Rodong Sinmun (15 January 2022); KCTV, 15 January 2022.

Figure 21-4: 17 January 2022 – Operational launch test of two SRBMs (possible KN-24) from a tracked-TEL



Source: KCTV, 18 January 2022, 8pm Bulletin available at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61e6c3cec3e8f/>
 Planet Labs Inc. 25 August 2021, 06 56 UTC; 16 January 2022, 01 58 UTC; 17 January 2022, 02 20 UTC.

Annex 22: On 28 September 2021 (local time) a “hypersonic gliding warhead” delivered by a ballistic missile (named Hwasong-8 by the DPRK) launched in an easterly direction from Toyang in the area of Jonchon

On 28 September 2021,¹² the DPRK launched a ballistic missile whose main body and exhaust plume appeared to be from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12.¹³ Called by the DPRK “*the hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile*” its possible manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle looked like a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) that resembled the solid fuel propellant hypersonic ballistic missile showcased by a Member State at a military parade in 2019. The missile was fired from the Mpuong-ri area, (Jagang province), travelling eastwards for about 200 km with an apogee between 30 and 60km and impacting waters off the east coast after following a depressed trajectory probably related to an early engine shutdown or switch-off.

¹² Pak Jong-chon, member of the Presidium of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee watched the test-launch with leading officials in the sector of national defence science. (KCNA)

¹³ Hwasong-12 was tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017. See S/2021/777, para.26; S/2019/171, para.174; S/2018/171, paras.7, 12; S/2017/742, paras.7-13.

Figure 22-1: Launch test of a possible hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile on 28 September 2021



Source: KCTV, 12 October 2021, and KCNA and Rodong Sinmun (En) (original version at source), 29 September 2021¹⁴


¹⁴ KCTV, 12 October 2021, and KCNA and Rodong Sinmun (En) (original version at source), 29 September; Juche 110 (2021), Article: Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-fired Date: 29/09/2021 |available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1632886875-742443353/hypersonic-missile-newly-developed-by-academy-of-defence-science-test-fired/?t=1642625103563and>

Annex 23: On 19 October 2021 (local time), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launched in an easterly direction from a submarine in the Sinpo area.

On 19 October 2021¹⁵, the DPRK launched a solid-propellant short-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile whose design is smaller than the SLBM Pukguksong missile series and appears to be based on that the SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 as well as its flight characteristics with pull-up manoeuvre (See figure 20-2-1 at annex 20-2). Called by the DPRK “the new SLBM” it would have been launched from a Gorae/Sinpo-B-class experimental ballistic missile submarine called “8.24 Yongung” according to KCNA and two Member States (see figure 23-1). The missile was fired from a submarine (or from a submersible test stand barge, see figure 23-2) temporary located off the coast of Sinpo south shipyard (Hamgyong province), traveling eastwards for about 600 km with an apogee between 50 and 60 km and impacting waters after “a pull-up manoeuvre” detected during the flight.

¹⁵ Yu Jin, department director of the Central Committee, guided the test-launch along with Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066)¹, vice department director of the Department of Munitions Industry (KPe.028) and leading officials of the Academy of Defence Science (KPe.021) (KCNA).

Figure 23-1: Possible use of a Gorae/Sinpo-B-class experimental BM submarine (the “August 24 Hero Warship”) as a submersible launch platform¹⁶



Source: KCTV, 20 October 2021, Full Broadcast annotated by the Panel.

¹⁶ The period from 2013 to 2014 was marked by the development of the experimental Gorae-class submarine launch platform (aka Sinpo-B, see S/2020/151, para. 196, S/2017/150, para. 40 and S/2016/157, paras. 41 to 44).

Figure 23-2: Focus on the movements of the submersible test stand barge and of one of the support vessels located originally in the secure boat basin of the Sinpo south shipyard between 17 and 20 October 2021 (40° 01' 34" N 128° 09' 59" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 17 October 2021, UTC 05 11 - 03 06- 01 46 - Planet Labs Inc., 18 October 2021, UTC 05 18 - 03 30- 01 52 - Planet Labs Inc. 20 October 2021, UTC 04 53 - 01 53.

Annex 24: 5 January and 11 January 2022 (local time): two possibly similar new ballistic missiles that, according to the DPRK, deliver “the hypersonic gliding warhead”. Launched in an easterly direction from Toyang in the area of Jonchon.

On 5 January and 11 January 2022, the DPRK launched two ballistic missiles (possibly the same type) whose main body and exhaust plume appeared to be from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but was shorter than, the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12 (see figure 24-1 and figure 24-2). The DPRK used the description “hypersonic glide vehicle” in connection with the missiles. Their possible manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) resembled the KN-23, KN-24 and the new SLBM ballistic missiles (see above).

The missile launched on 5 January was fired from the Mpuong-ri area, (Jagang province), travelling eastwards for about 500 km with an apogee 50 km¹⁷ and impacting waters off the east coast.

The missile launched on 11 January was fired from the same area and impacted off the east coast, but, according to a Member State, flew more than 700 km with an apogee of 60 km and reached up to a maximum speed of Mach 10 (12 240km/h)¹⁸. There was an “improvement” compared with the missile tested on 5 January 2022, which the DPRK claimed to have been a hypersonic missile.

Kim Jong Un officially attended the missile test on 11 January with Jo Yong Won, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau (KCNA 12 January 2022).

¹⁷ The DPRK claimed to have launched a “hypersonic missile” with a “re-entry vehicle” which “flew 700 km with a lateral movement of 120 km”.

¹⁸ The DPRK claimed to have launched a “hypersonic missile” with a “re-entry vehicle”. “The test fire was aimed at making a final confirmation of the overall specifications of the developed hypersonic weapon system. The hypersonic missile was launched into the sky. The hypersonic gliding warhead was separated from the launched missile, made a gliding re-leap from the point of 600 kilometres and 240-kilometre acute circular flight from the initial launch azimuth to the pinpoint to hit the target in the waters 1,000 kilometres away. The final test fire more clearly proved the superb manoeuvrability of the hypersonic gliding warhead” from KCNA Voice of Korea article “General Secretary Kim Jong Un watches test fire of hypersonic missile”, 12 January 2022, available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1641945680-505763594/general-secretary-kim-jong-un-watches-test-fire-of-hypersonic-missile/?t=1649732870380> (emphasis Panel’s).


Figure 24-1: Launch test of a new MRBM and its possible MaRV on 5 January 2022



Source: KCTV, 12 October 2021, and KCNA, 6 January 2022¹⁹

¹⁹ KCNA at https://www.nknews.org/pro/wp-content/uploads/kcna-watch/kcna_kp_en/images/MM00289748.jpg?t=1649371935222 and KCTV, 12 October 2021, 8pm, video on the "Self-Defence 2021" arms exhibition at "Three revolution Exhibition" (39° 04' 49" N 125° 45' 23" E), available at <https://kcnavatch.org/kctv-arch/ive/61658f2826e3a/> and <https://kcnavatch.org/?t=1649723100702>

Figure 24-2: Launch test of a new SRBM/MRBM and its possible MaRV on 11 January 2022




Source: KCNA at https://www.nknews.org/pro/wp-content/uploads/kcna-watch/kcna_kp_en/images/MM00289748.jpg?t=1649371935222 and <https://kcna-watch.org/?t=1649723100702>

Annex 25: Activity at the Sinpo south shipyard since August 2021


Sustained activity was detected in the **secure boat basin** between August and December 2021, which was likely to be related to the preparation of the launch test of the new SLBM before 19 October 2021 and the associated technical improvements as well the maintenance or reparation operation during December (see figures 25-1 and 25-2). According to the analysis of satellite imagery by two thinktanks²⁰ the GORAE/SINPO-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) was observed on the 13 December 2021 in the dry dock located at 40° 01' 53" N 128° 12' 35" E, probably for repairs or improvements of the vessel.

²⁰ See “Sinpo South Shipyard: The SINPO-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Returns to Secure Basin After Hull Maintenance” from the Stimson center 38 North publication, 5 January 2022 available at <https://www.38north.org/2022/01/sinpho-south-shipyard-the-sinpo-class-ballistic-missile-submarine-returns-to-secure-basin-after-hull-maintenance/>
And see “Sinpo-class Submarine Damaged During October 19 Test Launch” from CSIS Beyond the Parallel, 7 January 2022, available at <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sinpo-class-submarine-damaged-during-october-19-test-launch/>

Figure 25-1: Activity in secure boat basin around the submarine berth from August to December 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 12 October 2021, 22 29 UTC; 15 October 2021, 04 41 UTC; 18 October 2021, 02 16 UTC; 20 October 2021, 01 26 UTC; 27 October 2021, 23 33 UTC; 28 October 2021, 23 07 UTC; 29 October 2021, 22 43 UTC; Google Earth, 31 August 2021.

Figure 25-2: Various details of activity and presence of the submarine and submersible barge

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 12 November 2021, UTC 23 42; 25 November 2021, 05 26 UTC; 3 December 2021, 02 00 UTC; 8 December 2021, 02 10 UTC; 25 December 2021, 23 59 UTC; 27 December 2021, 23 50 UTC.

Infrastructure activity at the Sinpo south shipyard since August 2021

At the Sinpo south shipyard, construction and maintenance of infrastructure continued, but slowly throughout 2021. In July, a dredging barge (40° 01' 19" N 128° 09' 52" E) was observed in front of the new construction hall, in line with the slipway. The dredger probably excavated this area to facilitate the eventual berthing of a dry dock, potentially to be used to transport the new submarine when it leaves the construction hall. (see figure 25-3)²¹ The pier renovation (40° 00' 32" N 128° 08' 50" E) and housing construction (40° 00' 38" N 128° 09' 22" E) at the south continued but construction of the semi-buried shelter (40° 00' 41" N 128° 08' 53" E) has not yet resumed (see figure 25-4). The new buildings (40° 01' 08" N 128° 09' 26" E) in the area of the static test stand appear to be finalized.

²¹ See the report "Sinpo South Shipyard Update", the Center for Strategic and International Studies-Beyond Parallel (CSIS), 8 September 2021. Available at <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sinpo-south-shipyard-update/>

Figure 25-3: A dredger barge was observed (40° 01' 18" N 128° 09' 53" E) in front and alongside the south side of the new construction hall 's slipway from 17 July to 23 July 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 17 July 2021, 08 51 57 UTC; 20 July 2021, 02 04 UTC; 23 July 2021, 06 28 UTC; 8 December 2021, 02 10 UTC.

Figure 25-4: The construction or renovation of the pier (40° 00' 32" N 128° 08' 50" E) located in front of the buried submarine shelter (40° 00' 41" N 128° 08' 53" E) and the finalization of the housing at the cape (40 ° 00 ' 38 " N 128 ° 09 ' 22 " E)




Source: Planet Labs Inc., 11 September 2021, 23 33 UTC, 8 December 2021, 02 10 UTC.

Annex 26: Activity at the Nampo naval shipyard since August 2021 regarding the submersible test stand barge maintenance

In Nampo naval shipyard, the submersible missile test stand barge, which is mounted on a temporary static trolley on rails was still under maintenance or improvement in September 2021 (S/2021/777, annex 19, and S/2021/211, para. 23, annex 15). The satellite imagery (38° 43' 08" N 125° 23' 28" E) showed very well the possible missile launch tube in the center of the submersible platform, covered by its closed hatch (see figure 26-1).

Figure 26-1: Submersible missile test stand barge in Nampo was still under repair or improvement in September 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 29 September 2021, 05 23 UTC; Google Earth, 5 May, 5 June, 12 June and 20 July 2021.

**Annex 27: Developments at Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory) and at No. 112 Factory
(see S/2021/777, annex 21)**


The overall modernization of the infrastructure of the Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory, 40° 03' 16" N 125° 13' 16" E) in charge of ballistic missile TEL production has stalled in the second half of 2021, with little changes observed by satellite imagery (see figure 27-1). This is also true of the new building under construction near No. 112 Factory since 2020, where an IRBM Hwasong-12 was launched on 14 May 2017 (see figure 27-2).

Figure 27-1: The “Kusong tank factory” renovation slowdown in the second half of 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 December 2021, 01 46 42 UTC; Google Earth, 14 November 2021; Planet Labs Inc., 14 August 2021, 02 22 UTC; Planet Labs Inc., 24 July 2021, 05 27 UTC.

Figure 27-2: Construction of a large building in the Factory No. 112 area has continued slowly, but a new structure has been added to its eastern side since September.



Source: Google Earth, 14 November 2021; Planet Labs Inc. 24 July 2021, 05 27 UTC.

Annex 28: Procurement of Illicit and WMD related Commodities through O Yong Ho's Procurement Activities

28-1. According to a Member State, from 2016 to 2020, O Yong Ho²² attempted to purchase aramid fibre (Kevlar)²³, equipment including winders²⁴ used to produce aramid fibre, as well as a Russian version of a spinning nozzle.²⁵ For these transactions, O Yong Ho used the cover terms “clothing equipment” and “textile machines”. To strengthen DPRK’s domestic production of aramid fibres, O Yong Ho also sought four specific chemicals.²⁶

Despite the disruption of such purchase attempts by the Russian Federation in 2016, O Yong Ho²⁷ succeeded in purchasing 300kgs of Ruslan VM-600 Kevlar fibre in October that year. In late 2016, he notified Moscow based Parsek LLC’s²⁸ Director of Development, Mr. Roman Anatolyevich Alar,²⁹^{30 31 32} of his intent to purchase 500kg of Kevlar thread and awaited notification of funding to finalise the purchase. He was also in contact with the currently dissolved company PTKT Kayur LLC³³ which may have been involved in facilitating the transactions. He continued to attempt to procure Ruslan aramid

²² Date of birth: 25 December 1961, Diplomatic Passport no. 108410041 (issued 13 October 2018, expires 13 October 2023).

²³ In 2020, O Yong Ho purchased 100kg of Aramid fibre.

²⁴ The purchase of winders, fibres and materials continued into May/June 2019. O Yong Ho was actively moving these transactions on 7 and 20 June 2019.

²⁵ Spinning nozzle containing 200-300 holes sized between 0.08-0.1mm, made from a platinum palladium alloy to prevent corrosion.

²⁶ Polyorganohydride silozane, designator BS94SILRES, (*to produce high-strength high-modulus aramid fibres*) (1 kg); Polyhydrogen methyl silozane, designator 136-41, (1 kg); polyethylhydride silozane (1 kg); Silicon resin, designator 139-297, (*relates to a paint having anticorrosive and fire-resistant properties*) (1 kg); a secondary impregnation liquid EDT-10 (2 kg).

²⁷ On 12 January 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) individuals responsible for procuring goods for the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile-related available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0555>

²⁸ Source: Parsek LLC, a Moscow based company, INN 7714789249 available at <https://spark-interfax.ru/system/home/card#/company/E1B0CBC619A249959CD23CC9EE2AC612/101>

²⁹ LLC Parsek and its Director of Development Mr. Alar (Роман Анатольевич Аларь) have yet to respond to the Panel’s request for information on these transactions.

³⁰ Source: INN 370400863660 available at <https://spark-interfax.ru/system/home/card#/physicalperson/inn-370400863660/1>

³¹ *In a related action, the Department of State designated DPRK national O Yong Ho, Russian national Roman Anatolyevich Alar, and Russian entity Parsek LLC pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having engaged in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery by DPRK, see, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated on 12 January 2022, five Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) individuals responsible for procuring goods for the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile-related available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0555>*

³² Consecutive Russian MOFA’s statement: “*In a comment on this case the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry M.V.Zakharova denied accusations of “key role” of Russian citizen R.A. Alar and the Parsek company in the supply of components and technologies for “the entire DPRK missile program” and noted that Russia “is consistently committed to all its non-proliferation obligations both through the UN Security Council and within the framework of international and multilateral instruments to which it is a party.”*”, available at https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1794453/

³³ PTKT Kayur LLC: INN 7726299256. According to the reply of Russian authorities, based on the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, PTKT Kayur LLC was dissolved on 29 July 2021.

fibre from the same company in 2019 and 2020. In 2020, O Yong Ho purchased 100kg of Aramid fibre from Parsek LLC and was expected to place a much larger order in the middle of the same year.

In response to the Panel's enquiries concerning Parsek LLC, the Russian Federation stated that "*Parsek LLC supplies and provides after-sales service for equipment used in cable, power supply and control systems diagnostics and also sells related expendable materials and accessory parts. According to information received from company representatives, they had indeed been approached in 2018 by employees of the North Korean company Ponghwa with a request to arrange the supply of a lathe, condensers, bearings of various design, as well as Russian-made aramid fibre, but this request was rejected in view of the Security Council sanctions in place*".

28-2. In 2018, O Yong Ho allegedly approached at least one other company in Russia to procure stainless steel. According to the Member State, between 2016 and 2018, he attempted to buy steel used in the production of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and purchased nine tonnes in March 2018³⁴ from another Russian company to be delivered to the DPRK. He compiled an advanced payment return confirmation including the following details about the purchase:

- Contract item was stainless steel 12X18H10T-6 (Russian-origin).
- Delivery period for an arrival in Moscow was within 10 days of contract conclusion, and arrival of a container at Tumangang Railway Station on the Russian/DPRK border was within 30 days of contract acceptance.
- Document was dated 27 February, signed by a representative of the Korean Natural Resources Development Investment Corporation (KPe.010)³⁵ named O Yong Son.

28-3. Information provided by the Member State stated that between early July 2016 to late October 2016 O Yong Ho made progress in purchasing 3000 tonnes of the specific steel used in the manufacture of the hull of DPRK ballistic missile submarines.³⁶ He brought a delegation of DPRK officials to Russia in late 2016 to inspect the steel.

28-4. In addition, the Member State provided information that from 2016 to 2020, O Yong Ho attempted to purchase bearings for use by the DPRK's Rocket Industry department. In mid-March 2016, he received a commercial proposal from Parsek LLC, which was prepared by Roman Anatolyevich Alar

³⁴ He purchased 9 tonnes of 12X18H10T-6 stainless steel, (*the Austenite, Russia GOCT standard stainless steel and heat resistant steel*).

³⁵ KPe.010 Name: GREEN PINE ASSOCIATED CORPORATION
A.k.a.: a) CHO'NGSONG UNITED TRADING COMPANY b) CHONGSONG YONHAP c) CH'O'NGSONG YO'NHAP d) CHOSUN CHAWO'N KAEBAL T'UJA HOESA e) JINDALLAE f) KU'MHAERYONG COMPANY LTD. g) NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION h) SAEINGP'IL COMPANY i) National Resources Development and Investment Corporation j) Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials>

³⁶ Steel HY130, F500W, D40S, E40S used for shipbuilding as well as 08KH15N5D2T. Cost was 223,000 Roubles (\$3,496) per tonne, which was more than USD10M worth of steel.

³⁷ Артём Михайлович Калинин

and signed by the company's General Director Artem Mikhaylovich Kalinkin.³⁷ The proposal was on the supply of aviation oil and several models of ball bearings with applications to MTCR Category 1 and 2, ballistic missile guidance, navigation and control systems.³⁸ DPRK has previously procured several of these models on behalf of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), a known entity carrying out WMD and ballistic missile work (about aramid see above Sec.XX1). In late January 2020, O Yong Ho provided a price quote for 7 types of bearings.³⁹ DPRK has previously procured several of these models on behalf of SSRC. Parsek LLC and its executives have yet to respond to the Panel's request for information on these transactions.

The Russian Federation also noted in its reply, that "*the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control did not issue permits to Parsek LLC for the export (transfer to foreign persons) of materials, such as kevlar or aramid fiber or steel of various grades, or bearings or technical data or other products*" (see annex 29).

28-5. According to the Member State's information, O Yong Ho was interested in instructions and technical expertise on solid propellant production. In June 2018, he received from Roman Anatolyevich Alar a hand-written and typed copy of a letter containing instructions for using OSF brand catalyst in solid rocket fuel mixtures:

1. *Use a 5 tonnes rocket charge;*
2. *Pour with the mixture powder;*
3. *Use ammonium perchlorate as an oxidiser;*
4. *Use a specific impulse of the rocket engine of 250 seconds, noting the specific impulse does not increase with the use of this OSF brand catalyst.*⁴⁰

In the same vein, on 28 December 2019, O Yong Ho received Kompas CAD drawings of a Russian TRDD-50 cruise missile from a missile/rocket scientist (allegedly deceased), who was located in the Russian Federation.

28-6. In October 2017, O Yong Ho sought hot and cold isostatic presses.⁴¹ Isostatic presses are used in making nose tips for Re-entry Vehicles and nozzle inserts for rocket motors.


³⁸ Parsek LLC's proposal included more than 500 units of the following bearings, 24-45YU4T (*Deep groove ball bearing*); 4-2000083; 4-6023 or 4-6023E (*Deep groove ball bearings. Magneto type bearings. Complete*); 5-26; 5-6025 (*Angular Contact Ball Bearings dimensions*); 5-640065; 5-6W9YUT; Aviation oil OKB-122-3 (*Lubricants for Mi-17, NYCOLUBE 123 Gde. 3 132-19 OKB 122-3 TU 6-02-897 lend of a petroleum base stock and a polysiloxane, for the lubrication of aviation turbines, Compressors and gyro instruments. Information available at <https://www.nyco-group.com/site/content/uploads/MI-17%20product%20list-NYCO.pdf>*)

³⁹ 1000 units of bearings such as A-26; 4-6023 (*Type: Deep groove ball bearings. Magneto type bearings. Complete*); 4-6025; 5-60096; 5-640065; 5-640095; RA 5160 (*Removable angular ball bearings, open*).

⁴⁰ The OSF catalyst allows for uniform burning and prevents the development of vibration or pulsing burning which leads to detonation in a short period of time.

⁴¹ Its specifications a cold isostatic press, maximum operating pressure of 300 MPA, an effective workspace for the high-pressure vessel of 630 x 1200mm; a hot isostatic press, maximum operating pressure of 150 MPA, a maximum operating temperature of 1500 (pres deg), and an effective workspace for the high-pressure vessel of 630 x 1200mm. Some of these systems have applications to MTCR 2.B.2, MTCR 6.B.3. Category.

Figure 28-1: O Yong Ho's procurement activities



Source: The Panel.

Annex 29: Reply of the Russian Federation, dated 5 October 2021

В связи с запросом группы экспертов санкционного Комитета СБ 1718 по КНДР ОС.256 сообщаем, что О Ён Хо (O Yong Ho) является сотрудником аппарата торгового советника посольства КНДР в Москве, курирующим закупки в нашей стране продукции гражданского назначения и товаров народного потребления. Информацией о его причастности к незаконным операциям российские компетентные органы не располагают.

Данные о внешнеторговых контрактах, заключенных лицами, указанными в запросе, а также сведения о вывозе из России в Северную Корею перечисленных там товаров, подпадающих под действие международных санкционных ограничений, в информационных ресурсах российских таможенных органов отсутствуют.

ООО «Парсек» осуществляет поставки и гарантийное обслуживание оборудования для диагностики кабельных линий, источников электропитания и систем управления, а также реализует расходные материалы и комплектующие к ним. По информации, полученной от представителей данной организации, к ним в 2018 г. действительно обращались сотрудники северокорейской компании «Понхва» с просьбой об организации поставки токарно-фрезерного станка, конденсаторов, подшипников различной модификации, а также арамидной нити российского производства, однако в связи с действующим санкционным режимом СБ ООН данная просьба была отклонена.

ФСТЭК России не выдавала ООО «Парсек» разрешительных документов для осуществления экспорта (передачи иностранным лицам) материалов (кевларовое или арамидное волокно, сталь различных марок), подшипников или технических данных либо иной продукции.

По данным единого государственного реестра юридических лиц, ООО «Проектно-технологический консультативный центр «Каюр» ликвидировано 29 июля 2021 г.

Translated from Russian

In connection with the request contained in letter OC.256 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), we should like to inform you that Mr. O Yong Ho is an employee of the office of the Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Moscow in charge of procurement of civilian production-related and consumer goods in our country. The Russian authorities have no information about his involvement in illegal operations.

The Russian customs authorities have no information regarding foreign trade contracts concluded by the persons named in the letter or the export from Russia to North Korea of goods subject to international sanctions listed in the letter.

Parsek LLC supplies and provides after-sales service for equipment used in cable, power supply and control systems diagnostics and also sells related expendable materials and accessory parts. According to information received from company representatives, they had indeed been approached in 2018 by employees of the North Korean company Ponghwa with a request to arrange the supply of a lathe, condensers, bearings of various design, as well as Russian-made aramid fibre, but this request was rejected in view of the Security Council sanctions in place.

The Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control did not issue permits to Parsek LLC for the export (transfer to foreign persons) of materials, such as kevlar or aramid fiber or steel of various grades, or bearings or technical data or other products.

According to the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, PTKT Kayur LLC was dissolved on 29 July 2021.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 30: DPRK procurement activities (Kim Jong Dok and Rim Ryong Nam)

30-1 Kim Jong Dok

The Panel has reported that Korea Machinery General Trading (KMGT), represented by Kim Jong Dok, regularly placed orders of sensitive industrial materials, including 1Cr18Ni9Ti stainless steel,⁵³ which is known to be used for aeronautical purposes as well as for the fabrication of liquid-propelled ballistic missile engines.⁴³

According to a Member State, Kim Jong Dok's placed orders (at least four times since January 2021) with Dandong-based Dandong Jongsan Trading (aka Dandong Dingshan Trading)⁴⁴ for not only 1Cr18Ni9Ti stainless steel but also valves, pumps and ball bearings. Kim's main contact from Dandong Jongsan Trading was Jon Gon Hua (aka Tian Jinhua).⁴⁵ Kim informed Jon Gon Hua that he particularly turned to several Chinese companies to place his orders, including Zibo Stirling Mechanical Equipment Co. Ltd.⁴⁶ and Shandong Jinjian Heavy Mining Equipment Co. Ltd.⁴⁷ (see figure 30-1 for Kim's Procurement Activities)

The procured items, including stainless steel, are prohibited from being supplied to the DPRK by paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). In addition, pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 27 of resolution 2270 (2016), any item that could contribute to development of the operational capabilities of the DPRK's armed forces, or to the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction programs, is prohibited from being exported to the DPRK.

The Panel has yet to receive replies to its enquiries from these companies.

⁴² S/2021/777, para. 22 and annex 27.

⁴³ Joint advisory issued by US Government detailing DPRK's efforts to procure sensitive material and technology mention that steel alloys containing titanium are likely imports for DPRK's ballistic missile programmes, and explicitly lists 1Cr18Ni9Ti as one such alloy. See https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20200901_nk_ballistic_missile_advisory.pdf


⁴⁴ 丹东鼎山贸易有限公司

⁴⁵ Jon Gon Hua is likely a DPRK national and Dandong Jongsan a front company of the KMGT to acquire sensitive material in China. He is said to be one of the directors of the company with LI Faming.

⁴⁶ 淄博斯特林机械设备有限公司, a company in Zibo established in 2014 which specializes in manufacturing vacuum pumps and mechanic equipment.

⁴⁷ 山东金键重型矿山设备有限公司, a company in Zhaoyuan established in 2013 which focuses in selling mining equipment.

Figure 30-1: Kim Jong Dok's (attempted) procurement activities



Source: Member State, illustrated by the Panel.

30-2 Rim Ryong Nam

Multiple Member States provided information to the Panel that a Shenyang-based individual, Rim Ryong Nam,^{48 49} has been acting as a procurement representative for DPRK's Munitions Industry Department.⁵⁰ According to the information, in early 2018, Rim sought to purchase aluminum powder and other commodities, including those known to be used in solid propellant manufacture : trimethylaziridnyl phosphine oxide (MAPO),⁵¹ industrial-use argon, electrolytic copper, metallic chrome, acetone, and steel plates.⁵² In addition, in 2019 and 2020, Rim purchased and successfully shipped many tons of aluminum powder on multiple occasions to the DPRK, destined for the Ministry of Rocket Industry (aka Rocket Industry Department) as end user.⁵³

According to a Member State, some of the aluminum powder and other missile-applicable chemicals were reported to have been supplied by Shandong Zhangqiu Metallic Pigment Co., Ltd.⁵⁴ In effecting this procurement, Rim worked directly with Zheng Xin (aka Cho'ng Sin, Jong Sin(郑鑫)), the legal representative of Shenyang Jingchengjin Import & Export Co., Ltd. (see figure 30-2 for Rim's procurement activities).

Such export of aluminum powder to the DPRK may constitute a violation of various resolutions including: paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006); paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009); paragraph 9 of resolution 2087 (2013); paragraphs 7, 14, 15, 16 of resolution 2270 (2016); and paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017).

China replied *"China has conducted careful investigation based on the information provided by the Panel. We did not find any transactions of aluminum powder by RIM Ryong Nam within China. Nor did we find any information of the company registered under this person's name. RIM currently is not within the territory of China"*. No replies have yet been received from the companies.

⁴⁸ Rim is a DPRK national and his DoB is December 5, 1978. Acquired information also suggests that he is directly involved with a company called China Yantai Panocean Shipping Agency Co. Ltd (烟台泛洋船务代理有限公司).

⁴⁹ In 2019, Rim Ryong Nam was also directly involved in an effort to purchase tractors, operating as a middleman for payments. These payments also involved the accounts of the well-known Russia-based Korea Ungum Corporation, a DPRK Foreign Trade Bank front company (see S/2021/211 para. 141 ; S/2020/151 para 173 ; S/2019/691 para 56).

⁵⁰ Munitions Industry Department (MID) has been designated (KPe.028) by the Security Council (resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#)) for its involvement in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program.


⁵¹ S/2020/840, annex 6-3 (MAPO is a bonding agent used for propellant of solid fuel missiles).

⁵² Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) controls both aluminum powder (item 4.C.2.c of the MTCR Annex) and MAPO (item 4.C.6.a

⁵³ Ministry of Rocket Industry (aka Rocket Industry Department) is a subordinate organization to the MID (KPe.028).

⁵⁴ 章丘市金属颜料有限公司铝粉厂

Figure 30-2: Rim Ryong Nam's procurement activities



Source: Member State, illustrated by the Panel.

Annex 31: Report to the 1718 Committee by 50 Member States on the DPRK's breach of the refined petroleum cap in Security Council resolution 2397 (2017)

REPORT TO THE UN 1718 COMMITTEE: THE DPRK'S BREACH OF THE UNSCR 2397 REFINED PETROLEUM CAP

The Republic of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Palau, Peru, the Republic of Poland, Portugal, the State of Qatar, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, remain gravely concerned regarding large-scale evasion of restrictions the UN Security Council has imposed on the Democratic Republic of Korea's (DPRK) import of refined petroleum products. UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2397 operative paragraph (OP) 5 restricts the DPRK to importing no more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per year. Any Member State supplying, selling, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK is required to submit reports to the UN 1718 Committee informing it of the transfers every 30 days in order to allow the Committee to maintain an accounting of the DPRK's imports.

Moreover, UNSCR 2375 OP 11 prohibits UN Member States from engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with any DPRK-flagged vessel of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK. Nevertheless, DPRK-flagged vessels continue to conduct STS transfers on a regular basis as the DPRK's primary means of importing refined petroleum. The information in this report demonstrates that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 annual 500,000 barrel cap for 2021.

This submission further affirms previous submissions from 2018, 2019, and 2020 (see S/AC.49/2018/NOTE.213 and S/AC.49/2019/NOTE.134) and Panel of Experts reporting (see maritime section of S/2018/171, S/2019/171, S/2019/691, S/2020/151, S/2020/840, S/2021/211, and S/2021/777) that exhaustively demonstrated and detailed the illicit practices employed by the DPRK to circumvent UNSCR-mandated restrictions on its ability to import refined petroleum products. As a result, this report will not seek to repeat in detail the specific information the DPRK's evasive practices previously outlined in previous formal submissions to the UN 1718 Committee. These practices continue unabated, but the DPRK utilizes an ever-evolving fleet of vessels under its flag or its direct control to perpetrate pervasive and ongoing sanctions evasion.

This report demonstrates that the DPRK continues to conduct UN-prohibited STS transfers and imports of refined petroleum that are not reported to the 1718 Committee as required, and again this year has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 OP 5 refined petroleum products cap of 500,000 barrels per annum. This report supplies images and import volume data for vessels that continue to make deliveries of refined petroleum into DPRK ports and in the DPRK's territorial sea, without these deliveries being reported to the UN 1718 Committee. STS transfers of any cargo are explicitly prohibited by UNSCR 2375, so the relevant Member States involved in supplying refined petroleum products to DPRK tankers fail to report these volumes to avoid self-incrimination. As a result, the UN 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's imports vastly

underrepresents the volume of refined petroleum products that actually enter the DPRK. The overarching purpose of UNSCR 2397's provision limiting the DPRK's ability to import refined petroleum products is to limit the DPRK's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, which are a threat to international peace and security and are prohibited by numerous UNSCRs. The restriction on the DPRK's refined petroleum products imports is critical to ensuring that the DPRK chooses to halt these prohibited programs and completely denuclearize. If the DPRK is able to continue evading international sanctions, it will have little incentive to make such choices. As long as the DPRK continues to import refined petroleum products in excess of the UN-mandated cap with limited accountability at the UN, UNSCR 2397 OP 5 will remain ineffectual – which also undermines both the DPRK UNSCRs as well as the UN 1718 Committee.

We estimate that, this year alone, the DPRK has imported over 525,000 barrels via 18 confirmed tanker deliveries and 11 laden DPRK-flagged tankers that were waiting outside of DPRK ports to discharge their cargo as of September 30. As discussed in previous submissions on the DPRK breaching the import cap in 2018, 2019, and 2020, this report cannot provide an exact figure for each delivery of refined petroleum products to the DPRK, as that information is not readily available to any UN Member State other than the DPRK. This report instead calculates how much petroleum was acquired by the DPRK based on each vessel's dead weight tonnage. In 2021, all known refined petroleum transfers to the DPRK utilized DPRK-flagged vessels, a change from previous years when foreign-flagged delivery vessels directly unloaded petroleum at DPRK ports. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, oil was acquired by DPRK-flagged ships from foreign flagged vessels via STS, and those laden DPRK-flagged ships then underwent quarantine measures outside of the lock-gates near DPRK ports prior to delivering their petroleum cargoes.

We assess that each tanker is at least 90 percent laden due to the risks and costs involved in conducting illicit STS in order to acquire refined petroleum. Given the relative scarcity of refined petroleum products in the DPRK as well as the high cost of obtaining illicit petroleum cargoes via STS, it is highly unlikely that DPRK tankers deployed in search of fuel via STS transfers would return to DPRK ports with less than 90 percent of its cargo capacity filled. The expenditure of resources and risks of disruption to the tanker itself during these journeys, as well as the DPRK's dependence on imported refined petroleum, would not justify the DPRK tanker in question returning to port with less than 90 percent of its cargo capacity filled. Therefore, the 90 percent laden capacity volume is employed for this report.

We are providing images of 18 unreported deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports, which, when aggregated, represent 323,865 barrels of illicit imports. In addition, we are providing imagery of 11 DPRK-flagged vessels that were waiting outside of DPRK ports to discharge their cargo as of September 30, which represents another 202,102 barrels. Combined, these volumes represent 525,967 barrels of illicit imports -- constituting a clear breach of the cap imposed by UNSCR 2397 OP 5.

Table 1 and 2 below documents each of these transfers and provides an associated volume for each one.


TABLE 1: DPRK-FLAGGED VESSELS THAT HAVE DISCHARGED IN 2021

					BARRELS
<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>FLAG STATE</u>	<u>IMO</u>	<u>DISCHARGE DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>90% Laden</u>
AN SAN 1	DPRK	7303803	18-Jun, 2021	CHONGJIN	20,270.3
UN HUNG	DPRK	9045962	21-Jun, 2021	NAMPO	24,873.8
SIN PHYONG 2	DPRK	8817007	29-Jun, 2021	HUNGNAM	14,208.8
PO CHON	DPRK	8848276	2-Jul, 2021	NAMPO	23,881.5
SAM JONG 2	DPRK	7408873	11-Jul, 2021	HUNGNAM	16,922.3
RYE SONG GANG 1	DPRK	7389704	17-Jul, 2021	HUNGNAM	20,270.3
YU JONG 2	DPRK	8604917	19-Jul, 2021	HUNGNAM	8,140.5
JI SONG 6	DPRK	8898740	21-Jul, 2021	NAMPO	8,437.5
PAEK MA	DPRK	9066978	25-Jul, 2021	NAMPO	15,187.5
CHIL BO SAN	DPRK	8711021	29-Jul, 2021	HUNGNAM	13,493.3
SAE BYOL	DPRK	8916293	29-Jul, 2021	HUNGNAM	7,762.5
KUM JIN GANG 3	DPRK	8791667	8-Aug, 2021	NAMPO	33,635.3
SAM JONG 1	DPRK	8405311	22-Aug, 2021	HUNGNAM	11,238.8
PU RYONG	DPRK	8705539	25-Aug, 2021	NAMPO	19,500.8
NAM SAN 8	DPRK	8122347	3-Sep, 2021	NAMPO	21,262.5
KUM JIN GANG 2	DPRK	NONE	3-Sep, 2021	NAMPO	15,842.3
CHON MA SAN	DPRK	8660313	16-Sep, 2021	NAMPO	24,063.8
UN HUNG	DPRK	9045962	21-Sep, 2021	NAMPO	24,873.8
SUBTOTAL					323,865.0

TABLE 2: LADEN DPRK-FLAGGED VESSELS CURRENTLY WAITING TO DISCHARGE

					BARRELS
<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>FLAG STATE</u>	<u>IMO</u>	<u>DISCHARGE DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>90% Laden</u>
CHONG RYONG SAN	DPRK	NONE	N/A	NAMPO	13,466.3
AN SAN 1	DPRK	7303803	N/A	NAMPO	20,270.3
KUM JIN GANG 3	DPRK	8791667	N/A	NAMPO	33,635.3
KUM UN SAN	DPRK	8720436	N/A	NAMPO	13,972.5
MU BONG 1	DPRK	8610461	N/A	NAMPO	13,486.5
PU RYONG	DPRK	8705539	N/A	NAMPO	19,500.8

RYE SONG GANG	DPRK	7389704	N/A	NAMPO	20,270.3
SONG WON	DPRK	8613360	N/A	NAMPO	14,181.8
YU JONG 2	DPRK	8604917	N/A	NAMPO	8,140.5
YU SON	DPRK	8691702	N/A	NAMPO	22,936.5
SIN PHYONG 5	DPRK	8865121	N/A	HUNGNAM	22,241.3
SUBTOTAL					202,101.8
TOTAL DISCHARGED AND AWAITING DISCHARGE					525,966.8





As Table 3 above demonstrates, the DPRK has clearly surpassed the UNSCR 2397 refined petroleum products import cap in 2021. As of the submission of this report, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has additionally reported 38,334 barrels of refined petroleum transfers to the UN 1718 Committee for the months of January through August 2021, bringing the


DPRK's overall total of refined petroleum product imports in 2021 to more than 564,301 barrels as of September 30, 2021.

Given the information provided herein, we request that the 1718 Committee immediately make an official determination that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2021 has exceeded the 500,000 barrel annual cap and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. Similarly, the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying information in order to make a determination in its next report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap.


APPENDIX 1: DPRK-FLAGGED VESSELS THAT HAVE DISCHARGED IN 2021














APPENDIX 2: LADEN DPRK-FLAGGED VESSELS CURRENTLY WAITING TO DISCHARGE









Annex 32: Responses of China and Russia to report on breach of the cap on refined petroleum deliveries to DPRK**Communication dated 13 December 2021 from the delegation of China to the 1718 Committee**

Any action of the Committee should be taken on the basis of solid evidence and sufficient facts. The report in this proposal does not provide concrete evidence of DPRK-flagged vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum products, or an accurate and verifiable amount of refined petroleum products in each delivery. Its conclusion is only based on assumptions and estimations. It is neither scientific nor prudent to reach such a conclusion that the annual limit has been exceeded. In addition, estimations of the delivery volume for each shipment contained in this report do not even match that of the previous reports submitted by relevant Member States. China needs more time to study this proposal and would like to put it on hold. The Member States that made this proposal are recommended to provide more factual, accurate and verifiable information for the Committee's consideration.

