



## 安全理事会

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### 安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 [2680\(2023\)](#) 号决议第 2 段请第 [1874\(2009\)](#) 号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交一份载有结论和建议的中期报告。根据这一要求，安理会主席谨此分发专家小组提交的报告(见附件)。

\* 由于技术原因于 2023 年 10 月 30 日重发。



## 附件

### 2023 年 9 月 8 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2680(2023)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的中期报告。

所附报告于 2023 年 8 月 4 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2023 年 8 月 29 日审议了该报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和所附报告并将其作为安理会文件分发给为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号  
决议所设专家小组



## 附文

2023 年 8 月 4 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2680(2023)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的中期报告。

请提请安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意本信和所附报告为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号  
决议所设专家小组

## 摘要

在本报告所述期间(2023 年 1 月至 7 月), 朝鲜半岛的政治和军事紧张局势继续加剧。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续在许多领域无视安全理事会的制裁。该国继续发展核武器并生产核裂变材料, 尽管其最后一次已知的核试验发生在 2017 年 9 月。在宁边场址进行了新的建设活动, 丰溪里核试验场的活动仍在继续。弹道导弹活动继续快速进行: 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射了至少 19 枚固体推进剂短程弹道导弹, 并与 2022 年一样, 试射了洲际弹道导弹(两枚液体燃料和两枚固体燃料)。4 月 13 日和 7 月 12 日试射了该国首枚固体推进剂洲际弹道导弹“火星-18”。专家小组还继续调查可能违反制裁的技术无形转让。

在本报告中, 专家小组描述了向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油产品的船只所采取的种类繁多的逃避制裁措施。这些措施包括采用更复杂的手段躲避侦测, 改变在受影响水域的交易地点, 增加参与多阶段转运的船只。专家小组收到的资料显示, 该国继续违反安全理事会决议进口精炼石油产品。违反安全理事会制裁购置船只的情况继续存在: 在本报告所述期间, 该国购置了 14 艘新船。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭的违禁船对船出口仍在继续。

虽然该国的边境基本上仍然关闭, 但贸易额增加, 主要原因是恢复了铁路运输。种类繁多的外国商品迅速重新出现。专家小组继续调查关于进口奢侈品的报告。

在 2022 年网络盗窃达到创纪录的水平(估计为 17 亿美元)后, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国黑客据报继续在全球范围内成功地针对加密货币和其他金融交易所进行攻击。侦察总局行为体继续使用越来越先进的网络技术盗取资金和信息。加密货币、国防、能源和卫生部门的公司是重点攻击目标。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进入国际金融体系, 并开展非法金融活动。专家小组调查了在境外支持此类活动的该国金融机构和代表。边境重新开放可能增加朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民运送现金和高价值物项的情况。专家小组调查了关于该国国民违反制裁在海外工作赚取收入的报告, 包括在信息技术、餐饮、医疗和建筑部门工作。

专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口军事通信设备和弹药的指控, 并对该国可能向会员国出售武器或其他类型军事支助的案件启动了若干调查。

关于该国人道主义状况的可靠数据仍然很少。接受专家小组调查的人道主义组织报告说, 提供援助仍然困难重重, 该国的状况进一步恶化。联合国制裁及其执行造成意外影响, 不过这些制裁的相对作用仍然无法与许多其他因素分开。

专家小组珍视会员国对小组工作的贡献。

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\*\* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

## 一. 引言

1. 安全理事会第 2680(2023)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交一份载有专家小组调查结果和建议的中期报告。本报告的资料涵盖 2023 年 1 月 28 日至 7 月 28 日期间，除非另有说明。<sup>1</sup>

## 二. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的活动

### 核

2. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反安全理事会决议，开展与发展核武器和生产核裂变材料有关的活动。专家小组观察到整个宁边场址的新建设活动和丰溪里核试验场的持续活动，尽管自 2017 年 9 月以来没有发现核试验。

#### 金正恩视察“战术核武器”

3. 3 月 28 日，国家媒体宣布金正恩视察了“火山-31(화산-31)战术核武器”。一个会员国随后评估说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最近“表示要重点发展所谓的‘战术’核武器，这些武器几乎肯定是为了用于半岛，其弹头当量可能低于更远程系统的弹头当量”。另一个会员国评估说，由于缺乏关于其内部引爆装置和相关技术规格的信息，“难以评估该装置是否符合战术核武器通常的相关物理特征……披露该装置可能是为了欺骗目的……需要进一步分析”(见附件 1)。

4. 在金正恩视察期间，展示了设计用于携带“火山-31”战术核武器弹头的运载系统的示意图(见附件 1 照片)。专家小组评估认为，在各地点不同平台上测试的这些运载系统(见第 18 段)，佐证了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国自 2021 年 1 月以来关于其正在加强战术核武器能力的说法。<sup>2</sup>

#### 丰溪里试验场

5. 3 月初拍摄的卫星图像显示有一辆卡车和一个帐篷状结构物，其可能被用于保护 3 号隧道入口附近的设备和物品。<sup>3</sup> 现场有 3 号隧道的通风、供电、通信电缆以及连接可能的测试设备的电缆。2023 年 2 月初，在一处行政区，可看到一块空地上有多名人员，但没有观察到重大的配套建筑施工活动(见附件 2)。专家小组注意到，自 2023 年 4 月下旬以来，4 号隧道入口附近有不明确小型结构物。<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 报告中所有文字删减部分均经涂黑或经像素化处理，以防识别个人身份。

<sup>2</sup> S/2023/171，第 5 段。

<sup>3</sup> 根据专家小组咨询的外部专家提供的资料。

<sup>4</sup> 一个智库也观察到这两个小型结构物的建造。见 <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/punggye-ri-update-new-activity-at-tunnel-no-4>。据专家小组咨询的外部专家称，这可能与后来在隧道进行的重新开挖活动有关。

## 宁边场址

### 轻水反应堆

6. 2023 年 3 月和 4 月，一个会员国发现与轻水反应堆有关的冷却水系统可能进行了测试，评估该反应堆可能随时投入运行。专家小组的卫星图像分析显示，自 1 月以来，在九龙江附近断断续续地出现排水，位置与专家小组 2022 年观察到的地点几乎相同。<sup>5</sup> 3 月，反应堆西面配套建筑附近开始建造一座新建筑，在 2022 年完工的另外三座配套建筑附近也观察到了更多的小型施工活动(见附件 3)。

### 宁边实验核电站(5 兆瓦(电))

7. 会员国的评估和卫星图像分析表明，5 兆瓦(电)反应堆仍在继续运行。4 月初和 4 月中旬，除间歇中断外，反应堆的冷却水继续排放。<sup>6</sup> 在反应堆周围经常观察到有几种类型的车辆(见附件 4)。

### 放射化学实验室

8. 卫星图像分析显示，在放射化学实验室汽车调度场区经常有车辆活动。2 月至 4 月期间，在乏燃料接收建筑附近观察到成堆的材料。<sup>7</sup> 3 月，一个智库报告，在放射化学实验室东北有新的挖掘活动，<sup>8</sup> 专家小组随后证实了这一点(见附件 5)。国际原子能机构怀疑该地点和另一个地点是核废物储藏场所，<sup>9</sup> 但专家小组注意到，没有确切迹象表明在 1 月至 7 月下旬期间进行了乏燃料再处理活动。例如，与乏燃料后处理厂有关的蒸汽厂及其废物处理作业在此期间没有运行。

### 宁边核燃料棒制造厂

9. 3 月初，卫星图像显示在该场址南部地区有几栋建筑物正在施工，一个会员国评估其可能是用于行政目的。一台部署在四氟化铀生产处理厂房南侧的起重机仍在原地，可能表明该厂房的翻修工作尚未完成。专家小组注意到二氧化铀生产处理厂房可能进行了翻修的迹象(见附件 6)。

### 平山铀矿和浓缩厂

10. 卫星图像显示，铀矿和浓缩厂仍在继续运作。专家小组观察到，两个矿场的尾矿堆越来越大，同时浓缩厂经常有轨道车活动(见附件 7)。

### 其他场址

11. 专家小组继续监测降仙和永洞堂地区附近的的活动。详情见附件 8 和 9。

<sup>5</sup> S/2023/171，第 8 段。

<sup>6</sup> 据外部专家称，反应堆可能被短时间关闭。见 [www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor](http://www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor)。

<sup>7</sup> 据一名外部专家称，这些材料可能是用于维修和建筑活动的。

<sup>8</sup> 见 [www.38north.org/2023/03/satellite-imagery-reveals-new-activity-at-the-old-waste-site-at-yongbyon](http://www.38north.org/2023/03/satellite-imagery-reveals-new-activity-at-the-old-waste-site-at-yongbyon)。

<sup>9</sup> S/2023/171，第 11 段及附件 6-4。

## 弹道导弹

12. 弹道导弹计划继续持续进行, 3 月, 试验和演习突然增加(见附件 10)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 4 月 13 日试射了一枚名为“火星-18”的新型固体推进剂导弹(为试验其预定洲际射程), 导弹飞行了 1 000 公里, 在弹道导弹推进方面可能已经达到一个门槛。这一发展最终会增强该国武库的战略组成部分。与 2022 年一样, 试验液体或固体燃料的洲际弹道导弹是观察到的两大趋势之一, 另一趋势是同时发射固体推进剂短程弹道导弹(至少发射了 19 枚)。在两种情况下该国都报告了自己的努力, 其公开目标是在战略和战术层面实现核威慑。

13. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国总共至少进行了 23 次弹道导弹发射(见附件 10): 4 次洲际弹道导弹发射(2 次用液体推进剂发动机, 2 次用固体推进剂发动机), 19 次短程弹道导弹发射(均装有固体推进剂发动机)。<sup>10</sup>

## 洲际弹道导弹

14. 4 月 13 日, 从平壤东北 20 公里一处发射区完成了具有里程碑意义的三级固体推进剂洲际弹道导弹“火星-18”的有限试验(见附件 11)。朝鲜中央电视台 4 月 14 日的视频<sup>11</sup> 显示的排气羽焰与固体推进剂燃烧情况相符。在此次发射前, 2022 年 12 月 15 日在西海进行了一次固体推进剂发动机试验,<sup>12</sup> 2023 年 1 月 29 日或 30 日在马近浦进行了另一次试验<sup>13</sup> ——据一个会员国和一个公开消息来源称(见附件 15), <sup>14</sup> 在 2 月 8 日平壤一次阅兵式上展示了 5 枚装在筒中的不明洲际弹道导弹(见附件 12)。为“火星-18”发射进行了大量现场准备(紧邻金正恩的一处官邸), 金正恩及其女儿出席, 官方媒体<sup>15</sup> 随后立即进行了精心宣传, 这些都表明对此次发射取得成功的信心, 该国当局很快声称发射取得了成功。7 月 12 日, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从同一发射区第二次发射了一枚“火星-18”导弹。这次发射再次被宣布取得了成功(见附件 10)。

<sup>10</sup> 两名专家认为, 没有足够的证据可确定本段所述朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射的射弹的性质和所用技术。

<sup>11</sup> 见 <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/64395c9bbc9b7>。

<sup>12</sup> S/2023/171, 第 27 段。


<sup>13</sup> 位于北纬 39°48'06"、东经 127°33'39"。先前确定的 2022 年 12 月 15 日的固体推进剂发动机测试是在西海新建的卧式发动机试验台进行的, 位于北纬 39°39'06"、东经 124°42'57"(S/2023/171, 第 27 段)。

<sup>14</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/DaveSchmerler>, 2023 年 1 月 30 日。

<sup>15</sup> 朝鲜中央通讯社、朝鲜中央电视台和劳动新闻。另见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1681458619-912978826/another-mighty-entity-showing-continuous-development-of-strategic-force-unveiled-in-dprk-respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-first-test-fire-of-new-type-icbm-hwasongpho-18-on-spot>。

图一

2023 年 4 月 13 日“火星-18”洲际弹道导弹的发射



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台(2023 年 4 月 14 日)。

15. 在发射“火星-18”之前，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还进行了两次以前曾出现的液体推进剂洲际弹道导弹的发射。据大韩民国联合参谋本部和日本防卫省称，2 月 18 日从顺安国际机场发射了一枚弹道导弹，以高弹道方式向东飞行(见附件 10)。朝鲜中央通讯社发布的图片显示，似乎是从顺安国际机场的运输竖起发射装置发射了一枚“火星-15”洲际弹道导弹。<sup>16</sup> 朝鲜中央通讯社称此次发射是演习，而不是测试。3 月 16 日，大韩民国联合参谋本部报告从顺安国际机场又发射了一枚弹道导弹，以高弹道方式向东飞行。朝鲜中央通讯社发布的图片显示，似乎是从 11 轴运输竖起发射装置发射了一枚“火星-17”弹道导弹。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官方媒体再次宣布发射取得了成功。<sup>17</sup>

16. 一个会员国确认了这一新版“火星-17”的一处改动：导弹第一级下部比先前所见的导弹更直(见图二)。这一改动减少了飞行大气层部分的阻力，表明导弹总局<sup>18</sup>在其他方面对导弹的性能和稳定性有信心。

<sup>16</sup> 见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1676776192-691717962/icbm-launching-drill-staged>。


<sup>17</sup> 见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1679039432-23076180/demonstration-of-toughest-response-posture-of-dprk%e2%80%99s-strategic-forces-icbm-hwasongpho-17-launched>。

<sup>18</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个组织，2023 年 2 月首次被正式提及。一个会员国评估认为，该组织的成立是为了“开发、生产和管理导弹并执行实际操作和部署主要战略/战术核武器的任务”。




图二

2023 年 3 月 16 日“火星-17”洲际弹道导弹的发射



资料来源：朝鲜中央通讯社(2023 年 3 月 17 日)。



资料来源：日本防卫省(2023 年 3 月 16 日)，由专家小组附加说明。

17. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2 月 8 日在平壤金日成广场举行了军事检阅仪式，庆祝朝鲜人民军建军七十五周年。金正恩出席了仪式。会员国和专家小组认为，在这次活动中展示的主要武器系统包括一种新型的洲际弹道导弹，可能是固体燃料的，其中 5 枚装在 WS 51200 型九轴运输竖起发射装置的发射筒中，<sup>19</sup> 11 或

<sup>19</sup> 首次出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2012 年 4 月的一次阅兵式上。



12 枚“火星-17”洲际弹道导弹(创纪录的数量), KN-23<sup>20</sup> 和 KN-25 型短程弹道导弹以及一种“新型战术制导武器”。这次阅兵式上展示了 17 辆运输竖起发射装置, 数量异常多, 这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有可能已将这些重型支援车辆的生产本土化(见附件 13)。

#### 战术弹道导弹

18. 上述洲际弹道导弹发射不应掩盖频繁进行的固体推进剂短程弹道导弹发射: 至少在 8 个场合进行了 19 次此类发射(见附件 10)。这些发射似乎在作战环境下进行, 显然是为了展示该国武装部队的战备状态, 2022 年 9 月 25 日至 10 月 9 日的演习也是如此。<sup>21</sup> 据朝鲜中央通讯社报道, 2023 年的短程弹道导弹发射包括 3 月 19 日在“核反击模拟演习”中从西海地区进行了一次 KN-23 导弹的井基发射(见附件 22)。大韩民国联合参谋本部和日本防卫省证实了这次发射(见附件 10)。朝鲜中央通讯社报道说一枚模拟弹头在水面上方 800 米处被引爆, 如果得到证实, 这将表明该国意图和能力最大限度地实现在陆地上空引爆核弹头的影响, 同时尽量减少放射性尘埃。

图三

2023 年 3 月 9 日从苔城湖同时发射短程弹道导弹



资料来源: 朝鲜中央电视台(2023 年 3 月 9 日)。

<sup>20</sup> 该型号似乎有两个变体。见 <https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/Report-NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS%20%281%29.pdf>。

<sup>21</sup> S/2023/171, 第 28 段。

图四

2023 年 3 月 9 日从西海地区进行了一次 KN-23 短程弹道导弹的井基发射



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台(2023 年 3 月 20 日)。

19. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官方媒体广泛报道武装部队的战备情况。一个会员国评估认为，通过强调训练和使用导弹的意愿以提高威慑力的可信度，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实际上在力求将导弹能力投入运作。

20. 金正恩呼吁巩固战术核能力，从而使这些短程弹道导弹发射更具重要意义。1 月 1 日，他祝贺作为战术核武器部署新生产的“超大型多管火箭发射系统”，称该系统将“南朝鲜全境纳入打击范围，并能够携带[一枚]战术核弹头”。<sup>22</sup> 因此，他在战术和战略组成部分的基础上实现核威慑的决心得到重申，这与他在 2021 年 1 月朝鲜劳动党第八次代表大会上的讲话中概述的战略目标一致(见附件 16)。此外，在展示洲际弹道导弹前，2 月 8 日和 7 月 27 日的阅兵式突出展示了包括 KN-23、KN-25 和一种“新型战术武器”在内的短程弹道导弹。

#### 军事卫星发射

21. 5 月 31 日，国家宇宙开发局(KPe.029)尝试将一颗军用卫星送入轨道，此前，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向国际海事组织<sup>23、24</sup> 通报了三个“坠落区”，时间范

<sup>22</sup> 2023 年 1 月 1 日在 600 毫米超大型多管火箭发射系统捐赠仪式上的讲话。见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543895-380674944/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-reply-speech-at-ceremony-of-donating-600mm-super-large-multiple-launch-rocket-system>。

<sup>23</sup> 国际海事组织在 5 月 31 日通过的一项决议中呼吁朝鲜民主主义人民共和国停止非法和未经宣布的跨越国际航道的弹道导弹发射。

<sup>24</sup> 未通知国际民用航空组织(国际民航组织)。见国际海事组织和国际民航组织随后采取的行动(见附件 17)。

围为 5 月 30 日至 6 月 10 日。大韩民国联合参谋本部报告说，发射时间是韩国标准时间上午 6 时 29 分，地点是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新近升级的发射台所在地——东仓里(见附件 19)，并说部分火箭落在距大韩民国西海岸 270 公里处。然而，部分基于液体燃料洲际弹道导弹计划的“千里马-1”号空间运载火箭未能将其有效载荷“万里镜-1”号卫星送入轨道。朝鲜中央通讯社发布的图片显示了第一级液体燃料燃烧产生的初始明亮清晰的排气羽焰。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将随后的推力损失归因为“在正常飞行期间第一级分离后第二级发动机未能正常启动”(见附件 20)。此后，大韩民国公布了从海中打捞上来的火箭箭体和“万里镜-1”号卫星部分的照片(见附件 21)。专家小组的调查仍在继续。

#### 关键特征

22. 会员国报告或证实了关于弹道导弹发射轨迹的大部分信息。这些发射有助于实现 2021 年 1 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国五年路线图的两个目标：获得“陆基固体推进剂洲际弹道导弹”和“战术核武器”能力。通过 2 月 8 日的阅兵式以及 7 月 27 日为庆祝朝鲜战争停战 70 周年举行的阅兵式，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国证实了其雄心并宣传了其声称的成就(见附件 14)。

23. 成功发射一颗可使用的军事侦察卫星将为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供更多的瞄准手段，这是 2021 年 1 月路线图的另一个目标。然而，这次特定的发射也可能既是一种指挥与控制的手段，也是在内部传递讯息和树立威信。<sup>25</sup> 预计该国将继续投入大量资源发展这一能力：国家宇宙开发局已宣布正在考虑“尽快”进行第二次卫星发射。<sup>26</sup>

24. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国越来越注重固体推进剂发动机，在 2023 年上半年大量使用。“火星-18”试验是洲际领域这些事态发展状况的初步迹象，这一发展固体推进剂推进的努力可能最终提高该国武库的战备状态。各种类型导弹和发射平台的发展(如 3 月 12 日发射了两枚潜射巡航导弹，3 月 19 日进行了 KN-23 井基试验，增强了运输竖起发射装置能力并在 2022 年 9 月 25 日从水库进行了发射)以及导弹数量的增加<sup>27</sup> 都可能增强该国武库的力量和生存能力。年初，金正恩呼吁“实现国家核武库指数级增长”(见附件 18)。朝鲜中央通讯社后来表示，3 月 18 日和 19 日进行的战术演习旨在“大幅增强国家的战争威慑力和核反击能力”。<sup>28</sup> 这些动态和声明指向一种类似于第二次打击能力的威慑战略，可能会缓解研制假定的隐形弹道导弹潜艇方面的延误。

<sup>25</sup> 大韩民国联合参谋本部的初步评估是，“万里镜-1”号卫星不具备作为侦察卫星的军事用途。

<sup>26</sup> 见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1685600207-36284567/kcna-report>。

<sup>27</sup> 一个会员国评估认为，2023 年 2 月 8 日展示 12 枚“火星-17”洲际弹道导弹是为了宣传新的大规模生产能力。

<sup>28</sup> 见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1679299314-83338627/nuclear-counterattack-simulation-drill-conducted-in-dprk>。

## 技术无形转让和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大学的活动

25. 专家小组继续调查涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的技术无形转让(见安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议, 第 11 段)。

26. 关于一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国研究员自 2020 年以来受雇于瑞典一家研究所的情况,<sup>29</sup> 该研究所告知专家小组, 已按照瑞典移民当局 2023 年 2 月下旬拒绝该研究员的居留和工作许可申请并将其驱逐出境的决定, 在 2023 年 3 月中旬终止了该研究员的雇用(见附件 23)。专家小组请瑞典提供进一步资料。

27. 专家小组调查了一篇媒体报道,<sup>30</sup> 报道称朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金日成综合大学学者 Im Song-jin 与中国学者共同发表了学术论文。专家小组发现, Im 先生自 2019 年以来与隶属于北京一家研究机构的中国学者共同发表了论文, 他还在 2019 年与另一所中国大学有关联(见附件 24)。专家小组先前已注意到, Im 先生的研究领域可归类为两用性质。<sup>31</sup> 专家小组请中国提供资料, 说明中国机构与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大学之间的学术交流, 以及 Im 先生目前在中国大学的职位。中国答复说, “媒体[报道]严重失实……。媒体[报道]提到的两篇论文是基于正常的基础科学研究合作, 不具有两用性质, 与核扩散无关……。Im Song-Jin 参与这两篇论文仅限于理论问题的交流, 中国学者没有向 Im 提供任何数据。中国学者将 Im 列为作者只是出于尊重。这种交流不构成科技交流合作, 因此不违反决议的相关规定……。Im 在 2015 年 9 月访问结束后没有返回该大学, 也没有在该校的任何身份……。Im 对该大学的访问发生在 2016 年第 2321 号决议通过之前”(见附件 25)。

## 三. 部门制裁和海上制裁<sup>32、33</sup>

### 海上贸易

#### 精炼石油上限

28. 会员国必须向委员会报告向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油产品情况。<sup>34</sup> 截至 2023 年 7 月 10 日, 委员会网站显示, 在 500 000 桶精炼石油产品的年度许可上限中, 共交付了 157 862.701 桶(31.57%)(见图五)。

<sup>29</sup> S/2023/171, 第 17 段和附件 11。

<sup>30</sup> 见 [www.dw.com/en/despise-un-sanctions-german-research-institute-worked-with-north-korean-scientists/a-63890089](http://www.dw.com/en/despise-un-sanctions-german-research-institute-worked-with-north-korean-scientists/a-63890089)。

<sup>31</sup> S/2023/171, 第 19 和 20 段及附件 13-15。

<sup>32</sup> 本节所载资料涵盖的期限截至 2023 年 6 月或访问数据库获取信息或向专家小组提供信息的日期。其中可能不包括含有后来输入的回溯至 6 月前的追溯信息的国际海事组织全球综合航运信息系统的更新信息。


<sup>33</sup> 根据原始数据源, 记录时间为东部标准时间、协调世界时或当地时间。

<sup>34</sup> 安理会第 2397(2017)号决议, 第 5 段。

图五

经申报的向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油产品情况，2023 年 1 月至 4 月

(桶数)



资料来源：[www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum) 和专家小组。

29. 一个会员国提供了 2023 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 1 日期间 25 艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮 46 次向南浦和其他石油设施交付精炼石油产品的卫星图像和数据(见附件 26)。在 25 艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮中，9 艘被安全理事会指认，因此被禁止进入外国港口装载精炼石油产品(见第 2321(2016)号决议，第 12(c)段)。专家小组还指出，第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段禁止与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只进行船对船移交。

30. 据该会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“可能通过 46 次交付进口了大约 781 497[桶]精炼石油。按 90%[载重吨位]评估卸货量，[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]可能在 4 月 2 日左右突破了 500 000[桶]的上限。即使按 60%[载重吨位]计算，[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]到 5 月 1 日也超过了 500 000[桶]的上限”(见附件 26)。另一个会员国估计，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2023 年第一季度非法进口了约 80 000 吨(638 400 桶)精炼石油(见附件 27)。<sup>35、36</sup>

#### 受影响水域

31. 专家小组继续追踪在与图六中一个会员国提供的海区一致的海域进行非法贸易的船只(见附件 28)。

<sup>35</sup> 委员会的转换率为每吨 7.98 桶精炼石油产品。

<sup>36</sup> 两名专家认为，这两个会员国的数据是估计数，专家小组目前无法区分向委员会报告的合法精炼石油产品交付与非法交付活动。




图六

2022 年和 2023 年上半年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法船对船移交活动的区域

2022 年全年

2023 年上半年



资料来源：会员国。

### 逃避制裁的方法

改变在领水的交易地点

32. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续利用领水进行非法移交，包括在新观察到的区域。在该国水域内，专家小组观察到椒岛<sup>37</sup> 周围以及更北的 Sokdo-ri 岛周围水域有船对船活动(见附件 29)。在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域外，该国船只继续在中国水域出口煤炭，一个会员国发现在台山岛附近出现一个新的交易区(见第 74-76 段)。

躲避侦测

33. 专家小组继续观察到普遍使用规避制裁的措施：在黑暗中(通常是黎明和黄昏)进行非法移交；缩短船对船移交的时间；伪造识别信息；在移交过程中关闭自动识别系统信号。会员国报告的其他躲避侦测措施包括：使用暗语；阻断自动识别系统信号；发送“伪装”信号。<sup>38</sup> 这些措施不是互不相容，可疑船只通常会同时采用这些措施。

<sup>37</sup> 专家小组 2022 年报告该处是一个新的活动区域。见 S/2022/668，第 35 和 36 段及附件 26。

<sup>38</sup> 如另一个会员国就“Gold Star”号(国际海事组织：9146247)案件报告的信息，过去也曾发现过这些方法。见 S/2021/777，第 62-67 段及附件 35。

## 篡改位置

34. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国制裁逃避者正在使用一种新形位置篡改方法，即地理欺骗。<sup>39</sup> 其目的是造成船只位于别处的印象，从而混淆活动(见附件 30)。例如，4 月 4 日，一个海事数据库记录了前“直接交付”船只<sup>40</sup>“New Konk”号(国际海事组织：9036387)使用其已知的欺诈性识别信息“F.Lonline”(海上移动业务标识码：312162000)传输信号，据称穿越台湾海峡进入南海。卫星图像证实，在操纵活动开始时，该船实际上在中国三沙湾。


35. 在对其船迹进行地理欺骗时，“New Konk”号以另一个已知的假名“Lifan”传输信息(见图七)，开始向北航行，然后至4月中旬停止了自动识别系统信号传输(见图八)。

图七

2021 年 9 月和 12 月“New Konk”号以“Lifan”号身份传输信息

2021 年 9 月

2021 年 12 月




资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明；内嵌卫星图像，会员国。

<sup>39</sup> 地理欺骗也被称为全球导航卫星系统操纵，是指船只操纵其全球导航卫星系统信息，使船只显示在其他地方。以前曾在拉丁美洲和中东水域发现过地理欺骗，在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国逃避制裁活动中首次被发现。另见 [www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html)。

<sup>40</sup> 该术语用于描述冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行疫情之前在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口交付精炼石油的非该国油轮。

图八

2023 年 2 月在三沙湾使用欺诈性识别信息的可疑船只，2023 年 4 月可疑船只对其航程进行地理欺骗



资料来源：Windward；内嵌图像，Planet Labs 加 Windward 自动识别系统航迹叠图，由专家小组附加说明。

36. 4 月 21 日，在已知前“直接交付”船只与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮会合卸载非法石油货物的水域发现一艘与“New Konk”号长度相似的船只。<sup>41</sup>

37. 大约在“New Konk”号开始进行地理欺骗时，另一艘前“直接交付”船只“Unica”号(国际海事组织：8514306)也开始利用其已知欺诈性识别信息“Liton”(海上移动业务标识码：457106000)进行地理欺骗。也受到专家小组调查(见第 71-73 段)的悬挂多哥国旗的“Shundlli”号船(国际海事组织：8355724)同样在附近地区传输信号。<sup>42</sup> 几艘可疑船只在同一地点同时移动，可能是企图混淆船舶追踪(见图九)。


<sup>41</sup> S/2023/171，第 37 段及附件 31。

<sup>42</sup> 在“Unica”号和“New Konk”号同时就其位置进行地理欺骗时，“Shundlli”号开始向北航行，期间出现大片自动识别系统信号空白，直至抵达西朝鲜湾。



图九

“New Konk” 号和 “Unica” 号同时进行地理欺骗，2023 年 4 月 4 日



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

## 非法转运精炼石油

继续使用前“直接交付”船只非法运输石油

38. “New Konk” 号、“Unica” 号和 “Diamond 8” 号(国际海事组织：9132612)继续在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区交付精炼石油(见附件 31)。这些船只使用专家小组以前查明的已知虚假名称<sup>43</sup> 和新的虚假名称开展这些活动。2023 年这些船只使用的虚假海上移动业务标识码的最新清单见表 1。专家小组评估认为，这些船只可能受朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制。

39. 例如，5 月，“New Konk” 号涉嫌冒用假船号 “Lian”，传输以前属于专家小组报告 2022 年 4 月已报废的 “Joffa” 的海上移动业务标识码(667001395)。<sup>44</sup> “Lian” 与 “Lifan” 几乎名称相同，后者是 “New Konk” 号在 2021 年 12 月与 “Joffa” 号进行船对船移交时使用的虚假名称(见图十)。一个海事平台追踪到的 “Lian” 号 5 月和 6 月的航行路线让人想起 “New Konk” 号过去的航行路线，表明其持续为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法交付石油(见图十一)。


40. 自 2022 年 12 月以来，“Shundlli” 号也以类似方式向 “New Konk” 号和 “Unica” 号交付了精炼石油(见第 72 段)。

<sup>43</sup> S/2023/171，表 2。

<sup>44</sup> S/2022/668，第 41-46 段及附件 28、30、32.6 和 34。

图十

2023 年“New Konk”号使用现已报废的“Joffa”号的海上移动业务标识码。两艘油轮在 2021 年 12 月 29 日和 30 日进行了船对船移交




资料来源：专家小组。

注：除“Joffa”号外，“Sky Venus”号、“Hong Hu”号和“Xiang Shun”号也已报废。

图十一

2022 年 1 月“New Konk”号(“Lifan”)与 2023 年 5 月和 6 月“New Konk”号(“Lian”)的航行路线对比



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

表 1

2023 年 1 月至 5 月传输的欺诈性识别信息表<sup>45</sup>

Ship name	Fraudulent identifier
NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387)	F.LONLINE MMSI: 312162000  LIFAN MMSI: 312165230 MMSI: 312165923  LIAN MMSI: 667001395
UNICA (IMO: 8514306)	LITON MMSI: 457106000
DIAMOND 8 nka NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612)	SHUNLI MMSI: 457111000

资料来源：专家小组。

注：另见附件 32。

41. 自 2020 年以来，专家小组报告说，前“直接交付”船只经常在非法运输之间藏身于三沙湾水域(见附件 33)。<sup>46</sup> 在那里时，这些船只要么很少传输自动识别系统信号，要么传输虚假信号(见图十二)。下文详细讨论的一个例子是 2021 年 8 月一艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮，其船名为“**Nam Dae Bong**”号(原为“**Diamond 8**”：国际海事组织网站 2023 年才更新这方面的信息)。<sup>47</sup> 因此，在专家小组先前报告时，该油轮在三沙湾和进行非法燃料运输时就已经属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队。专家小组请中国当局协助获取有关前“直接交付”船只和为非法石油移交提供便利的相关个人的信息，以便能够阻止这些船只今后采购石油。中国答复说，其相关当局仍在调查，“初步调查结果显示，“**NEW KONK**”号、“**UNICA**”号、“**DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG**”号和“**SHUNDLLI**”号自 2020 年以来没有在中国入港和离港的记录”(见附件 25)。


<sup>45</sup> 前“直接交付”船只继续传输已知的虚假名称，其中一些海上移动业务标识码受到操纵。

<sup>46</sup> 专家小组鼓励这些船只可能在其领水内停泊或交易的相关国家当局进行调查并将信息告知专家小组。见 [S/2023/171](#)，第 39 和 40 段。

<sup>47</sup> 国际海事组织根据船旗国提供的信息更新船旗信息。

图十二

三沙湾的前“直接交付”船只，2023年1月6日



资料来源：会员国。

### 逃避制裁活动

42. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续规避制裁，情况如下：<sup>48</sup>

- (a) 分多阶段转运石油，在许多情况下起始地点在台湾海峡；
- (b) 中间船只的自动识别系统暗活动(在没有自动识别系统信号传输期间，船只活动不明，可能进行港口停靠或船对船活动)；<sup>49</sup>
- (c) 前“直接交付”船只在前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮会合时传输欺诈性识别信息；
- (d) 利用具有以下特征的船只注册公司所有权：网上足迹有限或无迹可查；公司注册信息仅将公司秘书列为联系人；注册的电子邮件似乎是一次性的(无法联系)；使用“转交”地址；实益所有权不明。

43. 以下两个例子说明了专家小组在 2023 年调查的案例。

<sup>48</sup> S/2022/132 和 S/2022/668。

<sup>49</sup> 专家小组使用“中间船只”一词来指多阶段船对船石油移交链上的油轮，这些油轮将其石油货物移交给前“直接交付”船只、非国际海事组织编号的船只或伪装的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮。

案例 1：供应船——“Ever Glory”号——“Nam Dae Bong”(“Diamond 8/Shunli”)号——朝鲜民主主义人民共和国

石油移交(见图十三)：

44. “Diamond 8”号<sup>50</sup>假冒“Shunli”(海上移动业务标识码：457111000)传输信息，同时在 2 月 17 日或前后离开三沙湾水域，沿台湾海峡向南航行，与悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Ever Glory”号(国际海事组织：9102813)会合。专家小组先前报告真正的“Shunli”号船只(国际海事组织：8514435)实际上已在 2021 年报废。<sup>51</sup>

45. 会合后，“Diamond 8/Shunli”号返回三沙湾，然后向北航行，在 3 月 13 日或其前后抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域。在与“Diamond 8/Shunli”号会面前，“Ever Glory”号在 1 月 21 日或其前后与供应船(“供应船 X”)会面。供应船 X 已在两天前在麦寮港装油。在收到供应船的石油后，“Ever Glory”号返回高雄港区域，在那里一直停留到 2 月 17 日，当日向南航行，在当天晚些时候停靠在“Diamond 8/Shunli”号旁边。


46. 在英属维尔京群岛注册成立的高雄贸易公司 Success Regent Development Limited(下称“Success Regent”)答复专家小组的询问说，供应船 X 在 1 月 21 日将 4 100 吨石油(价值约 400 万美元)移交给“Ever Glory”号。另外，在安圭拉注册的 Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd(下称“Full Victory”)是一家设在台南的实体，该公司从 Success Regent 公司购买了“Ever Glory”号的石油货物。Success Regent 还确认，其公司、供应船 X 的注册船东公司、该船的技术管理人 Mega Glory Holdings 和为 Success Regent 从麦寮港购买石油货物的采购实体均为共同所有权。

<sup>50</sup> 在数份报告中，“Diamond 8”号是专家小组的调查对象，还在 2019 年和 2020 年因向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法交付精炼石油而被建议指认。

<sup>51</sup> [S/2022/668](#)，第 42 段。



图十三  
“Nam Dae Bong/Shunli” 号在抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国前停靠在“Ever Glory” 号旁，2023 年 2 月至 3 月



资料来源：Windward(虚线为预计路线)；卫星图像，Planet Labs 加 Windward 自动识别系统叠图；由专家小组附加说明。

47. Success Regent 的记录显示，它在 1 月对接货船“Ever Glory”号进行了尽职调查。<sup>52</sup> 该公司表示，除 Full Victory 指定“Ever Glory”号作为石油货物移交的接货船外，“我们[与‘Ever Glory’号的注册船东]没有直接业务往来”。专家小组注意到，Full Victory 也是供应船 X 船向悬挂蒙古国旗的“Midas”号油轮(国际海事组织：9105279)提供的石油货物的所列买方(见案例 2 和图十六)。

<sup>52</sup> 专家小组注意到，Success Regent 在其他地方表示，其合规团队于 2023 年 5 月 3 日开始对“Ever Glory”号石油货物的购买者 Full Victory 进行尽职调查。专家小组请 Success Regent 作出进一步澄清。

## 关联实体和个人

48. 专家小组根据以往的调查、从各种对应方获得的航运记录和包括公司注册文件在内的主要来源信息，<sup>53</sup> 确定了与个人 A 有关的各种公司联系(见图十八)。除其他外，个人 A 答复说，他本人、其公司和合伙人是合规文件持有人，没有参与商业贸易活动。专家小组正在评估这些资料(见附件 34)。调查仍在继续。

49. “Ever Glory”号的注册船东 Kindom Honor Ltd(下称“Kindom Honor”)向专家小组表示，“Ever Glory”号 1 月 4 日至 8 日在“菲律宾北部水域”装载了 4 000 吨柴油货物，用于于 2 月 17 日和 18 日在台南港外交付给客户——福建的“Qui(Guo Rong)先生”。进一步询问后，Kindom Honor 撤回了先前的说法，解释说由于“燃料质量差”，它中止了从菲律宾燃料经销商处购买。相反，它确认从 Success Regent 购买燃料，“因为 Full Victory 的所有者……与[Success Regent]关系非常好”，从而获得了更好的价格。


50. 专家小组要求提供关于随后于 2 月 17 日和 18 日从“Ever Glory”号装载石油货物的接货船的资料，对此，Kindom Honor 解释说，“由于两艘船只在夜间并排停泊，视线不好，“Ever Glory”号的船长没有按照 Kindom Honor 的操作标准记录船只识别信息”。该公司称“双方船上没有说朝鲜语的人……没有……怀疑 Qui 先生指派的接货船……与[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]有任何联系”，并补充说，“Kindom Honor 从未利用‘Ever Glory’号从事任何非法海上活动”。在答复专家小组关于 Kindom Honor 认为它将石油货物移交给了哪艘船的询问时，该公司承认，一些接货船会“隐瞒船名”。

51. Kindom Honor 还声称，它对“Ever Glory”号有完全控制权，该船从未接触过“Nam Dae Bong/Diamond 8”号，“‘Ever Glory’号也从未停靠在名为‘Shunli’的船只旁”。然而，社交媒体上发布的一段视频显示“Ever Glory”号和“Shunli”号之间进行了报告的船对船移交，这与 Kindom Honor 的说法矛盾(见图十四)。专家小组审查了视频片段、自动识别系统信息分析和单独获得的对应方资料，如“Ever Glory”号船员的国籍，其与社交媒体帖子的语言一致，审查结果符合专家小组的评估，即两艘船确实曾在 2 月中旬并排停泊。

<sup>53</sup> 专家小组掌握的资料。

图十四

“Shunli” 号和 “Ever Glory” 号并排停泊，2023 年 2 月 19 日



资料来源：社交媒体视频的静态截图，由专家小组附加说明。

52. Success Regent 表示，其合规团队于 5 月 3 日开始尽职调查程序，要求 Full Victory “提供与客户的合同和相关货运单据” (见附件 35)，但直到 7 月 5 日才收到答复。专家小组请 Success Regent 提供这些文件。

53. 专家小组还致函其他相关方。专家小组得到了马绍尔群岛和塞舌尔的协助。塞拉利昂尚未答复。LW 海事服务有限公司(LW Maritime Service Co., Ltd)也尚未答复。

案例 2：供应船——“Midas” 号——“Shundlli” 号——朝鲜民主主义人民共和国石油移交(见图十五)

54. 次月，以类似方式转运了另一批运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法石油货物。3 月 9 日或其前后，“Midas” 号(国际海事组织：9105279)在台湾海峡与“Shundlli” 号进行了一次船对船移交。“Shundlli” 号(见第 34-37 段)是 2022 年 12 月一次媒体调查的对象，据报，该船只向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油，<sup>54</sup> 因此它是惯犯。与“Ever Glory” 号一样，中间船“Midas” 号在接受同一艘供应船 X 移交的石油前曾出现在高雄港地区。<sup>55</sup> 在与“Midas” 号会合前，

<sup>54</sup> 大韩民国当局向专家小组证实，目前正在对向母船“Mercury”号(国际海事组织：9262170)移交石油的一名中介人进行调查。另见 [www.ft.com/content/41e47ba2-3e3b-414b-905b-df4336f22bed](https://www.ft.com/content/41e47ba2-3e3b-414b-905b-df4336f22bed)。


<sup>55</sup> 2023 年 2 月至 3 月初。



该供应船也同样出现在麦寮港。中间船“Shundlli”号也是离开三沙湾水域，在台湾海峡与“Midas”号会合，然后穿过东海继续向北航行。“Shundlli”号报告的目的地是大连，却向东转向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域，然后在 3 月 21 日或其前后停止传输自动识别系统信号。

图十五

“Shundlli”号在驶向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域前与“Midas”号会合，2023 年 3 月



资料来源：Windward 和标普全球 Sea-web。

#### 关联实体和个人

55. “Midas”号的注册船东是在萨摩亚注册成立的 Laurel International Co Ltd(下称“Laurel International”), 在台南设有运营机构。该船的运营商和技术管理人是总部设在高雄的 Navigator Ship Management Ltd(下称“Navigator Ship”)。Navigator Ship 与 Green Ship Management Ltd(下称“Green Ship”)的详细联系信息相同，后者是“Ever Glory”号船东的“转交”公司。在就“Midas”号问题与专家小组的通信中，代表 Laurel International 的律师事务所也将信件抄送了 Green Ship。

56. Laurel International 说，从 Success Regent 购买的石油货物将从供应船 X 移交给“Midas”号。然后，这批石油将从“Midas”号移交给一艘代表 Qiu Guo Shu 的接货船，Qiu Guo Shu 是福建省的一名经纪人，Laurel International 与其有长期业务往来。Laurel International 被要求提供从“Midas”号接货的船只的相关信息，该公司声称，所述移交是“一次例外的交付活动”，期间“1 000 吨柴油”被转运至“Shundlli”号，而不是按照通常的业务做法，直接向客户船只交付石油货

物。关于尽职调查，Laurel International 表示，已委托 Navigator Ship(据报该公司未在其他方面参与“Midas”号的业务活动)核实 Qiu 先生提供的“Shundlli”号注册船东公司信息是否与香港公司注册处中的信息一致，此外，“‘Shundlli’号不是一艘[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]船只”。关于石油移交的通信记录，专家小组获悉，Qiu 先生不会使用智能手机。

57. Laurel International 还表示：“2023 年 3 月从 Success Regent……购买的柴油货物……已通过 Qiu 先生全部卖给了中国渔船和近海作业船”(见图十六)。专家小组注意到，这批石油货物被连续转运，而专家小组从一个会员国单独获得的信息显示，据推测，有 1 800 吨石油货物从“Shundlli”号移交给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“Kum Ryong 3”号油轮(国际海事组织：8610461)(见第 71-73 段)。专家小组注意到，根据发票，“Midas”号船上的桶装油接近 1 800 吨。

图十六  
显示与石油货物移交有关的实体的发票

向“Ever Glory”号移交石油的发票      向“Midas”号移交石油的发票

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

DATE: Feb. 01, 2023  
INV. NO.   
CONTRACT NO.

MESSRS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD

SUPPLY TANKED

DATE	VESSEL NAME	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QUANTITY (BBL)	UNIT PRICE (USD)	AMOUNT (USD)
2023/1/21	Ever Glory	Gasoil 180ppm	30,744.83	126.305	US\$3,991,676.63
TOTAL AMOUNT					US\$3,991,676.63

and on behalf of  
SUCCEEDING SIGNATURE AND COMPANY SIGNED  
  
SIGNED  
SIGNED

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

PROFORMA INVOICE

DATE: Mar. 03, 2023  
INVOICE NO.:

MESSRS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD

DESCRIPTIONS OF GOODS	QUANTITY(BBL)	UNIT PRICE(USD)	AMOUNT(USD)
GASOIL 500ppm	15,103.20	111.000	1,676,455.20
TOTAL AMOUNT(USD)			1,676,455.20

资料来源：专家小组。


58. Success Regent 代表供应船 X 向专家小组提供了所要求的文件和资料。专家小组已请该公司澄清，为何于 2023 年 3 月 30 日致函 Full Victory，拒绝与“Midas”号开展进一步商业活动，原因是对提交给 Success Regent 的文件有疑问。关于供应船 X 作为原卖方/供应商在发运地船边交货价和(或)船上交货价基础上订约销售石油货物的更多详情，见附件 36。

59. 图十七显示了石油和资金流情况。

图十七

案例 2 中的石油货物运输及其运输资金流，2023 年 3 月

**Flow of oil : Multi-stage trans-shipment of oil cargo**



**Flow of money : Buyer to broker to seller for oil cargo sale**



资料来源：专家小组。


**作案手法**

60. 在比较 Kindom Honor(“Ever Glory”号)和 Laurel International(“Midas”号)的答复时，专家小组注意到以下相似之处：使用同一家律师事务所；抄送共同的外部方(Green Ship)；引述类似的尽职调查方法；所涉经纪人的姓名和背景相似；声称石油货物的最终买家是“中国渔船”，但没有提供文件作为证据；无法提供有关石油移交的实质性通信记录或船只身份；同一买方实体(Full Victory)向供应船 X 购买“Ever Glory”号和“Midas”号的石油货物；使用类似的支付方法。在描述经纪人为从“Ever Glory”号和“Midas”号收到的石油货物进行的金融交易时，两家公司都解释说，由于“中国客户”用美元付款面临汇款问题，因此通过地下银行服务以现金付款，以便使用当地货币进行交易。因此，无法提供付款细节。关于编辑汇编的 Kindom Honor 和 Laurel International 提供的相关答复以及专家小组的比较，见附件 37 和 38。

61. 虽然 Laurel International 说它直接从 Success Regent 购买了石油货物，但财务资料显示，在“Midas”号与“Shundlli”号进行船对船移交前，Full Victory 已就从供应船 X 移交给“Midas”号的石油货物向 Success Regent 支付了货款。针对专家小组的进一步询问，Laurel International 说，它“在母公司 Full Victory 的监督下”运营，后者是“Laurel International 的主要出资方”。专家小组继续调查 Full Victory 购买“Ever Glory”号和“Midas”号船上的石油货物的情况，这些货物被转运至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。蒙古答复了专家小组的询问。专家小组在等待萨摩亚的答复。

62. 图十八显示了与“Midas”号和“Ever Glory”号有关的实体关系图。

图十八  
在调查“Midas”号和“Ever Glory”号时观察到的实体<sup>56</sup>和个人的联系



资料来源：专家小组。

注：另见附件 34。<sup>57</sup>

#### 船只销售和购置情况

63. 1 月至 5 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置了 14 艘船只，继续违反安全理事会禁止直接或间接向该国供应、销售或转让船只的相关决议。表 2(另见附件 39)更新了先前 S/2023/171 号文件表 33 未列出的自 2021 年以来悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只清单。专家小组继续追踪其他可能已在该国控制下但尚未正式悬挂该国国旗的船只，预计将有更多船只被列入清单。

64. 专家小组对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最近购置船只的分析情况如下：

(a) 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的中国沿海船只增加：这些船只现在占 2023 年迄今所购船只的大多数。<sup>58</sup> 这些船只大多没有国际海事组织船舶识别号，表明它们未进行开展国际航行的注册。由于国际海事组织船舶识别号、历史船迹或所有权记录不完整或缺失，在正式悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗之前，这些沿海船只没有商业上可获取的购置证据；

(b) 购置更新、更大的船只；

(c) 主要购置散装船或货船/集装箱船；

<sup>56</sup> 根据公司注册处、国际海事组织和船舶登记的记录。

<sup>57</sup> 对应的实体包括“转交”公司。

<sup>58</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2023 年 1 月至 5 月期间购置的船只中，80% 以前是作为中国沿海船只航行的，而 2022 年这一比例约为 50%。

(d) 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2023 年对其新近购置的一定数量船只进行了重新命名, 包括“Ryon Phung”号(国际海事组织: 9154189)(原“Sin Phygong 11”号)和“A Bong 1”号(国际海事组织: 8669589)(原“Kum Ya Gang 1”号)。

65. 在 2023 年头 5 个月, 专家小组根据海事数据库追踪和国际海事组织记录, 查明有 10 艘原悬挂中国国旗的船只或中国实体拥有的船只转入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队(见附件 40)。专家小组使用各种船只行为分析和各种特征标记来识别这些船只。在一些没有历史船迹或资料的情况下, 这些船只只有在开始在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域传输信息时才能确定其身份。

66. 中国答复说: “‘SHUNCHAO 9’号、‘HUI YI’号、‘HONG JIE 1’号、‘RUN HONG 58’号、‘XIN HONG XIANG 77’号、‘WEN TONG FA ZHAN’号和‘XIANGHUI 10’号分别[在]2022 年 5 月、2023 年 1 月、2022 年 8 月、2021 年 11 月、2022 年 10 月、2023 年 2 月和 2018 年 11 月被取消注册。此后, 这些船只未再重新注册。‘ZHI KUN 6’号和‘HUA JIN SHENG 8’号仍登记为中国船只。‘HONG TAI 215’号未申请国籍注册”(见附件 25)。

67. 专家小组还追踪了一些前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的悬挂中国国旗的沿海船只。<sup>59</sup> 这些船只先是在沿海航线航行, 在抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前会出现相当长时间的自动识别系统空白。在追踪的船只中, “Bao Ying Hai 18”号(海上移动业务标识码: 412550950)和“Xin Yang Hong”号(国际海事组织: 8358192)现在分别作为“Song Nim 9”号(国际海事组织: 8360248)和“Nam Pho 5”号在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队中航行。由于这些中国沿海船只中有许多船只没有公开的所有权详细资料, 专家小组请中国提供资料, 包括船只登记、受益所有人、海关资料、船只离开中国水域前的买卖情况信息。专家小组还请中国当局向船东转达问题。详情见附件 41。

68. 中国答复说, “‘BAO YING HAI 18’号、‘XIN YANG HONG’号、‘QIMING 168’号和‘FU LONG 98’号在 2022 年底至 2023 年初期间被取消注册, 并且……此后没有重新注册”, 因此没有“关于其确切下落”的信息。中国还表示, “没有找到‘XIN HANG SHUN’号和‘LONG XIN 12’号的入港和离港记录”, 而且“没有关于这些船只的详细信息”(见附件 25)。

69. 鉴于船只销售的复杂性, 包括存在中间人、经纪人和没有进行买方核实等情况, 专家小组注意到在侦测向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国销售船只方面的挑战。为减轻风险, 专家小组重申其最近一次报告中建议的船只销售过程中的最佳做法和尽职调查步骤。<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> 专家小组追踪的船只仅限于 2022 年 9 月至 2023 年 5 月期间。

<sup>60</sup> S/2023/171, 第 97(一)-(三)段。

表 2

购置船只(2023 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 1 日)和以前未记录的购置船只(2021-2022 年)的最新清单, 补充 S/2023/171 号文件中专家小组关于悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗的船只的上—份清单

Year 2023					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	8660909	SIN PHYONG 10 ex WALES	Cargo	28451	-
2	1015167	TAE DONG MUN 1 ex SHOU XIANG 8	Cargo	8667	-
3	1017787	MO RAN BONG 7 ex HUA XIANG 669	Cargo / Container	5115	-
4	1018614	UN HA SU ex WEN TONG 7	Cargo	3282	-
5	8592774	HWA PHYONG ex HAI SHUN FENG 6	Cargo / Container	5529	-
6	8598431	THAE JA BONG ex XIANG HUI 10	Cargo	5114	Detailed in current report
7	8662933	HWANG RYONG SAN ex HUA JIN SHENG 8	Cargo	3278	Detailed in current report
8	8360248	SONG NIM 9 ex BAO YING HAI 18	Cargo	6431	Detailed in current report
9	8360406	TOK SONG ex HONG TAI 215	Cargo	14,116	Detailed in current report
10	8358697	KUM GANG 1 ex HUI YI	Cargo	6310	Detailed in current report
11	8360250	HYANG SAN ex WEN TONG FA ZHAN	Cargo	5007	Detailed in current report
12	9054896	A SA BONG ex HAI JUN	Tanker	4785	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, and current report)
13	8358192	NAM PHO 5 ex XIN YANG HONG	Cargo	4831	Detailed in current report
14	1016355	SONG NIM 5 ex WANG HAO 1	Cargo	5263	-
Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
15	8669589	A BONG 1 / KUM YA GANG 1 ex HENG XING	Tanker	3221	Yes (S/2023/171, S/2022/667, S/2019/171 and current report)
16	8891297	PU YANG 2 ex SF BLOOM	Cargo / Container	3539	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
17	8356584	KYONG SONG 3 ex ANNI	Cargo / Container	5226	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
18	9142409	CHON HA 2 ex SHUN CHAO 9	Cargo / Container	4860	Current report
19	8864464	PUK CHON 2 ex SEA STAR 5	Cargo	4835	Detailed in current report
20	8358324	MO RAN BONG 5 ex HONG JIE 1	Cargo / Container	5515	Detailed in current report
21	8596122	UN SUN ex HUA YUAN DA 9	Cargo	5150	-
22	1015533	TAE RYONG 3 ex XING HONG XIANG 77	Cargo	5116	Detailed in current report
23	9536272	PU YANG 6 ex SEA GLORY	Cargo / Container	4802	-
24	9088031	HWANG GUM PHYONG 3 ex YUKO MARU 8	Cargo	4635	Detailed in current report
25	8597827	PHO HANG 1 ex AN YUAN 1	Cargo / Container	3637	-
26	8718639	JANG SU ex WEN XIANG	Cargo	3457	Detailed in current report
27	8660909	SAE GIL ex ZHI KUN 6	Cargo	4730	Detailed in current report
28	9154189	RYON PHUNG ex SIN PHYONG 11 / ex CONTREL	Tanker	3159	Yes (S/2023/171, and current report)
29	8597944	HONG DAE 2 ex HUA YU 108	Cargo	4519	-
Year 2021					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
30	8312497	SONG WON 2 ex NEW REGENT	Tanker	5167	Yes (S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, S/2019/171)
31	9132612	NAM DAE BONG ex DIAMOND 8	Tanker	9273	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, and current report)
32	8593209	MO RAN BONG 1 ex RUN HONG 58	Cargo	2162	Detailed in current report

资料来源：专家小组；从标普全球和国际海事组织记录中获得的船只信息。

注：大多数船只记录的日期是回溯的。


70. 中间船“Hai Jun”号(国际海事组织：9054896)<sup>61</sup>(见图十九)是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2023 年购置的，现作为“A Sa Bong”号航行(见图二十)。

<sup>61</sup> S/2022/132，第 53-58 段及附件 36、37 和 42；S/2022/668，第 40 段及附件 27。



图十九

作为“Sky Venus”号(国际海事组织：9168257)和“Unica”号之间的中间船的  
“Hai Jun”号，2021年9月



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

图二十

在南浦的“Hai Jun”号(现称“A Sa Bong”号)，2023年5月2日



资料来源：会员国和 Maxar Technologies，由专家小组附加说明。

协助方

71. 专家小组正在调查 HongKong Great Star Development Ltd/香港偉星發展有限公司(下称“HKGSD”)，该公司是数艘有关船只背后的实体。在下列船只悬挂



朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗之前，HKGSD 是这些船只最后的注册船东和船舶管理人：


(a) “Sea Star 5” 号，现称 “Puk Chon 2” 号(国际海事组织：8864464)，自 2022 年 7 月起悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗；

(b) “Yuko Maru 8” 号，现称 “Hwang Gum Phyong 3” 号(国际海事组织：9088031)，自 2022 年 10 月起悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。

72. 此外，自 2022 年 1 月起，HKGSD 一直是 “Shundlli” 号的注册船东和船舶管理人，该船在 2023 年 3 月从 “Midas” 号转运了运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的石油(见第 54-56 段)。“Shundlli” 号的月度航行模式表明，至少至 6 月底前，该船还进行了其他非法移交活动(见图二十一)。一个会员国提供了 2022 年 12 月至 2023 年 6 月期间 “Shundlli” 号每月向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮非法交付的数据(见表 3 和附件 42)。

图二十一

香港伟星发展有限公司拥有的 “Shundlli” 号的航行示例，2023 年 5 月和 6 月



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

表 3

“Shundlli” 号向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮移交的石油货物，2022 年 12 月至 2023 年 6 月

No.	Date and Time	Location	Presumed DPRK receiving vessel	Presumed amount of refined petroleum
1	Dawn of 8 December 2022	381710N, 1240546E (104km Southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHONG RYONG SAN (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 1,300 tons
2	Evening of 22 March to dawn of 23 March 2023	Unknown	KUM RYONG 3 (IMO: 8610461)	Approx. 1,800 tons
3	Dawn to morning of 13 April 2023	381600N, 1240400E (107km southwest of West Sea Dam)	UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962)	Approx. 2,000 tons
4	Noon of 13 May to dawn of 14 May 2023	382056N, 1240500E (102km southwest of West Sea Dam)	KUM CHIN KANG 2 (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 2,000 tons
5	Near midnight of 8 June to dawn of 9 June 2023	381612N, 1240507E (105km southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313)	Approx. 2,000 tons

资料来源：会员国。

注：没有一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮传输信号，据报“Shundlli”号在推定的移交时间前后屏蔽了其自动识别系统信号。日期和时间均为当地时间。

73. 专家小组致函前船旗注册处和 HKGSD。巴拿马答复说，已在 2022 年 6 月 7 日取消了“Sea Star 5”号的注册，据称是要转至帕劳船舶注册处。不过，“Sea Star 5”号次月就悬挂了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。帕劳尚未就“Yuko Maru 8”号做出答复。调查仍在继续。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭出口

74. 专家小组自 2019 年以来的报告描述了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只违反相关决议，通过船对船移交在中国领水出口违禁煤炭货物。专家小组再次追踪到先前被报出口煤炭的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只前往先前曾进行朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭出口的连云港水域。<sup>62</sup> 一个会员国评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭在那里卸载(见图二十二中的例子)。该会员国确定台山岛附近水域为通过船对船移交出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的新区域。该区域位于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭出口活动曾经汇合的宁波-舟山水域<sup>63</sup> 南部。

75. 数量有限的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭出口船只偶尔传输自动识别系统信号，通常是在卸载非法货物之后，<sup>64</sup> 但许多船只继续在其大部分非法航程中进行暗航。不过，这些船只所在领水的相关海事当局仍应能够追踪这些船只的

<sup>62</sup> S/2020/151，第 67-70 段；S/2021/777，第 85 段及附件 43。


<sup>63</sup> 自 2019 年以来专家小组报告的海运煤炭章节。

<sup>64</sup> S/2023/171，附件 48。

存在和活动，以执行安全理事会的相关决议。专家小组再次呼吁港口和海关当局加强对接货船及其货运文件的检查，并扣押涉嫌运输违禁物项的船只。其他案件见附件 43。

图二十二

“Hung Bong 3”号进行暗行以卸货，2022 年 12 月-2023 年 1 月，连云港



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。图片：(上) Maxar Technologies，(下) 会员国。

注：虚线表示没有自动识别系统信号传输。

76. 专家小组请中国提供资料，说明 2023 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在连云港水域和中国领水其他区域出口煤炭的情况，包括以下方面的信息：在这些水域朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只通过船对船移交卸载的货物；接货船的识别信息；拥有、经营和采购朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的任何货物的实体和个人；相关的货运文件和金融交易。关于“Hung Bong 3”号，中国表示，该船只“今年 1 月申报空载从南浦进入连云港港口一次……离开时……空载”。关于专家小组要求提供的其他船只的信息，见附件 25。

### 船舶伪装

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只欺骗

77. 为继续进行航行和贸易，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船只和代其行事的船只在数字和实物方面进行伪装，包括以复杂的方式进行船只身份清洗。<sup>65</sup> 一个会员国向专家小组提供了一张 2022 年 10 月拍摄的照片，照片中受制裁的悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Puk Dae Bong”号<sup>66</sup> (前“Hua Fu”号) 的船体上涂着的国际海事组织船舶识别号属于另一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只


<sup>65</sup> S/2022/132，第 43-51 段(“New Konk”号以“F.Lonline”号的身份)；S/2021/777，第 29-41 段(“Subblic”号以“Hai Zhou 168”号的身份，“Billions No.18”以“Apex”的身份)。

<sup>66</sup> 该船的真实国际海事组织船舶识别号是 9020003。

“Myong Sin”号(见图二十三)。专家小组的分析显示,“Myong Sin”号与“Puk Dae Bong”号的上层建筑差别很大(见附件 44)。在会员国拍摄照片的日期,两艘货船都没有传输自动识别系统信号,但两艘船只会偶尔在长时间隐蔽活动之间传输彼此的自动识别系统识别信息,可能是为了掩盖“Puk Dae Bong”号的行踪。

图二十三

船体涂有不同的国际海事组织船舶识别号的受制裁的“Puk Dae Bong”号, 2022 年 10 月 27 日



资料来源:会员国。

## 渔业问题

可能的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海产食品出口

78. 专家小组正在调查一家中国公司涉嫌销售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海产食品<sup>67</sup>的事件。据一个会员国称,至少在 2022 年 7 月,在延吉西市场<sup>68</sup>一家中国公司“北朝鲜海鲜批发(North Korean Seafood Wholesale)”<sup>69</sup>出售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产海产食品(见附件 45)。中国答复说,市场上的这家公司“几年来一直使用‘北朝鲜海鲜批发’的旗号,以此吸引顾客。经查,该摊位销售的海产食品实际上是通过合法渠道从俄罗斯进口的,并非从朝鲜非法获得”(见附件 25)。

## 建议

79. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续主要通过海上手段进行贸易。相应地,规避和违反制裁的情况持续存在,规避方法也随着时间的推移越来越复杂。专家小组先前报告所载的许多与海上活动有关的建议仍然至关重要。

<sup>67</sup> 根据安全理事会第 2371 (2017) 号决议第 9 段,禁止销售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产海产食品。

<sup>68</sup> 延吉西市场。

<sup>69</sup> 北朝鲜海鲜批发。

## 贸易统计和海关问题


### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计分析

80. 根据现有数据，<sup>70、71</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2022 年的贸易额是 2021 年的两倍多，与 2020 年相比增加了 50% 以上(见图二十四)。如专家小组先前报告所述，贸易额增加的主要因素是恢复了该国与中国之间的铁路货运。2022 年，与中国的贸易占朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对外贸易的 90% 以上。尽管出现这一增长，该国有记录的贸易总额仍然只有 2019 年疫情前贸易额的三分之一左右。

图二十四

### 2019-2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易记录

(百万美元)



资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图，2023 年 7 月 9 日查阅。

81. 贸易统计显示，2022 年期间(见附件 46)，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的前三大申报出口商品是矿物燃料和油料(协调制度编码 27)、矿石，矿渣和粉煤灰(协调制度编码 26)以及钢铁(协调制度编码 72)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国前三大申报进口商品是塑料(协调制度编码 39)、动物或植物油脂(协调制度编码 15)和橡胶(协调制度编码 40)。<sup>72</sup> 然而，这些贸易量数字源自贸易伙伴国的海关记录，在某

<sup>70</sup> 根据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2022 年最新贸易统计数据。随着更多会员国向国际贸易中心贸易图等相关贸易统计平台报告其双边贸易，这些数据将继续变化。

<sup>71</sup> 公布的贸易数字中存在由于国家代码使用错误而错报的情况(见第 85 段)，会员国海关当局将会纠正这些情况。

<sup>72</sup> 2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国按商品分列的贸易统计数据完整清单，见附件 46。




些情况下存在错报。这些统计数字也不包括朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法进出口的货物，如煤炭和精炼石油(见第 29、30 和 74-76 段)。<sup>73</sup>

82. 2022 年 6 月至 2023 年 3 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的总体贸易额逐步增加(见图二十五)。该国的月进口量仍低于疫情前的水平，但月出口量已达到或在某些情况下超过了疫情前水平。考虑到与中国的贸易正常化趋势，2023 年的月贸易额可能会进一步增加。

图二十五

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国记录的贸易统计，2022 年 6 月至 2023 年 3 月(月度)

(百万美元)



资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图，2023 年 7 月 9 日查阅。

#### 部门禁令监测

83. 专家小组继续监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的违禁进出口情况。<sup>74、75</sup> 用于此目的的协调制度编码列于附件 50。以下内容主要涵盖 2022 年 10 月至 2023 年 3 月期间。<sup>76、77</sup>

<sup>73</sup> 一个会员国提供了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法煤炭出口最新趋势的估计数(见附件 47)。

<sup>74</sup> 关于专家小组对 2022 年 4 月至 9 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据的询问，加拿大和萨尔瓦多答复说，由于海关数据中的国家变量编码错误，贸易统计数据不准确。就萨尔瓦多而言，进口货物的来源国是大韩民国。另见附件 48。关于统计数据，见 S/2023/171，附件 57。

<sup>75</sup> 关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的渔业产品贸易，见第 78 段。

<sup>76</sup> 关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据与会员国就与该国贸易提供的答复的对照表，见附件 49。

<sup>77</sup> 到 2023 年 7 月 9 日的现有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国总体贸易统计期限截至 2023 年 3 月。



84. 根据国际贸易中心的各国贸易数据记录，一些商品似乎属于制裁类别。专家小组询问了 15 个会员国与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的交易情况，包括拒绝清关申请或扣押货物的详细情况。<sup>78</sup>

85. 15 个会员国中有几个国家表示，它们没有与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易活动记录，之所以有统计数据的主要原因是在报关过程中错误使用了国家代码，即输入了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的国家代码(KP)，而不是大韩民国的国家代码(KR)。一个会员国答复说，所进行的交易符合联合国制裁制度。<sup>79</sup> 专家小组注意到，一些会员国可能在确定某些物项是否被禁止进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面继续面临挑战。