Communication dated 13 December 2021 from the delegation of the Russian Federation to the 1718 Committee

In regard of refined petroleum cap Russia would like to recall the provisions of the Security Council resolution 2397, which stipulates that the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. In the absence of the aforementioned notification of the Committee, export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK does not contravene the requirements of the 1718 sanctions regime. We understand the concerns expressed by the Member States in their letter. At the same time it is not possible to verify the accuracy of the provided information and its conclusions. Russia would like to put it on hold.

Annex 33: Deliveries of DPRK tankers of unreported refined petroleum at DPRK ports, June to September 2021

The following lists the DPRK-flagged vessels at its various home ports with unreported refined petroleum deliveries.

Table 1

VESSELS THAT HAVE DISCHARGED IN 2021				
SHIP NAME	IMO	DISCHARGE DATE	LOCATION	BARRELS 90% Laden
AN SAN 1	7303803	18-Jun	CHONGJIN	20,270.3
UN HUNG	9045962	21-Jun	NAMPO	24,873.8
SIN PHYONG 2	8817007	29-Jun	HUNGNAM	14,208.8
PO CHON	8848276	2-Jul	NAMPO	23,881.5
SAM JONG 2	7408873	11-Jul	HUNGNAM	16,922.3
RYE SONG GANG 1	7389704	17-Jul	HUNGNAM	20,270.3
YU JONG 2	8604917	19-Jul	HUNGNAM	8,140.5
JI SONG 6	8898740	21-Jul	NAMPO	8,437.5
PAEK MA	9066978	25-Jul	NAMPO	15,187.5
CHIL BO SAN	8711021	29-Jul	HUNGNAM	13,493.3
SAE BYOL	8916293	29-Jul	HUNGNAM	7,762.5
KUM JIN GANG 3	8791667	8-Aug	NAMPO	33,635.3
SAM JONG 1	8405311	22-Aug	HUNGNAM	11,238.8
PU RYONG	8705539	25-Aug	NAMPO	19,500.8
NAM SAN 8	8122347	3-Sep	NAMPO	21,262.5
KUM JIN GANG 2	NONE	3-Sep	NAMPO	15,842.3
CHON MA SAN	8660313	16-Sep	NAMPO	24,063.8
UN HUNG	9045962	21-Sep	NAMPO	24,873.8
SUBTOTAL				323,865.0
LADEN VESSELS CURRENTLY WAITING TO DISCHARGE				
SHIP NAME	IMO	DISCHARGE DATE	LOCATION	BARRELS 90% Laden
CHONG RYONG SAN	NONE	N/A	NAMPO	13,466.3
AN SAN 1	7303803	N/A	NAMPO	20,270.3
KUM JIN GANG 3	8791667	N/A	NAMPO	33,635.3
KUM UN SAN	8720436	N/A	NAMPO	13,972.5
MU BONG 1	8610461	N/A	NAMPO	13,486.5
PU RYONG	8705539	N/A	NAMPO	19,500.8
RYE SONG GANG	7389704	N/A	NAMPO	20,270.3
SONG WON	8613360	N/A	NAMPO	14,181.8
YU JONG 2	8604917	N/A	NAMPO	8,140.5
YU SON	8691702	N/A	NAMPO	22,936.5
SIN PHYONG 5	8865121	N/A	HUNGNAM	22,241.3
SUBTOTAL				202,101.8
TOAL DISCHARGED AND AWAITING DISCHARGE				525,966.8

**Table 1:
Delivery Volumes
of Documented
Deliveries**

*NOTE: The Member State has provided imagery for each of the DPRK-flagged vessels.

The above-mentioned vessels have been featured in previous Panel reports for delivering illicit refined petroleum to the DPRK. The Panel's reports and its investigations have illustrated that DPRK tankers typically do not enter third country ports to avoid detection and detention. They typically obtain their refined petroleum cargo via ship-to-ship transfers at sea. The modus operandi includes using smaller unmarked vessels or vessels without IMO numbers used to transfer the oil cargo from suspect vessels and then to DPRK-flagged or direct delivery vessels. Such transfer tactics are conducted with the express purpose of avoiding easy detection of oil transfers to DPRK-linked vessels. The Panel considers such transfers as aiding and facilitating delivery of illicit refined petroleum to the DPRK. The Panel's investigations in this report give examples of ship-to-ship transfers involving the various DPRK-flagged tankers listed at table 1.

A think tank reported⁵⁵ that DPRK tankers have continued to deliver unreported refined petroleum products to DPRK ports for the remainder of the year 2021. A sample of the vessels at ports for the months of October, November and December are at figure 33:

Figure 33: Sample imagery of DPRK-flagged vessels at Nampo port for the months of October, November and December 2021




Source: RUSI, Maxar Technologies (left to right: NAM SAM 8 on 17 October 2021, YU SON on 12 November 2021 and PAEK MA on 3 December 2021).

⁵⁵ See <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/north-koreas-oil-terminals-come-back-life-imports-breach-uncsc-cap>

Annex 34: Stateless Direct Delivery vessels in the Korea Bay, April 2021

The Panel in several reports highlighted the stateless direct delivery vessel XING MING YANG 888 (IMO: 8410847) had broadcasted on multiple false identifiers over time. In November 2020, the vessel transmitted a fraudulent identity as the Honduras-flagged VIFIN (MMSI: 334191000), with a call sign associated with the direct delivery vessel VIFINE (IMO: 9045962) (see figure 34-1), now sailing as the DPRK-flagged UN HUNG⁵⁶. The XING MING YANG 888, which was historically flagged under the DPRK (as ZUNXIA NG)⁵⁷ before being flagged out, likely retained its DPRK-links.

Figure 34-1: XING MING YANG 888 sailing with a call sign associated with another direct delivery vessel, VIFINE (nka DPRK-flagged UN HUNG), Sansha Bay, 1 November 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel (inset imagery, Member State).

On 24 April 2021, satellite imagery showed three stateless vessels, XING MING YANG 888 (IMO: 8410847), SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082) and HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) anchored inside of the DPRK's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (see figure 34-2). These vessels have been proposed by the Panel for designation and repeatedly featured in Panel reports for sanctions evasion activities.

⁵⁶ August 2020.

⁵⁷ 2010-2014.

Low resolution imagery a day later showed the likely XING MING YANG 888 meeting with another vessel measuring 85 meters in length still within the DPRK's western coast's EEZ at similar coordinates (see figure 34-2). The Panel notes only two oil tankers in the DPRK's fleet appear to fit that length, RYE SONG GANG 1 (IMO: 7389704) and AN SAN 1 (IMO: 7303803).


Figure 34-2: Likely XING MING YANG 888, Korea Bay, 25 April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

The AN SAN 1 was located on the east coast of the DPRK at Chongjin port area on 21 April 2021, with the RYE SONG GANG 1 at a closer location anchored at Nampo port area on 19 April 2021 (see figure 34-3), indicating the RYE SONG GANG 1 as the candidate for the ship-to-ship transfer.


Figure 34-3: AN SAN 1 at the DPRK's eastern port of Chongjin and the RYE SONG GANG 1 at the DPRK's western port of Nampo, April 2021



Source: (left) IHS Markit Seaweb; (right) Planet Labs Inc.

Both the AN SAN 1 and RYE SONG GANG 1 continued to call at DPRK ports to discharge refined petroleum in 2021 (see figure 34-4). Both the AN SAN 1 and the RYE SONG GANG 1 have a combined full (90% laden) capacity of 20,270.3 barrels of refined petroleum.

Figure 34-4: AN SAN 1 and RYE SONG GANG 1 at Chongin and Hungnam ports respectively, in June and July 2021



Source: Member State.

The following table lists the direct delivery vessels observed by the Panel in or near the DPRK's EEZ in 2021. The listed vessels have been previously investigated and recommended by the Panel for designation for the illicit transfer of refined petroleum to the DPRK. Given that the DPRK's COVID-19 restrictions appear to only allow its flagged vessels to enter port, direct delivery vessels have sailed towards the DPRK's EEZ to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers instead. The table lists the load capacity of each of the vessels (DWT⁵⁸):

Table of direct delivery vessels in DPRK EEZ or engaged in ship-to-ship transfers, 2021

Vessel	DWT	In or around DPRK EEZ or engaged in ship-to-ship transfers in 2021
DIAMOND 8	9,273	Yes
HOKONG* sailing as SHUNKAI	3,995	Yes
NEW KONK	8,057	Yes
SUBBLIC	5,989	Yes
XING MING YANG 888	7,303	Yes
UNICA sailing as HAISHUN 2	4,865	Yes

*Subject to demolition

Source: The Panel.

⁵⁸ DWT or dead-weight tonnage is a measure of a ship's carrying capacity that includes the amount of (oil) cargo, water, crew and provision stores that a ship can carry. The ships' DWT are sourced from the IMO.

Annex 35: Pattern of behavior of direct delivery vessel UNICA (IMO: 8514306)

The Panel first reported on the then Sierra Leone-flagged vessel UNICA in 2020 when it delivered unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK on multiple occasions⁵⁹.

The UNICA shared a similar pattern of behavior as that of the NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) as well as other direct delivery vessels. In December 2017, the Hong Kong-incorporated Rui He (HK) Marine Co Ltd became the owner and manager of UNICA. The vessel was re-flagged under Niue in the same month. A maritime database platform lists the vessel as flagged unknown shortly thereafter, until the vessel was re-flagged under Sierra Leone in October 2018. During this period, UNICA's intermittent AIS transmissions indicated arrived at the Bama River in Fujian Province by January 2018 and visited at least two shipyards, including at Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd. / 福建省易和船舶重工有限责任公司, (hereafter "Fujian Yihe") in October / November 2018 (see figure 35).

Figure 35: UNICA at the Baima River in January 2018, and at Fujian Yihe shipyard, October 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

NOTE: Satellite imagery is presented for location purposes only and not registered on the same date as the AIS signal overlays.

⁵⁹ S/2021/151, para. 20 and annex 2.

In October 2018, the vessel again transferred ownership and management to BVI-registered Prospera Pacific International, with the Hong Kong-incorporated Nuwanni International Ship as its Document of Compliance (DOC) company holder. The vessel was also re-flagged under Sierra Leone. As the Panel had previously reported, the Nuwanni International⁶⁰ also served as DOC holder company to the SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082), another direct delivery vessel. The company also listed its address⁶¹ that is shared by a corporate service registry provider associated with other entities that owned direct delivery vessels.

The vessel's AIS history showed it was more recently back at Fujian Yihe in April 2021, transmitting as the LITON.

Source: The Panel.

⁶⁰ Dissolved in July 2019.

⁶¹ Room 502C, 5th Floor, Ho King Commercial Building, Fa Yuen Street, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China.

Annex 36: Table of laundered identifiers used by direct delivery and other suspect vessels

Table 36: Direct Delivery vessels occasionally transmitting on fraudulent identifiers^a

<i>Name</i>	<i>IMO No.</i>	<i>Transmitting as</i>	<i>MMSI No.</i>	<i>Last port State control inspected</i>
NEW KONK	9036387	MOUSON F. LONLINE	511444000 312162000	July 2018
SUBBLIC	8126082	HAI ZHOU 168	667001397	May 2004
UNICA ^b	8514306	LITON HAISHUN 2	457106000 457400047	No data

Source: Panel.

^a The table is not exhaustive and represents what has been presented in the Panel's reports.

^b See annex 37.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 37: Direct delivery vessel UNICA (IMO: 8514306) transmitting as LITON and HAISHUN 2

The UNICA is a stateless vessel that has been recommended by the Panel for unreported illicit deliveries refined petroleum to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020. It was observed along the Baima River in Fujian Province, China, transmitting intermittently on a Mongolia-associated MMSI: 457106000 that belongs to the LITON (IMO: 8346395) in April and July 2021 (see figure 37-1).


Figure 37-1: UNICA along the Baima River, April and July 2021



Source: (top) Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel; (bottom) Member State.

The vessel sailed out of Baima River by 31 August 2021 (see figure 37-2).


Figure 37-2: UNICA as LITON anchored at Baima River prior to sailing out, 29 August 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

In September 2021, AIS transmissions overlay showed the UNICA transmitting on another fraudulent identity as the HAISHUN 2 (MMSI: 457400047). The vessel was transmitting near Dongyin Island, an area the Panel has previously identified where direct delivery and other suspects vessels have either transited or anchored in (see figure 37-3). Further, the vessel was not transmitting an IMO number and broadcasted the same callsign JVGN7 that the UNICA had used when it broadcasted as the LITON at Baima River two months earlier.

Figure 37-3: UNICA transmitting as HAISHUN 2, Dongyin Island, 18 September 2021



Source: Member State.

Annex 38: Network of linked entities associated with direct delivery vessels

The NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387), like other vessels investigated by the Panel that delivered illicit refined petroleum to DPRK ports (termed “direct delivery vessels”), were acquired by new owners in 2018 / 2019 before they began their illicit oil deliveries⁶².

The NEW KONK’s registered owner, New Konk Ocean International Company Limited (新康海洋國際有限公司) and the VIFINE ‘s (now DPRK-flagged UN HUNG) (IMO: 9045962) then registered owner Hongxin International Ship Management Co. Limited (鴻信國際船舶管理有限公司), both listed the same address on Hong Kong corporate registry records⁶³. Both entities, New Konk Ocean International and Hongxin International, were registered in the same month.

The NEW KONK and VIFINE also shared the same historical ship owner, manager and operator, All Sefety Ocean International Trading Co. Limited (全安海洋國際貿易有限公司). All Sefety also owned, managed and operated another direct delivery vessel, the HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) in February 2019, with the vessel conducting direct deliveries to the DPRK.

Prior to its transfer of ownership to All Sefety, the VIFINE was owned and managed by another Hong Kong-incorporated entity, Ha Fa Trade International (海發貿易國際有限公司). Ha Fa Trade also historically managed the direct delivery vessel SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082) when it was sailing as XIN YUAN 18 before its sale to Milyan R Trade International (邁源紅貿易國際有限公司) in October 2018. Nuwanni International Ship Management Co. Limited (紐縵日國際船舶管理有限公司) served as the vessel’s Document of Compliance holder. Nuwanni was in turn also the Document of Compliance holder to the direct delivery vessel UNICA (IMO: 8514306). Nuwanni also shares the same listed address as All Sefety.

⁶² S/2020/151, paras. 10~27 and 32.

⁶³ IHS Markit. The listed address provided belonged to be entity providing corporate secretary services.

Corporate registry documents for the above Hong Kong-based companies showed different listed company directors and shareholder for each entity. These individuals included nationals from mainland China, Myanmar and the Philippines. Despite being ostensibly being owned by different individuals, All Sefety and Nuwanni were both registered in Hong Kong on the same day⁶⁴. The Panel notes that the listed directors and shareholders on Hong Kong corporate registry documentation may not be the beneficial owners or in certain cases or have a confirmed established association with the vessel.

Nuwanni, the Document of Compliance holder for the SUBBLIC and for the UNICA, was also deleted from the Hong Kong registry the same day⁶⁵ as Milyan.R Trade, the owner of the SUBBLIC.

All Sefety, Ha Fa Trade, Milyan.R Trade International, and Nuwanni have used the same corporate secretary provider with a registered address in Wan Chai, Hong Kong.

Source: The Panel.

⁶⁴ Registered on 25 April 2018.

⁶⁵ Deleted on 26 July 2019.

Annex 39a: Suspect vessel at Fujian Yihe Shipyard – NEW KONK as F.LONLINE

The Panel has over the years reported on sanctions evasion methods used by vessels engaged in the illicit procurement of commodities to the DPRK. This involved various forms of vessel disguises, including: physical alterations of vessels, vessel renovation, transmitting on a different (falsified) identifier, and the falsification of paperwork. In its most recent two reports⁶⁶, the Panel has identified and described sophisticated methods of laundering vessels' identities, which enabled suspect vessels to continue to violate the DPRK sanctions regime. The Panel has deemed such vessel identity laundering measures as sanctions evasion techniques, and accordingly, those involved in these measures considered as facilitators of sanctions evasion. The provision of repair, maintenance and modification services to vessels suspected of evading sanctions enables them to continue to sail, trade and evade sanctions.

Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co Ltd (hereafter "Fujian Yihe") (福建省易和船舶重工有限责任公司) is located along the Baima river in Fujian, China. On a Chinese business data website, the shipyard lists its business scope as including ship modification, dismantling, repair, ship building, domestic ship management business, and the import and export of goods or technologies.

A number of vessels that the Panel has investigated for engaging in or enabling sanctions evasion-related activities have docked at the shipyard, likely to receive modification, repair and / or maintenance services. The Panel in its reports has determined that vessel disguise and changing a vessel's appearance to enable sanctioned activities to be conducted, to be a sanctions evasion tactic.

The following examples are provided:

NEW KONK as F.LONLINE (fka SMOOTH SEA 3)

The NEW KONK, which had intermittently transmitted under the MOUSON 328's identity in 2020, began transmitted as F.LONLINE from October 2020⁶⁷. The alleged Belize-flagged F.LONLINE was formerly sailing as the then Thailand-flagged SMOOTH SEA 3 (IMO: 8303616) before it was sold to Rui He (HK) Marine Co Ltd and then transferred to Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd in July 2019, sailing as the then Dominica-flagged RUI HE. In October 2019, the vessel again transferred ownership to the Hong-Kong incorporated Brilliant Trade International and was renamed F.LONLINE⁶⁸.

The Panel's on-going investigations into the SMOOTH SEA 3 indicated another suspected case of DPRK-related vessel identity laundering, which resulted in the creation of a suspected fraudulent identity - that of the F.LONLINE.

⁶⁶ S/2021/777 paras. 29-34 and annex 28, and S/2021/211, paras. 31-36 and annex 22.

⁶⁷ Vessel analysis of AIS transmissions on Windward.


⁶⁸ IMO GISIS.

The F.LONLINE's digital identity was used by the direct delivery vessel NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) (see timeline below). Investigations into the laundering process of the SMOOTH SEA 3's identity indicated the same entities and ship/dockyards involved as those engaged in the laundering of the vessel identities of the SMOOTH SEA 28 / HAI ZHOU 168 / SMOOTH SEA 22, investigated and reported on in S/2021/777. The actual SMOOTH SEA 3 is suspected to be sailing as the Thailand-flagged SMOOTH SEA 30 (IMO: 9892262), a reportedly newly built vessel that laid keel and was constructed at a shipyard in Ningbo, China in 2018. The SMOOTH SEA 30's IMO number is suspected to have been obtained through fraudulent means. The Panel's investigations are consistent with information obtained from a Member State that assessed the vessel characteristics of the SMOOTH SEA 30 and SMOOTH SEA 3 to be virtually identical, and there was no proof of the existence of the SMOOTH SEA 30 as a newly built vessel that laid keel.

Timeline:

In October 2020, the Panel noted a vessel began transmitting as F.LONLINE off Taiwan Province of China before sailing up the Baima River in November 2020 (see figure 39a-1).

Figure 39a-1: A vessel adopting F.LONLINE's identifiers sailing up to Fujian Yihe shipyard, November 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

Note: Inset satellite imagery as representative of the shipyard location, not by actual date on AIS signal overlay; AIS signal overlay as on 9 December 2020).


High resolution satellite imagery and vessel AIS transmissions showed the NEW KONK transmitting as the F.LONLINE at Fujian Yihe. The NEW KONK remained moored at Fujian Yihe from December 2020 to June 2021 where it underwent renovation work (see figure 39a-2 and 39a-3).

Figure 39a-2: NEW KONK at Fujian Yihe shipyard, China, 22 April 2021



Source: Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 39a-3: NEW KONK transmitting as F.LONLINE in June 2021 at Fujian Yihe, China



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The NEW KONK departed the shipyard by June 2021 to anchor at Baima River, departing by August 2021 using the F.LONLINE's identity. The vessel was observed on satellite imagery in late August in Sansha Bay, China (see figure 39a-4). It later conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged KUM JIN GANG 3 (IMO: 8791667) in the Korea Bay, see figure 39a-5.

Figure 39a-4: NEW KONK anchored at Sansha Bay, China, 20 August 2020.



Source: Member State.

Figure 39a-5: NEW KONK ship-to-Ship transfer with KUM GIN GANG 3, Korea Bay, 23 September 2021



Source: Member State.

The Panel wrote to Thailand requesting, *inter alia*, a detailed physical inspection and investigation into the SMOOTH SEA 30 that would help establish the vessel's identity, either as a newly-built vessel that laid keel at a shipyard in Ningbo, China, or as a reconstructed vessel, suspected to be the SMOOTH SEA 3 (IMO: 8303616).

Thailand has yet to respond.

The Panel also wrote to the relevant flag registries, shipyards and entities and individuals that owned and managed the vessels. The Panel also wrote to China seeking its assistance on information concerning any refueling or ship-to-ship activity undertaken by the NEW KONK in Chinese territorial waters.

Fujian Yihe has yet to respond.

Cheng Xin Shipping has yet to respond. Ruam Mitr dockyard responded that “...*Chengxin shipping company is our customer, he rented a dockyard for a short period of time.*” The Panel notes that the vessels involved in identity laundering were at the dockyard for significant periods of time. The Panel is in correspondence with the dockyard and continues its investigations.

Belize has yet to respond.

Rui He (HK) Marine Co Ltd has yet to respond.

Dominica has yet to respond.

China responded that “*There is no record of port calls in China for NEW KONK in 2021*”.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 39b: Other suspect vessels at Fujian Yihe Shipyard

RUI HONG 916

Fujian Yihe was identified as having been “in the possession” of the then Sierra Leone-flagged RUI HONG 916 (IMO: 9058866) and carried out repair and maintenance work before it was sold to an end buyer in Fujian, China (see figure 39b-1). The Panel understands that Fujian Yihe also purchases used vessels for repair and resale. The vessel conducted ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged KUM UN SAN (IMO: 9720436) on 28 May 2019, two months following its sale⁶⁹.

Figure 39b-1: Bill of Sale of RUI HONG 916

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Form No.10A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official Number, year and port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engine (if any)
9058866	TAIYO MARU NO.2	133683, 1993, Waki-gun, Okayama-Pref., Japan	Motor Ship	735KW
			Meters	Centimeters
Length			60	04
Breadth			10	00
Depth			4	50
			Number of Tons	
			Gross	Net
			498.00	286

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

I, **RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED** (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our registered office at **OFFICE 3A 12/F KAISER CENTRE NO.18 CENTRE STREET SAI YING PUN HK** in consideration of the sum of **USD 1.00 (United States Dollars One Only)** paid to us by **WANG** (hereinafter called "the Transferees") having their registered office at **FUJIAN PROVINCE P.R.CHINA** the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged transfer all (100%) the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, mortgages and maritime liens or any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this Bill of Sale on **20 MARCH 2019**.

For **RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED**

By: _____

Nat: _____

Note:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

Note:- Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part. Sec. F. 2058 (Oct. 1971)

Source: The Panel.

Previous Panel investigations into vessel identity laundering indicated that Fujian Yihe was associated with at least three vessel identity laundering operations, resulting in the freeing up of the AIS digital profiles of the laundered vessels, thereby allowing the direct delivery vessels NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) and SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082) to swap into these vacated AIS profiles. Direct delivery vessels could then sail as ‘clean’ ships.

⁶⁹ S/2020/151, paras. 36-37 and annex 9.

MOUSON 328⁷⁰

In the first case, then Panama-flagged MOUSON 328 was moored at Fujian Yihe in the second half of 2019 where it underwent some modification, including repainting (see figure 39b-2). The vessel then sailed out of the shipyard as a newly built vessel, CHERRY 19, and was subsequently entered under Thailand's ship registry on a fraudulent basis as SMOOTH SEA 29 (IMO: 9896945). Thailand has stated it was re-examining the registration of SMOOTH SEA 29⁷¹ on the basis of suspected fraud.

Figure 39b-2: MOUSON 328 re-painted at Fujian Yihe, September / October 2019



Source: Google Earth, annotated by the Panel. Coordinates: 26°50'28"N, 119°41'20"E.


High-resolution satellite imagery showed a vessel on 26 August 2020 transmitting on the MOUSON 328's historical Palau-associated MMSI 511444000, matching the dimensions and features of the NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) (see figure 39b-3).

Sailing on another identifier as a 'clean' vessel enabled the NEW KONK to obtain refined petroleum through ship-to-ship transfers for delivery of its cargo to the DPRK while sailing under the MOUSON 328's vacated AIS profile in 2020.

⁷⁰ S/2021/211, paras. 31-36 and annex 22.

⁷¹ S/2021/777, para. 34.

Figure 39b-3: Vessel dimensions and physical comparison of the NEW KONK transmitting as MOUSON, 26 August 2020



Source: (left) Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel; (right) Member State.

SUBBLIC as HAI ZHOU 168⁷²

In the second case, the then Sierra Leone-flagged HAI ZHOU 168 was moored at Fujian Yihe from September 2018 to January 2019 (see figure 39b-4).

Figure 39b-4: HAI ZHOU 168 moored at Fujian Yihe shipyard, September 2018



Source: C4ADS, Maxar Technologies.

⁷² S/2021/777, paras. 30-34 and annex 28.

Like the MOUSON 328, the HAI ZHOU 168 changed its identifiers as it departed the shipyard, updating its vessel profile to the newly built Belize-flagged CHENG XIN 1 (IMO: 9870991), a fraudulent identity. The SUBBLIC began transmitting under HAI ZHOU 168's vacated digital profile in 2020 (see figure 39b-5), where it called at DPRK ports to offload refined petroleum.

Figure 39b-5: SUBBLIC transmitting as HAI ZHOU 168, Sansha Bay, China, 26 November 2020



Source: Imagery: Planet Labs Inc.; AIS coordinates: Windward.

The vessel was subsequently entered under Thailand's ship registry as the new-built SMOOTH SEA 22. To the Panel's various queries, *inter alia*, to establish the validity of the SMOOTH SEA's actual identity (as a newly built vessel that laid keel at Fujian Yihe or as a suspected re-built vessel), Thailand responded by providing the Panel with ship dimensions of the SMOOTH SEA 28 (HAI ZHOU 168) and SMOOTH SEA 22 (see also annex 46b). The Panel has sought additional clarification questions from Thailand and is awaiting a response.

Use of second transponders aboard vessels of interest

The Panel noted an occasion in May 2020 where a vessel departed Fujian Yihe and began transmitting a similar MMSI number associated with the JIYUAN's (aka CHANG LONG) (IMO: 9044140)⁷³. The Panel investigated the JIYUAN's delivery of a luxury vehicle to the DPRK and its use of a second transponder as a sanctions' evasion tactic⁷⁴. The Panel also identified the JIYUAN's first transmission on its second AIS profile in September 2019, following its visit to a shipyard located south of Fujian Yihe⁷⁵ (see figures 39b-6 and 39b-7).

⁷³ This is a different vessel from the JIYUAN / CHANG LONG. This vessel of interest has since been broken up as of December 2021.

⁷⁴ S/2021/777, paras. 68-75 and annex 36.


⁷⁵ Both the vessel of interest and the JIYUAN called at shipyards along the Baima River following an ownership change and transmitted on a second transponder upon departing the shipyards.

Figure 39b-6: JI YUAN transmitting on a second AIS profile as it departed a shipyard in proximity of Fujian Yihe shipyard along the Baima River, 15 August 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 39b-7: JI YUAN transmitting on its second AIS profile in DPRK waters, September 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel made an enquiry to Fujian Yihe on the vessel of interest that departed its shipyard in May 2020. Fujian Yihe has yet to respond.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 40: Vessels of interest in Chinese waters, June to August 2021

DATE MM/DD/YYYY	VOI NAME	LAT/LONG	DATE MM/DD/YYYY	VOI NAME	VOI TYPE	POSITION	
						LAT	LONG
06/01/21	JOINT LUCK	2628N 11958E	8/2/2021	LOI HOPE	STS AV	35-49N	120-51E
06/01/21	XIN HAI	2627N 11959E	8/3/2021	HOKONG	NDDV	26-24N	120-11E
06/02/21	SUBBLIC	2456N 11926E	8/4/2021	HAI JUN	STS AV	26-18N	120-25E
06/03/21	HAI ZHOU 168	2456N 11926E	8/4/2021	INFINITE LUCK	STS AV	26-22N	120-53E
06/07/21	JOFFA	2652N 11940E	8/7/2021	OCEAN PORPOISE	STS AV	26-22N	120-10E
06/15/21	HANG YU 8	2936N 12145E	8/9/2021	FLONLINE	NDDV	28-00N	121-43E
06/17/21	XING MING YANG 888	2517N 11950E	8/12/2021	JUNE LUCK	STS AV	26-25N	120-10E
06/24/21	SHUN XIN	2628N 11959E	8/13/2021	HAI JUN	STS AV	26-18N	120-25E
7/1/2021	HANG YU 8	29-36N 121-45E	8/15/2021	HAI JUN	STS AV	26-19N	120-24E
7/1/2021	JEY HOPE	29-43N 122-34E	8/15/2021	SIN PYONG 5	DPRK-T	30-08N	122-41E
7/1/2021	JOINT LUCK	26-28N 119-58E	8/15/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-17N	120-13E
7/1/2021	SHUN XIN	26-27N 119-59E	8/15/2021	SIN PYONG 5	DPRK-T	30-18N	122-58E
7/2/2021	INFINITE LUCK	26-17N 120-55E	8/15/2021	HAI JUN	STS AV	26-19N	120-24E
7/7/2021	HAI JUN	23-09N 113-41E	8/15/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-17N	120-13E
7/9/2021	DAWN LUCK	26-19N 120-22E	8/18/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-16N	120-10E
7/9/2021	SAMBONG ARTEMIS	37-30N 120-36E	8/18/2021	HAI JUN	STS AV	25-17N	119-49E
7/11/2021	SUBBLIC	26-26N 119-56E	8/20/2021	FLONLINE	NDDV	26-25N	120-03E
7/17/2021	PU RYONG	36-49N 122-59E	8/24/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-60N	120-11E
7/20/2021	JOFFA	26-53N 119-40E	8/24/2021	DIAMOND 8	NDDV	29-37N	122-34E
7/20/2021	PAEK MA	37-05N 123-00E	8/28/2021	JOINT LUCK	STS AV	26-15N	120-40E
7/29/2021	OCEAN PORPOISE	26-50N 119-41E	8/30/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-24N	119-54E
7/31/2021	HOKONG	26-22N 120-18E	8/30/2021	CHAN FONG	STS AV	35-01N	120-50E

Source: Member State.

Legend:

STS AV: Ship-to-ship Transfer Associated Vessel

DPRK-T: DPRK-flagged Tanker


NDDV: Non-DPRK Flagged Delivery Vessel – (vessels named frequently in the Panel of Expert's reports)

The Panel shared the above list of vessels of interest with China and sought China's assistance on information it may have on the vessels' activities that would be of relevance to the Panel. China responded that "*Record of port calls in China for 44 vessels including JOINT LUCK and XIN HAI is not accessible, as no IMO information was provided.*"


Source: The Panel.

Annex 41: Direct delivery and sanctioned vessels at Ningde anchorage, China, 30 July and 2 August 2021

The Panel's reports continue to document the activities of vessels previously recommended by the Panel for designation for sanctions violation, as well as those of designated vessels that continue to operate. Such vessels have continued to transit or anchor in Chinese territorial waters, particularly in the Sansha Bay area in Ningde. Satellite imagery showed the following vessels operating in Ningde waters: SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082), HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) and YUK TUNG (IMO: 9030591). The SUBBLIC and HOKONG have been investigated by the Panel for sanctions violation and recommended for designation, while the YUK TUNG was earlier designated. All three vessels additionally exhibited suspicious indicators. For instance, the YUK TUNG did not appear to be transmitting on commercial maritime databases since May 2018; the HOKONG last transmitted on its registered AIS profile in September 2019 and tampered with its MMSI transmission; and the SUBBLIC transmitted on at least one laundered vessel identity profile as HAI ZHOU 168, a known laundered vessel identity profile reported by the Panel.



Source: Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

SUBBLIC transmitting as HAIZHOU 168, 2 August 2021

Source: (top) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (bottom) Member State.

HOKONG**SUBLIC****YUK TUNG**

Source: Member State.

The Panel sought China's assistance to detain the vessels in its territorial waters to obtain the requisite vessel information that would provide information on the individuals and entities behind these vessels. China responded that "*There is no record of port calls in China for SUBBLIC, HOKONG, and YUK TUNG in 2021*".

Source: The Panel.


Annex 42a: HAI JUN and UNICA ship-to-ship transfers, 2020 and 2021

The HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896) is suspected to have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers from 2020 to date with vessels that transferred illicit refined petroleum to the DPRK. The HAI JUN also served as the feeder or intermediate vessel that took some of its oil from SKY VENUS and transferred them on to direct delivery vessels (see also annex 48 on SKY VENUS).

The direct delivery vessels that also conducted suspected ship-to-ship transfers with the HAI JUN included the NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) and UNICA (IMO: 8514306). Both the NEW KONK and UNICA have been the subject of multiple reports by the Panel for transporting illicit refined petroleum to the DPRK, as well as for using fraudulent identifiers. The Panel further noted long periods of unaccounted gaps in the HAI JUN's AIS transmissions. The Panel is investigating the following⁷⁶:

- (i) HAI JUN and NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387), around 19 June 2020;
- (ii) HAI JUN and UNICA (IMO: 8514306) around 22 October 2020;
- (iii) HAI JUN and UNICA (sailing as LITON), around 30-31 August 2021;
- (iv) HAI JUN and SKY VENUS (IMO: 9168257) in August and September 2021;
- (v) HAI JUN and UNICA (sailing as HAISHUN 2), around 24-25 September 2021

HAI JUN with UNICA, Sansha Bay area, October 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

⁷⁶ AIS transmissions or satellite imagery.


HAI JUN registered draft changes during this period, indicating its oil cargo was offloaded with the UNICA (transmitting as LITON), August 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

AIS transmission capture showed the UNICA stopped transmitting on its AIS identity (MMIS: 667001252) on 30 October 2020 following some digital manipulation. High-resolution imagery captured on 1 November 2020 showed the LITON transmitting where the UNICA was located (see figure 42a).

Figure 42a: UNICA transmitting as LITON, 30 October – 1 November 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel, inset imagery, Member State.

HAI JUN ship-to-ship transfers with UNICA (transmitting as HAISHUN 2)



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The HAI JUN is suspected to have conducted more ship-to-ship transfers with direct delivery vessels transmitting under fraudulent identifiers. Investigations remain on-going.

Fraudulent transmissions

Both the LITON and HAISHUN 2's MMSI numbers utilized by the UNICA were Mongolia-associated during the periods of investigative interest where suspect ship-to-ship transfers were conducted with the HAI JUN. While the UNICA was transmitting as the HAISHUN 2, it was also using the call sign assigned to the LITON.

The Panel had written on the exploitation by DPRK and other suspect vessels transmitting on MMSI numbers associated with third countries that affect many flag registries⁷⁷. To ensure that flag registries' MMSI numbers are not fraudulently used, the Panel encourages all flag registries possess the requisite tools available to identify and investigate suspected fraudulent use of MMSI numbers, and where it is detected, to share the results of its investigation including with the Panel.

⁷⁷ S/2021/777, paras. 42-47 and 53-54 and annex 34.

The Panel sought Mongolia's assistance on its investigations into the MMSIs fraudulently used by the UNICA. Mongolia has yet to respond.

Owners and entities

The Hong Kong-incorporated Ruicheng (HK) Shipping Co Ltd (瑞程(香港)海運有限公司) (hereafter "Ruicheng Shipping") is registered as the owner and ship manager of the HAI JUN, with another Hong Kong-incorporated entity Guifeng International Trade Co Ltd (貴豐國際貿易有限公司) (hereafter "Guifeng International") as the vessel's Document of Compliance company / operator. Ruicheng Shipping bought the vessel in April 2018 (see annex 42b)

The Panel further notes that the LITON's owner and operator, Hong Kong incorporated Li Tong International Trade Co, lists the same address⁷⁸ belonging to Hong Kong-incorporated Guifeng International, the Document of Compliance company holder of HAI JUN since December 2019⁷⁹. This same address is also used by a Corporate Secretary entity that also served as agent for New Konk International Company Limited (新康海洋國際有限公司), the registered owner of the direct delivery vessel NEW KONK, as well as for Hongxin International Ship Management Co., Limited (鴻信國際船舶管理有限公司), the registered owner of the direct delivery vessel VIFINE (IMO: 9045962), now sailing as DPRK-flagged UN HUNG. Hongxin International and New Konk Ocean International also shared the same previous registered owner, ship manager and operator, All Sefety International Trading Co Ltd (全安海洋國際貿易有限公司), before their respective new ownerships in May 2019 (see also annex 38).

Responses:

The Panel wrote to Mongolia, Cook Islands as well as the relevant entities that own and operated the vessels.

Mongolia has yet to respond.

Cook Islands provided the requested documentation and assisted the Panel in its further enquiries. It also confirmed the HAI JUN's deletion from its ship registry on 1 December 2021 due to the vessel's onward sale (see annex 42c).

The Panel wrote to the HAI JUN's registered owning company, Ruicheng Shipping, via its Document of Compliance holder entity, Guifeng International, seeking information, *inter alia*, on the nature of the company's business(es), details of the ship-to-ship transfers conducted with the direct delivery vessels identified by the Panel, the full chain of custody of the oil cargo transfers, the identifiers of the vessels, along with information, financial transactions and payments of the concerned counterparties. The owner of Ruicheng Shipping instead chose to address the Panel via the ship registry, stating that the HAI JUN "... has not engaged in any illegal operation or had any dealings with all the ships involved in the

⁷⁸ Room 502C, 5th Floor, Ho King Commercial Building, Fa Yuen Street, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China.

⁷⁹ IHS Markit.

DPRK”. Ruicheng Shipping also stated that the vessel’s “GMDSS-related equipment ... is poor and often malfunctioned”, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, “... the company was unable to arrange for maintenance personnel to board the ship in time to assist with repairs, resulting in intermittent signals.” “... in order to save operating costs, the vessel often stops supplying power during non-operating conditions.” (see annex 42d)

The Panel has assessed that vessel tracking information would have indicated that HAI JUN would have stopped transmissions including the times it was sailing, including in open waters. The Panel further notes that the ‘GMDSS-related equipment’ malfunction or shut down the ship’s power supply, according to Ruicheng Shipping’s explanations coincided with the material times of investigative interests to the Panel.

In response to the Panel’s request for the HAI JUN’s Protection and Indemnity insurance coverage, the Panel was informed that “The insurance expired on the 04th December 2020 and the vessel has had no work since due to the COVID pandemic. The vessel has been out of work since the pandemic and the owners did not renew the insurance due to this” (see annex 42e). The Panel notes that commercially available AIS tracking data however showed the HAI JUN continued to sail and trade. Documentation also indicated the HAI JUN’s certificate of Classification and Document of Compliance holder certificate were both stamped as ‘overdue’.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 42b: Bill of Sale for HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896)

Transferred to the Transferee
at [redacted] & [redacted] with the
consent of the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry

Form No. 108

X.B. 79A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number / Official Number	Name of Ship	built year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9054896 / 132924	MITOYO MARU	1992 Matsuyama, Ehime	MOTOR SHIP	2,941 KW

Length (Article 280)	Meters	Teeth	Number of Tons	
	98	03	Gross	Net
Breadth (Regulation 280)	15	20		
Depth (Regulation 280)	7	59	2,871.00	N/A

and as described in more detail in the Register Book.

We, (a) MITSUHAM KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA of Japan (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having its registered address at 7-10, Harukawa 2-chome, Matsuyama City, Ehime Pref., Japan, in consideration of the sum of USD [redacted] paid to us by (b) RUICHENG (HK) SHIPPING CO., LTD. of Flat 01A1, 10F Carnival Commercial Building, 18 Java Road, North Point, Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer all (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from (d) all encumbrances, mortgages, maritime liens, taxes or any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have executed and delivered this Bill of Sale as a deed on the 2nd day of April in 2018.

MITSUHAM KISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA

Source: The Panel.

Annex 42c: Deletion certificate of HAI JUN from Cook Islands Ship Registry



COOK ISLANDS SHIPS REGISTRY



Deletion Certificate	
Issued under the provisions of the Cook Islands Ship Registration Act 2007 under the authority of the Government of COOK ISLANDS By THE REGISTRAR OF SHIPS	
Certificate Number	C-DEL-139
Ship Particulars	
Name of Ship	HAI JUN
Type of Ship	Tanker: Product
Official number	2822
Distinctive Numbers or Letters	ESU3713
IMO number	9054896
Gross Tonnage	2871
Port of Registry	Avatiu
Details of Owners (at Time of Deletion)	
Full name of owner	RUICHENG(HK) SHIPPING CO. LIMITED
Address	Flat 01A1, 10F Carnival Comm Bldg. 18 Java Rd North Point, , Hong Kong
Registered Owner IMO Number	6041531
% of Shares	100
Details of Charterers (at Time of Deletion)	
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT REGISTRATION OF THE ABOVE NAMED SHIP WAS CLOSED FREE OF ANY REGISTERED ENCUMBRANCES ON	



COOK ISLANDS SHIPS REGISTRY



Date of issue of Certificate	1 Dec 2021
Place of Issue of Certificate	Singapore



SIGNATURE

Source: The Panel.

Annex 42d: Responses provided by Ruicheng Shipping

About the Operation of MV "HAI JUN" Vessel

Dear COOK ISLANDS&THE UNITED NATIONS:

The MV "HAI JUN" vessel belonging to our company has been operating in the Taiwan Strait since July-October 2020, when it finished anchoring at Dongyin Island off Ningde, and has not engaged in any illegal operation or had any dealings with all the ships involved in the DPRK. Regarding the situation that the signal of GMDSS related equipment of "HAI JUN" vessel appeared in Malaysia for a short period of time, we believe that it may be caused by other vessels using the GMDSS related equipment of the vessel or the signal jumping to Malaysia for a short period of time due to equipment failure, and we attach the relevant pictures and recent photos of the vessel as a basis for reference.

Hereby certified!


RUICHENG (H K) SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

December 06, 2021

About the MV "HAIJUN" Vessel GMDSS Related Equipment**Signal Instability****Dear COOK ISLANDS&THE UNITED NATIONS:**

The MV "HAI JUN", which belongs to our company, has not been maintained for a long time since June 2020, and the GMDSS-related equipment of the vessel is poor and often malfunctioned. Affected by the COVID-19 epidemic, the company was unable to arrange for maintenance personnel to board the ship in time to assist with repairs, resulting in intermittent signals from GMDSS-related equipment. Due to the COVID-19 epidemic, the business can only be maintained with difficulty, and it is difficult to create profit. In this context, in order to save operating costs, the vessel often stops supplying power during non-operating conditions. Due to the combined effect of these two reasons, the signal of the GMDSS-related equipment of the ship often disappears for a long time or intermittently.



Hereby certified!

RUICHENG (H K) SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

December 06, 2021

Source: The Panel.

Annex 42e: Excerpt of HAI JUN's Protection and Indemnity Insurance expiration, 4 December 2020


7) Copy of the vessel's Protection and Indemnity Insurance													
<p>The insurance expired on the 04th December 2020 and the vessel has had no work since due to the COVID pandemic. The vessel has been out of work since the pandemic and the owners did not renew the insurance due to this.</p>													
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;">  <div> <h3>Blue Card</h3> </div> </div>													
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> NOT TRANSFERABLE BC Certificate No.: AE-OW-19-02-010196 </div>													
<p>To: Administrative Officer Maritime Cook Islands P.O. Box 882, Avarua, Rarotonga, Cook Islands.</p> <div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 300px; margin-top: 5px;"></div>													
<p>CERTIFICATE FURNISHED AS EVIDENCE OF INSURANCE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 7 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR BUNKER OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 2001</p>													
<p>THIS IS TO CERTIFY that there is in force in respect of the above-named ship while in the above ownership a policy of insurance satisfying the requirements of Article 7 of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001.</p>													
Assured Name and Address:	<p>RUICHENG (HK) SHIPPING CO., LIMITED as the Owner FLAT 01A1, 10/F CARNIVAL COMM BLDG, 18 JAVA RD NORTH POINT, HONG KONG</p>												
Insurer Name and Address:	<p>THE ANGLO & EASTERN SHIP OWNERS P&I CLUB LIMITED SEA MEADOW HOUSE, BLACKBURNE HIGHWAY, (P.O.BOX 116), ROAD TOWN, TORTOLA, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS</p>												
Object Details:	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Ship Name:</td> <td>HAI JUN</td> <td>IMO No.:</td> <td>9054896</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ship Flag:</td> <td>COOK ISLANDS</td> <td>Port of Registry:</td> <td>AVATIU</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Distinctive Number or Letters:</td> <td colspan="3">E5U3713</td> </tr> </table>	Ship Name:	HAI JUN	IMO No.:	9054896	Ship Flag:	COOK ISLANDS	Port of Registry:	AVATIU	Distinctive Number or Letters:	E5U3713		
Ship Name:	HAI JUN	IMO No.:	9054896										
Ship Flag:	COOK ISLANDS	Port of Registry:	AVATIU										
Distinctive Number or Letters:	E5U3713												
Period of Insurance:	From 12 hrs. GMT 04 th December, 2019 to 12 hrs. GMT 04 th December, 2020												
<p>Provided always that the insurer may cancel this Certificate by giving three months written notice to the above Authority whereupon the liability of the insurer hereunder shall cease as from the date of expiry of the said period of notice but only as regards incidents arising thereafter</p>													
<p>The Anglo & Eastern Club Management Limited Signature Authorized by The Anglo & Eastern Ship Owners P&I Club Limited:</p> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div>													

Source: The Panel.

Annex 43: Direct delivery vessel HOKONG (IMO: 9006758)

The Panel tracked the direct delivery vessel HOKONG when it retransmitted on its AIS identity in late July 2021 in Ningde waters (see figure 43):

Figure 43: HOKONG retransmitting on its old identifiers, July-August 2021, China



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

While the HOKONG was last observed in the same waters on 2 August 2021, a Chinese media article dated 3 November 2021⁸⁰ reported that the HOKONG was at a Chinese shipyard being demolished by November. Maritime authorities in Fujian Province were reported to be investigating the HOKONG based on domestic law concerning the scrap of a foreign vessel as constituting an importation of solid waste. A smuggling group headed by an individual named ‘Wang’ was alleged to have been involved in the smuggling of foreign ships of unknown origin for scrap. Satellite imagery of the vessel obtained by the Panel indicated the vessel was docked at a shipyard in Lianjiang County, Fujian Province, China, where the HOKONG was observed still in a partial stage of demolition.

In view of the vessel’s seizure, the Panel asked China for information on individuals and entities operating the HOKONG as well any material obtained from its authorities’ investigations relevant to the Panel’s mandate.

China responded that “*There is no record of port calls in China for ... HOKONG ... in 2021*”.

Source: The Panel.

⁸⁰ <https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/03/WS618221afa3107be49791641c.html>

Annex 44: Evasion methods⁸¹

Identifier and AIS manipulation

1. The Panel continues to observe suspect vessels displaying suspicious behaviour such as transmitting falsified or inconsistent identifiers on Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and reporting false destinations⁸². It also observes vessels trading in restricted or banned commodities and exhibiting AIS transmission gaps while sailing in and around waters where illicit ship-to-ship activities typically occur. Such practices may provide grounds for further investigations by the relevant public and private sector parties of the vessels they flag, charter, operate, insure, class or finance.
2. Few, if any, non-DPRK vessels appear to transmit AIS signal in DPRK waters based on commercial maritime database platforms. Suspect vessels instead have been observed to lose their AIS signal while sailing towards the DPRK's waters and re-transmit once back in external waters. To obscure the DPRK connection, complicit actors also falsify shipping documentation to conceal the cargo's origin or destination.

Flagging

3. A number of foreign-flagged vessels that conduct sanctionable activities have been recorded as falsely flagged, as having changed flag registries in quick succession (so called "flag-hopping"), continued to use a country's flag following removal from a registry, or flown a flag without proper authorization, seeking to mask their illicit activity⁸³. Some formerly foreign-flagged vessels have been reported to join the DPRK's fleet. In a number of cases, a vessel that was sold on and deleted from a flag registry transmitted as a DPRK vessel shortly thereafter.

Fuel supply chain

4. Suspect foreign-flagged tankers associated with illicit shipments to the DPRK have also been observed⁸⁴ operating outside of identified affected waters exhibiting uneconomical sailing behavior and AIS transmission gaps that suggest possible illicit ship-to-ship transfers or loading at ports.

⁸¹ S/2020/840, annex 17, with updates.

⁸² Panel investigations and data on commercial maritime platforms.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Owners, operators and managers

5. The Panel's investigations demonstrate the DPRK continues to deceive and leverage shipping companies, corporate registration services, entities and individuals across multiple jurisdictions to facilitate its activities.
6. Complicit actors have been known not to submit owner and management information on commercial maritime platforms or may be listed as undisclosed interests in the vessel's onward sale, likely to disguise the ultimate beneficial owner and to evade sanctions. Other characteristics include layered ownership and management structures, use of front companies and shell companies, and engaging multiple intermediaries removed from the actual owner.
7. In tracing the ownership and management history of suspect vessels, some vessels appear to show commercial relationships, linkages, or shared corporate secretary addresses between a vessel's historical and current owners and / or managers. In some cases, previous managers have linkages with DPRK-related shipping networks.
8. In a number of cases, the vessels' management companies manage(d) other vessels with similar risk profiles. Vessels' registered owners may be incorporated in a variety of jurisdictions but typically list operational or businesses addresses in East Asia and in Southeast Asia.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 45a: Examples of physical tampering of identity by DPRK vessels, September 2021

The Panel has documented over consecutive reports⁸⁵ the various techniques used by DPRK as well as suspect vessels to obscure their physical identity. Such physical obfuscation that are easily observable for those engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with such vessels, should serve as red-flag indicators and indicate the complicity of those engaged in such transfers.



⁸⁵ S/2019/171, annex 13, S/2019/691, para. 13, and S/2021/211, paras. 37-39.



Source: Member State.

Annex 45b: Fraudulent AIS transmissions of DPRK, direct delivery and suspect vessels

June – September 2021

Vessel	Technical measures - AIS name	Technical measures - Other	Physical measures	Attempt to conceal or deceive
AM SAN 1	AS	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit	Only AIS on bow, stern and bridge	Almost certain
CHUN FONG	BEYOND	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
CHUN LUCK	CHUN LUCK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @			Unlikely
DAMONG 8	JIN SHANG	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
HONGMO		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
HONGSON LUCK		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
JOTTA	JOTTA			Unlikely
JOINT LUCK	JOINT LUCK, UNIST	Identifying as "fishing" vessel, not "tanker"		Almost certain
LO HONG	F HONG			Unlikely
MEGA PRINCESS	PRINCESS			Unlikely
POWER EASY	33013943 (joining second AIS entities)	Simultaneous use of two AIS entities, one "tanker" and one "fishing"		Unlikely
RI SUN	HP888			Unlikely
SAUK MA		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
RU BYONG		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
RYE SONG GANG 1		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit	AIS on bridge, no identifiers on bow or stern	Almost certain
SUN SUN		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
SA PYONG 2	UNIDENTIFIED, SCAMMYTINIST	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
SA PYONG 3	SCAMMYTINIST	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit	AIS identifiers painted on vessel	Almost certain
SONG WON	SW	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit	SW on funnel, SONG WON on bridge, no identifiers on bow or stern	Almost certain
SUBJEC	HANZHOU 188	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
UNICA	UTON	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
HANG MING WANG 188	HANZHOU 188	Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain
RU JONG 2		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit	Painted deck and top of bridge	Almost certain
RU SON		Almost certainly disables AIS for portions of transit		Almost certain

Source: Member State.

Annex 46a: Vessel identity laundering of SMOOTH SEA 3 (IMO:9892262)

On-going investigations indicate the former Thailand-flagged SMOOTH SEA 3's identity was laundered, which resulted in the creation of a suspected fraudulent identity - that of the F.LONLINE. The Thailand-flagged SMOOTH SEA 30 (IMO: 9892262), a reportedly newly built vessel that was constructed at a shipyard in Ningbo, China, is suspected to be the former SMOOTH SEA 3.

Mongolia has yet to respond.

Belize has yet to respond.

Dominica has yet to respond.

Brilliant Trade has yet to respond.

Cheng Xin Shipping has yet to respond.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 46b: Thailand's response on the vessel identity laundering of SMOOTH SEA 28 / HAI ZHOU 168 / SMOOTH SEA 22

The Panel sought Thailand's assistance concerning the identity laundering of the SMOOTH SEA 28 / HAI ZHOU 168, and the SMOOTH SEA 22, the latter as suspected to be re-constructed from the SMOOTH SEA 28 and not a newly-built ship⁸⁶. The SMOOTH SEA 22's IMO number was suspected to have been obtained through fraudulent means. The Panel's investigations drew from a range of sources, including: maritime data, satellite imagery over time, primary source information and photographic comparisons. The Panel also identified entities and locations in this investigation that were similarly involved in another case of vessel identity laundering prior investigated by the Panel. The Panel assesses that the SMOOTH SEA 22 was unlikely to be a newly-built ship that laid keel at the listed shipyard in China but as a reconstructed ship from the SMOOTH SEA 28. The Panel's previous reporting and on-going investigations showed that the vacated digital profile of the SMOOTH SEA 28 / HAI ZHOU 168 had since been used by direct delivery vessels to facilitate illicit refined petroleum transfers to the DPRK.

The Panel provided information and sought a determination from the relevant authorities in Thailand to help establish the SMOOTH SEA 22's bona fide identity. Thailand responded that "The validity of the *Smooth Sea 22*'s identity was determined by a marine surveyor whose expertise and responsibilities include issuing Certificates of Survey for Thai ship registration", and it attached the "... vessel(s) *Smooth Sea 22* and *Smooth Sea 28*" dimensions (see following enclosure). The Panel continues to seek Thailand's assistance on this matter, including clarifying inconsistencies as well as pending responses to the Panel's list of queries.

The dockyard in Thailand that was involved the SMOOTH SEA 28's suspected reconstruction as the SMOOTH SEA 22, responded to the Panel that Cheng Xin Shipping was its customer that "... rented a dockyard for a short period of time". If you have any questions, please contact him directly ...". The Panel had documented the SMOOTH SEA 28's presence in the shipyard over a long period of time. The Panel further notes the dockyard was also used for the vessel identity laundering case involving the SMOOTH SEA 3 / SMOOTH SEA 30 currently investigated by the Panel. The Panel is awaiting a response to further queries from the dockyard.

The Panel continued to follow up with Cheng Xin Shipping Limited, a Hong Kong-incorporated entity with a physical 'care of' address of a dockyard in Thailand. Cheng Xin Shipping has yet to respond the Panel's letters.

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel.

⁸⁶ S/2021/777, paras. 30-34 and annex 28.

Note Verbale from Thailand, 15 October 2021

No. 56101/640

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the communication from Mr. Eric Penton-Voak, Coordinator of the Panel of Experts dated 4 June 2021, requesting information regarding the vessel currently sailing as the Smooth Sea 22 and Smooth Sea 28, has the honour to transmit the said information herewith for the latter's kind perusal.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand
to the United Nations, New York
15 October B.E. 2564 (2021)



Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
NEW YORK.

Excerpts of attachments:

**Information requested by
the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1874 (2009)
as per the Panel of Experts' Note No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.183
dated 4 June 2021**

The Royal Thai Government investigated the activities involving the vessel(s) *Smooth Sea 22* and *Smooth Sea 28* and wishes to inform the Panel of Experts (POE) as follows:

1. The validity of the *Smooth Sea 22*'s identity was determined by a marine surveyor whose expertise and responsibilities include issuing Certificates of Survey for Thai ship registration.

1.1 *Smooth Sea 22*'s details are as follows:

Length Over All (L.O.A)	113.00	metres
Length Between Perpendiculars (L.B.P.)	104.00	metres
Breadth	18.00	metres
Depth	9.00	metres
Gross tonnage	2998	
Net tonnage	1920	
License number	620000791	
IMO number	9870991	
Call sign	HSB7005	
Hull material	steel	
Type of engine	Hitachi B&W	
Size	2994 kilowatt	
Type of engagement	local trade vessel	
Type of vessel	oil tanker	
Shipyard	Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co., Ltd, China	

1.2 *Smooth Sea 28*'s details are as follows:

Length Over All (L.O.A)	113.32	metres
Length Between Perpendiculars (L.B.P.)	104.10	metres
Breadth	18.00	metres
Depth	8.00	metres
Gross Tonnage	4481	
Net Tonnage	2171	
License number	520085431	
IMO number	8514045	
Call sign	HSB4352	
Hull Material	steel	
Type of engine	Hitachi B&W	
Size	2992 kilowatt	
Type of engagement	local trade vessel	
Type of vessel	oil tanker	
Shipyard	Kurushima Dockyard, Japan	

2. In addition, relevant information from 2018 suggests that *Smooth Sea 28's* ownership was transferred to Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd. and withdrew from the Thai ship registry on 28 September 2018.

An account of *Smooth Sea 28's* presence from 2016-2018 :

Timeline	Activities
2016	- received an annual survey on 24 August 2016 and had the ship's license renewed to 23 August 2017 - 44 domestic trips between Sriracha, Chonburi - Bangkok
2017	- no information on the ship survey and the ship's license expired since 24 August 2017 - no information on the vessel's presence
2018	- received an annual survey on 28 August 2018 and had a ship's license renewed to 27 August 2018 - departed Thailand for Fujian, China on 5 September 2018 - transferred the ownership to Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd. (Address: 50 Bonham Strand, No. 5, 17/F Bonham Strand Trade Center Sheung Wan, Hong Kong) and withdrew from the Thai ship registry on 28 September 2018

3. Concerned authorities investigated the companies and found that *Smooth Sea Co., Ltd* transferred the ownership of *Smooth Sea 28* and *Smooth Sea 3* to Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd. on 28 September 2018 and 18 July 2019 respectively.

4. Relevant documentation with regards *Smooth Sea 22's* acquisition includes (1) Memorandum of Agreement between Cheng Xin Shipping Ltd. and *Smooth Sea Co., Ltd*, (2) Bill of Sale, and (3) Deletion Certificate are as attached.

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number / Official Number	Name of Ship	Year Built / Builder / Port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engine (if any)
9870991 / 161820930 -S	CHENG XIN 1	2018 / Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding HI Co., Ltd, China / Belize City	Oil tanker	4068HP
Length Over All (LOA)		Meters	Centimeters	Number of Tons
		113	00	Gross
		Breadth	18	00
		Depth	9	00
				2998
				1920

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, CHENG XIN SHIPPING LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our registered office at NO.5,17/F BONHAM TRADE CENTRE,50 BONHAM STRAND,SHEUNG WAN,HONGKONG, in consideration of the sum of USD 5,450,000/- (United States Dollars Five Million Forty Five Hundred Thousand Only) paid to us by SMOOTH SEA COMPANY LIMITED having their registered office at 924 TALOMSIN BUILDING RAMA 3 ROAD, BANGPONGPANG, YANNAWA, BANGKOK, THAILAND, (hereinafter called "the Transferees") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged transfer all (100%) the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and their assigns, that we have power to transfir in manner sforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, mortgages and maritime lier or any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this Bill of Sale on 20TH DECEMBER 2018.

NOTARY PUBLIC
HONGKONG

By: [Signature]
Name: [Redacted]
Title: Managing Director

Source: Member State.

Annex 47: Oil supply

Direct delivery and DPRK tankers source their refined petroleum from motherships at sea as they do not enter port. The modus operandi starts with the motherships that obtain their fuel at port. The motherships then take their petroleum cargo out to sea where it is either transferred onto DPRK tankers, or onto feeder vessels that in turn transfer the oil cargo to DPRK tankers or DPRK-linked direct delivery vessels.

Shipping documentation showed that on 16/17 March 2021 and on 2/3 April 2021, the SUNWARD purchased and loaded its oil cargo (gas oil) in two shipments at Taichung port. Taichung Port is a Free Trade Zone where oil is stored by local and foreign traders. The SUNWARD loaded two shipments, each approximated 5,000 metric tons (MT) or a total of 10,000 MT that were, according to a Member State, then transferred to DPRK tankers at sea. Both bills of lading showed that the consignee of the oil cargo loaded onto the SUNWARD was Everway Global Ltd. A Member State has assessed that Everway Global Ltd (hereafter “Everway Global”) is an entity established by Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co., Ltd (hereafter Cheng Chiun Shipping). Cheng Chiun Shipping in its response letter to the Panel acknowledged its association with Everway Global.

The SKY VENUS (IMO: 9168257), another vessel operated by Cheng Chiun Shipping being investigated by the Panel, also loaded refined petroleum at Taichung Port on a number of occasions. Everway Global was also listed as the consignee.


All the gas oil was sold under Free On Board (FOB) transaction from the oil terminals at port to the aforementioned vessels. In late 2020, “High Sea” was a permitted destination on bills of lading for vessels operating out of ports at Taiwan Province of China.

SK Energy assisted the Panel with documentation requested.

Source: The Panel.

Bills of Lading of refined petroleum cargo aboard the SUNWARD (IMO: 892011)

17 March 2021

CODE NAME: "CONGENBILL", EDITION 1994		BILL OF LADING B/L NO: SW/2104/001	
Shipper SK ENERGY CO., LTD.		TO BE USED WITH CHARTER PARTIES	
Consignee TO ORDER OF EVERWAY GLOBAL LTD.		COPY	
Notify address SAME AS CONSIGNEE			
Vessel SUNWARD V2104	Port loading TAICHUNG TAIWAN		
Port of discharge HIGHSEA			
Shipper's description of goods		Gross weight	
N/M		GASOIL	
		5,919.151 KL @ 15 C	
		37,250 BBL @ 60 DEG F	
		4,989.252 METRIC TON	
		4,910.452 LONG TON	
FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY			
CLEAN ON BOARD			
17 TH MAR., 2021			
(of which on dock at Shipper's risk; the Carrier not being responsible for loss or damage hereover arising)			
Freight payable as per CHARTER PARTY dated FREIGHT ADVANCE Received on account of freight Time used for loading days hours.		SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above. Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown. IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of his tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void. FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF	
Freight payable at Number of original B/L THREE(3)		Place and date of issue TAICHUNG TAIWAN 17TH MAR 2021 Signature  NAUTICAL SEA SHIPPING CO. LTD. ON BEHALF OF MASTER OF M/V SUNWARD CAPT. YIM MING TSEN	

3 April 2021

CODE NAME: "CONGENBILL" EDITION 1994		BILL OF LADING B/L NO: SW2105001	
Shipper SK ENERGY CO., LTD.		TO BE USED WITH CHARTER PARTIES	
Consignee TO ORDER OF EVERKAY GLOBAL LTD.			
Notify address SAME AS CONSIGNEE			
Vessel SUNWARD V2105	Port loading TAICHUNG, TAIWAN		
Port of discharge HIGHSEA			
Shipper's description of goods		Gross weight	
N/M		GASOIL	
		5,410.412 KL @ 15 C	
		34,048 BBL @ 60 DEG F	
		4,553.403 METRIC TON	
		4,481.487 LONG TON	
FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY CLEAN ON BOARD 3 TH APR., 2021			
ORIGINAL			
(if which condition at Shipper's risk the Carrier not being responsible for loss or damage to goods in stowage)			
Freight payable as per CHARTER PARTY dated FREIGHT ADVANCE Received on account of freight Time used for loading days hours		SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above. Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown. IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void. FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF	
Freight payable at Number of original B/L THREE(3)		Place and date of issue TAICHUNG, TAIWAN 3TH APR 2021 Signature  NAUTICAL SEA SHIPPING CO., LTD. ON BEHALF OF MASTER OF M/V SUNWARD CAPT. YIN VALUETHIN	

Source: Member State.

Annex 48: Facilitators

Investigations into Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co., Ltd (程群船務代理有限公司) (hereafter “Cheng Chiun Shipping”) showed the use of motherships, direct delivery vessels, and feeder vessels that also typify other suspect refined petroleum transfers the Panel previously investigated. The motherships are typically larger tankers that load refined petroleum cargo at port or port areas. These ships take their cargo out where fuel is ultimately offloaded at ports in the DPRK. This happens in a number of ways: the mothership transfers its oil cargo to direct delivery vessels who transmit under fraudulent identifiers, given their known history of sanctions violation. The direct delivery vessels in turn then conduct ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers in other waters. Alternatively, the mothership transfers to a feeder or intermediary vessel, which in turn transfers its oil cargo to smaller unidentified tankers that then conduct ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers or with direct delivery vessels. The latter then transfers the oil to DPRK tankers that offload the refined petroleum at its home ports. In other words, illicit refined petroleum procured by the DPRK is transferred in a multi-staged and layered manner that seeks to evade easy detection. A Member State has assessed that Cheng Chiun Shipping was aware of the sanctions’ evasion activity conducted and attempted to cover up their activities.

Case examples

SUNWARD⁸⁷:


The then Panama-flagged tanker SUNWARD delivered refined petroleum in at least four transfers to DPRK-flagged tankers in March and in April 2021 (the material time), based on Member State information. The SUNWARD’s oil cargo transfers included:

- (i) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 30 and 31 March 2021 to DPRK-flagged SIN PHYONG 2 (IMO: 8817007);
- (ii) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 31 March and 1 April 2021 to DPRK-flagged AN SAN 1 (IMO: 7303803);
- (iii) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 6 and 7 April 2021 to DPRK-flagged UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962);
- (iv) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 7 and 8 April 2021 to the DPRK-flagged SAM JONG 2 (IMO: 7408873).

The SIN PHYONG 2, AN SAN, UN HUNG and SAM JONG 2 have all been featured in previous Panel reports for illicitly delivering refined petroleum to the DPRK. After receiving refined petroleum from the SUNWARD, the three tankers were all observed offloading their cargo at various DPRK ports (see figure 48-1):

⁸⁷ Maritime database tracking showed the SUNWARD traveled to Chittagong, Bangladesh by early June 2021. The vessel is presently listed as broken up.

Figure 48-1: DPRK vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers with the SUNWARD delivering refined petroleum, DPRK



Source: Member State.

SKY VENUS


The Palau-flagged tanker SKY VENUS (IMO: 9168257) is suspected to have delivered refined petroleum in at least six transfers to DPRK-flagged tankers via multiple ship transfers in May and in August 2021 (the material time). The SKY VENUS' oil cargo transfers included:

- (i) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 14 May 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged YU JONG 2 (IMO: 8604917);
- (ii) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 17 May 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged SAM JONG 1 (IMO: 8405311);
- (iii) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 28 May 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged SAM JONG 1;
- (iv) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 8 August 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO: 8865121);
- (v) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 9 August 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged SIN PHYONG 5;
- (vi) Ship-to-ship transfer on or around 10 August 2021 to a vessel, which in turn transferred the oil cargo to DPRK-flagged SIN PHYONG 5.

Commercial AIS data showed the SKY VENUS was at Taichung port / port waiting area during the material time, a location where the SUNWARD had also loaded oil.


YU JONG 2, SAM JONG 1 and SIN PHYONG 5 have all been featured in previous Panel reports illicit delivering refined petroleum to the DPRK. The SIN PHYONG 5 loaded refined petroleum over three consecutive days in August. The three tankers were all observed in the DPRK offloading refined petroleum (see figure 48-2 and 48-3):

Figure 48-2: YU JONG 2 and SAM JONG 1 involved in ship-to-ship transfers with SKY VENUS delivering refined petroleum, DPRK



Source: Member State.

Figure 48-3: SIN PHYONG 5, involved in ship-to-ship transfers with SKY VENUS, delivering refined petroleum, DPRK



Source: Member State.

The Panel's investigations indicated the following shell companies established in various jurisdictions either: shared a similar address and contact number with Cheng Chiun Shipping, Director, or have been listed in the care of a company associated with Cheng Chiun Shipping's address:

- (i) Ocean Energy International Corp.
- (ii) Everway Global Ltd
- (iii) Wills International Co., Ltd
- (iv) Wisteria
- (v) Sunward Marine S.A.
- (vi) Energy Star Marine S.A.
- (vii) Trump Marine S.A
- (viii) Gemmy Marine S.A.

Ocean Energy International Corp (hereafter "Ocean Energy"), the registered owner and manager of SKY VENUS, registered an address in the Seychelles with no contact information⁸⁸. However, documentation of the vessel's classification society indicated that Ocean Energy was managed by Wills International Co. Ltd (hereafter "Wills International"). Wills International, an entity incorporated in Samoa with a physical office in Kaohsiung, shares the same address as Cheng Chiun Shipping. Cheng Chiun Shipping has acknowledged the listed entities as its subsidiary companies.

⁸⁸ IMO records.

The Panel separately notes that Wise Million Ltd, a company with a physical address in Kaohsiung, served as the ship operator and Document of Compliance holding company for the CHAN FONG (IMO: 7350260). The CHAN FONG was investigated by the Panel for conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK tanker CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313) in March 2018, as well as in connection to T Energy International Co., Ltd.⁸⁹ Wills International is listed as an associated subsidiary company with Wise Million Ltd.⁹⁰ Wills International managed and operated the SUNWARD from January 2013 until June 2021 when the vessel was scrapped. The SUNWARD was registered under the Panama-incorporated entity Sunward Marine S.A.

Responses

The Panel wrote to Cheng Chiun Shipping, the various jurisdictions where other offshore companies were established, and the relevant flag State.

Cheng Chiun Shipping, through a legal firm, acknowledged that SUNWARD and SKY VENUS “..belong to me and my shareholders.” The company denied “...ever transported refined petroleum product(s) to DPRK-related vessels through my oil tankers SUNWARD and SKY VENUS...”, and that the company served as purchasing agent and shipping agent for gasoil customers near Fujian Province, China. According to the company, a Mr Liu from a Hong Kong-incorporated company was the only person to whom it sold gasoil during the periods of interests requested by the Panel. The oil was transferred to “inland ships” and “fishing boats” nominated by Mr Liu. No ship identifiers were provided to receive the gasoil. According to Cheng Chiu Shipping, “...Mr Liu always sends his ships which had the signs and numbers shown on the ships covered”. These receiving ships were instead recognized with a “CNY paper bill” they would present, whose serial numbers would match against those provided by Mr Liu to Cheng Chiun Shipping. The Panel continues to review the information provided by the company.

The Panel is awaiting a response from Samoa on the relevant incorporated entity(s) associated with Cheng Chiun Shipping.

Seychelles provided the requested information to assist the Panel’s ongoing investigations.

Panama provided the requested documentation for the SUNWARD. The screening report for the vessel confirmed the SUNWARD dropped AIS signal during the investigative periods of interest when the vessel conducted ship-to-ship transfers with the DPRK tankers. The Panel is awaiting a response from Panama on the relevant incorporated entity(s) associated with Cheng Chiun Shipping.

Palau has yet to respond on the SKY VENUS.

The Panel separately continues its investigations into the facilitators of other vessels mentioned in the Panel reported alleged to have conducted ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels and direct delivery vessels.⁹¹

Source: The Panel.

⁸⁹ S/2021/211, paras. 52-53 and annex 31.

⁹⁰ IHS Markit.

⁹¹ S/2021/777, para. 45, and S/2021/211, paras. 52-53 and annex 31.

Annex 49a: Vessel's onward sale: RUI HONG 916 (IMO: 9058866)

The Panel investigated the RUI HONG 916 (IMO: 9058866) for ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged tanker KUM UN SAN (IMO: 8720436) on 28 May 2019 in the East China Sea (see figure 49a). The Panel recommended the RUI HONG 916 for designation pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017). No commercial AIS data exist following the vessel's sale in January 2019, with the RUI HONG 916 last showing AIS signal in early January 2019 when the vessel was at Hinase port, Japan. In March 2019, the vessel was flagged under Sierra Leone for a single delivery voyage from "Onomichi, Japan to Ningde, Fujian Province, China"⁹².

Figure 49a: Ship-to-ship transfer between RUI HONG 916 and DPRK-flagged KUM UN SAN, 28 May 2019



Source: Member State.

The vessel was brokered by the Japan-registered Toei Shipping Co., Ltd (hereafter "Toei"), for the Hong Kong-incorporated Ruis (HK) Marine Co., Limited, for sale in January 2019, with the vessel's Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance dated 9 January 2019. In the Panel's correspondence with Toei, the company clarified that it acted as a non-exclusive agent on behalf of Ruis (HK) Marine Co., Limited when entering into the vessel's sale and purchase agreement.⁹³

⁹² Sierra Leone Maritime Administration.

⁹³ According to Toei, the company usually represents offshore buyers seeking to purchase vessels from Japanese owners.

According to Toei, while it understood Fujian Yihe (see also paras. 47-51) to be the actual buyer of the RUI HONG 916, it was unaware of the vessel's onward sale between Fujian Yihe and the ultimate end buyer 'Wang' that subsequently took place. Toei also engaged a third-party committee of lawyers to review the case. Excerpts of a submitted report of 25 May 2021 is at annex 49b. Toei further indicated it had accepted the third-party committee's recommendations and "*In this respect, we have included the languages in our form of vessel sale and purchase agreement to the effected that we will not be involved in North Korea-related transactions*" (see addendum at annex 49b).

The Panel separately notes affiliations between Ruis Marine and Fujian Yihe.

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 49b: Proposed recommendations – Excerpts as provided in the original and translated version

Translation / For Reference Purpose Only

To: Toei Shipping Co., Ltd

**Investigation Report of the
Third Party Committee**

May25, 2021

The Third Party Committee of Toei Shipping Co., Ltd.,

Members of the committee:

[REDACTED] chair of the committee
Attorney-at-Law

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Attorney-at-Law

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Attorney-at-Law

[REDACTED]

X X X X X

III. Measures to avoid any connection with North Korea-related transactions

1 It is truly regrettable that the Vessel in Question was unfortunately used for a North Korea-related transaction that is prohibited or restricted by UNSCR. Even though the Company did not know or could not have known such a situation at all at the time of the transaction, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Company as an entity dealing with ship trading transactions to take measures to prevent such an incident from occurring again in the future.

Nonetheless, at the time of the transaction in question, there is no evidence that measures were generally taken in the ship trading industry to prevent the use of vessels in North Korea-related transactions prohibited or restricted by the UNSCR. The Japanese version of the ship purchase agreement used in this transaction is a standard form (the latest translation of the English version of the ship purchase agreement, revised on November 2, 1999) prepared by the Formalities Committee of the Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc. There is no clause in the form that includes measures to prevent its use in North Korea-related transactions and the form has not been revised to include such measures to this day. From this point of view, we would understand that it would be hard to say that the issues involved is not penetrated sufficiently in the Japanese ship trade industry.

2 Needless to say, it is not permissible to continue a transaction when it is known that the counterparty to a transaction is trying to use the goods to be sold in an illegal transaction. However, this case was not a case where such a circumstance could be detected at the time of the transaction, but rather this was a case where a subsequent buyer from a counterparty to the transaction in question committed illegal activity and it was an unexpected situation for the contracting parties.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Vessel in Question was actually used for the purpose violating the prohibition of transactions related to North Korea, which is prohibited or restricted by the UNSCR that the Japanese government takes the lead in expressing its compliance with, should be solemnly accepted. In order to eliminate involvement in such transactions as much as possible in the future, in light of the purpose of such prohibition, it is necessary to require all parties involved in sales contracts of vessels to take a pledge not to be involved in such transactions, both in concluding contracts and being involved in such contracts. Also, it is necessary to be determined to refrain from transactions with counterparties who cannot be expected to fulfill their pledge. In order to reveal the existence of such pledges, it is necessary to add

Translation / For Reference Purpose Only

a clause to that effect in the contract, which would also be meaningful to remind the parties involved in the contract of such duties. In addition, depending on the situations, there may be room for consideration to add a provision to the effect that if a contracting party violates its covenant and engages in such a transaction on its own and causes damage to the other party, it will be liable for compensation to the other party. In the standard form used in this case, there are also individual agreements outside the form as additional clauses and therefore, there would be no obstacle to adding the above clause as part of such clauses.

On the other hand, if a sale and purchase contract of vessel further includes a clause which prohibits the subsequent purchaser from the contracting party from engaging in such transactions and makes the contracting party itself liable for damages in the event that the subsequent purchaser violates such prohibition, there is a risk of placing excessive obligations and burdens on the contracting party that engages in a wide range of transactions. This may even possibly lead to a situation where a sales transaction fails to conclude even though all other terms and conditions of the transaction have been agreed upon. In commercial transactions, it is very exceptional to make the other party responsible for the actions of the subsequent purchaser and, except in cases where the result of the transaction is understood to have the possibility to support illegal activities, it would be generally understood that parties would trust the good sense of the counterparty and refrain from imposing such restrictions.

IV. Conclusion

1 Based on the above investigation and examination, although it is apparent that the Vessel in Question which is the subject of the sales transaction by the Company, being subsequently resold and used for purposes that violated the prohibition of transactions related to North Korea which is prohibited or restricted by the UNSCR, the Company was merely involved in the sale and purchase of the Vessel in Question as part of its ordinary course of business activities. The Company has never been actively involved in any act in violation of the prohibition of North Korea-related transactions, and at the time of the sales transaction of the Vessel in Question, there were absolutely no circumstances in which the Company knew or could have known that the Vessel in Question would be used for the above-mentioned purpose in the future.

2 In the event where the Company is involved in vessel purchase transactions in the future, in order to ensure that the vessel will not be used for any purpose that is in conflict with the prohibition of North Korea-related transactions, prohibited or restricted by the UNSCR, it is vital for the Company to confirm with counterparty in this point and request for a pledge, and to be determined not to carry out transaction with the counterparty who is not expected to comply with the pledge. On top of that, we believe that one of the best measures that can be taken under the current circumstances is, when concluding a vessel transaction contract, in addition to the standard form used in the past, the Company should include a special provision declaring that "the buyer pledges not to use the vessel which is the subject of this sales transaction for North Korea-related transactions prohibited or restricted by UNSCR" and further include a provision stipulating that the counterparty of the transaction is expected to make independent and voluntary efforts with use of good common sense in fulfilling this pledge, while stipulating liability for damages in the event of non-fulfillment, as the circumstances may be.

XXXXX

東栄汽船株式会社 御中

調 査 報 告 書

2021年5月25日

東榮汽船株式会社第三者委員会

委員長 弁護士

[Redacted signature]

委員 弁護士

[Redacted signature]

委員 弁護士

[Redacted signature]

第3 北朝鮮関連の取引と一切の関わりを持たないための方策

- 1 本件船舶が不幸にして国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引に使用されたことは誠に遺憾なことである。東栄汽船がそうした事情を取引当時全く知らず、また知り得なかったとはいえ、船舶売買取引に関与する者として、今後こうしたことが二度と生じないように注意するための対策を講じることが必要であることは多言を要しない。

もっとも、本件取引当時、国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引に使用されることのないようにするための対策が船舶取引業界において一般的に執り行われていた事情は認められない。本件取引に使用された和文の船舶売買契約書は社団法人日本海運集会所書式制定委員会の作成した定型書式（1999年11月2日改定の英文船舶売買契約書訳文で最新のもの）を用いているところ、その書式には、国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引に使用されることのないようにするための対策を盛り込んだ条項はなく、これを盛り込んだ改定も行われることなく現在に至っている。このことからみても、わが国の船舶売買取引業界において、その点に関する問題意識が十分浸透しているとまでは言い難いように思われるところである。

- 2 取引の相手方が違法な取引に売買対象物品を使用利用しようとしていること

が判明している場合に、なおその取引を継続することが許されないことは言うまでもない。本件は、取引の相手方からの転売先が違法行為に及んだものであって、本件船舶の取引当時にそうした事情が窺われるという事例ではなく、契約当事者間においては想定外の事態であった。

とはいえ、日本政府が率先して遵守を表明する国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引の禁止等に抵触する目的に本件船舶が現実使用されたという事実は厳粛に受け止めるべきものである。そして、その禁止等の趣旨に照らして、今後そうした取引への関与を可能な限り排除するためには、船舶の売買契約を締結し、またその契約に関与するに当たっては関係者間において、そうした取引に関与しないことの誓約を求め、その履行を期待できないような相手方との取引は差し控える決意が必要である。そして、その誓約の存在を明らかにするため、契約書にもその旨の条項を加えることが必要であるとともに、契約関係者にあらためてその注意を喚起する上でも有意義なことであろうと考える。また、場合によっては、契約当事者がその誓約に違反して自らそうした取引に関与し相手方に損害が生じた場合には、相手方に対して賠償責任を負う旨の規定を設けることも、考慮の余地はあろう。本件で用いられた定型書式においても、追加条項として書式外の個別の取決めがされており、そうした条項の一環として、上記のような条項を付加することに妨げはないと思われる。

他方で、それ以上に、契約当事者からの転売先がそうした取引に関与することまで禁じ、転売先が違反した場合にまで契約当事者自身が損害賠償責任を負うとの取決めをするということになると、広く取引を行う契約当事者に過大な義務と負担を負わせるおそれがあり、それによって、他の全ての取引条件が折り合ったにもかかわらず売買取引が成立しないという事態となることも危惧されるところといえよう。商取引において、取引の相手方に対し、その転売先の行動についてまで責任を負担させようとするのは極めて例外的なことであって、

その取引の結果が違法な行為に加担するおそれがあると判断される場合は別として、通常は、取引の相手方の良識を信頼してこれを差し控えるのが一般であろうと思われる。

第4 結語

- 1 以上の調査及び検討を踏まえると、東栄汽船の関与する取引の対象となった本件船舶がその後転売された結果、国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引の禁止等に抵触する目的に使用されたことは明らかであるが、東栄汽船は、単なる商行為の一環として本件船舶の売買取引に関与したに過ぎない。東栄汽船は、国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引の禁止等に抵触する行為に積極的に加担したことは全くなく、本件船舶の売買取引当時、将来本件船舶が上記のような目的で使用されることを知り、又は知り得るような事情は全くなかった。
- 2 東栄汽船が今後船舶売買取引に関与する場合には、その船舶が国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引の禁止等に抵触する目的に使用されることのないようにするために、取引の相手方に対してその点の確認と誓約を求め、その誓約の遵守が期待できない相手との取引は行わないとの厳格な決意を持って臨むことが肝要である。そして、その上で、船舶取引契約を締結するに当たり、従来から使用する定型書式に加えて、「買主は、国際連合安全保障理事会決議で禁止あるいは規制される北朝鮮関連取引に取引物件を使用しないことを誓約する。」旨宣明する特約規定を設けることとし、その履行については、取引の相手方の自主的主体的努力と良識に期待することとしつつ、状況に応じて、その不履行の場合の損害賠償責任を定めるのが、現今の状況のもとで採りうる最善の方策の一つであると考えらる。

以 上

Annex 49c: Addendum as provided by Toei Shipping Co. Ltd

ADDENDUM NO. 1

to a Memorandum of Agreement dated [Date] as amended and supplemented from time to time together with any addenda thereto (the "Memorandum") for the sale and purchase of the motor vessel XXXX (the "Vessel") entered by and between:

a) TOEI SHIPPING CO., LTD, 5F TOKYO BAYSIDE BUILDING, 3-33-17 KAIGAN, MINATO-KU, TOKYO, JAPAN (the "Sellers"); and

b) XXX (the "Buyers").