86. 专家小组继续请会员国海关当局提供资料，说明其实际履行制裁义务的情况，例如要求检查往来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的所有货物，并在发现违禁品时予以扣押和处置。附件 51 举例说明了新加坡海关当局在国家执行安全理事会决议方面的情况。

#### 建议

87. 专家小组强调其以往建议，即：

(a) 国际标准化组织和各会员国采取适当措施，包括针对各国海关当局开展外联活动，以防止错误使用国家代码；

(b) 会员国精简进出口管制清单，使用违禁商品的非正式清单作为辅助材料(见附件 50)；

(c) 会员国海关当局利用上述清单为其管辖范围内的贸易代理人提供信息，以进行尽职调查，特别是在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国等受制裁管辖区附近处理此类商品时；

(d) 对于在执行部门禁令问题上需要援助的会员国，委员会应考虑信息外联活动。

## 四. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人以及海外工人

### 禁运

#### *Global Communications (Glocom)*

88. 2017 年，专家小组得出结论认为，当时为军事和准军事组织宣传销售无线电通信设备的设在马来西亚的公司 Glocom 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公司 Pan

<sup>78</sup> 根据现有统计数据，23 个会员国报告了与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易；其中 15 个会员国与该国的贸易涉及限制类协调制度编码下的商品。

<sup>79</sup> 关于会员国的答复，见附件 52。

Systems 平壤分公司(下称“Pan Systems 平壤分公司”)的幌子公司。Pan Systems 平壤分公司由该国主要情报机构侦察总局(KPe.031)运营。<sup>80</sup>

89. 专家小组随后调查了据称于 2022 年 6 月向埃塞俄比亚国防部总局运送两批 Glocom 无线电设备的事件。<sup>81</sup> 据一个会员国称, 2022 年 12 月, 一家印度尼西亚公司 Advanced Technology Facility 代表 Pan Systems 平壤分公司向埃塞俄比亚国防军提供了如何使用 Glocom 无线电的培训。

90. 此外, 专家小组发现, Advanced Technology Facility 似乎在其网站上宣传销售据信是 Glocom 产品的设备。<sup>82</sup> 专家小组通过对 Advanced Technology Facility 网站上的照片进行比较分析, 评估认为这些设备原产于 Glocom。此外, 网站上展示的其中一款产品 ER-310 可能是与埃塞俄比亚国防部总局使用的 Glocom 的 GR-310 同一类型的通信设备(见附件 53)。印度尼西亚、埃塞俄比亚和 Advanced Technology Facility 尚未答复。

据称涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军火和有关物资中介活动的案件

91. 专家小组正在调查斯洛伐克国民 Ashot Mkrttychev 在 2022 年底至 2023 年初期间企图开展朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军火或有关物资的中介活动的资料。一个会员国在 3 月指认了 Mkrttychev 先生(见附件 54)。根据该会员国的新闻稿, “Mkrttychev 与[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]官员合作, 为俄罗斯获得 20 多种武器和弹药, 以换取商业飞机、原材料和商品等运往[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]的物资。Mkrttychev 与[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]和俄罗斯官员进行谈判, 详细说明朝鲜与俄罗斯之间的互利合作, 包括资金支付和易货安排……Mkrttychev 与一名俄罗斯人合作, 寻找适合交付给[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]的商用飞机”。

92. 俄罗斯联邦答复说: “关于所谓的斯洛伐克公民 A. Mkrttychev 就朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向俄罗斯供应武器弹药以换取货物而进行谈判的信息是美利坚合众国方面毫无根据的影射, 未经证实”(见附件 55)。美国提供了 Mkrttychev 先生的护照信息(见附件 56)。斯洛伐克尚未答复。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国武器出口的报告

93. 4 月 28 日的一份媒体报道称, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国制造的 BM-11 多管火箭炮、AGP-250 滑翔炸弹和 122 毫米制导火箭弹正在苏丹使用。<sup>83</sup> 报道中承认, 尚未正式确认这些武器的身份;<sup>84</sup> 但专家小组注意到, 据报朝鲜民主主义人民

<sup>80</sup> S/2017/150, 第 77、79 和 85 段。

<sup>81</sup> S/2023/171, 第 115 段。

<sup>82</sup> Advanced Technology Facility 网站上展示的至少两款产品与 Glocom 产品目录上的产品外观几乎相同, 说明和规格也相似。见 [www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205992/not-your-usual-game-of-whack-a-mole](http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205992/not-your-usual-game-of-whack-a-mole)。

<sup>83</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2023/04/north-korean-weapons-could-be-contributing-to-bloodshed-in-sudan-experts-say](http://www.nknews.org/2023/04/north-korean-weapons-could-be-contributing-to-bloodshed-in-sudan-experts-say)。

<sup>84</sup> 没有关于据称购置朝鲜民主主义人民共和国武器的日期的资料。

共和国曾在 2013 年向苏丹供应了 122 毫米精确制导火箭弹控制部分和 AGP-250 炸弹。<sup>85</sup> 苏丹尚未答复。

94. 5 月 2 日，布基纳法索领导人易卜拉欣·特拉奥雷在接受国家电视台采访时，除其他外，承认该国军队部署了 1980 年代采购的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国武器。<sup>86</sup> 特拉奥雷先生表示，随着恢复与该国的关系，有兴趣从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购更多武器。<sup>87</sup> 布基纳法索尚未答复。

95. 专家小组继续调查一家缅甸公司 Royal Shune Lei Co. Ltd(下称“Royal Shune Lei”),<sup>88</sup> 该公司为缅甸军方从被联合国指认的朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司 (KPe.001)(下称“朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司”)进口武器提供中介服务。<sup>89</sup> 一个会员国报告说，Royal Shune Lei 在 2022 年“与[联合国]指认的[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]人员合作”，采购空中制导炸弹套件。Royal Shune Lei 的负责人同时担任一家设在泰国的公司 TMA Network Group Co., Ltd 的负责人。Royal Shune Lei 也有可能位于缅甸的公司 Chromo Science Co Ltd 合作。缅甸和泰国尚未答复。

96. 专家小组继续调查关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向俄罗斯联邦出口军械的指控。<sup>90</sup> 除 2022 年 11 月通过铁路运输弹药(炮弹、步兵火箭弹和导弹)的说法外，美国还报告说，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和瓦格纳集团是这一交易的幕后操盘手。俄罗斯联邦答复说：“‘一个会员国’提供的照片不是全面的证据，也未显示有违反对平壤实施的国际限制性措施的行为。进出[朝鲜]的货物运输是在考虑到安全理事会关于该国的各项决议的要求的情况下进行的。安理会的制裁禁令和限制措施得到遵守。俄罗斯主管当局没有发现任何违反情况”(见附件 57)。专家小组没有获得进一步证据，仍无法证实所提供图像<sup>91</sup> 中的火车是用来运输弹药的。

疑似与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行军事合作

97. 据一篇媒体报道称，马里过渡政府在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国支持下，开始了一个建造弹药厂的项目。<sup>92</sup> 报道称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻几内亚外交官访问了马里。马里和几内亚尚未答复。

<sup>85</sup> S/2017/150，第 106 段。

<sup>86</sup> 见 [www.youtube.com/live/7aEgXcmzPvE?feature=share&t=2760](https://www.youtube.com/live/7aEgXcmzPvE?feature=share&t=2760)。

<sup>87</sup> 见 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aEgXcmzPvE&t=2760s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aEgXcmzPvE&t=2760s)。

<sup>88</sup> 地址：Bahosi Housing, Lanmadaw Township, Yangon, Myanmar。

<sup>89</sup> S/2023/171，第 124 段。

<sup>90</sup> S/2023/171，第 122 和 123 段。

<sup>91</sup> S/2023/171，附件 68。

<sup>92</sup> 见 <https://netafrique.net/cooperation-mali-coree-du-nord-un-projet-de-construction-dune-usine-de-munitions-a-bamako>。

### 小武器和轻武器

98. 专家小组注意到一个智库评估认为安全理事会的武器禁运总体上减少了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的小武器和轻武器贸易，<sup>93</sup> 同时调查了 2022 年波兰可能从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口“军火和有关物资”的交易信息(根据联合国商品贸易数据库(<https://comtradeplus.un.org>), 交易总额为 5 492 美元)。<sup>94</sup> 波兰答复说, “对国家数据库的分析……未显示在所述期间从[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]向波兰进口了协调制度编码 9305 和 9306 项下的商品或其他军火相关商品”(见附件 58)。

### 奢侈品禁令执行情况

99. 根据目击者的陈述和媒体报道, 2023 年边境的部分重新开放促进了各种外国商品重新出现在零售业中, 其中包括一些可被认为是奢侈品的商品, 含国际品牌商品, 以及外国制造的新车。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计<sup>95</sup> 显示, 除其他外, 协调制度编码为 24、33、43、60-66 和 91 的消费品的进口数量增加, 这些商品类别可能含有可被归类为奢侈品的物品。调查仍在继续。

100. 新加坡当局在 6 月向专家小组通报情况时说: “调查确定, 自 2013 年至 2018 年, 9 家公司与[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]进行了违禁贸易。这些公司包括出口商品销售公司和从事物流工作的公司。5 家公司和 9 名个人受到起诉, 其中 3 家公司和 7 名个人因参与此类贸易而被定罪。针对另外 1 家公司和 2 名个人的案件正在调查中”(见附件 59 和 60)。专家小组指出, 在执行安全理事会对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的制裁的决议时, 必须监测过境或转运货物。

101. 专家小组根据 2023 年 1 月和平壤一辆新交付的路虎卫士汽车的图像开始调查。制造商答复专家小组说, 这辆车是“一辆路虎卫士 110, 很可能是 2020 年款”(见附件 61)。调查仍在继续。

102. 专家小组继续调查 2021 年在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国观察到的一架三角钢琴, 媒体称该钢琴是施坦威品牌。<sup>96、97</sup> 施坦威乐器公司答复说, 该公司无法“在没有对该钢琴进行实物检查和审查其序列号(如果)的情况下, 确定钢琴是否

<sup>93</sup> 见 [www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation](http://www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation)。但是, 专家小组先前已查明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与数个会员国之间有可能被认为属于“军火和有关物资”类别的物项交易。见 S/2023/171, 第 118-121 段。

<sup>94</sup> 专家小组注意到, 波兰是 2022 年海关数据显示朝鲜民主主义人民共和国小武器和轻武器出口的唯一国家。在这方面, 一名外部专家向专家小组指出, “没有迹象表明[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]据称向俄罗斯出口”有三个可能的原因: (a) 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有向联合国报告其贸易活动; (b) 包括俄罗斯联邦在内的会员国没有充分披露其国际贸易数据; (c) 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有出口。

<sup>95</sup> 见第 80-82 段。

<sup>96</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos](http://www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos)。

<sup>97</sup> S/2022/132, 第 148 段。

是施坦威钢琴”，但“该钢琴外观的多处不一致表明它可能不是施坦威钢琴”（见附件 62）。

## 建议

103. 专家小组再次建议会员国考虑更新出口管制清单，以符合安全理事会第 1718(2006)、1874(2009)、2094(2013)、2270(2016)和 2321(2016)号决议目标的方式反映违禁奢侈品清单，同时避免不必要地扩大清单范围，目的是不限制向平民供应未受禁止的货物，并且不产生负面的人道主义影响。

104. 专家小组建议，会员国应鼓励本国从事奢侈品出口的商业实体和国民在合同中列入禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运的条款。

## 侦察总局(KPe.031)

105. 专家小组继续监测和调查被认为来自隶属于侦察总局<sup>98</sup>的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体(包括 Kimsuky、Lazarus Group 和 BlueNoroff)的网络攻击。<sup>99</sup> 如先前所报，这些行为体的主要任务是确定和攻击目标，以通过欺诈手段获取对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有价值的信息并非法创收(见第 139-144 段)。

106. 多个会员国制裁了与侦察总局有关联的网络威胁行为体和侦察总局内部的相关单位。<sup>100</sup>、<sup>101</sup> 2 月和 5 月，两个会员国还指认了技术监控(侦察)局。会员国发布了咨询和警报，提供了关于这些网络威胁行为体的行动和危险信号指标的详细信息。<sup>102</sup>

107. 根据网络安全公司的报告和会员国的资料，Kimsuky 继续进行鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动，通过各类附件文件部署恶意软件，创建欺骗性网站和网址以获取目标的凭据。Lazarus Group 针对加密货币、国防、能源和医疗部门的公司开展恶意活动。在一个案例中，首次观察到双重供应链入侵。BlueNoroff 继续开展鱼叉式网络钓鱼活动，并首次针对 MacOS 用户使用恶意软件。不过，有一个案件涉及旨在将不知情的攻击对象引向凭据收集页面的电子邮件。这与 BlueNoroff 惯用的恶意软件部署手法不同。

<sup>98</sup> 关于侦察总局在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行动中的作用，见 S/2020/840，附件 48。

<sup>99</sup> 本节中使用的网络威胁行为体及其行动名称在网络安全行业中广泛使用。

<sup>100</sup> 关于侦察总局组织结构中的网络威胁行为体，见 S/2023/171，图三十七。

<sup>101</sup> <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498> 和 [www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_4080/view.do?seq=373338&page=53](http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373338&page=53)。


<sup>102</sup> 例如，关于 Kimsuky，见附件 63。

Kimsuky<sup>103、104</sup>

108. 一家网络安全公司报告说，Kimsuky 一直在发送伪装的恶意文件附件——Word 宏文档、微软编译的 HTML 帮助文件、OneNote 文件等，一旦被执行，就会泄露受害者计算机中的数据，包括系统信息和已安装的杀毒软件。在另一个案件中，Kimsuky 创建了一个看似与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关研究所相同的 Webmail 网站(见图二十六)，并使用鱼叉式网络钓鱼信息引诱受害者登录，从而向 Kimsuky 提供登录信息。<sup>105</sup>

图二十六

针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关研究人员创建的 Webmail 登录页面



资料来源：ASEC。

109. 已知 Kimsuky 主要通过鱼叉式网络钓鱼进行社会工程攻击，但它也直接攻击网络服务器。一家网络安全公司在 3 月报告称，Kimsuky 攻击了一家建筑公司因补丁未更新而存在漏洞的互联网信息服务网络服务器。此次攻击在目标系统中安装了 Meterpreter 恶意软件，<sup>106</sup> 使 Kimsuky 能够控制网络服务器。在另一个案件中，据报 Kimsuky 使用交换数据流来隐藏恶意软件，该恶意软件通过启动超文本标记语言(HTML)文件中包含的 Visual Basic 脚本语言来收集数据。<sup>107</sup>

<sup>103</sup> 一家网络安全公司在 2023 年 3 月发布了一份关于 Kimsuky(被称为 APT43)的详细报告。见 <https://mandiant.widen.net/s/zvmfw5fnjs/apt43-report>。该报告指出，APT43 常常被公开追踪为 Kimsuky，尽管这家网络安全公司认为 APT43 是一个不同的团体。另一家网络安全公司称朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体 ARCHIPELAGO 是 APT43 的一个分支。见 <https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/how-were-protecting-users-from-government-backed-attacks-from-north-korea>。

<sup>104</sup> 关于与 Kimsuky 有关的其他案件，见附件 65。

<sup>105</sup> 关于相关报告的链接，见附件 64。

<sup>106</sup> Meterpreter 恶意软件是一个后门，可通过接收来自威胁行为体的命令执行各种恶意行为。该恶意软件由 Metasploit 提供，Metasploit 是一种用作渗透测试框架的开源工具。

<sup>107</sup> 关于相关报告的链接，见附件 64。



110. 据两个会员国 2023 年 3 月发布的咨询公告称，<sup>108、109</sup> Kimsuky 开展了一次鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动，涉及使用恶意 Google Chrome 扩展程序来进行 Gmail 电子邮件渗漏，方式是利用 Chrome DevTools 应用程序接口来协助拦截和盗窃电子邮件。该咨询公告还包含关于 Kimsuky 使用安卓恶意软件 FastFire、FastViewer 和 FastSpy 的警告。<sup>110</sup>

111. 一家网络安全公司 5 月报告<sup>111</sup> 称，Kimsuky 开展了一次网络钓鱼行动，邀请就当前的地缘政治问题进行交流，以引诱全球目标部署新的侦察工具 ReconShark，该工具收集敏感数据并绕过安全机制。ReconShark 恶意软件在目标打开下载的文档并启用宏时被激活。ReconShark 从受感染系统中窃取数据，如端点检测和反应机制，并通过 Windows 管理规范将窃取的数据发送给命令和控制服务器。

112. 专家小组从一个会员国收到的资料称，Kimsuky 还开展了针对各种联合国人员电子邮件的 ReconShark 相关鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动。Kimsuky 将鱼叉式网络钓鱼电子邮件伪装成来自新闻机构和智库的征求评论和书面投稿的邮件。Kimsuky 的电子邮件来自 [andersonj@rfa.ink](mailto:andersonj@rfa.ink) 和 [ashraf@ipinst.online](mailto:ashraf@ipinst.online)。

#### *Lazarus Group*<sup>112</sup>

113. 3 月，黑客入侵了 3CX<sup>113</sup> 的 Windows 和 MacOS 桌面应用程序，将其与恶意软件捆绑在一起。结果，3CX 的客户无意中下载了该公司语音和视频通话软件的恶意版本。攻击者利用该软件的恶意版本，可以在受害者计算机上下载并运行任意代码。这一供应链攻击<sup>114</sup> 是之前对一家金融软件公司 Trading Technologies 的供应链攻击的结果，这一罕见的例子说明单个犯罪者如何利用一

<sup>108</sup> 见 [www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/prevention/2023-03-20-joint-cyber-security-advisory-korean.html](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/prevention/2023-03-20-joint-cyber-security-advisory-korean.html)。

<sup>109</sup> 见 [www.nis.go.kr/resources/synap/skin/doc.html?fn=NIS\\_FILE\\_1679299138913](https://www.nis.go.kr/resources/synap/skin/doc.html?fn=NIS_FILE_1679299138913)。

<sup>110</sup> 专家小组在 S/2023/171 号文件附件 79 中报告了安卓恶意软件。另见 <https://medium.com/s2wblog/unveil-the-evolution-of-kimsuky-targeting-android-devices-with-newly-discovered-mobile-malware-280dae5a650f>。

<sup>111</sup> 见 [www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-evolves-reconnaissance-capabilities-in-new-global-campaign](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-evolves-reconnaissance-capabilities-in-new-global-campaign)。

<sup>112</sup> 关于与 Lazarus Group 有关的其他案件，见附件 67。

<sup>113</sup> 3CX 是一家国际因特网语音协议软件开发和分销公司，为许多组织提供电话系统服务。据其网站称，3CX 在航空航天和卫生保健等各领域拥有超过 600 000 家客户和 1 200 万用户。它提供客户端软件，可通过网络浏览器和移动或桌面应用程序使用其系统。

<sup>114</sup> 2023 年 7 月，信息技术管理公司 JumpCloud 宣布，一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体未经授权访问了该公司系统，目标是该公司一小群特定客户(见 [www.sentinelone.com/labs/jumpcloud-intrusion-attacker-infrastructure-links-compromise-to-north-korean-apt-activity](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/jumpcloud-intrusion-attacker-infrastructure-links-compromise-to-north-korean-apt-activity) 和 <https://jumpcloud.com/blog/security-update-incident-details>)。网络安全公司确定 Lazarus Group 是此次供应链攻击的罪魁祸首，其目的是盗窃加密货币(见 [www.reuters.com/technology/n-korea-hackers-breached-us-it-company-bid-steal-crypto-sources-2023-07-20/](https://www.reuters.com/technology/n-korea-hackers-breached-us-it-company-bid-steal-crypto-sources-2023-07-20/))。

次软件供应链攻击进行另一次下游攻击。目标包括能源部门的关键基础设施。网络安全公司认为此次攻击是 Lazarus Group 所为。<sup>115</sup>

114. 4月18日，一个会员国宣布，<sup>116</sup> Lazarus Group 入侵了 61 个地方组织和机构的 207 台计算机，其中包括 4 家生物技术公司和 3 家与国防有关的公司。Lazarus Group 针对一个对互联网银行和电子金融服务至关重要的软件的漏洞，使用通过已被入侵媒体网站传播的恶意代码。在此过程中使用了“水坑”攻击。<sup>117</sup>通过机构间联合应对努力，该会员国阻止了犯罪者的进一步访问。

115. 6月，一家网络安全公司告知专家小组，在 2022 年 5 月至 11 月，观察到 Lazarus Group 以一个会员国的公共和私营部门研究组织、医学研究和能源部门及其供应链为目标。这次行动被称为“*No Pineapple*”，<sup>118, 119</sup>重点是收集情报，首先是对一家公司进行攻击，为此利用 CVE-2022-27925(远程代码执行)和 CVE-2022-37042(绕过身份验证)这两个影响数字协作平台 Zimbra 的漏洞。<sup>120</sup>通过访问 Zimbra，Lazarus Group 使邮箱内容渗漏以收集信息。Lazarus Group 然后横向移动到同一网络中的另一个易受攻击的设备，使用 Dtrack 恶意软件<sup>121</sup> (窃取信息的后门程序)，最终窃取了 100GB 的数据。

#### *BlueNoroff*

116. 一家网络安全公司在 1 月报告说，<sup>122</sup> 一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国赞助的“与 BlueNoroff 重叠”的高级持续性威胁组织 TA444 在 2022 年 12 月下旬向多个会员国的各种目标发送了网络钓鱼电子邮件，涵盖数个“垂直领域”，除金融外，还包括教育、政府和卫生保健。<sup>123</sup> 这些诱骗电子邮件诱使用户点击

<sup>115</sup> 见 [www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cx-desktop-app-customers](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cx-desktop-app-customers), [www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/linux-malware-strengthens-links-lazarus-3cx-supply-chain-attack](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/linux-malware-strengthens-links-lazarus-3cx-supply-chain-attack), [www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise) 和 <https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/xtrader-3cx-supply-chain>。

<sup>116</sup> 更多详情见附件 66。

<sup>117</sup> 在“水坑”攻击中，攻击者感染目标个人或组织经常访问或通常使用的网站。其目的是通过安装额外的恶意软件，在受害者访问受感染网站时入侵受害者的计算机。

<sup>118</sup> 见 <https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf>。

<sup>119</sup> “No Pineapple”是一个远程访问恶意软件在向 Lazarus Group 服务器上传窃取数据时发送的错误信息。

<sup>120</sup> 关于 Zimbra 相关的公共漏洞和暴露的网络安全咨询公告，见 [www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-228a](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-228a)。

<sup>121</sup> 关于 Dtrack 恶意软件的详细信息，见 S/2023/171，第 171 段；S/2020/151，第 119 段。

<sup>122</sup> 见 [www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta444-apt-startup-aimed-at-your-funds](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta444-apt-startup-aimed-at-your-funds)。

<sup>123</sup> TA444 的活动历来都是出于经济动机。例如，该团体曾以“Snatchcrypto 行动”而闻名。见 S/2022/668，第 127 段。

“SendGrid 网址”，<sup>124</sup> 将受害者重定向到凭据收集页面。据报，这与 TA444 先前的操作不同，其先前的操作通常是直接部署恶意软件。

117. 4 月，首次观察到 BlueNoroff 通过名为“RustBucket”的新型 macOS 恶意软件攻击 macOS 用户，<sup>125</sup> 该恶意软件伪装成 PDF 阅读器应用程序，引诱受害者下载并打开该应用程序。RustBucket 然后部署一个特洛伊木马程序，使 BlueNoroff 能够执行诸如窃取敏感信息、删除或修改文件、安装其他恶意软件和远程控制被入侵系统等操作。6 月，另一家网络安全公司检测到 RustBucket 更新版本，其具有更强的持久化和躲避检测的能力。<sup>126</sup>

## 海外工人

118. 专家小组继续调查违反安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段在国外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(海外工人)。专家小组注意到，由于该国关闭边境，继续使会员国难以按照决议要求遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民。

## 信息技术工人<sup>127</sup>

Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation 公司(又称 Jinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company)

119. 根据会员国和公开来源的资料，Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation 公司(下称“Chinyong IT”)是人民武装力量省(KPe.054)(又称国防省)的下属实体，该公司“雇用在[多个国家]工作的[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术]工作人员”。此外，一个据称住在俄罗斯联邦符拉迪沃斯托克的名叫 Kim Sang Man 的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人据报是 Chinyong IT 的总经理，据称其参与了为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国销售和转让信息技术设备，并在 2021 年接收来自在中国和俄罗斯联邦的信息技术工人的加密货币转账。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Ki Hyok、Jon Yon Gun<sup>128</sup> 和 Kim Song Il 分别是 Chinyong IT 驻俄罗斯联邦、老挝人民民主共和国和中国的代表，据称他们参与了为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法赚取外汇的活动。<sup>129</sup> 两个会员国在 5 月指认了 Chinyong IT

<sup>124</sup> SendGrid 是一款基于云的电子邮件营销工具，可协助营销人员和开发人员进行活动管理和受众参与。

<sup>125</sup> 见 [www.jamf.com/blog/bluenoroff-apt-targets-macos-rustbucket-malware](http://www.jamf.com/blog/bluenoroff-apt-targets-macos-rustbucket-malware)。

<sup>126</sup> 见 [www.elastic.co/security-labs/DPRK-strikes-using-a-new-variant-of-rustbucket](http://www.elastic.co/security-labs/DPRK-strikes-using-a-new-variant-of-rustbucket) 和 [www.sentinelone.com/blog/bluenoroff-how-dprks-macos-rustbucket-seeks-to-evade-analysis-and-detection](http://www.sentinelone.com/blog/bluenoroff-how-dprks-macos-rustbucket-seeks-to-evade-analysis-and-detection)。

<sup>127</sup> 会员国关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外信息技术工人的指导/咨询公告，见 [www.state.gov/guidance-on-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-information-technology-workers](http://www.state.gov/guidance-on-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-information-technology-workers) 和 [www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m\\_25525/contents.do](http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_25525/contents.do)。专家小组就信息技术工人问题与数位专家进行了约谈(调查结果见附件 68)。调查结果与会员国的指导/咨询公告的内容一致。

<sup>128</sup> 专家小组 2023 年 6 月收到消息称，Jon Yon Gun 已离开老挝人民民主共和国。

<sup>129</sup> 关于本段提到的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人的资料，见附件 69。

和 Kim Sang Man, 其中一个会员国还在 5 月指认了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人 Kim Ki Hyok、Jon Yon Gun 和 Kim Song Il。<sup>130</sup>

120. 专家小组还从一个会员国获悉, Chinyong IT 在 2017 年至 2022 年期间进行了价值超过 5 000 万美元的交易, 持有数十个清洗非法收入的银行账户。据该会员国称, 一家设在第三国的公司直接参与代表 Chinyong IT 进行洗钱。该会员国提供的资料显示, Chinyong IT 在 2020 年初至 2022 年初期间, 利用若干银行账户和汇款服务为设在老挝人民民主共和国的 Chinyong IT 团队进行了价值超过 2 000 万美元的交易, 并在 2022 年年中为设在中国和俄罗斯联邦的 Chinyong IT 团队进行了超过 500 万美元的交易。调查仍在继续。

121. 俄罗斯联邦答复说, 它“没有关于第三方认为在俄罗斯境内、涉嫌通过网络空间从事具体活动而违反联合国安全理事会金融制裁的朝鲜国民的数据”。中国答复说, 该国“没有发现相关个人在中国境内从事任何非法网络金融活动”(见附件 25)。老挝人民民主共和国尚未答复。

老挝人民民主共和国

122. 专家小组以前曾报告朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人 Oh Chung Song 的情况, 据报其通过一个自由职业者平台为若干不同的公司开发和供应信息技术相关程序。<sup>131</sup> 2021 年 12 月, Oh 先生与其他 8 名与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的个人从阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜搬至万象。老挝人民民主共和国答复说, Oh 先生和另外两人(Kim Il Hyok 和 Kim Myong Chol)已于 2023 年 2 月离开万象, 其余 6 人将被“遣返回本国”, 此外, “一旦实施措施, 将向[专家小组]提供他们的记录”。6 月, 专家小组获得信息, 这 8 人已离开万象。专家小组正在等待老挝人民民主共和国提供关于这些人的移民资料。

123. 一个会员国向专家小组提供资料称, 据报设在老挝人民民主共和国的军需工业部(KPe.028)附属公司 Tongmyong Technology Trade Company(下称“Tongmyong Tech”)向国外派遣了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人。据该会员国称, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Hyo Dong 是驻老挝人民民主共和国的 Tongmyong Tech 的代表。此外, 另外两名驻老挝人民民主共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Yu Song Hyok 和 Yun Song Il 据报一直在协助朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人寻找办公场所和住宿地点, 并与外国中介人斡旋以套现盗取的虚拟资产。这两人还在老挝人民民主共和国经营一家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐馆<sup>132</sup>(见第 124 段)。<sup>133</sup> 出于这些原因, 该会员国在 2023 年 5 月

<sup>130</sup> 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498> 和 [www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=17](http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=17)。

<sup>131</sup> S/2023/172, 第 153 段; S/2022/668, 第 142 段。

<sup>132</sup> Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki(地址: Donchan Road, Thatkhao Village, Sisattanak District, Vientiane)。

<sup>133</sup> 关于本段提到的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人的资料, 见附件 71。

指认了 Tongmyong Tech、Kim Hyo Dong、Yu Song Hyok 和 Yun Song Il。<sup>134</sup> 老挝人民民主共和国尚未答复。调查仍在继续。

#### 餐馆工人

124. 专家小组以前曾报告，四家餐馆和一个夜市一直在雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，这些人本应在 2019 年 12 月底前被遣返。<sup>135</sup> 老挝人民民主共和国答复说，“其中两家餐馆已将所有权和经营转让给老挝公民，后以相同的餐馆名称重新开业，继续供应朝鲜食品”，并解释说，这些餐馆完全按照老挝法规拥有和经营，已不再违反安全理事会决议。专家小组注意到，老挝人民民主共和国没有提供关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐馆工人的资料。此外，如果朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民继续控制餐馆或从中受益，将正式所有权或经营权转让给当地个人可能是一种逃避制裁的策略。<sup>136</sup> 调查仍在继续。

#### 医务人员

#### 利比亚

125. 根据专家小组获得的资料，一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医疗队 1 月在利比亚一家医院工作。资料显示，该医疗队是乘坐一家总部设在利比亚的空运公司运营的包机前往库夫拉的。专家小组的调查显示，其中至少 10 名医务人员在 2019 年至 2020 年期间受雇在塞内加尔工作。<sup>137</sup> 专家小组已请利比亚提供补充资料。调查仍在继续(见附件 72)。

#### 莫桑比克

126. 专家小组获得的资料显示，截至 2022 年 12 月，似乎至少有 3 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医务人员一直在莫桑比克的两家医院工作。莫桑比克答复说，它“承认所报告的结论……要停止雇用新的[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]医生并取消现有合同”，并补充说，它“关注高素质的专科医生以增援国家卫生部门的需求”(见附件 73)。

<sup>134</sup> 见 [www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=1](http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=1)。

<sup>135</sup> S/2022/132，第 174 段及附件 82。

<sup>136</sup> 先前的调查显示，为掩盖参与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国逃避制裁活动的情况，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的个人和实体曾利用外国协助者制造貌似可信的否认，变更公司、飞机和船只的注册信息，包括将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的姓名改为非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人员，而朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民则保留控制权和(或)以其他方式获益。例如见 S/2013/337，第 78 和 110 段及附件十三；S/2015/131，第 131 和 132 段；S/2017/150，第 154 段；S/2018/171，第 189 段；S/2019/171，附件 46 和 47；S/2022/668，第 64 段及附件 39。关于以前对老挝人民民主共和国境内的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐馆的调查，见 S/2020/840，第 133 段。

<sup>137</sup> 为保护隐私，专家小组在附件中对个人的原始照片作了说明。



## 塞内加尔

127. 在塞内加尔，一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医疗队在 2019 年至 2020 年期间与一个非政府组织合作在数个地点开展工作。该非政府组织答复专家小组的询问说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一名大使向该组织介绍了由 30 名人员组成的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医疗队；医疗队数次与该非政府组织合作，包括在宗教和地方活动中；医疗队的工作是自愿性的。专家小组请塞内加尔提供关于医疗队工作报酬的补充资料(见附件 74)。调查仍在继续。

## 建筑工人

128. 专家小组先前曾就朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民持学生签证在海外工作的报告致函一些会员国和实体，<sup>138</sup> 并收到一个会员国对这种做法的确认。<sup>139</sup>

129. 专家小组调查了 2020 年 4 月在俄罗斯联邦萨哈林州柯尔萨科夫一住宅楼建筑工地事故中涉及疑似朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人一案。柯尔萨科夫市检察官办公室认定涉案公司 LLC Euro-Standard<sup>140</sup> 允许外国公民在多层住宅楼建筑工地工作，违反了劳动和移民法律。俄罗斯联邦答复说，“在住宅楼施工过程中受伤的两名朝鲜公民在参加工业工程体验课程，这是其在萨哈林州立大学联邦资助的高等教育机构学习的一部分”(见附件 75)。

## 建议

130. 专家小组提醒会员国，依照安全理事会第 2397 (2017)号决议第 8 段的下述规定不存在人道主义或医疗服务豁免：遣返所有在该会员国管辖范围赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和所有监视朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外工人的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府安全监督专员，除非会员国认定一朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民是该会员国国民或是禁止遣返的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，但须符合适用的国内法和国际法。

## 五. 金融

131. 专家小组评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反安全理事会决议，进入国际金融体系并从事非法金融活动。

### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外银行代表

132. 专家小组正在调查如下资料：朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Sim Hyon Sop 是朝鲜光鲜银行<sup>141</sup> (KPe.025)(下称“KKBC”)的代表，直到最近还在第三国，

<sup>138</sup> S/2020/151，第 146 段及附件 39；S/2020/840，第 108 段和 137-139 段及附件 54；S/2021/211，第 130 段及附件 67；S/2022/132，第 176 和 177 段及附件 83。

<sup>139</sup> S/2020/840，第 139 段。

<sup>140</sup> ООО “Евро-Стандарт”。

<sup>141</sup> 隶属于外贸银行(KPe.047)。



但目前在中国丹东。<sup>142</sup> 据一个会员国称，2021 年至 2023 年 3 月期间，Sim 先生收到价值超过 2 400 万美元的清洗的虚拟货币，其中至少 1 200 万美元来自隶属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军需工业部(KPe.028)的信息技术工人。据报，其中一些信息技术工人在美国公司非法就业并要求以虚拟货币支付其工作报酬。据称，Sim 先生还指示场外交易员(见第 142 段)用被盗虚拟货币的资金向幌子公司付款，以便这些幌子公司能够代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用法定货币支付货款。两个会员国在 2023 年 4 月指认了 Sim 先生。<sup>143</sup> 中国答复说，它“没有发现相关个人在中国境内从事任何非法网络金融活动”(见附件 25)。

133. 根据会员国提供的信息，Sim 先生还代表 KKBC 与其他个人合作，利用幌子公司、虚假运输记录和其他欺骗手段为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购货物。该会员国估计，这些活动为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国带来了近 7 亿美元的收入。据称，Sim 先生及其合伙人还在 2019 年违反决议，从第三国为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购了一架直升机。<sup>144</sup> 调查仍在继续。

### 进入国际金融体系

134. 据一个会员国称，朝鲜青松联合会社(KPe.010)正在与一个第三国国民合作，以获得银行服务。该会员国还指出，已知朝鲜青松联合会社<sup>145</sup> 还使用若干朝鲜民主主义人民共和国幌子公司名称。调查仍在继续。这些幌子公司名称包括：

- (a) Jihyang 联合会社(Jihyang Associated Corporation);
- (b) Jihyang 技术贸易公司(Jihyang Technology Trade Company);
- (c) Jihyang 贸易会社(Jihyang Trading Corporation);
- (d) 朝鲜建筑和健身器材会社(Korea Construction & Gym Equipment Corporation);
- (e) 健身器材会社(Gym Equipment Corporation);
- (f) 健身器材联合会社(Gym Equipment Associated Corporation);
- (g) 体操器材会社(Gymnastic Equipment Corporation);
- (h) 朝鲜建筑和体育器材联合会社(Korea Construction and Sports Equipment United Corporation);
- (i) 体育器材联合会社(Sports Equipment United Corporation)。

<sup>142</sup> 见 [www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1581281/download](http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1581281/download)。

<sup>143</sup> 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1435> 和 [www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_4080/view.do?seq=373600&page=1](http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373600&page=1)。

<sup>144</sup> 见 [www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1584251/download](http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1584251/download)。

<sup>145</sup> S/2022/668 号文件第 120 段提到前三个公司。

135. 专家小组继续收到关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人和实体非法进入国际金融体系的资料(见第 120 段)。同样, 据一个会员国称, 隶属于人民武装力量省(KPe.054)的一个实体正在利用数十个第三国银行账户将收入汇回其总部控制。调查仍在继续。

#### 合资企业、合作实体和非法商业活动

136. 专家小组对朝鲜民族保险总公司(KPe.048)(下称“KNIC”)启动了调查, 据一个会员国称, 该公司在过去几年就解决旧的索赔和参与新保单大幅增加了与世界各地保险和再保险公司以及法律事务所的接触。据报, 为了掩饰身份和逃避安全理事会制裁, KNIC 以其幌子公司或下属公司(包括 Rainbow Intermediaries、Samhae Insurance Corporation 和 Polestar Insurance Company)及其海外代表(其中许多人在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆“以外交身份为掩饰”)的名义开展工作。据一个会员国和媒体报道称,<sup>146</sup> KNIC 有进行保险欺诈的历史, 其下属公司也涉嫌从事类似的欺诈活动。据称, 它们利用当地公司作为中间方来接收或发送付款, 以规避制裁。专家小组已请可能与 KNIC 及其下属实体有牵连的公司提供资料, 但正在等待大多数公司的答复。调查仍在继续。

137. 据一个会员国称, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续建立合资企业和合作实体, 以逃避制裁, 并利用幌子公司、掩护公司和空壳公司。专家小组正在调查一个会员国提供的关于一名个人 Choi Chon Gon 的新资料, 此人于 2019 年在蒙古设立了一家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国幌子公司 Hanne Ulaan LLC(下称“Hanne Ulaan”), 他利用该公司为平壤采购货物。专家小组先前调查了 Choi 先生和 Hanne Ulaan, 蒙古当局随后告知专家小组, 该公司的注册文件被寄送到莫斯科的一个地址, 该地址与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆的地址相吻合。蒙古初步评估认为 Hanne Ulaan 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为逃避制裁而设立的幌子公司, 并进一步报告说已冻结了与 Hanne Ulaan 和 Choi 先生有关的银行账户中的资金。<sup>147</sup> 6 月, 一个会员国指认 Hanne Ulaan 和 Choi 先生代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从事非法金融交易。<sup>148</sup> 调查仍在继续。

138. 专家小组指出, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最近部分开放边境, 可能会增加其国民运送现金和高价值物项的案件。据悉, 一些该国在境外旅行的国民在行

<sup>146</sup> 例如见 [www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/23/uk-freezes-assets-of-north-korean-company-in-south-london-insurance-nuclear-weapons](http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/23/uk-freezes-assets-of-north-korean-company-in-south-london-insurance-nuclear-weapons)、[www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061703852.html?wpisrc=newsletter](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061703852.html?wpisrc=newsletter)、<https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/ID013001/KNIC-refutes-new-fraud-allegations> 和 <https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0209.pdf>。该会员国报告说, KNIC 和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府企图进行保险欺诈, 从开始投保时就为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的工厂或其他建筑物超额投保和(或)夸大损失金额, 还可能捏造灾害索赔。

<sup>147</sup> S/2021/211, 第 152 段及附件 89。

<sup>148</sup> 见 [www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_4080/view.do?seq=373848&page=1](http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373848&page=1)。

李中携带包括现金、黄金和野生生物产品在内的高价值物项，以逃避制裁。<sup>149</sup> 一个会员国提供了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行现金运送活动的资料。调查仍在继续。

### 通过网络活动非法创收

139. 2 月，一家网络安全公司报告称，<sup>150</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国家支持的网络行为体，如 Lazarus Group，<sup>151</sup> 在 2022 年盗窃了价值近 17 亿美元的加密货币，是其 2021 年盗窃金额的三倍多(见图二十七)。该公司进一步评估认为，该国正在优先重视加密货币黑客攻击，“以资助其核武器计划”。在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体 2022 年窃取的总金额中，近三分之二(约 11 亿美元)来自针对分散式金融平台的攻击，其中包括对 Harmony Bridge<sup>152</sup> 和 Axie Infinity 的 Ronin 网络的黑客攻击。<sup>153、154</sup> 同样，据 5 月依据另一家网络安全公司的分析报告的媒体报道称，<sup>155</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以多个会员国公司的虚拟资产为目标“以获取用于导弹计划的外汇”，从 2017 年到 2022 年盗窃了 23 亿美元的加密货币。一名会员国官员在 5 月评估说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的恶意网络活动为其导弹计划提供了一半资金。<sup>156、157</sup>

<sup>149</sup> 例如见安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 35 段、第 2270(2016)号决议第 37 段和第 2094(2013)号决议第 14 段；<https://static.rusi.org/OP-embassies-and-elephants-north-koreas-involvement-in-the-IWT-final-web.pdf>。

<sup>150</sup> 见 <https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/2022-biggest-year-ever-for-crypto-hacking>。

<sup>151</sup> 隶属于侦察总局(KPe.031)；见第 105-107 段和第 113-115 段。

<sup>152</sup> 会员国当局已与加密货币交易所和网络安全公司合作，以追回从这些黑客攻击中盗取的资金。见 <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/elliptic-collaborates-with-binance-and-huobi-to-freeze-lazarus-group-hack-proceeds>。

<sup>153</sup> S/2022/668，第 147 和 148 段；S/2023/171，第 165 段。


<sup>154</sup> 2023 年 2 月，挪威国家经济和环境犯罪调查和检察院(Økokrim)宣布已追回价值约 6 000 万挪威克朗(580 万美元)的加密货币。见 [www.okokrim.no/record-cryptocurrency-seizure-in-the-axie-case.6585495-549344.html](http://www.okokrim.no/record-cryptocurrency-seizure-in-the-axie-case.6585495-549344.html)。

<sup>155</sup> 见 <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cryptocurrencies/North-Korean-crypto-thefts-target-Japan-Vietnam-Hong-Kong>。

<sup>156</sup> 见 <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/north-korean-missile-program-cyberattacks/index.html> 和 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=fz\\_3PZq8gXs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fz_3PZq8gXs)。

<sup>157</sup> 其他会员国也公开评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在利用恶意网络活动为其导弹和(或)核计划提供资金。例如见 <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230719008400320>。

图二十七  
2016-2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体每年盗取的加密货币总额  
(百万美元)



资料来源：Chainalysis。

140. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络威胁行为体继续为逃避联合国制裁目的针对虚拟资产服务提供商和更广泛的虚拟资产行业进行攻击。专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国这些违反金融制裁的行为。

加密货币行业

141. 一家网络安全公司在 2023 年 2 月报告称，<sup>158</sup> 新的虚拟货币混币器 Sinbad 可能是 Blender.io 的改名。<sup>159</sup> 据该报告称，Sinbad 已清洗了近 1 亿美元的来自 Lazarus Group 黑客攻击的比特币，其中包括 2022 年 6 月对 Harmony Bridge 的黑客攻击。负责 Sinbad 运作的是“同一个人或团体”，与疑似 Blender.io 运行主体绑定的钱包也显示加密货币流向 Sinbad。<sup>160</sup> 据报，这两个混币器的链上行为模式非常相似，包括交易的具体特征和使用其他服务进行混淆。此外，“Sinbad 混币器的运行方式在几个方面与 Blender 相同，包括十位数的混币器代码、由服务地址签署的保证书以及最长 7 天的交易延迟”。调查仍在继续。

<sup>158</sup> 见 <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/has-a-sanctioned-bitcoin-mixer-been-resurrected-to-aid-north-korea-s-lazarus-group>。

<sup>159</sup> 2022 年，一个会员国指认了虚拟货币混币器 Blender.io 和 Tornado Cash。见 S/2022/668，第 147 段；S/2023/171，第 161 段。

<sup>160</sup> 另一家网络安全公司报告说(见上文脚注 150)，它“观察到属于与朝鲜有关的黑客的钱包向 [Sinbad] 服务发送资金”。

142. 专家小组正在调查会员国提供的资料，资料涉及场外虚拟货币交易员 Wu Huihui(中国国民)协助将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体盗取的虚拟货币兑换为法定货币，以及第三国场外交易员 Cheng Hung Man(驻香港)与 Wu 先生合作向公司汇款以换取虚拟货币。据报，Cheng 先生利用幌子公司使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体能够绕过金融机构的非法金融管制措施。4 月，一个会员国指认了 Wu 先生和 Cheng 先生。<sup>161</sup> 在这些活动中，向他们发出指示的是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的第三人(Sim Hyon Sop)(见第 132 和 133 段)。对专家小组关于 Wu 先生和 Cheng 先生的询问，中国答复说，它“没有发现有关个人在中国境内从事任何非法网络金融活动……专家小组提到的网络活动不属于决议禁止的范围”(见附件 25)。

143. 6 月 3 日，总部设在爱沙尼亚的非托管分散式钱包 Atomic Wallet 证实收到钱包被入侵的报告。<sup>162</sup> 一家网络安全公司评估认为 Lazarus Group 是肇事者，指出被盗加密资产的洗钱遵循了“一系列与 Lazarus Group 过去实施黑客攻击收益的洗钱过程完全吻合的步骤”。<sup>163</sup> 被盗资产是通过 Sinbad 进行清洗的。来自同一家公司的补充报告<sup>164</sup> 显示 5 500 多个被入侵的钱包被盗取了 1 亿多美元。此外，该公司还评估说，黑客“已转向设在俄罗斯的 Garantex<sup>165</sup> [加密货币]交易所来清洗被盗资产”。Garantex 在 2022 年 4 月被一个会员国指认。<sup>166</sup> 针对专家小组的询问，爱沙尼亚答复说，此案正在调查中。

#### 勒索软件

144. 专家小组注意到，两个会员国在 2 月就朝鲜民主主义人民共和国针对卫生保健和关键基础设施目标进行的全球勒索软件行动发布了咨询公告。<sup>167</sup> 该警报警告受害者不要支付赎金，因为“这样做不能保证文件和记录会被恢复，并可能构成制裁风险”。该咨询公告包括防范勒索软件事件和减轻其风险的建议、公共漏洞和暴露细节以及 Maui 和 H0lyGh0st 勒索软件变体的入侵指标。<sup>168</sup> 据该咨询公告称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一直在利用勒索软件攻击的收入来资助其他恶意网络行动以及该国的优先事项和目标。

<sup>161</sup> 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498>。

<sup>162</sup> 见 <https://atomicwallet.io/blog/june-3rd-event-statement>。

<sup>163</sup> 见 <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/north-korea-s-lazarus-group-likely-responsible-for-35-million-atomic-crypto-theft>。

<sup>164</sup> 见 <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/north-korea-linked-atomic-wallet-heist-tops-100-million>。

<sup>165</sup> Garantex2019 年在爱沙尼亚注册，但在 2022 年 2 月失去了提供虚拟货币服务的许可证。据一个会员国称，Garantex 的大部分虚拟货币业务都在俄罗斯联邦的莫斯科和圣彼得堡进行。

<sup>166</sup> 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0701>。

<sup>167</sup> 关于题为“#StopRansomware: Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities”的联合咨询公告，见附件 76。

<sup>168</sup> 勒索软件攻击背后的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体被称为 Andariel。见 S/2023/171，第 163 和 164 段。

## 建议

145. 专家小组鼓励会员国对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过联合国指认的该国实体利用幌子公司和下属公司逃避金融制裁的行为保持警惕。专家小组还鼓励会员国酌情向专家小组和(或)委员会提供公司名称和其他识别数据。

146. 专家小组再次建议会员国尽快执行金融行动特别工作组关于虚拟资产和虚拟资产服务提供商的指导意见，包括全面执行订正建议 15(和“旅行规则”)。

147. 专家小组还建议会员国考虑更积极地对虚拟资产行业进行外联，以确保广泛了解朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络盗窃虚拟资产的行为，以及防范和应对此类攻击的适当措施。

## 六. 制裁的意外人道主义后果

148. 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段重申联合国制裁无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义影响，并强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国须充分满足该国人民的生活需要，对此负有首要责任。专家小组根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 24 和 25 段及其他相关决议，继续监测与人道主义状况和向该国提供人道主义援助有关的现有信息。

149. 专家小组注意到最近通过的第 2664(2022)号决议，其中安全理事会强调需要尽可能减少制裁无意中产生的负面人道影响并为此提出了措施建议，还注意到委员会 2023 年 6 月 2 日对第 7 号执行援助通知进行的更新，其中纳入了第 2664(2022)号决议的相关内容并解释了其在向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供人道主义援助方面的适用情况。<sup>169</sup>

### 人道主义状况

150. 专家小组继续认识到缺乏关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人道主义状况的可靠数据，特别是因为该国关闭边境，由此导致大多数外国观察员和人道主义组织无法报告该国境内的情况。专家小组还注意到，缺乏一种将多边制裁的后果与其他因素区分开来的方法。专家小组继续向人道主义组织发送调查问卷(见附件 78)，匿名答复见附件 79。

<sup>169</sup> 关于第 7 号执行援助通知的更新，见附件 77。



151. 联合国各实体、会员国和非政府组织继续将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义状况描述为不断恶化，据联合国消息来源称，有 1 130 万人需要援助，45.5% 的人口营养不良。<sup>170</sup> 粮食安全、儿童营养、免疫覆盖以及获得清洁水和基本环境卫生和个人卫生服务的情况都有所恶化。<sup>171</sup>

152. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义局势可能是多种因素综合作用的结果。这些因素从高到低依次包括该国优先注重大规模毁灭性武器和弹道导弹的社会经济政策、冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行疫情及由此导致的边境关闭、自然灾害、该国不重视人道主义援助<sup>172</sup> 以及制裁的意外影响。

153. 2023 年春季，边境关闭策略有所放松，检疫限制也有所放宽，粮食、其他食品和医疗产品的进口得以在一定程度上恢复，至少至夏季情况略有改善。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的政策制定者可能越来越重视农业和粮食生产。<sup>173</sup>

154. 尽管难以准确说明，但基于先前的评估以及会员国、人道主义行为体和独立专家提供的资料，专家小组指出，即使自 2020 年初朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采取与 COVID-19 相关的边境关闭措施以来，制裁的相对影响有所减弱，但毋庸置疑的是，联合国制裁及其实施无意中影响了人道主义状况和援助行动的某些方面，加剧了该国经济政策造成的问题。在疫情前，专家小组根据各种来源的资料报告说，<sup>174</sup> 制裁对平民的人道主义需求的意外影响可能包括以下方面：

<sup>170</sup> 见 [www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc3017en](http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc3017en)。

<sup>171</sup> 秋季收成一般，但许多消息来源公布的关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国粮食价格的说法自相矛盾(例如见 [www.38north.org/2023/06/north-korean-market-prices-suggest-serious-food-shortages](http://www.38north.org/2023/06/north-korean-market-prices-suggest-serious-food-shortages) 和 [www.rfa.org/korean/in\\_focus/nk\\_nuclear\\_talks/foodprice-06262023095213.html](http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/foodprice-06262023095213.html))。人道主义事务协调厅 2022 年估计粮食无保障者的人数已增至人口的 60%(见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/crisisinsight-weekly-picks-31-may-2023>)。关于饿死人数增加的报告也很普遍，但意见不一(见附件 80 和 81)。外部专家向专家小组表示，有理由相信一些地区正处于准饥荒状态，一些群体可能正处于饥荒状态。

<sup>172</sup> 2 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一份国家报纸称，依靠外部援助解决粮食短缺等同于接受“毒糖果”(见 [www.nknews.org/pro/state-media-review-north-korea-rejects-humanitarian-aid-as-poison-candy](http://www.nknews.org/pro/state-media-review-north-korea-rejects-humanitarian-aid-as-poison-candy) 和 <http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0wMi0yMi10MDI4QDElQDJAQDBAMjg=>>)。正如一个人道主义组织向专家小组所述，“朝鲜当局不相信人道主义援助会从根本上改善其经济状况；相反，他们认为这只会增加其高级官员和人民对外部世界的依赖”。

<sup>173</sup> 国家领导层在 2023 年 3 月朝鲜劳动党第八届中央委员会第七次全体会议上将农业列为优先事项，粮食生产在 2022 年 12 月被列为“12 大目标”之首。见 [www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/be316125bbf4e33c49d80b628336942c.kcmsf](http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/be316125bbf4e33c49d80b628336942c.kcmsf) 和 [www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/ca7280c2250709518dc9e8e91bac53cf.kcmsf](http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/ca7280c2250709518dc9e8e91bac53cf.kcmsf)。

<sup>174</sup> S/2019/171，第 176 段；S/2019/691，第 83 段；S/2020/151，第 209 段；S/2020/840，第 156-158 和 160 段；S/2021/211，第 168-171 段；S/2021/777，第 174-178 段；S/2022/132，第 187-190 段；S/2022/668，第 163-166 段；S/2023/171，第 179 和 180 段。另见本报告附件 82。

(a) 社会边缘化加剧，因为精英阶层应对联合国和其他制裁的手段是加强对资源的控制；<sup>175、176</sup>

(b) 受制裁影响行业就业者的生计来源减少，因此造成的失业持续存在；<sup>177</sup>

(c) 农业设备持续短缺<sup>178</sup>和燃料匮乏，<sup>179</sup>使本已很低的农业机械化水平进一步下降；<sup>180</sup>

(d) 医疗供应链中断的情况增加。<sup>181、182</sup>

### 人道主义组织的业务

155. 在疫情之前，人道主义援助的规模约为每年人均 2 美元，<sup>183</sup>在某些地理区域并为弱势群体提供了至关重要的资源。人道主义组织报告说，边境关闭和其他疫情防控措施导致了各种后果，包括暂停或大幅减少各组织的援助活动，评估制裁潜在影响的能力下降，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义状况恶化。虽然一些组织强调援助意向没有得到积极回应，但其他数个组织报告在 2023 年能够在有限监测情况下向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供少量人道主义供应品。

156. 做出答复的人道主义组织进一步强调，由于边境关闭、检疫和消毒时间过长以及行政问题，在提供援助方面持续存在困难。各组织对联合国制裁对其工作可能产生的影响的评估各不相同，除其他外，列举了以下潜在因素：

- 
- <sup>175</sup> 两名专家认为，国家控制的加强导致市场部门萧条，自 2017 年以来，已造成普通家庭越来越难以进入市场以及他们的预算缩减。
- <sup>176</sup> 安全理事会第 2397 (2017) 号决议序言部分第 4 段除其他外，表示极为关切朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续将亟需资源挪用于发展核武器和弹道导弹，而该国人民的大量需求却未得到满足。
- <sup>177</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国保障人民充分就业(国家宪法第 29 和 30 条)。两名专家认为这一提法没有相关意义。
- <sup>178</sup> 如果政府决定分配资源，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的军火工业可以大量制造各种农业设备和农业机械(见 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1664356199-252182552/kim-jong-un-sends-farm-machines-to-south-hwanghae-province>)。两名专家认为这一评估不准确、不完整，因为生产此类商品需要违禁物项。
- <sup>179</sup> 会员国提供的资料表明，自安全理事会第 2397 (2017) 号决议规定精炼石油产品的进口上限以来，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国每年都大幅超过这一上限(见第 29 和 30 段)；与此同时，原油进口没有达到每年 400 万桶的上限，该国继续违反决议出口煤炭(见第 74-76 段)。实行石油上限后，精炼石油进口总量有所下降。
- <sup>180</sup> 两名专家认为，部门禁令造成出口收入总体下降，导致进口农业设备、化肥和燃料的可用资源减少，此外，这些商品的进口也受到部门“进口”禁令的影响。据这些专家称，粮食、能源和社会保障因此受到影响。
- <sup>181</sup> 不禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口药品和医疗用品，同时人道主义组织努力通过运作良好的既定人道主义目的豁免程序向该国提供相关用品。
- <sup>182</sup> 两名专家认为，医用关键物项进口中断的原因是外汇储备减少和部门“进口”禁令(例如被禁止的医疗相关物项，见 S/2019/171，附件 86 和 87)以及外国供应商的去风险化举措。
- <sup>183</sup> 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/provisional-2020-dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-overview>。

- (a) 缺乏银行业务渠道；
- (b) 申请投标的供应商减少，价格和质量受到影响；
- (c) 海关延误增加；
- (d) 申请豁免增加了工作量；
- (e) 采购延误；

两个组织评估认为，关闭边境政策严重加剧了该国的人道主义状况，联合国制裁没有产生影响，或影响甚微；另有两个组织评估认为，人道主义状况是关闭边境和制裁造成的。

157. 许多做出答复的组织表示目前经过改进的人道主义豁免程序可以满足需要，并欢迎对委员会第7号执行援助通知进行更新。数个组织建议延长豁免期限或自动延期至核准项目结束，并对某些低风险产品实行长期豁免。大多数组织预计朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不会在2023年完全开放，数个组织对今后只允许有限准入表示关切。

158. 据一个联合国官方消息来源称，2023年，一些准入限制有所改善，药品、疫苗、营养品以及水、环境卫生和个人卫生用品得以成功交付。然而，由于该国对COVID-19的措施只是有限地放松，援助人员仍然无法访问分发地点并核实交付情况。委员会批准了4项新的人道主义援助豁免和9项人道主义援助延期。

#### 建议

159. 专家小组重视联合国有关实体一年两次就制裁的意外影响进行通报，建议委员会继续这一做法。

160. 专家小组再次强调，迫切需要为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的人道主义行动重建一个持久的银行业务渠道。

161. 专家小组建议，在执行安全理事会第2664(2022)号决议方面，包括委员会在内的联合国系统应考虑到人道主义行为体提供的关于减轻联合国制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助的潜在不利影响的资料。

162. 专家小组重申其以往建议，即：

- (a) 安全理事会继续处理各种问题和流程，减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助行动可能造成的意外不利影响；
- (b) 委员会和其他相关利益攸关方继续以务实态度考虑豁免目前受制裁的选定出口，这些出口的收益可用于为人道主义供应品供资；
- (c) 委员会考虑更积极地与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供人道主义援助的民间社会开展外联，以帮助执行安全理事会第2664(2022)号决议；
- (d) 委员会以务实态度考虑对人道主义援助行为体和人道主义相关商品实行可续期和长期豁免。

## 七. 国家执行情况报告

### 会员国报告相关决议执行情况的现况

163. 截至 2023 年 7 月 28 日，有 66 个会员国提交了关于安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段执行情况的报告，81 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段执行情况的报告，95 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，90 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，107 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况的报告，115 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况的报告。专家小组注意到，未提交第 2397(2017)号决议执行情况报告的会员国数目(127 个)仍然很多。<sup>184、185</sup>

164. 另外，会员国、实体和个人对专家小组调查询问的总体答复率仍然偏低：专家小组指出，会员国、实体和个人应遵守安全理事会有关决议，充分配合专家小组的调查询问。

## 八. 建议

165. 建议综合清单见附件 83。

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<sup>184</sup> 关于国家执行情况报告的统计数据，见 [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/implementation-reports](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/implementation-reports)。

<sup>185</sup> 另见 [www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/value-reporting-national-reporting-practices-under-un-sanctions-regime-north-korea](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/value-reporting-national-reporting-practices-under-un-sanctions-regime-north-korea)。

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**Annex 1: Kim Jong Un's inspection of "*tactical nuclear weapons*" (excerpt from DPRK media report) and Member State assessments**

**1) Photo from DPRK media**



*Source:* Rodong Sinmun, 28 March 2023.

## 2) Assessments by Member States on “tactical nuclear weapons” (excerpts)

### [Member State 1]

On 28 March 2023, North Korea state media showed leader Kim Jong Un inspecting ten purported “tactical” nuclear devices alongside ballistic and cruise missile systems. Also shown were diagrams of warheads integrated with a range of delivery systems including an unmanned underwater vehicle. The nuclear devices being inspected appeared physically smaller than previous purported nuclear devices featured in North Korean media.

In recent years, North Korea has signalled a focus on developing so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons which are almost certainly intended for use on the peninsula and likely have a lower yield warhead than warheads for longer range systems.

It is highly likely that nuclear weapon design personnel would prefer to see a full-scale test to validate the new design. However, despite the reactivation of the test site last year North Korea has not resumed nuclear testing.

*Source:* Member State.

### [Member State 2]

[MS2] government assumes that the "Hwasan-31" is likely to be a tactical nuclear weapon when considering only its appearance, such as size and shape. However, the DPRK has yet to disclose the device's internal detonator and technical specifications, so assessing whether the device matches the physical characteristics typically associated with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult. In this vein, whether the device possesses a range of explosive yields depending on its technical use is also difficult to evaluate.

Meanwhile, considering that "Hwasan-31" is possibly disclosed for deception purposes, the [MS2] government assessed that further analysis is required.

*Source:* Member State.

**Annex 2: Activities at Punggye-ri nuclear test site (41° 16' 41" N 129° 05' 15" E)**

\*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are recent observations, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023.



## 1) Activities near Tunnel 3 (41° 16' 35" N 129° 05' 17" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 March 2023.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 13 March 2023, 25 June 2023.



2) Activities near Tunnel 4 (41° 16' 46" N 129° 05' 08" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 April 2023, Maxar Technologies, 7 May 2023.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 25 June 2023.

3) Activities at Administrative area (41° 16' 41" N 129° 05' 15" E)



*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 8 February 2023.



**Annex 3: Activities at LWR (39° 47' 45" N 125° 45' 18" E)**



Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023.



1) Construction of support buildings (39° 47' 46" N 125° 45' 14" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 March 2023, 1 April 2023.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 25 February 2018, Maxar Technologies, 18 June 2023.



2) Possible testing of cooling water system (39° 47' 39" N 125° 45' 21" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 27 February, 7 March, 12 April 2023.

**Annex 4: Activities at 5MW(e) reactor (39° 47' 51" N 125° 45' 20" E)**



*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023, 12 April 2023.





Source: Planet Labs Inc., 1 July 2023.

**Annex 5: Radiochemical Laboratory (39° 46' 50" N 125° 45' 08" E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023.



1) Suspected nuclear waste storage site (Old Waste Site) (39° 47' 16" N 125° 45' 23" E)

- A think tank reported new excavation activity was observed in March 2023. An outside expert consulted by the Panel explained that there had been some smaller excavation activities at this site even before 2023. The Panel's satellite imagery analysis corroborated these observations.
- According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this facility was not declared by the DPRK in its initial report submitted to the Agency in May 1992 along with another suspected nuclear waste storage site (aka: Building 500).<sup>186</sup> Despite repeated requests by the Agency for additional access to the facility, DPRK continued to refuse. This site was covered with soil before IAEA's visit in 1992.<sup>187</sup>



Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 May 2023

<sup>186</sup> See [https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032\\_web.pdf](https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf).

<sup>187</sup> See The Institute for Science and International Security, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle*.

2) Activities near spent fuel receipt building (39° 46' 49" N 125° 45' 07" E)

- The below images captured between late-February to mid-April 2023 showed the pile of unidentified material in front of spent fuel receipt building and vehicular activities at motor pool area.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 February 2023, Maxar Technologies, 21 March 2023.





*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023, 19 April 2023.

- The below image captures on 1 July 2023 showed vehicular activities in front of spent fuel receipt building in addition to motor pool area.



*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., 1 July 2023.



**Annex 6: Activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant (39°46'15"N 125°44'57"E)**

*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023.

1) New construction activities at southern area ( $39^{\circ} 46' 04''$  N  $125^{\circ} 45' 01''$  E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 February 2023, Maxar Technologies, 4 March 2023.





Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023, 1 July 2023.

## 2) Activities at UO2 production process building (39° 46' 11" N 125° 44' 55" E)

- The Panel did not observe smoke from the UO2 production process building, otherwise regularly observed by the Panel. A lack of smoke indicates that the conversion process from yellowcake to UO2 is not underway.
- In addition, a think tank reported the removal of drums and canisters from the building since March 2023 suggesting that renovations are taking place.<sup>188</sup> The Panel has also seen probable drums/canisters scattered around the building (see below). According to an outside expert, these signs appear to show that the building may be subject to renovation.




Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 June 2023.

<sup>188</sup> See <https://www.38north.org/2023/04/yongbyon-nuclear-scientific-research-center-expansion-work-continues/>.



**Annex 7: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant**  
(Location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38° 19' 04" N 126° 25' 54" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 16 June 2023.

- 1) Expansion of the piles of tailings at the mines ( $38^{\circ} 19' 57''$  N  $126^{\circ} 27' 20''$  E,  $38^{\circ} 19' 42''$  N  $126^{\circ} 26' 40''$  E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 23 February 2023, 16 June 2023.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 19 February 2023, 18 March 2023.

2) Railcar activities at Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 19' 02" N 126° 25' 55" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 February 2023, 5 March 2023, 16 June 2023.



## Annex 8: Activities at Kangson (38° 57' 26" N 125° 36' 43" E)

The Panel continues to monitor activities in the vicinity of Kangson, an alleged clandestine uranium enrichment facility.<sup>189</sup> Constant activity of several types of trucks has been observed adjacent to the main building.



*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 21 March 2023, 3 April. 2023, 5 June 2023, 16 June 2023.

<sup>189</sup> S/2023/171, para. 14 and annex 9

**Annex 9: Activities at Yongdoktong (40°01'51"N 125°18'28"E)**

The Yongdoktong area is believed to be involved in DPRK's nuclear weaponisation programme, including as a nuclear weapons storage facility.<sup>190</sup> The Panel observed continuous vehicular activities around the buildings adjacent to the entrance and the presence of personnel near one of the possible explosive storage sites.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 May 2023.

<sup>190</sup> S/2023/171, para. 15 and annex 10



1) Activities near the entrances of the tunnels (40° 01' 51" N 125° 18' 28" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 2 February 2023, 1 April 2023.