With the Buyers and the Sellers hereinafter called the Parties and each of them indistinctively a Party


THE PARTIES HEREBY AGREE AND CONFIRM as follows:

the buyer pledges not to use the vessel which is the subject of this sales transaction for North Korea-related transactions prohibited or restricted by United Nations Security Council resolutions.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the both parties hereto executed this Agreement on this [Date]

THE SELLERS
TOEI SHIPPING CO., LTD

THE BUYERS
XXXX

By: 
Title: PRESIDENT

By: _____
Title: PRESIDENT


Source: The Panel.

Annex 50a: Vessel's onward sale: RI HONG nka DPRK-flagged TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318)

The Panel recommended the then Sierra Leone-flagged RI HONG (IMO: 9162318) for designation when it was recorded on satellite imagery alongside other DPRK cargo vessels exporting coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters on 29 April 2020.⁹⁴ The vessel is currently DPRK-flagged, re-named TO MYONG.⁹⁵ Prior to that, the vessel was berthed at Songnim port, DPRK, on 23 December 2019 (see figure 50a-1). The vessel last transmitted less than a week earlier in Shidao waters, China. Both vessels, suspected to have been operating under DPRK control, have since officially transitioned under the DPRK fleet sailing as TO MYONG and SAM JIN 8 respectively. The Panel had recommended the RI HONG for designation pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017)⁹⁶. The vessel has since continued to export DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters.

Panama confirmed that the RI HONG was deregistered from its ship registry on 20 December 2019 on the basis of the transfer of the vessel under another flag (see figure 50a-2). The Panel wrote to the latter ship registry and did not receive a response. IMO records showed the vessel was next re-named KLAUSEN, sailing under the Sierra Leone flag in May 2020⁹⁷, with its registered owner and ship operator as the Hong Kong-incorporated Converse Trading Limited⁹⁸. The Sierra Leone Maritime Administration confirmed to the Panel that it de-registered the KLAUSEN on 17 November 2020 with the reason of the vessel's expiration of its issued provisional registration certificate. The RI HONG was subsequently listed to have come under the DPRK's fleet as on October 2020, sailing as the TO MYONG⁹⁹. There has been no commercial AIS transmissions of the vessel since mid-December 2019.

Figure 50a-1: RI HONG at Songnim port, DPRK, 23 December 2019, and anchored near Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 29 April 2020



Source: Member State.

⁹⁴ S/2020/840, paras. 57-59 and S/2021/211, para. 79 and annex 38(b).

⁹⁵ IMO GISIS. Flagged on October 2020 but updated only subsequently from information provided by flag state (backdated).

⁹⁶ IMO GISIS. Flagged in October 2020 but updated only subsequently from information provided by flag state (backdated).

⁹⁷ Information then available as dated on IMO GISIS.

⁹⁸ This entity has no online or commercial footprint.

⁹⁹ IMO GISIS. Flagged in October 2020 but updated only subsequently from information provided by flag state (backdated).

Figure 50a-2: Flag deletion certificate of RI HONG, December 2019

IMO No. IMO NUMBER	NÚMERO OFICIAL REGISTRATION No.	DISTINTIVO DE LLAMADA CALL / CALLER
9162318	23921-97-0	3FJH7

CANCELACIÓN DE REGISTRO / DELETION CERTIFICATE

Nombre del Buque: Name of Vessel		
RI HONG		
Tipo de Buque: Type of Vessel		
OTRAS CARGAS / CARGA GENERAL - OTHER CARGO / GENERAL CARGO SHIP		
Año de Construcción: Year of Build	Tonelaje Bruto: Gross Tonnage	Tonelaje Neto: Net Tonnage
1997	9448.00	3114.00
Eslora: Length	Manga: Breadth	Puntal: Depth
94.79 mts	19.60 mts	13.00 mts
Propietario: Owner		
LI HONG SHIPPING CO., LTD. (100%)		
Solicitante y Fecha: Applicant and Date		
COPIA DEL EXPEDIENTE DE LA NAVE		
[Redacted] 18-12-2019		
Resolución/Fecha de Cancelación: Resolution/Registration Close		
C-44215-19 20-12-2019		
Datos de inscripción del Buque: Information of the Registered Vessel		
Que el título de propiedad del buque consta inscrito en la FICHA 20270 ROLLO 55298 IMAGEN 14 de la Dirección General de Registro Público de Propiedad de Naves; si actual cambio de Propietario consta inscrito en el DOCUMENTO 1922205.		

Este certificado muestra que el buque arriba identificado se encuentra libre de gravámenes según confirmación del Registro Público expedido el 18-12-2019, y se cancela por motivo de Registro Público debido a: Cese de la actividad del buque y/o cambio de propietario. Se cancela el registro de la propiedad del buque.

Traducción a: Otro Registro: TRANSFERENCIA A OTRO REGISTRO

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Stamp]

Derechos: RO No. 10163588A del 20 de diciembre de 2019

Firma: AMP

000648903

Source: Member State.

In 2020, the Panel wrote to **Li Hong Shipping Co Ltd** (hereafter “Li Hong Shipping”), the then known last listed registered owner of RI HONG, and (listed in the care of) **Hong He Shipping Co Ltd** (hereafter “Hong He Shipping”), the latter serving as the vessel’s ship manager, operator, technical manager and Document of Compliance company holder. The Panel sought information on the vessel, its cargo, its ownership, all associated counterparties involved, along with relevant documentation and financial transactions. The Panel received a response from Li Hong Shipping’s owners via its lawyers on 24 August 2021 providing documentation, including of the vessel’s onward sale by 16 December 2019 to a Chinese entity, China Nuclear Aviation Technology (Ningbo) Company Limited (中核航空科技(宁波)有限公司) (hereafter “CNAT”) (see annex 50b). The Panel informed Li Hong Shipping that the information on the IMO website had continued to list the company as the vessel’s registered owner and recommended that vessel owners should ensure they do not remain liable by ensuring vessel onward sale information is updated with the IMO in a timely manner with the requisite documentation.

As regards information on whether Li Hong had reached out to the buyer (its representatives) for an explanation, Li Hong Shipping responded “Our clients have sought answers from the Buyer via the broker regarding the allegations, but have been unsuccessful. Our clients stress that they had no knowledge that the Buyer intended to carry out any alleged illicit activities.” The Panel separately was able to obtain a contact detail of CNAT sourcing publicly available information and corresponded with the company. The Panel continues to await the company’s response.

Li Hong Shipping¹⁰⁰ also indicated that it failed to receive the Panel's earlier emails requesting information on RI HONG as it was sent to a personal email possibly belonging to an individual of a similar sounding name (with a word mis-spelt) at Hong He Shipping (its management and 'care of company') that was no longer under its employ. The Panel notes that the individual's name continued to be officially listed with the IMO as recent as December 2021.

On the Panel's request on due diligence information, Li Hong responded "As the arrangement was through a broker and between two Chinese entities, our clients did not undertake additional due diligence to that which was undertaken by the broker. There was nothing to suggest to our clients that further due diligence was required. That said, our clients have updated their internal procedures to ensure that, in the future, additional due diligence checks are carried out."

On the Panel's query on steps undertaken by Li Hong to reduce the risk of such transactions, Li Hong responded:

"..... our clients had an in-house meeting with all their employees to discuss the lessons learned from the allegations concerning Ri Hong [Enclosure 9]. Those lessons included:

- 1) prudent investigations/due diligence on business counterparties;
- 2) enhanced due diligence when high-risk jurisdictions are involved;
- 3) better contract management;
- 4) conducting due diligence on cargo;
- 5) improved collection of information, including utilising brokers and insurers; and
- 6) penalties for non-compliance.

Our clients are also working with us to implement a sanctions compliance program that the companies and their employees may refer to for training and guidance purposes." See annex 50c. The Panel notes these efforts undertaken.

The TO MYONG has continued to transit in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters as well as at a Chinese port in 2021¹⁰¹ (see annex 58).

Source: The Panel.

¹⁰⁰ All information in this report that states a correspondence and corresponding responses from Li Hong Shipping's owners was conducted via its lawyers, a legal firm registered in the United Kingdom.

¹⁰¹ Pursuant to paragraph 5, resolution 2397 (2017).

Excerpt of the sale and purchase contract for RI HONG

船 舶 买 卖 合 同		Norwegian Shipowners' Association's Motto-conditions of Agreement for sale and purchase of ships. Adopted by The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) IN 1956. SALEFORM 1993 Revised 1966, 1983 and 1986/87
日期: 2019 年 11 月 23 日		1
LIHONG SHIPPING CO., LTD 作为该船的注册所有人		2
注册地址: 马绍尔公司注册号: 66359. Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Take Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands MH96960.		2
下称“共同卖方”, 同意出售		3
中核航空科技(宁波)有限公司 (下称“买方”), 同意购买		3
地址: 浙江省象山县鹤浦镇浦港西路2号05幢		3
船名: RI HONG		6
船级社: ICS (INTERNATIONAL CERTIFICATION SERVICES)		7
建造: 1977 建造厂: Higaki Shipbuilding Co., LTD. 日本		8
船旗: 巴拿马		9
注册地: 巴拿马		10
船舶呼号: 3FJM7 总吨/净吨 GRT/NRT: 6448/3144		11
国际海事组织编号: 9162318		12
下称船舶, 基于以下条款签订本合同		13
定义		14
“书面”是指买卖双方互相通信的挂号信件、电传或其他现代通讯方式。		16
“船级社”或者“船级”是指第7行规定的 ICS 船级社		17
1. 购买价格: [REDACTED]		18
2. 保证金		19
作为本合同顺利履行的保证, 买方须在双方签署(传真或者电子邮件)本合同后的五个银行工作日内支付 10%保证金。该保证金须按照买方的意愿, 以银行转账的方式或者现金支付到卖方书面指定的账户和地点。		20 21
3. 付款		22
船舶交接时, 买方须将剩余的 90%的尾款以及剩余燃油、润滑油及其它根据合同约定的应支付的款项(如果有的话), 以银行转账或者现金的方式支付到卖方书面指定的账户和地点。		23 24
上述款项的支付时间不超过“准备交船通知书”递交后的三个银行工作日。		25
准备交船通知书, 至少早于合同缔约日之前的三个银行工作日内提供。		26
4. 船舶检验		30
买家已于 2019 年 9 月 3 日在越南富美港对该船进行检验, 并且接受该船, 本合同买卖是完全的、肯定的, 将仅以本合同规定的条款为准。		31 32
5. 交船通知, 交船时间和地点		51
A) 卖方应就船舶动态及时通知买方, 并在递交“交船准备就绪通知书”之前, 发出 15、10、7 天的大约通知, 和 5、3、1 天的准确通知。“交船准备就绪通知书(NOR)”只有在船舶按照合同规定在各方都准备好交接时递交才被认为有效。买方必须在收到卖方的通知时做出书面回复, 否则视为买方接受该通知。		52 53 54
B) 该船须安全停泊在中国的山东石岛港的外锚地进行交接。		57
交船时间: 2019 年 12 月 10 日至 2019 年 12 月 20 日, 由卖方选择。		60
解约时间(参考第 5C 条款, 6B (III) 和 14 条款): 2019 年 12 月 30 日 由买方选择		61
C) 如果买方认为虽然尽其所能仍不能在解约时间之前准备好交船, 则卖方须书面通知买方新的交船时间并确定一个新的解约时间。在收到该书面通知后的 7 个连续自然日之内, 根据本合同第 14 条的规定买方有权选择		62 63

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X X X X X



Business Licence of China Nuclear Aviation Technology (Ningbo) Company Limited



Source: The Panel.

Annex 50c: Proposed due diligence measures --- Meeting minutes as provided in the original and translated version

鸿和船务有限公司
HONG HE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

关于总结 RIHONG 轮事件经验教训的会议记录

2021 年 8 月 5 日, Hong He Shipping Co, Ltd 全体人员召开会议, 主题是总结 Ri Hong 轮销售后买方利用该轮违法营运给我司代理损失的经验教训, 敦促所有人员在业务交往中提高警惕, 不要违反国家法律, 国际公约和相关的国际组织的法令。为此, 特将本会议记录发给各部门遵守执行。

我司 2019 年 12 月, 我司管理的 RIHONG 轮在正常程序中销售给了买方中核航空科技(宁波)有限公司。今年 7 月初我司在香港的账户被中国银行(香港)有限公司关停。事后经过调查, 得知买方中核航空科技(宁波)有限公司买入该轮后去做了涉及联合国制裁地的非法贸易。因此我司推测银行关停我司业务的原因即可能与此事有关。虽然我司聘请香港律师与银行做出了交涉和说明, 但是银行至今没有回复我司的银行服务, 也没有对关停业务的依据和理由给予说明或澄清。此事件给我司造成了很大的损失, 除了抗辩澄清的花费, 我司管理的船舶发生的正常交易没有了资金支持, 部分业务停摆和延误。现将就此事对我们造成的不良影响与经验教训总结如下, 请各位同事汲取教训, 在今后的工作中时刻保持高度警觉, 避免留下隐藏隐患。

1、 业务关系人的审查

鸿和船务有限公司

HONG HE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

从今往后，不论是在哪一环节哪一方面需要和新的客户，尤其是外国当事人发生业务关系时，负责该业务的员工必须上报公司，由公司做好尽职调查。调查的内容为该客户的信誉，经济实力和是否有过违法记录和违法了国际制裁令的行为。

2、 合同管理

在各类合同的拟定过程中，要多方查阅相关法律条文，确保语言得当严谨，叙事清楚明晰，责任归属表达准确，没有歧义。执行完结的合同要每个季度编订入卷。在季度末上交公司行政部登记存放。凡是在执行中发生过争议和纠纷的合同，当事人要在季度总结会上做出总结汇报并提出合同的改善意见和防损建议。

3、 交易标的物的审查

管理的船舶虽然在租船人的指令下营运，承载租船人提供的货物。但是我司各业务人员要尽量核实具体的货物是否涉嫌违法违规。目前已经听说有租船人安排船舶运载制裁地为原产地的货物。虽然中间经过伪装，但是已经给其他船公司造成了伤害。我司要以他人公司的案例作为教训，谨慎操作，切勿中招。

4、 信息收集和查证渠道

对于我司没有条件确定的疑问，应该立即联系船舶的租船经纪人，保险经纪公司，保险人或保赔协会询问情况和请求帮助查证。联系业务时不得使用个人邮箱。但个人邮箱也要告知公司登记管理。收到不属于本部门业务的邮件时要及时转发相关部门，不得不予理睬或忽视。

鸿和船务有限公司
HONG HE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED

5 处罚

Ri Hong 轮事件的经验教训请各位同事时刻谨记。如果有员工没有遵守上述规定给公司造成损失，公司将给予经济惩罚，严重者赔偿损失并解除合同。

请全体同事在今后的日常工作中严谨对待，时刻保持警觉状态，确保公司业务健康发展。

此致 全体员工

鸿和船务有限公司

For and on behalf of
HONG HE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED
鸿和船务有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

2021 年 8 月 6 日

Meeting Minutes on Lessons Drawn From “Ri Hong” Sale Incident

Aug 6th, 2021

All the employees of Hong He Shipping Co, Ltd had a meeting on Aug 5th, 2021 to conduct a reflection session on lessons learned in respect of the incident of the sale of the ship “Ri Hong”, the buyer of which has utilized the ship to conducted illegal trade and indirectly brought damage and loss to our company. Therefore, the company hereby reminds all employees to be alert and cautious of the potential risks in the course of business and to avoid breaching domestic and international laws and Acts. The minutes of this meeting are handed out to all the departments for compliance.

The ship “ Ri Hong” managed by our company was sold to the buyer ZhongHe Aviation Technology (Ningbo) Company (the “Buyer”) through normal purchase & sale formalities under a contract in Dec 2019. In early July 2021, our company’s bank account with the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Branch was canceled without prior notification and post-explanation. Our company afterwards conducted an investigation and learnt that the Buyer, after purchasing the vessel “Ri Hong”, used her to trade in North Korea, which is a state under UN sanction. Though our company has retained Hong Kong lawyers to deal with the Bank of China with full evidence proving our innocence and genuine ignorance towards buyer’s illegal activities, the Bank refused to restore their services, and furthermore, the Bank refused to give any further appropriate explanation. Therefore, this incident has resulted in a great loss to our company. Besides the costs in defending our position, our company has now suffered frustration of business due to loss of cash flow support. Now, we are having this meeting for the purpose of having the lessons summarized with an expectation that all colleagues should be well alert and be cautious of similar risks in future work .

1. Check on Business Counterparties

From now on, when dealing with new clients, no matter at which levels and in what respect, everybody should report all details to the company and the company shall conduct a prudent investigation on the legality of new clients. The investigation will cover the creditworthiness, the financial ability and default/criminal record inclusive of whether the client has been suspected of having breached international sanctions.

2 Contract Management

When drafting contracts, all employees should refer and rely on relevant laws and use proper terms with explicit and unambiguous wordings. The fulfilled contracts should be structured into volumes with codes and be submitted to the company for record keeping. Every dispute that took place during the execution of the contract should be summarized and reported to the company at the end of season meeting. Relevant moments for reflection and loss prevention suggestions should be raised by the relevant persons.

3 Checking Information on Cargo

All people should be on alert and exercise due diligence when checking the information on cargo such as the source, origin and the legality thereof, even though ships are trading under charterers' instructions and cargo are provided by charterers. It has been previously reported that other ship owners have suffered a lot for being wrongly and unknowingly involved in illegal cargo carriage arranged by their charterers. We should take it as a lesson and do our best to avoid such risks so as to ensure the company's business stays on a right and lawful track.

4 Collection of Information

It has been decided that it is now required where there are uncertainties and inquiries, or when there are no channels to satisfy anti-loss investigations, employees should immediately consult our charter broker, insurance broker or H&M insurer and P&I insurers for assistance on accurate information. However, it is strictly forbidden for private emails to be used in business contacts and every private email, despite not being allowed to be used, should be registered with the company for safety management protocols. Every person, after receiving emails unconnected with his own business, is obliged to re-deliver these emails to the right person who is in charge of that business so as to eliminate any omission of the work.

5 Penalty

Everybody is to take the incident of "Ri Hong" as a lesson and reflect especially in respect of observing international regulations and to be on guard against violation of international sanctions. People who cause damage or loss to the company due to his ignorance and negligence on this requirement will incur economic punishment imposed by the company. Those who violates these regulations to a serious extent shall be fired without excuse.

All employees are hereby demanded to follow and observe the above rules and stay alert to potential risks. These rules are stipulated for the purpose of making ship trading safe in the common interests of the company and all our employees.

Hong He Shipping Co, Ltd

Source: The Panel.

Annex 51: Vessel Acquisition by the DPRK - SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430)

The Panel began tracking the DPRK cargo vessel SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430) post-transition, based on anomalous AIS transmissions. While the vessel was flagged under the DPRK in October 2020¹⁰², no vessel tracks were available for ten months after August 2020. The vessel began transmitting intermittently on multiple identifiers as it departed Nampo 6 July 2021. It arrived at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters later the same month. By 25 August 2021, the vessel was at Longkou port area where it remained for over two weeks, where it was suspected to have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers based on transmitted draft changes, before berthing at Longkou's bulk cargo terminal by 11 September 2021. It was observed outside of Nampo Lockgate by mid-September 2021 (see figures 51-1~51-2).


Prior to it being flagged under the DPRK, the vessel sailed under the Dominican flag for three months, indicating the vessel was issued a single delivery voyage permit for delivery to its new owners, HongKong Great Fortune Development Co. Limited (香港吉運(运)發(发)展有限公司) (hereafter "HKGF"). HKGF was the last registered owner when it was sailing as the CJK OSAKA in 2020, before the vessel joined the DPRK's fleet¹⁰³. The company neither has an online footprint nor have kept the email it was registered against on corporate documentation.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ IMO GISIS.


Figure 51-1: Storyboard of DPRK-flagged vessel *SU RYONG SAN* transmitting false identifiers

July to September 2021



July 2021 – Ningbo Zhoushan, SU RYONG SAN spoofing as YONG AN and K SK¹⁰⁴. CJK OSAKA is the historical name of SU RYONG SAN


¹⁰⁴ The K SK's spoofed MMSI and calls sign belongs to a Cameroon-flagged cargo vessel operating solely in the Mediterranean.



August 2021 - Longkou

On 25 August 2021 (see figure 51-1), the vessel sailing as YONG AN briefly transmitted on its original identity SU RYONG SAN outside of Longkou port before changing its digital profile to K SK while at Longkou Bulk Cargo Terminal.

September 2021 – Longkou



Source: The Panel.

The Panel is further investigating suspected sanctions evasion and violation activities across multiple fronts by HKGF since 2019.

The Panel asked China, on the SU RYONG SAN's identifiers under which it was transmitting, its cargo offloaded in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and at other Chinese ports, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted

in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded and loaded, along with shipping documentation and financial transactions.

Based on information obtained from various sources, HKGF is alleged to have imported into China between 100,000 to 200,000 metric tons of DPRK-origin coal from the DPRK entity Yonggwang Furniture and Building Materials Corporation 영광가구건설회사 aka 영광가구합영회사 (Yonggwang Furniture Joint Venture Company) – hereafter “Yonggwang”. Yonggwang agreed to ship the following to HKGF:

- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged JANG UN (IMO: 8822260);
- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged KUM SONG 7 (IMO:8739396); and
- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged RYON HWA 3 (IMO: 8312227).

This information is consistent with an earlier investigation undertaken by the Panel concerning the suspected transfer of DPRK-origin coal from the DPRK-flagged JANG UN and KUM SONG 7 to the QUN RONG XIANG, a Chinese cargo ship, the latter as currently investigated by Chinese authorities¹⁰⁵. See annex 55 for details. The RYON HWA 3 was back in Chinese waters in August 2021 and was observed grounded a month later in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China (figure 51-2).

¹⁰⁵ S/2021/777, paras. 96-98.

Figure 51-2: Vessel aground, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 18 September 2021



Source: (top) Member State, (bottom) Maxar Technologies and Windward.

The Panel sought information from China on the DPRK vessels, their identities transmitted in Chinese territorial waters, Chinese-entities owning and operating the receiving vessels, those that procured the cargo from DPRK cargo vessels—imported the coal, and the relevant shipping and financial documentation.

China responded that “SU RYONG SAN entered Longkou Port in August 2021, offloaded watch movements, and left the port after loading stationary in September 2021”. On the QUN RONG XIANG, China responded: “*The investigations into ... QUN RONG XIANG are still underway, and we do not have information to share at the current stage.*” On RYON HWA 3, China responded the vessel entered Yantai port “empty-loaded” in March 2021 and departed “*...by loading pesticide, fertilizer and other agricultural supplies in the same month.*” China had no information on HongKong Great Fortune Development Co., Ltd.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 52a: SUSPECTED VESSEL ACQUISITION BY THE DPRK - OCEAN SKY (IMO: 9125308)

The Panel is investigating the suspected DPRK acquisition of the Sierra Leone-flagged OCEAN SKY (IMO: 9125308). A Member State reported that the vessel was delivered at sea by Asia Ocean Shipping Limited (亞洲遠洋運輸有限公司) to the DPRK entity, Ryongsung Trading Corporation, between 24 and 30 May 2021. Panel investigations also showed that another China-based intermediary associated with Asia Ocean Shipping was associated with the vessel PU ZHOU, prior to the latter becoming the DPRK-flagged SU RI BONG (IMO: 8605727).

Commercial maritime AIS data show that OCEAN SKY has not transmitted verified AIS signal following the vessel's onward sale as the vessel departed Busan, Republic of Korea on 11 May 2021. The vessel was previously sailing as the Republic of Korea-flagged DAEHO SUNRISE. The Hong Kong-incorporated entities China Tianchuan International Group Shipping Limited and Asia Ocean Shipping were listed as the vessel's new registered owner and ship manager¹⁰⁶.

Asia Ocean Shipping allegedly used an SDV permit issued by the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration for the said transfer. Such permits typically require less scrutiny. The PU ZHOU (IMO: 8605727) and RUI JI STAR (IMO: 9010058)¹⁰⁷ were also flagged under Sierra Leone for a short period of time before being re-flagged under the DPRK.

The Panel sought relevant information from Sierra Leone including, *inter alia*, whether the OCEAN SKY was issued a single delivery voyage permit (SDV) for its transit to its new owners. Sierra Leone has yet to respond.

To trace the OCEAN SKY, the Panel wrote to the vessel's previous ROK-registered owner, Daeho Shipping Co., Ltd (hereafter "Daeho Shipping"). According to Daeho Shipping, the vessel was under its ownership and management from 28 February 2011 to 17 May 2021. The vessel was cancelled from the Republic of Korea's ship registry on 17 May 2021 (seen annex 52b). According to Daeho Shipping, a mainland China and Hong Kong broker sought out a Seoul-based broker, a Mr. Chang, in March 2021 to purchase the specified vessel. A Bill of Sale was concluded the same month, with the final closing of the deal's Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance on 4 May 2021, when the vessel was handed over. A buyer inspection of the vessel in April was cancelled "due to COVID-19" when the vessel was at port in Nantong, China. No follow up inspection was scheduled.


Daeho Shipping stated it delivered the vessel to the ROK broker during the handover with no buyer's representatives present. Thereafter, the vessel departed Busan, ROK, on 11 May 2021 for delivery to Zhoushan by tug. Commercial maritime tracking showed AIS transmission was lost the same day (see figure52a-1).

¹⁰⁶ IMO GISIS.

¹⁰⁷ Now sailing as DPRK-flagged MYONG SA SIM NI. The vessel has since been observed on satellite imagery in Ning-Zhoushan waters exporting DPRK-origin coal (S/2021/777, paras. 89-92).

Intermittent spot AIS transmissions of the OCEAN SKY were captured on commercial maritime databases between August and November 2021¹⁰⁸ (see figure 52a-2). The vessel was observed on satellite imagery at a Chinese shipyard on 1 October 2021 (see figure 52a-3). The OCEAN SKY last transmitted AIS signal on 13 November 2021 in waters outside the shipyard (inset imagery at figure 52a-2).


Figure 52a-1: OCEAN SKY stopped transmission, Busan, ROK, 11 May 2021



Source: IHS Markit Seaweb, annotated by the Panel.


¹⁰⁸ The OCEAN SKY's last AIS transmission was on 13 November 2021, as on 31 December 2021.

Figure 52a-2: Spot AIS transmissions of the OCEAN SKY that show possible spoofing, August to November 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

Figure 52a-3: OCEAN SKY berthed at a shipyard, Shidao, China, 1 October 2021



Source: Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel continues to investigate the OCEAN SKY's suspected entry under DPRK control.

The Panel notes that another vessel investigated by the Panel, the WOO JEONG (nka SIN PHYONG 5) (IMO: 8865151)¹⁰⁹ was also delivered at Shidao in July 2019 before the vessel came under the DPRK flag (see figure 52a-4).

Figure 52a-4: AIS transmissions showing the OCEAN SKY in October 2021, and the WOO JEONG (nka SIN PHYONG 5) in July 2021, Shidao, China




Source: Google Earth, annotated by the Panel.

Investigations continue into the entities that facilitated the transfer of the OCEAN SKY.

Source: The Panel.

¹⁰⁹ S/2021/777, paras. 78-79 and annex 38.

Annex 52b: Ship registry cancellation notice of OCEAN SKY, 17 May 2021

CONFIRMATION OF CANCELLATION OF VESSEL'S NATIONALITY				
Confirmation Number : 2021-12				
Owner	Name (Company)	DAEHO SHIPPING CO., LTD.		
	Address	19, DAEPYEONG-RO 28BEON-GIL, YEONGDO-GU, BUSAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA		
Official Number		JJR-111011	Gross Tonnage	3,654 tons
IMO Number		9125308	Signal Letters	DSRB7
Kind of Vessel		MOTOR VESSEL	Name of Vessel	DAEHO SUNRISE
Port of Registry		JEJU	Material of Hull	STEEL
Rigging (if a Sailing Vessel)			Type and Number of Engines	DIESEL 1
Kind and Number of Propellers		SCREW 1	Where Built	JAPAN
Name of Builders		FUKUOKA SHIPBUILDING CO., LTD.	Date of Launch	1996-01-09
Main Dimensions		Length 93.97 m	Breadth 16.50 m	Depth 8.50 m
Date of Cancellation of Registration		2021-05-17		
Reason of Cancellation of Registration		EXPORT		
<p>It is hereby confirmed that the above described vessel was canceled from Nationality of the Republic of Korea in accordance with Ship Act Enforcement Regulations, Article 23.</p> <p>The 17 th day of 05 2021</p> <p>(Signature) </p> <p>Director General of BUSAN Regional Oceans & Fisheries Administration</p>				

Source: The Panel.

Annex 53: Fishing Rights Transfer

Annex 53a : Monitoring and Inspection of Fishing Vessels

(1) MMSI signals detected by Member State in 2021

A Member State identified at least 428 vessels which had entered DPRK waters between 22 April and 22 June 2021. In addition, the Member State identified 9 MMSI numbers associated with these fishing fleets. According to the Member State's analysis, those nine vessels had taken the route illustrated below. The Panel notes that the vessels apparently departed from Shandong Province (山东省) and Liaoning Province (辽宁省) of China.

MMSI numbers identified:

300807023
300820047
412329999
412445566
412556677
412599899
412631558
412900023
517518888

(2) List of three fishing vessels inspected by a Member State in 2021¹¹⁰

A Member State has informed the Panel that in May 2021 its authorities inspected the following three fishing vessels which were moving southwards from DPRK waters.

1. Fuyuanyu (福遠漁) 189
2. Liaodanyu (遼丹漁) 36005
3. Liaodanyu (遼丹漁) 36006

According to the inspections of *Fuyuanyu 189* on 1 May, the vessel had departed from the port of Shidao (石島) on 30 April and headed towards DPRK waters. The fishing rights in DPRK waters had been priced at 300,000 RMB, which would allow the right to fish from 1 May to 1 September.

According to the inspections of *Liaodanyu 36005* and *Liaodanyu 36006* on 6 June, the vessels had departed from the port of Dandong (丹東) on 1 May, entering DPRK waters on 15 May. The vessels conducted squid fishing until June. The cost of the fishing rights had been 200,000 RMB, allowing fishing until 1 October.

¹¹⁰ S/2020/777, para. 82.

Annex 53b: Reply from China**3. Fishing rights (OC.302)**

China's position on illegally acquiring fishing rights is crystal clear. Such activities, once verified, will be dealt with in accordance with laws and regulations. China's fishing authority and relevant coastal provinces have taken measures to strengthen management and demanded the fishing companies and fishermen to strictly follow the requirement of Security Council resolutions.

According to China's investigation, Fu Yuan Yu 189 has been anchored on the tidal flat since July 2017, and too eroded to sail. It is impossible for it to appear in relevant waters from May to June 2021. As for Liao Dan Yu 36005 and Liao Dan Yu 36006, we find no information of those two vessels. The license issued by the fishing authority in Dandong, Liaoning Province starts with number 2. The two vessels mentioned in the Panel's letter must have used fake licenses. The fishing vessel with MMSI number 412445566 mentioned in the Panel's letter has been operating in waters close to Fujian since 2021. China finds no activities of this vessel towards the DPRK's waters. In addition, we cannot find any information of HengXing Fisheries Limited, Dalian, JinHai Fisheries Limited, Tianjin, etc in China's business registration system.

Viewing and analyzing from the above, we believe the information

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
provided by some member states are seriously inaccurate and cannot serve as basis for China to carry out investigations. The information source is unreliable, and its truthfulness and accuracy cannot be verified. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information into the report. Otherwise, it will seriously damage the authority and objectivity of the report.

Source: Member State.

Annex 53c: Permitted fishing areas in DPRK waters 2020-2021

According to Member State information, the size of the permitted fishing areas¹¹¹ in DPRK waters was reduced in 2021 (figures 53c-1 and 53c-2).


Figure 53c-1



Source: Member State.

Figure 53c-2


Below is the image of abovementioned fishing areas annotated by the Panel. The area surrounded by the green dotted line was in 2020 and yellow dotted line is in 2021.



Source: Google Earth, annotated by the Panel.

¹¹¹ S/2021/777, para. 82 and annex 41.

Annex 54: Table of maritime coal exports by the DPRK




Source: Member State.

Annex 55: Examples of DPRK-flagged vessels in Ningbo-Zhoushan area to export coal between May and September 2021

DPRK-flagged KUM YA (IMO: 9004073)

According to commercial AIS maritime tracking data, the KUM YA departed Chongjin, DPRK, by 9 May 2021. It arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 14 May 2021 where it remained. The vessel, which departed the DPRK laden with coal, was observed to be riding high in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters on 31 May 2021, indicating it had offloaded DPRK-origin coal during that period of time. KUM YA was back in DPRK waters in the West Sea Barrage by 27 June 2021.

Storyboard of KUM YA April – May 2021



Source: IHS Markit Seaweb, annotated by the Panel, (satellite imagery) Member State.

DPRK-flagged HOE RYONG (IMO: 9041552)

Another DPRK cargo vessel, HOE RYON, was observed on satellite imagery departing Chongjin, DPRK, in July 2021 for Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, transmitting AIS only during a part of its journey. The vessel was observed in August 2021 riding low in water when it arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan. By 21 September 2021, HOE RYON, still in the same waters, was observed riding high in water, indicating it had offloaded DPRK-origin coal during that period of time.

AIS data showed the HOE RYON departed Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 25 September 2021 where it sailed towards the west coast of the DPRK, stopping transmission by 30 September 2021¹¹².

Storyboard of HOE RYON, July to September 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel, (satellite imagery) Member State.

¹¹² As on 30 December 2021.

DPRK-flagged FLOURISHING (IMO: 8421315)

The DPRK cargo vessel FLOURISHING was observed departing Wonsan laden with DPRK-origin coal on 1 August 2021, for Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, transmitting AIS only during a part of its journey. The vessel was observed on 17 August 2021 riding low in water when it arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan. By 21 September 2021, FLOURISHING, still in the same waters, was observed riding high in water, indicating it had offloaded DPRK-origin coal during that period of time (see storyboard). Both the HOE RYON and FLOURISHING were in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters around the same time exporting coal. FLOURISHING stopped AIS transmission while still in Chinese territorial waters.

The Panel also tracked the vessel's ownership and management history. The FLOURISHING was flagged under the DPRK in November 2018¹¹³. Prior to this, the vessel was managed and operated by Hongxiang Marine Hong Kong Ltd (鴻祥海運(香港)有限公司) (hereafter "Hongxiang Marine")¹¹⁴, an entity sanctioned by the United States' Treasury Department in February 2018¹¹⁵ that also managed then Comoros-flagged ORIENTAL TREASURE (IMO: 9115028). The ORIENTAL TREASURE¹¹⁶, flagged under the DPRK's fleet the same time as FLOURISHING, was reported by the Panel on multiple occasions for exporting DPRK-origin coal. Other vessels managed by Hongxiang Marine before transitioning under the DPRK flag, some of which around the same time included: ASIA HONOR (IMO: 8405220), HORIZON STAR (IMO: 9017123), NEW DAWN (IMO: 9135494)¹¹⁷, and PAEK MA (IMO: 9066978)¹¹⁸ – all of which have exported coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters.

Since coming under the DPRK fleet, FLOURISHING had been transmitting on fraudulent identifiers and sailing as 'FS'. The vessel had also transmitted in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in February 2020, a known area where DPRK cargo vessels have and continue to export their illicit coal (see storyboard).

¹¹³ IMO GISIS.

¹¹⁴ Room 1502, 15th Floor, Keen Hung Commercial Building, 80, Queen's Road East, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China. Entity was dissolved in June 2018.

¹¹⁵ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0297>


¹¹⁶ Flagged under the DPRK in November 2018.

¹¹⁷ Flagged under the DPRK in April 2017.

¹¹⁸ Flagged under the DPRK in December 2016.

Storyboard of FLOURISHING


July – September 2021



Source: IHS Seaweb, (inset AIS transmissions) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (satellite imagery) Member State.

January – February 2020

The FLOURISHING transmitted as FS in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters from late January to early February 2020. During the period, the vessel updating its draught status indicating an offload of cargo.



Source: Source: IHS Seaweb, (inset AIS transmissions) Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel continued to seek China's assistance on the recurring presence of multiple DPRK vessels in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters to export coal via ship-to-ship transfers, including information on any cargo offloaded by the DPRK vessels via ship-to-ship transfer in those waters, the receiving vessels' identifiers, and entities and individuals that own, operate and procured any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels.

China responded that *"There is no record of port calls in China for vessels KUM YA, HOE RYONG, FLOURISHING in 2021"*

Source: The Panel.


Annex 56: DPRK Coal Vessels at Ningbo-Zhoushan, China

Example: TAE DONG GANG 3 (IMO: 8730998) in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, China, October to November 2021



Source: (top) Member State, (bottom) Windward annotated by the Panel.

Figure 56: DPRK-flagged vessels laden with coal, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 5 October 2021



Source: Member State.

The Panel sought China's assistance in providing information concerning each of the above-mentioned vessels' presence in Chinese waters, the identifiers under which they were transmitting, their cargo, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded, the identities of the receiving vessels along with the entities and individuals that owned and operated the receiving vessels, the end destinations of the offloaded coal cargo, along with shipping documentation and financial transactions.

China responded: *"There is no record of port calls in China for vessels KUM YA, HOE RYONG, FLOURISHING, MI YANG 5, NORTHERN LUCK, RYO MYONG, PEAK HAK SAN, BOUN 1, JANG AN, TONG SAN 2, TAE DONG GANG 9 and TAE DONG GANG 3 in 2021. For vessels ZAI ZHOU 2, TO MYONG, SAM JIN 8, NAM DAE CHON, KANG HUNG and UN HA, they entered Yantai port empty-loaded, and left the port after loading chemical fertilizer, pesticide and other agricultural supplies."*


Source: The Panel.

Annex 57: DPRK coal vessels spoofing

DPRK vessels have continued to broadcast falsified identifiers while in Chinese territorial waters where they export coal. The transmission of falsified identifiers is a documented evasion method used by the DPRK and suspect vessels to conduct sanctions evasion activities.

For example, the Panel tracked a suspect vessel JDU (MMSI: 354270000) spoofing a fraudulent identifier in Ningbo-Zhoushan, October-November 2021 (see figure 57). The vessel transmitted briefly in the DPRK before appearing in Chinese territorial waters. While there, the vessel spoofed a Panama-associated MMSI that was operating in South America, along with other AIS manipulations, while reporting a destination of ‘NAM PHO’.

Figure 57: Suspect vessel transmitting as “JDU” transmitting in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in October-November 2021.



Source: (top) IHS Seaweb; (bottom) Windward, annotated by the Panel.

*Times and dates reflected on Windward are in EST.

The Panel asked China if it had more information on the JDU, whose location, lengthy AIS gaps and fraudulent transmission of false identifiers appear as very similar signatures used by DPRK-flagged vessels to obfuscate their illicit maritime trade. China replied that “There is no record of port calls in China for *JDU* in 2021”.

The following DPRK-flagged vessels transporting coal likewise fraudulently transmitted on other identifiers while in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters:

- SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430) (see annex 51);
- ASIA HONOR (IMO: 8405120);
- CHANG PHYONG (IMO: 9338981); and
- PU HAE (IMO: 9020601)

ASIA HONOR, CHANG PYONG and PU HAE are repeat offenders that had previously falsified their transmissions in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, as illustrated in previous Panel reports. They have continued to broadcast on the same false identities in the same waters.

Storyboard of DPRK-flagged ASIA HONOR transmitting false identifiers

May 2021



June 2021



July 2021





Source: Member State.

Storyboard of DPRK-flagged vessel CHANG PHYONG transmitting false identifiers


The CHANG PHYONG was reported by the Panel spoofing as the Sri Lanka-flagged QIUHAI in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in March 2021¹¹⁹. The vessel returned to the same waters by June 2021, transmitting on the same falsified identifiers.

June 2021



¹¹⁹ S/2021/777, Annex 34.


March 2021



Source: (map) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (satellite imagery) Member State.

Storyboard of DPRK-flagged vessel PU HAE (IMO: 9020601) transmitting false identifiers

August – September 2021




Source: Member State.

The Panel had previously tracked the DPRK-flagged PU HE, transmitting on falsified identifiers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in February 2020 before sailing towards the DPRK. The vessel appeared back in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area in May 2020 before sailing back towards the DPRK and repeating the voyage in June 2020.

April - May 2020



June 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel sought China's assistance in providing information concerning each of the above-mentioned vessels' presence in Chinese waters, the identifiers under which they were transmitting, their cargo, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded, the identities of the receiving vessels along with the entities and individuals that owned and operated the receiving vessels, the end destinations of the offloaded coal cargo, along with shipping documentation and financial transactions.

China replied that "*There is no record of port calls in China for ASIA HONOR, CHANG PHYONG, and PU HAE in 2021.*"

Source: The Panel.

Annex 58: DPRK vessels exporting coal and subsequently arriving at various Chinese ports, 2021

The Panel had reported¹²⁰ on the DPRK vessels' export of coal via ship-to-ship transfers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and their subsequent loading of humanitarian aid cargo at Longkou port *en route* back to Nampo port. In 2021, other DPRK vessels continued to conduct similar round-trip voyages to export DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters before calling at Chinese ports elsewhere, in apparent contravention of OP 9 of resolution 2097 (2017).

The following DPRK-flagged vessels are suspected to have exported DPRK origin-coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and subsequently called at various Chinese ports, notably Longkou port and Laizhou port, between the months of August and October 2021. They included the following vessels:

DPRK-flagged vessels that transitioned from Ningbo-Zhoushan waters to Longkou port:

- (i) SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430) (see also annex 51);
- (ii) PHO PHYONG (IMO: 8417962);
- (iii) SAMJIN 8 (IMO: 8810578);
- (iv) KANG HUNG (IMO: 9340257); and
- (v) UN HA (IMO: 8310281)

DPRK-flagged vessels that transitioned from Ningbo-Zhoushan waters to Laizhou port:

- (vi) TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318); and
- (vii) NORTHERN LUCK (IMO: 9061227)

The Panel sought China's assistance in providing information concerning each of the above-mentioned vessels' presence in Chinese waters, the identifiers under which they were transmitting, their cargo, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded, the identities of the receiving vessels along with the entities and individuals that owned and operated the receiving vessels, the end destinations of the offloaded coal cargo, the ports areas where the vessels subsequently arrived at to load cargo along with the financial or other transactions involved.

China, in response to another letter on the presence of the vessels in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters carrying DPRK-origin coal dated, responded that "There is no record of port calls in China for vessels *KUM YA*, *HOE RYONG*, *FLOURIHING[sic]*, *MI YANG 5*, *NORTHERN LUCK*, *RYO MYONG*, *PEAK HAK SAN[sic]*, *BOUN 1*, *JANG AN*, *TONG SAN 2*, *TAE DONG GANG 9* and *TAE DONG GANG 3* in 2021. For vessels *ZAI ZHOU 2*, *TO MYONG*, *SAM JIN 8*, *NAN DAE CHON*, *KANG HUNG* and *UN HA*, they entered Yantai port empty-loaded, and left the port after loading chemical fertilizer, pesticide and other agricultural supplies." On the *PHO PYONG*, China responded that the "*PHO PHYONG* entered Yantai port empty-loaded in September 2021 and left the port by loading general cargo in November 2021."


¹²⁰ S/2021/777, paras. 100-101 and S/2021/211, paras. 58, 63-64.

Ningbo-Zhoushan – Longkou port, China

PHO PHYONG (IMO: 8417962)

The DPRK-flagged PHO PHYONG departed Wonson, DPRK in early August 2021. Commercial AIS tracking information showed the vessel arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 9 August 2021, where the vessel was observed on satellite imagery on 17 August laden. By 28 August, PHO PHYONG had offloaded its coal cargo in the same waters. The vessel then proceeded to Longkou port, China, by 16 September 2021.

The PHO PHYONG had been recommended by the Panel for designation for ship-to-ship transfer on 24 October 2018 in violation of paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017)¹²¹.



¹²¹ S/2019/691, paras. 20 and 22 (c), and annex 5.



Source: Member State, (top inset map) Windward.

SAMJIN 8 (IMO: 8810578)

The DPRK-flagged SAMJIN 8 last transmitted on its own identifiers in April 2017. The vessel transmitted on a Comoros-associated MMSI prior to changing its identifier to SAMJIN 8 on 28 October 2021.

SAMJIN 8 has been the subject of past Panel reports when it was investigated for exporting DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in 2020, along with vessel's ownership and management history¹²².



¹²² S/2020/840, paras. 57-59 and annex 24.



Source: (top) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (bottom) Member State.


KANG HUNG (IMO: 9340257)

The DPRK-flagged KANG HUNG sailed towards Longkou port area by 9 October 2021 and was moored pier side by 25 October 2021. The vessel transmitted back at Nampo's West Sea Barrage quarantine area by 5 Nov 2021.

KANG HUNG was flagged under the DPRK as of May 2020 and was reported sold to an undisclosed buyer in July 2018¹²³. The vessel had also transmitted on its historical Jamaica-associated MMSI.




¹²³ IHS Markit.



Source: (top satellite imagery) Member State, (bottom), Windward, Google Earth and IHS Markit Seaweb, annotated by the Panel.

UN HA (IMO: 8310281)*

*The DPRK-flagged UN HA arrived by 26 September 2021 in Ningbo Zhoushan waters and was observed on satellite imagery on 5 October 2021. The vessel then proceeded to the Bohai Sea area by 18 October 2021 where it loitered off Longkou port until November 2021. It appeared the vessel may not have entered port and may have conducted ship-to-ship activity outside of port.



Source: IHS Markit Seaweb, annotated by the Panel (inset satellite imagery, Member State).


Ningbo-Zhoushan – Laizhou port, China

The following two DPRK-flagged vessels transitioned to Laizhou port, China, following their presence in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, based on commercial maritime tracking information.

The DPRK-flagged TO MYONG was in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by early October 2021 where it transmitted on different identifiers. The vessel dropped AIS signal on 9 October before retransmitting on 30 August as it sailed up the Yellow Sea towards Laizhou port. TO MYONG transmitted it was berthed pier side by 27 October 2021, before sailing out a day later.

TO MYONG was the formerly Sierra Leone-flagged KLAUSEN aka RI HONG, prior investigated by the Panel for exporting DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in 2020, along with vessel's ownership and management history¹²⁴. See also paragraph 90 of the main text and annex 50a. The Panel had recommended the RI HONG aka TO MYONG for designation pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017).

TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318)




Source: (top) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (bottom) Member State.

¹²⁴ S/2020/840, paras. 57-59, 79 and annex 24; S/2021/211, paras. 70-72 and annex 38.

NORTHERN LUCK (IMO: 9061227)

The DPRK-flagged NORTHERN LUCK transmitted AIS signal on 8 October 2021 as it sailed towards Laizhou port, China. Prior to this, the vessel was at Dalian port on 10 July 2021 before it dropped AIS transmission for three months. NORTHERN LUCK transmitted it was berthed pier side by 11 October 2021, before sailing out two days later.



Source: (top) Windward, annotated by the Panel, (bottom) Member State.

Annex 59: DPRK-flagged TAE PHYONG 2 (fka MING ZHOU 6) (IMO: 8602763)

The Panel continued to track the DPRK-flagged TAE PHYONG 2 (previously MING ZHOU 6) on maritime databases.

As earlier reported¹²⁵, the DPRK acquired the vessel by late May 2020 following its sale for scrap by a Chinese company in May 2019. TAE PHYONG 2 was sold by Ningbo Shipping Co. Ltd on 14 May 2019 to a Chinese national, Su Jianpo through Zhousan Yige Ship Auction Co. Ltd. Su also signed a scrap steel ship sale contract with Ningbo Shipping Co. Ltd.

The DPRK is suspected to have acquired the vessel following a joint venture agreement with the DPRK-based Jinmyong Trading Corporation and the China-based Dandong Economic Cooperation Border Maritime Processing Company in November 2019. A second DPRK-based company, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, which has overseas offices in Dandong, China according to the same Member State, helped to facilitate the acquisition. A number of Chinese nationals are suspected to be involved in the acquisition and deliverance of the vessel to the DPRK.

China responded that¹²⁶ *“In May and June 2019, the registration of ownership and nationality certificate[s] of ‘Ming Zhou 6’ and ‘Fu Xing 12’ were cancelled, respectively. Since then, there has been no record of these vessels entering or leaving Chinese ports.”*

The Panel continues to investigate the vessel’s transition to the DPRK-flagged TAE PHYONG 2 and the individuals and entities involved in the process. The Panel continued to seek information from China on the outstanding queries with regards the vessel’s sale and purchase, individuals, entities and alleged joint venture with the DPRK.

Vessel voyage - Nampo - Longkou - Nampo

AIS data indicated that the vessel departed Nampo, DPRK, on 9 August 2021 for Longkou, China. The vessel berthed in two separate locations within the same port area in Longkou: between 13 to 21 August 2021 and between 21 to 26 August 2021, indicating a possible export and import of different cargos at the different berths. The Panel obtained satellite imagery showing the vessel with bagged cargo in its holds on 21 August 2021 (see figure 59-1). TAE PHYONG 2 was back at Nampo by 27 August 2021.

TAE PHYONG 2 was also at Longkou port earlier in the year in March 2021 (see figure 59-2).

¹²⁵ S/2021/211, paras. 70-72, and S/2021/777, paras. 80 and 102, and annex 39.

¹²⁶ S/2021/211.

Figure 59-1: DPRK-flagged TAE PHYONG 2 at different berths at Longkou port, China, August 2021




Figure 59-2: DPRK-flagged TAE PHYONG 2 Storyboard, February to March 2021



19 February 2021 – TAE PHYONG 2 laden near Ningbo-Zhoushan



8 March 2021 – TAE PHYONG 2 loading bagged cargo, Longkou port



Source: Windward, IHS Markit, Google Earth, annotated by the Panel, (satellite imagery) Member State.

The Panel sought China's assistance in providing information concerning the cargo(s) exported by TAE PHYONG 2 to Chinese port(s), the cargo(s) loaded onto the vessel, along with shipping documentation and financial or other transactions involved. China responded that the "*TAE PHYONG 2* entered Yantai port empty-loaded in March and August 2021 respectively, and left the port by loading fertilizer and other agricultural supplies in the same month."¹²⁷


Source: The Panel.

¹²⁷ The TAE PHYONG (IMO: 9018751) and TAE PHYONG 2 (IMO: 8602763) are two different DPRK-flagged vessels. The Panel requested information on the TAE PHYONG 2 in this instance. The TAE PHYONG's last AIS transmission on commercial maritime databases was in May 2021. The Panel prior investigated the TAE PHYONG's (former GREAT WENSHAN) transition under the DPRK fleet in 2020, the vessel's subsequent and repeated transportation of DPRK-origin coal for export in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, and its last known Chinese entities that owned and operated the vessel before it became DPRK-flagged (see S/2020/840, paras. 52-56, and S/2021/211, paras. 63-64).

Annex 60: QUN RONG XIANG (IMO: Not reported, MMSI: 413213290)

According to a Member State, the China-flagged QUN RONG XIANG (MMSI: 413213290) delivered DPRK-origin coal to Qinzhou port, China by 23 March 2021. The coal it transported was reported to have been transferred onto the QUN RONG XIANG by ship-to-ship transfer from DPKR vessels located in its vicinity on or around 14 March 2021 in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, China (see figures 60-1 and 60-3).


Figure 60-1: Storyboard of China-flagged QUN RONG XIANG delivery coal, Qinzhou port, China, March 2021



Source: Member State.

On 15 March 2021, the vessel was observed near three DPRK-flagged vessels just west of Caiqi Island, within Ningbo-Zhoushan Port (see figure 60-2).

Figure 60-2: QUN RONG XIANG in proximity of three DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 15 March 2021




Source: Member State.

Prior to arriving in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters:

- The DPRK-flagged JANG UN (IMO: 8822260) loaded coal at Nampo Port on 16 February. The Panel has reported on the vessel's exports of DPRK-origin coal to Chinese waters dating back to 2018.
- The DPRK-flagged KUM SONG 7 (IMO: 8739396) loaded coal at Taeon Port, DPRK, on 14 February 2021.
- The DPRK-flagged NAM DAE CHON (IMO: 9138680) loaded coal at Nampo Port, DPRK, on 10 February 2021. The Panel has reported on the vessel's exports of DPRK-origin coal dating back to 2018.

The Panel's information based on AIS tracking data, port analysis and information from past maritime investigations, is overall consistent with the data and information of the coal suspected to have been imported by HKGF. Based on the Panel's port analysis, on 22 March 2021, the QUN RONG XIANG berthed at Qinzhou Port's Legou Terminal, (see figure 60-3). The vessel, which sails a domestic route, registered a draft change of 7.0 to 4.0 the same day at Qinzhou port area, indicating an offload of cargo. The vessel made a number of other domestic port area calls since that date.

Figure 60-3: QUN RONG XIANG at Qinzhou port, China, 22 March 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (inset satellite imagery as representative of the port location not by actual date; AIS signal overlay as on 22 March 2021).

The Panel sought China's assistance including, *inter alia*, confirmation of the Chinese vessel's identifiers, information on the vessels' activities during and around the dates of the investigative period, relevant shipping and customs documentation as it relates to the vessels' cargo, entities and individuals that owned and operated the vessels, and those that imported the coal cargo.

The Panel additionally sought confirmation of the presence of the DPRK-flagged vessels, the identifiers these vessels were transmitting, and information concerning any ship-to-ship transfers and / or cargo off-loaded from these vessels in Chinese territorial waters, shipping documentation and financial transactions, and any resulting actions taken.

China responded that “*“The investigations into ... QUN RONG XIANG are still underway, and we do not have information to share at the current stage.”*”

Source: The Panel.

Annex 61: Networks

The Panel's investigations into the sale of the SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430) to the DPRK, datapoints drawn from previous Panel investigations, publicly available information and information obtained, indicated that HongKong Great Fortune Development Co. Limited (香港 吉運(运) 發(发) 展 有 限 公 司) (hereafter "HKGF"), a Hong Kong-incorporated entity was engaged in the following sanctions violation activities:

- A) Vessel sale – involvement in the transition of the then Dominica-flagged vessel CJK OSAKA to DPRK-flagged vessel SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430)

HKGF was listed as the last owner and operator of the vessel sailing as CJK OSAKA, before it was re-flagged under the DPRK in October 2020, sailing as SU RYONG SAN.

The Panel additionally obtained information that HKGF is alleged to have invested in DPRK ships (either through joint maintenance, operation, or other associations).

- B) Import of DPRK-origin coal from a DPRK entity

HKGF is alleged to have imported into China of a total between 100,000 to 200,000 metric tons (MT) of DPRK-origin coal from the DPRK entity Yonggwang Furniture and Building Materials Corporation 영광가구건재회사 (Yonggwang Furniture Building Materials Corporation) aka 영광가구합영회사 (Yonggwang Furniture Joint Venture Company) – hereafter "Yonggwang".

- C) Shipments importing DPRK-origin coal on DPRK-flagged vessels

The Panel has been tracking DPRK vessels engaged in the export of DPRK-origin coal primarily through ship-to-ship transfers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters¹²⁸. "Yonggwang" was alleged to have agreed to ship the following to HKGF, based on information obtained from a Member State:

- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged JANG UN (IMO: 8822260)¹²⁹;
- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged KUM SONG 7 (IMO:8739396)¹³⁰; and
- DPRK-origin coal aboard the DPRK-flagged RYON HWA 3¹³¹ (IMO: 8312227).

All these ships have been known to off-load their coal cargo via ship-to-ship transfers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters to Chinese coastal vessels.

While commercially available AIS data indicated the JANG UN and KUM SONG 7 had not transmitted on their AIS profiles in several years, these vessels were nonetheless captured on satellite imagery in March 2021 in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters near the QUN RONG XIANG, a Chinese cargo vessel

¹²⁸ See Sectoral and Maritime section of Panel reports. Latest Panel report is issued as S/2021/777.

¹²⁹ Containing approximately 20,000 MT of DPRK-origin coal, valued at \$88 per MT.

¹³⁰ Containing approximately 5,000 MT of DPRK-origin coal.

¹³¹ Containing approximately 6,000 MT of DPRK-origin coal.

investigated by the Panel in 2020. The Panel had withheld the said vessel's identifiers and case write up in view China's response not to include information related to the vessels, to avoid interrupting its investigations and law enforcement¹³².

The Panel also sought China's assistance, *inter alia*, into the Chinese entities and individuals arranging the DPRK-origin coal to be transferred to the QUN RONG XIANG. China responded to the Panel in 2021 that it was conducting its investigations and did not have information to share then. Further to the Panel follow up enquiry on the status of China's investigations, China responded in 2022 that it had no information on the QUN RONG XIANG.

According to commercial AIS tracking platforms, the RYONG HWA 3 had transmitted in various Chinese port areas in 2021. The vessel was reported to have offloaded DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, including in May 2020 (see figure 61-1). It was back in the same waters in August 2021 and was observed to have run aground in Ningbo-Zhoushan a month later in September 2021 (see figure 61-2).

Figure 61-1: RYONG HWA 3 in Ningbo-Zhoushan, 7 May 2020, and at Longkou port, 27 March 2021

May 2020 at Ningbo-Zhoushan, China



¹³² S/2021/777, paras. 96-98.

March 2021 at Longkou port, China



Source: (top) Member State and (bottom) the Panel.

Figure 61-2: RYON HWA 3 outside Nampo, DPRK in August 2021 and grounded, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China in September 2021





Source: (top) Member State, (bottom) Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

C) Barter trade in exchange for DPRK-origin coal

In exchange for the above-mentioned coal shipments, HKGF reportedly agreed to pay an advance payment and to send two shipments of fertilizer to the DPRK. The Panel notes that payment via barter is a common sanctions evasion tactic in order to avoid funds transferred recorded in the international financial system. The DPRK is further known to operate a ledger system whereby it can continue to procure items abroad, including for its prohibited missile and nuclear programs.

These shipments were conducted in two parts; one was to be transferred to the DPRK-flagged TAE YANG (IMO: 8306929), with the remaining amount transferred to another vessel before 25 March 2021.

The Panel's previous investigations show that the TAE YANG transported DPRK-origin coal for export and has also not transmitted on its AIS profile in years. The vessel has also been known to spoof other vessel identifiers in attempts to obfuscate its identity. TAE YANG was reported in 2019 MTR as having off-loaded coal on 25 Oct 2019 via ship-to-ship transfer to Lighter "D"¹³³. The said DPRK-origin coal was off-loaded at Qisha port, China, by 17 December 2019 and was recommended by the Panel for designation.

TAE YANG was formerly operated by Hua Heng Shipping Limited, which also formerly operated a number of DPRK vessels, including the KO SAN, which the Panel had reported as transporting DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and proceeding to pick up humanitarian aid cargo at Longkou in 2020. Hua Heng Shipping is associated with LI Anshan, an individual affiliated with Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited (OMM)¹³⁴. Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM), inter alia,

¹³³ S/2019/691, paras. 20, 22 (d).

¹³⁴ S/2016/157, S/2017/150.

had played a key role in arranging the shipment of concealed cargo of arms and related material on-board the CHONG CHON GANG (IMO: 7937317) from Cuba to the DPRK in July 2013¹³⁵.

D) Export of UNSC-restricted and banned items to the DPRK

HKGF is also alleged to have engaged in sanctioned activities with the DPRK in 2019 and 2020, in which it had reportedly sold and shipped items, including steel, fuel, and transportation- and construction-related vehicles.

The Panel has demonstrated in its reports a continuation of unreported refined petroleum illicitly shipped to the DPRK. The Panel is also aware that the transfer of banned items and equipment including vehicles have been exported to the DPRK onboard China-flagged costal barges in 2020.

The Panel sought extensive information from HKGF including, inter alia, the company's business activities, beneficial and shareholder information, associations with other entities of interest including DPRK linkages, shipping documentation, vessel ownership and sale, cargo and maritime trading information as it relates to the Panel's investigations.

The Panel sought China's assistance on information on the presence of all of the above-mentioned vessels in Chinese territorial waters, including the DPRK vessels, SU RYONG SAN and the grounding of RYON HWA 3, along with information Chinese authorities possess of the status of the vessel and investigations conducted into the vessel's off-loading of coal, the receiving vessels involved in the ship-to-ship transfer of the coal cargo, and the entity(s) and individual(s) engaged in the procurement process. The Panel also sought assistance on HKGF and its incorporation, the registered owner a Chinese national, Mr Li, and the beneficial owners behind the entity along with any companies also registered in mainland China. The Panel also sought updates on the China-flagged coastal barge QUN RONG XIANG that was within the vicinity of the DPRK-flagged vessels in March 2021, the entities and individuals associated with the QUN RONG XIANG, those that imported the DPRK-origin coal into China, and outcome of its authorities' investigations.

HKGF has yet to respond.

¹³⁵ S/2014/147, S/2015/131, S/2016/157.

On HKGF, China responded:

(12) OC.380

The Chinese side has no information of Hong Kong Great Fortune Development Co.,Ltd at the moment.

China has on many occasions openly reiterated its solemn position against ship-to-ship transfers and its commitment to cracking down on such violation of provisions in accordance with law, which itself serves as a deterrent to such activities. As far as we know, the DPRK-related ships coming to China are loaded with agricultural supplies and daily groceries, which are necessary for the DPRK to develop its agriculture and ensure people's livelihood. Some countries are obsessed with monitoring the DPRK's normal activities, yet refuse to make more efforts to break the stalemate in peace talks and promote the political settlement of the Peninsula issue. This is like putting the cart before the horse. We hope the Panel will have a clear understanding in this regard, and not focus on the trivial while evading the important.

At the same time, China noted with concern that the Panel have simply copied information provided by some individual countries without verification. Such information, which is seriously out of date and inaccurate, cannot offer any basis for meaningful investigation. If the information that could not be fully verified are included by the Panel into the report, it will only politicize technical issues, affect its cooperation with China, and even undermine its own credibility. We hope the Panel will be more prudent and responsible in carrying out its mandate, and not include such information in its report.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 62: List of HS codes the Panel applies for the monitoring of sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items> for the complete list of prohibited goods and Implement Assistance Notes.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

†

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	2709	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of res. 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Industrial machinery	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles ¹	86	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof ²	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	Chapters 72-83		Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	77	Reserved for possible future use	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets ; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

¹ Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

² Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	2701	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	2601	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	Chapter 72	Iron and steel products (7201-7229)	
Iron and Steel products	Chapter 73	Iron and steel products (7301-7326)	
Gold	261690	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold powder, unwrought	
	710812	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	710813	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	710820	Monetary gold	
Titanium	2614	Titanium ores and concentrates	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
Vanadium	2615	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	2612	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [261210 and 261220]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code 261790 - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.	
Copper	Chapter 74	Copper and articles thereof (7401-7419)	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	Chapter 79	Zinc and articles thereof (7901-7907)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	Chapter 75	Nickel and articles thereof (7501-7508)	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	2616100 7106, 7107	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (incl fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	Chapter 3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates (0301-0308)	
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	Chapter 78	Lead and articles thereof (7801-7806)	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	2607	Lead ores and concentrates	

Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	Chapters 50-63		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; Horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	52	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	53	Vegetable textile fibers nesoi; Yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibers nesoi and paper	
	54	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	55	Manmade staple fibers, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; Special yarns; Twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	57	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; Textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; <i>not</i> knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	07	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	25	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709 : crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713 : refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Annex 63: Comparative table of bilateral trade with DPRK: Jan-Sept 2021¹³⁶

As of January 2022
 * Unit : Thousand USD

No.	Member State (MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Armenia, Republic of	0	18		1(HS Code 12) 1(HS Code 84) 3(HS Code 85)	Inaccuracy of data due to technical error in the declaration of goods / origin of items are ROK and Japan
2	Barbados	200	951		22(HS Code 61) 1(HS Code 63) 581(HS Code 84) 274(HS Code 85)	
3	Belgium	0	203		15(HS Code 73)	
4	Belize		14		14(HS Code 84)	
5	Benin	0	41			Nothing Applicable / No cases
6	Bolivia, Plurinational State of	0	20			Nothing Applicable / No cases
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	16		5(HS Code 84) 4(HS Code 85)	
8	Brazil, Federative Republic of	564	97	539(HS Code 2710)	2(HS Code 61)	
9	Bulgaria, Republic of	0	4		1(HS Code 85)	Technical mistake in the customs declaration / items imported from ROK
10	Cabo Verde, Republic of	0	110			Nothing Applicable / No cases
11	Cambodia, Kingdom of	453	61		41(HS Code 72)	Investigations underway
12	Canada	0	52		2(HS Code 72)	actual country the goods originated from was the ROK, and was inaccurately reported to ITC
13	Chile	36	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
14	China, People's Republic of	151,739	33,595	2229(HS Code 2710) 48(HS Code 2712) 3292(HS Code 2713)	2442(HS Code 50) 19(HS Code 62) 11388(HS Code 72) 7(HS Code 85)	Silk (HS Code 50) is raw material not textile / Ferroalloys (HS Code 72) is different from iron and iron ore / Women's Clothing (HS Code 62) and Electrical Equipment (HS Code 85) are from ROK, mistakenly declared

¹³⁶ See para. 126 of the main text.

No.	Member State (MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
15	Colombia, Republic of	21	84		3(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 52) 8(HS Code 56) 2(HS Code 61) 36(HS Code 84)	
16	Costa Rica, Republic of	26	240			Nothing Applicable / No cases
17	Croatia, Republic of	0	16		16(HS Code 87)	Declaration error / Country of origin was ROK
18	Denmark, Kingdom of	0	99		5(HS Code 59)	Country code input error / Country of origin was ROK
19	Ecuador	0	13			Nothing Applicable / No cases
20	El Salvador	0	817		38(HS Code 84)	
21	Eswatini, Kingdom of	0	12		1(HS Code 61) 2(HS Code 84)	due to declarants inability to differentiate between DPRK and ROK / supplier was ROK
22	Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of	267	1,049		562(HS Code 72) 207(HS Code 79) 51(HS Code 84) 59(HS Code 85)	
23	Fiji, Republic of	87	594	2(HS Code 84) 43(HS Code 72)	332(HS Code 72) 169(HS Code 73) 9(HS Code 55) 15(HS Code 60)	
24	Finland, Republic of	0	6			Nothing Applicable / No cases
25	Georgia	0	11			Nothing Applicable / No cases
26	Germany, Federal Republic of	16	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases
27	Greece	2	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
28	Hungary	0	1		1(HS Code 85)	Country code input error
29	Indonesia, Republic of	0	259		5(HS Code 73) 39(HS Code 84) 30(HS Code 85)	Interpret UNSCR does not prohibit DPRK exports of items under HS Code 73 / investigations on other trade items underway
30	Italy, Republic of	0	6		1(HS Code 84)	Supplier was UK company (UK : could not identify any imports from the DPRK)

No.	Member State (MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
31	Luxembourg	12	0	1(HS Code 84) 9(HS Code 85)		Encoding errors / goods were destined for the ROK
32	Madagascar, Republic of	0	176		1(HS Code 84) 3(HS Code 63)	
33	Namibia, Republic of	0	6		4(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	
34	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	413	33		1(HS Code 52)	
35	Niger	0	66		62(HS Code 85)	
36	Poland, Republic of	116	85			Nothing Applicable / No cases
37	Romania	0	1		1(HS Code 73)	Authorities have not confirmed the transfer of iron and steel products from DPRK
38	Russian Federation	0	2		1(HS Code 84)	
39	Seychelles, Republic of	0	1,156		726(HS Code 72) 11(HS Code 84)	Data inaccurate / items under HS Code 72, 84, 85 have been imported
40	Slovak Republic	0	6			Nothing Applicable / No cases
41	South Africa, Republic of	61	39	5(HS Code 84) 7(HS Code 73)	7(HS Code 56) 7(HS Code 84) 16(HS Code 85)	
42	Spain	256	68	231(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	1(HS Code 58) 40(HS Code 84) 26(HS Code 85) 1(HS Code 63)	
43	Thailand, Kingdom of	1,637	78	2(HS Code 74)	19(HS Code 84) 12(HS Code 85)	Some declaration forms were misfiled as the country of destination and origin to/from the DPRK, but are now amended
44	Turkey, Republic of	49	538		41(HS Code 72) 10(HS Code 73) 45(HS Code 84) 212(HS Code 85) 187(HS Code 55)	Inadvertent errors during declaration / country of origin was other countries such as the ROK
45	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	0	1536		5(HS Code 73) 1503(HS Code 84) 9(HS Code 85)	Inaccurate submission of country code / all trade confirmed to be with the ROK
46	Zambia, Republic of	1085	5585	1085(HS Code 84)	13(HS Code 84) 19(HS Code 85)	
Total		157,040	47,765			

Annex 64: Country Codes

‘Country Codes’ are officially referred to as UN/LOCODE¹³⁷ when it comes to trade activities. UN/LOCODE is used to identify locations in a unique and unambiguous way for international trade. It is a five-character code system in which the first two-character is for country/territory code based on ISO 3166-1 and the last-three code represents the location.

ISO 3166-1 is maintained by the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency (MA). A request for a new code or a modification is usually submitted by Governments to the MA. Then a ballot will be conducted by the MA to decide whether to approve the request.

UN/LOCODE directory is updated every six months, which includes over 100,000 entries. It is impossible to ensure data quality without knowledge and expertise from the country concerned.

A UN/LOCODE Focal Point Network was created by encouraging Governments to nominate a National Focal Point (NFP). These NFP’s work to validate all requests for his/her country. This is to avoid that wrong code location are entered into the database.

There are no NFPs either for the DPRK or the ROK.

¹³⁷ See <https://unece.org/trade/cefact/unlocode-code-list-country-and-territory> for details.

Annex 65: Glocom Case

In 2017, the Panel stated that Glocom was a Malaysia-based company which advertised and sold radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations.

Glocom is a front company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea company Pan Systems Pyongyang Branch (Pan Systems Pyongyang), operated by the designated Reconnaissance General Bureau (KPe.031), the country's premier intelligence agency.¹³⁸

The Panel continues its investigation on Glocom since 2017. Glocom's new product categories have increased.¹³⁹ Since 2017, the Panel has communicated several times with the Malaysian authorities on Glocom issues and has taken note of the declaration by Malaysia's police chief that local firms linked to Glocom were being "struck off" and that authorities were doing all they could to "comply with international regulations with regards to related sanctions."

According to information from a Member State, Pan Systems Pyongyang continues to operate, and utilizes a number of front company names when purchasing radio components for the production of military radios in order to evade sanctions and disguise the true destination and purchaser of the components.

The Panel's investigation continues.

¹³⁸ S/2017/150, paras. 77,79 and 85.

¹³⁹ Glocom offered seven radio systems in February 2020, but that number had increased to 11 in February 2021. The company added another military radio system to its webpage in July 2021. Likewise, new command and control products have appeared on the Glocom website in 2021, as well as new radar systems and battlefield accessories.

Annex 66: Reply of Uganda



REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE
 336 EAST 45th STREET
 NEWYORK, N.Y 10017-3489
 Tel: (212) 949-0110
 Fax: (212) 687-4517
 E-mail: admin@ugandaunyny.com

Our Reference: **UN-NY/TECH/38**

26 July 2021

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

I wish to refer to your letter Ref. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.81 dated 28 May 2021 regarding the Panel's investigations arising from the documentary "The Mole: Undercover in North Korea".

This is to inform you that investigations by the relevant government agencies are still ongoing, though delayed due to lockdown measures to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic in Uganda.

The Government of Uganda reiterates its cooperation with the Panel and as soon as the investigations are completed, the Committee will be updated.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Adonia Aycbare
 Permanent Representative

Mr. [REDACTED]
 Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
 New York



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE
336 EAST 45th STREET
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Tel: (212) 949-0110
Fax: (212) 687-4517
E-mail: admin@ugandaun.org

Our Reference: **UN-NY/TECH/38**

13 September 2021

Dear Mr. [REDACTED],

I wish to refer to your letter Ref. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.81 dated 28 May 2021, regarding a documentary "The Mole: Undercover in North Korea".

The investigations are still ongoing; however, a preliminary investigations report has been issued by the Government of Uganda as follows:

1. The documentary (video) was downloaded and analyzed, showing four Ugandans who appeared therein identified as Magala Moses who is former Senior Government Valuer, Muzoora Jude who is a real estate agent, Nagimesi Bob who is a lawyer and Twine Warren, a former Court Bailiff and a representative of the Island owner. They were summoned to help with the investigations.
2. Communication between Magala Moses and a representative of the "Norwegian Royal Family" a one Bjarte M. Tveit was retrieved and analysed. Another communication between Muzoora Jude and a representative of the "Norwegian Royal Family" a one Bjarte M. Tveit was retrieved too and analyzed.
3. It is established that the land referred to is called Buziri Island in Buvuma District situated on Block 66 Plot 1 owned by Fredrick Ssempebwa, who instructed Twine Warren to look for buyers in 2017.
4. Twine Warren contacted Muzoora Jude (real estate agent) to look for buyers. Muzoora then through a website www.privateislandinc.com that does online marketing for different Islands, uploaded the details of Buziri Island on the website in order to get potential buyers.
5. Muzoora Jude through a website, www.privateislandinc.com connected Larsen Ulrich a Norwegian National who had expressed interest in buying the Island. He was willing to physically visit Uganda with a team to inspect the Island.

6. Larsen Ulrich came to Uganda with his team as potential buyers and held meetings in Uganda in August 2017 in Serena Hotel Kampala. They introduced themselves to be from the Norwegian Royal Family, during the meetings with Magala Moscs, Muzoora Jude, Nagimesi Bob (Counsel) and Twine Warren. Larsen Ulrich and his team visited the Island and had cameras that they used to take photographs all the time.
7. Larsen and his team expressed interest in buying the Island, but nothing was documented during the meetings. Nagimesi Bob was tasked to finalize the documentation.
8. Larsen Ulrich and his team promised to come back to Uganda, which promise has not been fulfilled. They never revealed their true identity and intentions.
9. It became clear that Ulrich Larsen joined an organisation called the Danish Friends of North Korea and later an International Organisation called Korea Friendship Associations (KFA). He is the 'Mole' undercover operative within the 'KFA', who was working with Bjarte M. Tveit and others on an undercover investigation into sanctions breaking by the Government of North Korea.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Adonia

Ambassador Adonia Ayebare
Permanent Representative

Mr. [REDACTED]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

Annex 67: “The Mole” and Cambodia

The Panel continued to investigate the documentary film “The Mole: Undercover in North Korea” released in October 2020, which suggested that international arms dealers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and nationals of a European country discussed a quotation for weapons and how to complete an arms sales contract during meetings in Phnom Penh in 2017.

The documentary suggested that the arms sales were never realized.¹⁴⁰ Upon the first response from Cambodia, the Panel continued to ask Cambodia to provide more detailed and specific information. It has yet to receive a reply.

¹⁴⁰ S/2021/211, para. 90.

Annex 68: Military Cooperation with the DPRK

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

The Panel continued to investigate possible military and technological cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the DPRK.

According to a media report, the President of the National Constituent Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela signed a series of agreements pledging military and technological cooperation during a visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 2019.

In response to the Panel's enquiry, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela replied that: [The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela] expresses its serious concern at the decision of the Panel to initiate an official investigation on the basis of information from 'a media report'; namely, one single source ... particularly taking into account the fact that there is no single agreement between [the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela] and the DPRK on military and technological cooperation".¹⁴¹

The Panel continues to request further clarifications from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela but has not yet received a reply.

Somalia

According to reporting by the Panel on Somalia dated 28 September 2020 (S/2020/949), four 60 mm mortar rounds were fired by Al-Shabaab on 17 February 2020 in the direction of the United Nations compound within Aden Adde International Airport.

Based on an analysis of the tail fins, the Panel noted that the mortars had been produced by multiple manufacturers. The Panel further noted one had characteristics consistent with a 60 mm HE type 63 mortar round manufactured in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁴² The Panel continues to request further clarifications from Somalia and has yet to receive a reply.

¹⁴¹ S/2021/211, para. 94.

¹⁴² S/2021/211, para. 93.

Annex 69: Judgement Summary on Chan Han Choi ¹⁴³ (North South Wales Supreme Court, Australia)



Judgment Summary Supreme Court New South Wales

R v Choi (No 10) [2021] NSWSC 891

Adamson J

Following his plea of guilty to an amended indictment, Chan Han Choi, aged 62, was convicted of two offences involving breach of sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Count 1, which related to brokering services provided by Mr Choi to entities in North Korea with respect to the sale of North Korean military equipment and the purchase of Indonesian petroleum products, was an offence against s 27(1) of the *Charter of the United Nations Act 1945* (Cth). Count 2, which related to the sale of North Korean coal to entities in Indonesia, was an offence against s 16(1) of the *Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011* (Cth). The maximum penalty for each offence is 10 years' imprisonment.

Mr Choi was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a total of 3 years and 6 months. His sentence commenced on 16 December 2017, which was the day of his arrest. He spent almost 3 years in gaol on remand before he was released on strict conditions of bail to enable him to prepare for his trial, which commenced on 3 February 2021. As the sentence has now expired, no non-parole period was specified.

Mr Choi's plea of guilty to a fresh indictment was entered a week after his trial by jury had commenced. The original indictment presented at the commencement of the trial included two charges that he had provided services believing or suspecting on reasonable grounds that the services would or may assist in a weapons of mass destruction program. These charges were withdrawn and were not included in the fresh indictment to which Mr Choi pleaded guilty.

Mr Choi was born in South Korea, where he qualified as a civil engineer. He migrated to Australia in 1987 and became an Australian citizen in 2001. He pleaded guilty on the basis of agreed facts which included that none of the transactions had concluded. Some transactions were deferred because of concerns arising from increased international surveillance of sanctioned trade with North Korea following missile testing by North Korea in August 2017. Others did not go ahead by reason of Mr Choi's arrest on 16 December 2017.