2) Presence of personnel (40° 02' 24" N 125° 18' 22" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 2 February 2023.

## Annex 10: Ballistic missiles launches by the DPRK from 1 January to 28 July 2023

Official DPRK statements are in *italics*.

Mentions of liquid (LP) or solid propellant (SP) engines.<sup>191</sup>

<i>Tests in the year</i>	<i>Date and time (local)</i>	<i>Reported type</i>	<i>Number of missiles</i>	<i>Reported launch location and trajectory</i>	<i>Reported distance travelled (km)</i>	<i>Reported apogee (km)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>	<i>DPRK reports</i>
<b>1.</b> <b>SP</b> (reported in S/2023/171)	<b>1 Jan.</b> 02:50	<b>SRBM KN-25</b> <i>Super large rocket System (600mm)</i>	<b>1</b>	From Pyongyang Yongsang area toward east.	350	100		<i>At dawn of January 1, 2023, fired one shell towards the East...with a delivered super-large multiple rocket launcher... (KCNA DPRK Today, 2 Jan. 2023) 30 were recently deployed (KCNA, 2 Jan. 2023)</i>
<b>2.</b> <b>LP</b>	<b>18 Feb.</b> 17:22 or 17:21	<b>ICBM Hwasong-15</b> 9-axle wheeled TEL	<b>1</b>	From Sunan international airport toward east. Landed within Japan's EEZ at 18:27 about 200 kilometers west of Oshima Island in Hokkaido.	900	5 700	Depending on the weight of the warhead, the range may exceed 14 000 km (Japan).	<i>An ICBM launching drill was conducted on the afternoon of February 18. The Missile General Bureau guided the drill ... using ICBM Hwasongpho-15 ... missile traveled up to a maximum altitude of 5 768.5 km and flew 989 km for 4 015 seconds before accurately hitting the pre-set area in open waters (KCNA, 19 February 2023)</i>
<b>3.</b> <b>SP</b>	<b>20 Feb.</b> 07:00 or 06:59	<b>SRBM KN-25</b>	<b>2</b>	From Sukchon, South Phyongan Province toward east. Landed in the sea at 07:20.	390 to 400 and 350	100 and 50		<i>... multiple launch rocket firepower sub-units ... set virtual targets 395 km and 337 km away ... and fired two shells of 600 mm multiple rocket launchers... It is a tactical nuclear attack means boasting of the great might powerful enough to assign only one multiple rocket launcher with four shells so as to destroy an enemy operational airfield (KCNA, 20 February 2023)</i>
<b>4.</b> <b>SP</b>	<b>9 Mar.</b> 18:20	<b>Undetermined SRBM</b>	<b>6</b>	From Lake Taesong (38°54'27.19"N125°26'24	110		6 missiles launched simultaneously.	<i>The Hwasong artillery unit...fired a powerful volley under the simulated</i>

<sup>191</sup> A solid-propellant delivery system can be maintained in a ready-to-fire condition, i.e., as a whole with the solid-propellant motor and the pyrotechnics. A liquid-propellant missile is preferably fueled shortly before a potential launch, to avoid corrosion of the tank. This hazardous process can take around 45 minutes. In addition, the fuel and oxidizer must be stored separately in monitored tanks and facilities, further constraining the mobility of the missile. These constraints amount to added vulnerability in comparison to solid propellant missiles.



		4-canister launch system on a 3-axle TEL		.94"E) toward west. Hit targets off the coast northwest of Nampo.			Kim Jung Un attended. Appearance similar to that of a KN-23 missile	<i>conditions of the major elements of the enemy operation airport... [Kim Jung Un] stressed that the fire assault sub-units should be strictly prepared ...by steadily intensifying ... drills (KCNA, 10 March 2023)</i>
<b>5.</b>	<b>14 Mar.</b>	<b>SRBM KN-23</b>	<b>2</b>	From southwest Jangyon 620 area in the South Hwanghae Province (38°16'31.27"N 125°4'16.60"E) toward the sea.			First observation of a BM launch from Jangyon area.	<i>The missiles fired in an area around Jangyon County of South Hwanghae Province precisely hit the targeted Phi Islet off Pangjin-dong, Chongam District, Chongjin City of North Hamgyong Province 611.4 km away The 11th striking company ... launched two ground-to-ground tactical ballistic missiles by the medium range system (Voice of Korea, 15 March 2023)</i>
<b>6.</b>	<b>16 Mar.</b>	<b>ICBM Hwasong-17</b>	<b>1</b>	From Sunan international airport (launch pad 39°14'37.14"N 125°40'37.26"E) following a lofted trajectory toward east. Landed in the sea at 08:19 about 200 kilometers west of Hokkaido Island.	1 000	6 000	Japan MoD assesses the Hwasong-17 can fly a distance of up to 15 000 km. Kim Jon Un attended.	<i>On March 16, an intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwaseongpo-17" type firing drill was conducted... ...exercise was conducted with the aim of confirming the maneuverability and reliability of the DPRK's nuclear war deterrent...launched from the Pyongyang International Airport ascended to a maximum altitude of 6,045km and flew a distance of 1,000.2km for 4,151s before landing in the target waters off the high seas in the East (Rodong Sinmun, 17 March 2023)</i>
<b>7.</b>	<b>19 Mar.</b>	<b>SRBM KN-23</b>	<b>1</b>	From Tongchang-ri toward the east.	800	50	Flight time of 15 min and a possibly irregular trajectory. Oblique flames shown on KCTV could be due to the lateral evacuation of combustion gases out of a silo. A silo would have been dug in the area between February and March 2023 (annex 22). Kim Jon Un attended.	<i>Kim Jong Un... guided the combined tactical drill for nuclear counterattack ...The missile was tipped with a test warhead simulating a nuclear warhead... The tactical ballistic missile launched in Cholsan County ... accurately exploded at 800 meters above the target waters set in its 800 km strike range, thus proving ... the reliability of the operation of nuclear explosion control devices and detonators. (Rodong Sinmun, 20 March 2023)</i>

<b>8.</b>	<b>27 Mar.</b>	<b>SRBM KN-23</b>	<b>2</b>	From Junghwa area in North Hwanghae Province toward the north-east. Debris landed at 07:54 (BM 1) and 08:05 (BM 2).	370 or 350 and 350	50	Flight time of 7 min and a possibly irregular trajectory.	<i>... demonstration firing with a nuclear air explosion striking mode by two ground-to-ground tactical ballistic missiles ... The tactical ballistic missiles were loaded with warheads for trial simulating nuclear warheads.</i> (KCNA, 28 Mar. 2023)
<b>9.</b>	<b>13 Apr.</b>	<b>ICBM Hwasong-18</b>	<b>1</b>	From a launch pad (39° 6'40.84"N 125°59'52.89"E) next to an official mansion, 20 km north-east of Pyongyang, toward the east at a high angle. Landed in the sea.	1 000	Appx. 5000 (ROK media)	First SP ballistic missile with probable intercontinental range tested by the DPRK. Three-stage missile. The first-stage engine could be the same as the one tested on a horizontal test bench on 15 Dec. 2022. The TEL shown is identical to the five paraded on 8 Feb 2023. Construction in March, including at the nearby mansion from 13 to 16 March, suggested preparation for the launch. (NKNews and a Member State). Kim Jung Un attended.	<i>The aim of the test-fire was to confirm the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles and the reliability of the stage-jettisoning technology and various functional control systems ... the test fire was conducted in the way of applying the standard trajectory flying mode to its first stage and the vertical mode to the second and third stages, ... the development of the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 will extensively reform the strategic deterrence components of the DPRK</i> (Rodong Sinmun, April 2023)
<b>10.</b>	<b>15 Jun.</b>	<b>Probable SRBM KN-23</b>	<b>2</b>	From the Sunan Area. Landed in the Japanese EEZ 250 km west of Ishikawa Prefecture.	780 (ROK) 850/900 (Japan)	50	Flight time of 7 min and a possibly irregular trajectory. 900 km would be a long range for a KN-23.	No explicit admission.

<b>11.</b>	<b>12 Jul.</b> <b>SP</b> 10:00	<b>ICBM Hwasong-18</b>	<b>1</b>	From a launch pad (39° 6'40.84"N 125°59'52.89"E) next to an official mansion, 20 km north-east of Pyongyang, toward the east. Landed in the sea.	1 000	Over 6 000	Flight time of 74 min. Calculations show the range of the Hwasong-18 might exceed 15 000 km (Japanese deputy permanent representative Mitsuko Shino, at the 9376th UNSC session of 13 July 2023). Kim Jung-Un attended.	<p><i>Our test fire of a new type of ICBM.... Hwasongpho-18...did not pose any risk to surrounding countries. [We hold] the right ...to self-defence... to safeguard the security of our State... Military provocations of the United States are growing as never before. (DPRK permanent representative Kim Song at the 9376th UNSC session).</i></p> <p><i>The test-fire was aimed at re-confirming the technical creditability and operational reliability of the new-type ICBM ... The missile traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 648.4 km and flew a distance of 1 001.2 km for 4 491s before accurately landing (KCNA, July 13 2023, and videos on KCTV).</i></p>
<b>12.</b>	<b>19 Jul.</b> <b>SP</b> between 03:29 and 03:46	Probable <b>SRBM KN-23</b>	<b>2</b>	From the vicinity of the west coast (possibly the Sunan area) toward the east, landing in the sea.	Around 550 (ROK) and 600 (Japan)	50	A possibly irregular trajectory.	
<b>13.</b>	<b>24 Jul.</b> <b>SP</b> between 23:54 and 00:00	Undetermined SRBM possibly KN-25 missiles given the trajectories reported by Member States	<b>2</b>	Both missiles landed in the sea on the eastern side of the Korean Peninsula	Around 400 (ROK) 350 and 400 (Japan)	100		

*Source:* Member States (MSs) and the Panel.

## Annex 11: Assessments of the significance of the launch of a solid-propellant Hwasong-18 ICBM

Hwasong 18 launch on 13 April 2023: cold-launch sequence whereby the missile is expelled by an independent gas generator



Source: KCTV (14 April 2023), analysis by a Member State and the Panel.

### Member State 1 (unofficial translation)

On 14 April 2023, Pyongyang claimed this launch [of a Hwasong-18] by means of an official statement. The missile fired was a solid-propellant ICBM named ‘Hwasungpho-18’. It will occupy a central role in DPRK’s arsenal in the future. This test was conducted by the Missile General Bureau under the supervision of Kim Jung Un. The goal was to check solid-propulsion, stage separation and systems controls. The DPRK authorities did not communicate about the missile’s performance but claimed total success and stated their concern for the safety of neighboring countries, citing the areas where the stages landed. The statement highlighted that these missiles will be deployed in strategic forces units to contribute to their missions both to deter and to strike back.

Analysis of satellite imagery shows the location of the launch to be the garden of a villa 20 km north-east of Pyongyang. Important construction work had been conducted there before the launch. The first modification in the layout of the grounds (initially agricultural land) happened between April 2022 and February 2023. Major landscaping was then conducted from 1 to 31 March 2023. During this period, one witnessed important earth-levelling work leading to the creation of landscaped gardens comprising artificial ponds, enclosed by earth banks. Additional groundwork took place at the launch site itself, possibly to reinforce it in order to increase its stability.

Preliminary analysis of the pictures released by the DPRK show a solid-propellant three-stage intercontinental missile, based on the fact that it was transported in a launch tube and given the typical plume of smoke stemming from first-stage ejection gases. [...]

In those pictures, it appears the first stage might be guided by a flexible-bearing nozzle when Pukkusong-1 and 2 missiles were steered by exhaust gas stream deflectors. Also, the video released by the DPRK shows the Hwasong-18 launch system [...] a ‘cold-launch system’. It seems the same launch sequence as the Pukkusong-2 took place, on a smaller scale.

*This is the first known launch of this missile and the first of a solid-propulsion north-Korean ICBM.*

*From the pictures released by the DPRK, it appears that the TEL used on 13 April is identical to the five shown during the military parade on 8 February 2023.*

*DPRK’s assertions about the “standard” trajectory of the first stage and the vertical ones of the second and third stages, and the partial detections by Korean and Japanese authorities, lead to the conclusion that the overall trajectory was meant to ensure the landing of the stages in the sea.*



*The magnitude of the developments at the launch site before 13 April as well as dissimulation in the pictures released by the DPRK, are noticeable. They aren't abnormal given the launching requirements for a missile of this caliber. The mobility of a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) allows for firing a missile from different areas with little forward preparation. However, this type of missile [the Hwasong-18] can only be used from areas prepared well in advance, at least in order to accommodate for trucks this size and weight. Launching the missile outside of the well-known production and preparation sites showcases one advantage solid-propellant missiles have over a liquid-fueled Hwasong-17: Hwasong-17 missiles have always been fired from concrete-covered surfaces right next to Sunan airport facilities dedicated to the filling of liquid propellant. [...]*

*It is a major development, showing clear progress by Pyongyang in mastering solid propulsion. This event was to be expected and had been anticipated to the very least since the publication of the five-year plan in January 2021. It reflects efforts over a decade.*

*The transition to solid propulsion was one of the logical long-term goals of Pyongyang, apparent right from the very first signs of the development of mobile platforms for ballistic missiles. For reasons pertaining to the hazardousness of liquid fuels, the duration of the preparation steps and their lack of discreteness, especially when filling the fuel, a solid-fueled missile offers many operational advantages. More so if it is deployed from a mobile platform. [...]. Even though these developments took longer than those relating to liquid-fuel propulsion, which yield intercontinental ranges since 2017,<sup>192</sup> they showed marked progress during this period, on a parallel development track of ICBM propulsion.*

*The developments of the Pukkuksong-1 and-2 missiles was the first tangible evidence of progress by the DPRK in the field of solid propulsion, adjusted for long ranges. As of 2016, through in-flight and ground testing, Pyongyang demonstrated gradual expertise in engines close to 1.5 meters diameters. It reached an important threshold [...]. On 15 April 2017, Pyongyang signaled again its interest for solid-propulsion ICBMs by showcasing in a military parade two types of TELs (never tested or seen again) very similar to the type of TELs used for solid-propulsion ICBMs. The following development of short-range missiles fitted with solid propulsion allowed the DPRK authorities to gain expertise in relevant technologies and industrial processes.*

*The Pukkusong-3, -4, and -5 emblemized during that time the DPRK's constant efforts to develop solid propulsion designed for longer ranges. Eventually, in his speech in January 2021, Kim Jung Un laid out five-year goals, outlining those pertaining to land-based and sea-based solid-propulsion ICBMs. The most recent indication of activity for that programme had been the testing of a solid-propulsion engine with a large diameter, on the ground, on 15 December 2022 in Sohae. We couldn't establish if that test was for one of the stages of the Hwasong-18. However, it most probably helped confirm the use of technology associated with this missile.*

*This launch of a Hwasong-18 [...] brings the DPRK closer to owning ballistic missiles which would allow for intercontinental launches on short notice, along with high operational readiness. Reaching that objective [...] will heighten the threat posed by the north-Korean ballistic arsenal. This launch alone does not remove prior doubt about the country's intercontinental missiles, especially regarding the survivability of its re-entry vehicles when entering the atmosphere, never proven, and serial production.*

*The DPRK stated that the Hwasong-18 will take a major place in the country's arsenal. At this stage however, more developments and testing aiming at improving its performances should be expected. Choices made regarding the payload remain unknown.*

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<sup>192</sup> The DPRK's acquisition of soviet-design RD-250 liquid-fuel propulsion system, enabling it to speed up the development of ICBMs notably the Hwasong-14 and 15, both shown and tested in 2017.

**Member State 2 (assessment of the latest ICBM tests overall)**

[...] latest ICBM, the Hwasong-18 flight tested in April this year, is a three-stage solid propellant system. [...]

North Korea's deterrence perceptions changed; it no longer believes that a 'basic' ICBM capability is enough to guarantee its security. This was evident by the 2021 Party Congress, with Kim Jung Un outlining an ambitious series of development programmes and emphasizing the need to keep pace with modern technology. As a result, since 2021, the pace of testing has significantly increased.

Missile testing since the beginning of 2023 has continued this trend, with North Korea focusing on the survivability of its systems and its ability to counter missile defence; it has tested multiple systems, from a variety of launch platforms. It has aimed to demonstrate both a 'tactical' capability designed to deter on the Peninsula, as well as an ICBM capability to hold US mainland at risk. Its 13 April test of a solid-fuel ICBM, which Kim had previously described as one of the Party's top five priorities, demonstrated a further milestone in its development aspirations. As well as testing for development purposes, North Korea is also attempting to operationalize its capability, incorporating missile launches into military training exercises. However, while recent North Korean activity reflects ongoing improvements in its capability, it is also deliberate messaging, based on its perceived need to deter.

To have a credible deterrent, North Korea needs potential opponents to believe that not only does it have a capability, but also it has the training and willingness to use it; much of its recent activity has been intended to bolster this narrative. As a result, over the last twelve months, it has publicized nuclear training exercises, as well as its nuclear doctrine.

## Annex 12: DPRK media reporting of the Hwasong-18 launch on 13 April 2023<sup>193</sup>

**Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on Spot Pyongyang, April 14 (KCNA)** - The DPRK's nuclear war deterrent for self-defence is rapidly developing at increasing speed in keeping with the immutable strategic line and policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK to ceaselessly develop the might of the strategic force of the DPRK to turn it into an entity of super power and absolute strength, a powerful force capable of preventing the nuclear holocaust and deterring all sorts of possible dangerous enemy invasions, and a treasured sword for defending justice and peace.

On April 13, 2023, a powerful entity symbolic of the ceaseless development of the strategic force of the DPRK notified the world of its emergence. A new-type ICBM, Hwasongpho-18, which will fulfill its mission of an important war deterrent as the future core pivotal means of the strategic force of the DPRK, was test-fired. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, guided the first test-fire of the new-type ICBM on the spot. The aim of the test-fire was to confirm the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles and the reliability of the stage-jettisoning technology and various functional control systems and to estimate the military feasibility of the new strategic weapon system.

In consideration of the security of the neighboring countries and the safety of the multi-stage-separation of the missile during its flight in the territorial air, the test fire was conducted in the way of applying the standard trajectory flying mode to its first stage and the vertical mode to the second and third stages, and of confirming the technological features of all the components of the weapon system by restricting the maximum speed of the missile through delayed stage separation and motor reactivation. Kim Jong Un learned about the new weapon system on the spot while watching the pre-launch operation.

The launching site, which was to witness once again an important event of great significance in the history of the development of the strategic force of the DPRK under the direct guidance of Kim Jong Un, was seething with the burning will of all the defence scientists and workers in the field of munitions industry to inform the whole world of the emergence of another powerful nuclear attack means of the DPRK and demonstrate the reliable nuclear war deterrence of the state.

Ready for test-fire! When Kim Jong Un approved the test-fire of the new-type strategic weapon, General Jang Chang Ha ordered the second red flag company under the General Missile Bureau to launch the missile. The moment, a great entity fully representing the irresistible might of the DPRK began to soar into the sky with fierce flames at its tail, making a thunderous roar. The test-fire had no adverse effect on the security of the neighboring countries. Its first stage safely landed in the waters 10 km off the Hodo Peninsula in Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province and the second stage in the waters 335 km east of Orang County, North Hamgyong Province. The test-fire confirmed that all the parameters of the new strategic weapon system fully met the requirements of the design in terms of accuracy, providing guarantee and creditability that the new-type ICBM would serve as a powerful strategic attack means of greater military efficiency.

<sup>193</sup> See <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1681657470-258944918/another-mighty-entity-showing-continuous-development-of-strategic-force-unveiled-in-dprk/>.

<https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/64395c9bbc9b7/>.

*The Hwasongpho-18 weapon system, to be equipped with and operated by the strategic force of the DPRK under the long-term plan for building the state nuclear force, will perform its important mission and duty as the most powerful, pivotal and principal means in defending the DPRK, deterring aggression and defending the security of the state. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction at the eye-opening successes while guiding the test-fire. He was pleased with the fact that the DPRK has clearly proved once again the tremendous potentiality and reality of its defence technology further developing as the days go by and powerfully demonstrated its unshakable determination and practical ability to attain the goal for bolstering up the armed forces. He noted that it is the consistent stand of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government to steadily and rapidly accelerate the development of more developed and advanced powerful weapon system to cope with the ever-worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula and long-term military threats. He mentioned with pride the significance of the test-fire, saying that the development of the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 will extensively reform the strategic deterrence components of the DPRK, radically promote the effectiveness of its nuclear counterattack posture and bring about a change in the practicality of its offensive military strategy. Noting that it is an absolute mission and duty to be fulfilled by the DPRK's defence scientists to uphold the WPK and the DPRK government's policy of countering the enemy's nukes and policy of frontal confrontation in kind with practical successes in the development of self-defence capabilities, he set forth the important strategic tasks for further accelerating the bolstering of the nuclear strategic force of the DPRK. He affirmed that the WPK and the DPRK government would make the enemy, who are imperiling the environment on the Korean peninsula and harassing the Korean people's peaceful life and struggle for socialist construction with their inveterate policy of aggression and threatening military moves, experience a clearer security crisis, and constantly strike extreme uneasiness and horror into them by taking fatal and offensive counter-actions until they abandon their senseless thinking and reckless acts, thus making them feel regret and despair for their wrong choice by surely exposing them to an irresistible threat.*

*The successful test of the new strategic weapon system serves as an occasion for proving that the nuclear strategic force and the missile scientists and technicians of the DPRK directly responsible for its development always thoroughly and perfectly implement the strategic intention of the WPK, getting fully prepared to carry out their important mission at any time.*



## Annex 13: Military parade in Pyongyang on 8 February 2023



SRBM KN-25  
in multiple-launcher



Hwasong-17 on 11-axle wheeled TEL (12 units)



New ICBM in canister on 9-axle wheeled TEL (5 units)  
*This TEL is a slightly different from the Hwasong-15 9-axle TEL*



Hwasong-17 on 11-axle wheeled TEL

Source: KCNA, KCTV, annotations by the Panel.



Source: KCNA, KCTV, annotations by a Member State.

### Assessment

- Five TELs carrying KN-25 SRBMs shown
- Five TELs carrying KN-23 SRBMs shown
- “*Tactical nuclear weapons*”, according to the KCTV commentator, on trucks
- Five TELs carrying modernized cruise-missiles shown
- 11 or 12 Hwasong-17 ICBMs shown, on 11-axle wheeled TELs
- Five new presumably solid-propellant ICBMs shown,<sup>194</sup> in canisters, on 9-axle wheeled WS-51200 TELs
- Altogether a record number of 17 heavy-duty TELs displayed

*Source:* Member States (MSs), the Panel.

<sup>194</sup> Described as a “Hwasong-class” missile on KCTV. The presentation was suggestive of solid-propellant missiles, based on the length of the missile and its canister and taking into consideration the DPRK’s avowed ambition to develop such missiles. Canisters are more typical of solid-propellant missiles, helping control the environment (including temperature) and the pyrotechnics of the missile, already loaded with its propellant.

**Annex 14: Images from the military parade in Pyongyang in celebration of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Korean War (or “Great Fatherland Liberation War” for the DPRK).**

27 July 2023

The following images were characterized by the DPRK media as a display of “tactical and long-range cruise missile units”. The Panel will analyse further information about this parade.



KN-23 SRBM



KN-25 SRBM in multiple launchers  
(or “600 mm/super-large multiple rocket launchers”)



KN-24 SRBM



Probable Hwasong-12 IRBM fitted with an  
apparent glide vehicle



Hwasong-18 ICBM




Hwasong-17 ICBM (on a TEL bearing the same  
number as one shown at the 8 February parade)

Source: *Rodong Sinmun*, annotations by the Panel.



**Display of similar weapon systems at the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” in Pyongyang**  
26 July 2023



Source: KCTV, Rodong Sinmun, annotations by the Panel.



### **Annex 15: Possible solid-propellant engine test at Magun-Po (39°48'06"N 127°33'39"E) on 29-30 January 2023**

According to Member State information, an engine test occurred at the Magun-Po stand before 2 February 2023. An outside expert consulted by the Panel concurs,<sup>195</sup> placing the test date as 29 or 30 January 2023.

Panel satellite imagery analysis tends to corroborate those observations.



*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

<sup>195</sup> See Twitter/Dave Shmerler/30 January 2023.

## Annex 16: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's January 2021 speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to military objectives)

Excerpts relating to ballistic missiles:<sup>196</sup>

*...for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force...*

*...intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style*

*...review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb...*

*...was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear build up was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party...*

*...to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system...*

*... new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science ...*

*...developed the super-large MLRS, ...*

*... develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles ...*

*... achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex, ...*

*... perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage, finished research into developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets ...*

*... in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly ...*

*... that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched ...*

*... means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed,*

<sup>196</sup>See <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610502377-14004652/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory/?t=1665001072714> .

## **Annex 17: Statements by IMO and ICAO on the unannounced launches of ballistic missiles by the DPRK**

### **International Maritime Organization (IMO)**

By means of a resolution<sup>197</sup> adopted on 31 May, the IMO called upon the DPRK to cease unlawful and unannounced ballistic missile launches across international shipping lanes, denouncing these as a serious threat to the safety of international navigation. The IMO urged compliance with due regulations, including giving prior notice ahead of any missile tests.

### **International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)**

During its Council's 229<sup>th</sup> session on 22 June, the ICAO condemned the recent unannounced missile launches by the DPRK noting that they "pose a serious risk to international civil aviation", and "*a complete disregard of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.*" The ICAO recalled its Assembly Resolution A41-3 (of October 2022) which urgently called upon the DPRK to comply with its international civil aviation obligations under the Chicago Convention.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> See Maritime Safety Committee resolution on "Strengthening measures for ensuring the safety of international shipping": <https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/MSC-107th-session.aspx>.

<sup>198</sup> See <https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-Council-States-condemn-DPRK-missile-launches.aspx>.

## Annex 18: Report on 6th enlarged plenary meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee of 1 January 2023

Excerpts relating to the BM programme<sup>199</sup> (see S/2023/171 for the full text):

*... the official legalization of the DPRK's policy on its nuclear force at the most appropriate and crucial time ...*

*... however, if it fails to deter, it will carry out the second mission, which will not be for defense*

*... a task was raised to develop another ICBM system whose main mission is quick nuclear counterstrike.*

*... it highlights the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal, the report said, clarifying the epochal strategy of the development of nuclear force and national defence for 2023 with this as a main orientation.*

*...the National Aerospace Development Administration will launch the first military satellite of the DPRK at the earliest date possible by pushing ahead with the full preparation for a reconnaissance satellite and its vehicle in progress at the final stage, the report pointed out ...*

<sup>199</sup> See <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543894-200963704/report-on-6th-enlarged-plenary-meeting-of-8th-wpk-central-committee/>.



# Annex 19: Development of a new satellite launch pad in the Sohae area



## Development of new SLV launch pad



Source: Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

**Before SLV launch****After SLV launch**

*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.


**Annex 20: KCNA reporting on the Chollima-1 SLV launch of 31 May 2023<sup>200</sup>**

*Pyongyang, May 31 (KCNA) - The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) made public the following report on Wednesday as regards an accident occurred during the launch of military reconnaissance satellite: The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK launched a military reconnaissance satellite, "Malligyong-1", mounted on a new-type carrier rocket, "Chollima-1", at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Cholsan County of North Phyongan Province at 6:27 on May 31, Juche 112 (2023), as scheduled. The carrier rocket "Chollima-1" fell to the West Sea of Korea after losing thrust due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine after the separation of the first stage during the normal flight. The NADA spokesperson attributed the failure to the low reliability and stability of the new-type engine system applied to carrier rocket "Chollima-1" and the unstable character of the fuel used, saying that scientists, technicians and experts concerned start discovering concrete causes. The NADA said that it would thoroughly investigate the serious defects revealed in the satellite launch, take urgent scientific and technological measures to overcome them and conduct the second launch as soon as possible through various part tests.*

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<sup>200</sup> See <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1685600207-36284567/kcna-report/> .

## Annex 21: Salvaging of sections of the Chollima-1 Space Launch Vehicle and of the Malligyong-1 satellite by the ROK Navy



Source: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 31 May 2023, 5 July 2023.

Statement by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 May 2023: “We are providing you with a photo of an object presumed to be part of the North’s claimed space launch vehicle. Our military has identified and is currently picking up an object presumed to be part of the North’s claimed space launch vehicle at approximately 200 kilometers west of the waters near Eochong Island.”

Statement by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 July 2023: “The ROK has concluded the search and recovery operation for DPRK space launch debris and other remnants, which began on 31 May and ended on 5 July. Despite challenging operational conditions, the ROK military successfully recovered numerous debris, demonstrating excellent operational capabilities. Through the search and rescue operation, key components of the DPRK space launch vehicle and satellite were recovered and thoroughly analyzed by ROK and US experts, concluding that they have no military use as a reconnaissance satellite.”

Translation by the Panel.



**Annex 22: Construction of a silo used for the KN-23 launch on 19 March 2023**




















*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 7 February 2023, annotated by the Panel.



*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., 15 January 2023, 28 January 2023, 1 February 2023, 13 March 2023, annotated by the Panel.

**Annex 23: Reply from a research institute in Sweden**

		Sida: 1 (1)
	2023-03-16	Dnr: 2-3506/2023
University Director	 Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)	
	<i>By email only</i>	
Reference 		
Dear 		
<p>In reference to your letters dated 1 September 2022 and 15 December 2022  would like to provide additional information.</p> <p>When  first employed Dr.  in 2020 due check was made to ensure he had the relevant permits for work and residence in Sweden. The permits have been renewed after expiration. The Swedish Migration Agency's decision on February 28, 2023 to reject Dr.  application for a residence and work permit, deport him from the country etc. was brought to 's knowledge on March 15, 2023 by Dr. . Due to the decision  decided to terminate Dr. 's employment at  with effect as of March 16, 2023. The decision was handed over to Dr.  at a meeting later the same day and hereby the termination of his employment at  is definite.</p>  Acting University Director		
		

Source: A Swedish research institute.



## Annex 24: Co-authorship of Dr. Im Song-jin, Kim Il Sung University, with scholars from Chinese research institutes

### 1) List of co-authored publications of Dr. Im Song-jin

No	Title and we reference	Journal or source of information	Authors
1	Interactions between Plasmonic Nanoantennas and Vortex Beams	<i>Nano Letters</i> 2022, 22, 12, 5015–5021 5 June 2022 <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.nanolett.2c01926">https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.nanolett.2c01926</a>	[REDACTED] Song-Jin Im [REDACTED] Chol-Song Ri, Kum-Song Ho Ji-Song Pae [REDACTED]
2	Analytical analysis of spectral sensitivity of plasmon resonances in a nanocavity	<i>Nanoscale</i> 2019, 11, 10977–10983 06 May 2019 <a href="https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2019/NR/C9NR02766A">https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2019/NR/C9NR02766A</a>	[REDACTED] Song-Jin Im [REDACTED]

### 2) Bibliographic information about Dr. Im's affiliation with Chinese university

[REDACTED]<sup>a, b</sup>, [REDACTED]<sup>S. b</sup>, Im, S.-J.<sup>b, c</sup>, [REDACTED]<sup>b</sup>, [REDACTED]<sup>b</sup>, [REDACTED]<sup>a</sup>

**Analytical analysis of spectral sensitivity of plasmon resonances in a nanocavity**  
(2019) *Nanoscale*, 11 (22), pp. 10977–10983. Cited 10 times.  
DOI: 10.1039/c9nr02766a

<sup>a</sup> [REDACTED] Beijing, [REDACTED] China  
<sup>b</sup> Institute for Advanced Studies, School of Physics, [REDACTED] University, [REDACTED] China  
<sup>c</sup> Department of Physics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang, North Korea

**Funding details**  
2016YFB0700700, 2017YFA0303402, 2017YFA0303404  
National Natural Science Foundation of China NSFC21403081, NSAF U-1530401  
Science Challenge Project

**Funding details**  
[REDACTED]

**Correspondence Address**  
[REDACTED]

**Publisher:** Royal Society of Chemistry

**ISSN:** 20403364  
**PubMed ID:** 31140538  
**Language of Original Document:** English  
**Abbreviated Source Title:** *Nanoscale*  
2-s2.0-85067057281  
**Document Type:** Article  
**Publication Stage:** Final  
**Source:** Scopus

Source: Scopus



## Annex 25: Letter from the Permanent Mission of China and China's Reply



中华人民共和国常驻联合国代表团

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, 25 July 2023

Respected Acting Coordinator and experts,

I am writing in response to your previous letters regarding the requests to investigate alleged violations of Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK.

China has been fully and strictly implementing the Resolutions and consistently and constructively supporting the work of the Panel. In this regard, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted thorough investigations on the issues raised by the Panel, and the details of the investigations are enclosed herewith. These investigations are by no means easy to conduct, and a lot of efforts have been made to verify the information provided by the Panel. China hopes these feedback could be reflected in the Panel's midterm report in a faithful and comprehensive manner.

I would also like to take this opportunity to emphasize that China has made great efforts in implementing the Resolutions on the DPRK and sustained great losses. I count on the Panel to base

Panel of Experts  
Established pursuant to resolution 1874  
New York

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its work on facts and request the Panel to carry out its assessments and analysis in line with its mandate as specified in the related Resolutions, and refrain from including unverified information in its report.

I look forward to continuing working with you to contribute to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and the political solution to the Peninsula issue.

Warm regards,



Zhang Jun

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative  
of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

## **China's feedback to the 1874 Panel of Experts**

### **1. Intangible Technology Transfers**

China has been consistently and strictly implementing the provisions of the Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK regarding scientific and technological cooperation as well as academic communication. Necessary measures have been taken to prevent sensitive materials from being collected by the DPRK.

As verified by the related Chinese authorities, the German media reports are grossly inaccurate. First, the two papers mentioned by the media reports are based on normal cooperation of fundamental scientific studies, which has no dual use nature and has nothing to do with nuclear proliferation. Second, the involvement of Im Song-Jin in the two papers was limited to communication on theoretical issues, Chinese scholars did not provide any data to Im. Chinese scholars listed Im as an author just out of respect. This communication does not constitute scientific and technological exchanges or cooperation, and therefore is not a violation of the related provisions of the Resolutions. Third, Im visited the relevant University for only a short period of time from July to September 2015, with all expenses related to this visit paid by Im himself. The University did not provide any financial support or remuneration to him. Im did not return to the University after the end of his visit in September in 2015, nor did he have any status with this University. For Im's visit to this University occurred before the adoption of the Resolution 2321 in 2016, which restricts scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation with the DPRK, therefore his visit does not violate the Resolution.

The German media reports are clearly inconsistent with the facts, and the relevant Chinese research institutes, universities and individuals are not in violation of the Security Council Resolutions, China requests the Panel not to include this case into its report. We trust the Panel to base its work on facts rather than on media reports.

## **2. Illegal cyber financial activities**

China conducted serious and thorough investigations on the information provided by the Panel, and did not find any illegal cyber financial activities by the relevant individuals within Chinese border. China consistently and strictly combats illegal cyber financial activities by Chinese laws and regulations in an equal manner no matter if related personnel violate the Security Council Resolutions or not. Besides, the cyber activities mentioned by the Panel do not fall into the scope prohibited by the Resolutions. China requests the Panel to conduct its work according to its mandate, and do not include unrelated content into its report.



### **3. Alleged sale of DPRK seafood by Chinese company**

Chinese authorities have located the seafood stand in Yanji West Market mentioned by the Panel. This stand has been using the banner of “North Korea Seafood Wholesale” for several years as a means to attract customers. It was found that the seafood sold at the stand were actually imported from Russia through legal channels, not illegally obtained from the DPRK. Chinese authorities have ordered the stand operate the business according to law and remove the banner. Obviously, there is no violation of Security Council Resolutions in this case and it should not be included in the Panel's report.

### **4. Alleged export of coal by DPRK ships**

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

HUNG BONG 3 declared one entry into Lianyungang Port from Nampo Port in January this year empty loaded. And the ship left Lianyungang Port empty loaded.

TAE Dong 1 declared two entries into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January and March this year empty loaded. And the ship left Dalian Port loaded with grain and other grocery.

PU SONG declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January this year loaded with containers, and left the port loaded with goods for daily necessities. In June this year, this ship declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port empty loaded and left loaded with goods for daily necessities.

No records of port entry and exit or customs declarations of TO MYONG, MIYANG 5, RYONG RIM were found in the Chinese port logs.

China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. The above-mentioned ships were loaded with goods for daily necessities, not Security Council embargoed items. The Panel should execute its duties cautiously and responsibly, carefully screening the information it acquired, and should not include unverified information in its report.

## **5. Alleged illegal export by Chinese ships to the DPRK**

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

BAO YING HAI 18, XIN YANG HONG, QIMING 168, and FU LONG 98 were de-registered between late 2022 and early 2023, and these ships were not re-registered ever since. Chinese government does not have information on their exact whereabouts.

Records of port entry and exit of XIN HANG SHUN and LONG XIN 12 were not found and Chinese government does not have detailed information about these ships.

## **6. Alleged possession of Chinese ships by the DPRK**

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

SHUNCHAO 9, HUI YI, HONG JIE 1, RUN HONG 58, XIN HONG XIANG 77, WEN TONG FA ZHAN, and XIANGHUI 10 were de-registered on May of 2022, January of 2023, August of 2022, November of 2021, October of 2022, February of 2023, November of 2018 respectively. These ships were not re-registered ever since. ZHI KUN 6 and HUA JIN SHENG 8 are still registered as Chinese ships. HONG TAI 215 have not applied for nationality registration.

Judging from the investigations conducted by Chinese authorities, the information received by the Panel are inaccurate. This is not the first time such thing happens and China has previously raised concerns over this issue. China requests the Panel to conduct necessary screening of the information it receives, and avoid including information that are inconsistent with facts in its report, so as to maintain the objectivity of the report.

## **7. Request for seizure of DPRK ship**

China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. Relevant Chinese authorities are still conducting investigations on the case and preliminary findings show that NEW KONK, UNICA, DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG, and SHUNDLLI have no records of port entry and exit in China since 2020. The information provided by the Panel are not verified and should not be included in its report.



**Annex 26: DPRK-flagged tankers observed delivering refined petroleum products at Nampo and other oil facilities, 1 January-1 May 2023**


A Member State estimates that as much as 781,497 barrels of refined petroleum products may have been delivered to Nampo and other DPRK ports by 1 May, based on a maximum cargo capacity of 90 percent of each delivery vessel's deadweight tonnage. In reaching this conclusion the Member State used a methodology widely-accepted by industry. The Member State's calculations presume the carriage of "*refined petroleum*" to include diesel and/or fuel oil as both these products are widely recognized to be within the category "*refined petroleum*". The Member State uses a conversion rate of 7.5 barrels per metric ton, the average conversion rate of gasoline, kerosene, gas oil/diesel and residual fuel oil.

Based on a maximum cargo capacity of 90 percent of each vessel's deadweight tonnage, the Member States estimates that the cap would have been breached in mid-March (figure 26); assuming a 60% maximum cargo capacity the cap would have been breached end-April-beginning May; at 30% capacity<sup>201</sup> the cap would not have been breached during this reporting period.

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<sup>201</sup> A Member State has reported to the Committee however that "[i]t is highly unlikely that DPRK tankers ... would arrive in DPRK ports with less than one third of their cargo capacities filled. The expenditure of resources and fuel [in so doing]... would not be justified ...".

**Figure 26:** Estimates arising from observed deliveries of refined oil products to Nampo, Hungnam, Chongjin and Songnim, 1 January – 1 May 2023 (barrels). The intersection of the horizontal line, at 500,000 barrels, and the three trend lines, indicate approximately when the oil cap would have breached in this period, assuming a total cargo carried of 90%, 60% and 30% of total DWT of vessels involved in deliveries.









Source: Member State, the Panel

Abbreviation: DWT: Deadweight Tonnage




The Member State's imagery (see below) indicates that 39 of the 46 deliveries went to Nampo and the remainder as follows:




DPRK Port	Nampo	Chongjin	Hungnam	Songnim
<b>Number of deliveries (1 Jan – 1 May 2023)</b>	39 deliveries	3 deliveries (one each by SIN PHYONG 5, SIN PHYONG 9, SIN PHYONG 14)	2 deliveries (both by SIN PHYONG 14)	2 deliveries (both by KUM UN SAN)




<b>3 January</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 9</b> <b>(IMO 8916293)</b>  DWT 1150MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.	
<b>8 January</b> <b>PO CHON</b> <b>(IMO 8848276)</b>  DWT 3538MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 23880 barrels.	
<b>18 January</b> <b>KUM UN SAN</b> <b>(IMO: 8720436)</b>  DWT 2070MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.	




<p><b>18 January</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 5</b> <b>(IMO 8865121)</b></p> <p>DWT 3295MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>19 January</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 14</b> <b>(IMO: 8021579)</b></p> <p>DWT 949MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>25 January</b> <b>CHON MA SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8660313)</b></p> <p>DWT 3566MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24068 barrels.</p>	






<p><b>18 January</b> <b>JI SONG 6</b> <b>(IMO 8898740)</b></p> <p>DWT 1250MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>2 February</b> <b>PAEK YANG SAN 1</b> <b>(IMO 9129653)</b></p> <p>DWT 4989MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33676 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>5 February</b> <b>SAM JONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 7408873)</b></p> <p>DWT 2507MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 16922 barrels.</p>	




<p><b>5 February</b> <b>YU JONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8604917)</b></p> <p>DWT 1206MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>8 February</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8817007)</b></p> <p>DWT 2106MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>8 February</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 14</b> <b>(IMO 8021579)</b></p> <p>DWT 949MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.</p>	




<p><b>14 February</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 14</b> <b>(IMO 8021579)</b></p> <p>DWT 949MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.</p>	 <p>14 February 2023</p> <p>M/T SIN PHYONG 14 (IMO: 8021579) Unladen at the Pier Hungnam Petroleum Facility 38:42:56 N 125:22:07 E</p> <p>20 m</p> <p>SX9030856</p>
<p><b>10 February</b> <b>KUM RYONG 3</b> <b>(IMO 8610461)</b></p> <p>DWT 1988MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.</p>	 <p>10 February 2023</p> <p>M/T KUM RYONG 3 (IMO: 8610461) Delivering Refined Petroleum Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:55 N 125:21:57 E</p> <p>20 m</p> <p>JAG154996</p>
<p><b>14 February</b> <b>KUM JIN GANG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8708684)</b></p> <p>DWT 1988MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.</p>	 <p>14 February 2023</p> <p>M/T KUM JIN GANG 2 (IMO: 8708684) Delivering Refined Petroleum Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:55 N 125:21:56 E</p> <p>20 m</p> <p>PC2523744</p>




<p><b>14 February</b> <b>CHANG HAE 1</b> <b>(IMO 8791667)</b></p> <p>DWT 4983MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33635 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>16 February</b> <b>CHIL BO SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8711021)</b></p> <p>DWT 1999MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>19 February</b> <b>RYE SONG GANG 1</b> <b>(IMO 7389704)</b></p> <p>DWT 3003MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 20270 barrels.</p>	






<b>21 February</b> <b>PAEK MA</b> <b>(IMO 9066978)</b>  DWT 2250MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 15188 barrels.	
<b>23 February SIN</b> <b>PHYONG 9</b> <b>(IMO 8916293)</b>  DWT 1150MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.	
<b>26 February</b> <b>WOL BONG SAN</b> <b>(IMO 7636638)</b>  DWT 4296MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 28988 barrels.	

<p><b>4 March</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 5</b> <b>(IMO 8865121)</b></p> <p>DWT 3295MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>15 March</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 5</b> <b>(IMO 8865121)</b></p> <p>DWT 3295MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>13 March</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 14</b> <b>(IMO 8021579)</b></p> <p>DWT 949MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.</p>	




<b>19 March</b> <b>YUN HONG 8</b> <b>(IMO None)</b>  DWT 2900MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 19575 barrels.	 <p>19 March 2023</p> <p>M/T YUN HONG 8 (IMO: None) Delivering Refined Petroleum Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:00 N 125:18:17 E</p> <p>WE7910544</p>
<b>19 March</b> <b>AN SAN 1</b> <b>(IMO 7303803)</b>  DWT 3003MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 20273 barrels	 <p>19 March 2023</p> <p>M/T AN SAN 1 (IMO: 7303803) Delivering Refined Petroleum Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:55 N 125:21:58 E</p> <p>AU8992397</p>
<b>19 March</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8817007)</b>  DWT 2106MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.	 <p>19 March 2023</p> <p>M/T SIN PHYONG 2 (IMO: 8817007) Delivering Refined Petroleum Nampo Petroleum Facility 38:42:56 N 125:22:08 E</p> <p>KN7549881</p>




<p><b>26 March</b> <b>KUM RYONG 3</b> <b>(IMO 8610461)</b></p> <p>DWT 1998MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>29 March</b> <b>KUM RYONG 3</b> <b>(IMO 8610461)</b></p> <p>DWT 1998MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>29 March</b> <b>SAM JONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 7408873)</b></p> <p>DWT 2507MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 16922 barrels.</p>	






<b>30 March</b> <b>NAM DAE BONG</b> <b>(IMO 9132612)</b>  DWT 9273MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 62593 barrels.	
<b>30 March</b> <b>KUM UN SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8720436)</b>  DWT 2070MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.	
<b>2 April</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 9</b> <b>(IMO 8916293)</b>  DWT 1150MT  Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.	




<p><b>2 April</b> <b>YU JONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8604917)</b></p> <p>DWT 1206MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>2 April</b> <b>KUM RYONG 3</b> <b>(IMO 8610461)</b></p> <p>DWT 1998MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>7 April</b> <b>KUM RYONG 3</b> <b>(IMO 8610461)</b></p> <p>DWT 1998MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.</p>	




<p><b>7 April</b> <b>CHIL BO SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8711021)</b></p> <p>DWT 1999MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>9 April</b> <b>CHIL BO SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8711021)</b></p> <p>DWT 1999MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>7 April</b> <b>CHANG HAE 2</b> <b>(IMO 8691702)</b></p> <p>DWT 3398MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels.</p>	




<p><b>11 April</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 5</b> <b>(IMO 8865121)</b></p> <p>DWT 3295MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>16 April</b> <b>CHON MA SAN</b> <b>(IMO 8660313)</b></p> <p>DWT 3566MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24068 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>18 April</b> <b>SAM JONG 1</b> <b>(IMO 8405311)</b></p> <p>DWT 1665MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 11239 barrels.</p>	






<p><b>19 April</b> <b>UN HUNG</b> <b>(IMO 9045962)</b></p> <p>DWT 3685MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24874 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>24 April</b> <b>UN HUNG</b> <b>(IMO 9045962)</b></p> <p>DWT 3685MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24874 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>20 April</b> <b>SIN PHYONG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8817007)</b></p> <p>DWT 2106MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.</p>	

<p><b>20 April</b>  <b>CHANG HAE 1</b>  <b>(IMO 8791667)</b>  <b>(nka KUM JIN</b>  <b>GANG 3)</b></p> <p>DWT 4983MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33635 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>21 April</b>  <b>KUM UN SAN</b>  <b>(IMO 8720436)</b></p> <p>DWT 2070MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>24 April</b>  <b>KWANG CHON</b>  <b>(IMO 8605026)</b></p> <p>DWT 1966MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13271 barrels.</p>	

<p><b>26 April</b> <b>KWANG CHON</b> <b>(IMO 8605026)</b></p> <p>DWT 1966MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13271 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>27 April</b> <b>KUM JIN GANG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8708684)</b></p> <p>DWT 1988MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>1 May</b> <b>KUM JIN GANG 2</b> <b>(IMO 8708684)</b></p> <p>DWT 1988MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.</p>	

<p><b>27 April</b> <b>JI SONG 6</b> <b>(IMO 8898740)</b></p> <p>DWT 1250MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>1 May</b> <b>JI SONG 6</b> <b>(IMO 8898740)</b></p> <p>DWT 1250MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.</p>	
<p><b>27 April</b> <b>CHANG HAE 2</b> <b>(IMO 8691702)</b> <b>(nka YU SON)</b></p> <p>DWT 3398MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22937 barrels.</p>	



<p><b>1 May</b>  <b>CHANG HAE 2</b>  <b>(IMO 8691702)</b>  <b>(nka YU SON)</b></p> <p>DWT 3398MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22937 barrels.</p>			
<p><b>27 April</b>  <b>KUM UN SAN</b>  <b>(IMO 8720436)</b></p> <p>DWT 2070MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.</p>			
<p><b>1 May</b>  <b>KUM UN SANM</b>  <b>(IMO 8720436)</b></p> <p>DWT 2070MT</p> <p>Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.</p>			

Source: Satellite imagery - Member State; ship information – Member State, IMO records, and the Panel.

## **Annex 27: Data provided by a Member State regarding breaches of the cap on refined petroleum products delivered to the DPRK**

Annex 26 records that a Member State estimates that the cap on refined petroleum products delivered to the DPRK in 2023 has been breached. Data provided by another Member State support this assessment: This Member State estimates that approximately 80,000 tons of refined petroleum was illicitly imported by DPRK in the first quarter of 2023.

The Member State has provided additional data reflecting an equivalent breach in 2022, also by the end of the first quarter.

Data provided by the Member State, in tons


Smuggled refined petroleum imported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of refined petroleum illicitly imported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	None	Approx. 70,000 tons	Approx. 80,000 tons

Member State data converted to barrels by the Panel, using the Committee's conversion rate of 7.98 barrels per ton

Smuggled refined petroleum imported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of refined petroleum illicitly imported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	None	Approx. 558,600 barrels	Approx. 638,400 barrels

**Annex 28: DPRK's illicit maritime activities in 2022**

The DPRK's illicit sea trade took place over a larger number of locations than before.

**Year 2022**

Source: Member State

## Annex 29: Ship-to-ship activity at Sokdo-ri Island, DPRK

In 2023, the Panel observed activity around Sokdo-ri Island, near the DPRK's West Sea Barrage. This is the area where a floating crane, JIANG SHEN FU 6988, involved in ship-to-ship activity between DPRK vessels and former foreign-flagged vessels acquired by the DPRK, was located on 6 September 2022.<sup>202</sup> JIANG SHEN FU operated within DPRK's territorial waters between Nampo lockgate and Ch'o-do Island. The Panel recalls its earlier assessment<sup>203</sup> of contributing factors that have expanded the DPRK's use of territorial waters in conducting at-sea transfers, including the need to avoid monitoring vessels and the inability of many of its cargo vessels to enter foreign ports to offload banned commodities.

The following is a sample of satellite images of vessels taking part in what appear to be ship-to-ship transfers.

June 2023



<sup>202</sup> S/2023/171, para. 89 and annex 40

<sup>203</sup> S/2022/668, paras. 35-36.



May 2023



January 2023



*Source:* Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

### Annex 30: Geo-Spoofing as a new evasion technique for DPRK-related sanctions evasion, 2023

In April 2023, the Panel monitored two vessels on a maritime a.i. analytics platform sailing in an unusual pattern. AIS analysis revealed their voyages were consistent with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) manipulation, a machine-generated geo-spoofing, while the vessel was in fact traveling at the same speed and heading, but in a straight line. The two vessels in question were transmitting as:

- F.LONLINE, a known false identity for the former direct delivery vessel (FDDV) NEW KONK,
- LITON, a known false identity for the FDDV UNICA.

Figure 30-1: NEW KONK as F.LONLINE at Sansha Bay, 1-3 April 2023

On 1 April 2023, NEW KONK transmitting as F.LONLINE was anchored at Sansha Bay, China. Satellite Imagery by Planet Labs confirmed the vessel's presence in the same location a day later. According to the vessel's AIS transmission, NEW KONK / F.LONLINE departed its anchoring point on 3 April 2023 at 12:38 UTC.




Figure 30-2: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE begins geo-spoofing, 3 April

The vessel next transmitted an AIS signal at 13:21 UTC, at an apparent location approximately 28 nautical miles from where it last transmitted. This location would have required it to travel at the impossible average speed of about 20 nautical miles per hour. This GNSS manipulation lasted until 16 May 2023, making NEW KONK/F.LONLINE's AIS tracks during this period false.




Figure 30-3: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE remaining at Sansha Bay, 8-9 April

Medium resolution satellite imagery on Planet Labs showed that a vessel of similar length as NEW KONK remained at Sansha Bay after NEW KONK's GNSS manipulation began.





Figure 30-4: NEW KONK imaged at Sansha Bay, 9 April 2023

High resolution satellite imagery provided by a Member State confirmed NEW KONK's location on 9 April 2023.




Figure 30-5: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE transmitting as LIFAN, East China Sea, 15-16 April 2023

Satellite imagery show that by 16 April the vessel was no longer in Sansha Bay. Instead, AIS transmission showed a vessel transmitting as LIFAN, a known falsified identity of NEW KONK, sailing up through the East China Sea.



Figure 30-6: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE, Yellow Sea, 16 June to 8 July<sup>204</sup> 2023

NEW KONK repeated its GNSS manipulation again from 16 June 2023: The same geo-spoofing signatures suggesting travel in a straight line, at the same speed and heading, in a southerly direction through the Yellow Sea. This may indicate obfuscation of its actual location at the time to conduct further illicit activities.



Source: Windward; Satellite Imagery, Planet Labs; annotated by the Panel

<sup>204</sup> At date of writing.


### Annex 31: Suspect vessels in DPRK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The following are examples over the last two years of FDDVs and suspect vessels located in the same area of the DPRK EEZ, conducting or waiting to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers in the vicinity. Typically, the suspect vessels and DPRK tankers did not transmit AIS signals, conducting their illicit transfers in an effort to evade sanctions.

#### 2022

Figure 31-1:

NEW KONK in the same area of the DPRK EEZ in November 2022



*Source:* Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

Figure 31-2:

UNICA berthed alongside DPRK-flagged MU BONG 1 in the same area of the DPRK EEZ in September 2022




*Source:* Member State

Figure 31-3 shows the former intermediary vessel HENG XING (IMO: 8669589; currently the DPRK-flagged A BONG 1), UNICA (IMO: 8514306) and VIFINE (currently sailing as the DPRK-flagged UN HUNG), on 21 January 2022 in the DPRK EEZ.

The DPRK-flagged tanker UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962) previously sailed as the FDDV VIFINE. NEW KONK, then acting in the capacity of an intermediary vessel, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with VIFINE on 19 June 2019, before itself subsequently becoming an FDDV.<sup>205</sup> The Panel's investigations showed the entities behind the two vessels had common connections of ownership and management history. UN HUNG conducted ship-to-ship transfers with NEW KONK on at least one other occasion in January 2022, in the same DPRK EEZ location (figure 31-4).

Figure 31-3:

UNICA, HENG XING (nka A BONG 1) and NEW KONK 1 in the DPRK EEZ in January 2022



Source: Member State

<sup>205</sup> S/2022/151, para. 32, figure VI.



Figure 31-4:



Source: Satellite imagery: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; inset photograph, Member State

## 2021

Figure 31-5:

The DPRK-flagged NAM DAE BONG, then sailing as DIAMOND 8, with the DPRK-flagged CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313) in the same area of the DPRK EEZ, 8 August 2021<sup>206</sup>



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

<sup>206</sup> S/2022/132, para. 40.

Figure 31-6:

FDDV NEW KONK and DPRK-flagged KUM JIN GANG in the DPRK EEZ, 23 September 2021



*Source:* Member State

Figure 31-7:

FDDVs in the DPRK EEZ, 14 April 2021<sup>207</sup>



*Source:* Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel

<sup>207</sup> S/2022/132, para. 41 and annex 34.

**Annex 32: Table of fraudulent identifiers transmitted, January to May 2023**Table 32: Table of fraudulent identifiers transmitted, January to May 2023<sup>208</sup>

Ship name	Fraudulent identifier
NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387)	F.LONLINE MMSI: 312162000
	LIFAN MMSI: 312165230 MMSI: 312165923
	LIAN MMSI: 667001395
UNICA (IMO: 8514306)	LITON MMSI: 457106000
DIAMOND 8 nka NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612)	SHUNLI MMSI: 457111000

*Source:* The Panel<sup>208</sup> While these FDDVs continue to transmit known fraudulent names, some of their MMSIs have been manipulated.


### Annex 33: Former Direct Delivery Vessels (FDDVs) in the Sansha Bay area, China

The following are examples of FDDVs and suspect vessels co-located in Sansha Bay between 2020 and 2023. In many of these instances investigated by the Panel, the following pattern of activity was observed: departure from Sansha Bay; ship-to-ship transfer conducted in the Taiwan Strait; ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tankers in the DPRK EEZ.

The Panel sought Chinese authorities' assistance to obtain information from these FDDVs on the individuals facilitating the illicit oil transfers. This would enable disruption of future oil procurements conducted by these vessels. China replied: *"China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. Relevant Chinese authorities are still conducting investigations on the case and preliminary findings show that NEW KONK, UNICA, DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG, and SHUNDLLI have no records of port entry and exit in China since 2020. The information provided by the Panel are not verified and should not be included in its report"*.

#### 2023

FDDVs NEW KONK / F.LONLINE and UNICA / LITON in Sansha Bay, 15 February 2023



Source: Planet Labs; AIS overlay, Windward; annotated by the Panel



**2022**

FDDVs NEW KONK / F.LONLINE, UNICA / HAI SHUN 2 and HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896; currently the DPRK-flagged A SA BONG), Sansha Bay, 17-26 May 2022<sup>209</sup>



Source: Windward; annotated by the Panel

FDDVs UNICA, DIAMOND 8 and NEW KONK in Sansha Bay, 30 June 2022<sup>210</sup>



Source: Member State


<sup>209</sup> S/2022/668, paras. 39-42.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.


**2021**

FDDV's SUBBLIC and HOKONG in Sansha Bay, 2 August 2021

*HOKONG*<sup>211</sup>



*SUBBLIC*, sailing as *HAI ZHOU 168*<sup>212</sup>




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

<sup>211</sup> This FDDV is registered as being broken up in November 2021. S/2022/132, annex 43.


<sup>212</sup> S/2022/132.

2 August 2021<sup>213</sup>



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

<sup>213</sup> [S/2022/132](#), annex 41.

**2020**FDDV NEW KONK in Sansha Bay, 20 August 2020<sup>214</sup>*Source:* Member StateFDDV XING MING YANG 888 in Sansha Bay, 1 November 2020<sup>215</sup>*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Member State<sup>214</sup> S/2022/132, annex 39a.<sup>215</sup> S/2022/132, annex 34.



FDDV SUBBLIC transmitting as HAI ZHOU 168 in Sansha Bay, 26 November 2020<sup>216</sup>



Source: Windward

Source: The Panel

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

## Annex 34: Associated entities and individuals

The Panel recalls previous investigations have shown that facilitators capitalize on the maritime industry's complex ownership and operator arrangements to prevent easy linkage identification between them. To do so, different paper companies are often set up with different nominee directors, and company ownership and / or management characterized by only indirect linkages.

EVER GLORY's registered owner is Kindom Honor Co., Ltd (hereafter "Kindom Honor") with an operating presence in Kaohsiung.<sup>217</sup> The ship's operator and technical manager is LW Maritime Service Co., Ltd (hereafter "LW Maritime"), another Kaohsiung-based company.<sup>218</sup> Both entities were incorporated in the Marshall Islands until their status was annulled in April 2023.

### Kindom Honor

- Kindom Honor lists an address in the care of the Kaohsiung-based Green Ship Management Ltd<sup>219</sup> (hereafter "Green Ship") (see para. 55 of the Main Text (Case 2)).
- Green Ship shares the same contact details and address with three other companies: Navigator Ship Management Ltd (hereafter "Navigator Ship"), Marine Safety Consultants Ltd (hereafter "Marine Safety") and Fu Feng Marine Services Co Ltd (hereafter, "Fu Feng Marine") (富豐海事服務有限公司)
- Fu Feng Marine<sup>220</sup> was founded by two individuals, one of which ("Individual A") the Panel had previously corresponded with. Marine Safety's email is used by both Individual A as well as an associate of Individual A. This associate in turn has been listed on several shipping documents the Panel has in possession, including the Kaohsiung-based Gold Advance Corp, associated with AN PING (IMO: 7903366), another FDDV.<sup>221</sup>

### LW Maritime

- LW Maritime was also listed as the ship manager of HENG XING (IMO: 8669589), another vessel investigated by the Panel,<sup>222</sup> before the tanker's transfer to the DPRK fleet in January 2022.
- Mr Wu GJ of LW Maritime, has been publicly recorded<sup>223</sup> as associated with the Kaohsiung-based Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultants Co Ltd, a company associated with entities linked to vessels previously investigated by the Panel.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>217</sup> IMO records.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> With a Fuxing 2<sup>nd</sup> Road, Lingya District, Kaohsiung address.

<sup>220</sup> With a Zhongshan 2<sup>nd</sup> Road, Lingya District, Kaohsiung address.

<sup>221</sup> S/2021/211, para. 46 and annex 25.

<sup>222</sup> S/2023/171, table 34 and para. 99, S/2022/668, paras. 74-75 and annex 36 and S/2019/171, annex 6.

<sup>223</sup> See <https://web.archive.org/web/20181207111011/http://vanguard1.webnode.cz>

<sup>224</sup> S/2019/171, para. 9 and annex 6, and S/2018/171, paras. 68-69.

Individual A was also listed as having previously managed PU ZHOU when the vessel was still foreign-flagged and prior to its transfer to the DPRK.

The Panel wrote to Individual A concerning queries, inter alia, on his associations with the various entities; the entities' linkages viz one another, and to EVER GLORY and MIDAS. The Panel received a response from Individual A in late July 2023, to which it is still assessing the information provided.

In the meantime, the Panel highlights the following:

Individual A replied that he / his companies provide “...*ship safety consultant in complying relevant regulations ...*” and served as “...*DOC company ...dealing with ship safety audit, class survey assistance, external inspection for example PSC inspection*”.

With regards the associated companies identified by the Panel at figure XVIII of the Main Text, Individual A did not deny their linkages to him/his associate, but replied that “This is impossible to hide anything from owners from the fact this system established for, DOC company contact and email will lead to us”, indicated that the various companies identified by the Panel could be easily traced to him. The Panel maintains a different view. Identification to Individual A would not have been possible without access to various jurisdictional ownership information, restricted ship registration records, specialized subscription databases and the Panel's own investigations.

#### *Green Ship*

Individual A also claimed that Green Ship served as EVER GLORY's DOC holder rather than LW Maritime, and that Kindom Honor had no relationship with the other companies investigated by the Panel. IMO records list LW Maritime as EVER GLORY's DOC holder and that Kindom Honor was in the care of Green Ship.

Elsewhere, in a separate response to the Panel, Kindom Honor, which is the registered owner of EVER GLORY, stated that Individual A was “...*a consultant in the affair of vessel DOC management on EVER GLORY commissioned by Kindom Honor.*”

#### *Navigator Ship*

IMO records indicate Navigator Ship served as MIDAS' ship manager, operator and technical manager, in addition to being the DOC Holder at the time of the MIDAS' ship-to-ship transfer with SHUNDLLI.

Individual A further stated that in addition to simply providing DOC services, Navigator Ship provided no other commercial services nor had relationships with other companies investigated by the Panel. The Panel again notes IMO records indicate Navigator Ship shares a phone and fax number with Green Ship, Marine Safety, and Fu Feng Marine.

Individual A claimed Navigator Ship and Marine Safety had no relationships with the other companies investigated by the Panel. Yet, in his response Individual A acknowledged that the same associate of Individual A served as director of both Green Ship and Navigator ship. Elsewhere, Individual A claimed that MIDAS was supposed to have been transferred to Green Ship's management, but the transfer was not completed due to cost.

The Panel notes that while Individual A claimed to have provided only DOC services to vessels of interests to the Panel and had no knowledge of or role in the vessels' cargo or operations, the details in his response to the Panel's enquiries suggests much deeper knowledge, including that of Navigator Ship's internal communications.

Elsewhere, in a separate response to the Panel, Laurel International, which is the registered owner of MIDAS, replied that Individual A was "... *under the commission by Laurel International ...*". *established Navigator ship as MIDAS' Document of Compliance (DOC) holder. Where "Individual A was engaged by Laurel International to do the job of DOC management and counseling of the vessel MIDAS ..."* Ms. [X], through Individual A's introduction, served as "*nominal person*" responsible for Navigator Ship, and that "*she was charged with keeping contact with [Individual A] ... Neither... took part in the shipping management of MIDAS*".


Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel



**Annex 35: Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd**

Full Victory's Certificate of Incorporation



Source: The Panel

Invoice of oil transfer from supplier ship to Full Victory for EVER GLORY, 3 March 2023

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

## COMMERCIAL INVOICE

DATE: Feb. 01, 2023

INV. NO: [REDACTED]

CONTRACT NO. [REDACTED]

MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD  
SUPPLY TANKER [REDACTED]

DATE	VESSEL NAME	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QUANTITY (BBL)	UNIT PRICE (USD)	AMOUNT (USD)
2023/1/21	Ever Glory	Gasoil 10ppm	30,744.83	126.905	US\$3,901,672.65
TOTAL AMOUNT					US\$3,901,672.65

For and on behalf of  
SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Source: The Panel

Success Regent's request to Full Victory on customer and shipping information for the 18 January 2023 oil cargo transfer to EVER GLORY, 3 May 2023

<p><b>SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED</b> 3rd Floor, J&amp;C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <hr/> <p>致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.</p> <p>盡職調查</p> <p>依 SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED (後稱本公司) 與 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD. (後稱貴公司) 於 2023年01月18日 所簽訂之油品買賣合約 (合約編號 [REDACTED]), 本公司因企業盡職調查及國際制裁合規所需, 請貴公司盡速提供以下資料, 以便本公司進行相關法令遵循與合規管理:</p> <div><p>1. 貴公司與下游客戶之合約。</p><p>2. 貴公司船舶卸貨文件 (應包含卸貨起訖日期時間、卸貨地點、卸貨對象詳細資料、完整海運卸貨文件)。</p><p>3. 貴公司船舶軌跡紀錄 (若貴公司卸貨對象為船舶, 則該船舶的軌跡紀錄需一併提供)。</p></div> <p>SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 2023年05月03日</p>
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Unofficial Translation

1. Contracts between your company and downstream customers.
2. Your company's ship unloading documents (should include the date and time of unloading, unloading location, detailed information on unloading objects, and complete sea unloading documents).
3. Your company's ship track record (if your company's unloading object is a ship, the ship's track record must be provided together).

Source: The Panel

Oil cargo receipt confirming date of transfer of supplier ship to EVER GLORY, 21 January 2023

TO : MASTER OF VESSEL / BARGE			
M/T :	EVER GLORY ( 1729 )		
IMO:	9102813		
DATE :	21-Jan-2023		
<b>(" CARGO RECEIPT")</b>			
1. THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT UNDER MENTIONED SHIP/BARGE HAVE PHYSICALLY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MENTIONED BUNKER IN GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AT THE MENTIONED PORT / POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS, CONDITION AND EXCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE SALE CONTRACT .			
NAME OF RECEIVING VESSEL / BARGE		EVER GLORY ( 1729 )	
DESCRIPTION OF BUNKER :	GAS OIL	10	PPM SULPHUR
QUANTITY OF BUNKER :	4100	MT	METRIC TONS
<b>FLOW-METER READING .</b>			
BEFORE : NO.1		M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.1
BEFORE : NO.2	824765.3	M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.2
BEFORE : NO.3	620721.0	M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.3
<b>P.W FLOW-METER</b>			
BEFORE :	M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER :	M <sup>3</sup>
TOTAL :		0 M <sup>3</sup>	
<b>STATEMENT OF FACTS</b>			
	<b>TIME</b>	<b>DATE</b>	
ALONGSIDE :	17:30 LT	21.01.2023	GROSS LITRES
HOSE CONNECTED :	17:40 LT	21.01.2023	NET LITRES
COMMENCED SUPPLY :	17:50 LT	21.01.2023	US BBL'S
COMPLETED SUPPLY :	23:30 LT	21.01.2023	TEMPERATURE
HOSE DISCONNECTED :	23:40 LT	21.01.2023	DENSITY @ 15°C
VSL CAST OFF :	23:50 LT	21.01.2023	VCF
For and on behalf of FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.			
REMARKS :			
Authorized Signature(s)			
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT BY : MASTER OF M/T			
COUNTER - SIGN BY : MASTER OF			

Source: The Panel

Invoice of oil transfer from supplier ship to Full Victory for MIDAS, 3 March 2023

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED			
<div></div>			
PROFORMA INVOICE			
MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD			
		DATE: Mar. 03, 2023	
		INVOICE NO. :	<div></div>
<u>DESCRIPTIONS OF GOODS</u>	<u>QUANTITY(BBL)</u>	<u>UNIT PRICE(USD)</u>	<u>AMOUNT(USD)</u>
GASOIL 500ppm	15,103.20	111.000	<u>1,676,455.20</u>
TOTAL AMOUNT(USD)			<u>1,676,455.20</u>

Source: The Panel



Cargo receipt confirming date of transfer of supplier ship to MIDAS, 9 March 2023

<b>TO : MASTER OF VESSEL / BARGE</b>			
<b>M / T :</b>	<b>MIDAS (0285)</b>		
<b>IMO:</b>	<b>9105279</b>		
<b>DATE :</b>	<b>9-Mar-2023</b>		
<b>(" CARGO RECEIPT")</b>			
1. THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT UNDER MENTIONED SHIP/BARGE HAVE PHYSICALLY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MENTIONED BUNKER IN GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AT THE MENTIONED PORT / POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS, CONDITION AND EXCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE SALE CONTRACT .			
NAME OF RECEIVING VESSEL / BARGE		<b>MIDAS (0285)</b>	
DESCRIPTION OF BUNKER :	<b>GAS OIL</b>	<b>500 PPM</b>	<b>PPM SULPHUR</b>
QUANTITY OF BUNKER :	<b>2000</b>	<b>MT</b>	<b>METRIC TONS</b>
<b>FLOW-METER READING .</b>			
BEFORE : NO .1		M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.1
BEFORE : NO .2	<b>870498.1</b>	M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.2
BEFORE : NO .3	<b>674833.7</b>	M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : NO.3
<b>F.W FLOW-METER</b>			
BEFORE :		M <sup>3</sup>	AFTER : TOTAL : <b>0</b> M <sup>3</sup>
<b>STATEMENT OF FACTS</b>			
	<b>TIME</b>	<b>DATE</b>	
ALONGSIDE :	22:15 LT	08.03.2023	GROSS LITRES : <b>2400.000</b> M <sup>3</sup>
HOSE CONNECTED :	22:25 LT	08.03.2023	NET LITRES : <b>2383.680</b> M <sup>3</sup>
COMMENCED SUPPLY :	22:35 LT	08.03.2023	US BBLS : <b>15000.50</b> Bbls
COMPLETED SUPPLY :	00:40 LT	09.03.2023	TEMPERATURE : <b>23.2</b> °C
HOSE DISCONNECTED :	00:50 LT	09.03.2023	DENSITY @ 15°C : <b>0.8524</b>
VSL CAST OFF :	01:00 LT	09.03.2023	VCF : <b>0.9932</b>
REMARKS :			
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT BY : MASTER OF M/T			
COUNTER - SIGN BY : MASTER OF			

Source: The Panel

Success Regent's request to Full Victory on customer and shipping information, including for the 3 March 2023 oil cargo transfer to MIDAS, 23 March 2023

<p><b>SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED</b> 3rd Floor, J&amp;C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.</p> <p>盡職調查</p> <p>依 SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED (後稱本公司) 與 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD. (後稱貴公司) 於 2023年03月03日 及 2023年03月09日 所簽訂之油品買賣合約 (合約編號 [REDACTED] 及 [REDACTED])，本公司因企業盡職調查及國際制裁合規所需，請貴公司盡速提供以下資料，以便本公司進行相關法令遵循與合規管理：</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. 貴公司與下游客戶之合約。</li><li>2. 貴公司船舶卸貨文件 (應包含卸貨起訖日期時間、卸貨地點、卸貨對象詳細資料、完整海運卸貨文件)。</li><li>3. 貴公司船舶軌跡紀錄 (若貴公司卸貨對象為船舶，則該船舶的軌跡紀錄需一併提供)。</li></ol> <p>SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 2023年03月23日</p>
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Based on documentation provided by Success Regent, the company, on 30 March 2023, sent a letter to Navigator Ship, MIDAS' technical manager, rejecting further commercial activities with the vessel. The Panel has sought clarification with Success Regent on which basis it made this determination.

**SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED**

3rd Floor, J&C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands

**致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.**

本公司已收到貴司所提供的卸貨文件，但本公司對於該文件尚有疑義，在尚未釐清之前，本公司特以此信函通知貴司：

1. 本公司即刻起拒絕任何與 MIDAS 有關的一切商業行為；
2. 本公司即刻起拒絕與 MIDAS 的 Commercial Operator (NAVIGATOR SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD) 有關的一切商業行為；
3. 本公司亦將貴司本次制裁合規及盡職調查的表現，列為後續是否繼續進行商業合作的評估要點。

若貴司違反雙方所簽訂之油品買賣合約中的條款，貴司必須承擔全部法律責任，以及對本公司的全部損害負賠償責任。

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

2023年03月30日

Unofficial translation

Our company has received the unloading document provided by your company, but our company still has doubts about the document. Before it is clarified, our company hereby informs your company with this letter:

1. The company immediately rejects all commercial activities related to MIDAS;
2. The company immediately refuses all commercial activities related to the Commercial Operator (NAVIGATOR SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD) of MIDAS;
3. The company will also list your company's performance in this sanction compliance and due diligence investigation as the key points for evaluating whether to continue business cooperation in the future.

If your company violates the terms of the oil product sales contract signed by both parties, your company must bear all legal responsibilities and be liable for all damages to the company.

*Source:* The Panel

## Annex 36: Aspects of Sales Contract of Oil Cargo

The Panel notes that in cases of oil cargo contracts, particularly when first supplier vessels are involved, the seller of the oil cargo can either transact as ‘Free Alongside Ship’ (FAS) or ‘Free on Board’ (FOB).<sup>225</sup> FAS and FOB essentially defines the point at which risk and responsibility for the cargos is passed on to the buyer. Under a FAS contract, risk and responsibility for the cargos is passed on to the buyer when the seller’s ship arrives alongside the buyer’s ship or destination port, and the goods are considered as delivered. Meanwhile, under an FOB contract, the seller ensures that goods are loaded on board the ship from port. The risk and responsibility for the cargo passes on to the buyer once the goods are loaded on board the buyer’s ship.

The Panel recalls<sup>226</sup> its recommendation that Member States and relevant international organizations ensure that commodity trading companies and the tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions, including in at-risk segments of the FOB market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers in relevant international waters, adopt contractual language that includes an effective end-user delivery verification mechanism.

### Excerpts from the Contract between Supplier Ship X and EVER GLORY

1. 油品名稱：GASOIL 10PPM

2. 油品數量：4,100 MT+/-5%

3. 油品交易條件及價格：賣方可選擇交易條件為船邊「FAS」公海；或「FOB」臺灣任何一個港口。

4. 提貨日期：

(1) 買方應於其船隻預定加油前 3~7 天，給予賣方裝貨通知，內應載明船舶名稱及船舶聯絡方式及數量。

(2) 「FOB」：船舶進港口裝貨，裝貨數量的確認由買賣雙方同意並具有公信力的國際公證公司對貨品數量進行測量來做為提單的數量。

(3) 「FAS」：公海內以船對船方式交貨，最終的交貨數量由買賣雙方船長簽名的正本或副本的交貨單據將作為完成本次交貨的證明。

<sup>225</sup> See INCOTERMS definitions of FAS and FOB at <https://iccwbo.org/business-solutions/incoterms-rules/incoterms-2020/>

<sup>226</sup> S/2019/171, annex 89 para.22.



9. 禁止條款：

禁止買方，將與我司所購買的油品販賣到受國際制裁的國家（如北韓地區等），如有涉及違法情事相關法律責任全由買方自負，若經查獲買方從事非法交易之確切證據，本公司將依合約立即中止交易並斷絕往來。

*Unofficial translation of boxed text*

“3. Oil product transaction terms and prices: the seller can choose the transaction terms as "FAS" on the high seas by the ship; or "FOB" ...

4. Delivery date:

(2) "FOB": The ship enters the port for loading, and the confirmation of the quantity of the cargo shall be carried out by a credible international notarization company agreed by the buyer and the seller to measure the quantity of the goods as the quantity of the bill of lading.

(3) "FAS": Ship-to-ship delivery on the high seas, the final delivery quantity signed by the masters of the buyer and seller, the original or duplicate delivery documents will be used as proof of completion of the delivery...

9. Prohibited terms:

The buyer is prohibited from selling the oil products purchased by our company to countries subject to international sanctions (such as North Korea, etc.). If there is any violation of the law, the buyer shall bear all the legal responsibilities. If the buyer is found to have definite evidence of illegal transactions, the company will immediately suspend the transaction and cut off contact according to the contract.”

*Source:* The Panel

## **Annex 37: Correspondence with Kindom Honor (EVER GLORY) and Laurel International (MIDAS)<sup>227</sup>**

### **(A) Correspondence with Kindom Honor**

The Panel communicated with Kindom Honor Co., Ltd (hereafter “Kindom Honor”), the registered owner of EVER GLORY (IMO: 9102813) on 10 April 2023. Following a response from Kindom Honor via a legal firm on 21 April, the Panel wrote again to Kindom Honor on 26 June, seeking clarification and additional information.

The Panel is highlighting the following key information relevant to its investigations provided by Kindom Honor, followed by the Panel’s comments:

### **EVER GLORY**

#### *Ship-to-ship transfers*

Kindom Honor stated that it “... has never directed EVER GLORY to meet or conduct ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum with the DPRK-flagged NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612), formerly known as DIAMOND 8, nor has EVER GLORY ever berthed alongside a vessel named SHUNLI (MMSI: 457111000).”

**Comment: The Panel notes this stands contrary to video evidence taken onboard EVER GLORY by its crew, recording EVER GLORY’s meeting with SHUNLI.**

Kindom Honor stated during the months of January and February 2023, EVER GLORY “... loaded diesel cargo in the northern waters of the Philippines during the days of January 4 through January 8, 2023, delivered diesel cargo in the quantity of about 4,000 tons to the customer from Fujian ... Mr Qui Guo Rong, in the sea area off Taichung Port ... from February 17 to February 18, 2023 ...” “EVER GLORY only sold diesel to Mr Qui ... from China on February 18, with a quantity of 4,000 tons.”

**Comment: The Panel notes that no documentary proof was provided to back this assertion and it is contrary to information provided by the supplier vessel confirming that it provided EVER GLORY 4,100 tons of oil cargo on 21 January. This information corresponds with the Panel’s maritime AIS tracking as well as documentation provided by the supplier ship.**

<sup>227</sup> The Panel previously investigated another case of trans-shipped oil in multiple stages involving Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. The modus operandi showed some similarities. See [S/2022/132](#), paras. 64-73 and annex 48; and [S/2022/668](#), paras. 52-61 and annex 33.1. and 33.2.

Kindom Honor stated “EVER GLORY delivered diesel to Mr. Qiu<sup>228</sup> Guo Rong in China just for his supply to the fishery boat users ...”

**Comment:** The Panel notes Kindom Honor did not provide documentary proof to back this assertion.

### *Due diligence*

Kindom Honor stated “As for the receiving vessel assigned by Mr. Qui Guo-Rong on February 18, according to the captain of EVER GLORY, because the two vessels berthed alongside at night and the line of sight was not good, the captain of EVER GLORY did not follow the operation standards of Kindom Honor to record vessel identification information ...” and “Kindom Honor has never used EVER GLORY to engage in any illicit maritime activity.”

Elsewhere, Kindom Honor wrote “There is no Korean-speaking person on board the two sides ... neither the captain nor the purser of suspected that the cargo receiving vessel assigned by Mr Qui ... had any connection with the DPRK.”

### Communication records

In response to communication records and documentation regarding the sale of the oil cargo, Kindom Honor provided the following “communication records between Kindom Honor and Mr Qiu<sup>229</sup> Guo Rong dated February 18, 2023 with regard to the sale of the 4000 tons diesel” (see figure below)



<sup>228</sup> ‘Qiu’ is the spelling as provided in the legal firm’s letter in this instance.

<sup>229</sup> ‘Qiu’ is the spelling as provided in the legal firm’s letter in this instance.

## *Payments*

Kindom Honor was unable to produce original proof of payment “effected by Mr Qiu<sup>230</sup> GR [sic]” given the difficulties to effect payment via USD remittance. Payment was instead transacted in local currencies using a Chinese underground banking service provider.

**Comment:** The Panel notes that the letter spelled the name of the “operator of offshore gas stations” both as Mr Qui and as Mr Qiu.

### (B) The Panel’s correspondence with Laurel International

The Panel communicated with Laurel International Co Ltd (hereafter “Laurel International”), the registered owner of MIDAS (IMO: 9105279), on 20 April 2023. Following a response from Laurel International received via the same legal firm as that of Kindom Honor on 4 May, the Panel wrote again to the company on 26 June, seeking clarification and additional information.

The Panel is highlighting the following key information relevant to its investigations, provided by Laurel International:

## **MIDAS**

### *Ship-to-ship transfers*

Laurel International stated that “The diesel cargos purchased by Laurel International from Success Regent in March 2023 ... were fully sold to Chinese fishing vessels and offshore work ships through Mr. QIU GUO SHU (broker) who is an oil merchant from Fujian Province, China.”

Later in the same paragraph, the company stated that “Normally MIDAS delivered the diesel cargo by filling the diesel into the oil tanks of the customers’ ships. It was an exceptional delivery when Qiu Guo Shu asked for transshipment of 1000 tons of diesel to oil tanker “Shundlli”.”

**Comment:** The Panel notes that no documentary proof was provided to back this assertion, beyond providing an explanation that the cargo of 1,000 tons of diesel oil was an ‘exceptional delivery’ of transshipment insofar as the company was unable to determine the onward sale beyond SHUNDLLI. Further, the Panel’s vessel tracking data indicated that following the ship-to-ship transfer with MIDAS, SHUNDLLI proceeded to sail north to the Korea Bay. No further ship-to-ship transfers were logged.

<sup>230</sup> ‘Qiu’ is the spelling as provided in the legal firm’s letter in this instance.

*Due diligence*

Concerning its due diligence conducted, Laurel International stated that it entrusted the job to its Document of Compliance Holder, Navigator Ship, and “... *was satisfied with the report demonstrating that Shundlli’s registered owner was a Hong Kong company and that the information from Qiu ... was fully consistent.*”

**Comment:** The Panel notes that there already existed negative reporting on SHUNDLLI in international media.<sup>231</sup> As of mid-December 2022 SHUNDLLI was alleged to have illicitly delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK after loading oil cargo from MERCURY (IMO: 9262170).

**NOTE:** The Panel is also investigating SHUNDLLI’s owner, HongKong Great Star Development Ltd, in relation to its vessel sale of YUKO MARU 8 and SEA STAR 5 to the DPRK.

*Communication records*

In response to the Panel’s requests for all communication and payment information, Laurel International claimed to be unable to furnish documentation, explaining that Mr. Qiu Guo Shu had “...no idea how to use a smartphone ... Communication was done via telephone with no text records”.

*Payments*

Laurel International stated that for the voyages of ship-to-ship transfers undertaken by MIDAS in March 2023, the diesel cargos procured by Laurel International were “... *purchased from and supplied by Success Regent Development Limited (sic) ...*”.

**Comment:** The Panel notes that while Laurel International claims to have purchased the oil cargos directly from the British Virgin Islands-based Success Regent Development Limited, financial information provided indicated that the Anguilla-registered company Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd remitted payment to Success Regent for oil cargo transferred from the supplier ship to MIDAS prior to the MIDAS’s ship-to-ship transfer with SHUNDLLI.

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<sup>231</sup> See <https://www.ft.com/content/41e47ba2-3e3b-414b-905b-df4336f22bed>



According to Laurel International, given the difficulties faced for Mr. Qiu to effect payment via USD remittance, transaction in local currencies was conducted using a Chinese underground banking service provider that arranged cash payments to Laurel International “personally”. Laurel International provided further details of how such transactions in trade typically operated and was unable to provide documentary information of such “nonbank currency exchange providers” given its own acknowledgment of the unlawful nature of such underground banking activity.

#### Comparison of responses between Kindom Honor and Laurel International

The Panel notes several similarities between the responses from Laurel International (owner of the MIDAS) and Kindom Honor (owner of the EVER GLORY).

- (i) Both companies, responding via the same law firm to the Panel, claimed that the oil transfers to the NAM DAE BONG and SHUNDLLI were brokered by individuals from Fujian Province with similar names. Laurel International claimed that a “Qiu Guo Shu” brokered the MIDAS’s oil cargo transfer to SHUNDLLI while Kindom Honor claimed that a “Qiu Guo Rong” brokered the EVER GLORY’s oil cargo transfer to SHUNLI.
- (ii) Green Ship Management was copied in all responses provided by the legal office on behalf of their client, Laurel International, which owns MIDAS. Yet, Laurel International stated they had no knowledge nor have done any business with Green Ship, the document of compliance holder of EVER GLORY.
- (iii) Both responses claimed that the end buyers were Chinese fishing vessels but provided no documentation as evidence.
- (iv) The same buyer entity (Full Victory) paid for the oil cargos loaded onboard EVER GLORY and MIDAS.
- (v) Both companies were unable to furnish payment details given the transactions made in cash and through an underground service provider.
- (vi) Both employed the same offshore company in registering their companies. Primary source information showed the company in Samoa that Laurel International (MIDAS) was registered under is the same company, through its Seychelles office,<sup>232</sup> that also registered Sino Chance Enterprise Inc. Sino Chance manages (ISM) another vessel belonging to Kindom Honor, the registered owner of EVER GLORY.

*Source:* The Panel

<sup>232</sup> See <https://www.goldinglobal.com/goldinglobal/default.aspx?lan=zh-TW>

**Annex 38: Follow-up correspondence with Kindom Honor (EVER GLORY) and Laurel International (MIDAS), July 2023**

The following is a summation of the relevant responses from follow-up queries posed by the Panel to Kindom Honor and to Laurel International.

**Kindom Honor***Oil cargo transfers*

Kindom Honor, through its lawyers, confirmed it purchased the diesel fuel from [Success Regent] for the 18 February oil transfer to EVER GLORY “*through the connection of the owner of Full Victory ...*” Kindom Honor explained it did not purchase diesel fuel from the Philippines’ dealer given “*poor fuel quality*”.

In that regard, Kindom Honor admitted it “*...did pull alongside with [Supplier Ship X] on 22 – 23 January 2023...*”, and “*That quantity of diesel fuel was purchased by Full Victory ... under the request from ... Manager of Kindom Honor, because the owner of Full Victory ... had very good relationship with Mr ... [Success Regent]*”, and that “*... the connection to Full Victory ... entitled to a lower price at which the fuel was purchased ...*”

*Receiver ship of oil cargo from EVER GLORY*

Kindom Honor said it “*... engages in the fueling station on the sea for vessels and refills power fuel for fishing vessels and working vessels ...*”. In some cases where it bunkered with its customers’ ships, the ships “*...would conceal the vessel name when sailing out to sea ...*”, alluding to the smuggled nature of the refined petroleum transferred. In this regard, “*Hence the vessel master of EVER GLORY was unable to recognize the name of the transfer vessel*”.

*EVER GLORY and MIDAS*

In response to an enquiry on a meeting between EVER GLORY and MIDAS on 4 January 2023, identified by the Panel on maritime database platforms, Kindom Honor replied that “*... the shipping agency said that one of its customer’s vessels, the tanker MIDAS had defective pumps that needed replacement and requested EVER GLORY to assist by carrying two pumps to MIDAS (IMO: 9105279) for repairing*”. No petroleum was transferred. The Panel notes it had previously assessed common associations via companies and individuals between EVER GLORY and MIDAS.

*DOC holder for EVER GLORY*

Kindom Honor stated that Mr Wu (Panel's comment: of LW Maritime and Vanguard Shipping) was "... *the person responsible for Vanguard Shipping Safety management company for EVER GLORY*", and that Vanguard Shipping "...*ceased to commit the affair of DOC management on EVER GLORY ... several years ago*".

With regards Individual A, Kindom Honor replied that the said individual was "...*a consultant in the affair of vessel DOC management on EVER GLORY commissioned by Kindom Honor.*"

The Panel notes that this information was not updated on maritime databases. The Panel further notes past cases that it had investigated where different registered owner and management companies often changed hands, making the connection chain difficult to establish.

Kindom Honor maintained "... *we had no business whatsoever with any North Korean individual or company.*"

Investigations continue.

**Laurel International***DOC holder for MIDAS*

Laurel International, through its lawyers, replied that MIDAS' technical manager, Navigator Ship, was set up by Individual A. This individual, "... *under the commission by Laurel International ...*". established Navigator ship as MIDAS' Document of Compliance (DOC) holder and was not involved in the operation management of the ship. Instead, the shipping business of MIDAS was "... *managed directly by Laurel International under the supervision of its parent company Full Victory Enterprise*".

Where "*Individual A was engaged by Laurel International to do the job of DOC management and counseling of the vessel MIDAS ...*" the company explained that Ms. [X], through Individual A's introduction, served as "*nominal person*" responsible for Navigator Ship, and that "*she was charged with keeping contact with [Individual A] ... Neither ... took part in the shipping management of MIDAS*". The Panel notes from its previous correspondence with Individual A that Ms. [X] is his colleague in one of his companies.

*Laurel International and Full Victory*

"*Laurel International ... operates fuel station on the sea for vessels, where buying and selling of diesel fuel is all done in high sea. Because fuel transaction done in high sea requires no entry to any specific port ... to complete the customs clearance, that eliminates the necessity of preparing customs clearance and shipping documents including declaration of import/export*".

*“Laurel International is the owner of MIDAS and the real controller of MIDAS as well”. “Full Victory Enterprise is a primary capital contributor to Laurel International. The latter has been supervised by the former in terms of operational earnings”.*

Elsewhere, the Panel notes that Success Regent had indicated it sent a letter to Navigator Ship (DOC holder of MIDAS), on 30 March 2023, rejecting rejected further commercial activities with the vessel (see annex 35 above on Full Victory Enterprise).

Laurel International maintained “... *MIDAS knew no North Korean customers, nor did it sell any fuel to any North Korean company or individual ...*”. The Panel notes that Panel reports have shown DPRK entities and individuals work through third party individuals and facilitators, and mask their identity (ship, company and persons).

Investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel

### Annex 39: Vessels that have been sold to or acquired by the DPRK\*

See also Table 2 in the Main text.

The table below lists the acquired vessels (1 January to 1 May 2023) and an updated list of previously unrecorded acquired vessels (2021-2022), supplementing the Panel's S/2023/171 list of ships sailing under the DPRK's flag:<sup>233</sup>

Year 2023					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	8660909	SIN PHYONG 10 ex WALES	Cargo	28451	-
2	1015167	TAE DONG MUN 1 ex SHOU XIANG 8	Cargo	8667	-
3	1017787	MO RAN BONG 7 ex HUA XIANG 669	Cargo / Container	5115	-
4	1018614	UN HA SU ex WEN TONG 7	Cargo	3282	-
5	8592774	HWA PHYONG ex HAI SHUN FENG 6	Cargo / Container	5529	-
6	8598431	THAE JA BONG ex XIANG HUI 10	Cargo	5114	Detailed in current report
7	8662933	HWANG RYONG SAN ex HUA JIN SHENG 8	Cargo	3278	Detailed in current report
8	8360248	SONG NIM 9 ex BAO YING HAI 18	Cargo	6431	Detailed in current report
9	8360406	TOK SONG ex HONG TAI 215	Cargo	14,116	Detailed in current report
10	8358697	KUM GANG 1 ex HUI YI	Cargo	6310	Detailed in current report
11	8360250	HYANG SAN ex WEN TONG FA ZHAN	Cargo	5007	Detailed in current report
12	9054896	A SA BONG ex HAI JUN	Tanker	4785	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, and current report)
13	8358192	NAM PHO 5 ex XIN YANG HONG	Cargo	4831	Detailed in current report
14	1016355	SONG NIM 5 ex WANG HAO 1	Cargo	5263	-

<sup>233</sup> In addition to the 2023 new additions, this table updates the ships added in 2022 not listed in table 3/annex 33 of [S/2023/171](#).



The 2022 and 2021 lists of acquired ships should be read in conjunction with the Panel's list contained in S/2023/171, which does not include the following ships that have since been backdated as flagged under the DPRK. Consequently, the total number of acquired ships flagged by the DPRK in 2022 and in 2021 is now higher.

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
15	8669589	A BONG 1 / KUM YA GANG 1 ex HENG XING	Tanker	3221	Yes (S/2023/171, S2022/667, S/2019/171 and current report)
16	8891297	PU YANG 2 ex SF BLOOM	Cargo / Container	3539	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
17	8356584	KYONG SONG 3 ex ANNI	Cargo / Container	5226	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
18	9142409	CHON HA 2 ex SHUN CHAO 9	Cargo / Container	4860	Current report
19	8864464	PUK CHON 2 ex SEA STAR 5	Cargo	4835	Detailed in current report
20	8358324	MO RAN BONG 5 ex HONG JIE 1	Cargo / Container	5515	Detailed in current report
21	8596122	UN SUN ex HUA YUAN DA 9	Cargo	5150	-
22	1015533	TAE RYONG 3 ex XING HONG XIANG 77	Cargo	5116	Detailed in current report
23	9536272	PU YANG 6 ex SEA GLORY	Cargo / Container	4802	-
24	9088031	HWANG GUM PHYONG 3 ex YUKO MARU 8	Cargo	4635	Detailed in current report
25	8597827	PHO HANG 1 ex AN YUAN 1	Cargo / Container	3637	-
26	8718639	JANG SU ex WEN XIANG	Cargo	3457	Detailed in current report
27	8660909	SAE GIL ex ZHI KUN 6	Cargo	4730	Detailed in current report
28	9154189	RYON PHUNG ex SIN PHYONG 11 / ex CONTREL	Tanker	3159	Yes (S/2023/171, and current report)
29	8597944	HONG DAE 2 ex HUA YU 108	Cargo	4519	-

Year 2021					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
30	8312497	SONG WON 2 ex NEW REGENT	Tanker	5167	Yes (S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, S/2019/171)
31	9132612	NAM DAE BONG ex DIAMOND 8	Tanker	9273	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, and current report)
32	8593209	MO RAN BONG 1 ex RUN HONG 58	Cargo	2162	Detailed in current report

*Source:* The Panel. Ship information obtained from S&P Global and IMO records.

**Annex 40: Chinese vessels acquired by the DPRK in 2023**

The enclosed table is a non-exhaustive list of 10 cargo ships that were previously China-flagged ships or were last owned by Chinese entities before coming under the DPRK flag. The information is based on the Panel's AIS tracking on commercial maritime databases, IMO records, and results of the Panel's investigations.<sup>234</sup>

The Panel notes that the date of the ship's flagging under the DPRK's fleet may be submitted to the IMO at a later date. The table contains key details to assist the relevant Chinese authorities in their investigations, along with queries that supplement additional requested information.

The Panel separately continues to monitor other Chinese-flagged or Chinese-owned vessels of interest with similar characteristics. These vessels are presently of an unknown status and may possibly have been acquired by the DPRK.

The Panel sought information from China, including their ship registration, beneficial owners, customs information, ship purchase and sale prior to their departure from Chinese waters. Given that lack of available information on the owners and managers, the Panel also sought Chinese authorities' assistance to convey questions to the ship owners, including, *inter alia*, that would explain the presence of the ship in DPRK waters or verifiable evidence that show otherwise, as well as purchase and sale information where the vessel was sold on.

China replied: "*After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows: SHUNCHAO 9, HUI YI, HONG JIE 1, RUN HONG 58, XIN HONG XIANG 77, WEN TONG FA ZHAN, and XIANGHUI 10 were de-registered on May of 2022, January of 2023, August of 2022, November of 2021, October of 2022, February of 2023, November of 2018 respectively. These ships were not re-registered ever since. ZHI KUN 6 and HUA JIN SHENG 8 are still registered as Chinese ships. HONG TAI 215 have not applied for nationality registration. Judging from the investigations conducted by Chinese authorities, the information received by the Panel are inaccurate. This is not the first time such thing happens and China has previously raised concerns over this issue. China requests the Panel to conduct necessary screening of the information it receives, and avoid including information that are inconsistent with facts in its report, so as to maintain the objectivity of the report*".

Source: The Panel

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<sup>234</sup> Information valid as in May 2023.

#	SHIP *	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
1	<p><b>formerly SHUNCHAO 9</b></p> <p>Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>CHON HA 2 IMO: 9142409</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in May 2023</p>	<p>Hongkong Sun Rising Shipmanagement Co Ltd was the last registered owner prior to the ship sailing under the DPRK flag</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> Since June 2022</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on ship's presence along Baima River; any ship repair or modification conducted;</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>SHUNCHAO 9 first featured as a vessel of interest for the Panel when it bunkered with another vessel of interest, 19 WINNER (IMO: 8613190) along Baima River in August 2022. 19 WINNER had also conducted bunker with other vessels of interest that were then flagged under the DPRK.</p> <p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.</i></p>

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
2	<p><b>formerly</b> <b>ZHI KUN 6</b> MMSI: 413332690</p> <p>Last known as under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>SAE GIL</b> <b>IMO: 8660909</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in November 2022</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> January to February 2022</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on vessel AIS and ports of departure</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> Since September 2016 when the vessel was sold from its former Hong Kong owner Hung Tai International Ocean Freight (HK) Ltd</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information on ship's presence along Baima River; any ship repair or modification conducted; port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>ZHI KUN 6 was recorded moored outside Shidao between end January and 5 February 2022. The ship last transmitted AIS as it departed Shidao and sailed in the direction of the DPRK.</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on the presence of the ship and of its activity (e.g. cargo load/offload; bunker; crew change etc.)</i></p> <p>ZHI KUN 6 was prior at Rongcheng Yuantong shipyard in January 2022. This shipyard was featured in the Panel's last report S/2023/171.</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on ownership of shipyard</i></p>




#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
3	<p><b>formerly HUI YI</b> MMSI: 413331780</p> <p>Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>KUM GANG 1</b> <b>IMO: 8358697</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in February 2023</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> November 2022 to January 2023</p> <p>Registered Owner – Shandong Port Shipping Group; Manager Weihai Hairun Shipping Co Ltd</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> January 2023</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on ship's presence at a Zhoushan Zhejiang Fushen Ship facility by January 2023; any ship repair or modification conducted</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The ship transmitted on multiple occasions in DPRK waters, entering Nampo lock-gate by 6 February 2022.</p> <p>NOTE: Dandong Jincheng Trade Co Ltd was listed as KUM GANG 1's registered owner, with a listed "care of address" belonging to the DPRK ship manager, as Taedongmun Shipping Co in the DPRK, according to submitted maritime information to the IMO.</p> <p><i>-Query: Information and corporate registration information of any similarly named company(s) in China particularly where the company's line of business includes shipping-related trade, if so.</i></p> <p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.</i></p>

Formerly China-flagged HUI YI (MMSI: 413331780), currently DPRK-flagged KUM GANG 1 (IMO: 8358697)

The Panel tracked HUI YI's historical voyages after it began transmitting from DPRK waters in January 2023. HUI YI was located at Laizhou Bay in early December and was berthed at Yantai port by 24 December 2022. HUI YI then sailed south, arriving at the Ningbo-Zhoushan area by late December 2022. It moored at a ship recycling facility there before ceasing AIS transmissions after 2 January 2023. HUI YI next transmitted in DPRK territorial waters. See figure 40-1.

A Member State subsequently provided high resolution satellite imagery of HUI YI at Nampo port in February 2023 offloading cargo and dry docked at Nampo the following month. See figure 40-2.

Figure 40-1: HUI YI's voyage from September 2022 to January 2023



Source: AIS tracks: Windward; inset imagery: (top right) Maxar Technologies; (bottom right) Planet Labs; (left), Member State; annotated by the Panel

Figure 40-2a: HUI YI unloading cargo at Nampo, 8 February 2023

Figure 40-2b: HUI YI dry docked at Nampo, 5 March 2023



Source: Member State

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
4	<b>formerly HONG JIE 1</b>  Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	<b>MO RAN BONG 5</b> <b>IMO: 8358324</b>  Flagged under the DPRK in October 2022	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.  There is no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship. There is no transmission of the vessel operating in Chinese waters prior to 19 December 2022 when the vessel was at Dalian port waiting area, based on Panel maritime tracking.	The vessel recorded a flag and name change to MO RAN BONG 5 in October 2022, based on IMO records. The Panel's commercial maritime tracking data showed the vessel transmitting in DPRK waters in February 2023.  The vessel was recorded moored outside Dalian port area between 24 December 2022 and 8 January 2023 before sailing towards the DPRK.

			<p><i>- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at Dalian area in December 2022 along with all ship and customs documentation</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.</i></p>
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#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
5	<p><b>formerly RUN HONG 58</b></p> <p>Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>MO RAN BONG 1</b> <b>IMO: 8593209</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in October 2021</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.</p> <p>Registered Owner and ship manager – Zhoushan Runhong Shipping Co Ltd with a Zhejiang address.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Any common or related association of ownership, ship management and / or broker information between RUN HONG 58 and HONG JIE 1.</i></p>	<p>There were no recorded prior vessel tracks of RUN HONG 58.</p> <p>The vessel was registered built in August 2002 at Yueqing Huanghuagang Shipyard</p> <p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.</i></p> <p>The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as MO RAN BONG 1 called at Chinese ports, including Dalian and Longkou ports, from the last quarter of 2022 through 2023, namely at container and grain terminals, indicating possible transportation of grain and other cargo.</p> <p><i>-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should MO RAN BONG 1 next make a Chinese port area call.</i></p>



#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
6	<p><b>formerly XIN HONG XIANG 77</b> MMSI: 413501410</p> <p>Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>TAE RYONG 3</b> <b>IMO: 1015533</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in April 2023</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.</p> <p>Registered owner and ship manager – Guangxi Hongxiang Shipping Co Ltd.</p> <p><i>- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> October 2022 to January 2023, when the vessel was in Lianyungang port area</p> <p><i>-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence in Lianyungang area in December 2022, along with all ship and customs / cargo documentation.</i></p>	<p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de- registration, where applicable.</i></p> <p>The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as TAE RYONG 3 was at Yancheng anchorage area between 20 and 30 April 2023. It was prior in Lianyungang port area on 16 April 2023.</p> <p><i>-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should TAE RYONG 3 next make a Chinese port area call.</i></p>

Formerly China-flagged XIN HONG XIANG 77 (MMSI: 413501410), currently DPRK-flagged TAE RYONG 3 (IMO: 1015533)

XIN HONG XIANG 77 was a Chinese domestic vessel before it was acquired by the DPRK. According to a Member State, after departing Lianyungang waters, the cargo ship was enroute to the DPRK by December 2022, indicating it may have been purchased by the DPRK around that time. See figures 40-3a and 3b.

Following its flagging by the DPRK in April 2023, the vessel returned to Chinese waters, sailing as TAE RYONG 3, and by mid-April was imaged laden and at anchor near Lianyungang. TAE RYONG 3 was at the Wenzhou anchorage area four days later. See figures 40-4a and 4b.

Figure 40-3a: Ship photograph of XIN HONG XIANG 77 in August 2022



Source: Member State

Figure 40-3b: XIN HONG XIANG 77 at Lianyungang, China, 23 December 2022



Source: Member State

Figure 40-4a: TAE RYONG 3, formerly XIN HONG XIANG 77, returning to Lianyungang waters, 16 April 2023



Source: Member State

Figure 40-4b: TAE RYONG 3 proceeding to other Chinese port areas, April – May 2023



Source: S&P Global's SeaWeb

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
7	<p><b>formerly WEN TONG FA ZHAN (aka FENG XIN DA 1)</b> MMSI: 413693560</p> <p>Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>HYANG SAN</b> <b>IMO: 8360250</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in January 2023</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.</p> <p>There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship.</p> <p><i>-Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction.</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> August to November 2022</p> <p><i>-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at Xiamen port area and at Tangshan port area along with all ship and customs documentation</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The Panel's AIS tracking of the vessel showed it was in the Xiamen port area between August and November 2022.</p> <p>The vessel was last at Tangshan port around 20- 22 November 2022. This was the last port of call prior to the vessel dropping AIS signal on 30 November as it sailed out of port, crossing the Bohai sea in the direction of Nampo port.</p> <p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de- registration, where applicable.</i></p>

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
8	<p><b>formerly HONG TAI 215 (aka LI DA 8)</b></p> <p>Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>TOK SONG IMO: 8360406</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in April 2023</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.</p> <p>There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship.</p> <p><i>- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction.</i></p> <p><u>Period of interest:</u> From August 2022</p> <p><i>-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at various Chinese ports along with all ship and customs documentation; an accounting of vessel identity manipulation</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag.</p> <p>AIS signal indicates possible spoofing.</p> <p><i>-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.</i></p> <p>The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as TOK SONG called in the Yantai port area between 22 and 30 April 2023.</p> <p><i>-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should TOK SONG next make a Chinese port area call.</i></p>



#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
9	<p><b>formerly XIANG HUI 10</b></p> <p>Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>THAE JA BONG IMO: 8598431</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in February 2023</p>	<p><u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK.</p> <p>There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship.</p> <p><i>- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The Panel's maritime tracking information indicated the vessel last transmitted AIS signal in mid-August 2022 in the Shanghai port area.</p> <p>AIS signal indicate possible spoofing.</p> <p><i>-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should THAE JA BONG next make a Chinese port area call.</i></p>

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
10	<p><b>formerly HUA JIN SHENG 8 (aka XIANG JING 838)</b></p> <p>Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet</p>	<p><b>HWANG RYONG SAN IMO: 8662933</b></p> <p>Flagged under the DPRK in March 2023</p>	<p><u>Periods of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK</p> <p>And</p> <p>Between September and December 2021</p> <p><i>- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)</i></p> <p><i>-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction</i></p> <p><i>-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.</i></p>	<p>The Panel's maritime tracking information indicated the vessel last transmitted AIS signal in June 2022 with inconsistent data.</p> <p>Limited AIS tracks.</p> <p><i>-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should HWANG RYONG SAN next make a Chinese port area call.</i></p>

Source: The Panel.

\*denotes information from IMO records.

NOTE: All dates of vessel tracking are recorded in Eastern Standard Time. Variation of actual dates when addressing local time should be taken into account.

Source: The Panel

## **Annex 41: Chinese coastal vessels in DPRK waters, November 2022 to May 2023<sup>235</sup>**

The list below of China-flagged vessels tracked by the Panel in DPRK waters is restricted to the timeframe of September through May 2023. The information is drawn from the Panel's monitoring of ships based on commercial tracking data, IMO records and the Panel's on-going investigations. The Panel continues to analyse voyages of other China-flagged vessels in DPRK waters.

To assist the relevant Chinese authorities in their investigations, the Panel has listed the Chinese ownership and management information where available, the targeted periods of interest and other relevant information. The Panel has sought China's assistance with regards to these vessels' registration status and ownership information. As many of these Chinese coastal ships did not have publicly available ownership details, the Panel requested information from Chinese authorities relating to vessel ownership, including the nature of their activity in the DPRK, cargo, relevant customs and shipping documentation, AIS data and vessel purchase and sale information where relevant.

The Panel sought information from China, including their ship registration, beneficial owners, customs information, ship purchase and sale prior to their departure from Chinese waters. The Panel also asked Chinese authorities to convey questions to the ship owners, including, *inter alia*, that would explain the presence of the ship in DPRK waters or verifiable evidence that show otherwise, as well as purchase and sale information where the vessel was sold on. China replied: *"After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows: BAO YING HAI 18, XIN YANG HONG, QIMING 168, and FU LONG 98 were de-registered between late 2022 and early 2023, and these ships were not re-registered ever since. Chinese government does not have information on their exact whereabouts. Records of port entry and exit of XIN HANG SHUN and LONG XIN 12 were not found and Chinese government does not have detailed information about these ships"*.

*Source:* The Panel


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<sup>235</sup> All information contained in this annex is valid as of 30 June 2023.

**BAO YING HAI 18 (MMSI: 412550950), currently DPRK-flagged SONG NIM 9 (IMO: 8360248)**

BAO YING HAI 18 was reported transmitting as a 102m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Panel tracking analysis showed the vessel sailed as a Chinese coastal vessel prior to its AIS transmission in DPRK waters. It has not transmitted AIS since appearing at Nampo, DPRK on 7 March 2023 (figure 41-1).

Figure 41-1: Voyage of BAO YING HAI 18 before arriving in the DPRK, December 2022 – March 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

By April 2023, the vessel was flagged under the DPRK fleet, sailing as SONG NIM 9 with an assigned IMO number of 8358192. The last known owner prior to its acquisition is the China-based Fujian Wentong Shipping Co Ltd with an address in Fujian Province, according to IMO records.

### **XIN YANG HONG (IMO: 8358192), currently DPRK-flagged NAM PHO 5**


XIN YANG HONG sailed as a Chinese coastal vessel prior to its AIS transmission in DPRK waters. It arrived in DPRK territorial waters, south of Cho-do island, on 9 November 2022, where it subsequently registered a draft change on maritime databases, outside the West Sea Barrage area, indicating possible offload of cargo. As of April 2023, XIN YANG HONG was flagged under the DPRK, sailing as NAM PHO 5. The vessel returned to Chinese waters in 2023, including in Ningde and Luoyuan Bay waters.

XIN YANG HONG was transmitting as a 98m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The vessel is registered as owned and managed by the same Chinese owner, Fujian Wentong Shipping Ltd, since 2005, with an address at Pingtan Xian, Fujian Province, according to IMO records. XIN YANG HONG was located at a ship facility, possibly a shipyard, on Pingtan Island in the Zhoushan area, by 20 September 2022. It then arrived at Nanjing port area, where it remained during the month of October, before departing. By 10 November, the vessel was located outside the West Sea Barrage area in the DPRK (figure 41-2). AIS data indicate the vessel was also engaged in identity manipulation, possibly sailing at some point as FU YUN HENG XIN.

Figure 41-2: Voyage of XIN YANG HONG before arriving in the DPRK, September -November 2022







Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

### QIMING 168 (MMSI: 413244350)

QIMING 168 transmitted AIS signals at Nampo on 21 April 2023. Its previous location, according to AIS transmissions, was Shanghai on 9 March 2023 (Figure 3a). While in the DPRK, the vessel docked at Ryongnam Shipyard at Nampo, where other vessels including SHUN CHANG 78 / SUN CHANG 78, now sailing as the DPRK-flagged RAK NANG 2 (IMO: 8594552), have also been located before registering under the DPRK fleet (figure 41-3b).<sup>236</sup>

QIMING 168 was transmitting as an 86m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The vessel transmitted few AIS signals prior to its appearance in the DPRK. The Panel's vessel activity analysis indicated QIMING 168 had likely engaged in vessel identifier manipulation. It has not transmitted on its identifier since appearing in the DPRK.

<sup>236</sup> S/2023/171, paras. 70-72 and annex 41.

Figure 41-3a: Voyage of QIMING 168 before arriving at Ryongnam Shipyard, DPRK, March 2023



Source: AIS transmissions: Windward; inset, S&P Global, annotated by the Panel

Figure 41-3b: SHUN CHANG 78, dry docked at Ryongnam Shipyard, Nampo, July -August 2022



Source: AIS signal overlay, Windward; Satellite imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel


**FU LONG 98 (MMSI: 413464610)**

FU LONG 98 arrived in DPRK territorial waters above Cho-do by 5 March 2023, after sailing from the Yellow Sea for more than six days without transmitting AIS signals. The vessel was at the West Sea Barrage area by 12 March 2023 and located outside Nampo port by 26 March (figure 41-4).

FU LONG 98 was transmitting as a 99m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Prior to this, the vessel sailed a domestic route and called at multiple Chinese ports. The vessel exhibited inconsistent tracks and may have been spoofing in Chinese waters. It was last recorded making a call at a ship facility at Kan'ao in Pingtan Island, Zhoushan, departing on 8 January 2023. The vessel has not transmitted on its identifier since appearing in the DPRK.

Figure 41-4: Voyage of FU LONG 98 before arriving in the DPRK, March - April 2023







*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel

**XIN HANG SHUN (MMSI: 412502330)**

XIN HANG SHUN arrived in DPRK waters in May 2023. Prior to this, maritime database tracking showed the vessel had been at a shipyard at Pingtan in Fujian Province since 12 January 2023, departing by 8 April for Zhoushan and Lianyungang port areas. On 27 April XIN HANG SHUN was in the vicinity of Cho-do Island before appearing at Nampo port (figure 41-5).

XIN HANG SHUN was transmitting as a 97m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The Panel's vessel activity analysis indicates it had likely engaged in AIS manipulation. The vessel has not transmitted on its identifier since 21 May 2023.

Figure 41-5: Voyage of XIN HANG SHUN before arriving in the DPRK, January - May 2023

*AIS spoofing*

Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset satellite imagery, Planet Labs.



### LONG XIN 12 (IMO: 9485318)

LONG XIN 12 last transmitted on 3 December 2022 at Zhoushan Island, China, and was located at a shipyard at Zhoushan Zhejiang, prior to appearing in DPRK waters. It last transmitted AIS signals at Zhoushan in December 2022 before appearing in DPRK waters. The vessel was located near Cho-do Island on 4 April 2023 (figure 41-6).

LONG XIN 12 was transmitting as a 94m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Open-source maritime information indicates the vessel was sold in October / November 2019 to undisclosed buyers. It remains China-flagged, based on IMO records. The vessel exhibited limited AIS signals prior to its appearance in the DPRK and engaged in vessel identifier manipulation while in Chinese waters. The vessel's registered owner and ship manager is Qinzhou Guiqin Shipping Co Ltd, with an address at Qinzhou, Guangxi Province.

Figure 41-6: Voyage of LONG XIN 12 before arriving in the DPRK, December 2022 - April 2023



*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset satellite imagery, Planet Labs.



*Source:* S&P Global's Seaweb

NOTE: All dates of vessel tracking are recorded in Eastern Standard Time. Variation of actual dates in local time should be taken into account.

*Source:* The Panel

**Annex 42: Oil cargo transfers by SHUNDLLI to DPRK tankers, December 2022 to June 2023**

No.	Date and Time	Location	Presumed DPRK receiving vessel	Presumed amount of refined petroleum
1	Dawn of 8 December 2022	381710N, 1240546E (104km Southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHONG RYONG SAN (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 1,300 tons
2	Evening of 22 March to dawn of 23 March 2023	Unknown	KUM RYONG 3 (IMO: 8610461)	Approx. 1,800 tons
3	Dawn to morning of 13 April 2023	381600N, 1240400E (107km southwest of West Sea Dam)	UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962)	Approx. 2,000 tons
4	Noon of 13 May to dawn of 14 May 2023	382056N, 1240500E (102km southwest of West Sea Dam)	KUM CHIN KANG 2 (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 2,000 tons
5	Near midnight of 8 June to dawn of 9 June 2023	381612N, 1240507E (105km southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313)	Approx. 2,000 tons

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 43: Maritime trade in banned DPRK-origin coal**

The Panel continued to track DPRK vessels that have off-loaded coal cargo in contravention of the relevant resolutions:

- Paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2371 (2017) decides “the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.”
- Paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) decides “Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK.”
- Paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017) authorizes all Member States to seize and dispose of items identified in inspections, the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the relevant Security Council resolutions.


In that regard, in 2023 the Panel tracked to Lianyungang waters the below DPRK-flagged cargo ships, suspected to have transported and off-loaded their DPRK-origin coal cargo there.

**HUNG BONG 3 (IMO: 8603286)**

HUNG BONG 3 was observed on satellite imagery at a coal-loading area at Taean, DPRK, on 18 December 2022. It next transmitted AIS signals, after travelling dark, near Lianyungang waters around 16 January 2023. A Member State recorded satellite imagery of the vessel a week earlier sitting high on water near Lianyungang, indicating it had off-loaded its assessed coal cargo. This is consistent with the Panel’s tracking of previous DPRK-origin coal cargo export whereby DPRK vessels travelled dark when involved in illicit ship-to-ship coal transfer activity. On 19 January, with its AIS kept on, HUNG BONG 3 registered a draft change, indicating it could have loaded cargo at Lianyungang. The ship was back in DPRK waters by the end of January 2023. See figure 43-1.


HUNG BONG 3 was previously reported by the Panel to have exported its DPRK-origin coal cargo to Yantai, another Chinese port, in August 2021 (figure 43-2).

Figure 43-1: HUNG BONG 3 travelling dark to off-load assessed DPRK-origin coal cargo at Lianyungang, January 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Imagery; Maxar Technologies, Member State  
 \*Dashed lines denote no AIS transmission

Figure 43-2: HUNG BONG 3 exporting DPRK-origin coal and importing other cargo, Yantai, China, July – August 2021



Source: Windward, S&P Global, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; inset panchromatic imagery (top), Member State. Bottom imagery as representative of location, not actual date of AIS signal overlay.



The Panel asked China for information, including the relevant shipping documentation, on any banned cargo offloaded and loaded either pier-side or through ship-to-ship transfers at the respective Chinese ports. China responded that the HUNG BONG 3 “entered Yantai port empty-loaded in March and July 2021, respectively, and left the port by loading fertilizer and other agricultural supplies in March and August, respectively.”<sup>237</sup>

#### TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318)

TO MYONG was observed by a Member State on satellite imagery anchored at a known coal-loading area at Songnim along the Taedong River, DPRK on 11 December 2022. It arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by late December 2022, departing by 9 January 2023 to arrive in Lianyungang waters a day later, based on maritime database tracking. A Member State assessed that TO MYONG offloaded its DPRK-origin coal cargo at these two locations (see figures 43-3a~b).


Figure 43-3a: TO MYONG’s voyage route, December 2022 – January 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

<sup>237</sup> S/2022/132, paras. 91-92 and annex 59.


Figure 43-3b: TO MYONG at Songnim, DPRK, and in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, December 2022 – January 2023



Source: Member State.

The Panel had reported on TO MYONG several times, and the vessel is known to have exported DPRK-origin coal to Chinese waters on multiple occasions.<sup>238</sup> This is also not the first time TO MYONG was at Lianyungang. For instance, a Member State assessed TO MYONG offloaded its DPRK-origin coal cargo there in March – April 2022 (figure 43-4).

Figure 43-4: TO MYONG delivering DPRK-origin coal, Lianyungang, March – April 2022



Source: Member State.

<sup>238</sup> S/2023/171; S/2022/668; S/2022/132; S/2021/211; S/2020/840.

On yet another occasion, TO MYONG, then sailing as RI HONG, was also located at Songnim port in December 2019, and in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in April 2020 (figure 43-5). The Panel has recommended that the Committee designate TO MYONG for its export of DPRK-origin coal as well as for the vessel's acquisition by the DPRK in 2020.

Figure 43-5: TO MYONG (then sailing as RI HONG) at Songnim port, DPRK, 23 December 2019, and anchored near Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 29 April 2020



*Source:* Member State

According to a Member State, the following DPRK vessels were also assessed to have off-loaded DPRK-origin coal in Lianyunang waters. The Panel did not locate tracks of these vessels on the maritime databases to which it has access, indicating these vessels travelled dark or were transmitting on other identifiers.

#### MI YANG 5 (IMO: 8620454)

MI YANG 5 was assessed by a Member State to have exported DPRK-origin coal in the Lianyunang area in February 2023 (figure 43-6).

Figure 43-6: MI YANG 5 at Taean and at Lianyungang, February 2023




Source: Member State



The Panel previously reported on MI YANG exporting its DPRK-origin coal in Lianyungang waters in September 2019 (figure 43-7).<sup>239</sup>

Figure 43-7: MI YANG 5 near Lianyungang, 15 September 2019



Source: Member State

#### TAE DONG 1 (IMO: 8653229)

TAE DONG 1 was assessed by a Member State to have exported DPRK-origin coal in Lianyungang in March 2023 (figure 43-8).

Figure 43-8: TAE DONG 1 near Lianyungang, 13 March 2023



Source: Member State


<sup>239</sup> S/2020/151, para. 70.



PU SONG (IMO: 9534652)

PU SONG was assessed by a Member State to have exported bagged cargo containing DPRK-origin coal at Lianyungang in March 2023 (figure 43-9).


Figure 43-9: PU SONG exporting assessed bagged DPRK-origin cargo, Lianyungang, March 2023



Source: Member State

The Panel previously reported on PU SONG exporting DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in April 2020 (figure 43-10).<sup>240</sup>

Figure 43-10: PU SONG anchored near Ningbo-Zhoushan, April 2020



*Source:* Member State

According to the Member State, ship-to-ship transfers involving DPRK cargo ships in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters have continued, while increased deliveries to Lianyungang waters have been observed in 2023.

Also in 2023, the Member State identified a new location near “Taishan Islands,” where DPRK-origin coal exports are offloaded through ship-to-ship transfer. Panel investigations in this area remain on-going.

All the above DPRK vessels have featured in previous Panel reports as having engaged in the export of DPRK-origin coal in Chinese territorial waters. The Panel sought China’s assistance on the DPRK vessels’ export of coal in Lianyungang and other Chinese port areas in 2023. The Panel sought information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfers in those waters; the receiving vessels’ identifiers; entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels; and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions.

<sup>240</sup> S/2020/840, paras. 46-47 and annex 25.

China replied: “After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

*HUNG BONG 3 declared one entry into Lianyungang Port from Nampo Port in January this year empty loaded. And the ship left Lianyungang Port empty loaded.*

*TAE Dong 1 declared two entries into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January and March this year empty loaded. And the ship left Dalian Port loaded with grain and other grocery.*

*PU SONG declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January this year loaded with containers, and left the port loaded with goods for daily necessities. In June this year, this ship declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port empty loaded and left loaded with goods for daily necessities.*

*No records of port entry and exit or customs declarations of TO MYONG, MIYANG 5, RYONG RIM were found in the Chinese port logs.*

*China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. The above-mentioned ships were loaded with goods for daily necessities, not Security Council embargoed items. The Panel should execute its duties cautiously and responsibly, carefully screening the information it acquired, and should not include unverified information in its report”.*

Source: The Panel

**Annex 44: Vessel disguise**

In October 2022, a Member State photographed the sanctioned cargo ship PUK DAE BONG, with an IMO number of 9045182 painted on its hull, sailing past the coast of Kyushu, Japan. This IMO number belonged to another DPRK cargo ship, MYONG SIN. PUK DAE BONG (IMO: 9020003) had been the subject of several Panel reports for having exported banned DPRK-origin coal when it was sailing as HUA FU.

Both the PUK DAE BONG and the MYONG SIN had their AIS off over a period of time, inclusive of the dates when the PUK DAE BONG was photographed, between 26 and 28 October. Panel analysis of the AIS transmissions of both ships indicate long periods of non-AIS transmissions, overlapping AIS switch-off periods and spoofing of each other's identifiers, indicating the two ships are attempting to obfuscate vessel tracking on maritime databases.

The Panel's comparative analysis of photographs provided by the Member State against photographs obtained from open sourcing of PUK DAE BONG and MYONG SIN show these ships as having very different structures, confirming that the photographed ship was PUK DAE BONG.

PUK DAE BONG ship comparison

PUK DAE BONG sailing as HOAM,<sup>241</sup> undated photograph



*Source:* Maritime database

PUK DAE BONG, 27 October 2022



*Source:* Member State

---

<sup>241</sup> According to IMO records, PUK DAE BONG was sailing as HOAM between November 2000 and December 2011.



Panel comparison of ship structure between PUK DAE BONG and MYONG SIN

PUK DAE BONG, 27 October 2022



Source: Member State

MYONG SIN sailing as KUN JA RI, undated photograph<sup>242</sup>



Source: Maritime database

Legend:

- Different funnel shape and placement (blue box)
- Different placement level of lifeboat (purple box)
- Different superstructure of bridge area (red box)
- Different shaped hull (green box)
- Missing derricks (orange box)

Source: The Panel

<sup>242</sup> MYONG SIN was named KUN JA RI between 2002 and 2015. During that period, it sailed under the DPRK flag before being flagged out to several other ship registries. It was flagged back under the DPRK in 2015.

## Annex 45: Information about the sale of DPRK seafood

### 1) Photographs of the sale of DPRK seafood at Yanji West Market

A Member State provided the Panel with information, including photos of the sale of DPRK seafood at Yanji West Market. The name of the Chinese company that allegedly sold the seafood at the market is “North Korean Seafood Wholesale” (see **Figure F1-1**). The photographed packages of dried cod indicate in Chinese they are “Product of North Korea” (see **Figure F1-2**).

Figure 45-1




Figure 45-2



Source: Member State.

## 2) Information about “North Korean Seafood Wholesale”

A Chinese e-commerce website introduces North Korean Seafood Wholesale as follows: “...North Korean Seafood Wholesale specializes in the wholesale distribution of abalone, sea cucumber, and hairy crab, which are popular in the consumer market and hold a high position among consumers...”


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联系方式

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联系人: 郑有赫

联系人手机: 18043350028 未核实, 仅供参考, [删除号码](#)

邮政编码:

工商信息和基本资料

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职员人数:	5人
所属分类:	<a href="#">食品其他未分类公司</a>
顺企编码:	20147369

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Source: <https://www.11467.com/qiye/20147369.htm>.

**Annex 46: ITC Trade Map Data on DPRK Trade Statistics by Commodity (HS Code) (2022)**

\*\* Note: highlighted may include restricted HS Code commodities

Source : ITC Trade Map / Unit : thousand USD

<b>Total Exports : 263,691</b>
--------------------------------

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	52,422
26	Ores, slag and ash	44,579
72	Iron and steel	38,999
39	Plastics and articles thereof	15,884
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	12,782
50	Silk	12,178
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	11,704
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	9,673
30	Pharmaceutical products	8,717
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	7,847
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	7,562

<b>Total Imports : 902,858</b>
--------------------------------

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
39	Plastics and articles thereof	117,514
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	62,908
40	Rubber and articles thereof	62,479
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes;	52,315
30	Pharmaceutical products	44,756
29	Organic chemicals	41,829
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	38,437
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	35,576
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	34,061
10	Cereals	33,209
55	Man-made staple fibres	31,941



HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
70	Glass and glassware	6,738
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	5,006
75	Nickel and articles thereof	4,450
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	3,365
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	2,921
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	1,883
31	Fertilisers	1,862
29	Organic chemicals	1,837
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	1,382
79	Zinc and articles thereof	1,278
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	1,116

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	30,492
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	25,111
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	19,973
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	18,314
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	17,445
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	15,989
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	15,316
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	14,983
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	14,626
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	14,125
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	13,828



HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
73	Articles of iron or steel	1,077
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	1,052
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	916
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	607
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	505
40	Rubber and articles thereof	470
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	423
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	353
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	274
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	260

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
69	Ceramic products	12,734
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; luminaires and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	12,449
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	9,901
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	9,109
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	9,085
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	6,093
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	5,863
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	5,768
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	5,694
31	Fertilisers	5,470

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	244
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	242
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	228
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	223
55	Man-made staple fibres	222
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	219
74	Copper and articles thereof	197
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	190
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	185
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	183
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	170

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	5,230
70	Glass and glassware	5,092
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	4,983
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	4,710
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	4,536
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	4,460
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	4,045
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	4,040
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	3,756
52	Cotton	2,915
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	2,914

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	156
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	149
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	143
65	Headgear and parts thereof	136
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	113
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	78
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	58
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	41
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	38
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	35

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	2,635
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	2,040
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	2,031
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	1,607
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	1,363
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	1,034
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	909
65	Headgear and parts thereof	893
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	857
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	823

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	32
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	31
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	21
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	21
97	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	20
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	17
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	17
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	16
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	13
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	13
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	13
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes;	12

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	504
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	438
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	424
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	385
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	365
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	362
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	329
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	317
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	286
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	216
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	164
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	146

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	11
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	11
69	Ceramic products	10
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	9
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	7
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	6
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	5
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	5
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	4
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	4

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	145
16	Preparations of meat, of fish, of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates, or of insects	105
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	96
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	81
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	60
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	51
74	Copper and articles thereof	45
8	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	20
50	Silk	13
80	Tin and articles thereof	13



HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
78	Lead and articles thereof	3
8	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	1

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	11
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	8
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	5
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	3
1	Live animals	1

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 9 July 2023, annotated by the Panel.

## Annex 47: Recent trends of DPRK's coal exports

Maritime smuggling activities by the DPRK have expanded in 2023 for DPRK-origin coal (table 47). According to a Member State, the DPRK's activities in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have increased, with the country also reportedly conducting illicit ship-to-ship transfers in waters on its East Coast, near Rajin. The Panel has separately noted increased activity of DPRK ships departing the country's eastern coast in 2022.


Table 47

Smuggled DPRK-coal exported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of coal illicitly exported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	Approx. 300,000 tons	Approx. 200,000 tons	Approx. 800,000 tons

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 48: Additional replies from Member States on trade statistics in the Panel's previous report (S/2023/171, annex 57)**

**Canada**



## El Salvador



## DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ADUANAS

San Salvador, 13 de febrero de 2023

MH.UM.DGA/001.002/2023

Asunto: Emitiendo Informe.

SEÑORA VICEMINISTRA:

Atentamente hago referencia a nota MRREE/DGPE/DAM/2023/0504, de fecha 10 de enero de 2023, por medio de la cual se refiere al trabajo que realiza el Panel de Expertos establecido de conformidad a la Resolución 1874 (2009), del Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (CSONU), que recopila examina y analiza información relativa a la implementación de las medidas impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC).


En ese sentido, se indica que se ha recibido nota del coordinador de dicho Panel el señor [REDACTED] destacando que se han identificado transacciones en las que El Salvador importó de Corea del Norte, un monto de \$4,000.00 en concepto de "maquinaria", por lo que solicita al Gobierno de El Salvador, explicaciones sobre esta situación, particularmente:

1) Si la información es fidedigna. Si no es fidedigna, solicita remitir digitalmente los documentos que pueda explicar lo anterior. Si los documentos para probar lo anterior no pueden ser provistos en tiempo, se solicita explicar al Panel la naturaleza de la transacción.

2) Si la carga de DPDC a El Salvador que contiene la importación, fue inspeccionada de conformidad con el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016) y si esto es así, la razón por la cual no fue confiscada de conformidad al párrafo de la resolución 2397 (2017).

3) Otra información relevante o acciones tomadas por las autoridades de El Salvador respecto de las Importaciones de la RPDC.

En relación a lo solicitado, conforme a información recibida y registros que se tienen en los sistemas informáticos de la Dirección General de Aduanas de El Salvador, se ha constatado que la sociedad HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., el 24 de junio de 2022, registró en la Aduana Terrestre Las Chinamas, la Declaración Única Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, determinándose que a través de la misma se importaron las mercancías que se describen a continuación:



Km. 11.5 Carretera Panamericana, San Bartolo, Ilopango, El Salvador, C.A.  
 Comutador Tel: (503) 2244-5000, Atención al Usuario Tel: (503) 2244-5182  
 Sitio Web: [www.aduana.gob.sv](http://www.aduana.gob.sv); Twitter: @aduana\_sv; Facebook: Aduana El Salvador y Correo electrónico: [usuario@aduana.gob.sv](mailto:usuario@aduana.gob.sv)

CERTIFICADA BAJO LAS NORMAS ISO 9001 POR LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE NORMALIZACIÓN Y CERTIFICACIÓN



No Item	Código Arancelario	Descripción	VALOR EN ADUANA	
			FOB	CIF
1	84841000 00	(9) KIT DE SELLOS, PLATO RETENEDOR	\$579.53	\$601.14
2	84129000 00	(25) BARRIL, SET DE PISTON, ESFERA, PLATO VALVULA	\$3,531.55	\$3,663.29
3	73209000 00	(4) SET DE RESORTES	\$68.16	\$70.70
5	40169300 00	(30) RETENEDOR PARA PRESION METRICO	\$21.79	\$22.60
TOTAL			\$4,201.03	\$4,357.73

Es pertinente indicar, que las mercancías antes relacionadas al haberse declarado como originarias de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), fueron seleccionadas por el módulo de Gestión de Riesgo de la Dirección General de Aduanas, para ser inspeccionadas físicamente, conforme lo establece la Resolución 2270 (2016), del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; determinándose en la revisión que en efecto las mercancías amparadas en los ítems 1, 2, 3 y 5 fueron declaradas por HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., como originarias de la Republica Popular Democrática de Corea.