Adamson J stressed the importance of the criminal law in punishing and deterring breaches of sanctions by individuals whose conduct would otherwise undermine the international pressure which the sanctions were designed to exert. However, her Honour noted that Mr Choi's conduct was confined to a few transactions which did not go ahead. Further, the military equipment which he had brokered was limited to Man-Portable Air Defence systems, which are small surface to air missiles, and Tactical Inertial Measurement Units, which are used by objects in flight for military and civilian purposes. Adamson J rejected the Crown's

¹⁴³ Chan had contacts with Sudan's Military Industry Corporation, an associate of Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company which was involved in missile military cooperation projects with DPRK's Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) ([S/2019/171](#), para. 84).

submissions that Mr Choi was involved in providing brokering services for inter-continental ballistic missiles. Her Honour considered that the documents discovered when a search warrant was executed at Mr Choi's home in Eastwood, Sydney were the result of his interest in North Korea's military capability and were not related to his brokering service.

Although Mr Choi had, at times, professed a close relationship with Kim Jong-Un, Adamson J held that these statements were, as Mr Choi admitted in his evidence, false and were a product of his tendency towards grandiosity. Adamson J accepted that Mr Choi was contrite and that his prospects of re-offending were low.

Adamson J found that Mr Choi had two motives: he wanted to help the people of North Korea, against whom he believed international sanctions operated unfairly, as well as to earn money.

Source: New South Wales Supreme Court Caselaw website.

Annex 70: New Investigation Results on Mercedes Benz Vehicles Supplies¹⁴⁴

The Italian company European Cars & More (with which the Panel have had correspondence concerning the transit of two Mercedes-Benz S-Class 600 Sedan Long Guard VR9 vehicles in 2018 from Italy) have informed the Panel in 2021 that it also sold in 2018-2019 three other vehicles- Mercedes S600 Guard, a S650 Maybach and a S600 Pullman to LS Logistica & Spedizioni S.R.L.C. - the same company that was involved in illegal delivery of the first two Mercedes Guard vehicle.¹⁴⁵

European Cars & More informed the Panel about the “*complaint of termination of movement with PRA of January 10, 2020*”, meaning, that Italian registration authority deregistered these three cars.

However, there are no more details available concerning further movement of these cars. See annex 71 for European Cars & More’s reply.

Italy has informed the Panel that these three cars were resold “*within and outside Europe*” and their location was not determined.

Italy further replied to the Panel’s enquiry: “...*verifications made through Italian Customs Agency databanks reveal no customs operation that can be traced back to the vehicles in question. Further verifications have been initiated...*”.

¹⁴⁴ For previous investigation results see S/2021/211, para. 155; S/2019/691.

¹⁴⁵ S.2021/777, paras. 145-156.

Annex 71: European Cars & More's reply

Avv. Paola Zulli

*Patrocinante dinanzi alle Magistrature Superiori
Via Pietro Pollidori n°4 - 66034 Lanciano (CH)
tel. 0872.711778 pers. 339-6086512
p.iva: 02138420696 - c.f.: ZLLPLA77A55E435Z*

*zullipaola@gmail.com
zullipaola@pec.giuffre.it*

Lanciano, 15 december 2021

Via e-mail to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Via mail to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.58 -

S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.259

Dear [REDACTED]

We are writing to respond to your latest communications of March 30, 2021 and of September 30, 2021 in which you request us to cooperate by providing information and documentation relating to other vehicles sold to Logistics & Shipping LS. This request is based on information that we have provided to the Panel in previous communications, in a spirit of cooperation and total openness to the facts.

With the purpose to cooperate with you in the best possible way, as we have done from the beginning, we would like to try to better understand certain passages of the matter that concerns us.

In order to be able to better comprehend the whole issue, in fact, we have taken the liberty of making a reconstruction of the Reports published by the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) between August 30, 2019 and March 3, 2021, analysing the contents and the photos reported therein. This is also to realize the reasons for the unreasonable commercial blockade imposed on us by the Daimler Group, formally linked to contractual matters and based on information that we provided to the Panel in a spirit of cooperation.

Right from the start (Report S/2019/691 dated August 30, 2019), Daimler confirmed to the Panel that the images shown to them "were of vehicles produced by the company, with modifications by another party" (images that we probably have not seen, because the one shown in your communication dated April 29, 2020, was "for demonstration purposes only"). And it immediately

withdrew from all responsibility, stating that *"it had complied with all relevant applicable embargoes and did no business with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea"*.

We believe, therefore, that we need to better comprehend whether the reality of the facts, as reported by you, may not have been misled, unconsciously or otherwise, by the indications given to the Panel by Daimler.

In fact, from what we have read, it would seem that we have somehow been caught up in the middle by Daimler. And that to a certain extent it seems willing to let us to fulfil the role of "sacrificial victim" for the whole affair, leaving the other parties involved unscathed. Indeed, in subsequent reports it does not appear that any further information is being requested from Daimler.

This leads us to believe that the indications provided by the Daimler Group may perhaps be somewhat obstructive to the reality of the facts and to the reconstruction of the whole affair, aiming more to keep the company unharmed than to pursue the truth of the facts.


We would therefore like to ask you for more information on the Panel's relationship with Daimler, so that we can cooperate constructively in the objective reconstruction of the matter.

We reiterate, in any case, our willingness to collaborate with the Panel for a faithful reconstruction of the truth of the entire matter under investigation.

But, we have another huge problem that arises from your investigation: **for months our transfers from Italy to foreign countries have been blocked by the Bank of America due to internal policy.**

Since the activity of European Cars & More srl is mainly focused on exports and imports, I ask the Panel to definitively clarify the extraneousness of my Client extraneousness to the investigation on trade relations with North Korea, and to communicate it to the institutions, including Bank of America, in the next seven days.

Kind regards,

Avv. Paola Zulli


Annex 72: Images of Mercedes-Benz SUV used by DPRK



Source: The Panel.



Source : NK News.

Annex 73: Investigation on KOMID-related Cases**Kil Jong Hun**

The Panel has received information from a Member State that there is an ongoing relationship between Equatorial Guinea and KOMID. As of 2021, this relationship includes potential Equatoguinean procurement of items from KOMID, including shipments of defence and/or military technology items.

According to the information, Kil Jong Hun, who also goes by the name Ri Yang Chun, is a KOMID representative based and operating in Equatorial Guinea. Kil travels using a DPRK diplomatic passport. The Panel asked Equatorial Guinea about these issues but has yet to receive a reply.

Ri Hyong Thae

The Panel is investigating a DPRK national, Ri Hyong Thae, who is believed to continue to travel internationally in connection with arms-related activity and in the company of other individuals designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee. Ri has served with KOMID and KOMID-associated companies in Cuba, Iran and Malaysia in the past, and travelled widely using the DPRK diplomatic passports. The Panel requested further information about Ri from the United Arab Emirates and received a copy of Ri's passport (see annex 74 or Ri's passport copy).

A Member State informed the Panel that Ri arrived and departed Singapore on the same day in June 2004 under passport number 554132407 and that there were no travel record to the passport number 827310102.

Annex 75: List and Copies of Sok Kha's Passports

Passport List

បញ្ជីលិខិតឆ្លងដែន

លរ	លិខិតឆ្លងដែនលេខ	ប្រភេទ	ផ្តល់នៅថ្ងៃ	ផុតកំណត់នៅថ្ងៃ	អាជ្ញាធរផ្តល់
1	AA0000980	ការទូត	04/11/2020	04/11/2025	ក្រសួងការបរទេស និងសហប្រតិបត្តិការអន្តរជាតិ
2	D0004492	ការទូត	09/04/2018	09/04/2021	ក្រសួងការបរទេស និងសហប្រតិបត្តិការអន្តរជាតិ
3	N00540807	ធម្មតា	11/07/2016	11/07/2026	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
4	N1422669	ធម្មតា	08/04/2013	08/04/2016	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
5	D0000803	ការទូត	30/01/2012	30/01/2015	ក្រសួងការបរទេស និងសហប្រតិបត្តិការអន្តរជាតិ
6	N0675876	ធម្មតា	29/04/2009	29/04/2012	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
7	N0397996	ធម្មតា	18/11/2005	18/11/2008	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
8	N0292886	ធម្មតា	19/02/2004	19/02/2007	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
9	N0256027	ធម្មតា	12/06/2003	12/06/2006	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ
10	N0158174	ធម្មតា	18/07/2001	18/07/2004	ក្រសួងមហាផ្ទៃ

សិទ្ធិអម្បាញ់ជន

No. D0004492








No. N1422669



No. D0000803





Source: The Panel (provided by Cambodia).

Annex 76: Company Extract of C.H. World Travel Co., Ltd.

Company Extract

General Details

Company Number: 00008002
 Company Name (in Khmer): ភីអិចស៊ីស អិលធី ត្រាវែល
 Company Name (in English): C.H.WORLD TRAVEL CO., LTD.
 Company Type: Private Limited Company
 Company Status: Registered
 Incorporation Date: 23-May-2008
 Reregistration Date: 05-Apr-2016
 Business Activities:
 Business Objective: 791 Travel agency and tour operator activities
 Main Business Activities: 79110 Travel agency activities(1)
 Business Objective: 791 Travel agency and tour operator activities
 Main Business Activities: 79120 Tour operator activities(2)
 Business Objective: 799 Other reservation service and related activities
 Main Business Activities: 79900 Other reservation service and related activities(4)
 Business Objective: 511 Passenger air transport
 Main Business Activities: 51100 Passenger air transport
 Business Objective: 522 Support activities for transportation
 Main Business Activities: 52202 Issue and procurement of transport documents and waybills
 Business Objective: 731 Advertising
 Main Business Activities: 73100 Advertising(1)
 Business Objective: 829 Business support service activities n.e.c.
 Main Business Activities: 82900 Other business support service activities n.e.c.
 Share Par Value:
 Par Value (KHR): 20000
 Par Value equivalent (USD): 5

Addresses

Physical Registered Office Address: ផ្ទះលេខ ៤០, ផ្ទះលេខ ៤០ (ភីអិចស៊ីស អិលធី ត្រាវែល), ភ្នំពេញ, Boeng Profit, Prampi Makara, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
 Postal Registered Office Address: Same as Physical Address
 Contact Email: chworldtravel2016@gmail.com
 Contact Telephone Number: +855 9 12875554

Directors

Name (Khmer): សុខ ខា
 Name (English): Sok KHA
 Postal Registered Office Address: ១៦១, ២១៧, ភ្នំពេញ, Phsar Depou Mucy, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
 Telephone: +855 9 12875554
 Chairman of the Board of Directors: No
 Name (Khmer): លី ហង់ ម៉ានី
 Name (English): Lee Hong MANN
 Postal Registered Office Address: 618, Phum 16, Boeng Kak Piv, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, 12152, Cambodia
 Telephone: +855 916678176
 Chairman of the Board of Directors: Yes

Company Number - 00008002

Shares & Shareholders

Registered Share Capital (KHR): 20,000,000

Registered Share Capital equivalent (USD): 5,000

More than one class of share: No

Individual Shareholder

Name (Khmer): សុខ ខា

Name (English): Sok KHA

Postal Registered Office Address: ១៩១, ២១៩, ខ្នង, Phsar Depou Musy, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Number of shares: 700

Individual Shareholder

Name (Khmer): លី ហុង ម៉ាណ

Name (English): Lee Hong MANN

Postal Registered Office Address: 618, Phum 18, Boang Kak Pir, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, 12152, Cambodia

Number of shares: 300

Nationality of Majority Shareholders: Cambodian

Percentage of Majority Shareholders(%): 100

Page 2 of 2

The validation code for this Business Extract is MOC-73324678. To check the validity of this document enter <https://www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh/cambodia-br-companies/verify/00008002/MOC-73324678.html> in your browser.


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Source: The Panel (provided by Cambodia).

Annex 77: Bronze statue blueprints under construction by the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Cotonou, Benin and satellite imagery

1) Excerpt of the blueprints


According to multiple media reports, the MOP is partnering with the Government of Benin to build a bronze statue in Cotonou, using obfuscated identification to evade sanctions. The Panel obtained information indicating that the bronze statue is 30 meter in height. One of the Korean-language blueprints of the bronze statue “Amazone Monument” shows that the builder is “Republic of Benin, Ministry of the Living Environment and Sustainable Development” and a contractor is “Chongryong International Development” (see below).



Source: VOA.

2) Satellite imagery of the bronze statue (6°20'57"N 2°24'28"E)

Satellite imagery suggests that the statue was installed between June and September 2020. The Panel wrote to Benin requesting information on the entities involved in the construction of the statue. Benin replied to the Panel that there is no relationship between the entity and Benin (see reply from Benin). Investigations continue.¹⁴⁶ It seems that the structure surrounding the statue was not removed as of December 2021.



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

¹⁴⁶ Construction of bronze statues in Benin is also concerns possible violations of resolutions on overseas workers (S/2020/840, para. 105 and annex 45).

3) Reply from Benin

Le Bénin a pris note des résolutions¹ adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies sur la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC) suite aux activités menées par ce pays pour développer des armes nucléaires et des missiles balistiques en violation du droit international.

Le Bénin appuie fermement ces résolutions, y compris le régime des sanctions que celles-ci ont mis en place.

Conformément aux orientations de sa politique extérieure, le Bénin promeut la non-prolifération nucléaire dans toutes les régions du monde. Il a ratifié le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires qu'il considère comme un des piliers essentiels du régime international du désarmement et de la non-prolifération nucléaires.

En outre, le Bénin est Partie au Traité de Pelindaba qui crée une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Afrique et, depuis le 28 septembre 2018, a signé le Traité sur l'interdiction des armes nucléaires adopté à New York, le 07 juillet 2017. Le 22 octobre 2020, l'Assemblée nationale du Bénin a autorisé la ratification de ce Traité.

Le Gouvernement du Bénin soutient fermement toutes les initiatives des Nations Unies tendant à la création dans toutes les régions du monde, de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires. A ce titre, le Bénin encourage la mise en œuvre de la décision de création de ladite zone au Moyen-Orient et réaffirme, dans chacune de ces interventions aux Nations Unies, son soutien à la tenue d'une Conférence internationale pour y parvenir.

Le Bénin a exprimé à plusieurs reprises sa ferme conviction que l'objectif d'une paix durable et de la dénucléarisation de la péninsule coréenne doit être atteint par des voies pacifiques.

Le Bénin est l'un des rares pays africains à coparrainer chaque année les résolutions des Nations Unies sur la situation des Droits de l'Homme en RPDC aussi bien à New York (3^{ème} Commission de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies) qu'à Genève (Conseil des Droits de l'Homme).

S'agissant, en particulier des présumées activités au Bénin de "Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies", les investigations menées par l'ensemble des Services nationaux compétents concluent à l'inexistence de relations entre ce groupement d'entreprises de droit nord-coréen et le Bénin.

Toutefois, le Bénin s'engage à poursuivre les investigations au sujet des activités de ce groupement et à prendre les dispositions appropriées en vue de prévenir et d'empêcher que d'éventuelles activités dudit groupement soient menées sur son territoire.

Le Bénin réaffirme son ferme appui au régime des sanctions imposées à la RPDC et s'engage à continuer leur mise en œuvre avec rigueur et vigilance.

Fait à Cotonou, le 23 décembre 2021

¹ Résolutions 1718 (2006) ; 1874 (2009) ; 2094 (2013) ; 2270 (2016) ; 2321 (2016) ; 2356 (2017) ; 2371 (2017).

Source: The Panel.

Annex 78: DPRK workers in China

According to a Member State information, DPRK entities were working with entities located in China to employ DPRK nationals at several locations and fields including construction sites, factories, and IT from 2020 to 2021. Most of the contracts were to hire several hundred DPRK workers and some of the contracts were expected to dispatch additional employees. Details of each case are below.¹⁴⁷

1) Factory workers

Following entities in China employed DPRK workers as of mid-2020. Most employed between 100-400 DPRK workers, although several of these entities employed still higher numbers of laborers from DPRK.

Jilin Military Garment Co., Ltd (길림군상복장유한공사)
 Jilin Sangbok Clothing Co., Ltd (길림길상복장유한공사)
 Helong Kusong Clothing Co., Ltd (화룡구성복장유한공사)
 Yanbian Pros Clothing Co., Ltd (연변프로스복장유한공사)
 China Aulbon (Clothing Production) Co., Ltd (아을본(옷제작)유한공사)
 Jilin Rangdon Clothing Co., Ltd (길림랑돈복장유한공사)
 Helong Hyesang Clothing Co., Ltd (화룡혜상복장유한공사)
 Pacific Clothing Co., Ltd (태평양복장유한공사)
 Chongyon Clothing Co., Ltd (청연복장유한공사)

2) Construction workers

DPRK entity Korean Namgang Construction General Corporation (aka DPRK Ryongrim Overseas Construction Company) was working with a Chinese entity Xinzhexing Labor Resource Co, Ltd (广东省东莞市新臻头人力资源有限公司) to dispatch between 500 and 20,000 DPRK nationals to Zhongshan City and Dongguan City of Guangdong Province and Yangtze River Delta in April 2021.

Another DPRK entity Korean Namgang Construction General Corporation (aka DPRK Ryongrim Overseas Construction Company) was working with a Chinese entity PRC Tong Sin Communication Technology Co, Ltd (中国通信技术有限公司) to dispatch more than 200 DPRK nationals to Beijing and Heibei Province in June 2021.

¹⁴⁷ One expert is of the view that this information needs to be further corroborated.

3) IT workers

DPRK entity **Mangyongbong International Trade and Economic Development Corporation** (President: Yun Kuk Nam) was working with Dandong Junxing Science and Technology Co Ltd (丹东市君星科技有限公司) to send DPRK IT workers to work in China around October 2020. These workers would likely remain employed for several years. The information indicates that the UN-designated DPRK entity, the **Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028)** (see figure 70-1) facilitated the establishment of this relationship.

Figure 70-1: Excerpt from the List established and maintained pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

KPe.028 Name: MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT
A.k.a.: a) Military Supplies Industry Department b) MID **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea **Listed on:** 2 Mar. 2016 (amended on 9 Jul. 2019)
Other information: The Munitions Industry Department is involved in key aspects of the DPRK's missile program. MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK's ballistic missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2. The MID oversees the DPRK's weapons production and R&D programs, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences – also designated in August 2010 – are subordinate to the MID. The MID in recent years has worked to develop the KN08 road-mobile ICBM. The MID oversees the DPRK's nuclear program. The Nuclear Weapons Institute is subordinate to the MID.

Source: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials>.

4) Other cases

DPRK company **Korea Changsaeng Trading Corporation** was working with Dandong Jinsheng Electronics Co., Ltd (丹东锦盛电子有限公司) concerning the provision of at least 150 DPRK workers in Dandong, China, by October 2020, with an additional 200 workers planned to be dispatched in 2021. Information indicates that this relationship could be structured as a joint venture or cooperative entity.

Another DPRK entity **Korean Tangun Trading Corporation** was working with Heilongjiang Province Rixin Foodstuffs Company, Ltd (黑龙江省日信食品有限公司) to bring several hundred DPRK workers to China to work for foodstuff plant in January 2020. The information indicates that Korean Tangun Trading Corporation is the UN designated entity (KPe.008) (see figure 70-2)

Figure 70-2: Excerpt from the List established and maintained pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

KPe.008 Name: KOREAN TANGUN TRADING CORPORATION
A.k.a.: na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea **Listed on:** 16 Jul. 2009 **Other information:** Korea Tangun Trading Corporation is subordinate to DPRK's Second Academy of Natural Sciences and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK's defense research and development programs, including, but not limited to, WMD and delivery system programs and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.

Source: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials>.

Annex 79: Possible Joint/Cooperative entity between DPRK and China

According to information provided by another Member State, DPRK entity Koryo Commercial Bank Ltd (高麗商業銀行) agreed to establish a joint venture with Shenyang Dawoo Sealant Construction Material Co. Ltd (沈阳多友实兰特建筑材料有限公司) mainly for the production and sale of soybean oil in 2019. The information suggests that the construction of an office was completed in Pyongyang and the soybean production plant was under construction in Nampo, DPRK. The Member State assessed that soybean oil is for civilian purpose, but it also could be supplied to munitions factories where the oil is used for weapons manufacturing.

According to information obtained by the Panel:

Name of joint venture entity:

PYONGYANG HWASHIN JOINT CORPORATION (平壤和信合営会社)

Address: Jyonjin-dong, Rangrang district, Pyongyang city (平壤市楽浪区域前進洞)

Party of DPRK side:

KORYO COMMERCIAL BANK LTD (高麗商業銀行)

Party of Chinese side:

SHENYANG DAWOO SEALANT CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL CO., LTD

(沈阳多友实兰特建筑材料有限公司)

Address: No.258, Kunshan-Xilu, Yuhong District, Shenyang City, Liaoning Province, PRC (遼寧省瀋陽市于洪区昆山西路 258 号)

Shareholder: GIL GYEONG-GAP (吉京甲 (길경갑))

Category of business:

Production and sales of various food, Operation of wharf, Operation of sales facility (in Pyongyang, Nampo, Wonsan), Operation of stores (light industry products, food, sales of electric and electronics, clothes manufacturing)

Registered capital: 6,726,720,000 won (56,056,000 Euro)

Approval: No. 107-39 (5 October, 2018)

Duration: 40 years (until October 2052)

Annex 80: Reply from China

7. Workers (OC.306)

Jilin Military Garment Co., Ltd and the other 8 garment companies mentioned in the Panel's letter only have their English and Korean names. Since China's business registration system uses only the Chinese language, we cannot conduct comparison and verification. China has been strictly

7

implementing relevant provisions on migrant workers from the DPRK. Their working permits have all expired before the deadline set by the Security Council resolutions.

We did not find Korean Namgang Construction General Corporation sending migrant workers to China. In fact, since February 2020, for the sake of pandemic prevention and control, the DPRK has set strict restrictions on people entering and leaving the country. It is impossible for the DPRK to send migrant workers to China since then. Some information of so-called "violation of resolution" is not consistent with the actual situation amid the raging pandemic. The Panel should be more discerning.

As for the 99 DPRK migrant workers repatriated by [REDACTED] in 2019, according to China's exit and entry records, all of them have left China. Before the start of the pandemic, China was an important transit for people-to-people exchanges between the DPRK and other countries, especially in 2019, when all DPRK workers repatriated by other countries returned to the DPRK via China. If the Panel requires China to verify every time it gets some new information, it will be a huge burden of work. It is also by no means the obligation of the Chinese Government.

Source: Member State.

Annex 81: List of IT workers Equatorial Guinea

According to a Member State, at least 13 DPRK IT workers (see below) are located and working in Malabo and Oyala, in Equatorial Guinea. The Member State assessed that these IT workers arrived in Equatorial Guinea between 2018 and 2019. No response has yet been received to the Panel's request for further information.

DPRK IT workers reportedly located in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea :

- Ri Mun Song
- Pak Myong Song
- Kim Kuk Song
- Kim Hyon Chol
- Kim Kwang Chol
- Ri Tae Yong
- Ryu Jong Hyok

DPRK IT workers reportedly located in Oyala, Equatorial Guinea :

- Pak Tong Hyon
- Ri Jong Hyok
- Kang Thae Ho
- Cha Sung Hyon
- An Kuk Chol
- Kim Sun Hyok

Source: Member State.

Annex 82: Information about DPRK restaurants in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

The Panel has continued its investigations into the current status of the DPRK-related restaurants in Laos. Based on information received from a Member State, and the Panel's corroboration, at least four restaurants and one night market (see figure 82-1 and 82-2) in Laos seems to have continued to operate even after the applicable measures towards the closure of the restaurants and repatriation were taken by the Laotian authorities in 2020. The Laotian Government has already provided the Panel in July 2020 with the details of 28 DPRK nationals who had departed Laos from Wattay International Airport during the period between 2017 and the second half of 2019.¹⁴⁸


Nevertheless, open-source information suggest that restaurants are open and active, and that DPRK nationals have been working in Laos as waitresses and dance performers after these repatriations and after the December 2019 repatriation deadline. The list provided by the Laotian Government does not include female DPRK nationals and the Panel has requested clarification in view of the current information reported by the Member State to Laos in September 2021. Investigations continue.

Figure 82-1: List of Restaurants and Night Market

No	Restaurant	City	Latitude	Longitude
1	That Luang Pyongyang Restaurant	Vientiane	17.9734	102.6325
2	Paektu-Hanna Restaurant	Vientiane	17.96619	102.62825
3	Vang Vieng Pyongyang Restaurant	Vang Vieng	18.91901	102.44885
4	Vang Vieng Night Market	Vang Vieng	18.92347	102.44866
5	Koryo Restaurants	Luang Prabang	19.87404	102.12883

¹⁴⁸ S/2020/840, para. 133.

Figure 82-2: Location of the Restaurants and Night Market



Source: Google Earth, annotated by the Panel.


Annex 83: Information about the Russian Federation

According to Member State information, the DPRK official Kim Ju Sok, a Moscow-based official representative of DPRK's Ponghwa General Corporation, facilitated several contracts to send DPRK nationals to work in agricultural and construction activities in Russia between 2020 and 2021.

The same Member State reported that Kim collaborated with the general director of the DPRK Uljibong Cooperation Corporation, Yun Kuk Nam,¹⁴⁹ and contracted with a Russian company SMU-07, LLC to send a maximum of 100 DPRK nationals to construction projects in and around Moscow in June 2020. Kim Ju Sok also collaborated with DPRK company Korea Rungra-888 Trading Corporation to send at least 60 trainees to a Russian company Stroy Servis, LLC in July 2020. These trainees would receive training at vegetable greenhouses in the Moscow area and would receive 500 US dollars for participating in this program. The program was planned to run for several years and additional DPRK trainees were to be dispatched.

The Russian Federation replied to the Panel that “No information is available regarding his (Kim Ju Sok) activities in violation of Security Council resolution” and informed the Panel that “Both construction companies mentioned in the enquiry – SMU-07, LLC, which is not registered at the indicated address, and Stroy Servis LLC – ceased operations this year. No information is available regarding their contacts with nationals of the DPRK.”¹⁵⁰ Information provided to the Panel indicates that Kim was involved in another contract in sending DPRK nationals to Russia and investigations continue.

Figure 83: Kim Ju Sok's DPRK Overseas Worker Supply Activities



Source: The Panel.

¹⁴⁹ According to the information of Member State, Yun Kuk Nam was the director of Mangyongbong, a Korean general trading company and left Russia in December 2019.

¹⁵⁰ A Member State provided the Panel with the address of SMU-07, LLC. Its address is identical to the address described in the document obtained from ЕПЮОЛ.

Annex 84: Information about Koryo Restaurant in Viet Nam

According to a Member State, DPRK nationals remaining in Viet Nam continued to work at the “Koryo Restaurant” in 2021. The Panel’s past report,¹⁵¹ a think tank report,¹⁵² and corporate registry in Viet Nam show that Koryo Restaurant is associated with Mudo Vina Co., Ltd which remains active and its legal representative is DPRK national Kim Jong Gil. Moreover, open-source information suggests that the Koryo restaurant sells art products including paintings produced at Mansudae Art Studio, which is a violation of paragraph 3 of resolution 2371 (2017). Viet Nam has yet to reply to the Panel’s enquiry.

1) Corporate registry of Mudo Vina Co., Ltd.

The address of its head office (underlined in red) is identical to the former address of Koryo Restaurant (see 2)).

DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INVESTMENT OF HA NOI BUSINESS REGISTRATION OFFICE	SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Independence – Freedom – Happiness
BUSINESS REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE	
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WITH ONE MEMBER	
Enterprise Code: 0105844459	
First registration: day 26 month 03 year 2012	
Amendment registration for the time(-s): 1, day 15 month 08 year 2016	
1. Enterprise name	
Enterprise name in Vietnamese: CÔNG TY TNHH MUDO VIỆT NAM	
Enterprise name in foreign language: MUDO VIETNAM COMPANY LIMITED	
Enterprise name in abbreviation: MUDO VINA CO., LTD	
2. Address of head office	
<u>Số 7, Lô 13B phố Trung Hòa, Khu đô thị Trung Yên, Phường Trung Hoà, Quận Cầu Giấy, Hà Nội, Vietnam</u>	
Tel:	Fax:
Email:	Website:
3. Charter capital 6,210,900,000 VND	
In words: Six billion two hundred ten million nine hundred thousand VND (tương đương 300.000 USD - Ba trăm ngàn đô la Mỹ)	
4. Name of owner	
One or more parameters were not specified for the subreport, 'subreport1', located at: /info_products/en/bic_ong	
5. Legal representative	
* Name: <u>KIM JONG GIL</u>	Gender: <u>Nam</u>
Position: <u>Tổng giám đốc</u>	
Date of birth: <u>01/08/1973</u>	Ethnic background: <u>Nationality: North Korea</u>
ID type: <u>Hộ chiếu nước ngoài</u>	
ID card No.: <u>654333308</u>	
Date of issuance: <u>08/08/2014</u>	Place of issuance: <u>Bộ Ngoại giao Triều Tiên</u>
Contact address: <u>Số 7, Lô 13B phố Trung Hòa, Khu đô thị Trung Yên, Phường Trung Hoà, Quận Cầu Giấy, Thành phố Hà Nội, Việt Nam</u>	
Resident address: <u>Gyong Hung-Dong, Botonggang dist, Pyongyang City, Korea, Dem. Rep.</u>	
HEAD OF BUSINESS REGISTRATION OFFICE	
(Signature, Seal and Full name)	
Thông tin trên được kết xuất từ Cơ sở dữ liệu quốc gia về đăng ký doanh nghiệp vào thời điểm 22:20 ngày 27/8/2021. Thời điểm yêu cầu thông tin: 02:56 ngày 28/09/2021.	

The legal representative is Kim Jong Gil, a DPRK national.

Source: Vietnamese National Business Registration Portal.

¹⁵¹ S/2019/171, annex 74 (p. 331).

¹⁵² C4ADS, <https://www.c4reports.org/dispatched>.

Address of Koryo Restaurant

The Panel's past report and the photo of the business card of Koryo Restaurant. The address is indicated by the red dotted line.

Koryo restaurant	Hanoi	No.61 Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi
		Previous Address: No.7, Lot 13b, Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau iang Paper, Hanoi

Source: The Panel, [S/2019/171](#), p. 332.



Source: Naver.

2) The excerpt of corporate registry of Mudo Vina Co., Ltd


Corporate registry shows that its business activities are “Restaurants and mobile catering services” (underlined in red).

II. THÔNG TIN VỀ NGÀNH, NGHỀ ĐĂNG KÝ KINH DOANH		
	<u>Nhà hàng và các dịch vụ ăn uống phục vụ lưu động</u>	
	Chi tiết: Dịch vụ phục vụ ăn uống	
		Ngành, nghề chưa khớp mã với Hệ thống ngành kinh tế Việt Nam

Source: Vietnamese National Business Registration Portal.

3) A photo of a receipt from Koryo Restaurant

The receipt is dated on 15 December 2020.



Source: Google.

4) Excerpt of video footage of the Koryo Restaurant

The video footage was uploaded in February 2021, with restaurant workers wearing masks and using hand sanitizer, suggesting that the footage was filmed after COVID-19.



Source: Youtube.

5) Information about Mansudae Art Studio

Media report about art from Mansudae Art Studio sold at Koryo Restaurant. A restaurant employee says 'The art is from the famous Mansudae Art Studio in Pyongyang. These works were directly created by people's artists and are famous'. The employee also explains about the price of paintings and says "This is about 1,400 US dollars. A piece of embroidery is more expensive and could be two thousand dollars. The smallest is 500 US dollar. If you really want to buy it, we can give you a small discount". (See the part surrounded by red dotted line)

베트남 북한식당, 제재 대상 만수대 작품 반입...최대 2천 달러 판매 시도

기자 함지하, 김형진
2019.3.16 12:30 오전



베트남 하노이의 한 북한 식당에서 유엔 제재 대상인 만수대 창작사의 그림이 판매되고 있는 사실이 VOA 취재를 통해 확인됐습니다. 가격이 최대 2천 달러에 달하는데, 제재 위반이라는 지적이 나왔습니다. 함지하 기자가 보도합니다.

하노이에 위치한 북한 '고려식당'. 건물 곳곳에 여러 미술작품들이 걸려 있습니다.

북한 종업원은 만수대 창작사가 제작한 것들이라며, 평양에서 직접 가져와 판매 중이라고 밝혔습니다.

[녹취: 종업원(음성변조)] "우리 평양에 만수대 창작사라고 유명한 미술... 인민 예술가들이 직접 하는 겁니다. 유명한 겁니다."

지난 2017년 유엔 안보리는 만수대 창작사를 자산동결 대상으로 지정한 바 있습니다. 평양의 제재 대상 기관에서 제작된 미술품이 베트남으로 옮겨져 버젓이 판매되고 있는 겁니다.

판매 중인 미술품들은 만수대 창작사 수예단장이자 인민예술가 칭호를 받은 김청희의 작품을 비롯해 북한 화가 김경석의 수목화 등 종류가 다양했습니다.

주로 식당 내부 장식용 그림 형태로 벽에 걸려 있는데, 5층 높이의 고려식당의 2층과 3층에 주로 물려 있었습니다.

구매자가 나타나면 액자에서 꺼내 전달하는 방식으로 판매가 이뤄지며, 원할 경우 보증서도 발급한다는 게 종업원의 설명입니다.

2021/09/30 22:55

베트남 북반식당, 제재 대상 만수대 작품 전시... 최대 2천 달러 판매 시도 | Voice of America - Korean



하노이의 북한 식당인 '고려식당' 종업원이 만수대창작사에서 제작된 호랑이 그림을 들어 보이고 있다.

그림의 가격은 크기에 따라 달랐지만 대부분 미화 1천 달러에서 2천 달러 사이입니다.

[녹취: 종업원(음성변조)] "이건 한 1천400 (달러 정도 합니다). 수 들어간 건 더 비쌌습니다. 수 뜬 건 2천 불까지도 해야 됩니다. 제일 작은 건 500불이고, 실제 사시겠다면 조금씩은 할인해 드릴 수 있습니다."

이 종업원은 기계가 아닌 손으로 제작된 수예 작품이기 때문에 비싼 것이라고 강조했습니다.

미국 정부는 만수대창작사가 유엔 안보리 제재 대상 기관이란 점을 분명히 했습니다.

유엔주재 미국 대표부는 관련 내용을 묻는 VOA의 질문에 "추가 정보가 없는 가정적인 상황에선 답변할 수 없다"면서도 "만수대 창작사는 2017년 유엔 안보리 결의 2371호의 (제재) 지정 기관이며, 그들에게 수익을 제공하는 건 금지된다"고 대답했습니다.

유엔 안보리 대북제재위원회 전문가패널의 미국 대표로 활동했던 윌리엄 뉴콤 전 재무부 선임경제자문관은 "만수대 창작사는 제재 대상이며 판매 중인 미술작품을 포함한 모든 자산이 동결돼야 한다"고 밝혔습니다.

아울러 (만수대 창작사 판매 수익과 관련해) 예치된 자금이 있다면 은행이 어디에 있든 상관없이 이 역시도 동결 대상이라고 덧붙였다.

뉴콤 전 자문관은 고려식당 또한 문을 닫아야 하며, 북한 노동자들도 본국으로 송환돼야 한다는 점도 강조했습니다.

안보리 결의 2397호는 각 유엔 회원국들이 올해 말까지 모든 북한 해외 노동자를 돌려보내도록 하고 있습니다. 아울러 식당이나 호텔 등 북한과 합작회사를 설립하는 방식으로 운영되는 모든 사업 또한 중단해야 합니다.

제재 전문가인 조슈아 스탠튼 변호사도 만수대 창작사의 자산이 동결돼야 한다고 주장했습니다.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20210902164932/http://www.voakorea.com/korea/korea-politics/4831261>

2/3

Source: VOA.

Annex 85a: Panel enquiry to China (finance)



REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.260

4 October 2021

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is conducting an investigation into several illicit ship-to-ship transfers, which resulted in refined petroleum delivery to the DPRK in violation of relevant UN sanctions. As part of this investigation, the Panel is also investigating possible violations of, inter alia, paragraph 32 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 36 of resolution 2270 (2016), which prohibit the provisioning of financial services, directly or indirectly, that could contribute to DPRK sanctions evasion activities.

According to information obtained by the Panel, four Hong Kong-registered companies (annex A) transferred more than USD 45 million from accounts held at China-based banks, to Sino Global Trade Co Ltd for the purchase of gasoil which was transferred to the DPRK via the vessel *Diamond 8*.¹ These transactions occurred between September 2019 and August 2020 (annexes B and C). In paying for the transfer of this gasoil to DPRK, these companies are acting in violation of the resolutions detailed above. Given that the Panel intends to detail the findings of its investigation in the next report, the Panel would be grateful for the following information:

- Please provide the beneficial ownership information for each company in annex A, to include shareholders, directors, and managers;
- Please provide financial records, including all deposits, incoming and outgoing wire transfers for each account held by the companies in annex B and C. Please provide a detailed description of the actions taken by your national authorities to ensure that the DPRK is no longer benefitting from illicit payments through the Hong Kong-based companies in annex A;
- Please provide a detailed description of the actions taken by your national authorities to ensure that the companies in Annex A, as well as the banks listed in Annex B, are no longer providing financial services, directly or indirectly, to DPRK entities;

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you

¹ For previous Panel reporting on the *Diamond 8*, see paragraphs 14 and 21 of S/2020/151, paragraphs 25, 30-31 of S/2020/840, and paragraph 49 of S/2020/211. The Panel has also reported on the *Diamond 8* in the 2021 mid-term report, S/2021/777, which is not yet published at the time of drafting.

H.E. Mr. Zhang Jun
Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations
New York

that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within six weeks of the date of this letter. Please reply by email to the Panel at dppa-poe1874@un.org. Should you wish to discuss this request, or any follow-up matters, please contact me through [REDACTED]

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[REDACTED]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes:

Annex A: Hong Kong Registered Companies

Annex B: Summary of Financial Transactions and Accounts

Annex C: Bank Transfer Receipts, September 2019 to August 2020

Annex A: Hong Kong Registered Companies

The following Hong Kong-registered companies remitted payments to Sino Global between September 2019 and August 2020 for the purchase of gasoil, subsequently delivered to DPRK in transactions involving the vessel *Diamond 8*:

Name	Company Number
Hong Kong Stu Group Company Limited	2401566
Wanhr Trading Limited	2782517
Yield Gold Limited	1500069
Zfullboto Co., Limited	2792449

Annex B: Summary of Financial Transactions and Accounts

Aggregated totals of bank slips from September 2019 to August 2020.

<i>Remitter</i>	<i>Remitting Bank</i>	<i>Sum</i>
Hong Kong Stu Group Company Limited		\$4,312,419.00
Wanhr Trading Limited		\$6,990,000.00
Yield Gold Limited		\$22,544,239.00
		\$2,801,876.00
		\$1,206,264.00
Zfullboto Co Ltd		\$6,344,235.00
		\$852,836.00
Total		\$45,051,869.00

Annex C: Bank Transfer Receipts, September 2019 to August 2020

Annex C of the Panel's original letter to China contained 70 pages of bank transfer receipts from the four companies listed in Annex B to Sino Global for the purchase of gasoil. For the sake of brevity in this report, the Panel includes in this annex ten of those receipts. The Panel has redacted for this report (both from Annexes B and C of the original letter) the names of the remitting banks. Those redactions were not made in the original Annex to the Panel's letter to China.

23/10/2019 17:32 25111879

YUANTA BANK HK21

PAGE 01/05

Yuanta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch

SUITE 3418, 34/F, TWO PACIFIC PLACE, 88 QUEENSWAY, HONG KONG

Tel No. (852) 2511-1715 Fax No. (852) 2611-1878 SWIFT address CUHHHK33

Yuanta Commercial Bank Co Ltd
(Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability of shareholders)
YUANTA COMMERCIAL BANK CO., LTD. (HONG KONG BRANCH)
YUANTA COMMERCIAL BANK CO., LTD. (HONG KONG BRANCH)

TO: SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD

RM 1A-3 25F HAI-PIEN ROAD
KACHISUNG TAIWAN<<INWARD REMITTANCE
PAYMENT ADVICE >>

Date : OCT. 23, 2019

Our Refno : IR99919C01504

Tel: 886 -7 -2695988 #

Fax: 886 -7 -2693053

Remitted Type : TEL. TRANSFER
By Order Of : YIELD GOLD LIMITED
ROOM 1304-1305, 13/F SUP TOWER KING'

Remitting Bank :

Value Date	:	OCT. 23, 2019
Beneficiary's A/C No	:	999020011056
Payee Name	:	SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD
Amount of Remittance	:	USD 1,501,104.00
Exchange Rate	:	1.000000
USD Equivalent	:	USD 1,501,104.00
Commission	:	USD 7.00
Postage/Cable Charge	:	0.00
Exchange Comm.	:	0.00
Comm. Subtotal	:	USD 7.00
Total	:	USD 1,501,097.00

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.