En ese mismo orden, este Ministerio, al amparo de los principios de Legalidad y Verdad Material, al tratarse de una importación procedente de Guatemala, solicitó a HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., documentación de respaldo con la cual las mercancías ingresaron a Guatemala, verificándose con la información remitida que las mercancías objeto de análisis, fueron importadas originalmente en la República de Guatemala por la sociedad HY SEAL, S.A., ubicada en 31 Avenida 14-53 Zona 7, Colonia Ciudad de Plata 2 Ciudad de Guatemala, por medio de Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA-D), GTGUAEA-21-062439-0001-8, de fecha 4 de mayo de 2021 y factura JH21C03944, de fecha 3 de marzo de 2021, determinándose de la revision realizada a los referidos documentos que las mercancías son originarias de la República de Corea, con código de país KR, exportadas por [REDACTED] con domicilio fiscal en KYUNGMOON BLD. 1F 41 GUKHOE DAERO 54-GIL UEONGDEUNGPO-GU, KOREA.

Con la documentación antes relacionada, se determinó que se trató de un error del agente aduanero al momento de registrar la Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, al haber consignado las mercancías como originarias de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KP), siendo lo correcto, originarias de la República de Corea





## DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ADUANAS

con código de país KR, razón por la cual, las mismas no fueron objeto de incautación como lo dispone la Resolución 2397(2017).

Conforme a lo anterior, como resultado de la verificación y análisis documental de la operación aduanera relacionada, se concluye que las mercancías importadas por medio de la Declaración Unica Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, del 24 de junio de 2022, a nombre de HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., son originarias de la República de Corea, adjuntando al presente la documentación respectiva en formato digital.

DIOS UNIÓN LIBERTAD

  
 [Redacted Signature]  
 Ministro de Hacienda



A LA LICENCIADA ADRIANA MIRA  
 VICEMINISTRA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES  
 E.S.D.O.

[Redacted Address]



Km. 11.5 Carretera Panamericana, San Bartolo, Ilopango, El Salvador, C.A.  
 Comandante Tel.: (503) 2244-5000, Atención al Usuario Tel: (503) 2244-5182  
 Sitio Web: [www.aduana.gob.sv](http://www.aduana.gob.sv); Twitter: @aduanas\_SV; Facebook: Aduana El Salvador y Correo electrónico: [usuario@aduana.gob.sv](mailto:usuario@aduana.gob.sv)

CERTIFICADA BAJO LAS NORMAS ISO 9001 POR LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA  
 DE NORMALIZACIÓN Y CERTIFICACIÓN



*Translated from Spanish*

Directorate General of Customs

San Salvador, 13 February 2023  
MH.UM.DGA/001.002/2023  
Subject: Issuing report.

Madam,

I have the honour to refer to note MRREE/DGPE/DAM/2023/0504, dated 10 January 2023, concerning the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), which compiles, examines and analyzes information related to the implementation of the measures imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In this regard, a note was sent by the coordinator of the Panel, [REDACTED], highlighting the fact that transactions had been detected that involved imports to El Salvador from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of "machinery" with a value of \$4,000.00, in reference to which he requested an explanation from the Government of El Salvador, specifically:

"(1) Confirmation as to whether the listed data is reliable. If it is inaccurate, please submit the digital copies of original documents that can explain the cause of inaccuracy. If you cannot supply the relevant documents in time, please offer a precise explanation of the cause of inaccuracy to the Panel.

"(2) Whether the cargoes from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to El Salvador containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and if so, the reason why they were not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).

"(3) Any other relevant information and/or action taken by the Salvadoran authorities with respect to exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to El Salvador."

[REDACTED]  
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

In relation to the request, according to the information received and records in the computer systems of the Directorate General of Customs of El Salvador, it has been confirmed that Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V. filed Central American single declaration number 4-42754 at the customs office at the Las Chinamas border post on 24 June 2022, when it imported the goods described below:

Item No.	Tariff code	Description	Customs value (US dollars)	
			f.o.b.	c.i.f.
1	84841000 00	(9) gasket kit, retainer plate	579.53	601.14
2	84129000 00	(25) barrel, piston set, ball, valve plate	3 531.55	3 663.29
3	73209000 00	(4) spring set	68.16	70.70
5	40169300 00	(30) pressure retainer, metric	21.79	22.60
<b>Total</b>			<b>4 201.03</b>	<b>4 357.73</b>

Note that the above-mentioned goods, because they were declared as having originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, were physically inspected by the risk management module of the Directorate General of Customs, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2270 (2016). It was determined that the goods under items 1, 2, 3 and 5 had been declared by Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V., as having originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In addition the Ministry, in accordance with the principles of legality and material truth, this being a question of an import from Guatemala, asked Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V. for the supporting documentation with which the goods had entered Guatemala, and confirmed with the information provided that the goods in question had been imported originally into the Republic of Guatemala by Hy Seal, S.A., located at 31 Avenida 14-53 Zona 7, Colonia Ciudad de Plata 2, Guatemala City, under Central American single declaration GTGUAEA-21-062439-0001-8, dated 4 May 2021, and invoice JH21C03944, dated March 3, 2021. A review of those documents determined that the goods originated in the Republic of Korea, with country code KR, and were exported by [REDACTED], with its fiscal domicile at Kyungmoon Bld. 1F 41 Gukhoe Daero 54-Gil Ueongdeungpo-Gu, Republic of Korea.

Thanks to the above documentation, it was determined that the customs agent made an error when registering Central American single declaration number 4-42754, recording the goods as having originated from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (KP), instead of the correct origin of the Republic of Korea, with country code KR, which is why they were not seized as provided for in resolution 2397 (2017).

In accordance with the above, as a result of the confirmation and documentary review of the related customs operation, it has been concluded that the goods imported under Central American single declaration number 4-42754, dated 24 June 2022, by Hy Seals ~~Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V.~~, originated in the Republic of Korea. The respective documentation is attached hereto in a digital format.

God Union Liberty

Minister of Finance

Source: Member States, annotated by the Panel

## Annex 49: Comparison table on DPRK Trade Statistics and replies provided by Member States

\*\* Note: DPRK Trade Statistics and Member States' replies cover the six-month period of October 2022-March 2023/ Highlighted are restricted commodities.

As of 28 July 2023  
\* Unit : Thousand US\$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Austria	0	16		1 (HS Code 85)	purchased from a UK company
2	Barbados	0	458		307 (HS Code 84) 71 (HS Code 85) 33 (HS Code 61) 1 (HS Code 73)	
3	Belgium, Kingdom of	105	57			(Not Restricted)
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	11			(Not Restricted)
5	Brazil, Federative Republic of	0	2			(Not Restricted)
6	Belize	0	111		1 (HS Code 84)	shipments were imported from the Republic of Korea
7	China, People's Republic of	805,820	99,751	5550 (HS Code 2710) 174 (HS Code 2712) 4244 (HS Code 2713) 73 (HS Code 84)	3221 (HS Code 50) 20689 (HS Code 72) 63 (HS Code 73)	goods are items not prohibited by the UNSC resolutions or humanitarian assistance which has exemptions from the UNSC
8	Colombia	1,590	102	1590 (HS Code 72)	4 (HS Code 84) 5 (HS Code 61)	
9	Czech Republic	0	1			(Not Restricted)
10	Denmark, Kingdom of	0	12		12 (HS Code 84)	goods originate from the Republic of Korea
11	El Salvador	0	6		6 (HS Code 54)	
12	Hungary	0	7		7 (HS Code 73)	
13	Indonesia, Republic of	0	911		385 (HS Code 60) 39 (HS Code 85) 77 (HS Code 84) 5 (HS Code 73) 2 (HS Code 08)	
14	Italy	4	2			(Not Restricted)
15	Madagascar, Republic of	0	282		34 (HS Code 84) 76 (HS Code 85)	
16	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	238	8		7 (HS Code 73)	
17	Poland, Republic of	187	0			(Not Restricted)
18	Seychelles, Republic of	0	3,444		3213 (HS Code 72) 162 (HS Code 84) 1 (HS Code 74) 2 (HS Code 73)	request extension to submit reply
19	South Africa, Republic of	2	6,923	2 (HS Code 84)	39 (HS Code 84) 6854 (HS Code 85) 3 (HS Code 73) 1 (HS Code 54)	
20	Spain, Kingdom of	217	9		1 (HS Code 1604)	
21	Thailand, Kingdom of	52	97		95 (HS Code 85) 2 (HS Code 84)	
22	Uganda, Republic of	0	39			(Not Restricted)
23	United Kingdom	28	814			(Not Restricted)

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 9 July 2023, annotated by the Panel



## Annex 50: List of HS codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171, annex 4, as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. This list does not include items banned by previous resolutions such as arms embargo, dual-use items and luxury goods. See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items> for the complete list of prohibited goods.

### a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Condensates and natural gas liquids</b>	<b>2709</b>	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>2711</b>	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
<b>Industrial machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Transportation vehicles<sup>243</sup></b>	<b>86</b>	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>87</b>	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	<b>88</b>	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof <sup>244</sup>	
	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	
<b>Iron, steel and other metals</b>	<b>72-83</b>		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel	
	<b>73</b>	Articles of iron or steel	
	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof	
	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof	
	<b>76</b>	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof	
	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof	
	<b>80</b>	Tin and articles thereof	
	<b>81</b>	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	<b>82</b>	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	<b>83</b>	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

<sup>243</sup> Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

<sup>244</sup> Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

## b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Coal</b>	<b>2701</b>	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
<b>Iron Ore</b>	<b>2601</b>	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
<b>Iron</b>	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel ( <b>7201-7229</b> )	
<b>Iron and Steel products</b>	<b>73</b>	Articles of Iron and steel ( <b>7301-7326</b> )	
<b>Gold</b>	<b>261690</b>	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	<b>7108</b>	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	<b>710811</b>	Gold powder, unwrought	
	<b>710812</b>	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	<b>710813</b>	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	<b>710820</b>	Monetary gold	
<b>Titanium</b>	<b>2614</b>	Titanium ores and concentrates	
<b>Vanadium</b>	<b>2615</b>	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
<b>Rare Earth Minerals</b>	<b>2612</b>	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [ <b>261210</b> and <b>261220</b> ]	
	<b>2617</b>	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code <b>261790</b> - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	<b>2805</b>	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
	<b>2844</b>	Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes etc.	
<b>Copper</b>	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof ( <b>7401-7419</b> )	
	<b>2603</b>	Copper ores and concentrates	
<b>Zinc</b>	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof ( <b>7901-7907</b> )	
	<b>2608</b>	Zinc ores and concentrates	
<b>Nickel</b>	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof ( <b>7501-7508</b> )	
	<b>2604</b>	Nickel ores and concentrates	
<b>Silver</b>	<b>2616100</b> <b>7106, 7107</b>	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	<b>7114</b>	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
<b>Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)</b>	<b>3</b>	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates ( <b>0301-0308</b> )	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	<b>1603</b>	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	<b>1604</b>	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	<b>1605</b>	Crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
<b>Lead</b>	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof ( <b>7801-7806</b> )	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)

<b>Lead ore</b>	<b>2607</b>	Lead ores and concentrates	
<b>Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)</b>	<b>50-63</b>		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>50</b>	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>51</b>	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	<b>52</b>	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>53</b>	Vegetable textile fibres nesoi; yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibres nesoi and paper	
	<b>54</b>	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>55</b>	Manmade staple fibres, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>56</b>	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	<b>57</b>	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	<b>58</b>	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	<b>59</b>	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	<b>60</b>	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	<b>61</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>62</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; <i>not</i> knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>63</b>	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
<b>Agricultural products</b>	<b>07</b>	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	<b>08</b>	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	<b>12</b>	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
<b>Machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
<b>Electrical equipment</b>	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesite</b>	<b>25</b>	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
<b>Wood</b>	<b>44</b>	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
<b>Vessels</b>	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709: crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons ]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713: refined petroleum products [ cap: 500,000 barrels ]

Source: the Panel

## Annex 51: Organization of export controls pursuant to UN SC DPRK-related resolutions in Singapore


### Inter-Ministry Committee on Export Controls (IMC-EC)



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3

### Legislations Implementing various UNSCRs



We Protect Revenue, and Make Trade Easy, Fair and Secure.

4

## Immediate Implementation of UNSCRs

### **Regulation 6(1)(b) Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations**

“Notwithstanding regulation 3, there shall be no —**importation** into, **exportation** from or **transit** through Singapore of any goods which will contravene the decisions of the United Nations Security Council in resolutions made under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 26th June 1945.”



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## List of Items Prohibited for Import, Export, Transshipment and Transit from/to the DPRK

- List of all prohibited items listed in various UNSCRs on the DPRK updated in the Seventh Schedule of the Regulation of Imports and Export Regulations
- Last update on 17 Oct 2018 to include additional items listed under UNSCR 2397 (2017) on DPRK:
  - ✓ Food and agricultural products (under HS codes 07, 08, 12)
  - ✓ Machinery (HS code 84)
  - ✓ Electrical equipment (HS code 85)
  - ✓ Earth and stone, including magnesite and magnesite (HS code 25)
  - ✓ Wood (HS code 44)
  - ✓ Vessels (HS code 89)



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## Trade with DPRK



With effect from 8 Nov 2017, Singapore has prohibited all commercially traded goods from or to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including the transshipment and transit of these goods through Singapore.



Non-commercial transactions (e.g. humanitarian donation) of goods arriving from or destined for the DPRK is allowable, and require a permit to be submitted at least 3 working days before the intended shipment date.



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
## Operationalizing OP 18 of UNSCR 2270 (2016) - Inspection of DPRK Cargo

- With effect from 1 May 2018, enforcement powers extended to goods brought in transit, whose inspections are required pursuant to give effect to any relevant decision of the UNSC
- Inspection scope covers cargo where there is reasonable grounds to believe:
  - ✓ Originates from the DPRK
  - ✓ Is bound for the DPRK
  - ✓ Is brokered or facilitated by/for the DPRK and any entity acting on behalf of the DPRK



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Source: Member State

## Annex 52: Replies from Member States

### Austria

 Permanent  
Mission  
of Austria

to the United Nations  
in New York

Reference No. New-York-OV/POL/0254/2023

#### NOTE VERBALE

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to Note Verbale S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.109 dated 15 June 2023 would like to submit the following response:

The imported good referred to in your request is one satellite phone (Thuraya X5 Touch). The Austrian buyer ordered and purchased the item from company registered in the UK, from where it was shipped to Austria.

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 27 Juni 2023



To the  
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)  
New York, NY 10017  
[dppa-poe1874@un.org](mailto:dppa-poe1874@un.org)

600 Third Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016  
E-Mail: [new-york-ov@bmeia.gv.at](mailto:new-york-ov@bmeia.gv.at), Tel.: (+1) 917 542 8400

## Belize

**PERMANENT MISSION OF BELIZE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

675 Third Ave., Suite 1911

New York, NY 10017

Tel: (212) 986-1240

Fax: (212) 593-0932 E-mail: [blzun@belizemission.com](mailto:blzun@belizemission.com)

NV No. 53

The Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to the latter's correspondence referenced S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.111 of 15 June 2023 regarding data indicating trade between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Belize of items subject to sectoral sanctions pursuant to resolution 2397 (2017).

The Permanent Mission of Belize wishes to inform that the Belize Customs and Excise Department, the competent authority, has conducted an investigation into all trade from DPRK to Belize in 2021 and 2022. Their examination of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) showed two records of importation of machinery of HS Chapter 84 from DPRK in 2021 and 2022. The competent authority has now clarified with the relevant customs brokers and consignees that the said shipments were actually imported from the Republic of Korea, as clearly indicated in the attachments. Consequently, post-modifications for both customs declarations, herewith attached, were executed to reflect the accurate country of origin/export as Republic of Korea.

Further, the competent authority has advised that there has not been any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving DPRK.

The Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) the assurance of its highest consideration.

New York, 5 July 2023



United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)  
NEW YORK

**China**

China replied, “*According to the data from China, the goods mentioned by the Panel either are items not prohibited by the UNSC resolutions or humanitarian assistance which has exemptions from the UNSC.*”



## Denmark



July 13, 2023  
J.nr. 2023 - 5805

**Ministry of Taxation**  
Nicolai Eigtveds Gade 28  
DK 1402 - København K

Tel. +45 33 92 33 92  
Mail skm@skm.dk

www.skm.dk

In regard to the letter from the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts dated 15. June 2023 concerning the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), the Ministry of Taxation is pleased to provide the following information:

#### **Question 1**

*Ministry of Taxation can confirm that there has been an import of goods to Denmark as displayed in Tabel 1: Machinery (HS Code 84).*

*However, a subsequent examination of the import conducted by Danish Customs Agency indicates that the origin of the goods is mistakenly stated by the American consignor as originating from DPRK, although the goods originate from the Republic of Korea.*

*The importing company has on the request of Danish Customs Agency provided documents (including commercial invoice and product information) which specifies that the imported goods originate from the Republic of Korea.*

*It is the Danish Customs Agency's assessment that the documents sufficiently support that the goods in question originate from the Republic of Korea and not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as stated in Table 1.*

<b>Table 1: Machinery (HS Code 84): DATE</b>	<b>REPORTING COUNTRY</b>	<b>PARTNER COUNTRY</b>	<b>HS CODE</b>	<b>APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)</b>
December 2022	Denmark	DPRK	84	12,000

*Hence, the information as stated in Table 1 is de facto inaccurate.*

**Question 2**

*A review of the import in the Danish Customs Agency's systems shows that a consignment corresponding to the information in the Table 1 was inspected on 27 December 2022. The consignment contained goods of Chapter 84 consigned from the United States but with declared origin in the DPRK.*

*The consignment was therefore subjected to physical control on the basis of a concrete risk profile that was created to ensure effective enforcement of the ban on the importation of goods subject to sanctions.*

*Thus, the consignment has been inspected in accordance with paragraph 18 of Resolution 2270 (2016).*

*However, the cargo was after the inspection not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).*

*Danish Customs Agency has been in dialog with the relevant control unit, and it has been established that the consignment was erroneously released despite the fact that the goods could potentially be prohibited from importation. Furthermore, it has been established that the instructions in the inspection description in the relevant risk profile have not been followed, and that the correct contact persons have not been involved in connection with the execution of the inspection.*

**Question 3**

*As a result of the erroneous release of the cargo, the Danish Customs Agency will emphasize to the responsible control unit that the described procedures must be followed.*

## **Annex 53**

### **Advanced Technology Facility (ATF) appears to be reselling Glocom Products**

The Panel notes that at least two products displayed on the ATF website resemble products from Glocom's catalogue. The products are nearly identical in appearance, and share similar description and specifications, with only minor differences in wording. Despite using the brand name "EDSAT" and "ER" on ATF website, the Panel assesses that these products are originally Glocom-made products as seen in Glocom's catalogue.

- 1) Comparison between “EDSAT ER-310” and “Glocom GR-310” (Upper images are from ATF website and the bottom is from Glocom’s catalogue). The contents of both ① and ② are nearly identical.

1



1



**ER-310 VHF/UHF Tactical SATCOM**  
Manpack/Mobile Radio Frequency Hopping, Digital Secure EPM



**Description** **Features** **Specification** **Documents**

**Frequency bands & modulations**

- VHF-FM 30MHz to 88MHz
- VHF-AM 108MHz to 118MHz (Rx only)
- VHF-FM/AM 116MHz to 156MHz
- UHF-FM 156MHz to 174MHz
- UHF-FM/AM 225MHz to 512MHz
- SATCOM 243-270MHz & 292-318MHz
- Preset channels 100 channels
- Channel spacing 8.33kHz, 12.5kHz, 25kHz
- SATCOM (spacing) 5kHz, 25kHz
- Emergency frequency 243.0MHz (121.5MHz option) Frequency stability  $\pm 1$ ppm
- Channel changing time 1ms
- Duty cycle 1 min x Tx, 5 min x Rx without forced air cooling Receiver
- Sensitivity 0.5 $\mu$ V(FM), 1.5 $\mu$ V(AM)
- SATCOM -120 dBm for 10 dB SINAD
- AM modulation index 80% to 100%
- Audio output distortion 5%
- Spurious rejection 70dB
- Squelch Operates both on output signal-to-noise ratio and input carrier level, thresholds adjustable
- IF interface characteristics Frequency: 70MHz, impedance: 50Ohm unbalanced Transmitter

**GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical Manpack/Mobile Radio**  
Frequency Hopping, Digital Secure EPM  
Software Defined Radio

**General specifications**

**Frequency bands & modulations**

- VHF-FM 30MHz to 88MHz
- VHF-AM 108MHz to 118MHz (Rx only)
- VHF-FM/AM 116MHz to 156MHz
- UHF-FM 156MHz to 174MHz
- UHF-FM/AM 225MHz to 512MHz
- SATCOM 243-270MHz & 292-318MHz
- Preset channels 100 channels
- Channel spacing 8.33kHz, 12.5kHz, 25kHz
- SATCOM (spacing) 5kHz, 25kHz
- Emergency frequency 243.0MHz (121.5MHz option)
- Frequency stability  $\pm 1$ ppm
- Channel changing time 1ms
- Duty cycle 1 min x Tx, 5 min x Rx without forced air cooling

**Receiver**

- Sensitivity 0.5 $\mu$ V(FM), 1.5 $\mu$ V(AM)
- SATCOM -120 dBm for 10 dB SINAD
- AM modulation index 80% to 100%
- Audio output distortion 5%
- Spurious rejection 70dB
- Squelch Operates both on output signal-to-noise ratio and input carrier level, thresholds adjustable

**IF interface characteristics**

- Frequency: 70MHz, impedance: 50Ohm unbalanced

**Transmitter**

- Output power 10W(Peak) in AM, 10W in FM
- SATCOM 10W
- Spurious emissions 50dB below carrier level
- IF interface frequency 70MHz
- Impedance 50Ohm unbalance

**Power supply**

- Power input configuration DC12V
- Power consumption < 180W (in Tx), < 40W (in Rx)

**Environmental**

- Operating temperature -30°C to +70°C
- Storage temperature -40°C to +75°C
- Shock MIL-STD-810E
- Humidity 90% relative
- EMC MIL-STD-461D

**Physical**

- Dimension 230mm x 90mm x 230mm
- Weight  $\leq 4$ Kg (4.9Kg with battery)

**GR-310/GR-310VH Available options**

- HG SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz) GA-310-AT-05
- X-wing SATCOM antenna GA-310-AT-06
- Aircraft antenna(108-137MHz) GA-310-AT-07
- Aircraft antenna(220-400MHz) GA-310-AT-08
- 100W power supply unit GA-33A
- 320W power supply unit GA-34A
- External speaker with cable GA-40A

**GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical/Satcom Manpack Set**

The Gliocom GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Manpack Set is ideal for extended portable field operations providing the tactical user with effective, secure and comprehensive communications with remote sited command locations. It includes all necessary handset, headset, antennas, batteries and ruck sack carrying system. The standard set comprises:

- VHF/UHF 10W EPM SDR
- Remote control unit (For only GR-310R)
- Officer handset
- Tactical headset
- VHF 2.4m whip antenna(30-88MHz)
- Whip antenna(100-400MHz)
- SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz)
- GPS antenna
- Clone cable
- Li-ion battery pack(2pcs)
- Battery charger
- Rucksack
- User Manual

**GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical/Satcom Mobile Set**

The Gliocom GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Mobile Set upgrades the GR-310 by providing a convenient vehicle installation kit and transmitter power amplification to 50W PEP. With options for power supply system and the flexibility of dismantled use of GR-310 radio when not in the vehicle (additional accessories may be required), the GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Mobile Set can be installed in a wide range of vehicle types with antenna options to suit. The standard set comprises:-

- VHF/UHF 10W EPM SDR
- Remote control unit (For only GR-310R)
- Officer handset
- Tactical headset
- VHF 2.4m whip antenna(30-88MHz)
- Whip antenna(100-400MHz)
- SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz)
- GPS antenna
- Clone cable
- Li-ion battery pack(2pcs)
- Battery charger
- Rucksack
- User Manual
- VHF/UHF 50W amplifier
- Mobile antenna(100-400MHz)
- 3.8m VHF antenna
- Mobile installation kit

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- 2) Comparison between “EDSAT ER-452” and “Glocom GR-452” (Upper images are from ATF website and the bottom is from Glocom’s catalogue). The contents of both ①, ②, and ③ are nearly identical

**EDSAT - ER-452 ADS-B Receiver/Transmitter**  
Enhanced Automatic Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast



Image	Function	Specification	Comments
1	Why ADS-B	Our comprehensive range of integrated products is a preferred solution for enhanced wide area surveillance of aircraft. Why ADS-B? Airline and air navigation service providers benefit from improved low cost surveillance leading to safety enhancement, reduced workload for both pilots and controllers and more efficient operations. Enablers for ADS-B used in air-to-ground applications provides support in all phases of flight and ground operations. Functions e.g. for radar-like separation in non-radar or low coverage airspace. In Terminal Areas (TMA) e.g. for precision approach monitoring. At airport, e.g. within Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) including multilateration for surveillance and identification, and vehicle fleet management.	
2	The ADS-B ground station system provides the means of identification of other civilian aircraft which are equipped with a Mode S compatible transponder. The system conforms to the relevant requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Vol. IV and STANAG 4103, Part 1, Edition 2. Thus it is compatible with all other IFF and SSR systems meeting those requirements. The major equipment items are in service with our army, navy, air force and civil aviation and qualified to meet ground station and airspace environment, while all other component units are designed to meet these requirements. All that is necessary is the insertion of the appropriate computers into the secure housing supplied. All cabling and necessary controls form part of the offered system. The system is also supplied with Mode S facilities. However, to make full use of these facilities will require data handling capabilities external to the offered IFF/SSR system in order to initiate/receive the necessary digital communication messages.		
3	ER-452A General Specifications	Range >250nm Sensitivity <-140dB Dynamic Range > 80dB Mean Update Rate 1/s (max. 2/s) Capacity > 300 targets/s Output Formats Asterix, Raw Data Time of Arrival Resolution <200ns (True 2 Ant) Time Reference 12 Channel GPS, RAIM/HPL, Processing Power Supply 110V/220VAC, 47-63Hz, 18-38VDC Power Consumption <50W Dimensions 482.6 x 177.0 x 350.6 (mm) w/ Handles Weight 6.5Kg	

**Glocom**  
Global Communications Co.,

## GR-452 ADS-B Receiver/Transmitter System

Automatic Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast



**[GR-452A ADS-B Receiver Key Features]**

- Frequency 1090MHz
- Complete ADS-B Data Processing – No Central Equipment needed
- Covers up to 250nm Range
- Compact, Easy to Install, Maintenance Free, Robust Architecture
- Automatic Self Testing (BITE)
- Full Remote Control and Monitoring
- Secure Communication and Password Protection

**ADS-B** - Our comprehensive range of integrated products is a preferred solution for enhanced wide area surveillance of aircraft.

**Why ADS-B?** Airline and air navigation service providers benefit from improved low cost surveillance leading to safety enhancement, reduced workload for both pilots and controllers and more efficient operations.

**Enablers for ADS-B** ADS-B used in air-to-ground applications provides support in all phases of flight and ground operations:

- In-route e.g. for radar-like separation in non-radar or low coverage airspace
- In Terminal Areas (TMA) e.g. for precision approach monitoring
- At airport, e.g. within Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) including multilateration for surveillance and identification, and vehicle fleet management.

**DESCRIPTION** The ADS-B ground station system provides the means of identification of other civilian aircraft which are equipped with a Mode S compatible transponder. The system conforms to the relevant requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Vol. IV and STANAG 4103, Part 1, Edition 2. Thus it is compatible with all other IFF and SSR systems meeting those requirements. The major equipment items are in service with our army, navy, air force and civil aviation and qualified to meet ground station and airspace environment, while all other component units are designed to meet these requirements. All that is necessary is the insertion of the appropriate computers into the secure housing supplied. All cabling and necessary controls form part of the offered system. The system is also supplied with Mode S facilities. However, to make full use of these facilities will require data handling capabilities external to the offered IFF/SSR system in order to initiate/receive the necessary digital communication messages.

**[GR-452B ADS-B Transmitter Key Features]**

- ADS-B compatible signal (position, velocity, address)
- Parameter setting by keyboard & RS-232 interface
- Built-in LCD for status information display
- Built-in test equipment

**GR-452A General Specifications**

Range	>250nm
Sensitivity	<-140dB
Dynamic Range	> 80dB
Mean Update Rate	1/s (max. 2/s)
Capacity	> 300 targets/s
Output Formats	Asterix, Raw Data
Time of Arrival Resolution	<200ns (True 2 Ant)
Time Reference	12 Channel GPS, RAIM/HPL, Processing
Power Supply	110V/220VAC, 47-63Hz, 18-38VDC
Power Consumption	<50W
Dimensions	482.6 x 177.0 x 350.6 (mm) w/ Handles
Weight	6.5Kg

**Site Monitor**

Frequency	1090MHz
RF Power	<30dBm
Input	Direct Antenna
Dimension	482.6 x 43.9 x 302.7 (mm)
Weight	6.5Kg

**Environment**

Operating Temperature	0°C-60°C
Storage Temperature	-30°C-+70°C
Humidity	95%

**Handling**

Local Integrity Monitoring by means of Site Monitor

Automatic Self Testing (BITE)

Periodic "Long Loop" Test using Site Monitor

Full Remote Control and Monitoring

Secure Communication and Protecting

Safe reboot and upgrading of firmware

Source: ATF website and Glocom catalogues

## Annex 54: Notice of the U.S. Department of the Treasury

### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

#### Treasury Sanctions Facilitator for Attempted Arms Deals Between North Korea and Russia

March 30, 2023

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one individual for attempting to facilitate arms deals between Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Sanctions and export controls imposed by a coalition of over 30 countries have constrained Russia's ability to replace lost military equipment and supplies with modern technology. At the same time, the United States and its partners are continuing to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons to defend itself against Russia's brutal war of choice.

"Russia has lost over 9,000 pieces of heavy military equipment since the start of the war, and thanks in part to multilateral sanctions and export controls, Putin has become increasingly desperate to replace them," said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. "Schemes like the arms deal pursued by this individual show that Putin is turning to suppliers of last resort like Iran and the DPRK. We remain committed to degrading Russia's military-industrial capabilities, as well as exposing and countering Russian attempts to evade sanctions and obtain military equipment from the DPRK or any other state that is prepared to support its war in Ukraine."

#### WEAPONS AND PROHIBITED GOODS

OFAC is designating a Slovakian national **Ashot Mkrtychev** (Mkrtychev) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13551 for having attempted to, directly or indirectly, import, export, or reexport to, into, or from the DPRK any arms or related materiel.

Between the end of 2022 and early 2023, Mkrtychev worked with DPRK officials to obtain over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK. Mkrtychev's negotiations with DPRK and Russian officials detailed mutually beneficial cooperation between North Korea and Russia to include financial payments and barter arrangements. He confirmed Russia's readiness to receive military equipment from the DPRK with senior Russian officials. Mkrtychev's negotiations with those officials indicated that necessary Russian preparations for

a proposed deal were complete, and that they were ready to receive materials from and transfer materials to the DPRK. He also provided DPRK officials with information from Russian officials, likely connected to his attempts to obtain military equipment for Russia from DPRK. Lastly, Mkrtychev worked with a Russian individual to locate commercial aircraft suitable for delivery to the DPRK.

## SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, pursuant to E.O. 13551, all property and interests in property of the person named above that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked person are also blocked.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individual designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for the individual designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC's [Frequently Asked Question 897](#).

For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please [click here](#).

Find identifying information on the individual sanctioned today [here](#).

###

Source: [https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377?utm\\_campaign=Readbook&utm\\_medium=email&\\_hsmi=252489754&\\_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8CUtB47CLpIA1sL7zycVx7NGHKz7iHzsDx5U0uZVyH8ZCD-RntLDdWpiJi49MilWimJLtVw8YgIR-6XpYrcFrZKkpvdw&utm\\_content=252489754&utm\\_source=hs\\_email](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377?utm_campaign=Readbook&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=252489754&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8CUtB47CLpIA1sL7zycVx7NGHKz7iHzsDx5U0uZVyH8ZCD-RntLDdWpiJi49MilWimJLtVw8YgIR-6XpYrcFrZKkpvdw&utm_content=252489754&utm_source=hs_email)

**Annex 55: Russian Federation's reply**

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.105 сообщаем следующее.

Сведения относительно якобы проводимых гражданином Словакии А.Мкртычевым переговорах о поставках из КНДР в Россию оружия и боеприпасов в обмен на товары не подтверждаются, являясь бездоказательными инсинуациями американской стороны.

**Translated from Russian**

In connection with reference No. OC.105 from the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following. The information concerning the alleged negotiations by Slovak citizen A. Mkrtychev on the supply of arms and ammunition from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Russia in exchange for goods, being unsubstantiated insinuations on the part of the United States of America, is unconfirmed.

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**Annex 56: United States' reply concerning Mkrtychev' passport information**

MKRTYCHEV, Ashot (a.k.a. MKRTYCEV, Asot), Hana Melichkova Street 3448/37, Bratislava 84105, Slovakia; DOB 07 May 1966; POB Baku, Azerbaijan; citizen Slovakia; Gender Male; Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210; Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214; Passport BD3843329 (Slovakia) expires 08 Apr 2029; alt. Passport BD5609822 (Slovakia) expires 19 May 2024 (individual)[DPRK].



**Annex 57: Russian Federation's reply**

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.5 сообщаем следующее.

Представленные «одним государством-членом» фотографии не являются исчерпывающими доказательствами и не свидетельствуют о нарушении введенных против Пхеньяна международных ограничительных мер.

Движение товаров в/из КНДР осуществляется с учетом требований резолюций СБ в отношении этой страны. Установленные Советом санкционные запреты и ограничения соблюдаются. Компетентные российские органы нарушений не выявили.

*Translated from Russian*

In connection with reference No. OC.5 from the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following.

The photographs provided “by one Member State” are not comprehensive evidence and do not show a violation of the international restrictive measures imposed against Pyongyang.

The movement of goods to/from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is carried out taking into account the requirements of the Security Council resolutions concerning this country. The Council's sanctions prohibitions and restrictions are being complied with. The competent Russian authorities found no violations.

## Annex 58: Poland's SALW trade statistics with DPRK and its reply

### Poland's Trade Statistics with the DPRK on SALW in 2022

Month	HS Code	Imported Amount in USD
January	9306	404
February		366
March		327
April	9305	18
	9306	765
May	9305	18
	9306	1163
July	9305	18
	9306	446
October	9306	935
November		201
December		831

- **HS Code 9305:** Parts and accessories off arms (military weapons, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles etc.)
- **HS Code 9306:** Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including buckshot, shot and cartridge wads.

Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistic Database (<https://comtradeplus.un.org/>)

## Poland's Reply

RZECZPOSPOLITA POLSKA  
STAŁE PRZEDSTAWICIELSTWO PRZY  
NARODACH ZJEDNOCZONYCH



REPUBLIC OF POLAND  
PERMANENT MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

750 Third Avenue, NEW YORK, NY 10017  
TEL.: (212) 744 2506 FAX: (212) 517 6771

SP.ONZ.NJORK.6340.212.2023

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York presents its compliments to the Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the letter of 16 June 2023 (S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.137) regarding "arms and related materiel" imported by Poland from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2022 has the honor to submit herewith information on the issue at question.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts assurances of its highest consideration.



New York, 14 July 2023

[Redacted]  
Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

United Nations

New York

**Annex to the note SP.ONZ.NJORK.6340.212.2023**

**Information for the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) with regard to the import of "arms and related materiel" from the DPRK to Poland**

With reference to the question of the Panel of Experts with regard to "arms and related materiel" imported by Poland from the DPRK in 2022, please find below information that you may consider relevant to the issue at question.

First and foremost we would like to reaffirm our commitment to international obligations. Sanctions regime imposed on DPRK as well as export control are addressed in the Republic of Poland in both domestic and EU-level legal framework. Measures against the DPRK imposed by the Security Council have been jointly implemented by Poland and the other Member States of the European Union within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy. In order to give an effect of these measures in the most comprehensive and uniform manner the European Union adopted relevant legislation such as decision and regulation issued on the basis of article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, respectively. It should be emphasized that these measures constitute an essential part of the European Union foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue objectives in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It should also be noted that from legal perspective regulation has direct binding effect for all persons and entities, without requirement to be implemented into national legislation, unless it is stipulated otherwise.

The obligations stemming from resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) have been enshrined in respective provisions of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/848 of 27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Council Regulation (EC) 1509/2017 of 30 August 2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ L 224 31.8.2017, p. 1 with further amendments).

Considering robust sanctions' measures imposed on the DPRK, bilateral economic ties between Poland and DPRK are very limited. Apart from that due to the fact that the DPRK remains on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, all the DPRK-linked activities are under the highest possible scrutiny. Under statutory requirements as provided for in AML/CFT Act financial market entities are obliged to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures taking into account the risk-based approach. Moreover the comprehensive national export control regime in force is based on close interagency cooperation between export control authority and various national authorities such as inter alia National Security Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Revenue Administration (KAS), the latter responsible for customs matters. It is therefore mandatory for competent authorities to apply enhanced scrutiny in line with detailed procedures, taking into account comprehensive import and export restrictions on the DPRK. It should also be underlined that competent authorities exercise continuous vigilance over business activities and transactions that may be directly or indirectly linked to designated entities and individuals as well as prohibited activities. Nonetheless, well-tailored customer due diligence measures applied by respective institutions, along with wide interagency cooperation ensure that relevant authorities give the highest consideration to all the DPRK-linked activities.

However, it should be emphasized that in this particular case national competent authorities are not in possession of any information that may confirm the transactions referred to by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts. The analysis of the national databases on economic turnover available to National Revenue Administration does not show that in the period in question imports of goods classified under HS codes 9305 (parts and accessories of articles covered by headings 9301 to 9304) and 9306 (bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, projectiles and similar armaments of war and parts thereof, cartridges and other ammunition and grenades and parts thereof, including shot and ball wads) or other arms-related goods from the DPRK to Poland, took place. It should also be pointed out that the data contained in the UN Comtrade Database available on the website <https://comtradeplus.un.org/>, as indicated in the Coordinator's letter, does not correspond with the data reported by Poland to United Nations Register of Conventional Arms <https://www.unroca.org/poland/report/2022/>. Considering the above, it will be helpful to investigate the matter further if we are provided with the sources of this specific data.

In 2022, according to official data gathered by Statistics Poland (GUS) economic turnover between DPRK to Poland was at very low level, covering mainly basic goods. DPRK is ranked 198 out of the total 236 economic partners (this list also includes overseas territories and dependencies). Please find also enclosed document prepared by EU Directorate – General for Trade illustrating in details volume and value of trade in goods between the European Union and DPRK.

Taking into account the gravity of violation of international obligations by the DPRK, we would like to inform you that Poland considers cooperation with the Panel of Experts with a view to analyzing all issues related to alleged non-compliance to be of the utmost importance. We would like to assure you of our full readiness to cooperate in this matter.

*Source: Member State*



**Annex 59: Singapore's export control cases of luxury goods to the DPRK****Case Study: Sanctioned goods shipped to DPRK**

- In 2018, Singapore Customs received information alleging that Singaporean companies have engaged in trade in luxury goods which were prohibited by the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") sanctions.
- Through investigations, different companies were established to be engaged in such trade.

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**Key Points**

- Singapore gives force to the UNSC sanctions by implementing the sanctions within domestic law
- Therefore, exporting goods which violate the sanctions constitute an offence under the United Nations (Sanctions — Democratic People's Republic Of Korea) Regulations
- Additionally, on 8 Nov 2017, Singapore prohibited all commercially traded goods from or to the DPRK, regardless of whether they are imported, exported, or transhipped or brought in transit through Singapore

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## Outcome

- Investigations established that various companies had engaged in prohibited trade with the DPRK since 2013 to 2018
- These companies included those who sold goods for export, and those involved in the logistical role
- 5 companies and 9 individuals have been prosecuted, with 3 companies and 7 individuals convicted for their role in such trade
- Cases against further 1 company and 2 individuals pending investigations



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## Examples of convicted cases

- Rejo Beverages was fined \$160k; her director, one Loh Mun Sang was jailed for 6 weeks
- 123 Holdings was fined \$60,000, 123 Duty Free was fined \$30,000. Their director, one Wang Jung Chung was jailed for 8 weeks while the export director, one See Swee Hian, was jailed for 4 weeks



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*Source: Member State.*

## Annex 60: Cases prosecuted by Singapore for the violation of luxury goods export to DPRK




### PP v Ng Kheng Wah

- T-Specialist directly supplied designated luxury items to the Korean Bugsae shop between November 2010 and January 2017, including:
  - Wines and spirits
  - Perfumes, cosmetics, musical instruments and precious jewellery
  - Watches clad with a precious metal
- Total value of designated luxury goods supplied to DPRK was in excess of SGD \$6m
- T-Specialist and Ng Kheng Wah faced 80 charges under Reg 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Regulations (“UN-DPRK Regs”).

***PP v Ng Kheng Wah***

- Due to the sanctions, Li Ik/Li Hyon had difficulty paying T-Specialist and owed USD 20 m by end of 2013
- Ng then committed trade financing fraud – arranged for his friend Wang to create fictitious invoices for non-existent transactions to purchase MSG and instant noodles.
- Obtained over USD 94m in trade financing from five banks, which was then round-tripped back to T-Specialist. Loans were eventually repaid.
- Ng faced 81 charges of cheating and 8 charges under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (“CDSA”).

***PP v Ng Kheng Wah***

- T-Specialist: fine of \$880,000:
  - \$380,000 for UN-DPRK Regs Charges
  - \$500,000 for CDSA offences

**Jail for company director who sold luxury goods to North Korea, cheated banks of \$130m**





***PP v Chong Hock Yen and others***

- In total, 43 occasions where luxury items were supplied, with total value exceeding SGD 500k, and Richard Chong earning about \$120k.
- Designated luxury goods supplied included perfumes and cosmetics, watches of metal clad with a precious metal and musical instruments.
- At first instance, District Judge imposed the following sentences:
  - Richard Chong: 3 weeks' imprisonment
  - SCN: \$120,000 fine
  - Sindok: \$10,000 fine
  - Laurich: \$10,000 fine
- Prosecution and defence both appealed against sentences imposed.

***PP v Chong Hock Yen and others – the appeal***

- The violation of a UN measure enacted into domestic law would affect Singapore's international reputation, in particular, as an international trade and finance centre.
- Luxury goods do not pose a threat in itself but are prohibited, and "probably provide succour and motivation for the continued defiance or contravention of UN Sanctions by those in positions or power".
- Harm to Singapore's reputation and standing would be greater when it took place in relation during a period of heightened tension.
- Fines imposed had to take into account both punishment and disgorgement of profits.

## Our continued commitment

- As recently as April 2023, we have continued to prosecute and obtain jail terms for persons who supply banned goods to DPRK in breach of our regulations

### Pokka ex-manager who unlawfully supplied drinks to N. Korea jailed

A former Pokka beverage sales manager from India, who was arrested last year, has been sentenced to 10 years in jail for supplying banned goods to North Korea. The court found that the defendant, who was arrested in 2021, had supplied Pokka beverages to North Korea through a network of intermediaries. The court also found that the defendant had received a bribe from North Korea to facilitate the supply of the beverages. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years in jail and a fine of \$100,000. The defendant is currently in custody in India.

The court found that the defendant had supplied Pokka beverages to North Korea through a network of intermediaries. The court also found that the defendant had received a bribe from North Korea to facilitate the supply of the beverages. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years in jail and a fine of \$100,000. The defendant is currently in custody in India.

The court found that the defendant had supplied Pokka beverages to North Korea through a network of intermediaries. The court also found that the defendant had received a bribe from North Korea to facilitate the supply of the beverages. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years in jail and a fine of \$100,000. The defendant is currently in custody in India.

## THE STRAITS TIMES

Jail for two men in S'pore who sent \$1m worth of Pokka and alcoholic drinks to North Korea

Two men in Singapore have been sentenced to jail for supplying Pokka and alcoholic drinks to North Korea. The court found that the two men had sent \$1 million worth of Pokka and alcoholic drinks to North Korea through a network of intermediaries. The court sentenced the two men to 10 years in jail and a fine of \$100,000. The two men are currently in custody in Singapore.

Source: Member State.

## Annex 61: Reply from Jaguar Land Rover



The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts  
The United Nations Headquarters  
Siege  
New York  
NY 10017

4 April 2023

Your Reference: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.23

Dear [REDACTED]

I am writing in response to your letter of 15 March 2023 in relation to photographs of a Land Rover Defender in Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in January 2023.

Jaguar Land Rover takes Sanctions compliance very seriously. Our Corporate Policy on Export Controls & Sanctions Compliance prohibits all transactions in breach of sanctions and all trade with what Jaguar Land Rover term "Comprehensively Sanctioned countries", which includes DPRK. Our Policy is supported by proportionate monitoring and enforcement processes.

Jaguar Land Rover does not have any appointed Retailers or Service agents in DPRK. Vehicles are by their nature mobile and therefore we believe it likely that the vehicle photographed has been driven across the border or shipped in by a third party. The Panel notes in your letter that third party and criminal vehicle sales are difficult to follow. Jaguar Land Rover seeks to manage this diversion risk through robust contractual clauses and awareness raising with our counterparties in relation to permitted sales of our vehicles.

The table below contains our responses to the requests for information with regards to the vehicle photographed.


Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
1. The model, year of manufacture of the vehicle in the photographs, location of manufacturing facilities, and possible serial numbers	<p>The Defender pictured has no visible registration plates and the photographs do not include the Vehicle Identification Number.</p> <p>We have shown the photographs to internal experts on the Defender and they believe that it is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Model:</b> Land Rover Defender 110</li> <li>• <b>Model year:</b> Possibly 2020 model year (but they cannot be certain)</li> <li>• <b>Derivative:</b> P400 SE core specification (i.e. not X-Dynamic or X variant)</li> <li>• <b>Exterior Colour:</b> Santorini Black</li> <li>• <b>Interior:</b> Not visible</li> <li>• <b>Driver's Side:</b> Left-Hand Drive</li> <li>• <b>Manufacturing facility:</b> Jaguar Land Rover factory in Nitra, Slovakia</li> <li>• <b>Possible serial numbers:</b> The vehicle's serial number (Vehicle Identification Number / VIN) is usually displayed in the bottom corner of the windscreen. Are there any other photographs available with a close up of the windscreen? As can be seen from the response to question 3 below, the vehicle pictured could be any one of large number of vehicles. It may be feasible to generate list of all the VINs for Santorini Black 2020 Model Year Defender 110s and if the panel feels that this would be useful information we would endeavour to provide. However we would note that given the large number of possible vehicles, we would not be able to pinpoint the VIN for the specific vehicle.</li> </ul>

Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
2. Prevailing markets for this type / model of vehicles, in particular any information on whether the vehicle was produced for a specific market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This type of vehicle is sold into approximately 150 countries, however:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Given that it is a left-hand drive vehicle, it is unlikely (but not impossible) that it was originally supplied to a right-hand drive market.</li> <li>○ Our internal experts note that this not a North American specification vehicle, as such vehicles have side markers in the front and rear wheel arch claddings.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
3. Information concerning the supply of such models to these major markets after original manufacture, especially those in geographical proximity to DPRK [REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As noted above, we have not been able to identify which specific market this vehicle was originally supplied to and there is no way of knowing with certainty how the vehicle entered DPRK. It could have been driven over a land border or it could have been shipped in.</li> <li>• [REDACTED] Our internal experts think that is possibly a 2020 Model Year Vehicle and meaning it would likely have been manufactured and supplied to the original destination country in 2019 / 2020.</li> <li>• Below are the Global volumes of Defender 110s sold globally for the 20, 20.5 and 21 Model Years, including the subset of vehicles manufactured in Santorini Black [REDACTED]</li> </ul> <div data-bbox="521 856 1196 1457" style="background-color: black; height: 286px; width: 100%;"></div>

Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
4. Information relating to any specific customization of the vehicle, either by your company and/or any subsequent company (such as an armouring / security company). What is the function of the equipment installed, and which companies might have performed such customization?	<p>From what our experts can tell from the photographs, the vehicle does appear to have a number of accessories / modifications:</p> <p><u>Visible Accessories:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Front Protection System.</li> <li>• Chequer Plate Kit.</li> <li>• Black Gear Carrier box on the right side of the vehicle. From what we can tell from the images, this could be a genuine Land Rover accessory, but to date it has not been officially available in this colour, which suggests that it is either a counterfeit part or has been aftermarket painted (i.e. not by JLR).</li> <li>• Black Spare wheel cover – this was not available in a colour matching the body colour as a factory accessory until 23 Model Year. It could be a counterfeit or it is apparently quite common for genuine spare wheel covers to be aftermarket painted (i.e. not by JLR) to match the body colour of the vehicle.</li> <li>• Mudflaps (small).</li> <li>• Rear skid pan mounted bright scuff plate.</li> </ul> <p><u>Unavailable from factory possible aftermarket upgrades:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5095 20" Wheels – these appear to be genuine Land Rover wheels, but they are not an official option on SE vehicle specification (which is the specification of the vehicle in the photographs), suggesting that they have been changed after the vehicle left the factory.</li> <li>• Brake Callipers – In the photos, they appear to be yellow, which are not a factory available option. This may mean that they are not genuine Land Rover parts or that they are genuine parts that have been painted yellow after the vehicle left the factory.</li> <li>• Extended Black Pack skid pans.</li> </ul>

We hope that you will find the above responses satisfactory, but if you have any further queries or points that you would like further clarification on we would be pleased to try to help.

Yours sincerely



Director of Compliance, Ethics & Risk

**JAGUAR LAND ROVER**  
 ABBEY ROAD, WHITLEY, COVENTRY, CV3 4LF  
 T. 44 (0)2476 303 080  
 JAGUARLANDROVER.COM

REG. OFFICE: JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED, ABBEY ROAD, WHITLEY, COVENTRY, CV3 4LF, UK, REGISTERED IN ENGLAND NO. 1672070



**Annex 62: Reply from Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.**

STEINWAY MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, INC.

**SUBMITTED VIA EMAIL**

March 28, 2023

Attn: [REDACTED]  
 United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts  
 Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)  
 United Nations Headquarters  
 405 E 42nd Street  
 New York, New York (212-963-1055)

**Re: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.251 Letter; Response of Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.**

Dear [REDACTED]

On behalf of Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc. ("Steinway"), I write to you in response to your letter, dated July 9, 2021 (the "Letter"), regarding the possible transfer of one of Steinway's grand pianos to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK").

First and foremost, we would like to thank the Panel of Experts (the "Panel") for their ongoing commitment to uphold United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874. Steinway is committed to compliance with all applicable laws, including UN sanctions obligations. Steinway has not engaged in any activities in violation of UN or other applicable sanctions against North Korea. In preparing this response, Steinway conducted a review of its records and third-party relationships under the guidance of our outside counsel at Dechert LLP with expertise in sanctions compliance matters.

As was discussed with both of you and our outside counsel, due to miscommunications by the United Nations of which the Panel is aware, we did not become aware of the Letter until recently. Upon learning about the Letter, however, Steinway and its outside counsel reached out to the Panel to promptly address the Panel's concerns.

In the Letter, the Panel asked Steinway to confirm whether the images of a certain piano in a DPRK music video (the "Piano") showed a Steinway model and, if so, details as to how the Piano got into the DPRK. As discussed with the Panel's representatives, Steinway cannot definitively determine whether the Piano is a Steinway piano without physically inspecting the Piano and reviewing its serial number (if any). However, upon review of Steinway's records and

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 TEL 718.721.2600 • WWW.STEINWAY.COM

given the limited information available from the video regarding the Piano, it appears that the Piano might not be an authentic Steinway.

Steinway rarely manufactures red pianos and Steinway has no record of exporting pianos to the DPRK. Given the region involved, Steinway leadership determined that if the Piano were a Steinway, it would have been manufactured through Steinway's factory in Germany. Upon review of its records, Steinway's manufacturing team determined that only seven red pianos have been manufactured from 2016 to 2020 by the Steinway factory in Germany. Steinway did not identify any exports of any red pianos (or any other pianos) to the DPRK through a review of Steinway's retail sales records, wholesale sale records, or other financial records. Steinway also did not identify any warranty registrations, which are customarily issued upon initial purchase of a Steinway piano, made in the last ten years to any customers located in DPRK.

Although Steinway is unable to confirm or deny authenticity without reviewing the Piano or serial number (if any), Steinway's manufacturing department noted multiple inconsistencies in the Piano's appearance that suggest that the Piano likely is not a Steinway. Upon visual review of the Piano, Steinway's leadership noted that the Piano shows a black interior, but Steinway's red pianos have mahogany or red interiors – not black. Moreover, Steinway incorporates its logo on the fallboards of its pianos; however, based on the limited views from the music video, the Piano brandishes no such logo. For these reasons, the likelihood that the Piano is an authentic Steinway piano is low.

As set forth above, Steinway does not think the Piano came from a Steinway manufacturing factory or belongs to the Steinway brand. Steinway is happy to discuss any further queries of the Panel in an effort to expeditiously resolve the Panel's concerns.

Respectfully submitted,

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the Chief Legal Officer.

Chief Legal Officer  
Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.

cc: United States Mission to the United Nations







## Annex 63: US-ROK Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Kimsuky (1 June 2023)

# JOINT CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

**TLP:CLEAR** Product ID: CSA-20230601-1

June 1, 2023

Co-Authored by:

## North Korea Using Social Engineering to Enable Hacking of Think Tanks, Academia, and Media

### SUMMARY

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of State, and the National Security Agency (NSA), together with the Republic of Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Agency (NPA), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), are jointly issuing this advisory to highlight the use of social engineering by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK a.k.a. North Korea) state-sponsored cyber actors to enable computer network exploitation (CNE) globally against individuals employed by research centers and think tanks, academic institutions, and news media organizations. These North Korean cyber actors are known to conduct spearphishing campaigns posing as real journalists, academics, or other individuals with credible links to North Korean policy circles. The DPRK employs social engineering to collect intelligence on geopolitical events, foreign policy strategies, and diplomatic efforts affecting its interests by gaining illicit access to the private documents, research, and communications of their targets.

### BACKGROUND

North Korea's cyber program provides the regime with broad intelligence collection and espionage capabilities. The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK a.k.a. South Korea) have observed sustained information-gathering efforts originating from these North Korean cyber actors. North Korea's primary military intelligence organization, the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which has been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, is primarily responsible for this network of actors and activities.

We assess the primary goals of the DPRK regime's cyber program include maintaining consistent access to current intelligence about the United States, South Korea, and other countries of interest to impede any political, military, or economic threat to the regime's security and stability.

Currently, the U.S. and ROK Governments, and private sector cyber security companies, track a specific set of DPRK cyber actors conducting these large-scale social engineering campaigns as

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Kimsuky, Thallium, APT43, Velvet Chollima, and Black Banshee. Kimsuky is administratively subordinate to an element within North Korea's RGB and has conducted broad cyber campaigns in support of RGB objectives since at least 2012. Kimsuky actors' primary mission is to provide stolen data and valuable geopolitical insight to the North Korean regime.

Some targeted entities may discount the threat posed by these social engineering campaigns, either because they do not perceive their research and communications as sensitive in nature, or because they are not aware of how these efforts fuel the regime's broader cyber espionage efforts. However, as outlined in this advisory, North Korea relies heavily on intelligence gained by compromising policy analysts. Further, successful compromises enable Kimsuky actors to craft more credible and effective spearphishing emails that can be leveraged against more sensitive, higher-value targets. The authoring agencies believe that raising awareness of some of these campaigns and employing basic cyber security practices may frustrate the effectiveness of Kimsuky spearphishing operations. This advisory provides detailed information on how Kimsuky actors operate; red flags to consider as you encounter common themes and campaigns; and general mitigation measures for entities worldwide to implement to better protect against Kimsuky's CNE operations.

**If you believe you have been targeted in one of these spearphishing campaigns, whether or not it resulted in a compromise (particularly if you are a member of one of the targeted sectors), please file a report with [www.ic3.gov](https://www.ic3.gov) and reference #KimsukyCSA in the incident description.**

**Please include as much detail as you can about the incident including the sender email address and the text of the email message, specifying any links/URLs/domains. Please specify whether you responded to the email, clicked on any links, or opened any attachments. Please retain the original email and attachments in case you are contacted by an investigator for further information.**

- Please visit [www.ic3.gov](https://www.ic3.gov) and use #KimsukyCSA in your submission.
- The U.S. Government also encourages victims to report suspicious activities, including any suspected DPRK cyber activities, to local FBI field offices.
- For the ROK government, you can report suspicious activities to the National Intelligence Service ([www.nis.go.kr](https://www.nis.go.kr), 111), the National Police Agency ([ecrm.police.go.kr](https://ecrm.police.go.kr), 182), or the Korea Internet & Security Agency ([boho.or.kr](https://boho.or.kr), 118)

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## KIMSUKY OPERATIONS: SOCIAL ENGINEERING

In a cybersecurity context, social engineering is a broad term referring to the use of deception to exploit human error and manipulate a target into unwittingly exposing confidential or sensitive information for fraudulent purposes. DPRK cyber actors employ social engineering techniques to enable much of Pyongyang's malicious CNE. Among social engineering techniques, Kimsuky actors use spearphishing—or the use of fabricated emails and digital communications tailored to deceive a target—as one of their primary vectors for initiating a compromise and gaining access into a target's devices and networks. For over a decade, Kimsuky actors have continued to refine their social engineering techniques and made their spearphishing efforts increasingly difficult to discern.

A Kimsuky spearphishing campaign begins with broad research and preparation. DPRK cyber actors often use open-source information to identify potential targets of value and then tailor their online personas to appear more realistic and appealing to their victims.

The Kimsuky actors will create email addresses that resemble email addresses of real individuals they seek to impersonate and generate domains that host the malicious content of a spearphishing message. DPRK actors often use domains that resemble common internet services and media sites to deceive a target.

Castle

전자메일 - 구체적인 전자메일을 생성합니다.  
Input Settings - Set specific input  
주의: 전자 메일 생성 시 오류를 방지하기 위해 입력 설정을 확인하십시오.  
Caution: Check input settings for errors.

보내는 사람  
이름  
Sender Name

보내는 사람  
주소  
Sender Address

받는 사람  
주소  
Recipient Address

제목  
Subject

날짜 및 시간  
Date and Time

목적 링크  
Destination Link

생성자  
Creator Name

확인

Sample of a program for generating DPRK spearphishing emails.

- For example, Kimsuky actors are known to impersonate well-known news outlets and journalists using a domain such as "@XYZkoreas.news" spoofing a real news station while actual emails from the news service appear as "@XYZnews.com."
- DPRK cyber actors commonly take on the identities of real people to gain trust and establish rapport in their digital communications. Kimsuky actors may have previously compromised the email accounts of the person whom they are impersonating. This allows the actors to search for targets while scanning through compromised emails, with a particular focus on work-related files and personal information pertaining to retirees, social clubs, and contact lists. They craft convincing spearphishing emails by repurposing the person's email signature, contact list, and past email exchanges. DPRK cyber actors are also known to compromise

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email accounts belonging to foreign policy experts and subsequently create a secondary email account, using the email account and identity of the expert to communicate with other significant targets.

- In other cases, a Kimsuky actor will use multiple personas to engage a target; one persona to conduct initial outreach and a second persona to follow-up on the first engagement to distract a potential victim from discerning the identity of the original persona. Another tactic is to "resend" or "forward" an email from a source trusted by a target.
- The initial phishing email occasionally contains a malicious link or document, often purporting to be a report or news article. These attached malicious documents are frequently password-protected, which helps them evade detection by antivirus software and other security measures. However, more often, the initial spearphishing email does not contain any malicious links or attachments and is instead intended to gain the trust of the victim.
- Once DPRK cyber actors establish engagement with a target, the actors attempt to compromise the account, device, or network belonging to the target by pushing malicious content in the form of a malicious macro embedded within a text document. This document is either attached directly to the email, or stored in a file hosting service, such as Google Drive or Microsoft OneDrive. These malicious macros, when enabled, quietly establish connections with Kimsuky command and control infrastructure, and result in the provision of access to the target's device.
- In some cases, Kimsuky actors have developed "spoofed" or fake but realistic versions of actual websites, portals, or mobile applications, and directed targets to input credentials and other information that are harvested by the DPRK. Compromise of a target account can lead to persistent access to a victim's communications, often through a malware used by Kimsuky actors called [BabyShark](#). Kimsuky actors have also been known to configure a victim's email account to quietly auto-forward all emails to another actor-controlled email.

Notably, victim responses to spearphishing lures also provide Pyongyang with the added benefit of insight into foreign policy circles. This covert collection against the community of DPRK watchers is probably of high value to the Kim regime and provides another channel of information on top of what it gains through computer network operations.

Although all DPRK advanced persistent threat groups employ social engineering techniques, the campaigns and themes described in this advisory are specific to Kimsuky.

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**RED FLAG INDICATORS**

Sector targets should be aware of the following activity that may be indications or behaviors of malicious DPRK cyber actors.

- Initial communications are often seemingly innocuous with no malicious links/attachments; follow-on communications usually contain malicious links/documents to facilitate exploitation of a computer or network.
- Email content may include real text of messages recovered from previous victim engagement with other legitimate contacts.
- Emails in English may sometimes have awkward sentence structure and/or incorrect grammar.
- Email content may contain a distinct Korean dialect exclusively used in North Korea.
- Victims/targets with both direct and indirect knowledge of policy information i.e., U.S. and ROK government employees/officials working on North Korea, Asia, China, Southeast Asia matters; U.S. and ROK government employees with high clearance levels; and members of the military, are approached with common themes and questions as referenced in this advisory.
- Email domains look like a legitimate news media site, but do not match the domain of the company's official website. The domains also may be identified as such in open-source malware repositories like Virus Total.
- Spoofed email accounts have subtle incorrect misspellings of the names and email addresses of the legitimate ones listed in a university directory or an official website.
- Malicious documents require the user to click "Enable Macros" to view the document.
- Actors are persistent if the target does not respond to the initial spearphishing email. They will likely send a follow-up email within 2-3 days of initial contact.
- Emails purporting to be from official sources but sent using unofficial email services.

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**CAMPAIGNS AND THEMES**

Kimsuky cyber actors craft their spearphishing campaigns around themes characterizing the target, message content, and the malicious mechanism, or lure, through which a compromise is initiated. The main themes to beware of are impersonations and targeting of **journalists, academic scholars, and think tank researchers** to:

- solicit responses to foreign policy-related inquiries,
- conduct a survey,
- request an interview,
- review a document,
- request a resume, or
- offer payment for authoring a research paper.

Kimsuky actors tailor their themes to their target's interests and will update their content to reflect current events discussed among the community of North Korea watchers.

The following are examples of real Kimsuky spearphishing attempts that illustrate variations of the common themes. In some instances, the cyber actor poses as a journalist and targets a think tank researcher, while at other times, the DPRK actor may take on the persona of an academic scholar to target other scholars—virtually every combination of these themes and lures has been previously observed.

**1. Impersonation of journalists**

Kimsuky actors often spoof real journalists and broadcast writers to craft a credible front and make inquiries to prominent individuals working North Korea matters. Usually, the questions will revolve around current events and whether U.S. experts believe North Korea will re-join talks with the U.S., whether they believe North Korea will resume testing its missiles, and how they see China responding. In many instances, Kimsuky actors do not attach malware to their initial email. Instead, they first send an introductory email to inquire about interview opportunities.

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**Sample email communication 1:****Title: <name of legitimate Korean journal program>**

Greetings,

My name is <name of writer>, and I am a writer for <name of legitimate Korean journal program>.

I am writing to you today because I am currently preparing for a program related to North Korean issues. Professor <name of professor> of <actual Korean university>, whom I contacted earlier, recommended you as an expert on this issue. I would be grateful if you could spare some time to answer a few questions.

Thank you for considering my request. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Best regards,

**Follow-on email:** If the targets agree to the interview, the actors will then follow up with a second email containing malicious content.

**Title: RE: RE: <name of legitimate Korean journal program>**

Dear &lt;name of expert&gt;,

As promised, I am sending you a questionnaire. It would be greatly appreciated if you could answer each question in 4-5 sentences. Thank you for your cooperation.

Best regards,

@ attached file: [<name of legitimate Korean journal program>] questionnaire.docx

Additionally, we have seen Kimsuky actors spoof legitimate journalists to specifically target think tank employees. Kimsuky actors commonly pose questions in their spearphishing emails about current events, such as issues regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine; U.S.-DPRK relations; DPRK nuclear and security topics; policymaker stances on the Asian region; and thoughts on current China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea relations.

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**Sample email communication 2:**

Greetings,

I hope you've been well! This is <name of real journalist> with <legitimate U.S. news organization>.

North Korea Fires Powerful Missile on 4 Oct using Old Playbook in a New Worlds. The last time Pyongyang launched a weapon over Japan was in 2017, when Donald J. Trump was president and Kim Jong-un seemed intent on escalating conflict with Washington.

I have some questions regarding this:

- 1) Would Pyongyang conduct its next nuclear test soon after [REDACTED] in mid-October?
- 2) May a quieter approach to North Korean aggression be warranted?
- 3) Would Japan increase the defense budget and a more proactive defense policy?

I would be very grateful if you could send me your answers within 5 days.

Have a good weekend.

Sincerely,

<name of legitimate journalist>

## 2. Impersonation of academic scholars

Kimsuky actors impersonate South Korean academic scholars to send spearphishing emails to researchers at think tanks. In these emails, the targets are asked to participate in a survey, such as on North Korean nuclear issues and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula or requesting an email interview.

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**Sample email communication 3:**

Title: <name of legitimate Korean think tank institute> Request for survey

Hello,

I am <name of an academic scholar> from <name of legitimate Korean think tank>.

I am reaching out to ask if you would be willing to participate in a survey on North Korea's nuclear development titled, "A survey on the perception on experts on the advancement of North Korean nuclear weapons and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". Our goal is to find ways to resolve North Korean nuclear issues and achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Rest assured that all answers will be kept confidential and used solely for research purpose. As a token of appreciation, we would like to offer 300,000 won to those who participate in the survey. If you're interested in participating, please reply to this message, and we will send you the survey questionnaire. Looking forward to hearing from you soon.