Remittance information :

THIS IS A COMPUTER GENERATED ADVICE. Yuanta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch
NO AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED.

PAGE 81/82

Yantai Commodity Bank Co Ltd
Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability
大連商貨銀行有限公司
大連商貨銀行有限公司之代表人可傑德

Date : OCT. 24, 2019
Our Refno : IR99919001513
Tel: 886 -7 -2695988 #
Fax: 886 -7 -2693053

Remitting Bank

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.
Remittance information :

22-01569

28/09/2019 17:22 28111879

YUANTA BANK HK21

T/REF: 01/04

Yuanta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch

SUITE 3418, 34/F, TWO PACIFIC PLACE, 88 QUEENSWAY, HONG KONG

Tel No.: (852) 2511-1710 Fax No.: (852) 2511-1879 SWIFT address: CYTH333

Yuanta Commercial Bank Co Ltd
Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability of shareholders
元大商業銀行股份有限公司
台灣台北市信義區松山路100號

TO: SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD


<<INWARD REMITTANCE
PAYMENT ADVICE >>RM 1A-3 25F HAI-PIEN ROAD
KACHISTUNG TAIWAN

Date : SEP. 20, 2019

Our Refno : IR99919001301

Tel: 886 -7 -2695988 #

Fax: 886 -7 -2693053

Remitted Type : TTE.. TRANSFER
 By Order Of : WANIR TRADING LIMITED
 QUANZHOU SHI SHISHI SHI BAOBAO LU,
 Remitting Bank : 

Value Date : SEP. 20, 2019
 Beneficiary's A/C No : 999020011056
 Payee Name : SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD
 Orig. Remittance Amt : 586,000.00
 Amount of Remittance : USD 586,000.00
 Exchange Rate : 1.000000
 USD Equivalent : USD 586,000.00
 Commission : USD 7.00
 Postage/Cable Charge : 0.00
 Exchange Comm. : 0.00
 Comm. Subtotal : USD 7.00
 Total : USD 585,993.00

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.
 Remittance information :

THIS IS A COMPUTER GENERATED ADVICE, Yuanta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch
 NO AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED.

日期 2019年 9月20日 17:23 09940

04/11/2019 17:29 25111879

YUANTA BANK HK21

PAGE 02/03

Yuantai Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch
 SUITE 3418, 34/F, TWO PACIFIC PLACE, 88 QUEENSWAY, HONG KONG
 Tel No. (852) 2511-1719 Fax No. (852) 2511-1879 SWIFT Address: CYTH333

Yuantai Commercial Bank Co Ltd
 Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability of shareholders
 元大商業銀行股份有限公司
 台灣成立之有限責任公司股東為無限責任

TO: SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD

<<INWARD REMITTANCE
PAYMENT ADVICE >>


RM 1A-3 25F HAI-PIEN ROAD
 KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN

Date : NOV. 04, 2019

Our Refno : IR99919001576

Tel: 886 -7 -2695988 #

Fax: 886 -7 -2693053

Remitted Type : TEL. TRANSFER
 By Order Of : WANER TRADING LIMITED
 QUANZHOU SHI SHISHI SHI BAODAO LI,
 Remitting Bank : 

Value Date : NOV. 04, 2019
 Beneficiary's A/C No : 999020011056
 Payee Name : SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD
 Orig. Remittance Amt : 532,000.00
 Amount of Remittance : USD 532,000.00
 Exchange Rate : 1.000000
 USD Equivalent : USD 532,000.00
 Commission : USD 7.00
 Postage/Cable Charge : 0.00
 Exchange Comm. : 0.00
 Comm. Subtotal : USD 7.00
 Total : USD 531,993.00

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.
 Remittance information :

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03/09/2019 10:14 25111097

YUNTA BANK HK1

PAGE 02/03

Yunta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch

SUITE 3416, 34/F, TWO PACIFIC PLACE, 88 QUEENSWAY, HONG KONG

Tel No.: (852) 2511-1719 Fax No.: (852) 2511-1878 SWIFT address: OURIBH33

Yunta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd.
Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability of shareholders.
元大商業銀行股份有限公司
有獨立之資產及其公司股東為有限責任

TO: SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD

<<INWARD REMITTANCE
PAYMENT ADVICE >>RM 1A-3 25F HAI-PIEN ROAD
KACHSIUNG TAIWAN

Date : SEP. 03, 2019

Our Refno : IR99919001167

Tel: 886 -7 -2595988 #

Fax: 886 -7 -2593053

Remitted Type : TEL. TRANSFER
By Order Of : HONG KONG STU GROUP COMPANY LIMITED
ADD. RM 1805 18/F OLYMPIA PLAZA 243

Remitting Bank :

Value Date : SEP. 03, 2019
Beneficiary's A/C No : 999020011056
Payee Name : SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO., LTD HONG
KONG, CHINAOrig. Remittance Amt : 251,153.00
Amount of Remittance : USD 251,133.00
Exchange Rate : 1.000000
USD Equivalent : USD 251,133.00Commission : USD 7.00
Postage/Cable Charge : 0.00
Exchange Comm. : 0.00
Comm. Subtotal : USD 7.00
Total : USD 251,126.00

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.

Remittance information :

THIS IS A COMPUTER GENERATED ADVICE, Yunta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch
NO AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED.

儲款號碼 2019年 9月 30日 10時10分 儲款0915

17/09/2019 18:31 25111897

YUANTA BANK HK1

PAGE 01/02

Yuantia Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch

SUITE 3418, 34/F, TWO PACIFIC PLACE, 88 QUEENSWAY, HONG KONG

Tel No. (852)2511-1719 Fax No. (852)2511-1879 SWIFT address: OUPH33HH

Yuantia Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.

Incorporated in Taiwan with limited liability of shareholders

元大商業銀行股份有限公司

台灣成立之有限責任公司股東負有限責任

TO: SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD

RM 1A-3 25/F HAI-PIEN ROAD
KAOSIUNG TAIWAN<<INWARD REMITTANCE
PAYMENT ADVICE >>

Date : SEP. 17, 2019

Our Refno : TR99919001265

Tel: 886 -7 -2695988 #

Fax: 886 -7 -2693053

Remitted Type : TEL. TRANSFER
 By Order Of : HONG KONG STU GROUP COMPANY LIMITED
 ADD. RM 1805 18/F OLYMPIA PLAZA 243
 Remitting Bank : 
 Value Date : SEP. 17, 2019
 Beneficiary's A/C No : 999020011056
 Payee Name : SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO., LTD HONG
 KONG, CHINA
 Orig. Remittance Amt : 700,001.37
 Amount of Remittance : USD 699,981.37
 Exchange Rate : 1.000000
 USD Equivalent : USD 699,981.37
 Commission : USD 7.00
 Postage/Cable Charge : 0.00
 Exchange Comm. : 0.00
 Comm. Subtotal : USD 7.00
 Total : USD 699,974.37

We have credited your A/C No. 999020011056 with us.

Remittance information :

THIS IS A COMPUTER GENERATED ADVICE, Yuanta Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., Hong Kong Branch
 NO AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED.

日期時間 2019年 9月17日 18:26分 匯款0938

FX015 104.03 壹號

兆豐國際商業銀行
MEGA INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK匯入外匯水單及手續費收入收據
EXCHANGE MEMO AND CHARGE RECEIPT
國際金融業務分行(OBU)
☐ 匯入匯款買匯水單
☒ 匯入匯款交易匯款
☐ 逾期升匯支制

日期: 2020-05-27 15:29:07

幣別: USD 水單編號: OBC00052700004-0001 原契約書號碼:

匯入匯款編號: OBC0IS00000117	匯款地區國別: 香港	交易金額: Amount USD*****695,979.00	第一聯: 客戶存查
收款人名稱: 中文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD Payee 英文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD Acct/check No. 00023758002088 統一編號(UD No.) AIZ00219280		電匯 國外匯入 USD*****695,979.00	
匯款分類名稱及編號: 711 商仲貿易收入		匯款總額 USD*****695,989.00 存入外匯存款 USD*****695,979.00	
匯款人身份別: 國外 <input type="checkbox"/> 政府 <input type="checkbox"/> 公營事業機構 <input type="checkbox"/>			
匯款人: /027841101089001 ZHULI80YO CO LTD RM 03B-01 17/F RWO NG SANG HONG CTR 151-153 HOI SUN RD		匯率 Exchange Rate 29.950000 TWD*****00000000	折合新臺幣金額 NT Dollar Equivalent
匯款銀行: 		利息 Interest USD*****0.00	
付款銀行: CHASUS33 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.		匯費 匯電費 匯項手續費 費用總金額 USD*****10.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****10.00	
實付金額 NT\$ 本單總額付 TWD *****0 Net Proceeds 總匯付金額 TWD *****0 : ZERO 00/100 ONLY 本單提供兆豐商業銀行清算用 USD695979.00			

台端/貴公司之匯入款/支票款已結帳付訖, 特此通知。

Please note that your inward remittance/check have been settled and paid the details as above 經辦: 吳宜樞

櫃台交易

兆豐國際商業銀行	
內科科學園區分行	
台	手續費收入及稅收繳納
負責人	鄧世顯

申請人茲聲明已詳閱並充分明瞭本表及
 背面/銀行內人字號及法第八條第一項
 告知事項。The applicant hereby
 declares that he/she has carefully read and
 fully understood the "obligations to notify in
 accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of
 the Act" printed on the back of this
 declaration statement.

PX015 104.03 魚 宜 號

兆豐國際商業銀行
MEGA INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK匯入外匯水單及手續費收入收據
EXCHANGE INWARD REMITTANCE RECEIPT
☐ 匯入匯款買匯水單
☒ 匯入匯款交易憑證
☐ 匯入外匯交割

日期: 2020-05-29 14:52:45

幣別: USD

水單編號: 08C00052900012-0001

原契約書號碼:

匯入匯款編號: IBLC01500000125	匯款地區別: 臺灣	交易金額 Amount USD*****572,979.00	第一場: 客戶存查
收款人名稱: 中文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE C O L T D Payee 英文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD	外匯 匯款 來源 匯式	匯票 國外匯入 USD*****572,979.00	
Acct/Check No. 00023758002088 統一編號(UD No.) ATZ00219280			
匯款分類名稱及編號: 711 商仲貿易收入	匯款總額 USD*****572,980.00	匯方 存入外匯存款 USD*****572,979.00	
匯款人身分別: 國外 <input type="checkbox"/> 政府 <input type="checkbox"/> 公營事業 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 民間			
匯款人: /027841101089901 ZFOLLROYO CO LTD RM 038-01 17/F KND HQ SANG HONG CTR 151-163 HOI SHH RD	匯 Exchange Rate 20.050000	折合新臺幣金額 NT Dollar Equivalent TWD*****00	
匯款銀行: 	利息 Interest USD*****0.00		
轉帳銀行: CHASUS33 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.	匯費 收 郵電費 匯項手續費 匯用總金額	USD*****10.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****10.00	
實付金額 NTS 本單據解付 TWD*****0 Net Proceeds 糊解付金額 TWD*****0 ZRR0 00/100 ONLY			
本單據供兆豐商業銀行清算用 USD572979.00			

台端/貴公司之匯入款/支票等業已結付清楚, 明細如上。

Please note that your inward remittance/check have been settled and paid the details as above.

經辦: 吳宜禧

兆豐國際商業銀行	
行	卡坡坡坡坡坡坡坡坡
負責人	部 位 備

申請人茲聲明已詳閱並充分理解兆豐商業銀行
背面, 銀行個人資料保護政策第八條第一項
告知事項內容。The applicant hereby
declares that holder has carefully read and
fully understood the "obligations to notify in
accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of
the Act" printed on the back of this
declaration statement.

FXD15 104.03 版 宣統

兆豐國際商業銀行
MEGA INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK匯入外匯水單及手續費收入收據
EXCHANGE RECEIPT AND SERVICE CHARGE RECEIPT
☐ 匯入匯款買匯水單
☐ 匯入匯款交易憑證
☐ 逾期升匯交割

日期: 2020-05-29 14:50:10

幣別: USD

水單編號: 08C00052900011-0001

原起約定號碼:

匯入匯款帳號: 08C01S00000124	匯款地區類別: 台港	交易金額: USD*****575,979.00	第一聯: 客戶存查
收款人名稱: 中文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO. LTD. Payee 英文 SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD	匯款種類: 國外匯入	匯款金額: USD*****575,979.00	
Acct/check No. 00023758002088 統一編號(I/D No.) A1Z00219280	匯款來源: 匯款人	匯款日期: 20200529	
匯款分類名稱及編號: 711 商務貿易收入	匯款總額: USD*****575,980.00	匯款用途: 存入外匯存款	
匯款人身份別: 國外 <input type="checkbox"/> 政府 <input type="checkbox"/> 公營事業 <input type="checkbox"/> 民間	匯款幣別: USD	匯款日期: 20200529	
匯款人: /027841101089901 ZPHILROTO CO LTD RM 03B-01 17/F RM0 NO 'SAND HONG CTR 151-153 HOI HUN RD	匯率: 29.060000	新台幣金額: TWD*****00000000	
匯款銀行: [REDACTED]	利息: USD*****00.00	匯款手續費: USD*****10.00	
特匯銀行: CHASUS33 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.	匯款用途: 匯款人	匯款金額: USD*****10.00	
實付金額 NTS 本單匯解付 TWD*****00000000 Net Proceeds 匯解付金額 TWD*****00000000 ZERO '00/100' ONLY	匯款用途: 匯款人	匯款金額: USD*****10.00	
USD576979.00	匯款用途: 匯款人	匯款金額: USD*****10.00	

台帳/貴公司之匯入款/光票票款已結算付託, 明細如上

Please state that your inward remittance/check have been settled and paid the details as above.

兆豐國際商業銀行	
內閣科學園分行	
台	手續費收入印稅稅額
負責人	鄭世傑


申請人茲聲明已詳閱並充分理解本表內容, 銀行個人資料保護法第八條第一項各款內容。The applicant hereby declares that he/she has carefully read and fully understood the "obligations to notify in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Act" printed on the back of this declaration statement.

PX015 104.03 頁次

兆豐國際商業銀行
MEGA INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK匯入外匯水單及手續費收入收據
EXCHANGE MEMO AND CHARGE RECEIPT
兆豐金融集團分行(080)☐匯入匯款買匯水單
☒匯入匯款交易憑證
☐逾期外匯支票

日期: 2020-08-23 15:15:41

管別: USD 水單編號: OBC00062300009-0001 庫契約書號碼:

匯入匯款帳號: OBC01S00000178		匯款地區開別: 香港		交易金額: Amount USD*****141,329.00	
收款人名稱: 中文SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD Payee 英文SINO GLOBAL TRADE CO LTD		匯款種類: 外匯匯款 來方匯式		電匯 國外匯入 USD*****141,329.00	
Acct/check No. 00023758002088 統一編號(UD No.) 1200210280		匯款金額: USD*****141,339.00		存入外匯存款 USD*****141,329.00	
匯款分類名稱及編號: 711 商仲貿易收入		匯款人身份別: 國外 <input type="checkbox"/> 政府 <input type="checkbox"/> 公營事業 <input type="checkbox"/> 民間			
匯款人: /027841101089901 ZFULLBOTO CO LTD RM 03B-01 17/F KVO HQ SANG HONG CTR 151-153 HOI BUN RD		匯款日期: 29.500000		折合美金金額 NT Dollar Equivalent TWD*****0	
匯款銀行: 		利息: Interest USD*****0.00			
開帳銀行: CHASUS33 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.		匯費 郵電費 匯項手續費 費用總金額		USD*****10.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****0.00 USD*****10.00	
實付金額 NT\$ 本單據原付 TWD*****0 Net Proceeds 捌佰付金額 TWD*****0 ZKRO 00/100 ONLY					

本單據供兆豐商銀備算用
USD141329.00

台端/貴公司之匯入款/光票票款已結算付訖, 明細如上

Please note that your inward remittance/check have been settled and paid the details as above 辦: 吳宜德
櫃台交易

兆豐國際商業銀行	
內閣科學園區分行	
台	手續費收入印花稅貼紙
負責人	鄧世蘭

申請人茲聲明已詳閱並充分明瞭本水單
內容, 並向個人資料保護法第八條第一項
告知義務等。The applicant hereby
declares that he/she has carefully read and
fully understood the "obligations to notify in
accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of
the Act" printed on the back of this
declaration statement.

Annex 85b: China's response to Panel enquiry

China responded as follows to the Panel's letter:

“After investigation, China finds no involvement in DPRK-related activities or trade of refined petroleum products by the four Hong Kong companies mentioned in the Panel's letter. Relevant banks also find no possible DPRK-related transactions with the clues provided by the Panel. We have full reason to question the credibility of the information sources. It is not the first time for some individual countries to unilaterally take illegal actions based on lies and false evidence. We hope the Panel will be more discerning.”

Annex 86a: Panel enquiry to UAE (finance)



REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.61

14 April 2021

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2356 \(2017\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is investigating possible violations of, *inter alia*, paragraph 32 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 36 of resolution 2270 (2016), which prohibit the supply of financial services, directly or indirectly, that could contribute to DPRK sanctions evasion activities. The Panel has obtained information that suggests that “Grace Way General Trading LLC” and “Zeeshan Bashir Building Materials Trading LLC”—two Dubai-registered companies—facilitated payments at the behest of “Jiangxi Hailian Petrochemical Co., Ltd” (annex A) to “Golden Luxury Corp” in or around October 2018. The purpose of these transactions was for the purchase of petroleum products, which were ultimately delivered to the DPRK. In its efforts to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in supplying the following information:

- All corporate registration and beneficial ownership information for “Grace Way General Trading LLC” and “Zeeshan Bashir Building Materials LLC” (see annex B for company particulars);
- All financial accounts held by the aforementioned companies for the last five years; and
- All incoming and outgoing wire transfers for the last five years—to include sender/receiver details and wire transfer notes.

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

H.E. Mrs. Lana Zaki Nusseibeh
Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates
to the United Nations
New York, NY

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Please reply by email to the Panel at dppa-poe1874@un.org. Should you wish to discuss this request, or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel through [REDACTED]

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[REDACTED]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes:

- Annex A: Payment Instructions
- Annex 2: Company Particulars

Annex A: Payment Instructions

Figure 1. Payment instructions from “Jiang Xi Hai Lian” to “Golden Luxury Corp.”

江西海联石油化工有限公司

To: 金豪有限公司

本公司委请ZEESHAN BASHIR BUILDING MATERIALS TRADING LLC及
GRACE WAY GENERAL TRADING LLC两家公司代支付货款给贵公司,请知悉!

江西海联石油化工有限公司

10/19/2018



Figure 2. Wire Transfer receipt from “Grace Way” to Golden Luxury Corp.”

View Transaction Details - Telegraphic Transfer				
Transaction Date	20-Oct-2018			
Transaction Reference	GOODS			
System Reference	10063189			
Debit Account	3708290221602			
Account Name	GRACE WAY			
Special Instructions to the Bank				
Total Indicative Debit Amount	USD 455,000.00			
Charges	Beneficiary			

Beneficiary				
Sl No	Beneficiary	Pay Amount	Indicative Rate	Indicative Amount
1.	GOLDEN LUXURY CORP	USD 455,000.00	1	USD 455,000.00
	Beneficiary Address:	NO224 HE 1ST RD ZHONGZHENG DIST KEELUNG CITY202 TAIWAN		
	Beneficiary Bank:	DBS BANK LTD -		
	Account Number / IBAN:	00054686788		
	Bank Address:	TAIPEI 101 TOWER 28F - B: NO. 7 NA NA TAIWAN,,Taiwan		
	Payment Details:	PAYMENT FOR GARMENT		
	Transaction Type:			
	Payment Type:			
	Notify by Email:	yang265335@gmail.com		

Annex B: Company Particulars

Source: UAE National Economic Register (https://cbis.economy.gov.ae/Search_By_BN.aspx)

Name	Est. Date	Bus. License. Number (local)	Responsible Manager
Grace Way General Trading LLC*	16/10/2016	768115	Cai Zhi Yang
Zeeshan Bashir Building Materials Trading LLC	18/09/2018	814492	Zeeshan Bashir Ahmad
Ding Sheng General Trading LLC**	05/11/2014	720242	Yi Tong

* There is a second Dubai-based company with a similar name: "Grace Way Trading LLC" (BL 779761). The Panel does not believe that this company is involved in the aforementioned transactions.

** The Panel notes that Ding Sheng General Trading shares a phone number with Grace Way General Trading LLC.

Annex 86b: UAE Reply to the Panel's letter in connection with UAE entities linked to payments made to Golden Luxury Corp

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK



البعثة الدائمة
للإمارات العربية المتحدة
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Ref: 2021/1598

17 December 2021

[REDACTED]

Further to letter reference S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.61 (dated 14 April 2021) from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), I am pleased to share the following information on behalf of the concerned authorities in the United Arab Emirates:

Information on Grace Way Company General Trading LLC

x Commercial License No. 768 115; x

Activity license: General trading;

x Operated by Kai Zhiang, national of China, passport No. E12435700, as

Director of the company; x Bank transfers were observed from Dubai Islamic Bank account of Grace Way Company General Trading LLC to GOLDEN LUXURY CORP, valued at a total of AED 116 million distributed over 70 transfers in the past five years.

[REDACTED]

**Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)**

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
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NEW YORK



البعثة الدائمة
للإمارات العربية المتحدة
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Zeeshan Bashir Building Materials LLC

- x Commercial License No. 814492; x Activity license:
building materials trading;
- x Zeeshan Bashir Bashir, national of Pakistan, passport No. CJ3840062, as a manager;
- x Bank transfers were observed from the Emirates NBD Bank account belonging to the
Zeeshan Bashir Building Materials LLC to GOLDEN LUXURY CORP, valued at a
total of AED 329 million distributed over 205 transfers in the past five years.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.




Mohamed Abushahab
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex 87: The pathways of the impact of the international sanctions regime and the COVID-19 epidemic on the health system of the DPRK

The figure illustrates the tendency of commercialization of healthcare and growth of inequality in access to healthcare as the result of economic decline and other factors.

“Deepening marketization of healthcare practices without a supplementary social safety system seems to exacerbate the inequality of healthcare access between different socioeconomic groups in the DPRK, especially during the COVID pandemic crisis.”



Source :

<https://mailchi.mp/nautilus/napsnet-special-reportcovid-19-and-the-dprk-health-system-implications-for-an-inter-korean-biomedical-cluster-cooperation-and-ctr?e=cd46d00c05>

Annex 88: Some factors of UN sanctions' influence (S/2020/151, para. 209)

There can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations, although access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic factors within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the latest United Nations sanctions could exacerbate an already difficult situation in the country for those employed in sectors directly or indirectly affected by sanctions, as well as potentially disrupting supplies of necessities to the civilian population. The unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following:

- The disappearance of, or a decrease in, sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by United Nations sanctions and for repatriated overseas workers; this effect may be up to hundreds of millions of dollars, based on rough estimates.
- An increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, including the “new market economy”, in some cases channelling these resources to purposes other than the needs of the population.
- Continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization in agriculture, which can limit harvest windows and compound food insecurity caused by adverse environmental conditions and mismanagement of domestic resources.
- Increases in the disruption of medical supply chains, which can significantly impact the chronically underfunded and inadequate health-care system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
- The collapse of the United Nations banking channel and the subsequent lack of access to consistent and reliable financing jeopardizes supply chain operations and results in projects being suspended or stopped altogether. It has also created risky situations for humanitarian personnel.
- Financial institutions and private-sector entities continue to refrain from transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. Moreover, some financial institutions draw no distinction between United Nations and unilateral sanctions. This affects the humanitarian operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the United Nations and other organizations, to include increased costs.

Annex 89: Question of Panel's survey to NGOs

In its efforts to examine and report to the 1718 Committee and the Security Council on unintended humanitarian impacts of UN sanctions, the Panel would be grateful for your responses to the following questions:

- 1) What is your assessment of the impact of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK and how has that impact changed over time? What have been the effects of the restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic on the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have these restrictions influenced the overall humanitarian situation? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment;
- 2) Please provide detailed information and data on whether your organization experienced reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK and / or implementation of UN sanctions. Such impacts might include:
 - a) cost and speed of the response,
 - b) “operational” problems (i.e. access to beneficiaries and quality of assistance),
 - c) staffing and partnerships (i.e. in-country staff and implementing partners),
 - d) perceptions (i.e. how humanitarian organizations are perceived in the areas they operate),
 - e) Safety,
 - f) self-restraint and “de-risking”
- 3) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? The Panel notes that the Committee adopted amendments to the humanitarian exemption approval process in November 2020, including expedited consideration of certain requests. What, if anything, could be further improved in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?
- 4) Could you propose ways in which humanitarian and UN sanctions actors might enhance mutual understanding of each other's objectives and methodologies?

Annex 90: Statements from NGOs regarding UN sanctions

The following quotes have been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs.

NGO 1

“Sustained border closure has had a profound negative impact on the flow of supplies, which the DPRK population heavily relied on to supplement the government efforts.”

“an already weak health system has been further weakened due to lack of medicines, supplies and support, that would translate into higher risk for the already vulnerable population because of reduced country capacity in managing diseases/health issues”

“As part of emergency measures introduced against COVID-19 in DPRK, strict movement restrictions were applied. International staff as well as the government seconded national personnel in international agencies were confined to the capital and not allowed to leave Pyongyang.”

“...the prolonged sanctions has resulted in the country's health system remaining weak. The initiatives needed to strengthen and develop the health system were not taking place, as the focus to supporting health was only geared towards responding to emergencies and humanitarian crisis such as during floods and typhoons. As a result, the health sector lacks the resources to develop strategies that would have been able to prevent and mitigate shocks and emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic.”

“... as per UN sanctions applicable in DPRK, the lack of a banking channel has been severely impacting the availability of in-country cash to support operations and programme implementation. Overall, due to absence of international staff in the country (owing to the closure of borders due to COVID-19) and the lack of sufficient cash (owing to UN sanctions), [NGO] programme implementation and operational capacity has been severely impacted causing over 60% budget allocations to remain unutilized during the last two years.”

“the sanctions committee has been helpful in facilitating expeditious clearances with regard to COVID-19 related equipment and supplies.”

“[NGO] also appreciates the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months, (up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays related to a pandemic. This development is very helpful and welcome”.

NGO 2

“In the current situation of the country’s self-imposed border closure and self-imposed import restrictions, we deem that the UN sanctions currently do not have a major direct effect on the humanitarian situation.”

“...the humanitarian impact of the DPRK’s self-isolation because of COVID-19 is going to be severe and threatens to undo some of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health”

“The restricted movement of people is a concern especially for those requiring medical treatment, be it for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. The supply of medical equipment and drugs is another concern. None of the international humanitarian actors that used to support the country’s health system has been able to import and distribute any goods since June 2020. Schools have been closed for extended periods, leading to a lot of missed classes, and possibly also to children missing out on food hand-outs that are usually provided at schools.”

“The COVID-19 pandemic preventive measures taken by the DPRK Government have strongly affected the ability of the NGO, the UN system and other international actors to deliver humanitarian goods and assistance.”

“In some cases in the past, the approval process [for exemption] was lengthy and required a lot of information to be collected. However, there has been a significant improvement in the approval process for humanitarian exemptions in the course of the last 2 years. We are satisfied with the procedures, and highly appreciate the extension of the validity of the exemptions from six months to one year. We further appreciate the improvements to the exemption process made through Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7. We welcome the joint call to work together to sustainably resolve the banking channel. This matter has further increased in urgency, as cash-carry in the current situation is not a feasible option”.

NGO 3

“In addition to the above challenges (looming stock-out of [medicine] which has short shelf-life, the long transit time, the difficulty in communicating with the Government, the need for conducting additional quality assurance of the supplies prior to the distribution) the increased quarantine period to 90 days entails unexpected costs such as high fees for port storage, demurrage and additional freight and electricity expenditure while the reefer container remains in the vessel”

“Despite repeated requests ...to MFA counterparts, no indication has been received from DPRK authorities on whether additional exemption will be granted for the import of life-saving commodities. [NGO] has therefore decided to suspend any further procurement of supplies to the DPRK until a formal authorization is provided for future procurement. [NGO] had to either cancel most of its procurement in 2020 or re-allocate the supplies to others... to remain cost-effective and reduce demurrage and storage fees.”

NGO 4

“[NGO] receives little support from donor funded projects and maintains personnel and offices mainly at its own costs. The cash reserves in the country are largely used up, so that [NGO] might consider closing its operations completely until a reopening of the borders.”

“... humanitarian actions in DPRK must aim at strengthening the resilience of the food system to avoid crisis before their inception. Therefore, field support might combine humanitarian assistance but also developmental characteristics. However, the overall target remains to improve the diet, health and well-being of the most vulnerable groups which still suffer from malnourishment and short supply of WASH and health items.

An improvement would be an option to transfer money to DPRK to support the management of our activities and avoid costly travel”

NGO 5

“In light of the near complete border closure by DPRK related to covid prevention measures, any sanctions related challenges are essentially secondary (or moot) at this point since shipments of humanitarian goods are not yet being permitted by the DPRK government to transfer.”

NGO 6

“The access and communication barriers imposed by the COVID 19 situation as well as the lack of secondary data from other sources make impossible for (NGO) to propose an analysis of the humanitarian situation evolution in regards with the current pandemic.”

“[NGO]’s operational capacity has been decreasing from the moment DPRK decided to impose strict quarantine measure in January 2020,…”

“New rules imposed by DPRK in February 2020, which were:

- No international flights and no entry visa issuance (making impossible the supply of cash and the rotation of international staff)
- Strict limitation of humanitarian equipment and material imports
- No access to the field for expatriate teams

These additional restrictions made impossible for [NGO] to keep implementing its projects within acceptable quality and integrity standards, forcing the organization to suspend all its activities.”

“[NGO] however decided to maintain its Pyongyang office opened to avoid losing its capacities to redeploy and relaunch its project when it will be possible. It should be noted that this decision to maintain this limited presence is not without budgetary consequences... Indeed, certain support running costs must be maintained, but they are not fully eligible for our financial partners and [NGO] will not be able to pay these costs with its own funds if the situation continues over time. Moreover, considering the impossibility to send cash to DPRK in the absence of international staff movement, [NGO] has therefore been accumulating debts since the suspension of its operations. ...In terms of future operational capacity, the restart of [NGO]’s activities in the country will imply a mission revitalization period (restart the coordination with the KECCA; relaunch discussion for designation of national staff; clean up liabilities; sending back international staffs to the country; assessing the situation of each suspended projects and restart the contact with farms and partners; importing the material and equipment blocked at the border; etc.)”

“Even though the COVID 19 related restrictions on importations decided by DPRK are responsible for this situation, it has to be mentioned that (NGO) currently has materials and equipment ...blocked at the border since January 2020. (NGO) has no choice since then to request extension of the exemption granted for this purchase to ensure it is still valid when the border reopens.”

“Additional extension of projects will probably be needed, inducing costs that were not initially planned; [NGO] coordinating with its financial partners and will propose adjustments to its projects once the situation will have been reassessed.”

“Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated to humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [NGO] side to unblock the situation... Since the sanctions have come to force, a drop in the number of suppliers applying for the tenders [NGO] open in the frame of the procurement of goods and equipment. This decrease in the potential supplier diversity has a direct impact on prices competitively, goods and equipment quality.”

“The exemption process provoked some delays during the first months after its implementation since the different stakeholders (...customs, NGOs, UNSC) had to adapt to this new regulation... [NGO] would recommend the following actions:

- the extension of the 6-month validity period granted for each exemption..... The current restriction on imports linked to the COVID 19 situation is a good example of this constraint: as mentioned previously, [NGO] had to request extension of the exemption due to the fact that the goods and equipment covered by the granted exemption are still blocked at the border”
- It might be interesting to think about possible solutions regarding the supply of cash constraints due to financial sanctions.
- Strengthen the link with authorities to facilitate the customs clearance process
- Make fast tracks when it comes to 1) amendment justified in terms of quantity 2) renewal in the event of expiration”.

NGO 7

“...food shortages must have worsened after [NGO] departure from the country, when the population was already suffering from malnutrition especially in the countryside”.

“Concerning quarantine measure in DPRK

The closing of the country had important financial consequences for [NGO]. Whilst the projects’ activities as well as the HR costs are suspended, other running costs (office and guesthouse rent and maintenance, vehicle maintenance and insurance and salaries for KECCA liaison officer, driver and cleaning lady) continue to be borne monthly by [NGO]. These costs are not fully eligible for support by funding partners and [NGO] is not in a position to pay the entirety of these costs with its own funds. Thus [NGO] has accumulated major debts... which would eventually slow down [NGO] resumption of activities when the country’s borders reopen ...”

“The lack of contact with people inside the country precludes maintaining relationships with local partners, understanding their current situation, and beginning negotiations for the future”.

“International, European and national sanctions imposed on DPRK are entirely respected by [NGO]. On two different occasions however, the imposed...sanctions prevented the general functioning of the organization, thus hindering the implementation of all activities:

- [NGO] still owns a bank account with the FTB (Foreign Trade Bank). This account is no longer in use: no transactions are done to and/or from this account, but a small sum of money ...is still retained on it. This account is however kept open in the event that banking channels to DPRK would be re-authorized by the UNSC Sanctions Committee in the future.
- [NGO] has an insurance contract with KNIC, despite the company being blacklisted. Vehicle insurance being mandatory and KNIC being the only entitled insurance company in the country, ...

PROBLEMS

...additional administrative workload: the administrative work related to sanction compliance slightly increases the workload of project managers and the Country Director. The legal expertise required to understand the information involved in the sanction mechanisms and the absence of a direct channel for resident INGOs to communicate with the UNSC Sanctions Committee has, on some occasions, proven detrimental to other tasks and responsibilities

Major delays in the deliveries:.... These delays resulted in major impacts on project’s implementation (and on the population’s well-being), such as the suspension of the transportation of food to children institutions and the lack of vegetable intake by children due to the insufficiency of winter production because of the absence of the procured pipes to be used for the construction of greenhouses. All in all, these delays are estimated to have affected up to 30,000 to 45,000 beneficiaries, mostly children.”

“Reduction of the number of suppliers answering tenders: several major suppliers stopped submitting offers...”

“Delays on project implementation: each slight modification of technical specification must be notified to the UNSC SC, which appears to increase the planned duration of the action. As so, some activities have been delayed and no-cost extensions have been requested to donors for some projects due to the duration extension of the purchase procedures.”

“In order to further improve this mutual understanding (NGO) has two suggestions:

- The first suggestion concerns the interaction within the UN sanctions actors. July 2021 exchange meeting with the ..panel of experts from UNSC SC allowed us to better specify our needs and constraints. Such an initiative should be repeated regularly, especially when the borders are reopened.
- The second suggestion proposed by (NGO) concerns the communication regarding the UNSC SC resolutions against the DPRK. If the UNSC SC resolutions are amended or if new resolution passes, exchange workshops to introduce them and better integrate humanitarian specificities and exemption needs/processes would be an interesting development for mutual understanding between NGOs and UN sanctions actors.”

NGO 8

“The current situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains dire and has been exacerbated within the past two years by the COVID-19 pandemic. The country currently finds itself on the verge of an economic and humanitarian crisis, resulting from a variety of factors, including draconian COVID-related restrictions and a fragile food and nutrition situation. The DPRK is taking advantage of the pandemic to tighten controls and oppress the North Korean people. The DPRK continues to impose severe restrictions on basic freedoms to contain the spread of the virus.”

“...all of these three factors potentially preventing a great famine [market access, information flows, more freedom to farming] have been undermined. First, under the pretext of COVID prevention, the DPRK leadership has cracked down on markets and cross-border trade. Second, under the same pretext, the DPRK leadership has cracked down on information getting into and out of the country and applied harsh judicial and extra-judicial punishment to North Korean nationals involved in such information exchanges. Third, natural disasters (flooding) have negatively impacted agricultural output and implicitly the food security of North Koreans. Consequently, the likelihood of a humanitarian emergency erupting in the DPRK is higher now than it would have been pre-COVID.”

“the DPRK has imposed strict COVID-19 border control measures since January 2020, which are likely having a humanitarian and human rights impact on ordinary North Koreans, regardless of UN sanctions measures...”

“it is not currently possible to discern whether UN sanctions measures are also having an impact on the North Korean people, or whether there is a causal relationship between UN sanctions measures and the humanitarian situation on the ground in the DPRK...”

“Based on anecdotal information,[by a source in Dandong]..., [NGO] believes that North Koreans, already highly vulnerable to food insecurity, may be dying due to the precarious food situation in the DPRK.”

“We assess that this dire situation is likely attributable to the North Korean leadership’s policies, including strict border controls for almost two years, rather than the “unintended impact of sanctions measures.” If there is a causal relationship between sanctions and the precarious food situation, it remains to be verified and should be investigated through on-the-ground factfinding by the UN and humanitarian organizations, in cooperation with the DPRK.”

“...some perspective on whether UN sanctions measures may have an unintended impact. Generally, raw minerals are exported from the DPRK to the PRC. Processed products, such as construction materials or machinery, are purchased again at high prices from the PRC... Due to sanctions, it is highly probable that there are difficulties with importing essential materials for key industries... Simply put, the sanctions against the DPRK will result in a shortage of fuel, machinery, construction materials, and more. This shortage of essential materials for these key industries can deal a blow to the North Korean leadership. The North Korean leadership’s financial power will be reduced due to the sanctions against the DPRK, as is the intent, which will hurt the sustenance of the regime. In other words, sanctions against the DPRK are a serious problem for its leadership because they can have a significant impact and damage its sustenance.”

“...it is in the DPRK’s interest to have sanctions lifted, and Kim Jong-un is signaling this to the international community without taking responsibility for his policies that are causing the dire humanitarian situation. ... the overall economic situation in the DPRK is difficult enough for Kim Jong-un to publicly mention the ‘second March of suffering’ (or the ‘Arduous March’). Atypically, he did not hide the situation and disclosed the difficulties the country faces. The reason for this messaging—one that was intentionally provided to the international community—is to assert the necessity of lifting sanctions against the DPRK by arousing public opinion in the international community that the DPRK is in a serious humanitarian crisis and desperately needs help from the international community. In other words, it is up to the international community to choose whether to just watch the North Koreans die of starvation or lift sanctions against the DPRK. However, the status of the fundamental reason why sanctions are in place, i.e. the DPRK’s nuclear and missile program development, remains unchanged.”

“In fact, there are voices that advocate for the lifting of sanctions in general against the DPRK because of the humanitarian crisis in the DPRK. This exacerbates the idea that sanctions are hurting the North Korean people. However, that perspective often lacks a factual understanding of the situation, beginning with the goods that are not allowed to be exported or imported by the DPRK as previously discussed. This thinking also serves to promote politically motivated agendas to call for an easing or cessation of DPRK sanctions measures.”

“[NGO] recommends that:

...UN bring people from different sectors and disciplines together to tackle the complex issues of a humanitarian crisis in the DPRK, the DPRK’s obligations to its people and the international community, and the UN sanctions regime. Representatives from civil society organizations, including humanitarian aid organizations and human rights organizations, the banking sector, United Nations officials, medical professionals, and DPRK officials, if possible, should hold open discussions and share information and perspectives to enhance and promote understanding.

...Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK and representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [should]be allowed unimpeded access inside the DPRK... Their visits would be opportunities to assess the impact of COVID-19 on aspects focused on human security in general, including the nutritional and health insecurity of vulnerable groups in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such visits could serve as a precursor to conceptualizing and designing a comprehensive, sustainable, and inclusive approach to facilitate a more comprehensive dialogue, cognizant of the human security needs of the people of the DPRK, their human rights situation, and a United Nations Human Rights Up Front approach.