Best regards,

**Follow-on email:** Once targets respond to inquiries, Kimsuky actors send them a survey questionnaire and a document form for payment, which contains malicious content.

Title: RE: RE: <name of legitimate Korean think tank institute> Request for survey

Thank you for your response.

We will send you a document form for payment, which includes a personal information usage agreement. If possible, please fill out your affiliation, name, ID number, bank account, and signature, and attach copies of your bankbook and ID card.

Best regards,

P.S. The attached document is password-protected, and I will send you the password in a 'password.txt file'

@ attached file: PersonalInformationUsageAgreement

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**Sample email communication 4:**

Below is an example of Kimsuky actors pursuing responses to questions on sector targets by posing as a university professor and research student. Once an initial response is received, actors will request an email interview with a list of questions and request that targets access documents via a malicious link to a cloud-hosted service.

**To: <name of foreign affairs expert>****Subject: Re: Request for an interview**

Dear <name of foreign affairs expert>, Sorry for my late response because of the Profs busy time and thanks so much for replying me your kind answers. I did confer with <legitimate U.S. University Professor >about it and modified a bit. Please find the link below and let me know if you have the different opinions.

**https: <malicious drive link>****PWD: <redacted>****Best, <fictitious university student>****To: <foreign affairs expert>****Cc: <scholar>**

Dear <foreign affairs expert>, Thanks so much for your fast feedback. I did confer with <legitimate U.S. university professor> again and complete it as your request. Please find the updated below. https: <malicious drive link>

**PWD: <redacted>**

We're planning to upload it on our website within a week after final review. Please feel free to contact with me if you have any questions.

**Best, <fictitious university student>****3. Impersonation of think tank researchers**

Kimsuky actors impersonate researchers from legitimate South Korean think tanks to send spearphishing emails to political and North Korean experts. They initiate communication by sending genuine emails to establish rapport and seek opinions on various topics, such as "North Korea's foreign policy and our response."

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**Sample email communication 5:**

Title: [Request for opinion] I'm <name of legitimate Korean think tank> <name of deputy director>

Greetings,

I am <name of legitimate Korean think tank>, deputy director of the <name of deputy director>.

I am reaching out to you to discuss an article I am currently working on.

The topic, "North Korea's foreign policy and South Korea's response" is somewhat distant from my expertise, so I would greatly appreciate hearing the opinions of experts like you.

I would kindly request your comments on my writing, as I believe you are the most appropriate person to provide valuable insights on the subject. Your earlier article caught my attention, and I found myself nodding in agreement with each sentence. That is why I feel confident in asking for your opinion.

I am eagerly awaiting your reply and appreciate your willingness to assist me. Thank you for your time and consideration.

**Follow-on email:** After receiving replies from their targets, the Kimsuky actors exchange multiple emails, which may include attachments containing malicious links or files and instructions on how to open the attached files. Even after stealing the account information of their victims and infecting their devices with malware, they sometimes continue to send "thank you" emails to their targets.

Title: RE: RE: [Request for opinion] I'm <name of legitimate Korean think tank> <name of deputy director> <attached large size file>

Thank you for agreeing to provide your opinion. Please find the attached files.

We greatly appreciate your input. To ensure security in the face of increasing hacking activity, we have set a password (<password string>) for the attached file.

We look forward to hearing your valuable feedback.

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## Sample email communication 6:

Below is an example of Kimsuky actors spoofing a think tank employee and utilizing a spoofed think tank domain in order to target another think tank employee. Once the target responds with input, the Kimsuky actor sends a follow-on email with a malicious attachment.

Dear <think tank employee>,

Hope you are doing well. On behalf of <another think tank>, it is my pleasure to invite you to write a 1,200-word piece on the recent NK's provocation.

North Korea's latest missile launches, including the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan on October 4 and two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on October 6, provide a stark reminder of the numerous missile programs it is pursuing.

Subject is as follows:

- 1) Would Pyongyang conduct its next nuclear test soon after [REDACTED] in mid-October?
- 2) May a quieter approach to North Korean aggression be warranted?
- 3) Would Japan increase the defense budget and a more proactive defense policy?

You can send me this email by Oct 21. You can make your own title for your article. We can provide you with a small honorarium of around USD 480.00.

I would really appreciate it if you can contribute.

Best,

<Redacted>

Senior Fellow, <think tank>

Director, <think tank>

**Follow-on email:** The Kimsuky actor then sent a second communication with malicious content.

Dear <think tank employee>,

Sorry for my late response.

As promised, I'm writing to send our result of the review. Please find the attached and let me know if any problems.

PW: <redacted>

Best,

<Redacted>

Senior Fellow, <think tank>

Director, <think tank>

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### 4. Impersonation of government officials, law enforcement, web administrators

Below is an example of how Kimsuky actors approach their targets by impersonating individuals responsible for North Korean policies in government agencies, such as the South Korean National Assembly or the presidential office. These impersonated individuals may have already had their accounts compromised through a previous attack. Kimsuky actors may mention specific information about the target's position or schedule, which they obtained from the target's email exchanges or address book.

#### Sample email communication 7:

Title: Office of <member of the National Assembly>/Seminar "Proposal for the Unification Policies of the Yoon Government"

Hello, this is <name of secretary> from the office of <member of the National Assembly>.

Let me express our gratitude for your attendance and participation at the seminar we hosted yesterday. Your presence and insights contributed greatly to the success of the event.

If it's not too much trouble, could you kindly provide us with a brief summary of the remarks you made during the seminar? We would like to keep it as an internal reference material.

Additionally, we would greatly appreciate it if you could fill out the attached form and send it back to us. This will serve as an evidence document for the speaking fee payment procedure.

Password: <redacted>

Thank you again for your participation and we hope to see you at future events. Have a great weekend.

Kimsuky actors may also impersonate investigative agencies or law enforcement officials to deceive a target into believing that their email account has been involved in an illegal incident. They use the authority of investigative agencies to approach the target, implying that their account may have been stolen and that they could be involved in a criminal or national security-related incident.

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**Sample email communication 8:**

Title: <legitimate Investigator> of <legitimate investigation agency>.

I am <legitimate Investigator> of <legitimate investigation agency>.

I'm writing to inform you that someone has published content on YouTube using your email account that violates the National Security Law.

Link: <https://HYPERLINK> "https://%3cyoutube/"<HYPERLINK  
"https://%3cyoutube/"YouTube video link>. The video was posted on <Date: 0000. 0. 00.>  
by <target>

We also suspect that the same user has posted content that slanders North Korean defectors. We need your cooperation to identify the real publisher of these posts.

1. Provide us with your computer media access control address (MAC address) and Ethernet hardware address, as they are needed to track any illegal access to your email account.
2. If you cannot locate these addresses in your computer system, please run the program below and send us the resulting document: <check tool.zip>
- 3) Please respond to this email within 24 hours and delete it immediately after sending your reply.

Thanks you for your cooperation

Additionally, Kimsuky actors impersonate operators or administrators of popular web portals and claim that a victim's account has been locked following suspicious activity or fraudulent use. Victims are advised to protect their personal information and unlock their account by clicking a link attached to the email and changing their password. The link leads to a phishing site that mimics a legitimate web portal login page where victims are directed to input personal information, including their usernames and passwords, for harvesting by DPRK cyber actors.

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**Sample email communication 9:**

Title: Your Password for <legitimate portal site> Account Has Been Compromised

We regret to inform you that we have detected an attempt to log into your account (<email address>) from an unauthorized application. The incident occurred on <date> at <time> (Korea Standard Time), and the IP address used was <IP address> located in Washington, the U.S.

In order to prevent any further unauthorized access to your account, we recommend that you change your password immediately. You can do this by clicking on the following link: <link to change password - legitimate>

Please note that if you fail to change your password, we may have to permanently delete or close your account in accordance with our security policy.

**POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES**

For email recipients:

- Implement basic cyber hygiene to include robust passwords, multifactor authentication, and installation of antivirus tools. See [NSA's Best Practices for Securing Your Home Network](#) or [NIS's guidance for email security](#) for more details.
- Do not enable macros on documents received via email, unless the source is verified.
- Do not open documents from cloud hosting services when shared via email, unless the source is verified.
- Closely scrutinize identities and associated social media or credentials for fraud. Be especially cautious of:
  - Official messages coming from unofficial or personal email accounts using commercial providers.
  - Domain/subdomain variations, as DPRK cyber actors have been known to register spoofed domains (e.g., johndoe@abccompany.live vs. johndoe@abccompany.com).
- If you were previously in communication with the individual, use the known legitimate contact information instead of the new, potentially malicious email or account.
- When in doubt, consult the organization's official website for correct contact information.
- If you are still not sure, verify identities via phone or video call before engaging further. DPRK cyber actors are not known to engage outside of the virtual environment and will avoid voice/video communications.

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- If you cannot verify the source of an email inquiry, consider the risks before responding.
- Consider navigating to websites using a search engine's non-sponsored results instead of clicking on URLs provided in the email(s).
- Be cautious of a request to move communications to a separate messaging platform.
- If sending documents, only send to verified email addresses.

**For potential recipients' systems administrators:**

- Implement a user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
- Require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- Regularly use port checking capabilities to determine if your network is being accessed remotely via desktop sharing software or a VPN or VPS, particularly if usage of remote desktop sharing software or VPN services to access accounts is not standard practice.
- If you allow the use of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky remote services, secure and monitor them closely.
  - Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require phishing-resistant MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
  - Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols not in use for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol port 3389).
  - Restrict the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.

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- Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.
  - Implement application control policies that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs.
- Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
- Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](#). Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
- Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.
- Consider requiring administrator credentials to install software.
- Add an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations indicating that they are higher risk messages.
- Consider adding rules to block emails that match the sample emails provided in this advisory. Ensuring that you know how to scan for malicious undelivered email messages on email servers is a critical step for preparing to understand the scope of this type of targeting once malicious email identifiers are discovered.
- Enabling DMARC and DKIM on email domains generally makes certain forms of email spoofing more difficult, though it may not directly mitigate the tactics described above.

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**DPRK Rewards for Justice**

The U.S. and ROK Governments encourage victims to report suspicious activities, including those related to suspected DPRK cyber activities, to relevant authorities. If you provide information about illicit DPRK activities in cyberspace, including past or ongoing operations, you may be eligible for a reward. If you have information about illicit DPRK activities in cyberspace, including past or ongoing operations, providing such information through the Department of State's Rewards for Justice program could make you eligible to receive an award of up to \$5 million. For further details, please visit <https://rewardsforjustice.net/>.

**Disclaimer**

The information in this report is being provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or service by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the co-authors.

**TLP: CLEAR**



# JOINT CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

TLP: CLEAR

FBI | DOS | NSA | NIS | NPA | MOFA

## APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL SPEARPHISHING SAMPLES

### Sample email communication 10:

"This is <name of legitimate journalist> from <legitimate non-U.S. news organization>

I'm writing to know your thoughts on North Korea's future direction after the Beijing Winter Olympics are over. Many believe a recent absence of North Korean provocations is due to Pyongyang's decision not to hurt Olympic vibes held in its lone major ally, but with the Games in the books, speculation is growing that North Korea is likely to pick up where it left off in January, or a series of missile tests.

-Do you believe North Korea will resume testing its missile launches? If so, when is the best time for it and what kind of missiles it will opt?

-China is scheduled to hold the National People's Congress, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference from March 4 to 13 and do you think the schedule will further defer North Korea's possible missile testing?

-North Korea has indicated that it will lift its moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, but do you think there is the possibility that Pyongyang will offer to talk with the U.S., putting the moratorium on the line? If so, what would be the U.S. response? I'd be very grateful if you could send me your answers within this week

### Sample email communication 11:

Title: Documents for the Policy Advisory Committee.

Hello, <member of the committee>,

I am <name of government employee> from <government department>.

I am writing to inform you that I have attached the filed related to the recent visit of Special Representative Biegun to this email.

As this email contains sensitive information, please treat it as confidential.

<file name.pdf>

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CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY****TLP:CLEAR**

FBI | DOS | NSA | NS | NPA | MOFA

**Sample email communication 12:**

Dear <university professor>:

I hope you are safe and well.

This is <legitimate journalist> from <legitimate non-U.S. news organization>. I am sending e-mail to you because I would like to hear your opinions about how Russia's invasion of Ukraine will affect the situation surrounding North Korea. Would you like to give me your opinions about the questions below?

- 1) Some analysts argue that Russia's invasion of Ukraine may make North Korea much more reluctant to give up nuclear weapons, given that Ukraine has been eventually invaded by Russia after it abandoned its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. This certainly looks similar to an agreement made between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore in 2018. What do you think about this kind of argument?
- 2) While the Biden administration is concentrated on the evolving circumstances surrounding Ukraine, possibly lowering its guard in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea Launches New ICBM and may try to carry out nuclear tests. What do you think about North Korea's future developments?
- 3) Do you think North Korea believes that Biden is already a "lame duck" and sees this as a good chance to concentrate on developing new weapons?
- 4) Do you expect China will tolerate North Korea's spate of ballistic missile launches and possible nuclear tests? Do you think North Korea can or will maintain stable and amicable relations with China? Does Russia not afford to care about North Korea?

I would be very grateful if you could send me your answers within 5 days. Thanks for your consideration and time in advance.

best regards.

<legitimate journalist>

**TLP:CLEAR**

**JOINT  
CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY****TLP:CLEAR**

FBI | DOS | NSA | NIS | NPA | MOFA

**Sample email communication 13:**

Title: Your email account has been suspended

We are writing to inform you that your email account has been suspended because emails you sent appear to have violated relevant laws and in some cases you may be held legally liable. If you did not send any spam mails from your <portal site> mail account, it is possible that your account may have been compromised and used by someone else for spamming. We recommend checking your email settings to ensure that your POP/IMAP options have not 'Enabled' others to use your account.

If you are still unable to identify any problems with your email settings, it is possible that your account has been hacked and your personal information was stolen. To regain access to your email account, please follow the steps provided by our investigation department by clicking the button below.

<Button linking to phishing website disguised as a normal portal login page>

**Sample email communication 14:**

Title: Notification regarding your fraudulent account registration

This is the <legitimate portal site> operation team, and we regret to inform you that your ID <redacted> has been registered as a fraudulent account. To prevent any further harm, we recommend that you take immediate action.

We kindly request you to verify your identity as soon as possible to ensure the safety and security of your account. You can do this by visiting the member information page and checking the registered name. We also advise you to change your password to keep your account protected. Please be aware that the fraudulent account registration occurred on 00:00, 00/00/0000.

To unlock your account, please follow the link provided below:

<unlock your account: malicious link>

Thank you for choosing <legitimate portal site> as your trusted platform. We are committed to providing you with the best possible service and support.

**TLP:CLEAR**

Source: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-and-rok-agencies-cybersecurity-alert-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-dprk-social-engineering-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-academia-and-news-media/> and [https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m\\_25605/view.do?seq=5&page=1](https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_25605/view.do?seq=5&page=1)

**Annex 64: Links to Ahnlab Security Emergency Response Center (ASEC) reports in 2023 (as of July 2023)**

**Kimsuky Group**

[Kimsuky Distributing CHM Malware Under Various Subjects](#)

(21 June 2023)

[Kimsuky Group Using Meterpreter to Attack Web Servers](#)

(22 May 2023)

[Kimsuky Group's Phishing Attacks Targeting North Korea-Related Personnel](#)

(22 May 2023)

[Kimsuky Group Uses ADS to Conceal Malware](#)

(29 March 2023)

[Kimsuky Group Distributes Malware Disguised as Profile Template \(GitHub\)](#)

(29 March 2023)

[OneNote Malware Disguised as Compensation Form \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(24 March 2023)

[CHM Malware Disguised as North Korea-related Questionnaire \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(13 March 2023)

[Malware Disguised as Normal Documents \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(15 February 2023)

**Lazarus Group**

[Lazarus Group Targeting Windows IIS Web Servers](#)

(23 May 2023)

[Anti-Forensic Techniques Used By Lazarus Group](#)

(23 February 2023)

*Source: ASEC*

## Annex 65: Additional cases related to Kimsuky

### Case 1

In a June 2023, a cybersecurity firm reported<sup>245</sup> a Kimsuky social engineering campaign, targeting experts in DPRK affairs, to steal subscription credentials from Google and NK News, a DPRK- focused news and analysis service. via fake login websites and to gather strategic intelligence. Kimsuky employed sophisticated tactics, including extensive email correspondence, and spoofed URLs and deployed ‘ReconShark’ in the process.

### Case 2

A cybersecurity firm reported<sup>246</sup> in May 2023 that Kimsuky was deploying a variant of the ‘RandomQuery’ malware via phishing emails sent to DPRK-focused information services, human rights activists, and defector support organizations. The main purpose was to entice victims into downloading and accessing the attached CHM file. When executed, the file eventually downloaded a second-stage payload ‘RandomQuery’ from the Kimsuky-controlled C2 server to the victim’s system. The malware not only collected system data but also installed applications, files and directories which would be used to provide Kimsuky with more information. The data were eventually exfiltrated via the C2 server.

### Case 3

On 10 May 2023, the National Police Agency (NPA) of the Republic of Korea announced the results of its investigations into a breach of a network of one of the country's largest hospitals, Seoul National University Hospital, by DPRK cyberthreat actors.

The incident, which occurred between May and June 2021, resulted in data exposure for 831,000 individuals, most of whom were patients. 17,000 of the impacted people were current and former hospital employees.

The NPA conducted an analytical investigation lasting two years to identify the perpetrators.

Analysis of the breach revealed that the attack was attributed to DPRK hackers based on the following information:

- the intrusion techniques observed in the attacks,
- the IP addresses that have been independently linked to DPRK threat actors,
- the website registration details,
- the use of specific vocabulary only used in the DPRK.

The NPA cautioned that DPRK hackers might try to infiltrate information and communication networks across various industries and emphasized the need for enhanced security measures and procedures, such as implementing security patches, managing system access, and encrypting sensitive data.


<sup>245</sup> See <https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-new-social-engineering-campaign-aims-to-steal-credentials-and-gather-strategic-intelligence/>

<sup>246</sup> See <https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-ongoing-campaign-using-tailored-reconnaissance-toolkit/>



The NPA did not mention the specific DPRK cyberthreat actor group, but ROK local media linked the attack to Kimsuky.

Below is NPA's press release of 10 May 2023.


경찰청

보도자료

다시 대한민국!  
새로운 국민의 나라

보도시점 2023. 5. 11.(목) 조간, 누리망 방송 2023. 5. 10.(수) 12:00

## 서울대병원 해킹 및 개인정보 유출사건 (2021년), 북한 소행

- 약 83만 명의 환자·직원 개인정보 유출 정황 확인

경찰청 국가수사본부(사이버수사국)는 지난 2021년에 발생한 서울대학교병원 개인정보 유출사건을 수사한 결과, 북한 해킹조직의 소행이라고 밝혔다.

2021년 5월경부터 6월경까지 국내·외에 소재한 서버 7대를 장악하여 공격 기반을 마련하였으며, 서울대학교병원 서버의 취약점으로 내부망에 침입하여 환자 81만여 명, 전·현직 직원 1만 7천여 명 등 약 83만 명의 개인정보를 유출하거나 유출한 정황이 확인되었다.


경찰청은 그간 북한 해킹조직에 의한 주요 정보통신망 침입 사건을 여러 차례 수사한 사례가 있으며, 기존 북한발로 규명된 다수 사건과 비교하여, △ 공격 근원지의 아이피(IP) 주소 △ 인터넷 사이트 가입정보 △ 아이피(IP) 주소 세탁 기법 △ 시스템 침입·관리 수법 등이 같고, △ 북한어휘를 사용하는 점 등을 근거로 북한 해킹조직의 소행으로 판단하였다.

경찰청은 피해기관에 침입 및 정보 유출 수법과 재발 방지를 위한 보안 권고 사항을 설명하였고, 관계기관에 북한 해킹조직의 침입 수법·해킹 도구 등 관련 정보를 제공하여 정보보호 정책 수립에 활용하도록 하였다.

경찰청은 의료 분야 외 다른 분야에도 주요 정보통신망에 대한 침입 시도를 지속 해서 할 것으로 예상하므로 최신 보안 업데이트 적용, 불법적인 접속 시도에 대한 접근통제, 개인정보를 포함한 중요 전산 자료 암호화 등 보안 시스템과 보안 정책 강화를 당부하였다.

경찰청은 "국가 배후의 조직적 사이버 공격에 대해 치안 역량을 총동원하여 적극적으로 대응함과 동시에, 관계기관 정보공유 및 협업을 통해 추가적인 피해를 방지함으로써 대한민국의 사이버 안보를 굳건히 지키기 위해 노력할 계획이다."라고 밝혔다.

붙임: 사건 개요도(별도 첨부)



Source: <https://www.police.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=d6c2795c-3930-44ab-970d-d2d7a14f9571.hwp&rs=/viewer/202305>

## Annex 66: NPA Press Release on Lazarus hack exploiting finance-related software (18 April 2023)



경찰청

보도자료

다시 생각하는  
이제는 국민의 안전

보도시점 2023. 4. 19.(수) 조간 누리왕·방송 2023. 4. 18.(화) 12:00

보안인증프로그램 취약점 악용 해킹 사건,  
북(北) '라자루스' 소행으로 확인

- 대규모 피해가 우려되는 북(北)의 사이버공격 시도 선제적 확인·차단
- 보안프로그램 취약점 및 언론사 사이트 해킹을 통한 '위터링홀' 공격 기법 확인
- 추가 피해 예방을 위해 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트 중요

경찰청 국가수사본부(안보수사국)에서는 지난해 11월부터 금융보안인증 소프트웨어 취약점 악용 공격 사건을 수사한 결과, 이번 사건이 북한 경찰 총국이 배후인 것으로 알려진 일명 '라자루스\*' 해킹조직의 소행인 것으로 확인하였다.

\* '라자루스': '14년 미국 소니픽처스 해킹 사건, '16년 방글라데시 중앙은행 해킹사건, '17년 워너크라이 랜섬웨어 사건 등에 연루된 것으로 알려진 북(北) 해킹조직으로, 정부 는 사이버 분야 대북 독자 제재 대상으로 '라자루스' 해킹조직을 지정('23. 2. 10.)

이번 사건은 북한이 인터넷뱅킹 등 전자금융서비스 이용에 필수적으로 설치되는 소프트웨어의 취약점을 악용하고, 국민 대다수가 접속하는 언론사 사이트를 악성코드 유포 매개체로 활용하여 피해가 대규모로 확산될 위험성이 있었던 해킹 사건으로 밝혀졌다.

이와 관련하여, 지난 3월 30일 정부 관계기관은 국민들에게 관련 보안 취약점을 공개하고 신속한 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트를 당부하는 한편, 발견된 악성코드를 백신 프로그램에 반영하고 피해업체에 대한 보안 조치를 완료하는 등 추가적인 피해를 방지한 바 있다.

수사 결과, 북한은 지난 2021년 4월 국내 유명 금융보안인증 업체를 해킹 하여 소프트웨어의 취약점을 찾아내고, 공격에 활용할 웹 서버와 명령·제어 경유지 등 공격 기반시설을 장기간 치밀하게 준비한 것으로 확인되었다.

DPRK [the Lazarus Group] exploited vulnerabilities in a software essential for electronic financial services, including internet banking, utilizing a news media website widely accessed by the public as a means to distribute malicious code. This hacking incident could have led to large scale damages and losses.

Investigations revealed that the DPRK [the Lazarus Group] hacked a local financial security authentication company in April 2021 to identify the software's vulnerabilities, and for an extensive period of time meticulously prepared infrastructure, including web servers, to launch an attack.

경찰청은 취약 버전의 금융보안인증 소프트웨어가 설치된 컴퓨터가 특정 언론사 사이트에 접속할 경우 자동으로 악성코드가 설치되는 워터링홀\* 수법을 통해 국내 61개 기관이 해킹된 것으로 확인하였다. 국내 1,000만 대 이상의 컴퓨터에 설치된 금융보안인증 프로그램의 취약점을 활용해 대규모 사이버 공격을 준비했을 가능성도 배제할 수 없지만, 관계기관 합동대응을 통해 이를 사전에 확인·차단한 사례라고 밝혔다.

\* Watering hole: 방문 가능성이 높거나 많이 사용하는 사이트를 감염시킨 후 피해자가 해당 사이트에 접속시 컴퓨터에 악성코드를 추가로 설치하는 공격 방식

경찰청은 국정원·한국인터넷진흥원 등 관계기관 합동분석 결과, △공격 기반시설 구축 방법 △‘워터링홀’ 및 소프트웨어 취약점을 악용한 공격 방식 △악성코드 유사성 등을 토대로, 이번 사건을 북한 해킹조직 일명 ‘라자루스’의 소행으로 판단하였다.

경찰청은 북한의 해킹 수법이 날로 고도화되고 있는 만큼, 추가적인 피해 예방을 위해 보안인증 프로그램을 최신 버전으로 업데이트해 줄 것을 다시 한번 강조하였다.

※ 4. 14. 현재, 취약점 악용된 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트 약 80% 수준


경찰청은 “이번 사건에서 확인된 해외 공격·피해지에 대한 국제 공조수사를 진행하는 한편, 추가 피해 사례 및 유사 해킹 시도 가능성에 대한 수사를 계속 이어 나갈 계획이다.”라고 밝혔다.

붙임 1. 사건 개요도

2. 금융보안인증 소프트웨어 취약 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법

The NPA confirmed a watering hole attack, which automatically installs malicious codes, was used to hack 61 domestic institutions by means of computers with vulnerable versions of financial security authentication software accessing a specific news media website. With the financial security authentication software installed on over 10 million computers nation-wide, preparations for a large scale cyberattack could not be ruled out. However, through joint interagency efforts, additional cyberattack was prevented.

With relevant agencies such as National Intelligence Service and the Korea Internet Security Agency, the NPA analysed that the Lazarus Group was behind the attack based on the methods used to establish an attack infrastructure, the tactics used during the process (watering hole attack and use of software vulnerabilities), and malicious code similarities.

**붙임1**    **사건 개요도**




**붙임2****금융보안인증 S/W 취약 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법**☐ **S/W 취약 · 해결 버전 구분**

- (취약 버전) 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.40' 이하
- (해결 버전) 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.41'

☐ **S/W 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법**

- ① (버전 확인) 사용 중인 PC에서 검색 기능을 통해 [제어판] 검색 후  
클릭 → [프로그램] → [프로그램 및 기능]을 순서대로 클릭,  
'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3' 버전 확인

**프로그램 제거 또는 변경**

프로그램을 제거하려면 목록에서 선택한 후 [제거], [변경] 또는 [복구]를 클릭하십시오.

구성 • 제거/변경

이름	게시자	설치 날짜	크기	버전
INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3	Initech, Inc.	2023-03-23		3.3.2.
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.8.1 SDK	Microsoft Corporation	2023-01-03	20.2MB	4.8.09032
Microsoft .NET Framework 4.8.1 Targeting Pack	Microsoft Corporation	2023-01-03	42.2MB	4.8.09032

- ② (취약 버전 삭제) 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.40' 이하의  
취약한 버전으로 확인될 경우 [제거] 클릭하여 삭제
- ③ (해결 버전 설치) 이용 중인 금융사이트 등에 접속하거나 개발사  
홈페이지에 직접 접속하여 취약점이 해결된 버전(3.3.2.41) 재설치  
※ [http://demo.initech.com/initech/crosswebex\\_pack/3.3.2.41/INIS\\_EX\\_SHA2\\_3.3.2.41.exe](http://demo.initech.com/initech/crosswebex_pack/3.3.2.41/INIS_EX_SHA2_3.3.2.41.exe)  
－ 서비스 운영자의 경우, 개발사를 통해 해결 버전으로 교체

Source: <https://www.police.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=c45a5bc8-fd59-4c27-b4d8-1ce898fb2d19.pdf&rs=/viewer/202307>

## **Annex 67: Additional cases related to the Lazarus Group**

### **Case 1**

In April 2023, a cybersecurity company reported<sup>247</sup> on an October 2019 - March 2022 campaign, dubbed ‘DeathNote’. The campaign is also referred to as ‘Operation Dream Job’.<sup>248</sup>

Through this campaign, the Lazarus Group used social engineering lures mimicking cryptocurrency businesses and defense contractors to trick victims into interacting with macro-laced Word attachments and PDF files.

When the victims opened the file, the macro installed an obfuscated VBScript that extracted payloads in the form of harmful UltraVNC<sup>249</sup> with backdoor capabilities which evade detection and establish a connection to a separate C2 server.

### **Case 2**

Another cybersecurity company reported in May 2023 that the Lazarus Group has been carrying out attacks against Windows IIS web servers by placing a malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll) in the folder path as a normal application through the web servers’ process.

This ‘DLL Side-Loading technique’ hijacks targets’ legitimate applications to bypass security software.<sup>250</sup>

In addition, the Lazarus Group has also been using anti-forensic techniques to conceal its activity, including hiding and encrypting data, file deletion and timestamp changes.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> See <https://securelist.com/the-lazarus-group-deathnote-campaign/109490/>

<sup>248</sup> See S/2021/211, para.126 and footnote 107.

<sup>249</sup> UltraVNC is a remote desktop software that allows users to remotely access and control computers over a network or the internet. It is a popular and free open-source application that provides remote access capabilities for Windows operating systems.

<sup>250</sup> The Panel has reported on this technique in S/2023/171, para. 116 and annex 79.

<sup>251</sup> See annex 64 for links to related reports.

## **Annex 68: The Panel's summary of interviews with relevant experts on DPRK IT workers**

On several occasions over the past year, the Panel had the opportunity to interview experts on the issue of DPRK IT workers.

### **1) Account Creation in Freelance Platforms**

In order to create an account in freelance work platforms (websites), users are required to go through an identity authentication process which is often conducted via email, text message, identification card, and/or a real-time video interview.

There are cases where IT workers pay a foreign partner to conduct the authentication process as well as ongoing account verification (such as two-factor authentication). In other cases, IT workers utilize a falsified or stolen identity to complete the authentication process. IT workers are able to collect identification documentation, including passports and drivers licenses, and replace the original photo with their own.

Such IT workers will often not pursue a developer project if the employer requires fingerprint verification, drug testing, and/or for the developer to work on-site for all or a portion of the employment. Potential employers should also consider requiring developers to share their computer screen and appear on a video call during technical interviews to confirm the integrity of their responses, to ensure the developers are not cheating by looking up answers on a separate computer or utilizing AI software. Potential employers are advised to check answers to technical interview questions or other responses obtained in the job hiring process to determine if AI software was used, such as in response to interview questions or when producing coding upon request.

### **2) Subcontracts with Proxy Account Holders**

These IT workers are employing new methods to identify foreign individuals willing to create proxy accounts, in exchange for a percentage of the profits earned. They upload posts on different social media and networking websites such as Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as on freelance developer platforms, advertising that they are IT programme developers who would share their earnings with those who can lend them accounts and identities on freelance work platforms. These IT workers often disguise themselves as Chinese or from other Asian countries, asserting that they are able to earn much more by using foreign national accounts. Some of them use dating apps to search for foreign individuals who create can proxy account for them in exchange for money. More recently, they use websites such as 'playerup.com' to buy freelance platform accounts from foreigners.

### **3) Direct deals with Clients**

Once a client is identified, these IT workers seek to lure the client into establishing contracts directly, without going through the freelance work platforms. In many cases, clients have to pay a commission fee to use these websites, so it is also in the interest of the clients to direct contracts with the reliable IT developers.

These IT workers often perform work at a high level of competence with comparatively low hourly rates. They are able to obtain subsequent contracts directly with the client and also successfully recommend other DPRK freelance IT workers for jobs with the client.

### **4) Employing Other Developers**

A subset of these IT workers is increasingly employing non-DPRK developers to conduct work for U.S. and other foreign companies - including in Europe and Middle and Latin America. These hired developers are often located in South Asia, Africa, or South America. The DPRK IT workers, often purporting to represent a developer hiring company, only hire them for short periods of time, such as the length of a single project. These IT workers use U.S. or other local person information to create freelance platform and social media accounts for the hired workers, who then use the alias accounts to pose as U.S. or other local persons looking for remote jobs with U.S. or other local companies, applying for dozens of jobs daily. The developers then provide a large portion of their earnings to these IT workers. Profile information about these individuals is often falsified. The developers utilize proxy IP and VPN services to pretend to be located in the United States.

These IT workers - and the non-DPRK developers they hire - submit applications within the normal work hours of the location in which they are purporting to be citizens of. For instance, these workers apply to jobs with U.S. companies during U.S. time zones.

### **5) Methods to Circumvent Account Shutdown**

These IT workers are aware that freelance platforms are looking for red flag activities that could result in accounts being suspended or shut down. These red flag indicators include inconsistencies in the nationality of the account and the location of an IP address, logins into one account from multiple IP addresses in a short period of time, and excessive biddings on numerous projects from one account.

To evade their accounts being flagged for these reasons, these IT workers are known to utilize a proxy account holder's computer directly via remote desktop control tools. This makes it appear they are using the IP address of the proxy account holder and are located in the proxy's country. DPRK IT workers also have a set of guidelines to evade detection. For instance, instructions are given to bid only for three projects a day using one account so that the account does not stand out for further scrutiny from the freelance platforms. Considering the high competitiveness of the software development market where only a fraction of the bids gets responses, these IT workers use multiple accounts to raise their chances of winning a bid for a project.

## 6) Payment

DPRK IT workers will maintain group accounts on payment platforms and at local, regional, and international banks. These accounts receive payments for multiple workers' projects. These payments are often in round-dollar amounts, and the IT workers often seek to limit the amount of money flowing through each account on a monthly or annual basis, or the number of transactions conducted, so as not to raise suspicions. Given that the accounts are utilized by multiple workers, payments may take place every several days or even multiple payments (from different sources) in one day.

These IT workers, many of whom lack reliable payment platforms or mechanisms, are increasingly request payment in cryptocurrency, which is much easier for them to receive and use - rather than payment via a bank or non-virtual asset on a payment platform, which the IT workers then need to move through multiple accounts to cash out or otherwise use.

In many instances, the funds generated by these DPRK IT workers are eventually transferred to, and aggregated within, accounts in a third country financial system. They are likely then effecting cash withdrawals of at least some of the funds in these accounts. These third country-based bank accounts and debit card accounts are likely the accounts of third country nationals acting as proxies, selling the use of their accounts and their identification information to the IT worker.

## 7) Estimates of Workers, Revenue Generated, and Expenses

The experts estimated that the DPRK has dispatched between 3,000 to 10,000 IT workers overseas. In addition to these overseas IT workers, the DPRK is also increasing the number of home-based IT workers. These workers are often assigned to DPRK cities near the border, for better internet connection. These workers often rely on their overseas counterparts to obtain jobs for them; the overseas IT workers interact with the client and maintain the relationship while the home-based IT workers conduct the actual work, passing it back to the overseas IT workers when finished. This method allows the DPRK to obtain substantially more revenue without deploying additional IT workers overseas.

Overseas IT workers on average work on several projects at the same time and earn around \$3,000-\$5,000 a month, although those who are highly skilled can make \$10,000 to \$20,000 a month.

These IT workers pay 5-30% of their income to their proxy account holders. American and Western European account holders are preferred and paid the most, since developers from these regions can charge higher hourly rates and are more likely to win bids. These IT workers also seek Russian and Eastern European proxy accounts. These IT workers also have to pay financial intermediaries to access digital payment services and/or to launder their earnings. Usually, approximately 20-30% of their revenue is paid to these intermediaries – or a fixed monthly rate of \$600-\$1000 per person. In many cases, a team of these IT workers employ a single intermediary to access digital payment and/or money laundering services.

On top of these expenses, they must also pay for their office space, equipment, and other living expenses. Supervisors and managers of a DPRK IT worker team also receive a share of their



subordinates' revenue, as does their dispatching organization in the DPRK. In most cases, DPRK IT workers handover funds to 'Pyongyang' based on their designated quota earnings requirement.

## **8) Additional Illicit Activities**

DPRK IT workers with high coding skills have been known to take advantage of IT clients demonstrating poor security practices, by utilizing their administrator access and/or write vulnerabilities into their coding that they later exploit.

For instance, one DPRK IT worker provided IT services (including building smart contracts) to a cryptocurrency platform for several tokens. Later, the DPRK IT worker stole hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars' worth of these tokens from the platform, enabled by vulnerabilities the IT worker wrote into the smart contracts.

In another example, a DPRK IT worker was involved with the development and deployment of various smart contracts, including for cross-chain bridges. The DPRK IT worker purported to be a citizen from the Western Hemisphere when obtaining freelance jobs with cryptocurrency platforms, possibly using his access to enable future exploitation (hacking) of the smart contracts to steal funds.

DPRK IT workers and malicious cyber actors have also worked together in limited instances to develop software programs with malicious applications - and then likely utilize the applications in efforts to spread malware and conduct additional network intrusions.

DPRK malicious cyber actors are also performing IT work, which increases the threat posted to companies by even seemingly "harmless" IT workers. These cyber actors performing IT work may be particularly likely to utilize their administrator credentials or other privileged accesses and knowledge gained through IT freelance jobs to later conduct a malicious cyber-attack on their employer – potentially including theft of IP or other data, a ransomware attack, or theft of funds.

*Source:* The Panel

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**Annex 69: Information on DPRK nationals related to Chinyong IT (subordinate to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, (KPe.054))**

Name: **Kim Sang Man** (김상만, last name : Kim)  
Occupation: General Manager of Chinyong IT  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 109420132, 827220538, 563220082  
DoB: 25 April 1965

Name: **Kim Ki Hyok** (김기혁, last name : Kim)  
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Russian Federation  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 572420019  
DoB: 30 May 1980

Name: **Jon Yon Gun** (전연근, last name : Jon)  
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Lao PDR  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 927233154  
DoB: 22 April 1973

Name: **Kim Song Il** (김성일, last name : Kim)  
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in China  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 836438590  
DoB: 2 February 1976

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 70: Information on eight DPRK individuals related to Oh Chung Song**

Name: **Kim Il Hyok** (김일혁, last name : Kim)  
 Occupation: IT worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 108441346  
 DoB: 20 September 1993

Name: **Kim Myong Chol** (김명철, last name : Kim)  
 Occupation: N/A  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 108132085  
 DoB: 14 February 1968

Name: **Jon Yon Gun** (전연근, last name : Jon)  
 Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Lao PDR  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 927233154  
 DoB: 22 April 1973

Name: **Ri Song Il** (리성일, last name : Ri)  
 Occupation: IT Worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 927233194  
 DoB: 11 January 1997

Name: **Kim Kwang Jin** (김광진, last name : Kim)  
 Occupation: IT Worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 109380363  
 DoB: 24 January 1998

Name: **Kang Tae Bok** (강대복, last name : Kang)  
 Occupation: IT Worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 927233182  
 DoB: 22 February 1997

Name: **Jang Nam Il** (장남일, last name : Jang)  
 Occupation: IT Worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 109380365  
 DoB: 7 October 1999

Name: **Jong Pong Ju** (정봉주, last name : Jong)  
 Occupation: IT Worker  
 Nationality: DPRK  
 Passport: 9272331607  
 DoB: 25 January 1997

*Source:* Member State

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**Annex 71: Information on other DPRK nationals earning income in the Lao PDR**

Name: **Kim Hyo Dong** (김효동, last name : Kim)  
Occupation: Representative of Tongmyong Technology Trade Company  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 108130754  
DoB: 28 December 1989

Name: **Yu Song Hyok** (유성혁, last name : Yu)  
Occupation: Known to be operating a DPRK restaurant  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 108130754  
DoB: 1 August 1981

Name: **Yun Song Il** (윤성일, last name : Yun)  
Occupation: Known to be operating a DPRK restaurant  
Nationality: DPRK  
Passport: 927332691  
DoB: 23 September 1969

*Source:* Member State

## Annex 72: DPRK medical team in Libya

The media reported that<sup>252</sup> a DPRK medical team has been working at a hospital since their arrival in Libya in early January 2023. The Facebook page of Martyr Atiya Al-Kashef Teaching Hospital – Kufra posted the below content and video footage of the DPRK medical team. Information obtained by the Panel indicated that the team was transported to Kufra by charter plane operated by a Libya-based air transport company. The Panel assessed that at least ten of the DPRK medical workers in Libya had previously worked in Senegal between 2019 and 2020. Investigations continued

### 1) Facebook of Martyr Atiya Al-Kashef Teaching Hospital – Kufra posted the arrival of a DPRK medical team.

*“Just a little while ago, an international plane carrying the Korean medical team arrived at Kufra airport, with Mr. "Ismail Al-Eidah" on board, heading to the educational Al-Shahid Atiya Al-Kashef Hospital in Kufra. The medical team consists of 38 members, including specialists in:*

- General Surgery
- Anesthesia
- Obstetrics and Gynecology
- Ear, Nose, and Throat
- Pediatrics
- Cardiology
- Orthopedics
- Internal Medicine
- Dentistry
- Physical Therapy
- 12 specialized nurses.



*Thanks to the "Subul Al-Salam" battalion, where Sheikh Abdulrahman Hashem has borne the cost of renting the international company's plane that carried the doctors to Kufra. The battalion and its commander have carried a lot of burdens throughout the past period. This is a very big step towards providing better services to the people of Kufra..."*

Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>252</sup> NK News, <https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/libyan-hospital-welcomes-dozens-of-north-korean-medical-workers/?t=1688232932>.




## 2) Images of the flight transporting the DPRK medical team (excerpt)

The Panel assessed that the pictured airplane is affiliated with a Libya-based air transport company that provided a charter/private plane to the DPRK medical team.



Source: Facebook, Flightradar 24, annotated by the Panel.




Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 10 January 2023 08:06:53 UTC.

## Annex 73: Reply from Mozambique



Source: Member State.

## Annex 74: DPRK medical activities in Senegal between 2019 and 2020

According to open-source information,<sup>253</sup> a DPRK medical team worked at several locations in Senegal in collaboration with a non-governmental organization (NGO) between 2019 and 2020. The DPRK medical team included pediatricians, cardiologists, dentists, gynaecologists and other specialists. In a video that was posted online in 2019, the interpreter of the DPRK medical team said that she was from Mangyongbong and that the DPRK team was able to treat more than 400 people.

The NGO replied to the Panel's enquiry that a DPRK medical team composed of 30 personnel was introduced to the organization by the local DPRK Ambassador. The NGO explained that the DPRK medical team joined their events on several occasions, including religious and local events, "based on volunteering". The Panel requested Senegal provide additional information, in particular regarding any remuneration received by the DPRK medical team for their work.

On the basis of analysis of photographs of individuals in Senegal and in Libya, the Panel has concluded that some of the same DPRK medical workers arrived in Libya in early January 2023 to carry out further medical work (See annex 72).

### 1) DPRK medical activities at Touba in October 2019



Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>253</sup> NK News, <https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/libyan-hospital-welcomes-dozens-of-north-korean-medical-workers/?t=1688232932>.

The woman in below photo reviewed two-day long medical activities by DPRK medics (posted to Facebook on 19 October 2019). The contents of her interview (in French, English translation was done by the Panel) was as follows:

*“Bonjour, je m’appelle SO, je suis l’interprète de l’agence de coopération extérieure de la RPDC (nom) en partenariat avec le [REDACTED], présidente de l’association humanitaire « Medisol International ».*

*Nous sommes arrivés à Mbacké avec toute une équipe médicale, gynécologues-obstétriciens, anesthésistes, dentistes, kinésithérapeutes, chirurgiens, pédiatres, ORL. Nous avons mené des activités pendant 2 jours et nous avons pu effectuer des consultations sur plus de 400 personnes qui ont été satisfaites de nos traitements médicaux. Ce fut une très bonne expérience avec le peuple sénégalais. A cette occasion, je tiens à remercier le [REDACTED] et le peuple sénégalais qui ont été très chaleureux avec nous. Nous espérons que notre coopération se développera de plus en plus à l’avenir et qu’elle sera bénéfique pour tous. Je vous remercie de votre attention.”*



[Unofficial translation]

Hello, my name is... I am the interpreter of the DPRK’s external cooperation agency Mangyonbong in partnership with [REDACTED], president of the humanitarian association “Medisol International”. We arrived in Mbacké with a whole medical team, gynecologists-obstetricians, anesthesiologists, dentists, physiotherapists, surgeons, pediatricians, ENT specialists. We conducted activities for 2 days and we were able to carry out consultations on more than 400 people who were satisfied with our medical treatments. It was a very good experience with the Senegalese people. On this occasion, I would like to thank Dr. Rose Wardini and the Senegalese people who have been very warm to us. And we hope that our cooperation will develop more and more in the future and will be beneficial for everyone. Thank you.

Source: Facebook, image was annotated by the Panel.



## 2) DPRK medical activities at Tivaouane in November 2019

Local media<sup>254</sup> reported that the NGO Médisol International deployed a team of around thirty ‘Korean’<sup>255</sup> doctors to Tivaouane.



*Source:* Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>254</sup> See [https://senego.com/tivaouane-des-coreens-en-appui-a-la-couverture-sanitaire-du-gamou\\_999035.html](https://senego.com/tivaouane-des-coreens-en-appui-a-la-couverture-sanitaire-du-gamou_999035.html).

<sup>255</sup> The Panel notes previous instances in which DPRK nationals are represented or presented as “Korean,” which may be a tactic to evade detection. For instance, see S/2019/171, annexes 46-47, S/2018/171, para. 111 and 199 and annex 88.

### 3) DPRK medical activities at Ouakam and Dakar between February and March 2020



Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

## Annex 75: Russian Federation

### 1) Summary of the Statement of the Investigative Committee of Russia of the Sakhalin Region

The statement of the Investigative Committee of Russia of the Sakhalin Region, entitled “An investigation is being conducted in Korsakov regarding an accident involving foreign citizens”, described that on 7 April 2020, at 14:50, a report was received by the Investigative Committee that two citizens of DPRK had been taken to the intensive care unit of the State Budgetary Healthcare Institution “Komsomolskaya Central District Hospital” with severe bodily injuries. It explained that they were employed by the company Detal LLC (ООО «Детал»), which was carrying out the construction work. During the course of the work, a scaffolding collapse occurred, causing the men to fall from a height of approximately 6-7 floors to the ground, resulting in injuries.



### В Корсакове по факту несчастного случая, произошедшего с иностранными гражданами проводится проверка

07 апреля 2020 года в 14 часов 50 минут в Корсаковский межрайонный следственный отдел следственного управления Следственного комитета РФ по Сахалинской области поступило сообщение о том, что в реанимационное отделение ГБУЗ «Корсаковская центральная районная больница» с тяжкими телесными повреждениями поступили два гражданина Северной Кореи.

В ходе осмотра места происшествия установлено, что пострадавшие работали на строительной площадке многоэтажного дома по улице Советской в городе Корсаков в качестве разнорабочих в ООО «Детал», которое осуществляло строительные работы. В ходе работ произошло обрушение лесов, и мужчины с высоты примерно 6-7 этажа упали на землю, в результате чего получили травмы.


В настоящее время следственным отделом по данному факту проводятся проверочные мероприятия, направленные на установление причин произошедшего. По результатам проверки будет дана правовая оценка действиям должностных лиц указанной компании по ч. 1 ст. 143 УК РФ – нарушение правил техники безопасности.

07 Апреля 2020 16:03

Source : <https://sakh.sledcom.ru/news/item/1454029>.

## 2) Statement of the Korsakov City Prosecutor's Office

According to a statement issued on 8 April 2020, the Prosecutor's Office of Korsakov City launched investigations into the collapse of a scaffolding during the construction of a multi-apartment building, which resulted in injuries to individuals. The document stated that during the investigation, an assessment will be made concerning compliance with urban planning, labor, migration, and other legislation.


📄

Источник:

Корсаковская городская прокуратура

Дата публикации:

8 апреля 2020, 02:00

**Прокуратурой организована проверка по факту обрушения строительных лесов при строительстве многоквартирного дома, в результате чего пострадали люди**

Корсаковская городская прокуратура проводит проверку по факту обрушения строительных лесов при строительстве многоквартирного дома по ул.Советской в г.Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди.

В ходе проверки будет дана оценка соблюдению градостроительного, трудового, миграционного и иного законодательства.

По результатам проверки, при наличии оснований, будут приняты меры реагирования.

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Телефон: Тел. 8(42435)41311; Электронная почта: korsakov@65.maiop.ru

Source : [https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc\\_65/search?article=47277183](https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_65/search?article=47277183).

The statement issued on 1 June 2020 explained that an investigation has been conducted by the Korsakov City Prosecutor's Office regarding the publication in the media titled "Scaffolding Collapses on Sovetskaya Street in Korsakov, Resulting in Injuries to People." The Prosecutor's Office established that in violation of labor and migration legislation, the company "Euro-Standard LLC" allowed foreign citizens to work on the construction of a multi-apartment residential building. As a result of the collapse of scaffolding on the said building, these workers suffered varying degrees of injuries...Administrative offense cases have been initiated against the responsible individuals and the legal entity under Part 1 of Article 18.15 of the Administrative Offenses Code (illegal employment of foreign citizens or stateless persons in the Russian Federation) and Part 1 of Article 5.27.1 of the Administrative Offenses Code of the Russian Federation (violation of state regulations on labor protection).

	
Источник:	Дата публикации:
Корсаковская городская прокуратура	1 июня 2020, 15:30
<p><b>Обратная связь: приняты меры прокурорского реагирования по итогам проверки по публикации СМИ «Строительные леса обвалились на улице Советской в Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди»</b></p>	
<p>Корсаковской городской прокуратурой по публикации СМИ «Строительные леса обвалились на улице Советской в Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди» проведена проверка.</p> <p>Установлено, что в нарушение трудового и миграционного законодательства, ООО «Евро - Стандарт» допущены иностранные граждане для выполнения работ на строящемся многоквартирном жилом доме, в результате обрушения строительных лесов на котором, указанным рабочим причинен вред здоровью различной степени тяжести.</p> <p>Об устранении нарушений законодательства генеральному директору предприятия внесено представление.</p> <p>В отношении должностного и юридического лица возбуждены дела об административных правонарушениях, предусмотренных ч. 1 ст. 18.15 КоАП (незаконное привлечение к трудовой деятельности в РФ иностранного гражданина или лица без гражданства) и ч. 1 ст. 5.27.1 КоАП РФ (нарушение государственных нормативных требований охраны труда).</p> <p>Рассмотрение актов реагирования находятся на контроле прокуратуры.</p>	
© 2003-2023 Корсаковская городская прокуратура Все права защищены	Адрес: 694020, г. Корсаков, ул. Краснофлотская, 16 (поднадзорная территория; г. Корсаков, Корсаковский район) Телефон: Тел. 8(42435)41311; Электронная почта: korsakov@65.maiop.ru

Source : [https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc\\_65/search?article=36707624](https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_65/search?article=36707624).



### 3) Russian media report (Excerpt)

According to a Russian media report titled “Investigative Committee: Workers from DPRK fell from the 6<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> floor at a construction site in Korsakov”, a scaffolding collapsed on April 7 at a construction site in Korsakov. According to Russian media ASTV.RU, the building is being constructed at the end of Sovetskaya Street on the site of a former parking lot.

## Следственный комитет: на стройке в Корсакове рабочие из КНДР упали с 6-7 этажа

СУ СК начал проверку по факту обрушения строительных лесов

В



3 комментария

Строительные леса обвалились 7 апреля на новостройке в Корсакове. Дом возводят, как рассказали очевидцы ASTV.RU, в конце Советской улицы на месте бывшей автостоянки.

Во время происшествия пострадали [трое рабочих](#). Их доставили в местную районную больницу. Два человека в тяжелом состоянии, у третьего - лёгкие травмы.

Пострадавшие рабочие - граждане КНДР.

Как сообщили в областном следственном комитете, по факту несчастного случая, произошедшего с иностранными гражданами, проводится проверка.

В ходе осмотра места происшествия установлено, что пострадавшие работали на строительной площадке многоэтажного дома по улице Советской в Корсакове в качестве разнорабочих в ООО “Детал”, которое осуществляло строительные работы. В ходе работ обрушились леса, и мужчины с высоты примерно 6-7 этажа упали на землю, в результате чего получили травмы.

Следственный отдел по данному факту проводит проверку, устанавливаются причины произошедшего. По результатам проверки будет дана правовая оценка действиям должностных лиц указанной компании по ч. 1 ст. 143 УК РФ – нарушение правил техники безопасности.

**Обновление информации 8 апреля в 11:17.**

Как стало известно журналистам ASTV.RU, один из строителей находится в тяжелом состоянии в реанимации на аппарате ИВЛ. Другой гражданин КНДР стабилен и получил травмы средней тяжести.

Source : <https://astv.ru/news/criminal/2020-04-07-sledstvennyj-komit-et-na-strojke-v-korsakove-postradali-rabochie-iz-severnoj-korei/>.

#### 4) Satellite imagery analysis

A Russian media reported (see above) that the construction site was previously used as car parking lot. The Panel's satellite imagery analysis corroborated the media's reporting and further confirmed the location as the only place where a car parking lot became the construction site of multi-storey building between 2019 and 2020. The Panel assessed that the construction of the building began between August and October 2019. This is consistent with the start of the building's construction (19 September 2019) as displayed at the construction site. Satellite imagery captured on 14 April 2020 showed the exterior of a multi-storey building, a location that match the date of the reported construction site incident of 7 April 2019.

#### The development of the construction



### The poster displayed at the construction site


Construction starts on 19 September 2019 (19.09.2019 г.); Construction ends on 8 February 2021 (08.02.2021 г.).






## 5) The photos of the building

The photo of the building reported by the media after the incident (bottom left) is identical to Russian georeferenced information (top and bottom right) which shows the address: “Sovetskaya Street 57, Korsakov City”



Source: Yandex



Source: ACTB

Source: Yandex

## 6) Russian Federation's reply

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.140 сообщаем следующее.

Пострадавшие при строительстве жилого дома двое граждан КНДР проходили производственную практику в рамках обучения в ФГБОУ ВО «Сахалинский государственный университет». 7 апреля 2020 г. при погрузке керамогранитных плит на строительные леса ими были превышены нормы нагрузки на 1 шаг стоек вдоль стены в 3 метра (900 кг вместо допустимых 200 кг). Это привело к обрушению лесов, в результате чего оба северокорейца упали с высоты примерно 28 метров, получив телесные повреждения различной степени тяжести. Они были госпитализированы в Корсаковскую центральную районную больницу. По результатам проведенной проверки виновные были привлечены к административной ответственности.

### Translated from Russian


In connection with enquiry OC.140 from the Panel of Experts, we are providing the information below.

The two DPRK citizens injured during the construction of a residential building were on an industrial work experience course as part of their studies at the Sakhalin State University federally-funded institution of higher education. On 7 April 2020, while lifting granite-ceramic panels onto the construction scaffolding, they exceeded the permissible load of a row of supports along a three-metre wall (900kg instead of the permitted 200kg). This led to the collapse of the scaffolding, and the two North Koreans fell from a height of approximately 28 metres, receiving various degrees of injury. They were hospitalized at the Korsakov central regional hospital. Following an investigation, those responsible were brought to administrative accountability.



## Annex 76: US-ROK Joint Advisory on Ransomware (9 February 2023)

Cybersecurity Advisory
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## #StopRansomware: Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

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### Summary

Note: This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and various ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories detail historically and recently observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit [stopransomware.gov](https://stopransomware.gov) to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The United States National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Republic of Korea (ROK) National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the ROK Defense Security Agency (DSA) (hereafter referred to as the "authoring agencies") are issuing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight ongoing ransomware activity against [Healthcare and Public Health Sector](#) organizations and other [critical infrastructure sector](#) entities.

This CSA provides an overview of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored ransomware and updates the July 6, 2022, joint CSA [North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector](#). This advisory highlights TTPs and IOCs DPRK cyber actors used to gain access to and conduct ransomware attacks against Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations and other critical infrastructure sector entities, as well as DPRK cyber actors' use of cryptocurrency to demand ransoms.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

The authoring agencies assess that an unspecified amount of revenue from these cryptocurrency operations supports DPRK national-level priorities and objectives, including cyber operations targeting the United States and South Korea governments—specific targets include Department of Defense Information Networks and Defense Industrial Base member networks. The IOCs in this product should be useful to sectors previously targeted by DPRK cyber operations (e.g., U.S. government, Department of Defense, and Defense Industrial Base). The authoring agencies highly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.

For additional information on state-sponsored DPRK malicious cyber activity, see CISA's [North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories](#) webpage.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [AA23-040A.stix](#) (STIX, 197 kb).

### Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 12. See [MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise](#) for all referenced tactics and techniques.

This CSA is supplementary to previous reports on malicious cyber actor activities involving DPRK ransomware campaigns—namely [Maui](#) and [H0lyGh0st](#) ransomware. The authoring agencies are issuing this advisory to highlight additional observed TTPs DPRK cyber actors are using to conduct ransomware attacks targeting South Korean and U.S. healthcare systems.

### Observable TTPs

The TTPs associated with DPRK ransomware attacks include those traditionally observed in ransomware operations. Additionally, these TTPs span phases from acquiring and purchasing infrastructure to concealing DPRK affiliation:

- **Acquire Infrastructure [T1583]**. DPRK actors generate domains, personas, and accounts; and identify cryptocurrency services to conduct their ransomware operations. Actors procure infrastructure, IP addresses, and domains with cryptocurrency generated through illicit cybercrime, such as ransomware and cryptocurrency theft.

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- **Obfuscate Identity.** DPRK actors purposely obfuscate their involvement by operating with or under third-party foreign affiliate identities and use third-party foreign intermediaries to receive ransom payments.
- **Purchase VPNs and VPSs [T1583.003].** DPRK cyber actors will also use virtual private networks (VPNs) and virtual private servers (VPSs) or third-country IP addresses to appear to be from innocuous locations instead of from DPRK.
- **Gain Access [TA0001].** Actors use various exploits of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) to gain access and escalate privileges on networks. Recently observed CVEs that actors used to gain access include remote code execution in the Apache Log4j software library (known as [Log4Shell](#)) and [remote code execution in unpatched SonicWall SMA 100 appliances \[T1190 and T1133\]](#). Observed CVEs used include:
  - CVE 2021-44228
  - CVE-2021-20038
  - CVE-2022-24990

Actors also likely spread malicious code through Trojanized files for "X-Popup," an open source messenger commonly used by employees of small and medium hospitals in South Korea [\[T1195\]](#).

The actors spread malware by leveraging two domains: [xpopup.pe\[.\]kr](#) and [xpopup.com](#). [xpopup.pe\[.\]kr](#) is registered to IP address [115.68.95\[.\]128](#) and [xpopup\[.\]com](#) is registered to IP address [119.285.197\[.\]111](#). Related file names and hashes are listed in table 1.

Table 1: Malicious file names and hashes spread by xpopup domains

File Name	MD5 Hash
xpopup.rar	1f239db751ce9a374eb9f908c74a31c9
X-PopUp.exe	6fb13b1b4b42bac05a2ba629f04e3d03
X-PopUp.exe	cf8ba073db7f4023af2b13dd75565f3d
xpopup.exe	4e71d52fc39f89204a734b19db1330d3
x-PopUp.exe	43d4994635f72852f719abb604c4a8a1
xpopup.exe	5ae71e8440bf33b46554ce7a7f3de666

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

- **Move Laterally and Discovery** [TA0007, TA0008]. After initial access, DPRK cyber actors use staged payloads with customized malware to perform reconnaissance activities, upload and download additional files and executables, and execute shell commands [T1083, T1021]. The staged malware is also responsible for collecting victim information and sending it to the remote host controlled by the actors [TA0010].
- **Employ Various Ransomware Tools** [TA0040]. Actors have used privately developed ransomware, such as Maui and H0lyGh0st [T1486]. Actors have also been observed using or possessing publically available tools for encryption, such as BitLocker, Deadbolt, ech0raix, GonnaCry, Hidden Tear, Jigsaw, LockBit 2.0, My Little Ransomware, NxRansomware, Ryuk, and YourRansom [T1486]. In some cases, DPRK actors have portrayed themselves as other ransomware groups, such as the REvil ransomware group. For IOCs associated with Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware usage, please see Appendix B.
- **Demand Ransom in Cryptocurrency.** DPRK cyber actors have been observed setting ransoms in bitcoin [T1486]. Actors are known to communicate with victims via Proton Mail email accounts. For private companies in the healthcare sector, actors may threaten to expose a company's proprietary data to competitors if ransoms are not paid. Bitcoin wallet addresses possibly used by DPRK cyber actors include:
  - 1MTHBCrBKYEthfa16zo9kabt4f9jMJz8Rm
  - bc1q80vc4yigg6umedkut3e9mhehxl4q4dcjyzh59
  - 1J8spy62o7z2AjQxoUpiCGnBh5cRWKVVJC
  - 16ENLdHbnmDcEV8iqN4vuyZHa7sSdYRh76
  - bc1q3wzxvu8yhs8h7mlkmf7277wyklkah9k4sm9anu
  - bc1q8xyt4jxhw7mgqpwd6qfdjyvgvjeuz57jxrv9k9
  - 1NqihEqYaQaWiZkPVdSMiTbt7dTy1LMxgX
  - bc1qxrpevck3pq1yzrx2pq2rkvkvy0jnm56nzjv6pw
  - 14hVKm7Ft2rxDBFTNkkRC3kGstMGp2A4hk
  - 1KCwfCUgnSy3pzNX7U1i5NwFzRtth4bRBc
  - 16sYqXancDDiijcuruZecCkdBDwDf4vSEC
  - 1N6JphHFaYmYaokS5xH31Z67bvk4ykd9CP
  - LZ1VNJfn6mWjPzkCyoBvqWaBZYXAwN135

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- 1KmWW6LgdgykBBrSxRFu9kdoHz95Fe9kQF
- 1FX4W9rrG4F3Uc7gJ18GCwGab8XuW8Agy2
- bc1qlqgu2l2kms5338zuc95kxavctzy0v705tpvyc
- bc1qy6su7vrh7ts5ng2628escmhr98msmzg62ez2sp
- bc1q8t69gpxsezdc8w6tfzp3jeptq4tcp2g9d0mwy
- bc1q9h7yj79sqm4t536q0fdn7n4y2atsvvl22m28ep
- bc1qj6y72rk039mqpgtcy7mwjd3eum6cx6027ndgmd
- bc1qcp557vltuu3qc6pk3ld0ayagrxf2thp3pjzpe
- bc1ql8wsflrf9zlsauynzjm83mupq6c9jz9vnqyg
- bc1qx60ec3nfd5yhsyyxkzkpts54w970yxj84zrdck
- bc1qunqnjdlvqjuhtclfp8kzkjpvdz9qnk898xczp
- bc1q6024d73h48fnhwswhwt3hqz2lzw6x99q0nulm4
- bc1qwdvexlyvg3mqvqw7g6l09qup0qew80wj9jh7x
- bc1qavrtge4p7dmcrnvhluhaarx8rek76wxyk7dgg
- bc1qagaayd57vr25dlqgk7f00nhz9qepqgnlnt4upu
- bc1quvnaxnpqlzq3mdhfdh35j7e7ufxh3gpc56hca
- bc1qu0pvfmxawm8s99lcjvxpungtsmkvwyvak6cs
- bc1qg3zlxxhcv6t6hkuhmql8y9pas76cajcu9ltdl
- bc1qn7a3g23npuytchyyteyhkcse84cnylznl3j32
- bc1qhfmqstxp3yp9muvuz29wk77vjtdyrkff4nrpxu
- bc1qnh8scrvuqlzmzg7eesyrmtes9c5m78duetf3
- bc1q7qry3lsrphmnw3exs7tkwzpvzjcx942aq8n0y
- bc1qcmxcfsy0zqlqh72jvvc4rh7hvwhx6scp27na0
- bc1q498fn0gauj2kkjsg35mlwk2cnxhaqlj7hkh8xy
- bc1qnz4udqkumjghnm2a3zt0w3ep8fwdcyv3krr3jq
- bc1qk0saaw7p0wrwla6u7tflxrtlgrwnudz9tyw
- bc1qyue2pgjk09ps7qvs559k8kee3jkcw4p4vdp57
- bc1q6qfkt06xmrpclht3acmq00p7zyy0ejydu89zww
- bc1qmge6a7sp659exnx78zhm9zgrw88n6un0rl9trs
- bc1qcywkd7zqlwmjy36c46dpf8cq6ts6wgkx0u7cn

### Mitigations

Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. For more

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information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections, see [cisa.gov/cpg](https://cisa.gov/cpg).

The authoring agencies urge HPH organizations to:

- Limit access to data by authenticating and encrypting connections (e.g., using public key infrastructure certificates in virtual private network (VPN) and transport layer security (TLS) connections) with network services, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system [CPG 3.3].
- Implement the principle of least privilege by using standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts [CPG 1.5], which grant excessive system administration privileges.
- Turn off weak or unnecessary network device management interfaces, such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.
- Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when displayed and rendering it unreadable when stored—through cryptography, for example.
- Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for personally identifiable information (PII)/protected health information (PHI), per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures could prevent the introduction of malware to the system [CPG 3.4].
  - Secure PII/ PHI at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit using technologies, such as TLS. Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available.
  - Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI.
- Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer [CPG 8.1].
- Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise [CPG 3.1].

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In addition, the authoring agencies urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for and mitigate ransomware incidents:

- **Maintain isolated backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration** [CPG 7.3]. These practices safeguard an organization's continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses.
  - Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization's data infrastructure.
- **Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan** that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident [CPG 7.1.7.2].
  - Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include data breach incidents response and notification procedures. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable laws.
  - See the [CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center \(MS-ISAC\) Joint Ransomware Guide](#) and CISA Fact Sheet [Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches](#) for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches.
- **Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released** [CPG 5.1]. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](#). Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
- **If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely** [CPG 5.4].
  - Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require [phishing-resistant multifactor authentication \(MFA\)](#) to mitigate credential theft and reuse [CPG 1.3]. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate

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and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports [\[CPG 1.1, 3.1\]](#).

- Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols not in use for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol port 3389).
- Restrict the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
- Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity [\[CPG 5.6, 6.2\]](#).
- Implement application control policies that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs [\[CPG 2.1\]](#).
- Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
- **Implement a user training program and phishing exercises** [\[CPG 4.3\]](#) to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
- **Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible** [\[CPG 1.3\]](#)—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- **Use strong passwords** [\[CPG 1.4\]](#) and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip [Choosing and Protecting Passwords](#) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines](#) for more information.
- **Require administrator credentials to install software** [\[CPG 1.5\]](#).
- **Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges** [\[CPG 1.5\]](#) and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

- **Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.**
- **Only use secure networks.** Consider installing and using a VPN.
- **Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations** [CPG 8.3] indicating that they are higher risk messages.
- **Consider participating in CISA's no-cost [Automated Indicator Sharing \(AIS\)](#) program** to receive real-time exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and defensive measures.

If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:

- Follow your organization's ransomware response checklist.
- Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.
- **U.S. organizations:** Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. Report incidents to appropriate authorities; in the U.S., this would include the FBI at a [local FBI Field Office](#), CISA at [cisa.gov/report](#), or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a [USSS Field Office](#).
- **South Korean organizations:** Please report incidents to NIS, KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency), and KNPA (Korean National Police Agency).
  - NIS (National Intelligence Service)
    - Telephone : 111
    - <https://www.nis.go.kr>
  - KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency)
    - Telephone : 118 (Consult Service)
    - <https://www.boho.or.kr/consult/ransomware.do>
  - KNPA (Korean National Police Agency)
    - Electronic Cybercrime Report & Management System: <https://ecrm.police.go.kr/minwon/main>
- Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](#), developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

### Resources

Stairwell provided a YARA rule to identify Maui ransomware, and a Proof of Concept public RSA key extractor at the following link:

<https://www.stairwell.com/news/threat-research-report-maui-ransomware/>

### Request For Information

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, bitcoin wallet information, the decryptor file, and/or benign samples of encrypted files. As stated above, the authoring agencies discourage paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered and may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, the agencies understand that when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees, and customers.

Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay a ransom, the authoring agencies urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents using the [contact information](#) above.

### Acknowledgements

NSA, FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank ROK NIS and DSA for their contributions to this CSA.

### Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

### Trademark recognition

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. Apache®, Sonicwall, and Apache Log4j are trademarks of Apache Software Foundation. TerraMaster Operating System is a registered trademark of Octagon Systems.

### Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authors' cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

### Contact

NSA Client Requirements / General Cybersecurity Inquiries: [CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov](mailto:CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov)

Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: [DIB\\_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov](mailto:DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov)

To report incidents and anomalous activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact CISA's 24/7 Operations Center at [Report@cisa.gov](mailto:Report@cisa.gov) or (888) 282-0870 or your local FBI field office at [www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

Media Inquiries / Press Desk:

- NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, [MediaRelations@nsa.gov](mailto:MediaRelations@nsa.gov)
- CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, [CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov](mailto:CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov)

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

## Appendix A: CVE Details

CVE-2021-44228	CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
<b><u>Vulnerability Description</u></b>	
<p>Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.</p>	
<b><u>Recommended Mitigations</u></b>	
Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates.	
<b><u>Detection Methods</u></b>	
See vendors' <a href="#">Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability</a> .	
<b><u>Vulnerable Technologies and Versions</u></b>	
<p>There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, please check <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228</a>.</p>	
See <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228</a> for more information.	

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

CVE-2021-20038

CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)

**Vulnerability Description**

A Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in SMA100 Apache httpd server's mod\_cgi module environment variables allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to potentially execute code as a 'nobody' user in the appliance. This vulnerability affected SMA 200, 210, 400, 410 and 500v appliances firmware 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv and earlier versions.

**Recommended Mitigations**

Apply all appropriate vendor updates

Upgrade to:

- SMA 100 Series - (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v (ESX, Hyper-V, KVM, AWS, Azure):
- SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.0.9-41sv or later
- SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.1.3-27sv or later

System administrators should refer to the SonicWall Security Advisories in the reference section to determine affected applications/systems and appropriate fix actions.

Support for 9.0.0 firmware ended on 10/31/2021. Customers still using that firmware are requested to upgrade to the latest 10.2.x versions.

**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**

Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv  
 Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

See <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038> for more information.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

CVE-2022-24990

CVSS 3.x: N/A

**Vulnerability Description**

The TerraMaster OS Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via PHP Object Instantiation Vulnerability is characterized by scanning activity targeting a flaw in the script enabling a remote adversary to execute commands on the target endpoint. The vulnerability is created by improper input validation of the webNasIPS component in the api.php script and resides on the TNAS device appliances' operating system where users manage storage, backup data, and configure applications. By exploiting the script flaw a remote unauthenticated attacker can pass specially crafted data to the application and execute arbitrary commands on the target system. This may result in complete compromise of the target system, including the exfiltration of information. TNAS devices can be chained to acquire unauthenticated remote code execution with highest privileges.

**Recommended Mitigations**

Install relevant vendor patches. This vulnerability was patched in TOS version 4.2.30

**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**

TOS v 4.2.29

See <https://octagon.net/blog/2022/03/07/cve-2022-24990-terrmaster-tos-unauthenticated-remote-command-execution-via-php-object-instantiation/> and <https://forum.terra-master.com/en/viewtopic.php?t=3030> for more information.

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

### Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The IOC section includes hashes and IP addresses for the Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware variants—as well as custom malware implants assumedly developed by DPRK cyber actors, such as remote access trojans (RATs), loaders, and other tools—that enable subsequent deployment of ransomware. For additional Maui IOCs, see joint CSA [North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector](#).

Table 2 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with malware implants, RATs, and other tools used by DPRK cyber actors, including tools that drop Maui ransomware files.

Table 2: File names and hashes of malicious implants, RATs, and tools

MD5Hash	SHA256Hash
079b4588eaa99a1e802adf5e0b26d8aa	f67ee77d6129bd1bcd5d856c0fc5314169b946d32b8abaa4e680bb98130b38e7
0e9e256d8173854a7bc26982b1dde783	--
12c15a477e1a96120c09a860c9d479b3	6263e421e397db821669420489d2d3084f408671524fd4e1e23165a16dda2225
131fc4375971af391b459de33f81c253	--
17c46ed7b80c2e4dbea6d0e88ea0827c	b9af4660da00c7fa975910d0a19fda072031c15fad1eef935a609842c51b7f7d
1875f6a68f70bee316c8a6eda9ebf8de	672ec8899b8ee513dbfc4590440a61023846ddc2ca94c88ae637144305c497e7
1a74c8d8b74ca2411c1d3d22373a6769	ba8f9e7afe5f78494c111971c39a89111ef9262bf23e8a764c6f65c818837a44
1f6d9f8fbd8bd4e6ed8cd73b9e95a928	4f089afa51fd0c1b2a39cc11cedb3a4a326111837a5408379384be6fe846e016
2d02f5499d35a8dff8b4c8bc0b7fec5c2	830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba2321b866428aa04360376e6a390063570
2e18350194e59bc6a2a3f6d59da11bd8	655aa64860f1655081489cf85b77f72a49de846a99dd122093db4018434b83ae
3bd22e0ac965ebb6a18bb71ba39e96dc	6b7f566889b80d1dba4f92d5e2fb2f5ef24f57fcd56bb594978dffe9edbb9eb
40f21743f9cb927b2c84ecdb7dfb14a6	5081f54761947bc9ce4aa2a259a0bd60b4ec03d32605f8e3635c4d4edaf48894
4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346	5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

43e756d80225bdf1200bc34eef5adca8	afb2d4d88f59e528f0e388705113ae54b7b97db4f03a35ae43cc386a48f263a0
47791bf9e017e3001ddc68a7351ca2d6	863b707873f7d653911e46885e261380b410bb3bf6b158daefb47562e93cb657
505262547f8879249794fc31eea41fc6	f32f6b229913d68daad937cc72a57aa45291a9d623109ed48938815aa7b6005c
5130888a0ad3d64ad33c65de696d3fa2	c92c1f3e77a1876086ce530e87aa9c1f9cbc5e93c5e755b29cad10a2f3991435
58ad3103295afcc22bde8d81e77c282f	18b75949e03f8dcad513426f1f9f3ca209d779c24cd4e941d935633b1bec00cb
5be1e382cd9730fbe386b69bd8045ee7	5ad106e333de056eac78403b033b89c58b4c4bdda12e2f774625d47ccfd3d3ae
5c6f9c83426c6d33ff2d4e72c039b747	a3b7e88d998078cfd8cdf37fa5454c45f6cbd65f4595fb94b2e9c85fe767ad47
640e70b0230dc026eff922fb1e44c2ea	6319102bac226dfc117c3c9e620cd99c7eafb3874832f2ce085850aa042f19c
67f4dad1a94ed8a47283c2c0c05a7594	3fe624c33790b409421f4fa2bb8abfd701df2231a959493c3318fed34bec0ae7
70652edadedbacfd30d33a826853467d	196fb1b6eff4e7a049cea323459cfd6c0e3900d8d69e1d80bffbaabd24c06eba
739812e2ae1327a94e441719b885bd19	6122c94cbfa11311bea7129ecd5aea6fae6c51d23228f7378b5f6b2398728f67
76c3d2092737d964dfd627f1ced0af80	bffe910904efd1f69544daa9b72f2a70fb29f73c51070bde4ea563de862ce4b1
802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb	87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562ec4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6
827103a6b6185191fd5618b7e82da292	--
830bc975a04ab0f62bfedf27f7aca673	--
85995257ac07ae5a6b4a86758a2283d7	--
85f6e3e3f0bdd0c1b3084fc86ee59d19	f1576627e8130e6d5fde0dbe3dffcc8bc9eef1203d15fcf09cd877ced1ccc72a
87a6bda486554ab16c82bdfb12452e8b	980bb08ef3e8afcb8c0c1a879ec11c41b29fd30ac65436495e69de79c555b2be
891db50188a90ddacaf7567d2d0355d	0837dd54268c373069fc5c1628c6e3d75eb99c3b3efc94c45b73e2cf9a6f3207
894de380a249e677be2acb8fbdfba2ef	--
8b395cc6ecdec0900facf6e93ec48fbb	--

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92a6c017830cda80133bf97eb77d3292	d1aba3f95f11fc6e5fec7694d188919555b7ff097500e811ff4a5319f8f230be
9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1	45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78
9b9d4cb1f681f19417e541178d8c75d7	f5f6e538001803b0aa008422caf2c3c2a79b2eeee9ddc7feda710e4aba96fea4
a1f9e9f5061313325a275d448d4ddd59	dfdd72c9ce1212f9d9455e2bca5a327c88d2d424ea5c086725897c83afc3d42d
a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3	99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f
a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358	3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878
ad4eababfe125110299e5a24be84472e	a557a0c67b5baa7cf64bd4d42103d3b2852f67acf96b4c5f14992c1289b55eaa
b1c1d28dc7da1d58abab73fa98f60a83	38491f48d0cbaab7305b5ddca64ba41a2beb89d81d5fb920e67d0c7334c89131
b6f91a965b8404d1a276e43e61319931	--
bdece9758bf34fcad9cba1394519019b	9d6de05f9a3e62044ad9ae66111308ccb9ed2ee46a3ea37d85afa92e314e7127
c3850f4cc12717c2b54753f8ca5d5e0e	99b448e91669b92c2cc3417a4d9711209509274dab5d7582baacfab5028a818c
c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a	458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456
cf236bf5b41d26967b1ce04ebbdb4041	60425a4d5ee04c8ae09bfe28ca33bf9e76a43f69548b2704956d0875a0f25145
d0e203e8845bf282475a8f816340f2e8	f6375c5276d1178a2a0fe1a16c5668ce523e2f846c073bf75bb2558fdec06531
ddb1f970371fa32faae61fc5b8423d4b	dda53eee2c5cb0abdbf5242f5e82f4de83898b6a9dd8aa935c2be29bafc9a469
f2f787868a3064407d79173ac5fc0864	92adc5ea29491d9245876ba0b2957393633c9998eb47b3ae1344c13a44cd59ae
fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b	56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19
--	0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80b430e170d6e7c22fcf75261e9a3a71
--	151ab3e05a23e9ccd03a6c49830dabb9e9281faf279c31ae40b13e6971dd2fb8
--	1c926fb3bd99f4a586ed476e4683163892f3958581bf8c24235cd2a415513b7f

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## Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

--	1f8dcfaebbcd7e71c2872e0ba2fc6db81d651cf654a21d33c78eae6662e62392
--	f226086b5959eb96bd30dec0ffcbf0f09186cd11721507f416f1c39901addafb
--	23eff00dde0ee27dabad28c1f4ffb8b09e876f1e1a77c1e6fb735ab517d79b76
--	586f30907c3849c363145bfcdabe3e2e4688cbd5688ff968e984b201b474730
--	8ce219552e235dcaf1c694be122d6339ed4ff8df70bf358cd165e6eb487ccfc5
--	90fb0cd574155fd8667d20f97ac464eca67bdb6a8ee64184159362d45d79b6a4
--	c2904dc8bbb569536c742fca0c51a766e836d0da8fac1c1abd99744e9b50164f
--	ca932ccaa30955f2fffb1122234fb1524f7de3a8e0044de1ed4fe05cab8702a5
--	f6827dc5af661fbb4bf64bc625c78283ef836c6985bb2bfb836bd0c8d5397332
--	f78cabf7a0e7ed3ef2d1c976c1486281f56a6503354b87219b466f2f7a0b65c4

Table 3 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes are associated with Maui Ransomware files.

Table 3: File names and hashes of Maui ransomware files

MD5 Hash	SHA256 Hash
4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346	5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e
9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1	45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78
fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b	56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19
2d02f5499d35a8dff4c8bc0b7fec5c2	830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba2321b866428aa04360376e6a390063570
c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a	458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456
a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3	99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f

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a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358	3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878
802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb	87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562ec4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6
--	0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80b430e170d6e7c22cf75261e9a3a71

Table 4 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with H0lyGh0st Ransomware files.

Table 4: File names and hashes of H0lyGh0st ransomware files

SHA256 Hash
99fc54786a72f32fd44c7391c2171ca31e72ca52725c68e2dde94d04c286fccd*
F8fc2445a9814ca8cf48a979b7f7182d6538f4d1ff438cf259268e8b4b76f86*
Bea866b327a2dc2aa104b7ad7307008919c06620771ec3715a059e675d9f40af*
6e20b73a6057f8ff75c49e1b7aef08abfcfe4e418e2c1307791036f081335c2d
f4d10b08d7dacd8fe33a6b54a0416eecdaded92c69c933c4a5d3700b8f5100fad
541825cb652606c2ea12fd25a842a8b3456d025841c3a7f563655ef77bb67219
2d978df8df0cf33830aba16c6322198e5889c67d49b40b1cb1eb236bd366826d
414ed95d14964477bebf86dced0306714c497cde14dede67b0c1425ce451d3d7
Df0c7bb88e3c67d849d78d13cee30671b39b300e0cda5550280350775d5762d8
MD5 Hash
a2c2099d503fcc29478205f5aef0283b
9c516e5b95a7e4169ecbd133ed4d205f
d6a7b5db62bf7815a10a17cdf7ddbd4b
c6949a99c60ef29d20ac8a9a3fb58ce5
4b20641c759ed563757cdd95c651ee53
25ee4001eb4e91f7ea0bc5d07f2a9744
18126be163eb7df2194bb902c359ba8e
eaf6896b361121b2c315a35be837576d
e4ee611533a28648a350f2dab85bb72a
e268cb7ab778564e88d757db4152b9fa

\* From [Microsoft blog post on h0lygh0st](#)

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**Annex 77: 2 June 2023 updates to the 1718 Committee’s “Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7: Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK,” originally issued on 6 August 2018**

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) believes that the following information may be useful to Member States in carrying out their obligations contained in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). The Security Council has repeatedly affirmed that the measures imposed by the abovementioned resolutions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by these resolutions. Furthermore, many of the measures found in these resolutions contain explicit humanitarian exemptions that include, in some cases, the need to obtain an explicit exemption from the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis.

Nevertheless, in order to create a comprehensive humanitarian exemption mechanism, paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017) reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, stresses the DPRK’s primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK, or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions.

The Committee recalls that paragraph 6 of resolution 2664 (2022) directs it to assist Member States in properly understanding and fully implementing paragraph 1 of resolution 2664 (2022) by issuing Implementation Assistance Notices. To that end, the Committee notes that paragraph 1 of resolution 2664 (2022) created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006),<sup>1</sup> which was subsequently expanded by paragraph 27 of resolution 2094

<sup>1</sup> At the time of the publication of this update, the Council has designated individuals and entities for the asset freeze in paragraph 5(a) of resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 8 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 10 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 3 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 3 of resolution 2356 (2017), paragraph 3 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 3 of resolution 2375 (2017), and paragraph 3 of resolution 2397 (2017). The Committee has



(2013) and paragraph 32 of resolution 2270 (2016) and clarified by paragraph 12 of resolution 2270 (2016), to permit “the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs” by certain organizations.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 2664 (2022), a case-by-case Committee exemption is not required with respect to the asset freeze described above for activities permitted by resolution 2664 (2022).

Because the exception set forth in paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 2664 (2022) applies only to the asset freeze, a case-by-case Committee exemption is required to engage in activity prohibited by any other measure imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or 2397 (2017), including but not limited to sectoral measures. The Committee also notes that paragraph 6 of resolution 2664 (2022) directs the Committee, assisted by its Panel of Experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of the resolution, including any risk of diversion. The Committee therefore encourages that Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out humanitarian assistance and relief activities for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK to provide the Committee and its Panel of Experts with any information relevant to the risk of diversion.

As such, the Committee offers the following recommendations for Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK.

#### Format of Exemption Requests

The Committee recommends that Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and requiring a 1718 Committee exemption, submit requests for exemptions in a letter containing the following elements:

- Nature of humanitarian assistance proposed to be provided to the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK;
- Explanation of the DPRK recipients and criteria employed to select beneficiaries;
- Reasons for requiring a Committee exemption;

also designated individuals and entities for the asset freeze under the authority granted to it by the Council in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006).

<sup>2</sup> The United Nations, including its Programmes, Funds and Other Entities and Bodies, as well as its Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, international organizations, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organizations, or bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals, or OCHA-coordinated humanitarian “clusters,” or their employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities, or by appropriate others as added by any individual Committees established by this Council within and with respect to their respective mandates.

- Detailed description with quantities and relevant specifications (including, to the extent possible, make, model and manufacturer) of the goods and services to be provided within the exemption period to the DPRK for what purpose and to whom;
- Planned date(s) of proposed transfer to the DPRK within the exemption period;
- Planned route(s) and method(s) of transfer including ports of departure and entry to be used for shipments;
- All parties involved in the transfers, including DPRK entities, whether receiving authorization or providing support, that can be identified at the time of submission of the application;
- Financial transactions associated with the transfers;
- Annex containing itemized list of all planned transfers of goods and services with quantities, approximate value of goods and services in U.S. dollars or local currency, planned shipment date; and
- Measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used for the intended purposes, such as a monitoring plan, and not diverted for prohibited purposes.

The Committee recommends that Member States and international or non-governmental organizations obtaining humanitarian exemptions should do their utmost to consolidate all planned shipments into three shipments or less every nine months, per project, to the best extent practicable. If an applicant who has received a Committee exemption needs to make necessary and well-justified changes to items planned for transfer to the DPRK (such as exact specifications and quantities) and/or the method and parties involved in the transactions (such as the final shipping and delivery plan), the applicant must promptly provide the Committee with all changes needed for review through a follow-up exemption letter. The Committee would then review all the changes requested and make appropriate adjustments to the exemption it provided, where necessary.

If an applicant is unable or in any other way not in a position to provide the above information, the Committee recommends submitting the reason the information is missing and a plan to update the Committee as the details become available. If applicants face any challenges during the process, the Committee recommends they consult its Member State, the Committee Chair, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK. For applicants' convenience and optional use, please find a blank application and annex template for organization's applications on the [1718 Committee website](#).

#### Routing of Exemption Requests from International and Non-Governmental Organizations to the 1718 Committee

There are three ways international or non-governmental organizations can seek exemptions from the Committee as outlined below. However, United Nations agencies, ICRC, IFRC, IOC, or an organization that has received two or more exemptions during 18 months preceding the date of the new application, or the exemption request is in regards to providing urgent emergency humanitarian assistance to the DPRK people, such as aid to fight against pandemic outbreaks, like COVID-19, or aid to respond to a natural disaster, can submit exemption requests directly to



the Committee via the Committee Secretary, in accordance with relevant national authorities and organization by laws:

1. **Member States:** Because the resolution imposes obligations on Member States, it is Member States that should submit exemption requests to the Committee on behalf of international or non-governmental organizations seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. Member States can be contacted domestically or through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York. The contact information for Member States' Permanent Missions is available at <https://bluebook.unmeetings.org/>.
  - The Committee recommends that Member States explain to applicants how their application will be routed to the Committee (for example, if the application needs to be reviewed first by national authorities before being submitted to the Committee) and how much time the Member State will need to submit the application to the Committee. The Committee further recommends that the Member States update applicants frequently on the status of their application.
2. **United Nations:** If a Member State is unable or in any other way not in a position to route such a request to the Committee, the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK may serve as a liaison for the international or non-governmental organization to send exemption requests to the Committee and provide guidance to the organizations. The Resident Coordinator can be contacted at [rco.kp@one.un.org](mailto:rco.kp@one.un.org).
3. **Committee Secretary:** If both Member States and the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK are unable or in any other way not in a position to submit exemption requests to the Committee on behalf of an international or non-governmental organization or fit the criteria above, the international or non-government organization may submit an exemption request directly to the Committee Secretary at [sc-1718-committee@un.org](mailto:sc-1718-committee@un.org). The Committee Secretary will forward exemption requests to the Committee when they meet the following criteria:
  - The requesting entity is an international or non-governmental organization with a track record of having delivered aid to the DPRK or other countries in the past and/or the non-governmental organization is nationally recognized by the relevant Member State(s);
  - The nature of assistance planned to be provided to the DPRK is for humanitarian purposes and benefits the civilian population of the DPRK;
  - The exemption request addresses the informational requirements outlined above.

#### Committee Approval Process

Due to the time-sensitive nature of humanitarian assistance, the Committee will endeavor to process exemption requests as quickly as possible to provide decisions within a reasonable timeframe in accordance with the Committee Guidelines. Exemptions will be granted for a period of nine months from the date of the letter by which the Committee has granted the exemption, unless the applicant specifically requests otherwise and provides a well-founded

justification, such as transportation delays related to a pandemic, for the Committee to consider. If the party that received an exemption is unable to complete the project within the exemption timeframe, the Committee recommends that the party submit an extension request with an explanation, at least ten business days before the expiration date of the exemption. The Committee will review extension requests, updated exemption requests, and urgent emergency humanitarian assistance requests, such as those aimed at responding to pandemic outbreaks, like COVID-19, or natural disasters on an expedited timeframe.

#### Committee Exemption Approval Letter

After the Committee has reviewed the exemption request, it will issue a response letter with its decision. If the Committee approves the request, it will issue a letter to the requesting party that explains specifically what the Committee approves for transfer to the DPRK. An annex with an approved list of goods and services by quantity and planned shipment date will be appended to the Committee approval letter. The Committee approval letter and its annex will be published on the 1718 Committee website upon issuance for the public for the exemption period. The approval letter will be translated to all UN languages and the applicant may share it with relevant parties. If there is a need for the annex to be translated, for example, to help with procurement, customs, or financial transactions, the applicant should include a translated version in its initial application to be posted online once approved. Publication of the exemption allows relevant national authorities involved in reviewing the exempted transfers to the DPRK, and financial institutions and suppliers working with the applicant to quickly and independently verify the exemption.<sup>3</sup>

#### Best Practices

The Committee believes international and non-governmental organizations planning to carry out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK may benefit from reviewing previously approved exemption applications. If a party is willing to make its approved exemption request, or a portion of its exemption request, available for review for the above purpose, or to provide guidance to a prospective party, the Committee requests this information be included in the application. If a party opts in, the Committee Secretary, UN Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or relevant Member State, will share the authorized information to prospective international and non-governmental organizations requesting support. Participating in this best practice process will not impact an applicant's application. Additionally, the Committee Secretary will collate relevant anonymized information for the sake of holding a repository of generalized best practices.

<sup>3</sup> If applicants require portions of their annex to be kept confidential and not posted online, the applicant should indicate this in their application and submit both a full annex for the Committee's review and a redacted annex to be posted online, if approved. If an applicant requires anonymity, an approval letter indicating only the applicant's Member State, type of project, and a short description of the work will be posted online. Applicants requesting redacted annexes or anonymity should note that third parties may not be able to independently verify any portions of their application that are not posted online, and lack of verification might impact certain processes of aid procurement and delivery.

Banking Channel

The Committee is fully aware of the urgent need for establishing a stable and risk-free banking channel for humanitarian purposes and is actively seized in the process to create one.

Limitations of 1718 Committee Exemptions

The Committee reminds all international and non-governmental organizations that receiving exemptions from the Committee for United Nations sanctions does not exempt those organizations and their proposed transactions from the relevant domestic regulations and licensing requirements of Member States involved in those transactions. All international or non-governmental organizations requesting exemptions from the Committee must also fully observe relevant regulatory and licensing requirements of Member States that have jurisdiction over all aspects of the proposed transactions and involved parties, such as submitting a translated version of the annex of the Committee exemption approval letter to the customs authority in countries where English is not an official language and adhering to cash carry limitations.

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Source: [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ian7\\_updated\\_2jun23.pdf](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ian7_updated_2jun23.pdf);  
highlight annotations by the Panel



## **Annex 78: Questionnaire for humanitarian organizations that have worked in the DPRK**

**For this reporting period the Panel asked some reformulated questions addressing the impact of COVID-19 and the closed borders on organizational operations, as well as each group's estimate of when they expect to resume operations in DPRK.**

- 1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?
- 2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.
- 3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?
- 4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.
- 5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?
- 6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?
- 7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

## **Annex 79: Responses from humanitarian organizations**

The Panel has redacted humanitarian organizations' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations and in a few cases on other grounds. The Panel takes no position on the responses provided by these organizations.<sup>256</sup>

### **Organization 1**

[Org.1] has suspended its activities in DPRK since 2020 and therefore no new developments have occurred which might provide information for the panel. We intend to resume our activities as soon as possible, depending on the opening of border and adequate working conditions in DPRK to be able to implement humanitarian projects.

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<sup>256</sup> Two experts are of the view NGOs submissions should be verified and edited before publication.

## Organization 2

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in DPRK, from [Org. 2]’s perspective, are the following:

- Banking and cash supply issue:

The transfer of funds to DPRK being banned, [Org. 2] has to rely on its international staff who are the only option to bring funds to the country during their rotations into the country.

Even though this alternative solution has so far allowed [Org. 2] to keep on working and implementing projects in DPRK, until the border closed in January 2020, this cash supply modality provokes vulnerabilities in [Org. 2]’s operations. First of all, [Org. 2]’s national banks are more and more reluctant to supply sufficient amounts of cash, particularly if the cash supply is intended for projects in DPRK. Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [Org. 2] side to unblock the situation.

- Procurement and supply:

Since the sanctions have come to force, a drop in the number of suppliers applying for the tenders [Org. 2] open in the frame of the procurement of goods and equipment. This decrease in the potential supplier diversity has a direct impact on prices competitively, goods and equipment quality.

- Delay of delivery:

This impact is one of the most visible, considering that it directly impacts the implementation of the projects’ activities. As mentioned previously, the exemption process is now well understood and managed but can still provoke delays in case of unexpected administrative issue (e.g.: [Member State’s] customs that sometimes refuse to recognize the exemptions granted to [Org. 2] –calling for additional negotiations).

Even though the COVID 19 related restrictions on importations decided by DPRK are responsible for this situation, it has to be mentioned that [Org. 2] had materials and equipment ([project items]) blocked at the border since January 2020. Recently, in [Month] 2023, [Org. 2] had to close the project under which this purchase was planned, as the importation of these blocked materials has not been possible from January 2020 until [present].

- Additional workload:

The sanctions and needs for exemptions provoke an additional workload for [Org. 2] teams who have to deal with additional constraints, prepare and follows the exemptions requests.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The strict measures and limitations that [Org. 2] has been facing regarding the COVID 19 have significantly reduced the organization's capacity to monitor the impacts of the restrictions at a local and national level.

The last [Org. 2]'s expatriate staff left the country in [Month] 2020 considering the total suspension of the activities and the complete lack of visibility regarding a potential restart of [Org. 2] operations in the country, as well as the possibility to send personnel, funds and equipment needed to properly run the projects.

Despite its reduced capacity on the ground, [Org. 2] has kept on monitoring the situation prevailing in DPRK through external sources, a bilateral meeting with representatives of the DPRK delegation at Paris level, through its liaison officer who remains active in the country and by participating to the UN-led meetings (clusters and HCT).

The access and communication barriers imposed by the COVID 19 situation as well as the lack of secondary data from other sources make impossible for [Org. 2] to propose an analysis of the humanitarian situation evolution in regards with the current pandemic and borders closure.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

[Org. 2]'s operational capacity has been decreasing from the moment DPRK decided to impose strict quarantine measures in January 2020. However, [Org. 2] did its best to comply with the decreed measures to continue its operations in the country.

As [Org. 2] program activities can only be implemented if an international staff member can physically visit the field sites, all programs were suspended from January 2020. Indeed, from February 2020, the situation at country level was the following:

- No international flights and no entry visa issuance (making impossible the supply of cash and the rotation of international staff)
- Strict limitation of humanitarian equipment and material imports
- No access to the field for expatriate teams

These additional restrictions made impossible for [Org. 2] to keep implementing its projects within acceptable quality and integrity standards, forcing the organization to suspend all its activities.

Despite the suspension of all the activities, [Org. 2] decided to maintain its Pyongyang office opened to avoid losing its capacities to redeploy and relaunch its projects once it is possible again.

Considering the impossibility to send cash to DPRK in the absence of international staff movement, [Org. 2] has therefore been accumulating debts since the suspension of its operations. [Org. 2] sold, through an auction process, two of its vehicles to be able to keep its office running and to pay national staff food allowances among others. [...]

In terms of future operational capacity, the restart of [Org. 2]'s activities in the country will imply a mission revitalization period (restart the coordination with the [DPRK organization], clean up liabilities, identifying potentially new national staff, sending back international staff to the country, assessing the situation of each suspended projects and restart the contact with farms and partners, etc.).

Additional extension of projects will probably be needed, inducing costs that were not initially planned; [Org. 2] is coordinating with its financial partners and will propose adjustments to its projects once the situation will have been reassessed.

[Org. 2] is still expecting to see the borders to reopen in 2023 in order to be able to restart its operations. If the borders remain closed across 2023, [Org. 2] will potentially revise its strategy around December 2023 for the year 2024.

The main limiting factor for [Org. 2]'s operations at the moment is borders closure and the absence of international staff in country, which is the condition to resume the implementation of assessments and field activities at country level.

*4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

The exemption process provoked some delays during the first months after its implementation since the different stakeholders ([Member State's] customs, NGOs, UNSC) had to adapt to this new regulation. The first request from [Org. 2] took up to 5 months up to its approval (including [Org. 2] internal delay to manage the request), the second request 3 months and the shortest one only 2 weeks.

It has to be mentioned that thanks to the support of its donors as well as the reactivity of [Org. 2's relevant] [government institutions] who are in charge of introducing the exemption requests, and a better understanding of the process by [Org. 2], the exemption process has been running better and the maximum necessary delay from the exemption request up to the delivery of the procured items in DPRK has been reduced to 4 months maximum (out of COVID 19 period).



It is worth noting that [DPR] Korean government constraints (Korean customs, restrictive rules, access constraints to the field, etc.) have had greater impact on [Org. 2] projects, leading to delays in the implementation of activities.

An issue to report is that the exemptions granted to [Org. 2] are sometimes not recognized by [a Member State's] customs, which implies additional negotiations and explanation delays with [a Member State's] authorities to eventually lift this barrier.

The customs office in [border checkpoint] did not recognize the note and requested confirmation from the [Member State's central customs authority], that is, the central administration in [a city].

As of October 2018, the Sanctions Committee now publishes authorizations online, this can be very useful in asserting permissions. A good practice that could be implemented to facilitate the process would be to translate these documents into [language of the relevant customs authority] as well.

In the frame of the projects [Org. 2] implements in DPRK, [Org. 2] has requested 6 exemptions to the UNSC under the 1718 Directive.

*5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

In terms of potential improvement to the exemption process, [Org. 2] would recommend the following actions:

- the extension of the 6-month validity period granted for each exemption. Indeed, considering the weight of the exemption request process as well as the procurement delay necessary to import the goods and equipment in DPRK, the 6-month exemption granted so far complicates the implementation of the projects since it has to be quickly renewed to prevent delays in the delivery of the following items to be imported. In addition, even though the exemption process is now well understood and managed by all the stakeholders, any issue in the exemption granting process or more likely in the importation process could delay the importation to more than 6 months and therefore make null and void the exemption valid for 6 months. The current restriction on imports linked to the COVID 19 situation is a good example of this constraint: as mentioned previously, [Org. 2] had to request extension of the exemption since the goods and equipment covered by the granted exemption were blocked at the border.
- To think about possible solutions regarding cash supply due to financial sanctions.
- Strengthen the link with the [Member State's] authorities to facilitate the customs clearance process.

- Make fast tracks when it comes to 1) amendment justified in terms of quantity 2) renewal in the event of expiration.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that “... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies”. Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

This measure, if concretely applied, would allow to gain significant amount of time and ease the planning of activity implementation considering that the exemption process was taking between 1 to 5 months up to completion over the past years (when the borders were still open). Even if well managed by NGOs, this long and heavy process was not leaving room for any unplanned needs and extra purchases in the scope of the implemented projects.

Given the diversity of humanitarian projects and activities, bilateral consultations led by a coordination actor with each humanitarian actor implementing activities in DPRK would allow to prepare a list of goods and equipment needed and purchased on a regular basis.

Once consolidated, a global list common to all humanitarian actors could be pre-approved. Considering the instability of the supply chain to DPRK and in order to remain flexible, it would be important that the pre-approved items and equipment remain generic to avoid blocking the supply in case of minor changes in the technical specifications of the items to be imported.

Depending on the possibilities, a regular update of such a list should be considered to adapt to context and need evolutions.

Possible effects:

- Increased reactivity for humanitarian actors to respond to sudden needs/changes that could not be anticipated.
- Reduced administrative burden over humanitarian actors' shoulders.
- Easier project and activity planning.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

UN sanctions over DPRK prevent easy financial transfer to Pyongyang to allow smooth implementation of the activities as listed at question 1). On top of the financial transfer blockage to DPRK, sanctions prevent today the ability of NGOs to pay their contracted debt. If activities are on standby since Covid period, few running costs are still associated with local expenses (office rent, fuel, etc.) [...]

### Organization 3

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The North Korean governments decision to close its borders in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the humanitarian situation in the country; in our understanding and assessment, the UN sanctions had no influence in this. Aid offers from outside to ameliorate the situation received no positive response from the government. Sources: Monitoring the news in international and South Korean media.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

Due to the closing of the borders, our regular visits to the country came to a complete stop; consequently we lost our detailed first hand information from our local counter parts. Drawing from our experiences, the limitations of available health services in country, in particular the challenges of medical laboratories to monitor infectious diseases and to provide necessary preventive and vaccination materials, the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of the borders hit seriously the overall health status of the population. Food insecurity aggravated this further.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization s operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

From the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, we offered preventive and lab materials to our local counter part, the North Korean Health Ministry. All reactions to support any delivery were slow and came to a complete halt with the closure of the border. Monitoring visits werde not anymore possible and crucial contacts to the our counter parts lost. So even in case the border would open again and visits could be resumed, it would take time to recover project activities and to establish access to local sites. We have been informed that former contact persons changed or even have died.

*4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization s humanitarian response.*

As mentioned under 1) we don't see a correlation between the humanitarian situation and the UN sanctions, but with political decisions by the North Korean government. The UN mechanism to receive a humanitarian exemption had in the past gone smoothly and had no negative impact on our operations.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

The main challenges are at this stage the loss of trust and contacts on our local counter parts' side. So far, we don't see any effort from North Korean government to welcoming international NGO back into the country. Consequently a significant change of attitude of the North Korean government would be required to clearly show that humanitarian assistance is accepted.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

As there is no clear perspective for continuing cooperation with local counter parts in the humanitarian field any suggestion would be irrelevant.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

We hope that the UN panel can contribute to changing the North Korean government's attitude towards allowing humanitarian assistance back into the country.

## Organization 4

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

[Org. 4's] general assessment is that people in DPRK are suffering from a combination of border closures and sanctions against the country. We are concerned that humanitarian support cannot reach people in need, which are expected to be a large part of the population. This is a general understanding of the situation based on media articles, reports and sharing of information among peers.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

The [Org. 4] country delegation in Pyongyang has been kept in place since the closing of the borders [....] Due to the Covid-19 restrictions along with the lack of a functioning banking channel, operations have been very limited. Primary focus has been to procure emergency items and supporting emergency preparedness activities. Items are purchased outside DPRK to be shipped to DPRK and sent to [Org. 4] warehouses. [Org. 4] is dedicated to keep supporting the [local Org. 4] to be prepared in case of a natural disaster. The central problem for [Org. 4] is the inability to get money into DPRK and to pay off the incurred debt to the DPRK [Org. 4] Society, local suppliers and [Org. 4] staff. It is not possible to identify a specific time for [Org. 4] to return with international staff, but we are preparing for a return and ready to respond if there is a request for international assistance during a natural disaster of scale.

*4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

The effects of the sanctions have primarily impacted the ability to transfer funds for the support of operations and staff. The absence of a banking channel along with the unwillingness and risk awareness of banks and suppliers have made it almost impossible to continue funding activities in country. The overall situation is contributing to overall reduced funding and might influence the [Org. 4] ability to sustain presence in DPRK.



*5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

The exemption approval process has met our needs lately. [Org. 4] had helpful and speedy support during the last request and need for publishing of the approval. We appreciate the new 2664 UN resolution but also acknowledge that private actors, especially banks, are still hesitant to support transfers to DPRK.

*7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

Humanitarian organizations must be able to deliver humanitarian assistance in a way that does not compromise the humanitarian principles. There is a need for a permanent banking channel for humanitarian funding.

## Organization 5

- 1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

In the current situation of the country's self-imposed border closure and self-imposed import restrictions, we deem that the UN sanctions currently do not have a major direct effect on the humanitarian situation. On the other hand, we can assume that the humanitarian impact of the DPRK's self-isolation because of COVID-19 is severe and threatens to undo some of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health. However, it has to be noted that any assessment of the impact within the DPRK of the COVID-19 pandemic or the country's border closure is based on assumptions rather than evidence at this point. No foreigner has visited the areas outside Pyongyang since 22 January 2020. Very little reliable information trickles out of the country.

- 2) *How has the COVID- 19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The border closure is a concern especially for the most vulnerable population requiring specific medical treatment, be it for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. With the exception of [one UN agency], which was able to import and distribute therapeutic foods and micronutrients in February this year, international humanitarian actors that used to support the country's health system seem not to have been able to import and distribute goods on a significant scale since June 2020 [....]The strict border closure further affects the livelihood of small traders and industries relying on cross-border trade and imported goods.

- 3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

The COVID-19 pandemic preventive measures taken by the DPRK Government have strongly affected the ability of all humanitarian actors to deliver humanitarian goods and assistance.

[Org. 5] had to put its activities in the DPRK on hold [...] The office in Pyongyang is running with minimal local staffing looking after the maintenance of the premises and other assets. An independent monitoring of the situation is impossible.

A recent positive development has been the delivery to DPRK in [month] 2022 of a stock of PPE gear (Personal Protective Equipment) destined for hospitals. It received clearance at the [Member State's] border, where it was blocked since [Month] 2020. No other activity is currently implemented.

The first and main condition to be able to resume humanitarian operations in the DPRK will be the reopening of borders. As long as they are closed and no international staff is allowed to enter into DPRK, the current minimal activities (maintenance of the premises and other assets) will continue. As for now, there is no concrete signal for any development in that direction or a time horizon for a potential reopening of the border. Without such a signal, it is difficult and too early to assess the level of operations that will take place once they could resume. Their feasibility and the DPRK humanitarian needs at that moment will have to be taken into account.

- 4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

As stated above, the strict border closure imposed by DPRK has had more impact on the difficulties to respond to COVID-19 than the UN sanctions. For example, the stock of [project items were] allowed to enter into the country after waiting for clearance from the DPRK authorities for [number of] years, meaning the humanitarian exemption from the 1718 Committee had to be extended several times.

- 5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

In some cases in the past, the approval process was lengthy and required a lot of information to be collected. However, there has been a significant improvement in the approval process for humanitarian exemptions in the course of the last years. We are satisfied with the procedures, and welcome the 1718 Committee's update of the IAN7 specifying the implementation of Resolution 2664 in the context of the DPRK. We welcome the joint call to work together to sustainably resolve the banking channel. This matter has further increased in urgency, as cash-carry in the current situation is not a feasible option.

- 6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

[Org. 5] welcomes initiatives aimed at facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid, while attaching the utmost importance to the proper implementation of UN sanctions. At this stage, we do not have specific elements to share regarding the Panel of Experts' recommendation.

- 7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

There is room for improvement in the implementation of sanctions as follows:

- establishment of a humanitarian international banking channel, and we refer here to our letter of [Month] 2022 on that matter. We need a way to legally and transparently bring humanitarian funds into DPRK to be able to pay local expenses. Without being able to pay our debts, we put at risk our cooperation with local partners.
- consideration of a "green list" of humanitarian goods for which multi-year exemptions could be granted (for example: water pipes, plastic sheeting for agriculture, personal protective equipment etc.).

## Organization 6

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The humanitarian crisis is a reality that the North Korean authorities refer to the current situation, such as international sanctions against North Korea, COVID-19, and natural disasters caused by the climate crisis, as “triple hardships.” However, at the fifth plenary session in December 2019, the North Korean authorities declared the “front-to-front breakthrough” and decided to resolve the crisis by self-reliance, judging that the situation would be prolonged. These policies remain unchanged over three years (Source: Rodong Newspaper, a party newspaper). Recently (June 15), however, various media outlets in Korea quoted the BBC as saying that starving people appear in North Korea.

In response, we checked with North Korean insiders and contacts to find the authenticity and obtained information that the broadcast could be true. However, insiders also said that although the situation of North Koreans is serious, they should overcome it on their own, not with external help. In other words, it is judged that they are not in a condition where they can request external assistance.

We are concerned about whether the situation before and after 1995 is repeated. At that time, it was recognized that there would be a high humanitarian crisis in North Korea, but there was no way to help it out, so I recall the experience of nearly 300,000 starvation. I hope not to repeat the tragic history. To do so, humanitarian aid organizations must actively seek opportunities to talk with North Korea.

The U.N. says humanitarian aid to North Korea is possible at any time and is ready to provide it if it wants, but we believe that the U.N. is not taking action acceptable to the North Korean authorities.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The North Korean authorities have closed their borders for over three years, preventing even their citizens from entering the country. Recently, the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia borders have been opened, allowing trains and vehicles to enter, but the North Korean authorities need most of the material transported. It is still impossible for ordinary North Koreans to come forward and import the necessary supplies. The COVID-19 quarantine the North Korean authorities are taking is still strongly promoted.



However, we recently sent [item] from Dandong [...] to Sinuiju, confirming that the natural neglect date for preventing supplies in the previous period considerably eased from 90 days (3 months) to 14 days (2 weeks). And from the second half of this year, rumors have been confirmed that it is possible to accept not only supplies but also outsiders' visits to North Korea.

Still, if the international atmosphere is unfavorable to the North Korean authorities, the humanitarian crisis could be prolonged because it is improbable to open the border. We hope the international community will discuss measures to resolve this issue.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?*

We have promoted humanitarian aid projects to North Korea since [Date in the 1990s], but contact with North Korean business partners has been suspended since 2019. Moreover, with the inauguration of a new South Korean government in 2022, military tensions have increased, and as the current government has been confirmed to be pessimistic about inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, we have given up the North Korea project itself. In other words, neither South nor North Korean authorities accept NGO exchanges and cooperation.

Therefore, we are waiting for the time when inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are possible with the minimum number of people. We will closely watch the situation in North Korea and collect related data to focus on education and research projects.

The North Korean authorities are also seriously in a difficult economic situation, so the need to open the border is likely to increase over time. In addition, in May 2023, the WHO decided to lift the COVID-19 pandemic. As many countries are turning to the endemic, North Korea is also likely to come to the international community in the second half of 2023 to supply necessary supplies and secure funds through tourists. Unfortunately, however, the [Org. 6 national] government or NGOs will not be considered.

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

UN sanctions against North Korea make it difficult to deliver supplies smoothly. We can't do business when it's impossible to make bank transfers to purchase supplies. The willingness to actively develop the project has been dampened as we have seen the difficulty of delivering humanitarian aid to North Korea during the three years of the COVID-19 pandemic.

As exchange and cooperation with North Korea and humanitarian aid, which are the basis for our organization's existence, have become impossible, we are stuck in a vicious cycle that has decreased the interest from sponsors and doubled the difficulties in raising funds.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

It is true that the process has improved a lot, with the UN 1718 Committee's approval process for sanctions exemption being streamlined and the time it takes to make an approval decision being shortened. However, from the standpoint of NGOs, it still feels cumbersome and challenging to get approval. In particular, even if we do get approved, humanitarian aid itself is still impossible when North Korea, which accepts it, is not receptive.

Unfortunately, the decision to accept outside humanitarian aid is in the hands of the North Korean authorities. Humanitarian aid is in a difficult place to take hold at a time when the international community, which is unable to resolve the issue of UN sanctions, and the North Korean authorities, which reject UN sanctions, are in a tight tug-of-war. Also, North Korean authorities do not believe that humanitarian aid will fundamentally improve their economic situation; instead, they think it only increases the dependence of its high-ranking officials and people on the outside world.

However, if the internal situation of North Korea is dire enough to dampen the will of the North Korean authorities, as it was in 1995, they may ask for help. But it is the worst-case scenario, and we know from experience that the level of suffering among North Koreans was already excessive in 1995 and that many starvation deaths had already occurred.

In addition, the climate crisis is causing more damage to poorer countries like North Korea, which the North Korean authorities recognize and are trying to solve it. The UN agencies need to step up and promote projects that can fundamentally improve the situation in North Korea. Only then can the North Korean authorities move.

The longer the connection with North Korea is completely cut off, as it is now, the more the way is blocked to grasp the situation on the ground accurately. This is likely to act as an obstacle to the peace of the international community along with the prolonged tension on the Korean Peninsula.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

Items already approved should be exempted from the same approval process, or clear humanitarian supplies such as food and healthcare should be exempted from the UN sanctions waiver approval process altogether. The UN 1718 Committee on North Korea should review and actively implement the system of preparing a list of goods and removing sanctions exemption. We believe that the evaluation of the effectiveness could be sufficiently conducted through comparison of indicators across UN agencies before and after the implementation of the system.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

[...] We hope that [North Koreans] will never starve to death again in another humanitarian crisis. We also hope that UN sanctions on North Korea due to its nuclear program will not drive North Koreans to death.

In common sense, no one believes that North Korea, the world's most impoverished country, can solve strong international sanctions against it, COVID-19, and the climate crisis on its own. North Koreans should not be sacrificed to break the will of the North Korean authorities. We do not think that humanitarian aid, in particular, should ignore this type of business.

## Organization 7

1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

There have been reports that the health of North Koreans is not as good as it used to be since the UN sanctions in 2018. In particular, we have heard from the North Korean Consulate in [Member State] and North Korean sources that the nutrition and health of people in rural areas are worse than in Pyongyang.

2) *How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

COVID-19 and border closures have significantly impacted North Korea's economy and humanitarian sectors. Internally, North Koreans have been surviving on their folk remedies due to the lockdown and disruption of medicine supplies from abroad. Also, we've heard from North Korean defectors that North Koreans are struggling to buy medicine, even at the market.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?*

Since the border was closed in 2020, we have virtually lost contact with North Korea. We received a waiver from UN sanctions in 2021. Since then, we have consistently asked the North to meet in third countries [...] conveying our opinion to the country on the resumption of [Org. 7's project]. However, we have been unable to do so due to COVID-19. Our occasional correspondence through the North Korean Consulate in [Member State] has also been cut off.

According to a North Korean source, we've heard that flights between North Korea and China will resume between July and August this year. Now we are all set to resume the [Org. 7's] project. Suppose we receive a positive response from North Korea. In that case, we will immediately proceed with the project to resume the construction of [Org. 7's project]. As the WHO declared end to COVID-19 as a global health emergency on May 5, we hope North Korea will open its borders soon.

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

Since most of the items we wanted to resume the project with were under sanctions, it took over a year to get the waiver approved. With the borders closed due to COVID-19, we were unable to make any plans for the project as an organization due to the length of time it took to get the waiver approved.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

We are always grateful to the 1718 Committee for providing Sanctions Exemption Guidelines and humanitarian assistance through the Implementation Assistance Notices. Thanks to them, we were able to be exempted from UN sanctions for a significant amount of goods to resume the construction of [Org. 7's project].

However, getting approval for such a large-scale exemption was quite time-consuming and economically draining. Therefore, if the facts of the exemption applicant's project are verified, I think it would be better to exempt the project as a whole rather than approving individual items.

Also, we were approved for sanctions exemption, but we have yet to make any progress due to COVID-19. The exemption approval was extended in [Month] 2022, and we need it to be extended again this year. Instead of continuously extending without making progress, we would like to request an automatic extension until the end of the project.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

First, the whitelist will be created by selecting the most sanctioned items and prioritized items for each field of humanitarian aid. We believe that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the whitelist can be achieved through the monitoring of the organizations that have implemented the assistance and the subsequent submission of monitoring reports.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

As per the answer to question 5, we need the sanctions exemption extended until the project is completed. Please review the automatic extension system for the goods already exempted from sanctions. We are unsure when we will be able to send the goods to North Korea, and we believe continuous extensions are pointless.



## Organization 8

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

As outlined in the annexed letter there is a continuing and pressing need to provide emergency relief and development to the most vulnerable people in DPRK. The UN OCHA's Needs and Priorities Report for 2023 estimates that 11.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the population (10.1 million) are food insecure and according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2022, DPRK scored 24.9, a level of hunger that is serious.

It is important to emphasise also that up-to-date data is not available at this time and that the situation is likely to be worse than estimates indicate. The biggest humanitarian challenges facing the country include chronic malnutrition; lack of access to basic health services; declining conditions in water and sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); malnutrition and high vulnerability to natural disasters

The details in Question 1 in the annexed letter also outlines the unintended consequences of the sanctions.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The annexed letter outlines the information we have regarding the economic and humanitarian situation in the country as a result of the COVID-19 measures. As you are aware the strict lockdown measures implemented in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic have indeed posed significant challenges for humanitarian operations. The suspension of many humanitarian programs and the lack of international staff since early 2020 have impacted the delivery of essential services to vulnerable populations. The restrictions on supplies into the country, limited to China and Russia, have hampered the flow of goods; including food, medical supplies, and equipment. This has put a strain on the availability of food, access to healthcare, and water and sanitation services. It is still not possible to get verifiable data however there are continuing reports in the media about serious food security concerns.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

Again the annexed letter outlines [Org. 8's] operations in the DPRK since early 2020. We are still working from the assumption that the borders may reopen sometime in quarter three 2023. Since our last correspondence there has been some positive reports that the flow of trade by rail and ship are getting back to normal and there is on-going negotiations to open the border by land transport. Moreover, quarantine period of items coming from outside the country at present is 3-6 weeks compared to previously 3 months.

It was also confirmed that [a Member State's] ambassador also crossed a bridge at the [...] border city of Dandong into Sinuiju on the DPRK side by vehicle last March 2023. There have also been some informal reports that there may be some lifting of restrictions for diplomats, UN & International NGO staff in 2023. Nevertheless, until this information has been officially conveyed or validated, we remain in the current situation.

Given the global crisis caused by COVID-19, the challenges faced in DPRK are particularly complex and require concerted efforts from all stakeholders involved. To effectively respond to the humanitarian needs in the country, it urgently require greater cooperation of all stakeholders and needed support to secure entry for international staff and facilitate their movement with fewer restrictions both inside and outside the country.

We recognize that securing the necessary permissions and access for international staff has been challenging due to various factors, including diplomatic and logistical constraints. However, it is crucial that we continue to engage with DPRK authorities and various diplomatic missions to emphasize the negative consequences of restricted access on humanitarian assistance. Through these engagements, we can work towards negotiating a formal arrangement that facilitates the entry and movement of international staff, ensuring access to vulnerable communities and the uninterrupted delivery of critical humanitarian aid.

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

Please refer to Question 1 in the annexed letter for further information on the unintended consequences of UN sanctions.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

Please refer to Question 5 in the annexed letter.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para.188) include a suggestion that relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

Before we are able to provide a response to this suggestion it would be useful to get more clarity on this question specifically related to what are the 'selected exports' currently under sanctions that are being considered for exemptions to finance humanitarian supplies. In hindsight, although the objective is to alleviate human suffering, the challenge in DPRK will be how it could be operational in a very restrictive and controlled environment. Unhindered access to the most vulnerable and unrestricted monitoring of humanitarian supplies delivered should be the most important priority while maintaining the highest standards of transparency, accountability, and impact.

*7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

Please refer to Question 7 in the annexed letter for recommendations regarding the UN sanctions.

#### Annex to [Org. 8]'s letter

Based on the conditions of the UN Security Council's resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), [Org. 8]'s Country programme has streamlined its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to comply with the obligatory UNSC policies and process. We actively pursued the derogation approval processes through the [Org. 8's national] Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as the competent member state authority responsible for the monitoring of the Sanctions. The guidance and collaboration with DFAT on derogations from the UN Sanctions Committee 1718 has always proved to be an effective and collaborative support to [Org. 8] in adhering to the mandatory process and smooth submission.

[Org. 8] successfully received three UNSC approvals; two in 2019 and one in 2020 from the 1718 Committee for the derogation of all humanitarian supplies falling under the restricted Harmonised Standard (HS) Codes on a half yearly basis. The cooperation and approval from the 1718 Committee and support from our Member State, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the [Org. 8's country] Aid team ensured timely humanitarian assistance in [North Korea] up to 2021. Currently our biggest challenge is the strict lockdown of the country as a result of COVID-19 preventative measures. As you may be aware, the majority of humanitarian programmes have been suspended with limited international staff on the ground since early 2020. Supplies into the country (restricted only to China & Russia) have been severely hampered, which has no doubt put a huge strain on food supply, the health system and water and sanitation services. In addition, these restrictions have severely limited [Org. 8] and the International Community's ability to assess and verify the level of humanitarian need on the ground.

*1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

There is an immense need to provide emergency relief and development to the most vulnerable people in DPRK in a timely manner to save lives and uplift the lives of the people. The UN OCHA's Needs and Priorities Report for 2022 estimates that 11 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the population is undernourished and according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2022, DPRK scored 24.9, a level of hunger that is serious. It is important to emphasise also that up-to-date data is not available and that the situation is likely to be worse than estimates indicate. The biggest humanitarian challenges facing the country include chronic food insecurity; lack of access to basic health services; declining conditions in water and sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); malnutrition and high vulnerability to natural disasters.

The unintended consequences of the sanctions continue to have a major impact on the humanitarian operations coupled with the gradual decline in funding. Other factors such as the disruption to the banking channel as the result of the sanctions; the delay in supply chains due to the border restrictions for the transportation of vital goods; inflation in the prices of humanitarian goods and a steady decline in donor funding due to restricted working environments have all complicated and delayed humanitarian responses. The situation gets more challenging in the case of rapid-onset-emergencies, where the humanitarian response needs to be swift to respond in real-time to needs. The capacity to secure supplies to deliver a timely humanitarian response is restricted and complicated by access issues and compliance issues relating to UNSC sanctions. While there is a mechanism of humanitarian exemptions of banned items for UN agencies and INGOs, the approval process of UNSC adds another layer to the huge logistical challenges of bringing the much needed relief assistance to the people in a timely manner. As detailed under question six below, modifications to the sanction approval timelines would be welcomed to expedite the process of delivery of humanitarian supplies once the country opens up.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The humanitarian situation in the DPRK is characterized by chronic food insecurity and lack of access to lifesaving essential basic services with profound impacts on the most vulnerable. The situation has been exacerbated during the global pandemic. DPRK, with its fragile health system took a more protective stand to shield the country from the spread of the pandemic. COVID-19 related restrictions, especially the closure of the border, further hampered the already complex and challenging humanitarian operations on the ground, with international staff unable to return to the country, and the entry of humanitarian supplies severely restricted. The ongoing border closures and the resulting suspension of most humanitarian programmes, means that the humanitarian situation is likely to have worsened significantly in 2022, and will continue to deteriorate through 2023.

The ongoing socio-economic and other challenges resulting from COVID-19 are likely to reverse the meagre development gains made in previous years and result in additional people

requiring humanitarian support and deeper vulnerabilities. Natural disasters such as drought, floods and storms are recurring phenomena in the country, compounding vulnerabilities and food insecurity, and increasing the need for humanitarian assistance. There have been some reports of food imports from China and Russia but these are unverified, and there is no information on how the food items are being distributed across the country and if it reached those most in need.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, field monitoring has not been possible and no verifiable data on the humanitarian situation is available, therefore the data is tentative and subject to adjustment once access is restored.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?*

DPRK has been under strict lockdown since early January 2020. The [number] international [Org. 8] staff left the country at different stages following the closure of the border. The Country Director along with all remaining international staff left in March 2021 by crossing the border by land to China. Since then, [Org. 8] and other agencies have been waiting for the borders to re-open to resume full operations. [Org. 8] was able to remotely deliver some ongoing activities (including COVID response activities with IFRC) in 2020 and 2021, however, it was not possible in 2022 with no international staff in-country throughout the year. As a result, projects were either suspended or terminated impacting the delivery of food security & agriculture, WASH and [disaster risk reduction (DRR)] activities.

Despite this context, [Org. 8] has still maintained its presence in DPRK with limited national staff supervised remotely by the Interim Country Director. The difficulty in accessing cash in country to support the remaining national staff has been a huge challenge, not only for [Org. 8] but also to the UN and other INGOs. [Org. 8] continues to accrue administration operational costs and once the country reopens, these costs will be considered.

*4) If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to their pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?*

It is anticipated that the country will re-open again in quarter three of 2023 and [Org. 8] is cautiously optimistic that international staff will be able to return. There have been reports of a 'return plan' being drafted by the UN Permanent Representative to DPRK, following meetings with the DPRK Ambassador in Bangkok. The on-going DPRK response planning for 2023 is based on the assumption that the border will open at least in the third quarter of 2023. Resuming operations to pre-COVID levels will take time. There may be significant quarantine periods for international staff entering the country as well as long quarantine periods for imported goods. Therefore the priority first step upon re-entry will be to conduct detailed needs assessment to understand the needs on the ground and to scale up operations as quickly as possible.



5) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response.*

In 2020 [Org. 8] joined with the UN and [another organization's] team to respond to the COVID preparedness at the community level, under the "Global Humanitarian Response plan for COVID-19" in DPRK. Between April and May 2020, [Org. 8]'s COVID-19 preparedness response facilitated the distribution of PPE material/hygiene kits to 314 kindergartens, nurseries, schools and clinics, benefitting 12,394 children and community members.

However, as the monitoring and access to the field by the international team has been restricted since January 2020, monitoring and verification of data was limited. Due to the strict COVID restrictions, [Org. 8] faced delays in procuring humanitarian supplies which resulted in the UNSC derogation approval received in April 2020 expiring, as it was valid for up to six months. This meant that COVID response, WASH and other activities could not be continued.

6) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

Looking at the post- COVID-19 scenario when the border re-open and the increasing complexity of the operational environment as a result, it would be extremely helpful to extend the validity of the approval process to allow for expected delays in procurement and other processes.

Further, the consideration of a 'blanket waiver' for local procurement for humanitarian operations would be welcome to avoid the delays in meeting the priority needs for effective humanitarian assistance, once the border opens.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

The list of sanctioned items from agricultural machinery to simple vegetable garden hand tools affect many aspects of everyday life and present serious challenges to social economic and development in the country. This impacts the most vulnerable people who live in remote villages and have very limited access for food, WASH, health supplies, and fuel for cooking and heating in winter. A review of the UN sanctions mechanisms would be welcome to make it more streamlined with wider inclusion to cover humanitarian supplies to reach the most vulnerable in timely manner. Apart from the supply of sanctioned items, many if not all the humanitarian agencies have been forced to suspend their operations due to the limitation of cash supply in the country. It would be very timely and progressive if a decision to pursue an operational banking channel was facilitated to ensure the continuity of the actions with cash flow possibilities for humanitarian operations.

Given the global crisis that COVID-19 has created and the unique consequences in DPRK, we must all work together to prevent further suffering and increasing vulnerability of communities. In order to do this, [Org. 8] must be able to plan and coordinate our operations effectively and efficiently. We also require greater cooperation and support to secure entry for international

staff and ensure international staff can move with fewer restrictions inside and outside the country. This will require continued bilateral engagement with relevant authorities and diplomatic missions to emphasise the negative consequence on the humanitarian assistance and negotiate for a formal arrangement in this regard.

Thanking you again for the opportunity to engage in these critical discussions in relation to the impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on DPRK. We cannot underestimate the importance of greater cooperation and coordination to ensure humanitarian programming can resume and continue to deliver to the most vulnerable communities in DPRK.

## Organization 9

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

We believe there is a “structural vulnerability” when it comes to North Koreans' access to cooking and heating fuels. A vicious chain reaction of energy shortages continues.

Economic hardship due to UN sanctions → Deforestation for cooking and heating fuels → Forest degradation → Landslides due to heavy summer rains → Food shortages → Economic hardship and energy shortages

We've learned that the reality inside North Korea has been revealed through news reports of typhoons and torrential rains in the country and media interviews with North Korean defectors about their struggles to heat their homes and make meals in the winter.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

In the early days of COVID-19, shortages of COVID-19 quarantine supplies, vaccines, etc. in North Korea were already known. However, North Korean defectors suggest that the situation of cooking and heating fuels has improved somewhat as UN sanctions have prevented North Korea from exporting coal, which is distributed internally.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?*

It has been more difficult to get in touch with North Korea than before since the border closure in 2020. Our organization did not have local staff on the ground in North Korea before the border closure, and the closure limited our ability to get information about the humanitarian situation inside the country. North Korea is likely to partially open its borders with the recent easing of COVID-19, but it will take time as political factors such as inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea relations, apart from the humanitarian situation, are strongly at play.

*4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

Implementing UN sanctions required an additional process, called UN sanctions exemption, in addition to the domestic legal process for humanitarian aid. To proceed with the project of providing coal briquette machines, we had to first obtain a UN sanctions waiver before we could begin the domestic import and export process and consultations with North Korea. It was another gateway that we had to go through.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

The process of obtaining the approval for sanctions exemption went smoothly. Still, if the 1718 Committee reduced the time, it would benefit organizations to carry out their projects.

It is also likely to improve meeting the needs and achieving the goals of the humanitarian sector if the approval letter includes recommendations for governments to implement their projects exempted from the sanctions imposed by the Committee.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

We believe it would benefit us if the sanctions exemption continued to apply to the items approved for a sanctions waiver. In addition, the 1718 Committee should make a whitelist by organizing a list of items exempted from sanctions, including non-disclosure items.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

We would love the opportunity to organize online or offline seminars on the implementation of UN sanctions exemptions to share information.

**Organization 10** <sup>257</sup> <sup>258</sup>

With respect to the questions raised by the Panel, the provision of accurate analysis of recent developments of the impact of UN sanctions on the civilian population continues to be challenging due to the lack of transparent data and strict limitations imposed by the DPRK government on access inside the country.

Throughout our submission, we have particularly focused on examining the responsibility of the DPRK government in perpetuating a widespread situation of humanitarian concern among the population, especially the most vulnerable. In particular, we have addressed government expenditure on its nuclear weapons and missile program at the expense of the citizens' health, nutrition, and human security. The human security of North Koreans has remained precarious, especially since the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This becomes increasingly problematic not only as the population remains at the edge of a widespread humanitarian crisis, but also because the state's commitment to develop its nuclear and missile programs continues to pose a threat to international peace and security while violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

[Org. 10] respectfully submits the following observations to the Panel based on our experience, expertise, and current understanding of the topics addressed. Our response below addresses questions 1, 2 and 3 from the list of questions provided by the Panel as these questions most directly pertain to our activities.

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

In our previous submissions to the Panel of Experts, we described the ongoing concerns relating to the humanitarian and human rights situations in the DPRK by highlighting and addressing the government's responsibility in protracting the dire conditions that threaten the human security of the North Korean citizens. Moreover, we addressed the DPRK government's continuation of sponsoring its nuclear development and missile programs despite the critical humanitarian situation that remains widespread in the country and the multiple UN Security Council resolutions that sanction such activities.

One year later, the conditions have not improved. 2022 has in fact characterized a turning point concerning the escalation of tensions in the East Asian and Pacific region. In December 2022, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) stressed the importance of advancing the mass production of tactical nuclear weapons for their potential employment against Japan and the Republic of Korea.<sup>259</sup> Additionally, with the DPRK launching more than 90 missiles in one year, the Republic of Korea and Japan may consider the potential deployment of nuclear weapons within their own territories and/or the increase of military security spending in light of the escalating threats deriving from the DPRK missile launches.<sup>260</sup> Moreover, despite the fact that it remains challenging to establish the exact ratio of the national budget assigned to nuclear weapons and

<sup>257</sup> Note: Sourcing and bolding are in Org. 10's submission.

<sup>258</sup> Two experts are of the view that this organization did not answer the Panel's questions from a professional perspective. Its response is full of ideological bias and misinformation and should not be reflected in the report.

<sup>259</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "World Nuclear Forces," 2022, retrieved from <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB23%2007%20WNF.pdf>.