...To ask organizations requesting sanctions exemptions for additional, specific information on the intended locations of the disbursement of humanitarian aid as well as its beneficiaries. This would facilitate a better understanding for external monitoring of humanitarian aid and allow a more accurate determination as to whether the aid will be delivered in areas where the most vulnerable North Koreans reside.”

NGO 9

“...the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population would be difficult to gauge accurately, given the restricted access of international and non-governmental organizations and experts to the country.”

“... the unintended effects of sanctions on the work of international organizations and NGOs have been well documented (see UN and specialized agency reports and the information compiled by the National Committee on North Korea, <https://www.ncnk.org>.) Every effort should be made to resolve unnecessary restrictions on humanitarian relief to the civilian population.”

“...consideration of the sanctions issue would be well to be more broadly framed. The General Assembly resolution [A/C3/76/L.27]¹⁵³ calls on the United Nations system ‘as a whole’ to address the human rights situation in the country ‘in a coordinated and unified manner’... The government’s diversion of its resources to nuclear weapons and missiles at the expense of the needs and welfare of the civilian population are repeatedly raised by the General Assembly and Security Council. Although the DPRK has often put forward that sanctions are the main issue to be addressed by the international community, government-imposed restrictions, as noted above, on the civilian population in response to the covid-19 pandemic, and even earlier as a means to control and punish elements of the population, are also essential to examine. These restrictions directly impact food insecurity, severe hunger, malnutrition, widespread health problems and other hardship for the population as well as the human rights of the population”.

¹⁵³ <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/C.3/76/L.27>

NGO 10

“The current greatest concern in the DPRK is the economic decline, which includes food shortages from COVID-19 border closings. The DPRK economy was already in a vulnerable state due to sanctions, but now it is in a critical state.”

“It has been nearly impossible to transport goods inside the country, with there being only a few exceptions in the past two years. People have not been able to enter the DPRK since the borders were closed at the end of January 2020.”

“Recent information suggests that rice prices have doubled. A kilogram of rice used to cost 4 to 5 RMB, and currently it is 7.5 to 9.5 RMB per kilogram. Cooking oil is also 2 to 3 times higher in price. The central government is rationing food to ensure equal distribution throughout the country. Rice is rationed at 200 g per meal per person, which allows for a daily allotment of 600 g of rice per person. An individual is allowed to purchase 20 days’ worth of rice at a time, which totals to a 12 kg bag of rice.”

“Currently, food shortage is a primary concern. As long as the borders are closed, the nation’s economy will also continue to decline. In addition, fertilizer needs to be imported for the sufficient production of food. Unfortunately, in response to COVID, practically all imports and exports have been blocked due to border closings.”

“UN Sanctions have posed additional hurdles to providing humanitarian assistance to the people of DPRK. While we understand that the process of receiving UN sanctions exemptions has improved significantly, we have not been able to test it ourselves due to the lack of shipments since North Korea’s COVID-related border closure.”

“We believe that the pandemic has likely deteriorated the humanitarian situation inside the country. However, since we have not been able to visit the country since the end of 2019, and because of the limited flow of information from inside the country, it is difficult to provide examples or supporting data. Given the drastic decrease in food and other imports from China, coupled with a virtual cessation of all international assistance (provided by the UN and INGOs), not to mention the natural disasters that negatively impacted harvests, we can surmise that the people of North Korea are in increased need of food and medicines, especially the vulnerable populations.”

“Prior to the COVID pandemic, global sanctions had already aggravated the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. Please refer to the comprehensive report entitled, “The Human Costs and Gendered Impact of Sanctions on North Korea” published in October 2019, for details on the direct impact sanctions have had on the DPRK.”

“The amendments to the humanitarian exemption approval process in November 2020 were helpful. Unfortunately, apart from U.N. sanctions, the problem with U.S. sanction exemptions remains. The most difficult of these approvals is the U.S. Treasury License. In addition, approval for Special Validation Passports from the Department of State has been inconsistent. Therefore, even though the U.N. exemption process has improved, the problem with sanctions remains because organizations usually need to obtain U.S. licenses before even applying for a U.N. exemption.”

“The U.N. needs to create permanent exemptions for humanitarian organizations, including a “whitelist” for medical and agricultural equipment. This will make it unnecessary for humanitarian organizations to even apply for exemptions and allow them to adequately provide pandemic, medical, and agricultural relief to the DPRK. In the midst of not only a global pandemic but also a food security crisis, it is crucial that humanitarian aid is unhindered and received in a timely manner in the DPRK”.

NGO 11

“It could potentially be helpful to humanitarian actors for UN Sanctions actors to explain in more detail why certain commodities (for example 'metal goods', including clearly humanitarian items such as medical goods, agricultural goods, or clean water goods) are being sanctioned in such a blunt way, and without more nuance? Perhaps with dialogue between the two sides, there could be tighter targeting of UN sanctions to only affect the truly problematic dual use items, leaving the broader categories of goods needed for various humanitarian purposes greenlighted, and outside the bounds of required action by the UN Sanctions Committee ...”

NGO 12

“Obviously, the biggest issues were in 2017-2018 as [NGO] were trying to navigate both the new UN sanctions, and the new Treasury sanctions (which the UN is not concerned about) - but now the real snags and confusion caused by both of those issues (and the time it took to work out a "process" for review/approval of exemptions/licenses) have largely been resolved and/or the process made more clear with time. Yes, it has resulted in a lot more time-consuming work for [NGO], but the process is now doable, and somewhat more predictable.”

“...the approval process since 2019/2020 has been much more responsive to [NGO] needs. Other than providing a blanket exception (rather than requiring exemption applications) for certain approved humanitarian projects/organizations - which would be really helpful, the more nimble response by the Committee and their greater flexibility on granting extensions, etc. has been very helpful.”

NGO 13

“.. the absence of a banking channel allowing for the conveyance of operating funds by the international aid community into the DPRK has devastating implications for the neediest of its citizens.”

Annex 91: Information on humanitarian operations in 2021

WHO informed the Panel that “*Two shipments containing essential medicines for non-communicable diseases, tuberculosis and malaria prevention reached Nampo seaport respectively on 7 August 2021 and 2 September 2021 and are since then placed in a 90-days quarantine*”. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) informed that “the UNFPA’s refer container was loaded onto vessel on 01 September 2021.”

Annex 92: Additional information on export entries provided by Thailand

With regards to its trade between 2018-2020, Thailand previously informed the Panel that 12 export entries with the DPRK as the destination had been withdrawn.¹⁵⁴ During this reporting period, Thailand has provided subsequent information to the Panel regarding several export entries, which were withdrawn due to mistaken use of KR/KP country codes. The local companies involved, Inter Rim Company Limited, authorized by Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd. and EIC Semiconductor Co. Ltd., had been exporting its goods to the ROK, not the DRPK (see figures 92-1 and 92-2).

Figure 92-1: Inter Rim Company Limited / Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd.



¹⁵⁴ S/2021/777, para. 123 and annex 52.

**Additional Information to supplement the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1874 (2009)'s
midterm report on the work of the Panel of Experts (S/2021/777)**

The Royal Thai Government has received additional information on export entries as previously requested by the Panel from Inter Rim Company Limited and wishes to convey the following information:

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand received a letter with supporting documents from Inter Rim Company Limited, authorized by Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., dated 24 December 2021 explaining the withdrawal of two export entries, with regard to the shipments of goods mentioning the DPRK as reflected in the Panel's midterm report dated 8 September 2021.

2. As the midterm report mentioned the two misfiled export entries, Inter Rim Company Limited is concerned that the information may cause significant damage to the Company and its associates (Attachment 1). The Company has contacted the Department of Customs of Thailand to verify the cancellation of the two export entries and provided proof of evidence to support its case. (Attachments 2-3)

3. As mentioned in the midterm report, mistaken usage of country codes, in which the country code for the DPRK (KP) is entered wrongly in the place of the country code for the ROK (KR), the actual trade partner, is frequently cited as a problem. This is also the case for Thailand. Since Inter Rim Company Limited has shown its good faith and openly shared its concerns, it would be highly appreciated if the Panel could undertake actions that will reflect the aforementioned information at the earliest opportunity in order to avoid misunderstanding and unintended consequences for the Company concerned.

* * * * *

Attachment1 เอกสารแนบ 9



Mass Transport Express Co., Ltd.

วันที่ 24 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2564

เรื่อง การชี้แจงข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการส่งออกของกรมศุลกากร และยื่นร้องขอเพื่อลบข้อมูลออกจากระบบ
เรียน อธิบดีกรมองค์การระหว่างประเทศ
สิ่งที่ส่งมาด้วย

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| 1. หนังสือที่ กศ ๐๕๐๖/๒๕๖๔๔๔ เรื่อง การยกเลิกใบขนสินค้าขาออก กรณีตรวจพบการสำแดงประเทศปลายทางคลาดเคลื่อน ลงวันที่ 23 ธันวาคม 2564 | จำนวน 1 ฉบับ |
| 2. หนังสือจากคณะกรรมการความมั่นคงแห่งสหประชาชาติ ลงวันที่ 8 กันยายน 2564 | จำนวน 6 หน้า |
| 3. สำเนาใบขนสินค้าขาออกที่ถูกยกเลิกแล้ว เลขที่ A0121630309810 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 | จำนวน 1 ชุด |
| 4. สำเนาใบขนสินค้าขาออกที่ถูกยกเลิกแล้วเลขที่ A0231630405508 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 | จำนวน 1 ชุด |
| 5. สำเนาใบขนสินค้าขาออกที่จัดทำใหม่เลขที่ A0121630315425 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 | จำนวน 1 ชุด |
| 6. สำเนาใบขนสินค้าขาออกที่จัดทำใหม่เลขที่ A0231630407861 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 | จำนวน 1 ชุด |

ตามที่บริษัท อินเตอร์วิม จำกัดได้มอบอำนาจจากบริษัท พูจิสุระ อีเล็คทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด ในการดำเนินการพิธีการศุลกากรส่งออกสินค้า ตามใบขนฉบับเลขที่ A0121630309810 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 และฉบับเลขที่ A02316305508 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 ขณะทำการตรวจปล่อยกับศุลกากรได้ตรวจสอบพบว่า ได้ลงชื่อประเทศปลายทางคลาดเคลื่อนจากเกาหลีเหนือ (KP) ทั้ง 2 ฉบับ ซึ่งประเทศปลายทางที่ถูกต้องคือประเทศ เกาหลีใต้ (KR) บริษัทจึงได้ยื่นคำร้องขอยกเลิกใบขนสินค้าขาออกทั้ง 2 ฉบับ และเจ้าหน้าที่กรมศุลกากรได้ทำการยกเลิกใบขนสินค้าทั้ง 2 ฉบับหลังจากนั้นได้ดำเนินการจัดทำใบขนสินค้าฉบับใหม่ ได้แก่ ใบขนสินค้า A0121630315425 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 และ ใบขนสินค้า เลขที่ A0231630407861 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 และดำเนินการส่งออกสินค้าไปยังประเทศเกาหลีใต้เป็นที่เรียบร้อยแล้ว สถานะใบขนสินค้าเป็น 0409 ทั้ง 2 ฉบับ

หลังจากการส่งออกแล้วเสร็จสมบูรณ์ บริษัทได้ตรวจสอบเอกสารความมั่นคงแห่งสหประชาชาติ ลงวันที่ 8 กันยายน 2564 ปรากฏว่ามีปัญหามากมาย ระบุเลขที่ใบขน A0121630309810 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 และฉบับเลขที่ A02316305508 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 และ ชื่อผู้ส่งออกบริษัท พูจิสุระ อีเล็คทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัดเป็นผู้ส่งสินค้าออกไปยังประเทศเกาหลีเหนือ ซึ่งตามข้อเท็จจริงแล้ว บริษัทฯ มีได้ส่งของดังกล่าวไปยังประเทศเกาหลีใต้ จึงได้มีการชี้แจงความอนุเคราะห์ไปยังกรมศุลกากร เพื่อขอให้ตรวจสอบการส่งออกของใบขนทั้ง 2 ฉบับ ซึ่งกรมศุลกากรจึงได้มีหนังสือแจ้งกลับมาถึงบริษัทตามหนังสือที่ กศ ๐๕๐๖/๒๕๖๔๔๔ เรื่อง การยกเลิกใบขนสินค้าขาออก กรณีตรวจพบการสำแดงประเทศปลายทางคลาดเคลื่อน ลงวันที่ 23 ธันวาคม 2564 ซึ่งได้แจ้งถึงบริษัททราบว่า ใบขนทั้ง 2 ฉบับนี้ได้ถูกยกเลิกเป็นที่เรียบร้อยแล้ว และได้ส่งออกที่ถูกต้องตามใบขนเลขที่ A0121630315425 ลงวันที่ 12-03-2563 และ ใบขนสินค้า เลขที่ A0231630407861 ลงวันที่ 23-04-2563 ประเทศปลายทางคือประเทศเกาหลีใต้

ตามรายละเอียดดังกล่าวข้างต้น บริษัทมีความประสงค์ ที่จะให้ขอความอนุเคราะห์จากกระทรวงต่างประเทศในการประสานงานกับคณะกรรมการความมั่นคงแห่งสหประชาชาติ เพื่อลบข้อมูลดังกล่าวออกจากระบบให้แก่ทางบริษัทด้วย ทั้งนี้เพื่อลดปัญหาและอุปสรรคในทางการค้าและทางธุรกิจที่มีผลกระทบต่อบริษัท พูจิสุระ อีเล็คทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด

จึงเรียนมาเพื่อโปรดพิจารณา ขอความอนุเคราะห์ในครั้งนี้

ขอแสดงความนับถือ

(พระยาศรี จอมพลตรี พลเรือเอก)

กรรมการผู้จัดการ



December 24, 2021

Subject: Clarification of information about the export of the Customs Department and submit the request to delete the information from the UN system

Dear Director-General, International Organization

Attachment:

1. Books at Kor. 0506/21699 Referring to the cancellation of outgoing goods In case of manifestation, the destination country is moved on December 23, 2021, 1 issue.
2. Copy of the book from the United Nations Security Council dated 8 September 2021, 6 pages
3. The copy of the output product at the Customs Department has already been canceled No.012163039810 dated 12-03-2563 1 set and A0231630405508 dated 23-04-2563 1 set
4. Copy of the new outbound goods that produce the number. A0121630315425 dated 12-03-2563 and A0231630407861 dated 23-04-2563 1 set

According to Inter Rim Company Limited, authorized by Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd. has operated the export customs clearance. According to the leaves A0121630309810 dated 12-03-2563 and A02316305508 Dated 23-04-2563 while checking the product with the customs authorities Check the destination country in both product leaves in the form of 2 cases. Accurate, the destination country must be South Korea (KR), therefore filed a request for cancellation of both products and the customs clearance. Output product A0121630315425 Dated 12-03-2563 and A0231630407861 dated 23-04-2563 and export products to South Korea until complete completion the status of the shape of the product in the customs system appears. The status is 0409 (has already exported the product to foreign countries).

After the delivery of goods to South Korea is complete The Company has examined the Era of the United Nations Security Council dated 8 September 2021. Get a system number that has been canceled in the system of the customs system. Both 2 are A01216303810 and A02316305508. The sender name is Fuji Kura Electronic (Thailand) Co., Ltd. is the sender of North Korea. Which according to the facts did not deliver such products to North Korea in any way In order to obtain accuracy in such cases, the company therefore has a letter requesting courtesy to the Director-General of the Customs Department. In order to check the export of the product of the two outbound products that have the correct facts The Director of the Director of the Customs Department has a notification of the audit results back to Fujikura Electronic (Thailand) Co., Ltd. according to the books at Kor. 0506/21699 on the cancellation of the outbound product. In case of detecting the arrangement of the destination country, the error dated 23 December 2021, in the notice that 2nd output products, No.012163039810 and A0231630405508 That shows the destination country as North Korea has been the Customs Conduction of exports And have a new export To South Korea According to the output product leaf A0121630315425 dated 13-03-2563 and A0231630407861 dated 23-04-2563

According to the details mentioned above, Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd. wishes to ask for help from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate with the United Nations Security Council. To delete the output data that appears in the account at the United Nations Security Council, the issue of the issue of September 8, 2021, to the company. In order to reduce the problem and obstacles in the trade and business that affects Fujikura Electronic (Thailand) Co., Ltd.

Please be informed accordingly. Ask for help this time.

Sincerely

A solid black rectangular box used to redact the signature of the managing director.

Managing director

เอกสารแนบ ๒

Attachment 2



ที่ กค ๐๕๐๖/๒๐๖๔

กรมศุลกากร
๑ ถนนสุนทรโกษา คลองเตย
กรุงเทพมหานคร ๑๐๑๑๐

๒๓ ธันวาคม ๒๕๖๔

เรื่อง การยกเลิกใบขนสินค้าขาออก กรณีตรวจพบการสำแดงประเทศปลายทางคลาดเคลื่อน
เรียน กรรมการผู้จัดการบริษัท พูจิสุระ อีเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด

อ้างถึง หนังสือบริษัทพูจิสุระ อีเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด ลงวันที่ ๙ ธันวาคม ๒๕๖๔

ตามหนังสือที่อ้างถึง บริษัท พูจิสุระ อีเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด ขอความอนุเคราะห์
กรมศุลกากรในการตรวจสอบใบขนสินค้าขาออกเลขที่ A๐๑๒๑๖๓๐๓๐๔๘๓๐ และ A๐๒๓๑๖๓๐๔๐๕๕๐๘
เพื่อทางบริษัทฯ จะได้นำข้อมูลไปชี้แจงต่อคณะกรรมการความมั่นคงแห่งสหประชาชาติต่อไป นั้น

กรมศุลกากร โดยสำนักงานศุลกากรตรวจสินค้าทำอากาศยานสุวรรณภูมิ ส่วนบริการศุลกากร ๒
ฝ่ายบริการศุลกากรที่ ๒ ขอเรียนว่าใบขนสินค้าขาออก A๐๑๒๑๖๓๐๓๐๔๘๓๐ และ A๐๒๓๑๖๓๐๔๐๕๕๐๘
ได้ดำเนินการยกเลิกการส่งออก และสินค้าดังกล่าวได้มีการส่งออกเรียบร้อยแล้วตามใบขนสินค้าขาออกเลขที่
A๐๑๒๑๖๓๐๓๐๔๘๓๐ และ A๐๒๓๑๖๓๐๔๐๕๕๐๘ ตามลำดับ

จึงเรียนมาเพื่อทราบ

ขอแสดงความนับถือ



ผู้อำนวยการสำนักงานศุลกากรตรวจสินค้าทำอากาศยานสุวรรณภูมิ ปฏิบัติราชการแทน
อธิบดีกรมศุลกากร

สำนักงานศุลกากรตรวจสินค้าทำอากาศยานสุวรรณภูมิ
โทรศัพท์ ๐ ๒๑๓๔ ๐๖๔๘

At. Kor Kor. 0506/21699

December 23rd, 2021


Subject the cancellation of the export declaration In case of declaration of destination
country inaccurate
To Managing Director of Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Reference Fujikura Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd. letter dated on December 9th, 2021.

Reference Fujikura letter to request for reconfirmation of No. A0121630309810 and A0231630405508 in order for Fujikura to use this confirmation to explain to the United Nations Security Council.

Thai customs at Bangkok airport (service unit 2) would like to confirm that export entries A0121630309810 and A0231630405508 had been cancel from export. The cargo had been exported successfully under export entries A121630315425 and A0231630407861 instead.

Please be informed accordingly.

Best regards


Director of the Customs Bureau Suvarnabhumi Airport Acting on behalf of the Director-General
of the Customs Department



[illegible]

A012 1630309810

0/50. 10 1/1

AD121630309810 M06-1210320 12-Mar-2020

06-120120 06/12/21 14:32 NOEN910A

เลขที่ใบขน AD121630309810		กศท. 101/1 แผ่นที่ 2
คำขอผู้ส่งของ Inspection Request No Assessment Request No Cargo Packing Type 9 - Other cargo types	บันทึกการตรวจหาสารเสพติด	
บันทึกการร้องเรียนและปราบปราม	บันทึกการประเมินอากร	
บันทึกการนำส่ง	บันทึกการวิเคราะห์สินค้า	
บันทึกการตรวจ	บันทึกการปล่อย	
บันทึกการรับบรรจุ AWB. No. 1. 98829034234 / PLITH2B00770 Vessel / Voyage OZ744 Release / Load 1191 12-03-2563 16:54:26 /		
		
		
STATUS=0301 12-03-2563 16:54:26 ขอรับรองว่าข้อมูลถูกต้องได้รับรองการบรรจุและ ส่งออกสำเนาตามระเบียบพิธีการศุลกากรในรูปแบบ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์แล้ว (ชื่อผู้ส่งของออก / ผู้รับมอบ) MR.HIDEKI TOMITA TR4672922 วันที่ขึ้น 12-03-2563		

ใบกำกับการขนถ่ายสินค้าทางอากาศยาน

A012 1630309810

หมายเลขอ้างอิง..... DNVY000002972		เลขที่..... 			
ข้าพเจ้า..... บริษัท พูจิกระ จีเส็กพรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด		เลขที่ประจำตัวผู้เสียภาษีอากร..... 0135553004429			
ที่อยู่..... เลขที่ 1/80 สวนอุตสาหกรรมโรจนะ หมู่ที่ 5 ถนนโรจนะ ความงาม อุดมัย พระนครศรีอยุธยา 13210					
เพื่อส่งมอบให้แก่..... 1190-สนามบินสุวรรณภูมิ		e-Seal			
เที่ยวบิน	วันที่อากาศยานออก	เลขที่ใบตราส่ง (Airway Bill No)	คลังสินค้าที่ส่งมอบ	จำนวนหน่วยรวมหน่วย	น้ำหนักรวมหน่วย
OZ744	14-03-2563	Master 88826034234  House PLTH2800770 	1191 TG	12 CT	59.320 KGM
Job code M06-12/03/20 (ผู้ส่งของออกให้เฉพาะ) บริษัท พูจิกระ จีเส็กพรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด วันเดือนปีที่ขึ้นเอกสาร..... 06-12-2564 14:32:34			ช่องบันทึกเจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร <input type="checkbox"/> ตัดบัญชีใบกำกับฯ (Green Line) <input type="checkbox"/> ตรวจสอบพัสดุสินค้า (Red Line) (เจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร)..... วันเดือนปีรับตรา.....		
หมายเหตุ การแจ้งจำนวนหน่วยต่อ ผู้ที่ลงลายมือชื่อกับการลงบันทึกใบรับรองว่าข้อมูลที่เป็นความจริง หากไม่ถูกต้อง ผู้ที่เกี่ยวข้องขอรับเป็นความผิดตามกฎหมาย Invoice no. RGA1721 12/03/20					



ฉีก




[illegible]



A0231630405508_M05-22/04/20_23-Apr-2020

ไบชนสินค้ำชาออก

A023 1630405508

REV. 10/91

ผู้ส่งออก (ชื่อ) (ในวงเล็บ) เลขประจำตัวผู้เสียภาษี 0135553004429		สำเนาเอกสาร 000000		ประเภทสินค้า DNYV000003424		เลขที่ใบขนสินค้า A0231630405508	
FUJIKURA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) LTD. บริษัท ฟุจิคุระ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด เลขที่ 1/80 ซอยสุขุมวิทซอยใหม่ หมู่ที่ 5 ถนนสุขุมวิท คลองเตย กรุงเทพฯ 10110				ใบอนุญาตนำเข้า เลขที่ 23-04-2563 12:08:48 DECLARATION ACCEPTED 23-04-2563 13:41:01 Goods Transition Control Already Checked กรมศุลกากรท่าอากาศยานดอนเมือง			
ข้อมูลการนำเข้า (กรณีนำเข้า) หมายเลขใบขนสินค้า: 1100700973157							
ข้อมูลการนำเข้า (กรณีนำเข้า) หมายเลขใบขนสินค้า: 1100700973157							
USD B.B. : วันที่				วันที่นำเข้า		ค่าภาษีอากร (บาท)	
				0.00		0.00	
ชื่อผู้นำเข้า OZT42				วันที่ส่งมอบ 24-04-2563		เลขที่การนำเข้าจากประเทศ KOREA DPR	
ข้อมูลการนำเข้า KEIJO BIN				จำนวนกล่องรวม 1100		จำนวนกล่องรวม 1100	
จำนวนกล่องรวม (เก้ากล่อง) 9 Cartons (NINE CARTONS ONLY)				อัตราแลกเปลี่ยน 1 USD = 32.4030 THB			
รายละเอียดการนำเข้า LG DISPLAY MONITOR MADE IN THAILAND CARTON 14 NET WEIGHT 14.00 KG GROSS WEIGHT 42.56 KG				จำนวนกล่องรวม 9 Cartons			
1 FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD RQP-14SS-0A สำหรับใช้กับเครื่องคอมพิวเตอร์โน้ตบุ๊ก				น้ำหนักสุทธิ 14.000 KGM ปริมาณ 8,000.000 C62 จำนวนชิ้น 9 PARTS 003 50001 รหัสสินค้า 85340680 000 / KGM			
				ราคา FOB (บาท) USD 813.29 ราคา FOB (บาท) THB 26,353.04 ราคาประเมินมูลค่า 0.00			
				For THB 767.56			
							
STATUS=0301 2020-04-23T13:41:01				Total G.W.: Total QTY.: Total For THB 767.56		Total N.W.: Total Inv. QTY.: Total For THB 767.56	
				USD 813.29 THB 26,353.04		0.00	
						0.00	

เลขที่ใบขน A0231630405508		กศก. 101/1
สำเนาผู้ส่งของ Inspection Request No Assessment Request No Cargo Packing Type 9 - Other cargo types		วันที่ 2
บันทึกการร้องเรียนและปริมาณ	บันทึกการประเมินสาร	
บันทึกการนำส่ง	บันทึกการวิเคราะห์สินค้า	
บันทึกการตรวจ	บันทึกการปล่อย	
บันทึกการรับบรรจุ AWB. No. 1. 98831355575 / PLITH2901102 Vessel / Voyage OZ742 Release / Load 1191 23-04-2563 13:41:01 /		
		
		
STATUS=0301 23-04-2563 13:41:01 ขอรับรองว่าข้อมูลถูกต้องได้รับรองการบรรจุและ (ชื่อผู้ส่งของ/ผู้รับมอบ) MR.HIDEKI TOMITA ส่งออกสำเนาตามระเบียบพิธีการศุลกากรในรูปแบบ TR4672922 บันทึกเลขที่สินค้า วันที่ขึ้น 23-04-2563		

ใบกำกับการขนส่งสินค้าทางอากาศยาน

A023 1630405508

หมายเลขอ้างอิง..... DNVY000003424		เลขที่..... 			
ผู้ขาย..... บริษัท พรีซูร์ อีเล็คทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด		เลขที่ประจำตัวผู้เสียภาษี..... 0135553004429			
ที่อยู่..... เลขที่ 1/80 ถนนอุตสาหกรรมโรจนะ หมู่ที่ 5 ถนนโรจนะ ตำบลสาม อรัญย์ ครอบคลุมหรือขยาย 13210					
เครื่องออกอากาศ..... 1190-สถานีวิทยุสมัครวิทยุ		Q-Sigal			
เที่ยวบิน	วันที่ออกอากาศ ออก	เลขที่ใบตราส่ง (Airway Bill No)	คลังสินค้า ที่ส่งออก	จำนวนปีก รวมหน่วย	น้ำหนักรวม หีบ หน่วย
OZ742	24-04-2563	Master 98831355575  House PLTH2B01102 	1191 TG	9 CT	42.590 KGM
Job code M05-22/04/20 บริษัท พรีซูร์ อีเล็คทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด (ผู้ส่งของออก/หัวหน้า) วันที่ขึ้นปีที่ขึ้นเอกสาร..... 06-12-2564 14:34:19			ช่องบันทึกเจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร <input type="checkbox"/> ตัดบัญชีใบกำกับฯ (Green Line) <input type="checkbox"/> ตรวจสอบข้อมูลสินค้า (Red Line) (เจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร)..... กับเงื่อนไขการค้า.....		
หมายเหตุ การแก้ไขจำนวนสินค้า ผู้ที่ลงลายมือชื่อกับการแก้ไขเป็นผู้รับรองว่าข้อมูล นี้เป็นความจริง หากไม่ถูกต้อง ผู้ที่แก้ไขจะต้องรับผิดชอบต่อความผิดตามกฎหมาย Invoice no. RGA2847 22/04/20					



ฉีก

សំណុំរឿង ១០២/១
ទំព័រទី ១២

22-01569

ใบกำกับการขนส่งสินค้าทางอากาศยาน

A012 1630315425

หมายเลขอ้างอิง..... DNVYD00002985		เลขที่..... 			
ข้าพเจ้า บริษัท พิวเจอร์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด		เลขที่ประจำตัวผู้เสียภาษีอากร 013553004429			
ที่อยู่ เลขที่ 1/80 สวนอุตสาหกรรมโรจนะ หมู่ที่ 5 ถนนโรจนะ ตำบลนาหมื่น อำเภอรอบเมือง พะเยา 13210					
จัดส่งเอกสารที่ 1199-สนามบินสุวรรณภูมิ		e-Sale			
เที่ยวบิน	วันที่ออกอากาศ	เลขที่ใบตราส่ง (Airway Bill No)	คลังสินค้า	จำนวนใบต่อ	น้ำหนักรวมหีบ
02744	14-03-2563	Master 98826034234  House PLTH2800770 	1191 TG	12 CT	59.320 KGM
Job code M06-12/03/20 (ผู้ส่งของออกหัวแทน) บริษัท พิวเจอร์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด วันที่ออกใบที่ขนส่งเอกสาร 06-12-2564 14:34:43 หมายเหตุ การแก้ไขจำนวนใบต่อ ผู้จัดส่งสายมีชื่อเกี่ยวกับการแก้ไขเป็นผู้รับรองว่าข้อมูล แก้ไขเป็นความจริง หากไม่ถูกต้อง ผู้ที่แก้ไขต้องยอมรับเป็นความผิดตามกฎหมาย Invoice no. RGA1721 12/03/20			ช่องบันทึกเจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร <input type="checkbox"/> ตัดบัญชีใบกำกับฯ (Green Line) <input type="checkbox"/> ตรวจจ่ายปล่อยสินค้า (Red Line) (เจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร)..... วันที่ขึ้นภาษีอากร.....		



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ใบกำกับการขนส่งสินค้าทางอากาศยาน A023 1630407861

หมายเลขอ้างอิง DNVY000003439		เลขที่ 			
ผู้รับจ้าง บริษัท พูจิเอร์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด		เลขที่ประจำตัวผู้เสียภาษีอากร 0135553004429			
ที่อยู่ เลขที่ 1/80 สวนอุตสาหกรรมโรจนะ หมู่ที่ 5 ถนนโรจนะ ตำบลสามชัย พระนครศรีอยุธยา 13210					
เพื่อส่งมอบแก่ 1190-สนามบินสุวรรณภูมิ e-Seal					
เที่ยวบิน	วันที่ออกเดินทาง	เลขที่ใบตราส่ง (Airway Bill No)	คลังสินค้า ที่ส่งมอบ	จำนวนใบปะ รวม/หน่วย	น้ำหนักรวม หน่วย
OZ742	23-04-2563	Master 98831365675  House PLTH2801102 	1181 TG	9 CT	42.500 KGM
Job code M06-23/04/20 (ผู้ส่งของขอรับทราบ) บริษัท พูจิเอร์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (ประเทศไทย) จำกัด วันที่ขึ้นเอกสาร 06-12-2564 14:35:05			ช่องบันทึกเจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร <input type="checkbox"/> ตัดบัญชีใบกำกับฯ (Green Line) <input type="checkbox"/> ตรวจสอบข้อมูลสินค้า (Red Line) (เจ้าหน้าที่ศุลกากร) วันที่ขึ้นมีอา		
หมายเหตุ การเปิดจำนวนสินค้า ผู้ที่ลงลายมือชื่อเกี่ยวกับการแก้ไขเป็นผู้รับรองว่าข้อมูล เป็นความจริง หากไม่ถูกต้อง ผู้ที่เกี่ยวข้องจะมีความผิดตามกฎหมาย Invoice no. RGA2847 22/04/20					


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Figure 92-2: EIC Semiconductor Co. Ltd.

URGENT

No. 56101/33



PERMANENT MISSION OF THAILAND
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
138 EAST 39TH ST., NEW YORK, NY 10016

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the former's Note No. 56101/26 dated 13 January B.E. 2565 (2022) transmitting additional information on export entries, which appear in Annex 52 of the midterm report on the work of the Panel of Experts (S/2021/777), has the honour to enclose herewith Thailand's further response to the midterm report, in particular paragraph 123 and Annex 52 of the said report.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand wishes to underscore the urgency of the request contained in paragraph 3 of the attached response, and request the Panel of Experts to inform the Permanent Mission on actions it intends to take with a view to addressing Thailand's concerns as expressed in the attached response and the aforementioned Note at the earliest opportunity.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations,

21 January B.E. 2565 (2022)



Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
NEW YORK.

Thailand's Response to the Panel's Midterm Report dated 8 September 2021

Thailand wishes to provide additional information and emphasize the following points with regard to the Panel's midterm report dated 8 September 2021:

1. Similar to the case mentioned in the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations' Note no. 56101/26 dated 13 January B.E. 2565 (2022), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand received a letter from EIC Semiconductor Co. Ltd., whose name also appears in Annex 52 of the midterm report, explaining their action regarding the misfiled export entry and providing documents to support their case.

2. Thailand expresses its deep concern over the choice of language used in paragraph 123 of the report referring to export to the DPRK. Upon the request of the PoE, Thailand has shared, in good faith, all necessary information to reflect transparency. However, the language used in the report appears to create a misleading impression that the companies had an intention to engage in export of prohibited items to the DPRK, which was NOT the case. The report has evidently caused significant damage to the companies mentioned in Annex 52 and their associates.

3. As mentioned in paragraph 117 of the midterm report, mistaken usage of country codes, in which the country code for the DPRK (KP) is entered wrongly in the place of the country code for the ROK (KR), the intended trade partner, is frequently cited as a problem. This is also the case for Thailand. According to the information from the Department of Customs, out of 12 export entries, 8 are confirmed to be misfiled and the entries have been corrected, with the goods subsequently exported to the ROK, their intended destination. The other 4 entries were withdrawn, with goods returned. There were no traces or records of attempted export to the DPRK and there were no trade transactions between Thailand and the DPRK between January - September 2021.

In order to avoid misunderstanding and unintended consequences for the companies concerned, Thailand requests the Panel to reflect the aforementioned information at the earliest opportunity.

4. Thailand fully supports the Panel's recommendation that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) look into possible measures to prevent erroneous usage of country codes for the DPRK (KP) and the ROK (KR).

* * * * *

Annex 93: Consolidated list of recommendations

Procurement of illicit WMD-related choke-point commodities

1. The Panel recommends the designation of the following individual for his role in and support for the country's prohibited programme:
 - Mr. O Yong Ho, currently based in Moscow as a DPRK diplomat, is involved in procuring items connected to DPRK's ballistic missile programme through his support to the UN-designated "Second Academy of Natural Sciences" (SANS) (aka "Academy of National Defence Science" (ANDS)).

Maritimes

To Member States:

On vessel Identity laundering and AIS manipulation

2. The Panel recommends that Member States and ship registries add to their ship circulars information pertaining to detected cases of vessel identity laundering or tampering, and ensure wide dissemination, including to maritime authorities. Such information would include:
 - Identifiers of ships in their registry that have transmitted cover identities;
 - Identifiers of ships in their registry that may have had their identifiers exploited by other vessels;
 - Names of ship registrants whose vessels have transmitted fraudulent identifiers.
3. The Panel recommends that flag States and their recognized organizations keep verified records and up-to-date time-stamped photographs of vessels they certify and flag, including for submission to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at regular intervals. These recorded images would include:
 - All permanent markings of the ship's name and IMO number;
 - Photographs of the ship at various angles;
 - Photographs of the ship's engine, including its engine number.
4. The Panel recommends that the IMO consider the review of hardware and software security standards for preventing the tampering of AIS transponders.
5. The Panel recommends that the IMO urge all flag States to ensure that the requirements for the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) are complied with, including, for such information to be updated accordingly on the IMO GISIS website.

On vessel onward sale

6. The Panel recommends that sellers check that vessel sale information is reflected on the IMO GISIS website on a timely basis.

7. The Panel recommends that shipowners and managers undertake on-going in-house reviews on sanctions compliance programs with the requisite training and resources.

On oil supply chain and free-on-board practice

8. The Panel reiterates that commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the free-on-board market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes effective end-use delivery verification.
9. The Panel recommends that commodity trading companies, tanker fleets and segments of the affected free-on-board markets should review the AIS history and any known use of fraudulent identities of all vessels that they intend to supply or receive products/commodities banned under the resolutions.
10. The Panel recommends that financial institutions include AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments issued to commodity traders involved in the oil and petroleum products industry in the affected areas.
11. The Panel recommends that financial institutions involved in commodity trading in affected areas expand transaction monitoring programs to incorporate AIS screening for both client and counterparty vessels.

On enhanced due diligence and data-sharing

12. The Panel recommends that flag States possess the requisite tools available to identify and investigate suspected fraudulent use of MMSIs where it is detected and share the results of its investigation with other maritime authorities, including with the Panel.
13. The Panel recommends that the IMO GISIS include information to indicate whether a vessel's flag registration is provisional or permanent as well as the effective date range.
14. The Panel recommends that ship owners, charterers and operators continue to enhance 'know-your-customer' and 'know-your-counterparty's-vessel' due diligence with regards ship-to-ship transfers. During the transfers, time-stamped photographs, including verifiable ship identifiers and associated transmitted AIS profiles, financial transaction records and other relevant crew details are recorded for compliance purposes, and to be shared with law enforcement and the Panel of Experts where necessary.

To the Committee:

15. The Panel reiterates its recommendations of the following vessel for further designation under paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) and recommends the vessel for designation under paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017):
 - UN HUNG (fka VIFINE) (IMO: 9045962), DPRK-flagged.
16. The Panel recalls its previous recommendations of the following vessels for designation under paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) and further recommends their designation under paragraphs 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) and 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
 - DIAMOND 8 (IMO: 9132612), unknown-flagged
 - NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387), unknown-flagged
 - SUBBLIC (IMO: 8126082), unknown-flagged
 - XING MING YANG 888 (IMO: 8410847), unknown-flagged.
17. The Panel recommends the following vessel for designation under paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) and for designation under paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017):
 - SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430).
18. The Panel reiterates its recommendation of the following vessel for further designation under paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
 - PHO PHYONG (IMO: 8417962), DPRK-flagged.
19. The Panel reiterates its recommendations of the following vessels for further designation under paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) and for their designation under paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017):
 - TO MYONG, (fka RI HONG / KLAUSEN) (IMO: 9162318), DPRK-flagged
 - TAE P(H)YONG 2 (fka MING ZHOU 6) (IMO: 8602763), DPRK-flagged.

Trade and Customs

20. The Panel recommends appropriate measures to be taken by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to prevent erroneous usage of country codes for DPRK and ROK (KP and KR respectively).
21. The Panel recommends that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the informal list of prohibited commodities.
22. The Panel recommends that Customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list for information of their jurisdictions' trading agents for due diligence purposes, particularly when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions.

Implementation of Luxury Goods Ban

- 23. The Panel recommends the Member States could consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), but avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population nor have a negative humanitarian impact once trade restarts.**
- 24. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent transshipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.**
- 25. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States and relevant organizations encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for end-user checking, bearing in mind the risk of trans-shipment, including ship-to-ship transfer and means of transport for humanitarian cargo.**

Unintended Impact of Sanctions

- 26. The Panel recommends that the Committee review the responses of nongovernmental organizations to the Panel's survey and consider contacts with civil society to tackle the complex issues of a humanitarian crisis in the DPRK to help substantiate future decision-making and to better assess humanitarian aid needs.**
 - 27. The Panel underlines the urgency of concrete measures for re-establishing the banking channel.**
 - 28. The Panel appreciates the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.**
 - 29. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the country's vulnerable population and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.**
 - 30. The Panel notes the positive outcome of the Committee's efforts to streamline the processes and procedures for applying for humanitarian exemptions and recommends that the Committee continue these efforts, taking into account the suggestions by humanitarian actors.**
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