<sup>260</sup> Kim Tong-hyung, "North Korea sustains high defense spending with new budget," *AP News*, 2023, January 19, retrieved from: <https://apnews.com/article/politics-united-states-government-kim-jong-un-north-korea-south-d834bdfda0c2277f180e2e749b5e764>.



artillery development, it is believed that both the Supreme People's Assembly and Kim Jong-un requested an additional increase of budgetary allocation devoted to military equipment, from 15.9 % in 2022.<sup>261</sup> For each missile launch, Bruce Bennet, analyst and researcher at the RAND Corporation, stated that costs range from \$3 to \$10 million USD. Ever since the 1970s, the DPRK is estimated to have allocated up to \$1.6 billion for the development of its nuclear weapons.<sup>262</sup> Such expenditure would have sufficed to feed the North Korean population for 4 years straight.<sup>263</sup> While the DPRK government continues to allocate funds to the country's military apparatus, humanitarian actors and international organizations believe that the population is continuing to endure increasingly critical conditions relative to their human security.

The most recent FAO-WFP report highlighted that a large segment of the population remains food insecure due to the extremely low levels of food access and consumption.<sup>264</sup> Defined as a "strategic issue" other than merely a humanitarian one by Dr. Marcus Noland,<sup>265</sup> humanitarian concerns and, mostly, food insecurity are deepening within the country as a consequence of the government's policy-making which disregards its own citizens. Exclusive interviews from inside the country quoted by BBC News have recently revealed that food insecurity remains widespread today and people are dying from starvation.<sup>266</sup> Some have argued that the current situation might become catastrophic soon and might amount to the worst humanitarian crisis ever since the famine of the 1990s, also considering the worsening climate conditions and increased global food prices.<sup>267</sup> The FAO currently estimates that the number of malnourished people in the country range from 40 to 60 %, <sup>268</sup> as the number of undernourished people has increased since the 2000s up to more than 10 million people today.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>261</sup> Christy Lee, "Price of North Korea's Missile Launches Measured in Food Relief," *VOA Asia*, 2022, February 2, retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/price-of-north-korea-s-missile-launches-measured-in-food-relief-/6423243.html>.

<sup>262</sup> Rok Suk-jo, "Starving N.Korea Squanders Billions on Developing Nukes," *The Chosunilbo*, 2022, September 27, retrieved from <https://english.chosun.com/m/news/article.amp.html?contid=2022092701605>.

<sup>263</sup> Greg Scarlatoiu, "Long Overdue Paradigm Shift: A Human Rights up Front Approach toward North Korea," *HRNK Insider*, 2022, November 2, retrieved from <https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/11/long-overdue-paradigm-shift-human.html>.

<sup>264</sup> WFP and FAO, "Hunger Hotspots. FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook," 2022, Rome.

<sup>265</sup> Marcus Noland, "North Korea as a complex humanitarian emergency: Assessing food insecurity," 2022, *Asia and the Global Economy*, 2(3): 100049.

<sup>266</sup> Jean Mackenzie, "North Korea: Residents tell BBC of neighbours starving to death," *BBC News*, 2023, June 14, retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65881803>.

<sup>267</sup> Paula Hancocks, "North Korea's food shortage is about to take a deadly turn for the worse, experts say," *CNN*, 2023, March 3, retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/03/asia/north-korea-hunger-famine-food-shortages-intl-hnk/index.html>.

<sup>268</sup> FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, "FAO Hunger Map," 2022, Rome retrieved from <https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/SOFI/2022/docs/map-pou-print.pdf>.

<sup>269</sup> FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, "The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World," 2022, Rome, retrieved from <https://www.fao.org/3/cc0639en/cc0639en.pdf>.

Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions for sanctioning and terminating the illicit activities of the DPRK government to ultimately safeguard the North Korean population and the international community as a whole. The fundamental aim of the sanctions encompasses limiting the regime sources of funding that allow it to pursue its illicit activities. According to our previous submissions and statements, **the sanctions are not meant to degrade the human security or humanitarian situation of DPRK citizens. Rather, accountability for the lack of health, food, and human rights of the DPRK population is to be attributed to the country's regime.** The funds that remain available to the DPRK government continue to be invested in the development of nuclear warheads and missile launches, in turn having a significant negative impact on its population.

To illustrate this proposition, we can look at last year's arms development expenditures versus food shortages. In 2022 alone, the DPRK is believed to have spent \$589 million on nuclear weapons development, approximately one third of its GNI (35%), witnessing an increase of \$21 million from the previous year.<sup>270</sup> As of 2023, the DPRK is expected to not be able to provide enough food to its population as it is facing a food deficit of about 800,000 tons of rice.<sup>271</sup> As the average price of rice is currently estimated to be \$0,70 cents per kilogram,<sup>272</sup> the DPRK government could have used the funds spent on nuclear weapons in 2022 to buy the tons of rice that the population needs. Therefore, despite the potential financial burdens arising from the UN sanctions, the DPRK government could have sufficient funds to ensure a more stable food supply to its population. And yet the DPRK leadership has knowingly and willingly decided to allocate the available funds to its military and security apparatuses. It is therefore a question of will, not capacity, which continues to perpetuate human insecurity among the population.

**Although the UN sanctions may have unintended and indirect negative effects on the civilian population, the DPRK government's priority on the nuclear weapons program directly affects the human security, especially the food and health security of the civilian population.** While UN sanctions can "frequently delay and suspend the delivery of international humanitarian aid",<sup>273</sup> the DPRK government has continued to refuse the humanitarian aid offered by international organizations and bilateral aid offered by other countries ever since the imposition of the COVID-19 border closure.<sup>274</sup> The DPRK's allocation of funds to the nuclear weapons program while also rejecting foreign aid and vaccines for over two years demonstrates how the DPRK's priority on the nuclear weapons program affects the citizens of the DPRK.

<sup>270</sup> International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, "Wasted: 2022 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending," 2023, June, retrieved from [https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/3785/attachments/original/1686495965/ICAN\\_Spending\\_Report\\_2023\\_sm.pdf?1686495965](https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/3785/attachments/original/1686495965/ICAN_Spending_Report_2023_sm.pdf?1686495965).

<sup>271</sup> Sung Whui Moon and Do Hyung Han, "Food shortage spreads in North Korea, with some starving farmers unable to work," *Radio Free Asia*, 2023, May 23, retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/food-05232023121954.html>.

<sup>272</sup> RimJin Gang "Latest Market Price Index Inside N.Korea," 2023, *Asiapress*, retrieved from <https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/north-korea-prices/>.

<sup>273</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, "What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea," 2022, July 27, retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons>.

<sup>274</sup> The Guardian, "'Poisoned candy': North Korean state media shuns food aid despite hunger crisis," 2023, February 22, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/22/poisoned-candy-north-korean-state-media-shuns-food-aid-despite-hunger-crisis#:~:text=3%20months%20old-,%20Poisoned%20candy%20A%20North%20Korean%20state%20media%20shuns,food%20aid%20despite%20hunger%20crisis&text=The%20major%20North%20Korean%20state,increase%20in%20deaths%20from%20starvation>.

Moreover, UN sanctions against DPRK illicit activities have not been enforced unanimously and consistently. [Certain Member States] in particular have maintained a certain level of relationships, trade, and exchanges with the DPRK despite sanctions. This includes officially dispatching North Korean workers to [certain Member States], leading to further human rights violations at overseas worksites. The DPRK's official dispatching of overseas workers provides the government with hard currency which fuels the elite and the country's nuclear weapons and missile program rather than assisting its own population.<sup>275</sup> Dispatching North Korean workers to the Middle East and other areas has become more difficult, due to applicable UNSC sanctions, and most of them are now sent to [certain Member States]. Their worksites are managed by agents of the DPRK. They work under conditions that constitute forced labor while the DPRK regime confiscates up to 90 percent of their salary, under different pretexts. Nevertheless, providing work authorizations and allowing North Koreans to work within the territories of UN Member States remains prohibited by the UN Security Council, following Resolution 2397 from 2017.<sup>276</sup> Despite sanctions having been implemented at the UN level to halt this exchange, North Korean workers appear to have remained in [certain Member States].<sup>277</sup> The latest US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report estimated that between 20,000 to 100,000 North Koreans are currently working in [a Member State].<sup>278</sup> Latest developments have also included the consideration by the DPRK regime to send North Korean workers to [a Member State's]-occupied territories in support of the war in Ukraine,<sup>279</sup> highlighting the continuation of the sanctioned activity also after the spark of the pandemic.

The DPRK continues to use cyberattacks to fund its nuclear program while bypassing sanctions. These cyberattacks and cryptocurrency thefts are used to steal millions or even billions of dollars for the regime while the citizens suffer from food insecurity and health issues.<sup>280</sup> In May 2023, CNN reported that almost half of the regime's nuclear program is funded through cyberattacks and cryptocurrency thefts.<sup>281</sup> Latest data on this matter indicates that billions of dollars are garnered through these illicit activities which is funding that could be directed to alleviate the country's humanitarian crisis.<sup>282</sup> It is evident that cyberattacks, cryptocurrency theft, and the exploitation of illicit overseas workers are essential strategies for the DPRK to fund the nuclear weapons program, despite the UN sanctions and the resulting human and labor rights violations of its citizens.

<sup>275</sup> [https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Overseas\\_Workers\\_0926.pdf](https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf).

<sup>276</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2397 (2017)," 2017, S/RES/2397.

<sup>277</sup> Jacob Fromer, "After UN Worker Ban Took Effect, Russia Granted 753 Work Visas to North Koreans," *NK Pro*, April 21, 2020, <https://www.nknews.org/pro/after-un-worker-ban-took-effect-russia-granted-753-work-visas-to-north-koreans/>.  
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-china-sanctions-idUSKBN1ZL34H>.

<sup>278</sup> US Department of State, "2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea," 2023, retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/>.

<sup>279</sup> Justin McCurry, "North Korean labour could be sent to rebuild Donbas, Russian ambassador says", *The Guardian*, July 19, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/19/north-korean-workers-could-help-rebuild-donbas-region-russian-ambassador-says>

<sup>280</sup> Benjamin Young, "North Korea Knows How Important Its Cyberattacks Are," *Foreign Policy*, 2022, February 9, retrieved from [Underestimating North Korean Cyberattacks Leaves the West Vulnerable \(foreignpolicy.com\)](https://foreignpolicy.com/article/north-korea-knows-how-important-its-cyberattacks-are/).

<sup>281</sup> Sean Lyngaas, "Half of North Korean missile program funded by cyberattacks and crypto theft, White House says," *CNN*, 2023, May 10, retrieved from [Half of North Korean missile program funded by cyberattacks and crypto theft, White House says | CNN Politics](https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/north-korea-missile-program-funding/index.html).

<sup>282</sup> Jeff Stone, "North Korean IT Workers Help Spy from UAE and Russia, UN Says," *Bloomberg*, 2023, May 31, retrieved from: [North Korean IT Workers Help Spy from UAE and Russia, UN Says - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-31/north-korean-it-workers-help-spy-from-uae-and-russia-un-says).

The DPRK regime continues to violate numerous UN sanctions in order to procure the funds needed to support its nuclear and missile development programs. Funds continue to be invested on the country's military apparatus while the population continues to suffer increasing levels of food insecurity and what appears to be an evolving healthcare crisis.

- 2) *How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The current conditions of the economic and humanitarian spheres in the DPRK are driven by political factors. The constant food insecurity and the limited access to basic healthcare and clean water in the country have left millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance. However, the limited and restricted access to information inside the country, along with the absence of official statistics, makes it challenging to correctly assess the needs of the economic and humanitarian spheres within the country.<sup>283</sup> Nevertheless, the evidence collected has highlighted that both have particularly worsened since the COVID-19 pandemic and border closures imposed by the DPRK regime in January 2020. After two years of claiming no confirmed COVID-19 cases, the DPRK government disclosed a nationwide outbreak in May 2022 and launched emergency epidemic prevention measures, including a strict national lockdown.<sup>284</sup> We have previously expressed the concern that the inability to conduct independent assessments within the DPRK directly hinders other countries, institutions and aid organizations from not only estimating the current COVID-19 situation, but also from providing humanitarian assistance in an effective manner.<sup>285</sup>

The DPRK government continues to deny any great negative impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, announcing in August 2022 that it has successfully defeated the virus. The government's preferred narrative remains framing the outbreak as under control for two reasons. Firstly, to boost Kim's legitimacy and enhance domestic control over the population, and secondly, to signal to the world that it is self-reliant under its *Juche* "self-reliance" ideology - able to handle its own affairs without outside assistance.<sup>286</sup> This is only a smokescreen masking the true condition of the country.

It is perplexing to see how the DPRK has been reluctant to reveal the facts regarding COVID-19 - hiding the truth from its people to avoid any potential unrest, and from the outside world to avoid any speculation and investigation.<sup>287</sup> Despite this, the recognition of the spread of COVID-19 has led the government to impose tighter travel controls, both internationally and domestically. Moreover, the overall situation has been defined by worsening food insecurity, decreasing food consumption and nutritional diversity levels among the most vulnerable.<sup>288</sup> As mentioned in our previous correspondence, official statistics indicated a cumulative total of 4.7

<sup>283</sup> ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19," 2023, retrieved from <https://www.acaps.org/country/dprk/crisis/complex-crisis>.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

<sup>286</sup> Khang Vu, "North Korea's Politics Defeats COVID...Almost," *Lowy Institute*, 2022, September 7, retrieved from <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/north-korea-s-politics-defeats-covid-almost>.

<sup>287</sup> Kim Myong, "The Need for the Truth: COVID-19-Free North Korea," *HRNK Insider*, retrieved from <https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2020/04/the-need-for-truth-covid-19-free-north.html>.

<sup>288</sup> ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

million cases in a country of 25 million, with only 74 deaths reported as of July 7, 2022. Around 4.8 million cumulative fever cases (nearly 20% of the country's total population) were reported in the DPRK as of August 2022.<sup>289</sup> Yet on August 11, 2022, the DPRK claimed that it had succeeded in defeating the virus without vaccines. Kim Jong-un called it the "greatest miracle," accomplished without a single vaccine being administered. Subsequently, on August 13, 2022, the DPRK government lifted the mask mandate and social distancing regulations.<sup>290</sup> We have previously submitted that public health experts including WHO have noted that the healthcare system in the DPRK is not at all equipped to deal with such a massive outbreak. Moreover, experts have argued that it remains difficult to provide a proper analysis of the most closed country where we do not have access to the necessary data, casting uncertainty on the government's narrative.<sup>291</sup> In October 2022, Elizabeth Salmón, the special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK, expressed her concerns about the people's access to healthcare given the fragile state of the health system, plagued by unreliable electricity supply, lack of equipment, and lack of access to basic medicine, which has reportedly been further limited during the prolonged border shutdown brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>292</sup> Nevertheless, Kim Jong-un announced victory over the COVID-19 pandemic purportedly without a single vaccine being administered, and after refusing to receive millions of vaccines from foreign countries in the past two years, implying their lack of "technical preparedness" and supply shortages.<sup>293</sup> The situation seemingly changed when, last September, Kim Jong-un announced that the DPRK would begin distributing COVID-19 vaccines officially for the first time in fall 2022, having been wary of the virus spreading during the winter. The origin of the vaccines remains unclear and undisclosed, but most of them are believed to be Chinese imports.<sup>294</sup>

The COVID-19 restrictions have affected the already dire food insecurity and nutritional deficiency levels in the country, especially among the most vulnerable, including the children and the elderly.<sup>295</sup> Between 2020 and 2021, the population affected by food insecurity was estimated to be 45–60% of the total population and the prevalence of malnutrition among children under five years of age was estimated at 18%.<sup>296</sup> The prices of staple foods, i.e. rice and corn, have increased in recent months, with more people not being able to access food. A series of satellite images indicates that the increased border security has almost entirely stopped unauthorized cross-border economic activity, which has contributed to severe shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities. The DPRK government has been taking advantage of the pandemic to tighten control and further oppress its citizens. The government continues to impose severe restrictions on basic freedoms to allegedly contain the spread of the virus. These restrictions include the shutdown of informal marketplaces commonly known as *jangmadangs*, as well as a crackdown on cross-border trade. Kim Yeong-soo, a professor of Political Science and International Studies at Sogang University, said, "North Korean residents obtained food through rations in the past, but since the Arduous March, they have been securing food from the marketplace."<sup>297</sup> Many marketplaces have been shut down due to the COVID-19 pandemic,

<sup>289</sup> [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> Maria Cheng, "WHO Believes COVID is Getting Worse, Not Better in North Korea," *AP News*, 2022, June 2, retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/covid-politics-health-epidemics-north-korea-ba092ba8f0dfd1e534fb420a0efddd91>.

<sup>292</sup> OHCHR, "Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 77th session of the General Assembly," 2022, October 13, A/77/522.

<sup>293</sup> James Fretwell, "State media silence fosters uncertainty around COVID vaccinations in North Korea," *NK Pro*, 2022, November 16, retrieved from <https://www.nknews.org/pro/state-media-silence-fosters-uncertainty-around-covid-vaccinations-in-north-korea/>.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid.

<sup>295</sup> ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

<sup>296</sup> ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

<sup>297</sup> [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.



severely affecting the food supply. “The North has been in serious economic difficulties since a total border lockdown early in the coronavirus pandemic. Yoo Seong-ok, a former chief of the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, “The North is launching provocations to create a warlike atmosphere and quell domestic discontent with economic difficulties”.<sup>298</sup> As such, the strict containment measures issued by the DPRK are expected to have long-term consequences on the economy as trade, imports/exports, aid, and livelihood opportunities have been disrupted.<sup>299</sup> Furthermore, the reduced cases of DPRK citizens who seek asylum abroad are also attributed to the strengthening of border control. The DPRK government has used purported COVID-19 measures to further repress the citizens of the DPRK, which violates freedom of movement and other fundamental human rights.<sup>300</sup>

Constraints on humanitarian access have persisted in the DPRK. As mentioned in previous correspondence, international aid organizations and countries including the United States and the Republic of Korea have attempted to make multiple aid shipments to the DPRK to alleviate the COVID-19 situation in the country, but they have been consistently refused by the DPRK’s government.<sup>301</sup> As previously submitted, UNICEF has been one of the few aid organizations that has been able to ship supplies to the DPRK after it shut its borders in early 2020 (after being granted a second exemption from UN sanctions against the DPRK). However, once a shipment crosses the border, it will likely be held at a storage facility for several months and no information relative to its distribution will be provided to the sender. Considering the organization’s most recent aid shipment took more than a year to reach the country, it is unclear when the latest health and nutrition supplies may reach the DPRK’s most vulnerable groups.<sup>302</sup> It is noteworthy that the DPRK has been implementing the *songbun* system, a socio-political classification system that favors groups who are viewed as loyal to the DPRK regime, its top leadership in particular as well as the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). This system inevitably discriminates against certain groups and limits their access to resources in the country, also including basic services and necessities, and especially humanitarian aid. As mentioned in our previous correspondence, the Republic of Korea approved two recent deliveries of humanitarian aid to the DPRK in October 2022, according to the ROK Ministry of Unification, which was the fourth aid delivery that had been approved under the Yoon administration and subsequently rejected. It seems that regardless of the sender, the DPRK appears unlikely to accept aid as it still exerts strict COVID-19 border controls resulting in very few humanitarian shipments reaching the DPRK over the last three years.<sup>303</sup>

The right to freedom of movement remains strictly controlled in the DPRK. Traveling abroad or moving within the country without government authorization is rendered illegal. The announcement of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in stronger COVID-19 containment measures, with the implementation of a strict national lockdown, tighter border control (including total closure), and a further restriction of the freedom of movement. This resulted in heightened movement restrictions for the population and led to a negative impact on both trade

<sup>298</sup> Kim Myong-song and Yang Seung-sik, “N.Korea’s Missile Launches ‘Squandered a Year’s Rice Imports’,” *The Chosunilbo*, 2022, November 4, retrieved from [https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2022/11/04/2022110400890.html](https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2022/11/04/2022110400890.html).

<sup>299</sup> ACAPS, “DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19.”

<sup>300</sup> Human Rights Watch, “North Korea: Covid-19 Used as Pretext to Seal Border,” 2022, November 17, retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/17/north-korea-covid-19-used-pretext-seal-border>.

<sup>301</sup> [Org. 10], “Submission: UN Panel of Experts,” 2022.

<sup>302</sup> Ifang Bremer, “Seoul approves two new deliveries of humanitarian aid to North Korea,” *NK News*, 2022, October 18, retrieved from <https://www.nknews.org/2022/10/seoul-approves-two-new-deliveries-of-humanitarian-aid-to-north-korea/>.

<sup>303</sup> [Org. 10], “Submission: UN Panel of Experts,” 2022.

and the remaining humanitarian responses.<sup>304</sup> Tómas Ojea Quintana, the previous Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, claimed that “prolonged border closures and restrictions on movement in-country have decimated the market activity that has become essential for the general population to access basic necessities.”<sup>305</sup> Since April 2021, there have been no foreign aid workers left in the country. International aid organizations have been relying on local staff to distribute aid throughout the country, resulting in the increased control of the government over the distribution of humanitarian aid and subsequently increasing the likelihood of maldistribution (as this is subject to the *songbun* system). In her first report to the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Elizabeth Salmón, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, noted that “the DPRK’s self-imposed COVID-19 restrictions led to the departure of all international humanitarian staff from the country.”<sup>306</sup>

COVID-19 and the subsequent tighter border controls have placed a lot of strain on an already failing DPRK economy. Despite this, Kim Jong-un’s choice is still to prioritize his nuclear and missile programs, not food or other necessities of the population. The DPRK remains consistent with its strategy of advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to gain recognition for its status as a nuclear power and to increase its bargaining power with the United States. However, this is a strategy that does not allow any sustainability for future generations. We have previously indicated that sources within the DPRK escapee community who are in contact with sources inside the country have informed [Org. 10] that, in absolute terms, the level of human insecurity may be comparable to the mid to late-1990s, the days of the “Arduous March,” the great famine that devastated the DPRK. It is unfortunate that the DPRK continues to deliberately choose to prioritize the regime’s perceived “security” at the expense of the population’s health and well-being. In our previous correspondence, it was highlighted that if there were a shift in the DPRK’s budget allocation from military spending to COVID-19 relief, the humanitarian impact of COVID-19 on the DPRK could be limited. “The money North Korea spent launching missiles this year could have been used to procure 20 million to 32.5 million coronavirus vaccine doses, according to KIDA.”<sup>307</sup> That would be enough to give each North Korean citizen one round of vaccination, the institute said.” This is the value that the DPRK places on its nuclear and missile program versus that of the lives of its people.<sup>308</sup>

At this point, the DPRK is likely facing a prolonged humanitarian crisis caused by worsening food shortages resulting from long-term border closures, adverse weather, and a failing economy. It has been reported that in March 2023 the country requested assistance from the WFP, which could not be provided due to disagreements around access into the country. According to statistics, before the COVID-19 pandemic, approximately 42% of the population was malnourished, and an estimated 40% of the population was unable to access food or other supplies. In 2022, the number of people affected by food insecurity was estimated to increase to 60% of the population.<sup>309</sup> In the economic sphere, trade with [a Member State] decreased by up to 90% in 2021 compared to 2019. The current humanitarian and economic situation in the DPRK is exceptionally dire. This is due to the lack of imports, including agricultural inputs, and the decline in food production which has led to significant price increases and food shortages. Furthermore, continued access restrictions make assessment data difficult to obtain, allowing

<sup>304</sup> ACAPS, “DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19.”

<sup>305</sup> [Org. 10], “Submission: UN Panel of Experts,” 2022.

<sup>306</sup> OHCHR, A/77/522.

<sup>307</sup> Junnosuke Kobara, “North Korea missile tests cost 2% of GDP already this year: report,” *Nikkei Asia*, 2022, June 11, retrieved from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-missile-tests-cost-2-of-GDP-already-this-year-report>.

<sup>308</sup> Junnosuke Kobara, “North Korea missile tests cost 2% of GDP already this year: report,” *Nikkei Asia*, 2022, June 11, retrieved from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-missile-tests-cost-2-of-GDP-already-this-year-report>.

<sup>309</sup> ACAPS, “DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19.”

Kim Jong-un's narrative to mislead the population. Nevertheless, the DPRK government continues to build its nuclear and missile programs and allocate its funding elsewhere. In 2023, there is no marked improvement in the humanitarian, human security, or human rights situation in the DPRK.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has a clear humanitarian and economic impact on the DPRK, the government continues to prioritize its military power over reducing the impact of the pandemic on its population. The DPRK's rejection of foreign aid while allocating funds to the nuclear weapons and missile programs demonstrates how the DPRK's prioritization of such programs worsens any possible unintended negative effects of the UN sanctions on its citizens, resulting in an exacerbated humanitarian and economic crisis affecting the North Korean population.

- 3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

[...] The COVID-19 border closure implemented by the DPRK has not directly affected our operations and research projects, as we do not operate and engage with local actors within the country's borders. Nevertheless, considering the strict measures imposed in early 2020, including the *shoot-to-kill* orders at the country's borders,<sup>310</sup> the number of North Koreans who escaped the country has notably decreased during the last three years, reaching a record low of fewer than 100 escapees entering the Republic of Korea in 2021 and 2022.<sup>311</sup> As a consequence, the number of recently escaped North Koreans that we have been able to interview has decreased. As we rely on interviews and testimonies of escapees for the collection of data on human rights violations, it has been challenging to obtain direct information about the conditions experienced by the population, both related to the humanitarian emergency as well as the repression and human rights abuses perpetrated by the government.

Additionally, despite the sporadic release of unofficial news announcing the total re-opening of the DPRK-China border for tourism and trade, as of now it remains unlikely that such activities will fully resume soon and that the DPRK will officially open its entire northern border. Nevertheless, small-scale exchanges of both authorized and illicit goods, such as hair products, rice and seafood, have been detected at the beginning of this year at border cities in China and the DPRK.<sup>312</sup> Moreover, considering the crumbling DPRK economy, which deteriorated after the closure of the borders and interruption of all economic exchanges as well as inflows of hard currency, it appears that the country has not entirely interrupted its cross-border trade with China and Russia.<sup>313</sup> Over the course of the pandemic, despite enforcing the strictest COVID-19 border closure in the world, the DPRK has continued to engage in illicit trade for sponsoring its nuclear weapons program, neglecting the needs of its population and breaching UN-imposed sanctions.

<sup>310</sup> France 24. "North Korea issues shoot-to-kill orders to prevent virus: US," September 9, 2020, retrieved from: <https://www.france24.com/en/20200911-north-korea-issues-shoot-to-kill-orders-to-prevent-virus-us>.

<sup>311</sup> Ministry of Unification, "Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors," n.d., retrieved from: [https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng\\_unikorea/whatwedo/support/](https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/).

<sup>312</sup> <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/From-wigs-to-seafood-North-Korea-scrambles-for-trade>.

<sup>313</sup> Sangsoo Lee. "North Korea Likely to Lift Pandemic Border Restrictions in 2023," January 6, 2023, The Diplomat, retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/north-korea-likely-to-lift-pandemic-border-restrictions-in-2023/>.

In conclusion, the COVID-19 border closure has been an additional challenge to international organizations aiming to gather information on the humanitarian and human rights situations within the country and for assisting the people of the DPRK. Nevertheless, the DPRK regime has not altered its sanctioned and illegal activities, continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and never ceasing to represent a threat to regional and international peace and security.

In closing, [Org. 10] wishes to emphasize the egregious human rights situation in the DPRK. [Org. 10] continues to support human rights initiatives in the DPRK and abroad. [Org. 10] would like to highlight a “Human Rights up Front” approach towards the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK, also aiming to successfully denuclearize the country, which includes international access to DPRK detention facilities, increased transparency, and in-country access for human rights organizations as well as humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable groups in the DPRK. [Org. 10] respectfully recommends that the Panel ask organizations requesting sanctions exemptions for specific information on the intended locations of the disbursement of humanitarian aid as well as its beneficiaries. This will facilitate better monitoring of humanitarian aid and allow to determine more accurately whether the aid prioritizes the most vulnerable DPRK citizens.

## Organization 11

*1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

The DPR Korea has suffered a severe set-back, impacting the humanitarian situation due to UN and bilateral sanctions and to the complete closure of borders since February 2020. This has further weakened [Org. 11]'s efforts to supply critical equipment and human resources development initiatives.

The sanctions and closure of borders also have challenged and, in some cases, stopped the work of [Org. 11] and other ... humanitarian organizations. The dysfunctionality of international banking channels has further led to acute liquidity crunch and severely constrained the critical in-country activities. Concomitantly, with limited in-country funds, [Org. 11]'s focus remained in supporting and responding to humanitarian crisis and emergencies, such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, floods and typhoons, etc. Resultantly, there is dearth of resources needed to develop strategies enabling prevention and mitigation of shocks and emergencies, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

For instance, procurement got delayed due to the closure of borders and ultimately some items could not be procured.

These challenges further cascaded when some supplies and equipment got stranded at the [Member State's] borders and not allowed to enter the country, thus incurring huge storage/demurrage/cold chain charges.

*2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

[See also response under 1) above]

In January 2020 the Government of DPRK closed its international borders (air, sea, and land) in an attempt to prevent the entry of the novel coronavirus into the country when WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak to be a pandemic. As of date, the borders continue to remain closed although the limited supply of essential commodities are being allowed on a case-by-case basis.

The strict restrictions on cross-border movement has a profound negative impact on the flow of supplies, which the DPRK population heavily relied on to supplement the government initiatives to meet needs of its vulnerable population.



To reiterate, several shipments of essential and critical equipment that [Org. 11] procured, most of which were approved by the UN Sanctions Committee were held up at different locations incurring large expenses on storage charges and customs demurrage. Several shipments expired while being held up, costing more money to dispose such shipments. Some shipments had to be re-routed to other countries, causing additional financial burden.

*3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

In the absence of any international staff allowed in the country for about three years, the operations were remotely managed. The implementation of technical activities however, got severely impacted.

There were certain difficulties encountered as during the year 2021 and early 2022 the borders and ports were closed due to pandemic which impacted in delivering supplies to the country. Also due to the sanctions imposed on certain items, the procurements are delayed.

The preparation of the required documentation for the UN Sanctions Committee is lengthy and requires several levels of consultations.

As of now, there is no concrete information from the Government on the border reopening. However, with WHO's declaration of COVID-19 no longer a public health emergency of international concern, it is anticipated that the Government may consider opening its borders in the near future.

*4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

With the decision of the Government to limit the presence of international staff, the capacity of the [Org. 11] Country Office was markedly reduced. Limited capacity due to suboptimal staff presence led to challenges in providing emergency support to the country. This got further aggravated when all international staff had to leave the country.

*5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

[Org. 11] has been able to obtain humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 committee in the past as required, generally on a fast-track process, whenever required. [Org. 11] also appreciate the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months (i.e., up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays. This development is very helpful and welcome. Thanks to the quick approval process used during the pandemic, [Org. 11] requests to procure emergency supplies were approved within 4 days, which is a positive example of the UN Sanctions Committees flexibility and understanding of the severity of the situation.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that “... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies”. Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

The Panel’s recommendation is a welcome move if considered. It would be good to know the selected exports under sanctions that will be considered for exemption. without which it will be difficult to comment or suggest how the proceeds for financing humanitarian supplies will be utilized.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

One of the major challenges in [Org. 11]’s work in DPRK has been the absence of a viable banking channel to transfer much needed funds for in-country operations and programmatic implementation. This has a significant negative impact on [Org. 11] activities, and a quick and efficient solution is required to be found. This also negatively impact international staff to meet their daily subsistence expenses like accommodation, food, and other personal expenses.

## Annex 80: Excerpts of *BBC News* interviews conducted in 2023 with North Korean citizens in the DPRK

### Individual 1 (“Myong Suk” – a border town)

*“I wake up at 5 am and make breakfast for my family. Then I go and prepare my business at the market, where I sell medicine. Before COVID, life was stable. I didn’t smuggle every day, but my business made quite a profit. But since COVID, my earnings have halved. It’s become much harder to smuggle things over the border, and the crackdowns have become stricter. I tried to smuggle, but I got caught. I had to bribe an official with money I didn’t have, and barely got away with it. After that, I was monitored, and I couldn’t do anything. Most of the products in the market came from China, but it’s empty now. You could always find grain, but not these days. The scarcest thing is medicine. Even if you can find it, it’s too expensive.”*

*“Our food situation has never been this bad,”* Myong Suk tells us.

She is the main earner in the family. Before the border closure, Myong Suk would arrange for much-needed drugs, including antibiotics, to be smuggled across from China, which she would sell at her local market. She needed to bribe the border guards, which ate up more than half of her profits, but she accepted this as part of the game. It allowed her to live a comfortable life in her town in the north of the country, along the vast border with China.

The responsibility to provide for her family has always caused her some stress, but now it consumes her. It has become nearly impossible to get hold of products to sell.

Once, in desperation, she tried to smuggle the medicine herself, but was caught, and now she is monitored constantly. She has tried selling North Korean medicine instead, but even that is hard to find these days, meaning her earnings have halved.

Now when her husband and children wake, she prepares them a breakfast of corn. Gone are the days they could eat plain rice. Her hungry neighbours have started knocking at the door asking for food, but she has to turn them away.

*“We are living on the front line of life,”* she says.

The pandemic, she believes, has merely provided the authorities with the excuse to re-exert its diminished control over people’s lives. *“Really they want to crack down on the smuggling and stop people escaping,”* she says. *“Now, if you even just approach the river to China, you’ll be given a harsh punishment.”*

### Individual 2 (“Chan Ho” – a border town)

*“I work on construction projects. Often, we have to work late into the night, and I sleep at the site. I wouldn’t be able to survive if my wife didn’t work at the market. When they closed the border, everything became scarce. The price of grain, sugar and seasoning has shot up. Food supplies are so low, people have started dying.”*

*“I want people to know that I am regretting being born in this country,”* says Chan Ho, a construction worker.

He helps his wife set up for the market, before heading to the construction site. He carries her products and loads them on to her stall, aware that her business is the only reason he is still alive. The 4,000 won he makes a day is no longer enough to buy one kilo of rice, and it has been so long since his family received government food rations, he has forgotten about them.

The markets, where most North Koreans buy their food, are now almost empty, he says, and the price of rice, corn and seasonings has soared.

At first Chan Ho was afraid he might die from Covid, but as time went on, he began to worry about starving to death, especially as he watched those around him die.

The first family in his village to succumb to starvation was a mother and her children. She had become too sick to work. Her children kept her alive for as long as they could by begging for food, but in the end all three died. Next came a mother who was sentenced to hard labour for violating quarantine rules. She and her son starved to death.

More recently, one of his acquaintance's sons was released from the military because he was malnourished. Chan Ho remembers his face suddenly bloating. Within a week he had died.

*"I can't sleep when I think about my children, having to live forever in this hopeless hell," he says.*

This is the hardest period he has ever lived through. The famine was difficult, he says, but there were not these harsh crackdowns and punishments. *"If people wanted to escape, the state couldn't do much,"* he says. *"Now, one wrong step and you're facing execution."*

His friend's son recently witnessed several executions carried out by the state. In each instance three to four people were killed. Their crime was trying to escape.

*"If I live by the rules, I'll probably starve to death, but just by trying to survive, I fear I could be arrested, branded a traitor, and killed,"* Chan Ho tells us. *"We are stuck here, waiting to die."*

### Individual 3 ("Ji Yeon" – Pyongyang)

*"I know one family that starved to death at home. No-one came in or out for three days. Water was brought around, and we knocked on their door telling them to get some. But nobody answered. There are lots of beggars now. if they're lying down, we check them and usually find they're dead. There are others who kill themselves at home or disappear into the mountains. I never used to hear of this happening."*

Ji Yeon has two children and her husband to support with the pennies she makes working in a food shop.

She used to sneak fruit and vegetables out of the shop to sell at the market, alongside cigarettes her husband received in bribes from his co-workers. She would buy rice with the money. Now her bags are thoroughly searched when she leaves, and her husband's bribes have stopped coming. No-one can afford to give anything away.

*"They've made it impossible to have a side-hustle,"* she frets.

Ji Yeon now goes about her day pretending she has eaten three meals, when in truth she has eaten one. Hunger she can endure. It is better than having people know she is poor.

She is haunted by the week she was forced to eat puljuk – a mash of vegetables, plants and grass, ground into a porridge-like paste.

*"We survive by thinking 10 days ahead, then another 10, thinking that if my husband and I starve, at least we will feed our kids,"* Ji Yeon says. Recently she went two days without food.

*"I thought I was going to die in my sleep and not wake up in the morning,"* she says.

Despite her own hardship, Ji Yeon looks out for those worse off. There are more beggars now, and she stops to check on the ones lying down, but usually finds they are dead. One day she knocked on her neighbour's door to give them water, but there was no answer. When the authorities went inside three days later, they discovered the whole family had starved to death.

*"It's a disaster,"* she says. *"With no supplies coming from the border, people do not know how to make a living."* Recently she has heard of people killing themselves at home, while others disappear into the mountains to die. She deplores the ruthless mentality that has blanketed the city.

*"Even if people die next door, you only think about yourself. It's heartless."*

Source: BBC News, lightly edited by the Panel, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/bskbb4rmae/inside-north-korea>

## Annex 81: Russian Ambassador Alexander Matsegora's interview with NK News

### INTERVIEWS

## Russian ambassador rejects reports of famine in North Korea, corpses on streets

In interview, Alexander Matsegora admits food situation is 'not easy' but dismisses BBC documentary claims of starvation

Chad O'Carroll June 23, 2023

The Russian Embassy in North Korea has not observed an increase in beggars in Pyongyang or dead bodies lying in the streets, the country's ambassador has told *NK News*, dismissing claims featured in a new documentary on famine in the DPRK.

But Ambassador Alexander Matsegora acknowledged that the food situation is "not easy" and that North Korea lacks fertilizers, farm machinery and other materials needed to boost harvests, blaming international sanctions for preventing their import.

In written remarks sent to *NK News* on Thursday, Russia's envoy to the DPRK described a new BBC documentary on food shortages in the country as "biased" and "far from the truth" and claimed that there are "no signs of starvation" in the capital.

In the documentary released last week, an anonymous Pyongyang source told the British broadcaster that she had seen a growing number of beggars on the streets, adding that "if they are lying down we check them and usually find that they are dead."

The source also said she knew of a family of three that starved to death at home, while sources in other parts of the country told the BBC they had experienced major food shortages.

Jesus Aise Sotolongo, Cuba's former ambassador to North Korea who ended his post in April, also rejected BBC's reports of famine in the capital and told *NK News* that the food situation was stable when he left.

He also said there had been "radical" improvements in food supplies compared to summer 2021, when North Korean state media openly admitted to a "food crisis."

Both Cuba and Russia have historically maintained friendly ties with the DPRK, and Moscow and Pyongyang have notably made efforts to strengthen cooperation since last year.

A third diplomat in Pyongyang told *NK News* on condition of anonymity that they had not observed famine-like conditions in the capital, but they did note rising food scarcity of late.

Experts have raised alarm about the food situation in North Korea since earlier this year, with some analysts warning that price data and other signs point to the worst food insecurity since the Arduous March famine of the 1990s.

The South Korean government also assessed that a "significant" number of North Koreans are dying of starvation in smaller cities, while concluding that the situation has not yet devolved into mass famine.



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*The following interview has been edited for clarity and style.*

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**Amb. Alexander Matsegora:** I've received your letter with a request to answer the questions about the situation in North Korea. Being an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I was supposed to ignore such an inquiry, especially from the representative of the unfriendly state's media.

I'm sure that ambassadors, for example, of the USA or Great Britain, accredited in any state, would not have done so in case Russian media made such a request. But the story by BBC, which I surely watched and read, is so biased and so far from the truth that I've decided to answer some of your questions in order to discredit that false impression, which English colleagues deliberately or not could have created in the minds of their audience. Besides, I think that if I stay silent that will give grounds to believe the story made by BBC.

I ask you to publish this letter and my answers in full. Keeping in mind our previous agreement, I suppose that you will not add any comments in the vein of the modern Western mainstream. [Editor's note: *NK News* proposed using the ambassador's responses to inform this report.]

So, here are my answers to your questions.

**NK News: A source in Pyongyang reportedly told the BBC that there are now lots of beggars on the streets of the capital, and that often they can be found "lying down." When the bodies are checked, they are "usually dead," the source said. What is your and colleagues' experience of walking around Pyongyang? Have you ever encountered such scenes?**

**Matsegora:** Neither I nor my colleagues walking or driving around Pyongyang have ever seen beggars lying or loitering in the streets.

There are even no drunk people lying around in the streets here, as is often the case in many other capitals.

It is impossible to imagine someone falling down and not having a passerby run up and help him get up.

**NK News: DPRK state media acknowledged a "food crisis" in summer 2021. However, Chinese trade data now shows that bilateral trade has recovered to nearly pre-pandemic levels. How would you characterize the changing supply of food and medical supplies since the beginning of the pandemic to date?**

**Matsegora:** As for the availability of locally produced food (grain, beans, potatoes, meat, poultry, eggs, vegetables, fruits), the situation has not changed compared to the pre-pandemic period — the aisles in stores were full of all kinds of goods both then and now. There is more fish available as sea and river fishing resumed after being temporarily put on hold by the Emergency Anti-Epidemic Headquarters.

Prices, as always, fluctuate slightly depending on the season but generally remain stable. The range of imported food products is slightly wider than at the end of 2020, but it is still nowhere near as extensive as it was before the pandemic.

Medicines, including those made in Russia, are now quite available in pharmacies, and the deficit in pharmaceutical products is virtually gone, except maybe for a few rare medications.

I would add one caveat here: Although the markets in Pyongyang and all other cities are overcrowded with both vendors and customers, certainly not everyone can afford to buy food at market prices on a daily basis.

That's why there is a fixed rationing supply system in place here. Depending on a person's workplace, either the state or his enterprise is responsible for providing food rations. The main thing is to have sufficient resources to meet the population's needs to the utmost. Hence, the availability of these resources remains the key issue. I will talk about it later.

**NK News:** A source in the BBC report claims closed-door executions are now taking place in the DPRK. Have you or colleagues ever heard of such a phenomenon?

**Matsegora:** I have never heard of any "closed-door executions."

**NK News:** Overall, what is your assessment of the BBC documentary and the text report that claims that the DPRK currently is enduring food shortages so significant that people are starving to death? The ROK government has shared similar assessments in recent months.

**Matsegora:** The situation with food resources is not easy, and the DPRK government admits this. One of the main reasons for it is last year's unfavorable weather conditions. But the current difficulties are nothing compared to those during the Arduous March [famine of the 1990s]. At that time, it was very hard. I was here at that time, so I can compare. Now there are no visible signs of starvation here.

Regarding the last point, I would like to add the following. Increasing grain production is the main, top-priority goal on the list of 12 goals to be achieved by the government during the five-year plan (2021-2025). All government efforts are aimed at solving the problem of nutrition once and for all. A lot is being done; we can see it with our own eyes.

But, unfortunately, there are still many issues that cannot be resolved quickly, and harvest yields cannot be increased dramatically due to a lack of fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, agricultural machinery and spare parts for them. The local industry can't fully satisfy these needs. However, the country could have imported all these items, including grain, from abroad. But sanctions do not let it happen.

In the West, you whine pharisaically that North Korean authorities don't provide food to their people and also don't let humanitarian organizations in to help with the food situation. In fact, this country doesn't need any of your help, especially since in recent years humanitarian aid has not reached more than \$25 million a year (that's one dollar per person per year).

The DRRK could have fully coped with its problems if there were no sanctions imposed on it. Lift the sanctions or ease them at least partially, give North Koreans an opportunity to legally export their coal, iron ore and seafood. Allow them to open a bank account, and deposit a well-earned \$2 billion so they could pay for 500,000 tons of grain, 300,000 tons of fertilizer, 100,000 tons of diesel fuel, 50,000 tons of pesticides, tractors and harvesters.

Make customs officers authorize bringing these goods to the DPRK, and do not harass foreign manufacturers, suppliers and transporters for maintaining ties with North Korea. Then the issue of DPRK people's nutrition will be solved in the shortest possible time!

But we understand that the West will never let this happen. Because the worse it is here, the better it is for them. Because the West wants to make the life of the people of North Korea as difficult as possible, stoke up grievances against the authorities, provoke protests and (this is a golden dream!) finally give rise to social upheavals, overthrow the political system and achieve the overarching goal of destroying the DPRK as a sovereign state.

By the way, the West is trying to do the same in my country. That won't work either in Russia or in DPRK.

*Edited by* [REDACTED]

*Source:* <https://www.nknews.org/2023/06/russian-ambassador-rejects-reports-of-famine-in-north-korea-corporates-on-streets/>

## Annex 82: Excerpts from previous Panel reports on humanitarian factors

### S/2019/171, paragraph 176

176. Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption clauses and the Committee's efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience unintended consequences on their humanitarian programmes that make it impossible to operate normally in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The six main areas of concern communicated to the Panel are: delays in receiving exemptions; the collapse of the banking channel; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in willing foreign suppliers; the increased cost of humanitarian-related items and operations; and diminished funding for operations (see annexes 85–87). These are negatively affecting their ability to implement humanitarian-related programmes. In particular, the sectoral sanctions are affecting the delivery of a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see *ibid.*). For the Panel's assessment of adverse humanitarian consequences of sanctions for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, see annex 85.

### S/2019/691, paragraph 83

83. In its previous final report, the Panel identified six main areas of concern communicated by United Nations agencies and humanitarian operations in which unintended consequences had adversely affected the operation of their humanitarian programmes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (S/2019/171, para. 176). Two leading concerns were delays in receiving exemptions from the Committee and the collapse of the banking channel. On 6 August 2018, the Committee adopted "Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7: guidelines for obtaining exemptions to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".<sup>48</sup> While the average time between the receipt and approval of exemption requests has been significantly reduced,<sup>49</sup> there has been no restoration of a banking channel. This, together with the practice by financial institutions of rejecting all transactions tied up to high-risk jurisdictions, has continued to hinder the programmes of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, with adverse consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

<sup>48</sup> Available at [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718\\_implementation\\_assistance\\_notice\\_7.pdf](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718_implementation_assistance_notice_7.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> From February 2019 to the time of writing, the Committee granted 16 approvals. Information about the exemptions approved by the Committee are posted on the website. See [www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests](http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests).



**S/2020/151, paragraph 209**

209. There can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations, although access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic factors within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the latest United Nations sanctions could exacerbate an already difficult situation in the country for those employed in sectors directly or indirectly affected by sanctions, as well as potentially disrupting supplies of necessities to the civilian population. The unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following:

- The disappearance of, or a decrease in, sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by United Nations sanctions and for repatriated overseas workers; this effect may be up to hundreds of millions of dollars, based on rough estimates<sup>200</sup> (see annex 68).
- An increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, including the “new market economy”, in some cases channelling these resources to purposes other than the needs of the population.
- Continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization in agriculture, which can limit harvest windows and compound food insecurity caused by adverse environmental conditions and mismanagement of domestic resources (see annex 69).
- Increases in the disruption of medical supply chains, which can significantly impact the chronically underfunded and inadequate health-care system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
- The collapse of the United Nations banking channel and the subsequent lack of access to consistent and reliable financing jeopardizes supply chain operations and results in projects being suspended or stopped altogether. It has also created risky situations for humanitarian personnel.
- Financial institutions and private-sector entities continue to refrain from transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. Moreover, some financial institutions draw no distinction between United Nations and unilateral sanctions. This affects the humanitarian operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the United Nations and other organizations, to include increased costs.

<sup>200</sup> Estimates from the Bank of Korea (see <https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091>, webpage in Korean).

## S/2020/840, paragraphs 156-158 and 160

156. As the Panel has previously noted, it is difficult to disambiguate United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic and political factors, but there can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.<sup>97</sup> Additionally, according to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "government policy lockdown measures – enacted early in response to [COVID-19-related] low capability for health preparedness – have hit the economy in a way that sanctions alone do not appear to have".

157. The Panel notes that several non-governmental organizations have concerns about United Nations sanctions affecting the civilian population. One concern, for example, is how sanctions may further constrain limited agricultural resources (for example, transportation, machinery and production of fertilizers) and the allocation of financial resources for food imports, leading to reduced food "availability" (that is, decreasing food security). This effect is further compounded by the political priorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which have reduced "accessibility" through the redirection of needed resources.

158. According to some assessments, sectoral sanctions may result in negative social and economic consequences for those employed in those sectors, including loss of income.<sup>98</sup> The extent of this effect, however, is largely unknown as there is no accurate compilation of economic data and the fiscal and monetary policy priorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may also have a significant impact. There is also a concern about lost wages for repatriated workers, especially those who may have been affected by COVID-19-related quarantine measures.

...

160. The concern of financial institutions and private-sector entities over compliance with sanctions regimes continued to affect humanitarian operations. The efforts to restore the banking channel for United Nations humanitarian organizations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and provide access to consistent and reliable financing continued with marginal progress owing to the pandemic, jeopardizing supply chain operations and also creating risky situations for humanitarian personnel.

<sup>97</sup> For the Panel's most recent reporting, see S/2020/151, sect. VI.

<sup>98</sup> Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, media statement, Geneva/Seoul, 9 June 2020. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25929&LangID=E>.



## S/2021/211, paragraphs 168-171

168. United Nations agencies, Member States and non-governmental organizations describe the evolving humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as dire and rapidly deteriorating. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental disasters, sanctions and the mismanagement of social and economic policies have exacerbated food shortages,<sup>141</sup> led to price spikes and panic buying and further limited the availability of medical supplies and services.<sup>142</sup>

169. Given these factors, in addition to the scarcity of accurate data, the Panel is unable to make a quantitative assessment of the unintended consequences of United Nations sanctions<sup>143</sup> but notes that during the reporting period sanctions likely had unintended effects affecting civilian population.

170. According to two Member States, the unintended consequences of United Nations sanctions were as follows:

- Limitations on fuel imports negatively influenced energy security,<sup>144</sup> production of electricity,<sup>145</sup> civil transport and agriculture, and resulted in ecological problems like deforestation
- Constraints on agricultural resources, e.g. transportation services, imports of machinery and production of fertilizers, led to reduced food "availability"<sup>146</sup>
- The health care, sanitation and hygiene spheres were negatively affected by import restrictions on medical equipment and its supplements<sup>147</sup>
- Sectoral sanctions caused an estimated loss of at least 200,000 jobs, resulting in a disappearance of income and a rise in hidden unemployment
- The repatriation of workers has led to the loss of income and adverse socioeconomic conditions. Such workers were mostly sent to do construction work in remote mountainous regions, practically without pay, and some faced a debt crisis because of the abrupt termination of their earnings.

<sup>141</sup> A Member State conveyed to the Panel that the public distribution system quota as of October 2020 had been reduced to 545 grams.

<sup>142</sup> See annex 98 for the statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the humanitarian crisis in that country.

<sup>143</sup> Two experts have different views on this.

<sup>144</sup> According to research materials (<http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Refined-Products-Balance-Thru-July-22-2020-SR-PDF.pdf>), imported fuel is predominantly used in the civilian sector (see annex 97).

<sup>145</sup> According to the Member States: "Amid growing scarcity of hydrocarbons in the country, many thermoelectric power stations suspended their operation".

<sup>146</sup> According to the Member States: "Unable to use the fuel-consuming farming equipment, Korean farmers are forced back to implement less effective methods (up to using draught cattle and manual labour)".

<sup>147</sup> The Member State notes that "health-care problems grow out of import restrictions on medical equipment and its supplements related to coercive measures and of a deficit of foreign currency due to export restrictions".

171. Two additional Member States reported to the Panel that their analyses indicate that the trajectory of economic mismanagement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including "white elephant" projects and the diversion of resources, not sanctions, has been the primary driver of agricultural declines, food insecurity and inadequate health and medical services. The Member States further noted the following:

- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to prioritize the stability and continuity of the Kim family regime over all other national priorities, including health and medical services and food security
- The vast majority of the income that nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea earn abroad is retained by the State-owned enterprises that employ them, so the regime is the primary beneficiary of their labour. Additionally, any "social benefit" derived from overseas workers is hampered by strict living conditions that are controlled and monitored;
- Agricultural and enterprise reforms were publicly launched months after Kim Jong Un took power in 2012 and rolled back almost immediately afterwards, nearly five years before the Security Council unanimously implemented sectoral sanctions and bans on overseas workers in 2017
- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has politicized humanitarian assistance. It is only accepting aid in areas that the Korea Workers' Party considers a priority, and it is only accepting aid from countries that do not pose an ideological problem for the regime or demand procedures that minimize diversion. Moreover, the aid has "almost certainly" been diverted to meet the needs of the leadership, ultimately reducing the incentive for meaningful economic reform.
- The regime has focused all its energy on hastily building a showcase hospital in the heart of the capital city. Construction was started, apparently, without a comprehensive plan for even completing the building and was rushed to meet an artificial political deadline, which was not met.

## S/2021/777, paragraphs 174-178

174. United Nations agencies, Member States and non-governmental organizations continue to characterize the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as deteriorating. In April 2021, Kim Jong Un underscored the severity of the country's economic situation, noting that "the people's food situation is now getting tense as the agricultural sector failed to fulfil its grain production plan due to the damage by typhoon last year",<sup>118</sup> and the situation was officially described as a "food crisis",<sup>119</sup> which official data support.<sup>120</sup> This admission coincided with an unusual price volatility for many consumer commodities, food shortages, a drop in access to goods and services, panic buying and a further decrease in the availability of medical supplies and services. The Panel attributes the following as factors contributing to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

(a) Measures related to the prevention of COVID-19, including border closures since January 2020 and the virtual cessation of consumer imports, declines in export earnings and strict limits on the ability to purchase food and other essential goods;

(b) Continuing restrictions related to United Nations sanctions: In its previous reports, the Panel assessed that these restrictions, such as limitations on the importation of fuel, machinery and spare parts, had unintended effects on energy security, civil transport, agriculture, health care, sanitation and hygiene. Although the Panel is unable to make a quantitative assessment of this impact and further notes that its relative impact has probably decreased due to the country's border closures, travel limitations and import restrictions, the Panel does assess that in the reporting period, sanctions likely have had some unintended effects and would continue to have negative humanitarian consequences after the borders are opened;<sup>121</sup>

(c) Attempts to increase centralized control over the economy and further limitations on market activity (for example, restricting domestic sales of consumer goods other than food), resulting in the loss of stimulus for individuals' economic activities.

<sup>118</sup> Remarks made by Kim Jong Un during the Workers' Party Central Committee plenum in June, which is traditionally a period when the depletion of food stocks is at its lowest. See "Kim Jong Un admits food security issues as party plenum event kicks off", *NK News*, 19 August 2021, available at [www.nknews.org/2021/06/party-plenum-event-kicks-off-kim-jong-un-admits-food-security-issues](http://www.nknews.org/2021/06/party-plenum-event-kicks-off-kim-jong-un-admits-food-security-issues).

<sup>119</sup> "North Korea admits 'food crisis,' says grain to be distributed to population", *NK News*, 20 June 2021. Available at [www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korea-admits-food-crisis-says-grain-to-be-distributed-to-population/](http://www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korea-admits-food-crisis-says-grain-to-be-distributed-to-population/).

<sup>120</sup> According to the information officially provided by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, "the production in 2018 was about 4.95 million tons, the lowest during the last 10 years", and experts estimate a food shortage of around 1.3 million tons in 2021. See also "N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018", *The Korea Herald*, 14 July 2021. Available at <http://www01.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000330>.

<sup>121</sup> Two experts are of the view that there can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation. Another expert notes that there is no evidence to support the assessment that sanctions have had an effect on the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.



175. The Panel continued to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions on humanitarian operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In May 2021, the Panel surveyed 38 United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations that applied for exemptions to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), either directly or indirectly<sup>122</sup> (see annexes 65 (1) to 65 (3) for a summary of responses).

176. Responding organizations noted little or no improvement in their ability to conduct humanitarian aid operations since the border closures in January 2020.<sup>123</sup> Most organizations no longer have in-country personnel and lack access to information, making independent monitoring impossible. Continued restrictions on movement for the few remaining personnel have weakened relationships with local officials. This decreased transparency makes it increasingly difficult to seek new funding. Organizations are struggling to maintain overhead costs in the absence of ongoing projects.

177. With respect to sanctions' impact on humanitarian aid, the main areas of concern for the organizations are delays in receiving exemptions; the absence of a stable banking channel, which ultimately increases administrative costs and risks; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in the willingness of foreign suppliers; increased costs of humanitarian-related items and operations; de-risking by financial institutions; and diminished funding for operations. One organization noted: "The legal expertise required to understand the information involved in the sanction mechanisms and the absence of a direct channel for resident INGOs to communicate with the UNSC Sanctions Committee has, on some occasions, proven detrimental to other tasks and responsibilities." Complicated customs procedures create significant delays, despite the imports having received the proper exemptions. Suppliers to aid groups have stopped submitting offers, specifically noting the challenge with customs authorities.<sup>124</sup> According to another organization, the "secondary boycott" measures have prevented bank transactions for payments for humanitarian supplies purchases and vessels to enter ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, as a result, Democratic People's Republic of Korea counterparts have given up on humanitarian projects for the country. Shipping and logistical delays have also been attributed to both sanctions compliance and customs enforcement.

178. The Panel recognizes the importance of humanitarian aid as the country recovers from the pandemic and underscores the need for Member States to ensure that humanitarian aid to the country proceeds unhindered, consistent with the relevant resolutions. The exemption process, which has improved considerably since the start of pandemic, should be further streamlined and made more transparent and understandable.

<sup>122</sup> See S/2021/211, paras. 173–174 and annex 99 (a) for a summary of previous survey responses.

<sup>123</sup> According to one organization, measures imposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have resulted in a shortage of domestic production, ultimately affecting the civilian population.

<sup>124</sup> Since 2018, the price of goods for humanitarian projects has increased, sometimes by as much as 25 per cent, ultimately putting pressure on the operating budgets of aid organizations.


## S/2022/132, paragraphs. 187-190

187. The Panel's analysis, however, focuses on the unintended impact of the United Nations sanctions. Access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates the effects of United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic problems.

188. However, there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation and the right to development,<sup>136</sup> exacerbating the problems caused by the inward-looking centralized economic mismanagement by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although the influence of sanctions is not the most important factor in the dismal humanitarian situation, it has not been negligible (see figure XLVI). As a result of the Security Council resolutions in 2016 and 2017, export and currency earnings declined, trans-border financial operations stopped and transportation encountered growing limitations, while foreign economic and financial entities started to avoid risks of any operations involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This contributed to limiting the ability of the country to legally acquire humanitarian necessities and medical commodities, and the degradation of social services including health care (see annex 87; see also annex 88 for the Panel's pre-pandemic analysis of the possible factors of sanctions impact on humanitarian sphere).

Figure XLVI  
United Nations sanctions as one of several factors causing humanitarian problems (examples)

(Factors retrospective since 2018 (after Security Council resolutions), outcomes 2020–2021)



Source: The Panel.

<sup>136</sup> This right for nation States is enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development, see General Assembly resolution 41/128, annex; and A/41/53. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Discussion paper: implications of the Right to Development for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other United Nations Member States", August 2021, p. 11, in which it was proclaimed that "sanctions should always take full account of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also [www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx).



189. Any negative humanitarian effect of the sanctions is probably long-term and is not directly linked to COVID-related isolation. The Panel notes the comments on these issues by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Tomás Quintana.<sup>137</sup> In October 2021, China and the Russian Federation submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for the relaxation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-related sanctions, citing the absence of nuclear and long-range missile testing by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 2017.<sup>138,139</sup>

190. International aid operations that have contributed to mitigating the above-mentioned negative effects have currently been drastically reduced. To assess the impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on humanitarian operations, the Panel surveyed around 40 organizations (including both United Nations and non-governmental aid organizations), most of which had applied for exemption requests, either directly to the Committee, through the United Nations Resident Coordinator or through a Member State (for the list of questions, see annex 89).<sup>140</sup> The following analysis is based mostly on the information received (see annex 90):

- Limitations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of all cross-border movements have complicated humanitarian operations. Most organizations had to suspend both implementation and monitoring efforts in 2021. Some retain a small local presence after the departure of international staff
- The absence of a banking channel is continuing to be a major issue leading to the depletion of cash reserves<sup>141</sup>
- The organizations are not very optimistic about the possibility of resuming their operations even when and if the borders are reopened

<sup>137</sup> The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Tomás Quintana, noted in October 2021 that "sanctions imposed by the Security Council should be reviewed and eased when necessary both to facilitate humanitarian and life-saving assistance and to enable the promotion of the right to an adequate standard of living of ordinary citizens" (A/76/392).

<sup>138</sup> See [www.nknews.org/2021/10/china-and-russia-submit-proposal-to-ease-un-sanctions-on-north-korea-sources](http://www.nknews.org/2021/10/china-and-russia-submit-proposal-to-ease-un-sanctions-on-north-korea-sources).

<sup>139</sup> Four experts object to this sentence, believing that the reports of the Panel are not a place for political statements.

<sup>140</sup> Responses to the Panel's inquiry were optional and had no bearing on the exemption approval processes.

<sup>141</sup> World Food Programme (WFP), "WFP DPR Korea country brief", December 2021. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000135453.pdf>.

**S/2022/668, paragraphs. 163-166**

163. Although difficult to specify precisely, the Panel has previously concluded that there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation and the right to development, even as the relative influence of sanctions has probably lessened after 2020.<sup>148</sup>

164. Although it concentrates on analysing the influence of United Nations sanctions, the Panel notes that the dismal humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is probably the result of a number of factors, including a lack of resources and capital, low productivity, the prioritization of heavy industry and military needs, which dwarf the consumer sector, the country's internal decision-making, a failed centralized planning system, frequent natural calamities, self-isolation, a lack of export earnings and import capacity and the closure of borders because of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effect of sanctions.

165. The direct impact on the humanitarian situation of the COVID-19 outbreak (referred to by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as "fever"), which reportedly started in the country in April 2022, is difficult to assess. The illness was estimated by July to have affected around 25 per cent of the population, but very few lethal cases were reported (although some sources suspect underreporting).

166. Prior to the pandemic, the medical system of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was already in a dilapidated state due to a number of factors (see para. 164) and the country reportedly imported only a limited supply of medical commodities (see annex 71), most of them through aid channels. Disaggregating the impact of United Nations sanctions from these other factors is difficult. The Panel has calculated that in 2020 and 2021, with the borders closed, the country imported COVID-19-related medical goods amounting to approximately \$1.87 per person.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>148</sup> S/2022/132, para. 188.

<sup>149</sup> This figure is calculated on the basis of the population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and ITC data on the country's COVID-19-related imports (see annex 71).

**S/2023/171, paragraphs 179-180**

179. Although difficult to specify precisely, and based on its previous conclusions<sup>163</sup> and information from humanitarian actors, the Panel is of the view that there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation, even as the relative influence of sanctions has probably lessened after 2020.<sup>164</sup>

180. The responses provided to the Panel by the humanitarian organizations reflect the difficulties presented by continued closed borders, as well as differing opinions about the impact of United Nations sanctions and the Committee on their work. They noted that COVID-19-related restrictions and the absence of a banking channel enabling humanitarian operations were particular concerns.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>163</sup> S/2020/151, para. 209; S/2021/777, para. 174; S/2022/132, paras. 188 and 189; and S/2022/668, paras. 121 and 122 and annexes 51 and 52.

<sup>164</sup> In S/2020/151, para. 209, before the pandemic, the Panel concluded that the unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following: the decrease in sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by sanctions; the increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, in some cases channelling those resources to purposes other than the needs of the population; continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization of agriculture; and increases in the disruption of medical supply chains.

<sup>165</sup> In interviews with non-governmental organizations, the Panel learned that internal debts within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea weighed heavily on organizations because of their inability to pay rent for their buildings, purchase new supplies of aid and pay salaries to employees, some of whose contracts needed to be terminated owing to a lack of funds, or who simply left the organization. It should be noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, without publicizing, does carry the burden of the local expenses for the operation of the humanitarian assistance representative offices, showing a degree of interest in continuing cooperation for obtaining humanitarian assistance without requesting it.

## **Annex 83: Consolidated list of recommendations**

### **Trade Statistics and Customs Issues**

1. The Panel emphasizes its previous recommendations that:
  - (a) Appropriate measures be taken by the International Organization for Standardization and Member States, including outreach activities to respective customs authorities, to prevent erroneous usage of country codes;
  - (b) Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supporting material the informal list of prohibited commodities (see annex 50);
  - (c) Customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, in particular when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
  - (d) With regard to Member States requiring assistance with the implementation of the sectoral ban, the Committee consider information outreach.

### **Luxury Goods Ban**

2. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact.
3. The Panel recommends that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals involved in exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prohibit forwarding to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

### **Overseas Workers**

4. The Panel reminds Member States that there is no humanitarian or health services exemption to the requirement, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), to repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals overseas earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad, unless the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law.

### **Finance**

5. The Panel encourages Member States to be vigilant regarding Democratic People's Republic of Korea financial sanctions evasion through the use, by United Nations-designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, of front and subordinate companies. The Panel also encourages Member State provision of company names and other identifying data to the Panel and/or Committee, as appropriate.

6. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States implement as soon as possible the Financial Action Task Force guidance on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, including full implementation of the revised recommendation 15 (and the “Travel Rule”).
7. The Panel further recommends that Member States consider more active outreach to the virtual asset industry to ensure a broad awareness of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyber-enabled thefts of virtual assets, as well as appropriate measures to defend against and respond to such attacks.

## **Unintended Humanitarian Effects of Sanctions**

8. The Panel values the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations entities on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.
  9. The Panel once again stresses the urgency of re-establishing a durable banking channel for humanitarian operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  10. The Panel recommends that, in the context of implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), the United Nations system, including the Committee, take into account information provided by humanitarian actors on the mitigation of the potential adverse impact of United Nations sanctions on the civilian population and on humanitarian assistance in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  11. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations that:
    - (a) The Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations;
    - (b) The Committee and other relevant stakeholders continue to practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies;
    - (c) The Committee consider more active outreach with civil society providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK to help to implement Security Council resolution 2664 (2022);
    - (d) The Committee practically consider the idea of renewable and standing exemptions for humanitarian aid actors and humanitarian-related commodities.
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